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Ctc Sentinel 012021 OBJECTIVE ·· RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULYJANUARY 2021 2018 · VOLUME· VOLUME 14, 11, ISSUE ISSUE 1 6 FEATUREFEATURE COMMENTARY ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE Counterterrorism The Jihadi Threat David Lasseter Challenges for the LTC(R) Bryan Price to Indonesia Deputy Assistant Secretary of New Administration Defense forFormer Countering Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Bruce KirstenHoffman E. and Schulze Jacob Ware Combating Terrorism Center FEATURE COMMENTARY Editor in Chief 1 Terrorism and Counterterrorism Challenges for the Biden Administration Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware Paul Cruickshank Managing Editor INTERVIEW Kristina Hummel 13 A View from the CT Foxhole: David Lasseter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Stephen Hummel, Paul Cruickshank, and Don Rassler EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ANALYSIS Department Head 20 Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) Jonathan Schroden Brian Dodwell 30 The April 2020 Islamic State Terror Plot Against U.S. and NATO Military Director, CTC Bases in Germany: The Tajik Connection Nodirbek Soliev Don Rassler Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC The violent storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, has height- ened concerns about the threat posed by far-right extremism in the United CONTACT States. In examining the wide range of terrorism and counterterrorism Combating Terrorism Center challenges facing the incoming Biden administration in this month’s feature commentary, Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware write that “the January 6 events at the U.S. Capitol offered a stark, fright- U.S. Military Academy ening picture of the powerful forces fueling a conspiratorial mindset eschewing both the country’s 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall foundational democratic values and the rule of law” and “serves as a salutary and timely reminder of the danger of potential violence to come.” Given the continued threat posed by “a stubbornly resilient West Point, NY 10996 Islamic State and an implacably determined al-Qa`ida,” they write that “it may be that as the United Phone: (845) 938-8495 States and its allies enter the third decade of war against international salafi-jihadi terrorism, we need to recalibrate our immediate expectations away from ‘winning’ and ‘losing,’ toward ‘accepting’ Email: [email protected] and ‘managing’ this conflict. Such an admission would not be popular, but it would be a fairer reflec- Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ tion of the current state of the fight against terrorism, and a more honest prediction of what to expect over the next four, or more, years.” Our interview is with David Lasseter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering SUBMISSIONS Weapons of Mass Destruction. He notes that “advances in synthetic biology and other related bio- technologies hold the potential for both promise and peril in their application. And so we’ve got to be The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. cognizant of how such technological shifts can alter the threat landscape [and] impose new defense Contact us at [email protected]. and security challenges. We’ve heard it said that biological weapons are ‘a poor man’s nuke,’ given the potentially enormous impact of their usage. I think COVID-19 has further accelerated this mindset. The U.S. has had a watchful eye on bio threats and has elevated bio threats as a core national security The views expressed in this report are priority over the past several years.” those of the authors and not of the U.S. In an assessment that has far-reaching implications for the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, Military Academy, the Department of the Jonathan Schroden finds that if the United States were to withdraw the remainder of its troops from the country, the Taliban would have “a slight military advantage” over Afghanistan’s security forces, Army, or any other agency of the U.S. “which would then likely grow in a compounding fashion.” Nodirbek Soliev examines the Tajik con- Government. nection in an Islamic State plot against U.S. and NATO air bases in Germany thwarted in April 2020. Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief Cover: The American flag flies at half-staff at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., on January 11, 2021. (Joshua Roberts/Reuters) JANUARY 2021 CTC SENTINEL 1 Terrorism and Counterterrorism Challenges for the Biden Administration By Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware • That America’s adversaries had deliberately enmeshed us As the Biden administration starts work in January, it will in a debilitating war of attrition that we lacked an effective face a new raft of national security challenges. Counter- strategy to counter, much less defeat.1 terrorism, as with the previous three administrations, will That this assessment should have proven prescient and retained once again be a central concern. The administration will its relevance is testament to the highly parlous situation in which be forced to grapple with old threats, including from the the United States again today finds itself—with the same interna- Islamic State and al-Qa`ida, as well as a rapidly chang- tional terrorism threats continuing unabated, but now joined by a salient and profoundly unsettling domestic dimension. ing—and deteriorating—domestic terrorism landscape. This article assesses the threat to homeland security posed by Despite 20 years of the so-called war on terror, the battle non-state actors; accordingly, it deals less with state-sponsored for the safety of the American homeland remains fraught threats, as well as proxy warfare around the world. First, the article with challenges and risks. Managing this war will require will briefly summarize the counterterrorism strategies pursued by enduring vigilance and energy, as well as a new set of coun- the Trump administration. It then assesses the enduring threats terterrorism policies, to more effectively address the total- posed by the United States’s most persistent terrorist enemies of ity of the new terrorism threat. the past two decades, the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida. Finally, the article provides an in-depth analysis of the current domestic terror- ism threat, assessing dangers posed by both far-right and far-left lus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” goes the famous extremists, before concluding with policy recommendations for the 19th-century epigram by Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr. incoming administration. An important caveat: this is not intended The more things change, the more they stay the same. to be a comprehensive overview of the entire landscape of terrorist The same might be said about both the new and ongo- threats confronting the United States and the new Biden admin- ing terrorist threats President-elect Joe Biden and his istration. Rather, it reflects the authors’—albeit, perhaps, idiosyn- Pincoming administration faces as it attempts to fashion an effective cratic—view of the most salient and compelling threats the United counterterrorism strategy. States faces as a new presidential administration takes off—and the Four years ago, an analysis assessing these same dangers for war on terrorism continues unabated. newly elected President Donald J. Trump identified three main challenges: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? • The fact that the Islamic State had fundamentally changed To its credit, the Trump administration put forth a highly creditable the global terrorist landscape during its brief incarnation as U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism in October 2018. This a self-proclaimed “State” and that, regardless of its then-im- was the fourth iteration of this planning guidance since the war on minent defeat, the threat it posed would not disappear; terrorism commenced nearly two decades ago. Significantly, it was • That al-Qa`ida, despite its prolonged quiescence, had tak- the first not concerned exclusively with al-Qa`ida. In contrast to en advantage of the global coalition’s preoccupation with the 2003, 2006, and 2011 versions, the latest iteration identified the Islamic State and was therefore quietly rebuilding and the Islamic State as well as Iran and Iranian-backed Shi`a militias, marshaling its resources to carry on the struggle against the domestic violent far-right and far-left extremists, and militant sin- United States; and, gle-issue organizations as all presenting significant security con- cerns.2 The most tangible manifestation of the Trump administration’s Bruce Hoffman is the George H. Gilmore Senior Fellow at the U.S. implementation of this strategy was the old made new again: the Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center. He is also the continuance of the high-value targeting of top terrorist leaders that Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis Senior Fellow for Counter- had dominated both the Bush and Obama administrations’ respec- terrorism and Homeland Security at the Council on Foreign Rela- tive approaches to counterterrorism. Accordingly, the elimination tions and a professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies of a succession of senior Islamic State and al-Qa`ida leaders fol- Program. Follow @hoffman_bruce lowed. Foremost among these was the killing of Abu Bakr al-Bagh- dadi, the Islamic State’s emir, in October 2019. Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism at the Even further inroads were made to al-Qa`ida’s senior leader- Council on Foreign Relations and a graduate of Georgetown Uni- ship. In September 2019, President Trump confirmed that Usama versity’s Security Studies Program. Follow @Jacob_A_Ware bin Ladin’s youngest son and presumptive heir apparent, Hamza, had perished as a result of a U.S. “counterterrorism operation in © 2021 Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware the Afghanistan/Pakistan region” at least two months before.3 Five 2 CTC SENTINEL JANUARY 2021 HOFFMAN / WARE months later, the president reported the elimination of Qassim al- strategy statement is more closely aligned with the U.N. analysis Rimi, the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),4 than with the administration’s assertions.
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