DOCSLIB.ORG

The Soft War and Cyber Tactics in Iran 2017

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Soft War and Cyber Tactics in Iran 2017 Tightening the Net Part 2: The Soft War and Cyber Tactics in Iran 2017 Executive Summary “ In this situation, we should know, before anything, what is happening in cyberspace so that we can use our knowledge, science, and persistence to defeat our enemy in the soft war.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Despite being one of the region’s leading cyberpowers, Iran is Those who express dissent, including social activists and one of the worst violators of international standards relating to human rights campaigners, (who frequently fail to adopt the Internet, routinely violating human rights exercised online, necessary online security precautions such as complex and using online tactics to restrict rights exercised offline. passwords and online anonymity) are monitored and even A regime-led ideological Soft War threatens to keep Iranian arrested. In subsequent interrogations they are often citizens isolated from the rest of the world, and unable to subjected to torture and other ill-treatment: the authorities exercise their rights to freedom of expression and information. thus obtain key information – communications, online account In order to understand how to address the challenges facing details, web histories – which enables the persecution of other freedom of expression in Iran both off- and online, it is targets of interest. This has been one of the most effective essential to understand how online control is implemented techniques in gathering information on human rights activists. and maintained. The second type of activity is cyberattacks i.e. hacking: The Soft War has remained of great importance to the intrusive malware, monitoring, and, for example, Distributed Iranian regime, with a particular surge in activity after Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks carried out on actors the controversial 2009 elections, five months after which perceived to be in opposition to state ideology: the targets are Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated: “Today, the suspected of being selected by state actors, and civil society country’s priority is to fight the enemy’s soft war.”1 and political opponents have been shown to be primary targets of such intrusive tactics. This not only directly interferes with There has been much discussion, by international civil both the activities and publications of organisations deemed society, as well as groups and individuals within Iran to oppose the government, but can also lead to information including members of the Iranian establishment itself, of used to arrest and prosecute dissenting individuals or groups. an ‘Iranian Cyber Army’ (ICA) – an organised group with It is important to note the difficulty in researching hacking official oversight and support of the Iranian government. actions and groups, especially in determining the attribution The origin and structure of this group are extremely difficult and intent of intrusive online actions. to establish, but there is clear evidence of online actors and tactics, whose actions and goals often align with those of the Perhaps the greatest success of the Iranian government’s Iranian authorities, even shifting with that political agenda. online campaign, at least domestically, is the ‘chilling Individuals and groups targeted by this group are often civil effect’: the establishment of a climate of fear that surpasses society, activists, and political opposition groups, though actual surveillance capabilities and encourages online diasporic Iranians have also been targeted, as well as state communicators and activists to self-censor. It would be entities seen as oppositional or a threat (potentially including impossible to maintain a catch-all censorship or monitoring the US Department of Justice2). programme, but by instilling in Iranian citizens a sense of fear, the surveillance and blocking do not have to be There are two distinct types of online activity which contribute comprehensive. to the hegemony of state ideology and discourse: the first is the content of the Soft War itself online – the production and This report aims to provide an insight into the online tactics promotion of state-sanctioned ideological content, with the and networks active in Iran’s Soft War, using a combination restriction of content perceived to threaten tradition Iranian of primary sources, interviews, and metadata collection. cultural and political values. (See Methodology) 1 Supreme Leader Meeting with Basij Members, Khamenei.ir, November 2009, (online) Available at: http://farsi. khamenei.ir/news-content?id=8429 Accessed: 1 March 2016. 2 Motherboard, US Charges Iranians With Coordinated Cyber Attacks on Banks, Companies, 24 March 2016, available at: https://motherboard.vice.com/read/us-charges-iranians-with-coordinated-cyber-attacks-on-banks-companies. Accessed: 1 March 2016. 2 1 Table of contents Executive Summary 1 Section 6 39 International human rights 40 Glossary and Abbreviations 4 The Right to Freedom of Expression and Information 41 Content restriction: blocking and filtering 41 Introduction 6 Surveillance of communicators and activists 42 Hacking 42 The IRGC and ICA 8 The chilling effect 42 Section 1 11 Iran and the Internet - a brief history 12 Conclusions 43 Early history 12 2009 Elections 12 Recommendations 45 President Rouhani 13 Recommendations to the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran 45 Recommendations to the Iranian online community 45 Section 2 15 Information online – filtering, smart filtering and monitoring 16 Methodology 46 Introduction 16 Bandwidth throttling 16 Appendices 47 Blocking & filtering 16 ‘Smart Filtering’ 18 Agencies involved in filtering 19 Filtering evidence of hacking? 20 Section 3 21 Monitoring, prosecutions, and shrinking civic space 22 Introduction 25 ‘Catphishing’ and infiltration: creation of fake accounts on social media 25 Reporting social media accounts 25 User data gathered by companies 26 Section 4 27 Content creation and promotion 29 Content promotion tactics 29 1. Reproducing content - with or without citation 29 2. Clickjacking: using links in <iframe> tags 29 3. Promoting content from other websites and providing links to original sources 30 4. Reproducing content on blogs and social media 30 Section 5 31 Intrusive cybertactics – hacking 32 Introduction 33 Hacking groups 35 Cyber Army: a profile of recruits 36 Hacking techniques 36 Remote Access Technology or Remote Administration Technology (RAT) 36 Phishing 36 DDoS attacks 37 The effects of hacking 37 2 3 Glossary and Abbreviations Basij The Organisation for Mobilisation of the Oppressed ICT Ministry of Information and Communications Technology RAT Remote Access Trojan. A RAT is a piece of software that (Basij) is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in allows a remote ‘operator’ to control a system as if they have 1979 by order of the Islamic Revolution’s leader Ayatollah IP Internet Protocol. IP is the principal communications physical access to that system. Malicious RAT software is Khameini. protocol in the Internet protocol suite for relaying datagrams typically installed without the victim’s knowledge, often as across network boundaries. Its routing function enables payload of a Trojan horse, and will try to hide its operation CCDOC Committee Charged with Determining Offensive internetworking, and essentially establishes the Internet. from the victim and from security software. Content IPDF Iranian Passive Defence Force RCDC/Gerdab Revolutionary Guards Cyber Defence Command CCL Computer Crimes Law - Gerdab is the centre for the investigation of organised crime IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Army of the of the IRGC. CERT Computer Emergency Response Team. CERT are expert Guardians of the Islamic Revolution). groups that handle computer security incidents. Alternative SAFAVA Iranian Intelligence and Security Technology names for such groups include computer emergency readiness IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. Industries team and computer security incident response team. ISP Internet Service Provider: the ISP is a company that SCC Supreme Council on Cyberspace DAFUS University of Command & Control of the Islamic provides access to the Internet, usually for a fee. Republic of Iran’s Army SCCR Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution ITC An organisation affiliated with the Ministry of Information DCISE Deep Content Inspection System Expansion. Deep and Communications Technology named ‘The Data Company’ Social engineering The psychological manipulation of people Content Inspection (DCI) is a form of network filtering that (currently known as the Information Technology Company, in order to trick them into performing actions that would examines an entire file or MIME object as it passes an or ITC). divulge confidential information. inspection point, searching for viruses, spam, data loss, keywords or other content level criteria. ITRC Iran’s Telecommunications Research Centre, currently Spear phishing An attempt to acquire sensitive information known as the Information and Communication Technology such as usernames and passwords by masquerading as a DDoS Distributed denial-of-service. A DDoS attack occurs Research Centre. trustworthy entity in an electronic communication, tailored when multiple systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a and targeted towards a specific individual, organisation or targeted system, usually one or more web servers. MOI Ministry of Intelligence. business DoS Denial of service. A DoS attack is an attempt to make MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a mechanism TCI Telecommunication
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Same Old Rights Violations in Tunisia
    BEHIND THE FAÇADE: HOW A POLITICISED JUDICIARY & ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS UNDERMINE TUNISIAN HUMAN RIGHTS Report from the Seventh IFEX-TMG Mission to Tunisia (6 June 2010) Behind the Façade: How a Politicised Judiciary & Administrative Sanctions Undermine Tunisian Human Rights About the IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) The International Freedom of Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) is a coalition of 20 organisations set up in 2004 to monitor freedom of expression in Tunisia in the run up to and following the WSIS, held in Tunis in November 2005. The 20 organisations are all members of IFEX, a global network of around 90 national, regional and international organisations committed to defending the right to freedom of expression. The seventh mission of the IFEX-TMG to Tunisia took place in the context of a 30-month project Monitoring & Advocacy in Support of Independent Human Rights Defenders in Tunisia, funded by European donors and managed by Index on Censorship, which started in January 2010. It was comprised of Amadou Kanoute of ARTICLE 19, Yousef Ahmed of Index on Censorship, Anthony Mills of the International Press Institute (IPI), Carl Morten Iversen of Norwegian PEN, and Tamsin Mitchell of the Writers in Prison Committee of International PEN (WiPC). Barbora Bukovsa of ARTICLE 19 was not granted a visa on time by the Embassy in London (as has happened for previous members of IFEX-TMG missions requiring a visa. None of the other mission participants required a visa.) The first IFEX-TMG mission took place in January 2005 and led to the first report Tunisia: Freedom of Expression Under Siege, published in February 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Iranian Strategy in Syria
    *SBOJBO4USBUFHZJO4ZSJB #:8JMM'VMUPO KPTFQIIPMMJEBZ 4BN8ZFS BKPJOUSFQPSUCZ"&*ŦT$SJUJDBM5ISFBUT1SPKFDUJ/45*565&'035)&456%:0'8"3 .BZ All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ©2013 by Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project Cover Image: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, and Hezbollah’s Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah appear together on a poster in Damascus, Syria. Credit: Inter Press Service News Agency Iranian strategy in syria Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, & Sam wyer May 2013 A joint Report by AEI’s critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War ABOUT US About the Authors Will Fulton is an Analyst and the IRGC Project Team Lead at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. Joseph Holliday is a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. Sam Wyer served as an Iraq Analyst at ISW from September 2012 until February 2013. The authors would like to thank Kim and Fred Kagan, Jessica Lewis, and Aaron Reese for their useful insights throughout the writing and editorial process, and Maggie Rackl for her expert work on formatting and producing this report. We would also like to thank our technology partners Praescient Analytics and Palantir Technologies for providing us with the means and support to do much of the research and analysis used in our work. About the Institute for the Study of War The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education.
    [Show full text]
  • Blood-Soaked Secrets Why Iran’S 1988 Prison Massacres Are Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity
    BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2017 Cover photo: Collage of some of the victims of the mass prisoner killings of 1988 in Iran. Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons © Amnesty International (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2017 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 13/9421/2018 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS GLOSSARY 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 METHODOLOGY 18 2.1 FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE 18 2.2 RESEARCH METHODS 18 2.2.1 TESTIMONIES 20 2.2.2 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 22 2.2.3 AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 23 2.2.4 COMMUNICATION WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES 24 2.3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 25 BACKGROUND 26 3.1 PRE-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 26 3.2 POST-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 27 3.3 IRAN-IRAQ WAR 33 3.4 POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS 33 3.4.1 PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN 33 3.4.2 FADAIYAN 34 3.4.3 TUDEH PARTY 35 3.4.4 KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN 35 3.4.5 KOMALA 35 3.4.6 OTHER GROUPS 36 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Stands up Against Transatlantic Bullying the Tabriz Based Club’S Officials Parted Company with the 49-Year-Old Coach on Tuesday
    WWW.TEHRANTIMES.COM I N T E R N A T I O N A L D A I L Y 8 Pages Price 50,000 Rials 1.00 EURO 4.00 AED 42nd year No.13829 Wednesday DECEMBER 9, 2020 Azar 19, 1399 Rabi’ Al thani 23, 1442 Zarif advises regional Jordan Burroughs Iranian university Architect Amirali states to exclude West misses competing students runner-up Sardar-Afkhami in regional talks Page 2 in Iran Page 3 at IMC 2020 Page 7 dies at 91 Page 8 Iran completely self-sufficient in building freight wagons Iran stands up against TEHRAN – Iranian railway industry has systems for freight wagons. become completely self-reliant in man- “For the first time this year, national ufacturing freight wagons, Head of the (domestically-made) wheels will move on Islamic Republic of Iran Railways (known the national rail,” the official said. as RAI) Saeed Rasouli said. Mentioning the launch of a system for Speaking in an unveiling ceremony for introducing the needs of the country’s railway transatlantic bullying domestically-made wagon brake system industry to domestic manufacturers and and wheels on Tuesday, Rasouli announced companies producing parts for the railway that RAI is going to sign a contract with transportation industry, the official noted domestic manufacturers for the purchase that so far 4,600 parts have been requested See page 3 of 500 monoblock wheels and 500 brake on this website. Continued on page 4 Rouhani: Astana peace talks can protect Syrian territorial integrity TEHRAN — President Hassan Rouhani Rouhani said during a meeting with visiting on Tuesday hailed the Astana peace talks, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad.
    [Show full text]
  • King and Karabell BS
    k o No. 3 • March 2008 o l Iran’s Global Ambition t By Michael Rubin u While the United States has focused its attention on Iranian activities in the greater Middle East, Iran has worked O assiduously to expand its influence in Latin America and Africa. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s out- reach in both areas has been deliberate and generously funded. He has made significant strides in Latin America, helping to embolden the anti-American bloc of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. In Africa, he is forging strong n ties as well. The United States ignores these developments at its peril, and efforts need to be undertaken to reverse r Iran’s recent gains. e t Both before and after the Islamic Revolution, Iran Iranian officials have pursued a coordinated has aspired to be a regional power. Prior to 1979, diplomatic, economic, and military strategy to s Washington supported Tehran’s ambitions—after expand their influence in Latin America and a all, the shah provided a bulwark against both Africa. They have found success not only in communist and radical Arab nationalism. Follow- Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, but also in E ing the Islamic Revolution, however, U.S. officials Senegal, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. These new viewed Iranian visions of grandeur warily. alliances will together challenge U.S. interests in e This wariness has grown as the Islamic Repub- these states and in the wider region, especially if l lic pursues nuclear technology in contravention Tehran pursues an inkblot strategy to expand its d to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safe- influence to other regional states.
    [Show full text]
  • UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Gestalt Computing and the Study of Content-oriented User Behavior on the Web Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/41b1c1n9 Author Bandari, Roja Publication Date 2013 Supplemental Material https://escholarship.org/uc/item/41b1c1n9#supplemental Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California University of California Los Angeles Gestalt Computing and the Study of Content-oriented User Behavior on the Web A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering by Roja Bandari 2013 c Copyright by Roja Bandari 2013 Abstract of the Dissertation Gestalt Computing and the Study of Content-oriented User Behavior on the Web by Roja Bandari Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering University of California, Los Angeles, 2013 Professor Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Chair Elementary actions online establish an individual's existence on the web and her/his orientation toward different issues. In this sense, actions truly define a user in spaces like online forums and communities and the aggregate of elementary actions shape the atmosphere of these online spaces. This observation, coupled with the unprecedented scale and detail of data on user actions on the web, com- pels us to utilize them in understanding collective human behavior. Despite large investments by industry to capture this data and the expanding body of research on big data in academia, gaining insight into collective user behavior online has been elusive. If one is indeed able to overcome the considerable computational challenges posed by both the scale and the inevitable noisiness of the associated data sets, one could provide new automated frameworks to extract insights into evolving behavior at different scales, and to form an altogether different perspec- tive of aggregated elementary user actions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Cyber Threat
    The Iranian Cyber Threat May 2021 0 Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Cyber Retaliation ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Iran’s National Security Strategy .............................................................................................................. 4 Laying the Groundwork ........................................................................................................................... 5 Structure ................................................................................................................................................... 5 Defense ................................................................................................................................................... 6 Offense .................................................................................................................................................... 6 History of Iranian Cyber Attacks and Incidents ........................................................................................... 7 The Attacks .............................................................................................................................................. 8 Iranian Cyber Army .................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Today's Fraud Threats: Hackers, Rings, and Mobs
    Reducing Risks; What you need to know about Payment Fraud Wells Fargo Customer Training © 2016 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. All rights reserved. For public use. Agenda . Fraud trends . Online account takeover fraud . Impostor fraud . Call to action 1 Remain vigilant in payment fraud 72% 42% 48% of organizations of them report of organizations were experienced that the number exposed to wire attempted or actual of fraud incidents fraud– a significant payments fraud increased increase from the previous survey Source: 2016 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey 2 Online account takeover fraud What is account takeover fraud? 3 Social engineering strategies Classic phishing Email messages sent to large populations designed to obtain confidential information Emails purport to be from trustworthy sources with which victims have established relationships Vishing and smishing Spear-phishing Vishing is where fraudsters Targeted phishing attack connect with their victims via directed at a small group phone of potential victims Smishing is when a fraudulent Emails are focused, have a text message is sent to the high degree of believability victim and a high open rate 4 Phishing successes explained Cybercriminal excellence Social media explosion Accurate logos, professionally Users are sharing an alarmingly written communications, amount of information through personalization of content increase social media platforms believability Provides criminals with the fodder Targets are more likely to click on necessary to construct the links and/or open attachments, personalized and believable which download malware messages Credulous users Users are the first line of defense, yet organizations do not have robust training programs to heighten users’ sensitivity to phishing attempts Bottom Line: Phishing attempts are becoming more challenging and more difficult to address 5 1 in 244 Email malware rate Source: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume 20, April 2015 Malware improvements Malware has evolved to where it can now: .
    [Show full text]
  • De Farlige Bloggerne De Har Lagt Ned Aviser Og Arrestert Kritiske Journalister, Nå Prøver Myndighetene I Iran Å Kneble Bloggerne
    De farlige bloggerne De har lagt ned aviser og arrestert kritiske journalister, nå prøver myndighetene i Iran å kneble bloggerne. Men unge, smarte iranere finner hullene i den statlige nettsensuren. Av Bente Kalsnes, Master of Arts i Communication, Culture and Technology ved Georgetown University og community- ansvarlig på dagbladet.no Iran og Kina har en tvilsom felles interesse: interaktiviteten med andre mennesker er internettsensur. Kina har lenge vært kjent noe av forklaringen til bloggsuksessen som for å drive verdens strengeste internettsen- startet i usa gjennom selskap som blog- sur, blant annet ved å sensurere ord som ger.com. I dag finnes det 16,7 millioner “demokrati” og “menneskerettigheter” i blogger i verden, ifølge bloggsøkemotoren søkemotorer,1 men de siste årene har også Technorati,3 og disse favner om et vidt iranske myndigheter skjønt at internett er spekter av genre, alt fra personlige dagbøk- farlig for landets innbyggere. Først slo de er, politiske kommentarer og litterære ned på pornografiske sider som ikke søm- eksperimenter til foto-, video- og met seg for iranske statsborgere, men etter audioblogger. Blogger har fått gjennomslag hvert har myndighetene skjønt at politiske i amerikansk media etter avsløringer av fak- nettsider er minst like fordervende som tafeil hos blant annet programleder Dan pupper og lår. Det siste it-sjefene i Teheran Rather i 60 Minutes II. I et program om har fått snusen i, er blogger – nettjour- president George Bush’ militærtjeneste, naler som jevnlig oppdateres med kom- siterte Rather et dokument som hevdet at mentarer og linker av én eller flere person- Bush ikke fullførte militærtjenesten sin.4 er.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Full Text
    Annual Report 2019 Published March 2019 Copyright©2019 The Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. ISBN: 978- 2 - 35822 - 010 -1 women.ncr-iran.org @womenncri @womenncri Annual Report 2018-2019 Foreword ast year, as we were preparing our Annual Report, Iran was going through a Table of Contents massive outbreak of protests which quickly spread to some 160 cities across the Lcountry. One year on, daily protests and nationwide uprisings have turned into a regular trend, 1 Foreword changing the face of an oppressed nation to an arisen people crying out for freedom and regime change in all four corners of the country. Iranian women also stepped up their participation in protests. They took to the streets at 2 Women Lead Iran Protests every opportunity. Compared to 436 protests last year, they participated in some 1,500 pickets, strikes, sit-ins, rallies and marches to demand their own and their people’s rights. 8 Women Political Prisoners, Strong and Steady Iranian women of all ages and all walks of life, young students and retired teachers, nurses and farmers, villagers and plundered investors, all took to the streets and cried 14 State-sponsored Violence Against Women in Iran out for freedom and demanded their rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Rise of the Revolutionary Guards
    Political Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Rise of the Revolutionary Guards Ali Alfoneh Political Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Rise of the Revolutionary Guards Ali Alfoneh February 5, 2018 Issue Paper #1 2019 The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), launched in 2015, is an independent, nonprofit institution dedicated to providing expert research and analysis of the social, economic, and political dimensions of the Gulf Arab states and how they impact domestic and foreign policy. AGSIW focuses on issues ranging from politics and security to economics, trade, and business; from social dynamics to civil society and culture. Through programs, publications, and scholarly exchanges the institute seeks to encourage thoughtful debate and inform the U.S. policy community regarding this critical geostrategic region. © 2019 Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. All rights reserved. AGSIW does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSIW, its staff, or its board of directors. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from AGSIW. Please direct inquiries to: [email protected] This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.agsiw.org. Cover Photo Credits: Khamenei.ir/Wikimedia Commons About the Author Ali Alfoneh is a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He is the author of Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards are Transforming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship, published by AEI Press in April 2013.
    [Show full text]