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IRAN CASE FILE ٢٠١٨ April

CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...... 4 Internal Affair ...... 6 Political File ...... First: The motion to question President Hasan Rouhani: between failure and success ...... 6 Second: Fundamentalists employ surveillance and espionage techniques to spy on reformists ...... 8 The defense and security file ...... 11 First: Iran and combat drones ...... 11 Second: Arab Ahwaz region: Arab protests and popular resentment against racial discrimination policies ...... 14 The economic file ...... 16 First: explanations of the continuous decline of the Iranian currency between urgent crises and historical roots ...... 16 Second: Macroeconomic indicators ...... 19

RASANAH The Social file ...... 22

+966112166696 First: Indicators related to addiction and drugs in Iran ...... 22 [email protected] Second: overpopulation and its impact on unemployment ...... 24 Arab affairs ...... 30 First: Iran and the interactions in the Syrian arenas ...... 30 Second: Iran and the Yemeni crisis ...... 32 International Affair ...... 44 US-Iran Relations ...... 44 The nuclear deal is at risk and a strike on Syria carrying a message to Iran ...... 44 Russia-Iran Relations ...... 48 www.rasanah-iiis org Conclusion ...... 53

The materials contained in the report should not be quoted without indicating their sources, and should not be republished without Rasanah’s permission. 4 Iran Case File ,April 2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report tracks the most important developments in Iran during April 2018. It presents a detailed description on three key aspects of the Iran case-file: Internal, Arab, and international affairs.

Internal Affairs Political This part handles the call for questioning President Hasan Rouhani on the reasons behind the current difficult socio-economic conditions, the government’s failure in removing unemployment, smuggling, and economic recession. Also, discusses the reasons behind the continuity of sanctions on the Banking system in Iran, the devaluation of the Iranian currency and the statements and positions of some officials and Reformist activists on the bugging case raised by the prominent Mu’talifah Party member, Hardliner Hameed Riza Tarqi.

Military and Security The report discusses the combat capabilities of Iranian drones and their use in battles in Syria and Yemen. Also, discusses the demonstrations which erupted in most of the cities and districts of the Ahwaz province and the Iranian attempts to whitewash the Arab Character, as well as, the racist practices by the Iranian regime, media and the reaction of the representatives of this province in the Assembly of Experts.

Economics This part of the report analyzes the appreciation of the US dollar against Iran’s currency and the performance of most of Iran’s economic sectors and their indicators in April 2018.

Social This part of the report handles social issues such as drugs and unemployment in Iran, as well as, their impact on Iran’s social fabric and state policies. 5

Arab Affairs This part of the report discusses the recent developments in Syria including the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians in the Syrian city of Duma and the Israeli air force strike on the IRGC T-4 military base in Syria. Also, handles the US, French, and British strikes on some Syrian regime sites in Homs and Damascus after it was charged with using chemical weapons against its civilians, along with the impact of these developments on Iran as it is one of the major players in Syria. As for the Iranian interference in Yemen, the report discusses the most important developments on the ground between the legitimate government and the international coalition on the one hand, and the Iranian Houthi proxy militia on the other, especially, the targeting of some prominent Houthi rebel leaders. In addition, the report handles the Houthi launch of Ballistic missiles targeting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the regional and international reaction on the Houthi offenses, and Iran’s relationship to the Houthi’s role in Yemen.

International Affairs The US-Iran Relations The report discusses the most important developments in light of President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw the US from the nuclear pact on May 12. The report also handles the most important US messages conveyed to Iran through the US-led military strike on Syria after accusing the Syrian regime of using chemical weapons against its civilians in the Syrian city of Duma.

Russia-Iran Relations The report discusses how strong the Russia-Iran coalition is in Syria in light of the US-led and Israeli strikes on Iranian forces in this country. 6 Iran Case File ,April 2018

INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL FILE

First: The motion to question President Hasan Rouhani: between failure and success 7

Several Iranian lawmakers have proposed to question Iranian President Hasan Rouhani over the country’s economic crisis and the failure of his economic policies. This is a repeated case that began two months ago. During the period in writing this report, the political debate in Iran heated up and the issue of questioning the president became one of the main topics in the Iranian media after the number of deputies supporting the issue of questioning increased, with them being instigated by the depreciation of the Iranian currency against the dollar. According to Article 89 of the Iranian constitution, questioning the president in parliament requires signatures from one third of the 290 deputies in parliament. (1)

Motives behind calls to question Rouhani First: Disputes between political trends Some reformist political activists believe that the issue of questioning President Hasan Rouhani in parliament was planned by fundamentalists to undermine him and accuse him of incompetence. The reformists believe the hardliners in the Iranian regime are plotting to pressure the government and weaken its legitimacy by protests in various Iranian cities as one saw at the beginning of this year. Although these protests began in the city of Mashhad with economic demands and slogans against Rouhani, they quickly changed and took another turn not wanted by the fundamentalists. (2) But the representative of the Golpayegan region in the Iranian parliament Ali Bakhtiar believes that plans of questioning President Hasan Rouhani has nothing to do with the conflict witnessed between the different political wings and currents within the Iranian regime. He justified this claim by claiming that the group of deputies who signed the request to question the president includes fundamentalists and reformists. And this group is made up of various parliamentary committees.

Second: Deteriorating economic conditions The plunge of the Iranian currency was a direct cause of the call for questioning Rouhani. Some experts attributed the collapse of the currency to the weak supervision of the Central Bank over the financial and credit institutions which the citizens had trusted and deposited their money therein. The Central Bank stood idly by while seeing these violations as if it was not responsible for these institutions, which sparked massive popular discontent. Because the law does not allow them to question the head of the Central bank, it was the duty of parliamentarians to work to demand that the president be questioned until they reach the desired goal, which is to bring about a radical change in the administration of the Central bank so it plays its role to the fullest.

The main five points in the issue of questioning Rouhani A number of Iranian lawmakers prepared five questions related to economic issues to present them to Rouhani. 1. What are the reasons for the government’s failure to combat smuggling? 2. Why are the international banking sanctions imposed on Iran still in place more than two years after the signing of the nuclear agreement and despite Tehran’s commitment to all the promises made by the group 5 + 1? 3. What are the factors that led to the government’s failure to reduce unemployment? 4. What are the reasons for the continued economic recession despite the repeated promises made by the government to end this dilemma? (3) 8 Iran Case File, April 2018

5. The last question will be on the current hot issue which is the reasons and motives for the rapid and steady rise in foreign exchange rates. (4)

Reasons for delaying the questioning On the reasons for the delay in the questioning of President Hasan Rouhani the representative of the city of Qom in the Iranian parliament Mojtaba Zoo al-Nour, said two factors led to this delay, namely: First: Failure of the presidential body in the parliament in performing its role to render the questioning successful.

Second: The role of lobbies created by the government in parliament to pressure parliamentarians and thwart efforts to question the president. According to Zoo al-Nour, the government has taken many steps that have contributed so far to delay the questioning. Some of the ministers and their assistants, as well as the governors of the Iranian provinces, exerted heavy pressure on the deputies to discourage the process of questioning. They promised a number of deputies to implement some projects in the provinces they represent in parliament, while some of the deputies have been threatened with some procedures if they did not withdraw their names from the list that demands that the president be questioned. “Rouhani said in his speeches and comments that he would accept any criticism directed at him and his government. What makes him fearful of coming to parliament and answering the MPs’ questions?”(5)

But Ali Waqfchi, a member of the Iranian parliament and one of the signatories to the request for questioning, said that the lobbies would not be able to prevent the president from being questioned in a public hearing before Parliament. The parliament still insists on reaching concrete results to end the economic crises facing the country, as well as the depreciation of the Iranian currency to its lowest level against the dollar. “The committee sent two letters to President Hasan Rouhani and asked him to appoint a representative so that parliamentarians can ask questions about the country’s economic situation, but it has not yet received any response from the president,” he said. (6) Perhaps the supreme leader’s unwillingness to escalate the internal crisis now is the reason for not questioning the president, given the expectation that Iran will face new international sanctions in case the United States withdraws from the nuclear agreement.

Second:Fundamentalists employ surveillance and espionage techniques to spy on reformists The Islamic Resistance Party member Hamid Reza Taraqi has raised the issue of the security authorities’ spying on meetings and on the office of the former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Despite denials of the security services, a wide range of politicians and citizens believe that the operations of surveillance and espionage continue, and have even increased, and that certain entities such as the Revolutionary Guard and the Ministry of Security lead such operations. 9

“Khatami should not believe that his speech at the private meetings is neither understood nor heard by anyone, so that he knows that all his positions and statements have reached the ears of the regime,” Taraqi said in an interview with Etemad newspaper. (7) Taraqi’s remarks regarding spying were not the first. Informed sources told the Etemad newspaper that the spying on Mohammad Khatami was not only in his office. Pro-reformist elements in the ministry of security found espionage devices and dismantled them .(8)

Conservative politicians intimidate reformists In addition to conservative politicians’ announcing that the security services are spying on the reformist leaders, such as Khatami, they are practicing a kind of political terrorism. This makes reformists question how party activists from the fundamentalist movement acquire information that is related to top-secret issues and subsequently raise them in the media. The reformists also wonder “If we accept the fact that espionage is one of the tools of the security services and intelligence to protect national interests, why is the reformist movement the only entity whereat fingers of blame are pointed and its affiliates are being spied on while the backers of the fundamentalists are being briefed on all security secrets?”

Reactions of reformists Mohammad Reza Khatami, a reformist activist and the brother of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, expressed his concern about the fundamentalists’ access to security information. “We know that many media outlets, news sites and individuals who have nothing to do with security and intelligence work are given this information and take advantage of it by political blackmailing. (9) Mohammad Reza Khatami believes that reformers are always being spied on, and that this is not confined to meetings. They are exposed to it in their workplaces, homes and cars. Reformists do not fear being spied on because they always speak up about their opinions and beliefs and see no reason to express them secretly and behind the scenes, he said. (10)

Conservatives agree, reformists oppose MP Mohammad Reza Tabesh, Deputy Head of the “parliamentary bloc of Hope” or “Hope fraction”, supports the wiretapping to preserve national interests and improve national security. He cited the use of modern tools and devices for spying by security institutions in some countries, but he refused to employ these devices in spying on offices, the meetings of political parties and entities active within Iran, to achieve some purposes and political objectives, stressing the need not to use spying in favor of a certain current at the expense of the other. (11) The head of the political committee in the “Hope fraction”, in the Iranian parliament, Jalal Mirzaie, strongly criticized acts of espionage against officials, and said it would not help national unity. He defended Khatami, saying that Khatami has nothing to hide, and all his policies and decisions during his eight years of his presidency were to serve the most sublime interests of the country. He longer has any executive powers, and all his activities and meeting with political figures and civil institutions are clear and known to all. Another reformist figure is Mahmoud Sadeghi, Head of the Iranian parliament’s Transparency Committee, who believes that wiretapping creates a sense of insecurity. “I do not know whether the security services are spying on my calls or not, I always have 10 Iran Case File, April 2018

the feeling that I’m being monitored. Some advise me to shut down my mobile or placing it inside the refrigerator.” (12)

The views of the fundamentalists on spying did not differ much from the opinion of some reformists some of whom strongly defended wiretapping, such as Mohammad Ali Pourmakhtar and Hassan Norouzi. But they criticized wiretapping that violated the rights and privacy of individuals. (13) It is the same criticism that was made by the current President Hasan Rouhani who put forward a manifesto entitled “Rights of citizenship”, which includes 120 articles, most of which affirm the “freedom of opinion and belief” and the right to a “decent” life. This comes in light of official international and domestic statistics confirming the high rates of human rights violations i n this country.

In 2017, Majid Ansari, a member of the Expediency Council and the first Head of the Iranian Prisons Organization, said government officials were concerned about the security services’ spying on their meetings and calls, and criticized the use of wiretapping under the pretext of preserving the Iranian revolution.

Article 570 of the Penal Code provides for the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and deprivation of holding any governmental posts for periods ranging from one to five years and facing jail for periods of two to three years for officials and employees belonging to government institutions who commit illegal acts such as spying, and deprive citizens of their rights stipulated in the Iranian Constitution.

After increasing fears of spying, Iranian President Hasan Rouhani presented a bill to the Iranian parliament in 2014 to discuss and set laws and penalties for spying in preparation for being included in the Islamic Penal Code.

The bill, which has not yet been considered, despite the passage of more than 3 years, is entitled “Use of technical equipment for the collection and circulation of confidential information” in accordance with article 1 of this proposed bill. “

The bill includes an article “to try persons who produce, distribute or promote the devices used in the collection and circulation of confidential information such as audio and video.” Ministries of Security and Defense were excluded from this law. Article II of this draft explicitly prohibits the “installation, processing and use of spying products, equipment, tools and devices”.

Also, the proposed law stipulates that the Ministry of Security is obliged to prepare a list of equipment and tools for spying after three months of ratification, in cooperation with the military institutions and police, and to send them to the Customs Department to prevent their entry into Iranian territory, publishing advertisements about them in popular newspapers. The law requires that the Ministry of Security reviews this list once every six months. (14)

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The Defense and Security File

First: Iran and combat drones

» Growing capabilities and an escalating presence in Middle East conflicts Iranian planes have appeared in theaters of operations in Yemen and Syria recently. In February, Israel shot down an Iranian drone over the Syrian Golan Heights. On April 18, 2018, an air defense unit of the UAE armed forces seized control of another Iranian-made aircraft named Qasif 1. The Arab Coalition Forces Command announced on 11 April that the air defense system for the protection of 12 Iran Case File, April 2018

Abha airport had shot down a strange object heading towards the international airport. During the examination conducted by experts of the Coalition forces, it was found that a hostile Houthi drone, bearing the fingerprints of the Iranian industry, was targeting the airport protected under international humanitarian law. The statement said that another object identical to the plane that was shot down in Abha had targeted the city of Jazan and was destroyed without any losses. (16) As of January 2017, the date whereon US President Donald Trump took power, Iran changed the tactics of harassing US naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, relying on drones instead of rocket boats. (17) Increasing the downing of Iranian aircraft on various fronts makes us realize that Iran is relying on the weapon of flying aircraft in reconnaissance, espionage and even combat operations. Aircraft may become the second most important component of Iran’s military strategy after the missiles, but Iran’s actual capabilities in this area are highly questioned by military experts. The many categories and models that Iran has declared as homemade from these aircraft have made experts more skeptical. And in this report we will focus on the type of combat or armed aircraft, that is, the aircraft carrying cargos of explosives or missiles.

» The Iranian drones in Syria On April 14, 2018, the Israeli Air Force announced that in March 10, 2018 the plane that was shot down inside the airspace of Israeli was an Iranian aircraft loaded with weapons. After analyzing its flight route, it was discovered that it had been flying from Syrian territory and was downed by Israeli helicopters. Israeli fighters entered Syrian airspace and targeted Syrian positions. (18) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu carried a piece of the wreckage of the plane with him to the Security Conference in Munich and announced that he would respond to the Iranian attack. Netanyahu addressed the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was present at the conference “Do you know the wreckage of this plane? It is yours. Not only Iran’s arms in the region will be targeted by us, but we will attack the heart of Iran if we have to.” (19) Javad Zarif responded to Netanyahu’s remarks in Munich after the latter threatened Iran “You should not test our will” by saying “We are watching a funny circus.” (20) This was not the first time that an Iranian plane was shot down from Syrian airspace. American forces downed an Iranian “Shahed 129 “aircraft on 20 June 2017. It was shot down by an F-15 fighter near the Al-Tanf area. The same thing happened after two weeks. (21) The first Iranian aircraft appeared in the theater of operations in Syria in 2013 when the Syrian opposition forces spotted an Iranian Yasser drone flying. It was downed by the forces of the Nusra Front. (22) The Syrian regime could not claim ownership of these aircraft, whether armed or conducting aerial reconnaissance, in view of the modest Syrian capabilities in this field. Syria did not have any of the drones except the aircraft “Noras 2”, whose range does not exceed 160 km. And it 13

is a reconnaissance aircraft that does not carry weapons. In 2016, Syria transferred all the means of producing aircraft from the Scientific Research Center in Damascus to Iran. Syria also transferred all its experts, engineers and technicians to Iran. (23)

» History and centers of manufacturing unmanned aircraft in Iran The history of the unmanned aircraft industry in Iran dates back to the 1979 revolution. In 1970, Muhammad Reza Shah began a program for the local manufacture of drones, but was stopped because of the Iranian revolution. However, it was one of the achievements of the program to establish the Quds industrial complex in Qom. It opened in 1985. The first unmanned aircraft to be produced there was “Mahajir “. It was used in the Iran-Iraq war. And then Iran produced “Mahajir 3” and “Ababil”.(24) Thereafter, the Center for the Study of Aeronautic Industries in Isfahan was established. It conducted the designs and studies related to the jet Hasa 100. The model was developed in 2005, launching category of Shahed 123, which was the prototype of Shahed 129, the main category making up the Iranian drones’ fleet. (25)

» Combat unmanned aircraft Shahed 129 The combat unmanned aircraft Shahed 129 was such a prominent model for Iran that it set up a large production line for it. Tehran revealed the plane in 2012 which entered into service in 2013. The width of the wings of the eight-meter long jet is 16 meters. Visual cluster have been installed in the front of the aircraft named Oqab 6. They include a surveillance camera, a thermal camera, and laser weapons. The source of this equipment is not known because Iran does not have the capability to manufacture it. This optical kit is imported from Russia, but some say it is the result of SA’s cooperation with Chinese companies. Now access to this type of optics has become available in the civil markets worldwide. The jet was equipped with a “Rotax 914” engine manufactured by Austria and used in many light helicopters worldwide and weighs 78 kg with 100 hp. (26) The range of the drone Shahed reaches 1,700 kilometers in case of conducting reconnaissance missions. This range becomes shorter in case it carries weapons. It can keep flying for 24 hours. Its speed ranges from 175 to 200 km. Its maximum altitude is 24,000 feet. It can be controlled by a ground guidance station and is has a low flight cost of about $ 20 per hour. (27)

Some reports indicate that the Iranians were unable to supply Shahed “129” with the surface-to- air missiles (the Iranian model of anti-tank missiles) or Fateh 362 missile. The reason for this is their failure to manufacture a suitable launch pad for carrying missiles under the wings of the aircraft, as well as not being able to solve the problem of guidance. Therefore, specialists in the Center for the Study of Aeronautic Industries have manufactured “Sadid 361 for the unmanned aircraft. It is directed like a smart bomb, and is used against fixed ground and mobile targets. The bomb has no engines. It was given the name the “Sadeq 342”. It has become the main weapon for Shahed 129. (28) One of the downsides of Shahed 129 is its low speed compared to the MQ drone of the US and the Israel-manufactured Haroun. It is also not guided by satellites such as Turkish drones. Mobile guidance stations have no capability to control it in a distance further than 400 kilometers in case there are no guidance stations powered by radio waves. Iran has announced that it aims to produce 40-50 aircraft, but reports indicate that Iran can only produce four aircraft of this category. (29) 14 Iran Case File, April 2018

Second: Arab Ahwaz region: Arab protests and popular resentment against racial discrimination policies Protests broke out continually in Ahwaz to demand the fundamental rights of the oppressed Ahwazi Arab people. Ahwaz contains almost half of Iran’s national production and about 90 percent of Iran’s oil revenue. But it suffers from poor services, rampant unemployment, as well as devastating environmental pollution, river droughts and land desertification. For 40 years, the Iranian regime has been practicing a systematic policy to obliterate the national and cultural identity of Ahwazi Arabs. It falsified its history, changed its name from Ahwaz to Ahvaz, and replaced the names of the Arab cities with Persian ones. For instance, Muhammarah city was given the name of Khoramshahr, Howeyzeh to Hoveyzeh and Abadan’s name was changed to Persian as well. The names of individuals have not escaped this policy. The Iranian regime controls the process of naming babies and forces Arab families to give their children Persian names. (30)

» Roots of the protests Since the beginning of this year, Ahwaz and some areas inhabited by Arabs have witnessed several protests against the policies of the Iranian regime targeting this minority, the most recent of which was the demonstrations in those areas in April 2018. They took to the streets initially to express anger at the latest anti-Arab insult in a program broadcast on the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) TV network. A show dedicated for children and broadcast on Iran’s new year’s celebrations featuring dolls representing each minority in Iran. In the areas where Arabs dwell, dolls representing Lors and Bakhtiars were shown, ignoring the historical Arab presence there. (31)

» Protests These protests, which began with the first spark in the Al-Thawra neighborhood West of the city of Ahwaz, spread to other cities such as Abadan, Mahshor, Shibeyshe, Sheyban, Hamidiyeh and Masjid Suleiman. The demonstrators chanted slogans denouncing anti-Arab racist rhetoric in Iran, accusing official bodies of being behind this discriminatory policy. The aim has been to marginalize the Arabs because of their national identity, and the Arabs have demanded their right to teach their children Arabic and work in large oil institutions in their cities, which the authorities deny them. They also criticized the continuation of policies of national oppression, and other demonstrators called for stopping campaigns of repression and torture in the prisons of the regime, fighting poverty and unemployment, developing of the region of its oil and wealth and combating environmental pollution. Also, activists have spoken of casualties in the protests, but the Iranian police Chief Brigadier General Hussein Hosseini denied these reports during the protests and dismissed them as mere rumor. (32)

» The Iranian government’s tackling of the protests The activists confirmed that the Iranian security forces attacked the demonstrators and stormed the homes of a large number of Ahwazis who participated in the demonstrations, and arrested more than 400 people (33) in the areas of al-Malashiya, Hamidiyeh, Al Ain, Du, Kut Abdullah, Kut Alawain, Mahshor, Khafajiyeh , Omidyah and different parts of Abadan city. (34) 15

The Iranian authorities also cut off electricity, communications and the Internet completely from Ahwaz, and said power plants in the province faced problems due to a wave of dust, and that the Internet in the country is facing an attack from foreign pirates. Witnesses pointed out that the arrests were not limited to political activists and demonstrators but included a large number of Arab workers who demonstrated because of the suspension of their salaries by the Revolutionary Guard, who purchased the steel plant in Ahwaz. (35) No official statements were made by senior officials in the Iranian regime about these demonstrations, but the representative of Ahwaz in the Assembly of Experts Mohammed Hussein Ahmadi Shahroudi said that the failure of parliament and officials to address the problems of Ahwaz for decades caused the spread of resentment among the population of this region. He asserted that demanding Ahwaz rights through the legal process, is true and respectful and does not defy the Constitution. (36)

The other representative of the province of Ahwaz in the Council of Experts Abbas al-Kaabi, presented an objection to the government and asked the IRIB to stop underestimating and abusing

Arab nationalism and to apologize to the Arab people of Ahwaz. (37) To be noted that the Ahwaz region witnessed similar protests during the previous years with similar motives. Large protests erupted in 2005 following the publication of a letter that said that Mohammad Khatami was seeking to implement a demographic change scheme in the Ahwaz province. During these protests a number of people were killed and hundreds injured. The letter was then attributed to Muhammad Ali Abtahi, the adviser to Mohammad Khatami, but Abtahi and government officials denied the authenticity of the letter and considered it as being fabricated. (38) 16 Iran Case File, April 2018

The Economic File

First: Explanations of the continuous decline of the Iranian currency between urgent crises and historical roots The most prominent economic issue of concern to all Iranians in April 2018 was the sharp and rapid fall of the local currency against the US dollar in the parallel market, beginning on April 8, 2018, until the decision of the Central Bank of Iran to unify the official exchange rate and the parallel market on April 10th, after the dollar rose to record highs in a very limited period ranging between 16% and about 20%, between 7 and 9 April. If we go past the recent dollar rally and look back years away, we shall discover that radical factors have been affecting the dollar’s exchange rate against the Iranian Toman.

» To which extent the US dollar rose against the Iranian Toman? On April 8, the US Dollar rose to 5660 Toman on the market. The previous day it posted 5171 Toman. By the end of April 9, it had reached about 6000 Toman, up 16% in just two days as shown in the following chart explaining the exchange rate of the dollar against the Toman since the beginning of the last Iranian year on 21 March 2017. (39)

Figure (1): The exchange rate of the dollar against the Toman since March 2017 to April 2018 :٥YgmRy News Eghtesad Source/Source: Eghtesad News https://goo.gl 17

The sudden jump in the price of the dollar caused panic among Iranians, forcing them to que to buy it in front of the money exchangers, to preserve the purchasing power of the money they own, prompting the dollar to rise more and more as demand grew. Sometimes, an increase of almost 20% compared to April 7.

The Iranian government intervened to stop the collapse of the local currency and decided on April 10 to consolidate the official exchange rate, which is the government deal, and the parallel price, which is most traded among Iranians, at the price of 4,200 Tomans per dollar, and trading is prohibited at any other price. Those who trade at a different price shall be handed over to the police and the judiciary. It will be considered “smuggling” and they will be prosecuted according to this accusation. (40)

Changes in the exchange rate of a currency, whether it is free or managed, (41), happen due to several factors such as changes in the supply and demand of the currency, the state’s balance of payments, interest rate changes, high levels of inflation, speculation, and geopolitical developments and international crises. (42)

Here we briefly address the different interpretations of the rapid and sudden rise of the dollar against the Toman, and then review the historical reasons for the continued rise of the dollar or the continuous decline of the Toman.

First: In the short term, explanations suggest geopolitical factors and external tensions affected the increase in domestic demand for the currency, which led to the sharp rise of the dollar on April 8 and 9. But the difference was about those pushing this demand up. Are they individuals, institutions or groups? (43) The explanations for the increase in the demand for individuals were attributed to growing concerns about the withdrawal of US President Trump from the nuclear agreement and the return of sanctions on Iran, prompting traders, speculators and the public to compete for demanding or purchasing the dollar. Some Iranian went attracted by a price bubble led by speculators, with Iran’s rich people benefiting from the price differentials of the dollar’s rise, and then re-selling it.

At the same time, interpretations have pointed to large-scale withdrawal of $ 30 billion from the market, led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to buy weapons, ammunition and equipment in preparation for a US-Israeli strike on Iran’s allies in Syria and Lebanon as expected by Iranian intelligence. (44) A joint American-British-French joint strike of Syrian regime positions occurred on April 14. If this explanation is true, it has not only caused the dollar to rise, but has created a state of panic among ordinary individuals that has led to increased demand for the US currency, which would have made the dollar more expensive if the government had not intervened to stabilize the exchange rate. In any case, the clear result is that the large and rapid demand for dollar holdings amid scanty supply pushed the price to a sharp rise in just two days before stabilizing after the government intervened. The impact of exchange rate instability is expected to appear in inflation in the coming period.

Second, in the long term, there is a combination of root factors resulting in the continuous rise of the dollar against the Toman for nearly two decades. From 1992 to 2002, one dollar was equivalent to 143 tomans, according to the official price, the price on the parallel market is up by 20 percent. It 18 Iran Case File, April 2018

then rose to 3200 tomans in 2016 and then to 4200 tomans for every dollar in 2018 after the mandatory determination of the exchange rate, as shown in the following figure.

Source: Iranian Central Bank. A number of geopolitical conflicts and Iran’s tense diplomatic relations with the West since the 1990s, which worsened in 2012 led to an international oil and banking blockade, which caused a decline in both the country’s foreign exchange resources and the influx of investments. This exacerbated inflationary stagnation, given the economy’s dependence on unsteady sources, like oil, in providing hard currency, freezing much of the oil revenues, as well as the surge in imports recently and the existence of several exchange rates that the government failed to tackle despite attempts. (45) 19

Explanations of the US dollar’s rise against the Iranian currency

At the present In the past

Fears of Trump’s decision on the nuclear deal Iranian conflicts in the region and (scheduled for May 12th) as well as a large associated geopolitical tensions. demand from the Iranians for the dollar

An international and oil bank blockade Speculation by the Iranian traders and the rich and the fear by foreign investors to work in on the currency the local market

Claiming the Revolutionary Guards have Dwindling foreign currency sources withdrawn $ 30 billion from the domestic as well as freezing Iranian oil revenues market in preparation for a US strike on Syria abroad

Inflationary stagnation that occurred in some years, as well as production levels stagnating coupled with high prices

» Future exchange rate expectations The unification of the exchange rate known as “single foreign exchange rate” aims to remove the parallel market basically, but this objective depends on the extent of the Central Bank’s flexibility to change the exchange rate in line with the supply and demand of the currency. But if the price is unrealistic and away from the real value of the currency, the exchange rate will not be able to hold for long. Sooner or later, the Central Bank of Iran will set the dollar exchange rate at 4,200 tomans, while over 6,000 tomans entered the free market before unification. If the Iranian Central Bank does not gradually raise the dollar exchange rate in the coming period in line with its real value, this will mean that either the difference between the two prices will be met, or the dollar will be offered at subsidized prices and below its real value. In this case some will benefit such as manufacturers who use intermediaries from abroad. Or that the government simply will not be able to offer this price to all who wish, so their alternative would be to go to the parallel market. Previous experiences of unifying exchange rates in Iran since the 1990s confirms this. This raises the question- To what extent will the state support the dollar in light of the growing budget deficit and costly military conflicts? Recent high oil prices - due to geopolitical developments - may give it some time.

Second: Macroeconomic indicators Iranian officials, especially the economists, are waiting for Trump’s decision in May 2018 on the United States’ position on the nuclear deal with Iran. Trump threatened to pull out of the deal if the US and European diplomats did not alter the terms of the Iranian nuclear deal by May 12. This deal, 20 Iran Case File, April 2018

which re-infused the Iranian economy again after three years of stagnation in which unemployment rates were high, inflation reached record levels, the economy plummeted and the country saw capital flight.

Several Iranian newspapers discussed the upcoming event with a sense of concern and urged the Iranian diplomatic community to prevent the United States from leaving the nuclear deal. The Iranian diplomats’ defeat in this regard would “put the economy in a dead end”. The US exit from the deal will restrain the foreign trade of Tehran causing a trade deficit, even with the export of oil, capital flight, and result in great challenges to the currency market, which will undoubtedly affect the business market, unemployment and exacerbate the rates of poverty and income disparity. (46) The most prominent indicators issued during April on the status of the non-oil trade balance to Iran surfaced during the last year (March 2017-March 2018), which posted a deficit of 7 billion dollars, as the volume of non-oil exports during this period reached $ 47 billion, while imports amounted to $ 54 billion. But if we add the Iranian oil exports (estimated at 40 billion dollars) to Iran’s total exports, the balance will surely achieve a surplus.(47) 21 22 Iran Case File, April 2018

The Social File

In March and April, Iran witnessed a series of structural changes and developments in the social fabric that, in the long and medium term, impact domestic and foreign policy making. The most prominent social developments for the months of March and April can be highlighted through the following points:

First: Indicators related to addiction and drugs in Iran The smuggling and addiction rates are increasing throughout Iran as days go by, exacerbating the people’s social problems. The drugs and smuggling networks operating across Iranian territory lead to or contribute to the emergence of complex problems such as depression, unemployment, prostitution and others . Iran’s drug industry has grown to the point where UN officials have warned of Iran’s global centrality as one of the most important and most active drug hubs in the world.

» The United Nations’ posture The Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Yuri Fedotov, said during his meeting with the Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli that Iranian efforts in the field of drug control last year were of great im- portance to the international community and the United Nations. He stressed that the United Nations thanks Iran for com- bating drugs. He said the UN is keen to continue the activity of its office located in Tehran and support Iran, pointing out that 80% of drug seizures in the world were in Iran. For his part, the Iranian In- terior Minister, Rahmani Fazli, said that the production of narcotics in Afghani- stan, the neighbor of Iran and the source of drugs coming to it, has reached very alarming rates. Statistics show that the production of drugs in Afghanistan has reached about 9 thousand tons annual- ly. He stressed the need to implement awareness and cultural programs in Af- ghanistan to curb the spread of drug pro- duction. Since the beginning of the year, Iran has seized 785 tons of narcotics from Afghanistan. The rate of drug seizures in Iran has increased by 15% compared to last year. The Minister of the Interior of 23

Iran pointed to money laundering from drug smuggling and stressed that 90% of the money generated from drugs is used in such operations in Western countries, noting the importance of stopping such suspicious financial operations. (48)

» The relationship between drugs and the exacerbation of social problems Iran’s smuggling networks and global drug cartels have had a significant impact on Iranian youth. Officials in the Iranian parliament have issued statements that in Iran there are 2.8 million addicts who use several drugs, in addition to 5 million addicts who abuse and consume alcohol. According to Iranian officials, narcotics cannot be confined to Iran because there are countless species. There are more than 700 new narcotics substances that have entered the world’s drug market. Some of these materials have certainly reached Iran and are being consumed. Over the past years, many Iranian activists and officials have sought to organize conferences and participate in various exhibitions to highlight the dangers of drug addiction and drug abuse in Iran. According to Iranian officials, the high rates of addiction lead to other social complications. The relevant agencies have registered 200,000 abortions, 35,000 cases of HIV / AIDS, 3 million homeless, 4,500 female suicides, and 3,000 cases of youth trying to run away from home. (49)

» Tehran is the prime target for spreading drugs and addiction The statistics of March issued by official institutions in Iran highlight the high rates of abuse of marijuana in Tehran. Iran’s Ministry of the Interior confirmed that the seeds of marijuana are smuggled in passengers’ bags and small luggage, specifically from the Netherlands. The value of the seed is estimated to be 200 thousand tomans and its seeds are planted inside apartments and private gardens. Police monitor these activities in the suburbs of Tehran. (50) 24 Iran Case File, April 2018

In the city of Tehran alone, the Interior Ministry has identified more than 1,000 women addicted to violence and seized 150 addicts in the past two weeks. Iranian police said the pursuit of drug addicts on the outskirts of cities and dangerous areas is a top priority (51). With regard to these statistics, a member of the Social Committee in the Iranian parliament, Rasoul Khezri, criticized the lack of a person who collects the statistics on addiction and overt addicts, whose numbers are increasing daily, indicating that a minister should be appointed to combat drugs. He added that the number of addicts in Tehran was ten thousand, both males and females, and the later made up about 10 percent of them. (52)

» Schools and drugs The Iranian government has tried to take action in Iranian schools to prevent the spread of drugs among students in the hope of preventing addiction among adolescents. The Iranian Ministry of Education confirmed a project to support and protect schools. The project was implemented in 38 thousand schools. Also, drug prevention programs have been implemented in Iranian schools. The project participants prepare reports and study the social damages that society may face and increase endeavor’s to address them. The Ministry of Education announced that 100,000 students a year in Iranian schools are identified to be at risk. Some of the students behave in a manner that shows they are exposed to various disorders. These students are transferred to the competent authorities for examination and protection and to help them overcome any psychological or behavioral disorders they face. (53) The Iranian Minister of Education, Mohammad Bat’haei, warned during his remarks about the rate of students affected by social damage and pointed to the high rates of smokers among Iranian students. In addition, 136,000 students are at risk of drug addiction, while the number of students who used drugs once was at least 3,600. (54)

Second:Overpopulation and its impact on unemployment The population growth rates in Iran are disturbing to the authorities, and the authorities attribute all social problems, such as poverty, unemployment and others to high population. According to the Population Statistics Center, Iran’s population exceeded 81 million at the end of last year. The population clock showed many changes in terms of population numbers and their increase. It should be noted that the population clock has been placed on the website of the Iranian Statistics Center since 2009, and since that moment the Iranian population has been recorded moment by moment. (55) According to one official, it is inappropriate for the Iranian regime to have 10 million Iranians under the poverty line. In a related context, Ahmed Jannati, Chairman of the Experts’ Leadership Council, said “We are not satisfied when it comes to the rates of unemployment and poverty in Iran.” (56) This comes at a time when some official statistics indicate that the unemployed in Iran are currently more than 3 million people. In addition, one million people a year seek to enter the labor market and Jannati highlighted the New Year as “the year to support local goods” as being important and vital. Jannati asserted everyone should be committed to it, indicating that today’s producers face serious challenges in terms of cooperation between them, officials and consumers. (57) Some clerics have come out to express their fears about corruption, and its spread and the lack of genuine and realistic solutions to it. The cleric Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli, one of the most prominent philosophers of the Iranian regime, made statements in his meeting with the Minister of Cooperation Ali Rabie. “Many fled from the state or set up a place to escape, but we have nowhere to 25

escape,” he said, “If the people rise up, they will throw everyone into the sea.” According to him, “the lack of justice and integrity of some officials cannot be tolerated.” During his meeting with the Minister of Youth and Sports, cleric Asadollah Bayat-Zanjani said that part of the recent demonstrations was the result of ignoring the demands of the young people. When asked how the government dealt with young people’s concerns and whether they responded appropriately, he said no. He added these concerns were not addressed. They are increasing day after day. (58)

» Future indicators We note that the Iranian regime attributes its social problems to increasing population growth and drug smuggling networks, that is, the regime evades responsibility and was supposed to raise questions about the regime’s responsibility for smuggling networks and the procedures necessary to stop such networks and their effectiveness. The fragility of the social fabric led smuggling groups and addiction to surface. It is noted that such structural problems facing the regime will not disappear in the near future, because the regime does not want to confront the origins of the problem but deals with the essence. Instead of stopping the formation of external militias and supporting them with billions of dollars a year, channeling these funds to support Iran’s infrastructure, the regime is paying no heed to this reality to portray the problem because of smuggling networks, population growth and a Western conspiracy. Also, if new sanctions are imposed on Iran over its missile and nuclear program after the recent Trump administration shakeup and its determination to curb Iran, Iran’s problems will be aggravated in terms of poverty, unemployment, education and health. Therefore, two factors dominate the future landscape and problems of Iranian society, the first factor is the extent to which the Iranian leadership is able to pay partial attention to the interior and channel its expenditures to the internal structure and development projects. The second factor is external, is the position of the US administration and the international community on the nuclear agreement and its sustainability in the future, in addition to the position on the Iranian missile program, and whether this position will be sanctioned or not.

Interactions of events » Iranian President Hasan Rouhani- Tehran and Moscow on track for strategic relations. » Lawmaker- The fight against corruption should start from the office of the supreme leader of the Iranian regime. 26 Iran Case File, April 2018

» A written memo from a number of MPs asking the Iranian president to solve the dilemma of unemployment. » The head of the National Security Committee of the Iranian parliament, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, says that Telegram impacted the security situation of the country. » The Director of the Office of the President of the Republic, Mahmoud Vaezi, confirms that the unemployed are more than 3 million people. » Two border guards were killed in a clash with gunmen in Mirjaveh border city in Sistan and Baluchistan province. » Khamenei asks the Ministry of Intelligence to be a pure revolutionary ministry. » 10 dead and 3 injured in a huge fire in a cafe in the market “Kayan” Ahwaz. » The Revolutionary Guard announced seizing a large shipment of explosives on the Eastern border of Iran. » Iranian doubts the ability of the “S-300” system to repel rocket attacks after the US missile strike on Syria. » Iran is reviewing the “Shafaq” missile, which is installed in combat helicopters. » Revealing Kamin 2 missile which is anti-drone and is used in cases of low-flying » 63 MPs demand the removal of the head of the Central Bank. » The government replaces the euro with the dollar as the main currency in its trade dealings. » Negotiations to sign a number of oil agreements with Indonesia, China and Russia. » Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi in 2003 asks Europe not to invest in Iran. » High rates of marijuana abuse in Tehran. » Debate about the veil of women in the Iranian media. » High rates of child marriages in marginalized areas. » High rates of depression among Iranian women. » 80% of drug seizures in the world take place in Iran. » More than a thousand addicts are prominently on the streets of Tehran. » Ten million people are below the poverty line. » Iran’s population exceeds the 81 million mark. » More than 4 thousand people from the elite studying in Britain. » 80,000 workers in Western Iran are unemployed. 27

Endnotes

(1) ﭘﺮﺳﺸﮑﺪه، اﺻﻞ ”اﺳﺘﯿﻀﺎح وزﯾﺮان و رﯾﯿﺲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮر“ در ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮري اﺳﻼﻣﻲ اﯾﺮان ﭼﯿﺴﺖ؟، http://cutt.us/gnsqe (2) ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﺑﺮﻧﺎ، ﭘﺸﺖ ﭘﺮده طﺮح ﺳﻮال از رﺋﯿﺲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮر، ۲ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ ﻣﺎه http://cutt.us/HJtpa ،۱۳۹٦ (3) اﯾﺴﻨﺎ، طﺮح ﺳﻮال از رﺋﯿﺲﺟﻤﮭﻮر، ﺟﻨﺎﺣﯽ ﻧﯿﺴﺖ/ﺗﻐﯿﯿﺮ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺖ در ﺑﺎﻧﮏ ﻣﺮﮐﺰی ﻻزم اﺳﺖ، ۷ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ ﻣﺎه http:// ،۱۳۹٦ cutt.us/k0dSq (4) روزﻧﺎﻣﮫ، طﺮح ﺳﻮال از روﺣﺎﻧﯽ، رﺳﻤﺎً ﮐﻠﯿﺪ ﺧﻮرد، ۳ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/k9PkR ،۱۳۹٦ (5) ﻣﺸﺮق، طﺮح ۵ ﺳﺆال از رﺋﯿﺲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮر در دﺳﺘﻮر ﮐﺎر ﻣﺠﻠﺲ، ۲۱ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/RAVHM ،۱۳۹۷ (6) وطﻦ اﻣﺮوز، آﺧﺮﯾﻦ وﺿﻌﯿﺖ طﺮح ﺳﺆال از رﺋﯿﺲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮر، ۹ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ http://cutt.us/0Urho ،۱۳۹۷ (7) اﻋﺘﻤﺎد، ﺷﻨﻮد إﺻﻼﺣﺎت، ٥ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ http://cutt.us/qHceD ،۱۳۹۷ (8) روزﻧﺎﻣﮫ اﯾﺮان، ادﻋﺎی ﮐﺸﻒ دﺳﺘﮕﺎهھﺎی ﺷﻨﻮد در ﻣﻨﺰل ﺧﺎﺗﻤﯽ، ٥ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ http://cutt.us/VZEtU ،۱۳۹۷ (9) آﻓﺘﺎب، ﻣﺤﻤﺪرﺿﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤﯽ: از اﺑﺰار ﺷﻨﻮد ﺑﺮای ﺷﺎﻧﺘﺎژ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ اﺳﻔﺘﺎده ﻣﯽﮐﻨﻨﺪ، ٥ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ ۱۳۹۷، http://cutt.us/kXDMy (10) اطﻼﻋﺎت، واﮐﻨﺶ ﻣﺤﻤﺪرﺿﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺷﻨﻮد ﻣﺤﻞ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ رﺋﯿﺲ دوﻟﺖ إﺻﻼﺣﺎت، ٥ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ ۱۳۹۷، http://cutt.us/8IO7Z (11) ﺷﮭﺮوﻧﺪ، ﻧﮭﺎدھﺎی اﻣﻨﯿﺘﯽ واطﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ از ﺷﻨﻮد اﺳﺘﻔﺎده اﺑﺰاری وﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﻧﮑﻨﻨﺪ، ٥ ﺷﮭﺮﯾﻮر ۱۳۹۷ ، https://bit.ly/2HxBSiV (12) اﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﻧﯿﻮز، ﺧﺎطﺮات ﺧﺎﺗﻤﯽ از ﺷﻨﻮد ﺳﺨﻨﺎﻧﺶ، ٥ اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ http://cutt.us/ld8o5 ،۱۳۹۷ (13) اﻟﻤﺮﺟﻊ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ.، http://cutt.us/iBIC5 (14) زﻣﺎﻧﮫ، ﺷﻨﻮد ﺟﻠﺴﺎت ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻻن ﺣﮑﻮﻣﺘﯽ «ﺑﮫ ﺑﮭﺎﻧﮫ ﺣﻔﻆ ﻧﻈﺎم»، ۲٦ اذر http://cutt.us/2r0WR ،۱۳۹٦ (15) اﻹﻣﺎرات ﺗﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ طﺎﺋﺮة ﱠﻣﺤﻤﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﻔﺠﺮات ﻓﻲ اﻟﯿﻤﻦ، ﺳﻜﺎي ﻧﯿﻮز، http://cutt.us/n993Q (16) اﻟﺘﺤﺎﻟﻒ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﯾﻌﻠﻦ إﺳﻘﺎط طﺎﺋﺮة ﻣﺴﯿﱠﺮة ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟـ“أﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻠﮫ“ اﺳﺘﮭﺪﻓﺖ ﻣﻄﺎر أﺑﮭﺎ، ﺳﺒﻮﺗﻨﯿﻚ ﻋﺮﺑﻲ، http://cutt.us/QAMvq (17) ﻣﺴﺆول أﻣﺮﯾﻜﻲ: إﯾﺮان ﺗﺮاﻗﺐ أﺳﻄﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻋﺒﺮ طﺎﺋﺮات اﻻﺳﺘﻄﻼع اﻟﻤﺴﯿّﺮة، ﻗﻨﺎة اﻟﻌﮭﺪ اﻟﻔﻀﺎﺋﯿﺔ، http://cutt.us/RIaoq (18) اﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ: ﭘﮭﭙﺎد ﺳﺮﻧﮕﻮنﺷﺪه اﯾﺮاﻧﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ﺑﻮد، دوﯾﭽﮫ وﯾﻠﮫ، http://v.ht/ATnxQ (19) ﻧﺘﻨﯿﺎھﻮ ﯾﺤﻤﻞ ﺣﻄﺎم اﻟﻄﺎﺋﺮة اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺆﺗﻤﺮ ﻣﯿﻮﻧﺦ، ﻋﻜﺎ ﻟﻠﺸﺆون اﻹﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻠﯿﺔ، http://v.ht/vj1Z (20) طﻌﻨﮫ ظﺮﯾﻒ ﺑﮫ ﻧﺘﺎﻧﯿﺎھﻮ: ﺷﺎھﺪ ﺳﯿﺮﮐﯽ ﻣﻀﺤﮏ ﺑﻮدﯾﻢ، ﺑﮫ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎت ﺟﺪی ﺑﭙﺮدازﯾﻢ، ﯾﻮروﻧﯿﻮز، http://v.ht/UxD8 (21) آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ ’ﯾﮏ ﭘﮭﭙﺎد ﺳﺎﺧﺖ اﯾﺮان‘ را در ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ زد، ﺑﻲ ﺑﻲ ﺳﻲ ﻓﺎرﺳﻲ، http://v.ht/DXQm (22) طﺎﺋﺮات إﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ دون طﯿﺎر ﺗﻘﺎﺗﻞ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻷﺳﺪ، اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﻧﺖ، http://v.ht/Jonj (23) ﻣﺼﺪر: ﻧﻈﺎم اﻷﺳﺪ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣﺸﺮوع إﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻄﺎﺋﺮات اﻟﻤﺴﯿﱠﺮة إﻟﻰ إﯾﺮان، http://v.ht/VPij (24) ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﺻﻨﺎﯾﻊ ھﻮاﯾﻲ ﻗﺪس و ﭘﻨﮭﺎ، ﺗﺒﯿﺎن، http://v.ht/azI6 (25) آﺷﻨﺎﯾﯽ ﺑﺎ ﭘﮭﭙﺎد ھﺎی ﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ اﯾﺮان و ﻣﻘﺎﯾﺴﮫ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺮﺗﺮﯾﻦ ھﺎی ﺟﮭﺎن، http://v.ht/xEUB (26) ﭘﮭﭙﺎد ﺷﺎھﺪ ۱۲۹، ﺟﻨﮕﺎوران، http://cutt.us/P6uDL (27) ﺗﺼﺎوﯾﺮ ﭘﮭﭙﺎد دورﺑﺮد و ﻣﻮﺷﮏ اﻧﺪاز ﺳﭙﺎه ﺑﺎ ﻧﺎم «ﺷﺎھﺪ ۱۲۹» ﻣﻨﺘﺸﺮ ﺷﺪ، ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﻓﺎرس، http://cutt.us/8abHB (28) ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ ﻣﻮﺷﮏ ﺳﺪﯾﺪ و ﺑﻤﺐ ھﺪاﯾﺖ ﺷﻮﻧﺪه ﺳﺪﯾﺪ ۳٤۲ , اوﻟﯿﻦ SDB اﯾﺮاﻧﯽ، ﻣﯿﻠﯿﺘﺎري اﯾﺮان، http://cutt.us/E4iqt (29) ﭘﮭﭙﺎد ﺷﺎھﺪ ۱۲۹، ﺟﻨﮕﺎوران، http://cutt.us/P6uDL (30) اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﯾﺔ 25، اﻷﺣﻮاز .. «ﺗﻔﺮﯾﺲ اﻟﻌﺮب» طﻤﺲ ﻗﻮﻣﻲ وﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ ﻣﻤﻨﮭﺞ، http://cutt.us/3v58T (31) اﯾﺮان اﻧﺘﺮﻧﺎﺷﯿﻮﻧﺎل، ﺑﺎزداﺷﺖ ﮔﺮوھﯽ از ﻣﻌﺘﺮﺿﺎن در ﺷﮭﺮھﺎی ﺧﻮزﺳﺘﺎن، ۱۱ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ ۱۳۹۷ ، 28 Iran Case File, April 2018

http://cutt.us/rKgBF (32) ﺑﺮﺗﺮﯾﻦ ھﺎ، ﺗﻮﺿﯿﺢ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻧﺪه ﻧﺎﺟﺎ درﺑﺎره ﻧﺎآراﻣﯽھﺎی اھﻮاز، ۱۲ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/2VrDD ،۱۳۹۷ (33) ﺑﺎزداﺷﺖ ﺑﯿﺶ از ٤۰۰ ﺷﮭﺮوﻧﺪ ﻋﺮب در اﻋﺘﺮاﺿﺎت اھﻮاز، ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﻧﯿﺮوھﺎی رژﯾﻢ، ۹ اﺑﺮﯾﻞ ۲۰۱۸، http://cutt.us/Esrk (34) ﺟﻮاﻧﮫ ھﺎ، ﮔﺰارﺷﯽ از ﺗﻌﺪاد ﺑﺎزداﺷﺖ ﺷﺪﮔﺎن در اﺳﺘﺎن ﺧﻮزﺳﺘﺎن ھﻤﺮاه ﺑﺎ اﺳﺎﻣﯽ ﺑﺮﺧﯽ از آﻧﺎن، ۹/٤/۲۰۱۸، http://cutt.us/j9y78 (35) اﻟﺒﻮاﺑﺔ، إﯾﺮان: اﻋﺘﻘﺎل 400 ﻋﺮﺑﻲ ﺷﺎرﻛﻮا ﻓﻲ اﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت اﻷﺣﻮاز، 8 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ http://cutt.us/KZqW1 ،2018 (36) ﻛﺮدﺳﺘﺎن ۲٤، ﻧﻤﺎﯾﻨﺪە ﺧﻮزﺳﺘﺎن در ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺎن: ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﮫ وطﺮح ﺧﻮاﺳﺘﮫھﺎ واﻋﺘﺮاﺿﺎت ﺣﻖ ﺑﺪﯾﮭﯽ ﻣﺮدم اﺳﺖ، ۸ اﺑﺮﯾﻞ http://cutt.us/zMh7p ،۲۰۱۸ (37) رادﯾﻮ زﻣﺎﻧﮫ، ﺗﻈﺎھﺮات ﻋﺮبھﺎی اھﻮاز ﺑﮫ ﺧﺸﻮﻧﺖ ﮐﺸﯿﺪه ﺷﺪ، ۱۰ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/LGyIB ،۱۳۹۷ (38) رادﯾﻮ ﻓﺮدا، ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻧﺪه ﭘﻠﯿﺲ اﯾﺮان: در ﻧﺎآراﻣﯽھﺎی اﺧﯿﺮ ﺧﻮزﺳﺘﺎن ﮐﺴﯽ ﮐﺸﺘﮫ ﻧﺸﺪه اﺳﺖ، ۱۲ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ ۱۳۹۷، http://cutt.us/UY7Hb (39) اﻟﻤﻌﮭﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ، ﺗﺮاﺟﻊ ﺳﺮﯾﻊ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻠﺔ اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ أﻣﺎم اﻟﺪوﻻر: أﺑﻌﺎد ودﻻﻻت، 8 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ 2018، https://goo.gl/JqpAbD (40) ﺻﺤﯿﻔﺔ اﻟﯿﻮم اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ، إﯾﺮان ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪ أﺳﻌﺎر ﺻﺮف اﻹﺳﺘﺮﻟﯿﻨﻲ واﻟﺪوﻻر واﻟﯿﻮرو ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺮﯾﺎل اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﻲ، 10 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ 2018، https://goo.gl/SeZsn3 (41) أي إن ﺳﻌﺮ اﻟﺼﺮف ﯾﺘﻐﯿﺮ ﺑﺤﺮﯾﺔ أﻣﺎم ﺑﺎﻗﻲ اﻟﻌﻤﻼت َو ْﻓﻘًﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﺮض واﻟﻄﻠﺐ ﻋﻠﯿﮫ دون ﺗَ ﱡﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ أو ﻣﻊ ﺗَ ﱡﺪﺧﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪود ﻣﻌﯿﱠﻨﺔ، وذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻜﺲ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺼﺮف اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺘﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ِﺗﺤﺪّدھﺎ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ. (42) اﻧﻈﺮ: ﻓﺎروق ﺻﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺨﻄﯿﺐ، ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﯾﺰ أﺣﻤﺪ دﯾﺎب، دراﺳﺎت ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﯾﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ، 2015، دار ﺧﻮارزم اﻟﻌﻠﻤﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ واﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ، ﺟﺪة، ص311 وﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪھﺎ. (43) اﻟﻤﻌﮭﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ، ﺗﺮاﺟﻊ ﺳﺮﯾﻊ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻠﺔ اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺔ أﻣﺎم اﻟﺪوﻻر، ﻣﺮﺟﻊ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ. (44) ﺻﺤﯿﻔﺔ ﻣﻌﺎرﯾﻒ، ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ ﱠﻗﺮر اﻟﺤﺮب: إﯾﺮان ﺗﺴﺘﻌﺪّ ﻟﺤﺮب ﺷﺎﻣﻠﮫ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻮﻻﯾﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة وإﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ (ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺒﺮﯾﺔ)، 7 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ http://www.maariv.co.il/news/world/Article-630736 ،2018 (45) ﻟﻠﻤﺰﯾﺪ اﻧﻈﺮ: https://goo.gl/E1asbi (46) ﻣﺤﻤﻮد ﺟﺎم ﺳﺎز، ﭼﺎﻟﺶھﺎی ارزی ﺳﺎل 97 ، ﺻﺤﯿﻔﺔ ”ﻋﺼﺮ اﯾﺮاﻧﯿﺎن“، http://soo.gd/cdJH. (47) اﺑﺮار اﻗﺘﺼﺎدي، ﻋﻀﻮ ﮐﻤﯿﺴﯿﻮن ﺑﻮدﺟﮫ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﻣﻄﺮح ﮐﺮد: ﺿﻌﻒ دوﻟﺖ در ﮐﻨﺘﺮل ﺑﺎزار ارز۱۸ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ ۱۳۹۷، https://goo.gl/uCxeZe (48) ﮐﺸﻒ ۸۰ درﺻﺪ ﻣﻮاد ﻣﺨﺪر ﺟﮭﺎن ﺗﻮﺳﻂ اﯾﺮان (ص۱٤)، ۲۳ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/2MZHh ،۱۳۹٦ (49) آرﻣﺎن، ۸ ﻣﯿﻠﯿﻮن إﯾﺮاﻧﻲ ﻣﻌﺘﺎدﻧﺪ (ص٤)، ۱۰ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/ryHOw ،۱۳۹٦ (50) ﺗﺠﺎرت، اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ ﻣﺼﺮف ﻣﺎده ﻣﺨﺪر ﮔﻞ در ﺗﮭﺮان، ۲۷ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ hppp://cutt.us/J5uiY ،۱۳۹٦ (51) ارﻣﺎن، ﺑﯿﺶ از ۱۰۰۰ ﻣﻌﺘﺎد ﻣﺘﺠﺎھﺮ زن در ﺗﮭﺮان، http://cutt.us/kmjyA (52) ارﻣﺎن اﻣﺮوز، ۱۰ ھﺰار ﻣﻌﺘﺎد ﻣﺘﺠﺎھﺮ زن در ﺗﮭﺮان، ۲۷ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/jD0UP ،۱۳۹۷ (53) اﺑﺘﻜﺎر، ﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﯾﯽ ﺳﺎاﻧﮫ ۱۰۰ھﺰار داﻧﺶ آﻣﻮز در ﻣﻌﺮض ﺧﻄﺮ (ص۳)، ۱٦ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/aDv6L ،۱۳۹٦ (54) ارﻣﺎن اﻣﺮوز، ۰٫۸٪ در ﺻﺪ داﻧﺶ اﻣﻮزان در ﻣﻌﺮض اﻋﺘﯿﺎد، ۲٦ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/EWFG3 ،۱۳۹٦ (55) اﯾﺮان، ﺟﻤﻌﯿﺖ اﯾﺮان از ﻣﺮز ۸۱ ﻣﯿﻠﯿﻮن ﻧﻔﺮ ﮔﺬﺷﺖ، ۲٤ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/dPemz ،۱۳۹٦ (56) اﯾﺮان، زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ۱۰ ﻣﯿﻠﯿﻮن ﻧﻔﺮ زﯾﺮ ﺧﻂ ﻓﻘﺮ ﺷﺎﯾﺴﺘﮫ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻧﯿﺴﺖ، ۲٤ اﺳﻔﻨﺪ http://cutt.us/7PgiG ،۱۳۹٦ (57) ﺗﺴﻨﯿﻢ، رﺋﯿﺲ دﻓﺘﺮ رﺋﯿﺲ ﺟﻤﮭﻮر: ﺟﻤﻌﯿﺖ ﺑﯿﮑﺎران ﺑﯿﺶ از ۳ ﻣﯿﻠﯿﻮن ﻧﻔﺮ اﺳﺖ، ۱٤ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ ۱۳۹۷، http://tn.ai/1691622 (58) رادﯾﻮ ﻓﺮدا، آﯾﺖاﻟﻠﮫ ﺟﻮادی آﻣﻠﯽ: ﻣﻠﺖ ﻗﯿﺎم ﮐﻨﺪ ھﻤﮫ ﻣﺎ را ﺑﮫ درﯾﺎ ﺧﻮاھﻨﺪ رﯾﺨﺖ، 7 اردﯾﺒﮭﺸﺖ 1397، https://bit.ly/2vVSKys 29 30 Iran Case File, April 2018

Arab Affairs First: Iran and the interactions in the Syrian arena

During April 2018, the Syrian arena witnessed important developments that reflected on the Iranian role in Syria, and we can highlight the most important developments by addressing the following elements: 31

» The use of chemical weapons in Duma and Iran’s reaction: The targeting of residential neighborhoods in Duma on 7 April 2018 led to mixed reactions from all regional and international parties. While the regime tried to deny responsibility for the incident, opposition parties and many international actors accused the regime for this attack. (1) As it was leading a massive military operation and intense shelling to eliminate the armed opposition in this vital region with the help of its Iranian and Russian allies, within its effort to clear any opposition pocket in the areas they control.

The Iranian regime supports the Syrian regime, which considers these accusations as baseless and contradicts the facts on the ground since Damascus had cooperated with the United Nations after agreeing to the Chemical Weapons Convention (2). However, Tehran blamed Saudi Arabia for the use of chemical weapons under the pretext of the Syrian refusal for Saudi Arabia to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of Syria and in return removing Hezbollah and Iran from Syria (3). In fact, Iran has never accused the Syrian regime of using chemical weapons against its own people, although the regime has been accused by many international bodies of carrying out at least 50 chemical weapons attacks since the beginning of the crisis in March 2011. (4)

» Israeli targeting Iranian presence in Syria: The accusation against the Syrian regime of the chemical attack was used by Israel to carry out an air strike on the T-4 military base on April 10, 2018, where it includes a base for the Iranian drones. This incident killed many Iranian, such as the commander of the Iranian drone’s base, who is also the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps ‘ Colonel Mahdi Dehqan Yazdli.(5) The Israeli-Iranian confrontation in Syria is multifaceted, so the aim of the last Israeli strike was likely to respond to Iranian drones penetrating Israeli airspace and one of them was shot down by Israel in March 2018. The recent developments confirm with Israel’s vision in eliminating Iranian presence in Syria, as this was not the only time Israeli planes have bombed Iranian forces or their militias (6). This was expressed by the Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman “ we will not allow Iran to have a permanent foothold in Syria. We have no other choice”. (7) Israel is concerned about Iranian growth in Syria and its implications for Israel’s national 32 Iran Case File, April 2018

security. Israel estimates the number of Shiite forces under Iranian control in Syria to be about 20,000. Some of them according to the statistics of the Israeli army, are about 2,000 Iranian soldiers and advisers, 7,500 Hezbollah members and 9,000 members from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (8). The Iranian efforts do not stop at establishing a permanent foothold in Syria, but Iran is also assisting the regime and supporting its air forces, as the regime succeeded in taking out an Israeli aircraft in February 2018. (9) Relatively, the US intelligence has tracked a series of Iranian flights to Syria suspected of transferring weapons to the regime or Iranian forces there, which may pose a threat to Israel. (10) Iran and Israel have exchanged escalation and accusations. Iran vowed to respond to the “crime” carried out by Israel, a reference to Israeli attack on the Syrian T-4 base, but the Israeli response was stronger. Israeli security officials said, “Assad’s regime and Assad himself will disappear from the map and the world if the Iranians do try to harm Israel or its interests from Syrian territory, because Israel is determined to continue on this issue to the very end”. Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said “We will not allow Iran to consolidate its military presence in Syria at any cost, because if we agreed about their presence, as if we would agree to putting a choking collar around our neck, that would not happen at all”. (11) The constant developments reflect the nature of the conflict raging between Iran and Israel on the Syrian arena, which seems to escalate for the next phase in which each party seeks to protect its interests and preserve its gains. There is no doubt that Israel is more motivated now after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took up his duties and his affirmation of Israel’s inherent right of self-defense, not to mention, the US commitment to repress Iran’s influence in Syria. (12)

» Iran and Trump’s statements about the US withdrawal from Syria: Confusion and contradiction still dominates the American position around the Syrian crisis. US President Donald Trump shocked the public by saying that “the time has come for US troops to leave Syria. The US involvement in this country is costly and beneficial to other countries” (13). These statements were followed by Trump’s decision to freeze $200 million in aid to Syria and he called for reassessing the US role in Syria (14). There is no doubt that this approach serving the interest of Iran, which seeks to assert its influence in Syria, especially when Trump has linked the existence of US forces with defeating ISIS and the end of this mission requires the withdrawal of US forces from Syria. Trump’s comments and decision comes at a time when Trump’s advisers believe that the existence of the United States in Syria was necessary so that Iran would not have a chance to establish its presence there. This was also the view of the former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who also believed that the existence of the US forces is a guarantee that Syria will not become an Iranian base (15). Trump’s stance, in fact, reveals the absence of a coherent strategy towards Iran. Then, how can we understand the adoption of a strategy of confronting Iran’s regional influence with this kind of withdrawal tendencies?! Iran considered these statements as a new defeat for the United States, and like the American withdrawal from Iraq. Iranians see Trump’s talk about spending $7 billion without any achievement in Syria as a recognition of failure, (16) and they also believe that American withdrawal from Syria will change it into another Iraq in its grip.

» Iran and the triple military strike (American - British - French) on Syria: The United States with its allies, Britain and France, launched a military strike on April 13, 2018 against some Syrian targets in response to the use of chemical weapons in Duma (17). The significant 33

point here is that clarifying how this strike affected the Iranian influence in Syria. In fact, the operation targeted number of facilities for manufacturing chemical weapons by launching more than 100 missiles from US, British and French fighters and launchers. According to the Pentagon, three targets were attacked; the main pillar of the research institute in Al-Barza, a storage of sarin gas and a chemical weapons production center in Homs. (18) The strike provoked widespread Iranian internal reaction, as the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that the attack on Syria was a “crime.”(19) The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly condemning the missile attack and warned of regional and international consequences (20). The IRGC also issued a statement condemning the criminal attack by the United States, Britain and France against Syria and declared that this missile attack on Syria indicates the apparent failure of the Western allies in supporting Takfiri terrorism (21). The Iranian army’s statement also condemned the missile attack and considered it because of the failure and frustration of the global arrogance. (22) With this furor of statements and criticism, Iran insisted on continuing its support to the Syrian regime (23) without reacting to this attack. The former Iranian ambassador to Jordan Nasra allah Tajiks said, “It does not seem that America is heading for a severe blow against Syria, and the issue is not so violent that it requires Iran’s intervention”(24). Iran believes that the strike aimed at influencing its positions and attracting Russia away from it to appear alone on the Syrian scene. This is confirmed by Russia’s non-interference and coordination with the United State such as Russia’s participation in the negotiations called by Trump in the White House, which could lead to an agreement that would harm Iran. (25) In fact, this triple attack did not target the Iranian forces operating in Syria or even its militias (26), despite the claim of the US Vice President Mike Pence that Russia and Iran should be blamed for these chemical attacks in Syria (27). This would send a message that there is no American desire to confront Iran in Syria at this stage, and this contradicts all American statements about reducing the regional influence of Iran. Undoubtedly, this attack included a clear message to Iran that the engagement boundaries between the active actors and the American red line are not on the use of chemical weapons and the protection of civilians. The strike was a tool used to change the balance of power on the ground. This attack seems to have been ineffective on the internal conflict stream as much as it was a message to stabilize the status quo. This situation is a major challenge for Iran, which seeks to change its military influence into a political process in Syria to guarantee its influence path from Tehran to the Mediterranean. This message is linked to another one which is aimed at disrupting the Astana negotiations led by Turkey, Russia and Iran, emphasizing that “The Syrian issue cannot be resolved without the mutual understanding with the United States and Europe, and the need to return to the Geneva negotiations” as a possible path to a political settlement in Syria. (28)

» Russian-Turkish-Iranian coordination in Syria (Ankara meeting): There is no doubt that the Russian-Turkish-Iranian coordination in Syria led to form a new reality imposed on the crisis. Such prominent coordination between the three countries in the second round of the tripartite discussions around the future of Syria November 22, 2011 in Sochi, (29) with the participation of Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The last round of this coordination was held on 4 April 2018 and the agenda of this summit was confined to discuss the Syrian file. (30) 34 Iran Case File, April 2018

The previous axis is encountered by another one led by America and the two axis are diverged not only in their vision about the Syrian future but also in the struggle over the land and the sharing of influence. So, these meetings are part of a multi-level coordination between the three countries, such as the Sochi and Astana negotiations, which sometimes played a role in reducing the size of the conflict in Syria, and opened the way for an alternative settlement process from Geneva. This approach witnessed various rounds in Astana and Sochi with some Syrian political and armed opposition participation. This Summit addressed the process of ceasing -fire in the agreed-upon areas of pacification, especially after striking extremist organizations, primarily ISIS, as well as the developments in the military operations led by regime and the military operations in the North by Turkey (31). The Syrian army tightened its control over Eastern Ghouta with the help of Russia and Iran, while the Turkish army entered Afrin in northern Syria after a three-month war. These developments perhaps prompted Russia to announce a new round of negotiations in Astana on 14 and 15 May 2018. (32) The three countries agreed on the unity of the Syrian territories and coordinating their efforts to stand up against separatist intentions that seek to weaken the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and the national security of neighboring countries. The presidents also stressed the continuous cooperation to cease-fire between the conflicting parties, to move on with the political settlement, to work together for the return of the displaced, and to fight terrorism. (33) Despite this coordination, the divergent positions between the three countries cannot be ignored. Away from the public statements, this meeting was mainly to test the political centers along with the military developments on the ground. Turkey wants Russia and Iran to recognize the legitimacy of its presence on the ground in northern Syria, and Iran wants Russia to continue its support for its presence in Syria. Despite the obvious implicit understandings around these areas, the summit had showed some differences on the surface. This was reflected in President Rouhani’s statement “on the need for all foreign forces to leave Syria”. President Putin is also interested in uniting this front to counter Western and US pressure in the region, and he is even ready to reconsider Assad’s survival issue, unlike Tehran, which considered it as vital issue to secure its influence in Syria. (34) The amount of dispute from the divergent positions was obvious from the trilateral military strike on Syria as the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement welcoming the joint attack and describing it as an appropriate response which supports the Western and American accusation of the Syrian regime using chemical weapons. While Russia considered this attack as a violation of international law, as President Putin said in response to the attack “Russia condemns the attack on Syria. Russian forces are helping the legitimate government in fighting terrorism”. And The Iranian position was consistent with the Russian one, which considered it as illegal and the Supreme Leader described it as a crime committed by the US.(35) It is obvious that the overall reaction in the Syrian arena emphasizes the fact that Iran maintains its influence without a real threat during the current stage as it still maintains coordination to ensure its influence with both Russia and Turkey, despite the differences between the three parties. But the mutual need for each party makes this coordination up to the degree of strategic compatibility. As well as the US hesitancy or confusion within the Trump administration on dealing with Syria allows Iran to stick to its positions on the Syrian arena. However, Iran has consolidated its existence through supporting the Syrian regime, as it succeed to avoid the direct clash with US forces. Iran tries to implement its strategy in Syria through a long-term policy and the use of contradictions in the Syrian crisis. The Israeli targeting of Iranian forces and militias is the most dangerous thing that could face 35

Iran. This was apparent in the repetitive targeting against Iranian forces by the Israeli Air Force, but the survival of the Iranians in Syria remains a strategic option, which is indispensable to the Syrian regime. Iran has the ultimate power in determining the future of Syria because of the actors’ disability in resolving the conflict, as well as the desperate condition of achieving a settlement that would satisfy all the parties involved in the crisis, as the Geneva and Astana stages of settlement have failed. It is likely that the sharing of influence and the division of Syrian territory would either settle down the struggle or stabilize the status quo the next stage in the Syrian arena, especially with partial battles on the lines of contact or unloading the areas of influence from any pockets of opposition, as what happened in Ghouta. In the light of the recent scenario, Iran will keep its share alongside the Syrian regime and Russia in areas around Damascus and Western Syria, to have a possible chance for changing this formula, which was shaped on the remains of millions of victims, displaced persons, and the ruins of the Syrian nation state.

Second: Iran and the Yemeni crisis The Yemeni arena witnessed several developments during April 2018. The most prominent of these developments was the progress of the Yemeni National Army on various fronts, which contributed to the decline of the Houthis militia on several fronts. The militia also fired ballistic missiles towards Saudi Arabia, with Iranian support. The most important of these developments can be addressed through the following elements:

» The developments in the Yemeni arena: Iran relies on the Houthi militia to extend its influence on the South of the Arabian Peninsula, and to threaten the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states from the South. During April 2018, the Houthi militia intensified their missile attacks on some Saudi cities. More than 15 ballistic missiles were intercepted by the Saudi Royal Air Defense Forces (see table). These operations may be linked to the Iranian-Saudi escalation over deep disagreements around several regional issues and files, including the Yemeni file. Several regional and international actors have confirmed Iran’s responsibility for supporting the Houthis with short- and long-range ballistic missiles. The United Nations has considered these missile strikes and Iran’s role as a clear violation of UN resolutions «2216» and «2231», because they target populated areas, and civilians in general. In the same context, in a qualitative development, the Houthis used drones targeting Abha Regional Airport. The Coalition’s Spokesman Colonel Turki al-Malki said that by examining the aircraft’s wreckage, it was found to be a drone with Iranian characteristics and qualities. (36) 36 Iran Case File, April 2018

The table below shows the rockets and ballistic missiles fired by the Houthi militias towards the Kingdom’s territory during April 2018.

Date Time Missiles City Results

Riyadh, The rocket’s fragments were On Wednesday Najran, scattered over residential areas 5:32 pm Three rockets (April 11th) Jazan and no damage or injury was reported.

The closure of air traffic in On Wednesday accordance with the laws of 7:40 am Drone Abha (April 11th) international aviation, and then reopening the air traffic as usual

The rocket’s fragments were On Monday Ballistic scattered over some residential 10:16 pm Najran (April 16th) missile areas and no injuries were reported.

The rocket’s fragments were On Friday Ballistic scattered over residential areas 10:02 AM Jazan (April 20th) missile and no damage or injury was reported.

The rockets’ fragments scattered On Sunday Two Ballistic over the residential areas that 4:24 pm Najran (April 22th) Missiles set the fire at a farm owned by a citizen without injuries reported.

The rockets’ fragments were On Monday Two Ballistic 4:24 pm Jazan scattered over the residential ( April 23d) Missiles areas without injuries or damage.

On Wednesday A citizen was injured by rocket 5:49 pm Mortar shell Najran (April 25th) fragments

On Friday Ballistic 12:46 pm Najran Without any damage (April 27th) missile 37

On Friday Ballistic 12:41 pm Jazan Without any damage (April 27th) missile

A citizen was killed and two On Saturday 4 ballistic 10:40 am Jazan houses and three vehicles were (April 28th) missiles damaged

On the other hand, the legitimate Yemeni forces continued their advance in different locations, as the Yemeni army engaged in fierce battles in Kataf al-Baqa, East of the Saada province, specifically near mountain Atis and Melil. (37) Military sources also reported that coalition aircraft launched more than eight raids on militia concentrations near mountain Melil overlooking the Al fara’a area. These operations resulted in targeting some weapons and the death of several Houthi leaders, including Houthi leader Ahmed Hussein Muayed(38). Another Houthi leader was killed in air strikes targeting Houthi gatherings in Al-Baidah province, the middle of Yemen, in the district of Sawadiya and a weapons depot of the militia was destroyed after it turned the Technical Institute building into a weapons depot and assembly point for its members. In the Hajjah province, more than 50 Houthis were killed by the coalition’s artillery and air strikes (39). The Arab Coalition Forces for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen launched a raid on April 19 in the province of Hodeidah in Western Yemen, which resulted in killing two militia leaders, such as the prominent leader Saleh Ali al-Sammad, the head of the Political Council. According to security sources, military leaders of the Houthis accompanied Saleh Ali al-Sammad, were killed as well. (40) Iranian authorities commented about the killing of Al-sammad, as it was the first successful operation against Houthi leaders by using one of the UAE’s drones especially after it bought the “Wing Long 2” drone from China, which is equivalent to the capabilities of the American MQ 9. The UAE’s drone launched an explosive head, the AKD-10, equivalent to the American “Hellfire”.(41) On the other side, the Yemeni national resistance under the leadership of Tariq Saleh, supported by the UAE armed forces, and the support of the resistance “Tihamiah “ and “Southern” resistance, took over the Tabab and other military sites of the Houthis at the junction of Mocha and Barh. The resistance is engaged in a wide operation in the west coast under the cover of air fighters of the Arab Alliance, which destroyed weapon depots, ammunition and military mechanisms of the Houthis at the junction of Mocha. Saleh’s national resistance forces continued to advance on the west coast fronts controlling strategic positions from the grip of the Iranian Houthis militia East of the Mocha junction and Barh, the west of the Taiz province. (42) Tariq Saleh’s office stated that the forces he leads, which he called the Yemeni army, do not represent any party, class or group, and no one has the right to speak on his behalf. The military leaders close to Tariq Saleh confirmed that the forces he is training will work to stabilize security and confront retaliation, to liberate Yemen from the power of those who led coup. (43) According to Iranian sources, Tareq Saleh has formed a new axis for confronting the Houthis, especially after his success in controlling the city of Hays supported by some Yemeni tribes, and coordination with coalition forces, especially the UAE. (44) It is important to mention here the military personnel who arrived in Aden during the past three months amounted to 10 thousand officers and soldiers as they were re-arranged in combat battalions and military brigades, supervised by the late president’s nephew with the support of the Arab Alliance (45). The Yemeni army and the Arab coalition forces have also developed the attack technique on the battlefront and concentrating 38 Iran Case File, April 2018

themselves in new strategic areas. In addition, the militia lost many of its leaders, most importantly Saleh Ali al-Sammad, the head of the Political Council of the militia, in an air strike of coalition forces in Al Hudaydah, who previously threatened Saudi Arabia by saying “This year will be ballistic excellence” pointing out that Saudi Arabia will be attacked by such missiles, regardless of its defense systems (46). The militia announced the killing of one of its most prominent leaders, who was the second in the list of 40 Houthi terrorists, announced by Saudi Arabia that allocated $20 million for any information leading to his arrest or to determine his whereabouts. (47) In speech broadcasted by the Houthi channel “ Almasirah”, the leader of the Houthi Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said that “The aggressor countries led by America and Saudi Arabia are responsible for the commission of this terrible crime and its consequences,” and he also stated that “This crime will not go unpunished, neither will it nor the other terrible crimes against our dear people.”(48) While the Spokesman for the Houthis, Mohamed Abdel Salam, called all Yemenis to move in what he called the “Gun march” in Tihama in loyalty to the head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Saleh Ali al-Sammad. (49) The Yemeni government’s legitimate leader, Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, described the killing of Saleh Ali al-Sammad as a painful and cruel blow to the Houthi forces and as a victory for the law. (50)

This table shows the targeting of the most important leaders in the Houthi militia in April:

Name Occupation Date Location

Ahmed Hussein Houthi Field Commander 8 April 2018 Saada province Meayed

Known as Abu Houthi Field Commander 8 April 2018 Bayda province Qusay

19 April Farres Manna Weapons dealer Al Hudaydah province 2018

The head of the Political 19 April Saleh al-Sammad Al Hudaydah province Council 2018

Gen. Ali Hamoud 19 April Deputy Chief of Staff Al Hudaydah province Al - Moshaki 2018

Hamid Ahmed 28 April Houthi Field Commander Bayda province Younis Al - Kareidi 2018

Ali Dahan Farhan 28 April Houthi Field Commander Bayda province al - Abdi 2018

Ismail Yahya 28 April Houthi Field Commander Bayda province Gharbani 2018 39

» Regional and international criticism. And Iran’s relationship in supporting the Houthis: The international and regional forces condemned the continuous violations by the Houthi militia supported by Iran for UN resolutions 2216 and 2231. By launching many ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi Arabia. In this context, the Spokesman of the coalition, Colonel Turki al- Maliki, stated that this aggressive and random act proves the continuous involvement of the Iranian regime by supporting the Houthi armed militia with qualitative capabilities, to threaten the security of Saudi Arabia and to destabilize the security of the region. Maliki stressed that the actions of the Houthis militia is a dangerous development in the war against the terrorist organization and those behind them who are the sponsors of terrorism such as the Iranian regime. (51) At the same extent, the US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, on April 17, 2018, during a session of the Security Council in New York, said that this is the time to start serious negotiations to resolve the Yemeni crisis, pointing out that the war in Yemen was at a critical juncture with the presence of a new UN envoy. Nikki Haley also said, “We should not fear the condemnation of the Houthis and their Iranian sponsors,” adding, “we support our Saudi partners for defending their security”. (52)

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Driansaid said that Iran was supplying weapons to the Houthis in Yemen. He also stated to “RTL” radio that “There is a problem in Yemen, the political process has not started yet, and Saudi Arabia feels that it is constantly under the attack committed by the Houthis who themselves are getting weapons from Iran.” (53) The members of the UN Security Council condemned the multiple attacks launched by the Houthis militias in Yemen against Saudi Arabia, as they pose a threat to regional security. In a statement that mentioned, “Members of the Security Council expressed their concern over the stated intention of the Houthis to continue their attacks on Saudi Arabia and to launch additional attacks against other countries in the region”. (54) Human Rights Watch said that the Houthis forces in Yemen had violated the laws of war by firing ballistic missiles indiscriminately at populated areas in Saudi Arabia. Sarah Leah Whitson, the Middle East and North Africa Director at Human Rights Watch said, “ The Houthis should immediately stop their indiscriminate missile attacks on populated areas of Saudi Arabia.”(55) 40 Iran Case File, April 2018

» Iranian position on the developments in the Yemeni arena: Iran considered the accusations regarding the transfer of Iranian missiles to the Houthis as unfounded, and as an attempt to deny any role for supporting the Houthis with weapons. (56) It also condemned the killing of several Houthi leaders, especially al-Sammad, as the Spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Bahram Qassimi expressed his condolences in connection with the killing of al-Sammad the head of the militias Political Council in Yemen.(57) The secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, said that the blood of al-Sammad proved the right of Yemen’s struggle, stressing that the assassination of political leaders were meant to finish dialogue and any possible channel of a political solution.(58) Confirming its role in the Yemeni conflict, Iran incited the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia. A prominent member of the Revolutionary Committee of Ansar Allah in Yemen, Tawfiq al-Humiri, called on the Syrian government to bomb Saudi bases, in response to the attack carried out by Western countries against it.(59)

Events Interactions: » Iran considers the US-British-French attack on military sites in Syria as a parade operation. » Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the attack on Syria. » Israeli fighters bomb T-4 airport, according to Russian sources. » Iran sends planes to Syria suspected of transporting weapons. » Israeli Defense Minister: We will bomb Tehran if Iran attacks us. » Israel announces the killing of 18 Iranian soldiers in Hama. Iran denies any loss of its elements. » Coalition forces intercept a ballistic missile fired towards Mocha. » A Red Cross International Committee member was killed by unidentified gunmen. » The Houthis hold 19 vessels carrying oil derivatives. » The appointment of Mehdi Muhammad Hussein al-Mashat as President of the Supreme Political Council. » The Houthis militia threatens to blow up the historic city of Zabid in Al Hudaydah. » Milkafi: Yemen suffers from the Houthis terrorism. » The UN Coordinator puts three priorities for her mission in Yemen. » The Houthis militia set up a trap for Sudanese soldiers in the province of Hajjah in Northern Yemen. 41

Endnotes

(1) Al-Badri: a new chemical attack in Syria.. This time in Douma... And the victims are dozens of citizens, Deutsche Welle, April 9, 2018, goo.gl/4b5Tdf (2) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری داﻧﺷﺟوﯾﺎن اﯾران – اﯾﺳﻧﺎ: ﻗﺎﺳﻣﯽ: ﺑﮫ ﮐﺎرﮔﯾری ﺳﻼح ﺷﯾﻣﯾﺎﯾﯽ در ھر ﺟﺎی ﺟﮭﺎن ﺑﮫ ﺷدت ﻣﺣﮑوم اﺳت، ۱۹ ﻓروردﯾن ۱۳۹۷، http://cutt.us/nHefK (3) ﺑﺎﺷﮕﺎه ﺧﺑرﻧﮕﺎران ﺟوان: اﻓﺷﺎﮔری از ﻧﻘش ﺳﻌودیھﺎ در ﺟﻧﺟﺎل ﺷﯾﻣﯾﺎﯾﯽ «دوﻣﺎ»، ۲۱ ﻓروردﯾن http://cutt.us/184od ،۱۳۹۷ (4) Ala-khabar Alaa’n: Washington: Syrian regime used chemical weapons 50 times, 13 April 2018, goo.gl/SkcyUH (5) Mahmoud Hamdi Abu Qasim, Iranians between two wars, International Institute of Iranian Studies, April 24, 2018, goo.gl/A7sdYh (6) Felicia Schwartz: Trump Freezes Funds for Syrian Recovery, Signaling Pullback, The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2018, goo.gl/ucBB6Z (Haaretz (7:: ליברמן: לא יודע מי תקף בסוריה, אבל אנחנו לא נאפשר התבססות איראנית، goo.gl/FqxS3a (Haaretz (8:: הצמרת הביטחונית דוחפת לקו התקפי מול איראן בסוריה، goo.gl/VaUZj3 (Haaretz (9:: הצמרת הביטחונית דוחפת לקו התקפי מול איראן בסוריה، goo.gl/zKVjUp, See: Altabayiyn Institute of Strategic Studies https://goo.gl/oeWsDh (10) Haami Shilo: Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.6028818 (Maariv (11: בכירים במערכת הביטחון: «אם איראן תפעל נגדנו – נפיל את אסד goo.gl/pC4LYC (12) הצבא הסורי חצה את הפרת. מול איתות של פומפיו לישראל מול איזה מטרות לפעול בסוריה, איתות תמיכה רוסי בכוחות האיראניים בסוריה، https://goo.gl/hWjikk (13) CNN Arabia: Trump: We’ll get out of Syria very soon.. Let others care about it now, 30 March 2018, goo.gl/ Q43gxo (14) CNN Arabia: Trump Freezes $ 200 Million as Aid for Reconstruction of Syria, 01 April 2018, goo.gl/ K6qZiH (Yedioth Ahronoth (15:: טראמפ מקפיא סיוע לסוריה, יועציו מזהירים מאיראן goo.gl/MY9JBr (16) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری ﻣﮭر: ﺗﺻﻣﯾم ﺗراﻣپ درﺑﺎره ﺳورﯾﮫ؛ اذﻋﺎن ﺑﮫ ﺷﮑﺳت ﯾﺎ ﺑﺎج ﮔﯾری از رﯾﺎض، http://cutt.us/0cGO4 (Press Today (17: ﺑﯾﺎﻧﯾﮫ ﺳﭘﺎه ﭘﺎﺳداران در ﻣﺣﮑوﻣﯾت ﺣﻣﻠﮫ ﻣوﺷﮑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ، http://cutt.us/G7Eyd (Walaa» news» (18: נכתשו עד דק: הלוויין חושף את ההרס במתקני הנשק הכימי בסוריה goo.gl/65wkgv (Aintikhab (19: رھﺑر ﻣﻌظم اﻧﻘﻼب ﮔﻔﺗﻧد: ﺣﻣﻠﮫ ﺳﺣرﮔﺎه اﻣروز ﺑﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ ﯾﮏ ﺟﻧﺎﯾت اﺳت. ﺑﻧده ًﺻرﯾﺣﺎ اﻋﻼم ﻣﯽﮐﻧم رﺋﯾسﺟﻣﮭور آﻣرﯾﮑﺎ، رﺋﯾسﺟﻣﮭور ﻓراﻧﺳﮫ وﻧﺧﺳتوزﯾر اﻧﮕﻠﯾس ﺟﻧﺎﯾﺗﮑﺎرﻧد وﺟﻧﺎﯾت ﮐردﻧد، http://cutt.us/1szH3 (20) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری ﻓﺎرس: اﯾران ﺗﺟﺎوز ﻣوﺷﮑﯽ آﻣرﯾﮑﺎ وﻣﺗﺣداﻧش ﺑﮫ ﺧﺎک ﺳورﯾﮫ را ﺑﮫ ﺷدت ﻣﺣﮑوم ﮐرد، http://cutt.us/gjShW (Khabar net (21: وزارت اﻣور ﺧﺎرﺟﮫ ﺣﻣﻠﮫ ﺑﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ را ﻣﺣﮑوم ﮐرد، http://cutt.us/s3egR (22) ﺧﺑر ﮔزاری ﺗﺳﻧﯾم: واﮐﻧش ارﺗش درﺑﺎره ﺣﻣﻠﮫ ﻣوﺷﮑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ، http://tn.ai/1700346 (23) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری داﻧﺷﺟوﯾﺎن اﯾران – اﯾﺳﻧﺎ: وﻻﯾﺗﯽ: ھﻣﭼﻧﺎن در ﮐﻧﺎر ﺳورﯾﮫ ﻣﯽﻣﺎﻧﯾم/ اﻗداﻣﺎت آﻣرﯾﮑﺎ در ﺳورﯾﮫ ﺑﮭﺎﻧﮫﺟوﯾﯽ اﺳت، /goo.gl GDa2ve (24)«ﺟﮭﺎن ﺻﻧﻌت»: ﺑﺎﻻ ﺑودن ھزﯾﻧﮫ درﮔﯾری ﺑﺎ آﻣرﯾﮑﺎ، http://soo.gd/bOex (25) previous source. (Aietimad (26: واﻛﻧش ﻣﺗﺣدان ﺳورﯾﮫ، goo.gl/1XeFQj (27)ﺣﻣﺎﯾت: ﮔزارش «ﺣﻣﺎﯾت» از ﻋﻘدهﮔﺷﺎﯾﯽ ﻣﺣور ﻋﺑری-ﻋرﺑﯽ-ﻏرﺑﯽ ﻋﻠﯾﮫ اﯾران ﭘس از ﺷﮑﺳت ﻣﻔﺗﺿﺣﺎﻧﮫ در ﺳورﯾﮫ، /https://goo.gl H384zF (28) ﻗﺎﺳم ﻣﺣب ﻋﻠﯽ: ﭘﯾﺎم ھﺎی ﺳﯾﺎﺳﯽ ﺣﻣﻠﮫ ﻣوﺷﮑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ، ﺻﺣﯾﻔﺔ «إﯾران»، http://soo.gd/7PIF (29) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری داﻧﺷﺟوﯾﺎن اﯾران – اﯾﺳﻧﺎ: ﭘﯾش از ﻋزﯾﻣت ﺑﮫ ﺗرﮐﯾﮫ؛ رﯾﯾسﺟﻣﮭور: راهﺣل ﻣﺷﮑل ﺳورﯾﮫ، ﻧظﺎﻣﯽ ﻧﯾﺳت، /http://cutt.us 42 Iran Case File, April 2018

Suo4N (30) «ﺳﺗﺎره ﺻﺑﺢ» http://soo.gd/dtx9 (31) ﺧﺑرﮔزاری داﻧﺷﺟوﯾﺎن اﯾران – اﯾﺳﻧﺎ: ظرﯾف در ﺑدو ورود ﺑﮫ آﻧﮑﺎرا: ﺣﺿور آﻣرﯾﮑﺎ در ﺳورﯾﮫ ﺑﺎﻋث اﻓزاﯾش ﺷﮑﺎفھﺎی ﻗوﻣﯾﺗﯽ ﺷده اﺳت، http://cutt.us/udQoH (32)ﻣوﻗﻊ رادﯾو ﻓردا: ﺑﯾﺎﻧﯾﮫ ﭘﺎﯾﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﺷﺳت آﻧﮑﺎرا: ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﮫ ﺳورﯾﮫ راه ﺣل ﻧظﺎﻣﯽ ﻧدارد، http://cutt.us/92Yjl (33) Al-Jazeera Net: Ankara Summit committed to the unity of Syria and a political solution to the crisis, April 5, 2018, goo.gl/3nx9G8 (34) Oded Gernot: Israel Today, http://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/546997 (35) Ahval new: Cracks in Turkey-Russia-Iran alliance: goo.gl/NvdSxz (36) The coalition reveals the details of the landing of two Drones aircraft for Houthi Abha and Jazan, Sky News, http://cutt.us/wROUi (37) The Yemeni army is advancing. and the killing of Houthi leaders in Saada and Bayda, Al Arabiya.net, http:// cutt.us/W4w0B (38) With the support of the UAE forces... Coalition fighters destroy the sites and military mechanisms of Houthis West Coast, UAE today, http://cutt.us/DfBv1 (39) The Yemeni army is advancing.. and the killing of Houthi leaders in Saada and al - Bayda, Al Arabiya.net, http://cutt.us/W4w0B (40) Houthis announce the killing of the head of the “political council” in a raid of the Arab collation, France 24, http://cutt.us/L56h0 (41) واﮐﺎوی ﻧﻘش اﻣﺎرات در ﺗرور ﺻﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺻﻣﺎد، ﺑﺎﺷﮕﺎه ﺧﺑرﻧﮕﺎرات ﺟوان، http://cutt.us/25MMz (42) The victories of the resistance led by Tariq Saleh continue.. The killing of Houthi leaders, Sky News, http:// cutt.us/e3ExG (43) Important statement from the Office of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh on the functions of the forces led by and talks about the process of liberation, the Yemeni scene, http://cutt.us/zx7ha (44) Tariq Saleh Dar Yemen; New Targets for Violators of Ansar Allah? Andishkada Rahebard Tbein, http://cutt. us/JvGjG (45) Former Yemeni military aborted Houthi mobilization campaign, Middle East, http://cutt.us/78ZFi (46) The threat of Saudi Arabia and the criticism of Iran’s are the most prominent statements of Al-Sammad, Al Jazeera Net, http://cutt.us/4CEUe (47) Who is Houthi leader Saleh al-Sammad that was killed by the coalition? Arabic Net, http://cutt.us/vvXV0 (48) Houthi: America and Saudi Arabia are responsible for the assassination of Samad and they will be held accountable, Russia today, http://cutt.us/Pp5HG (49) «اﻟﻣﺷﺎط» در ﭘﯽ ﺷﮭﺎدت «اﻟﺻﻣﺎد» وﻛﺎﻟﺔ أﻧﺑﺎء ﺗﺳﻧﯾم، ﮔزارش ﺗﺳﻧﯾم، https://bit.ly/2qXwiPF (50) Saudi pilot refused to bomb... Details targeting Saleh Al-Emad, sputnik Arabic, http://cutt.us/HyBA (51) Intercepting a ballistic missile fired by Houthi militia towards Najran, Altaghyiur, http://cutt.us/jcCqu (52) Haley: We support our Saudi partners in defending their security, Al Arabiya.net, http://cutt.us/jPlxH (53) Paris confirms: Iran provides Houthis with free weapons, http://cutt.us/tjw53 (54) UN Security Council Condemns Attacks Houthi Militias, Middle East, http://cutt.us/MaplC (55) Saudi Arabia / Yemen: Houthi Missile Attacks, Human Rights Watch, http://cutt.us/SrsmH (56) اﺗﮭﺎم اﻧﺗﻘﺎل ﻣوﺷﮏھﺎی اﯾران ﺑﮫ ﯾﻣن ﺑرای ﺗداوم ﻓروش ﺗﺳﻠﯾﺣﺎت ﻏرﺑﯽ اﺳت، داﻧﺎ، http://cutt.us/KHWZs (57) ﺳﺧﻧﮕوی وزارت اﻣور ﺧﺎرﺟﮫ،ﺷﮭﺎدت رﺋﯾس ﺷورای ﻋﺎﻟﯽ ﺳﯾﺎﺳﯽ ﯾﻣن را ﺗﺳﻠﯾت ﮔﻔت، إﯾﺳﻧﺎ، https://bit.ly/2vJyyj5 (58) ﺷﻣﺧﺎﻧﯽ: ﺧون ﭘﺎک «اﻟﺻﻣﺎد» ﺣﻘﺎﻧﯾت وﻣظﻠوﻣﯾت ﻣﺑﺎرزات ﻣردم ﯾﻣن را اﺛﺑﺎت ﮐرد، ﺗﺳﻧﯾم، http://tn.ai/1708576 (59) اﻧﺻﺎراه ﯾﻣن: ﺑُرد ﻣوﺷك ھﺎﯾﻣﺎن را ﺑﮫ اﺳراﺋﯾل ﻣﻲ رﺳﺎﻧﯾم، ﺻﺣﯾﻔﺔ اطﻼﻋﺎت، http://cutt.us/bWMAQ

44 Iran Case File ,April 2018

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS US-Iran Relations

The nuclear deal is at risk and a strike on Syria carrying a message to Iran 45

The nuclear deal and the US-led strike (in cooperation with Britain and France) on Syria was at the forefront of US-Iran interaction in the month of April 2018, along with the approach of May 12, 2018, the date set by President Donald Trump to amend or withdraw from the international agreement. The impact of these developments can be traced by analyzing the following points:

First: The nuclear deal and Trump’s deadline President Trump vowed he would withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal unless the flaws were fixed in the international pact. Earlier, in January 2018, Trump extended the agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 group that resulted in sanctions relief on Iran, but, at the same time, he said it would be the last time he would ease sanctions on Tehran unless the US and its European allies agree to amend the nuclear deal signed by the former US administration in 2015.(1) There are some indicators that incline towards a Trump withdrawal from the nuclear deal. He made essential changes in his administration by removing Rex Tillerson, as the Secretary of State and H.R. McMaster, as the National Security Advisor, with them being replaced by two of the most outspoken opponents of the Iran nuclear deal, Mike Pompeo and John Bolton.(2) In his first statement after succeeding to his new position as the US Secretary of State, Pompeo said, “Iran’s behavior is worse after signing the nuclear deal.” He added, “The United States will withdraw from the nuclear deal if it is not fixed since the agreement failed to restrain the Iranian practices in many aspects”.(3) On the other hand, the US administration opened the door for understanding with its European partners to exert more pressure on Tehran and fix the flaws of the nuclear deal since the United States was aware that the imposition of new sanctions without international support would not have the same impact on Tehran.(4) The US pressure on its European partners succeeded when the European countries discussed the resumption of international sanctions on Iran.(5) but, in fact, their position differs entirely from that of the United States, which is evident in the fact that whenever the United States announces it would withdraw from the nuclear deal in case Iran does not meet all requirements, the European countries announce they would preserve it and try to find common ground to save the international agreement from collapse. This was apparent when the French President, Emmanuel Macron visited the United States on April 24, 2018 and asserted, “Europe and the United States should not repeat the same mistakes in the Middle East; France will not withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and will not leave the Middle East open for turmoil and chaos”.(6) In his meeting with his American counterpart, Macron suggested to preserve the nuclear deal as one of the first foundation for a new one. In fact, this is the European position on the Iran nuclear deal under French leadership and supported by Britain and Germany when the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel adopted the same position during her meeting with the US president on April 28, 2018. She said that 46 Iran Case File, April 2018

there had to be a European-American consensus on the Iran nuclear deal.(7) In addition, the British Prime Minister’s Office, announced a statement on April 29, 2018 about a British, French, and German agreement on preserving the nuclear deal as the best solution for preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons. It seems that the three parties agreed to preserve the nuclear deal, but at the same time, asserted that the international pact had to include other issues such as ballistic missiles, an agreement on the post-nuclear-deal era, and the ending of Iranian destabilizing activities in the region. The statement asserted coordination with the United States on “Tackling the challenges posed by Iran in addition to any issues that might be included in any upcoming agreement with Tehran”.(8) Indeed, the European position does not completely align with Trump’s tendencies. So, some American departments believe the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal might not isolate Iran as much as it isolates the United States. This view was adopted by some American observers like Denis Ross, a former US National Security Advisor when he said, “The US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will be a reason for isolating the United States, but not Iranians”.(9) This view was also adopted by the Executive Director of Arms Control Association in Washington, Daryl Kimball, one of 200 experts in national security and US foreign policy who sent a letter to President Trump on March 27, 2018 urging him to preserve the JCPOA, since the US non- compliance with the nuclear deal will question the United States credibility and achieve nothing for the American nation. (10) In addition, Trump’s National Security Advisors adopted the same opinion when they advised the president in January 2018 to extend the Iran nuclear deal. All in all, Trump is in front of a complex calculation, internally and on the international level, concerning the Iran nuclear deal and he has to decide on May 12, 2018. On the other hand, Iran is cautiously watching the developments on its nuclear file and the agreement signed with the P5 + 1 group in 2015. The ninth report of Iran’s Foreign Ministry, submitted to the National Security Committee in the Iranian parliament on April 15, 2018, confirmed that Iran has complied with its commitments to the nuclear deal, but there were, it added, obstacles and non-compliance by the United States. The Iranian Tabieen Institute for Strategic Studies presented an analytical study of the nine periodic reports of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, asserting that the United States was the biggest obstacle to the successful implementation of the nuclear deal and that one of the most important weaknesses of the agreement is the possibility for the other side to withdraw without any influential response by Iran. Hence, the agreement did not provide an internal mechanism to face the United States constant violations of the international pact, allowing it to break and breach its terms whenever it will’s. Accordingly, the nuclear deal has become of no use for Iran, not even at the lowest level.(11) Iran is opposing any amendments to the nuclear deal, but some parties have different views on the issue. Basically, there is no unanimous position in Iran in this concern. Some believe in waiting for the United States and the other parties of the agreement to announce their position on the nuclear deal. They said that Iran might rely on patience, long-term policies, and last bets to preserve the nuclear deal as a vital option for Iranian interests. If the United States, they believe, withdraws from the nuclear deal, Iran must resume uranium enrichment as stated by Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during his visit to New York to attend a meeting in the United Nations. He said that Iran was considering additional dramatic measures in response to a possible US withdrawal from the nuclear deal. He considered the logical answer to the United States withdrawal would be to resume uranium enrichment. He asserted, “We will work at a faster pace to enrich uranium”.(12) 47

Indeed, Iran is willing to do so and is prepared for that, which was evident when the Deputy Chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency said, “If America withdraws from the nuclear deal, we are fully prepared to implement any decision taken by the state’s senior officials”.(13) Other Iranian parties have different views in this concern. They want to preserve the nuclear deal as long as the other parties are committed to the agreement as stated by Spokesperson of the Front of Followers of the Line of the Imam Kamal Sajjadi . Another party in Iran believes that even if the United States preserves the nuclear deal but, at the same time, continues the policy of sanctions, the nuclear deal will be useless and oblige Iran to withdraw from the international pact, relying on their experiences with the United States since the 1979 revolution. They believe Iran has remained strong despite the economic pressures and tough sanctions for about thirty five years.(14)

Second:Indications of the US-European airstrike on Syria to Iran On April 14, 2018 the United States, Britain, and France targeted the Syrian regime’s military sites as it used chemical weapons against its civilians in the Syrian city of Duma on April 7, 2018. The strike raised many questions by all active players in Syria while others raised questions on the consequences of this strike on Iran as one of the major players in the Syrian civil war.(15) The latest US-led strike on several Syrian military sites (16)aimed at restricting the Assad regime’s capabilities to use chemical weapons but it did not target any of the Iranian and Russian bases and forces. Some observers believe this was just a symbolic military operation that would never change the balance of power on the ground in Syria, but, at the same time, it conveys a message to Iran and can be summarized as follows:(17) » Targeting the Assad regime, Iran’s most important regional ally. The US hard line position on the Assad regime and undermining its legitimacy by accusing it of using chemical weapons against its civilians will constrain and question Iran’s presence in Syria. » America is fully prepared to launch attacks and expand its influence. The significance of this military strike is that it sends a message that such strikes can be launched on targets inside Iran or against its forces anywhere in the region, especially considering Iran’s stubbornness and defiance of America’s will. » The US ability to form and mobilize international alliances. The US-led strike proved the United States’ superior capabilities in forming and mobilizing regional and international alliances. Despite the strike did not impact any of the Iranian militias, forces, and military bases operating in Syria, it did give a clear message to Tehran that it is a rogue state and its destabilizing role in the Middle East will not be tolerated. » The US influence on Europe. The US-led strike proved the impossibility for Europe to take a different position from that of the United States as the European position on the strike reflects its position on Iran in general. Recently, the United States urged the European countries, especially the Iran nuclear deal partners to exert more pressure on Tehran to make amendments to the nuclear deal and fix it flaws. » Revaluation of Geneva talks. The strike was negatively reflected on all Syrian crisis settlement summits- Sochi and Astana, except that of Geneva- which represents a real challenge for the future of the Iranian role in Syria. » The strike has given a green light to Israel to face the Iranian presence in Syria because of the danger of its presence for Israel. The Israeli operation might be part of a joint operation as the United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with Russia and Iran in Syria and wants to exert 48 Iran Case File, April 2018

more pressure on Iran and deprive it from accomplishing its regional project or being the major player in Syria. Finally, in case such strikes continue, they will pose high pressure on the Iranian regime in both Syria and the Iranian interior which is upset with Iran’s military interferences outside its borders. Also, it represents an important pressuring card in negotiations on the controversial issues with Iran- the nuclear deal, its regional practices, and its missile program. However, if the strikes do not have a clear strategy like their precedents to deal with the Syrian crisis, they will have a limited impact and will pave the way for the Iranian regime to interfere more, bearing in mind it would not be held responsible for its hostile practices in the Middle East.

Russia-Iran Relations The month of April witnessed military escalation represented by the US-led strike- on Syrian military sites due to the Syrian regime’s chemical attack on the Syrian city of Duma and witnessed an Israeli strike on some Iranian military sites in Syria. Consequently, the Russia-Iran coalition has been put to a highly critical test represented by the Russian capability to defend its Iranian ally in the face of the Western and Israeli military attacks.

» The US-led strike: rejection but no response On April 13, 2018, the United States, Britain, and France launched missile attacks on Syrian sites suspected of making chemical weapons. This strike was intensely covered by media and followed by threats to Bashar Assad regime and Iran by the Western countries. The world expected a comprehensive war leading to a world war due to the wide coverage and tough statements by senior official about the strike a week before the due date. According to Iranian sources, the West fired thirty-five missiles targeting Damascus and Homs in Syria; twenty three of them were shot down by the Syrian air defense, mainly, by the S-200 defense system. One hundred missiles were also fired by the US B-1 bomber and the British Tornado warplane on Syrian regime military sites.(18) Iran considered the strike as a show off by Western countries since it had achieved no field or operational gains. The Iranian statement added that President Trump wanted to save face by launching this strike after all the media circus on this concern. In fact, the strike did not target well equipped military sites, but a research site, Mazzah airport to the West of Damascus, and Adhumeir airport that all were evacuated before the attack.(19) Officially, the Iranian foreign ministry condemned the strike sharply and said it was a clear 49

violation of international law, the sovereignty and unity of Syria.(20) On the other hand, the Russian position on the strike was limited in three dimensions: it announced that the US-led strike on Syria targeted territories outside the Russian area of operations away from the Hmeimeem and Tartous bases, which required no Russian response to the attack.(21) It also announced the Syrian air defense had shot down all missiles targeting Syrian military sites without help from Russian air defense.(22) Finally, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin announced that the United States and its allies had attacked Syria in violation of the constitutive act of the UN, international law, and without authorization by the Security Council(23). It is noted that the Russian position was less pronounced than before the US-led strike. On April 10, 2018, three days ahead of the strike, the Russian ambassador in Lebanon said that Russia would not only shoot down missiles, but also would target the US missile-launching sites.(24) This means that Russia either withdrew its threats or it agreed with the West on the targeted sites and size of the strike in exchange for Russian silence. By analyzing the Russian and Iranian positions on the strike, it appears that both sides are not willing to broaden the conflict or go into direct confrontation with the Western countries. They favored limited losses than going into an open war by using the Russian threats to limit the strike as much as possible and to keep the Russia forces safe in Syria. In addition, Trump’s early threats decreased the Syrian and Iranian losses to a great extent while the strike did not incur any change in the balance of power on the ground in this country.

» Israeli attacks and the withdrawal of Russian air cover for Iranian forces Israel has launched about 100 air strikes on Syria since the beginning of the Syrian crisis targeting, according to the Israeli air force commander, arms convoys belonging to Hezbollah and other factions in Syria over the five past years.(25) The latest of these strikes was launched on the T-4 airport and targeted the Russian forces in Syria for the first time. In 2015, Russia and Israel signed an agreement to prevent any confrontation between them in Syria. Accordingly, Israel informed Russia of all operations it launched on Syria ahead of time. This agreement did not include to give permission by any side to the other before any military operation, but to inform each other about any air raid in overlapping areas to avoid any confrontation between the two sides.(26) However, Israel targeted the T-4 airport that had, according to the Israeli sources, an Iranian command and control center for drones without coordination with the Russian side on April 9, 2018 after the Israeli air force shot down an Iranian drone in the occupied Palestinian air space. As a result, Moscow escalated its rhetoric against Israel and held Tel Aviv responsible for the airstrike that targeted the Russian T-4 base in Syria. 50 Iran Case File, April 2018

The Russian announcement on the Israeli airstrike was an unusual Russian procedure that broke, for the first time, the Israeli blackout method it had adopted for many years concerning its military operations. As a result, the Israeli acknowledgment or rejection of any attacks on Syria has become unnecessary because Russia will take this role and immediately announce such attacks.(27) It seems that the Iranian drone that broke into Israeli air space and the presence of the West’s forces near the Syrian theatre of operation encouraged Israel to launch the attack on the Russian military site in Syria. Two months ago, the Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Israel that the Russian air force would respond to any Israeli strikes after Israel had launched a broad attack on Syrian and Iranian military sites that ended up with the shooting down of an F-16 Israeli warplane on February 10. As a result, Israel halted all strikes on Syria for two months due to the Russian threats until it believed it had no choice but to launch an attack on Iranian targets in Syria despite Putin’s threats.(28) In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry made strong statement condemning the Israeli practices against Hamas demonstrations and the separation wall in Gaza when it said, “Using forces without any distinction against civilians.” Some military and intelligence sources also informed Tech DEBKA that the talk is now on the first Russian step and Moscow would take further steps.(29) The difference in the Russian response on both strikes- the American and the Israeli- was represented by acknowledgment of the Russian air defense role in defending the recent Israeli attacks while denying response to the US-led attacks that might have contributed to the latest Israeli strike on a Syrian military site having Russian forces. By analyzing the Russian response to the strikes, it has become clear that Russia does not mind attacking Iranian as well as the Syrian regime’s forces when coordinating with Russia for the safety of Russian forces and the need of both sides- Iran and the Syrian regime- for Russian help. However, this view cannot be generalized because Russia has made a condition, which is to keep the balance of power on the ground, at least in the current time before eliminating the Syrian opposition in Damascus and reaching a final status arrangement in Syria. Russia has adopted a tougher stance on the Israeli strike than that on the American-led strike because Israel, in addition to ignoring coordination with Russia, launched a qualitative operation to destroy Iranian capabilities in Syria, knowing that it had a declared goal, which is to deprive Iran from having an everlasting presence in Syria and eliminating the Iranian supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranian position on both the US-led and Israeli strikes was weaker than the Russian one. Neither the West nor Israel had coordinated with Tehran on the strikes in contrast with their policy on Russia. In addition, the Iranian forces never responded to any strikes it had been exposed to and adopted the policy of restraint and de-escalation or submitted to the Russian pressure that prevented it from taking any action. All in all, the consecutive attacks on the Iranian forces in Syria by the West and Israel represented a test for the Russia-Iran coalition. Russia could not or did not want to protect the Iranian forces in Syria. It has never used its political weight in the international arena to support Iran and let it alone in the face of the Western and Israeli strikes except some limited support by the Russian air defense in Syria that aimed, mainly, at promoting the Russian air defense system. The Russian goal is to keep its two bases in Hmeimeem and Tartous safe away from attacks, as stated by the Russian Defense Minister when he said that the US-led strikes were far away from their areas of operations, which is evidence that if the Iranian forces are exposed to a comprehensive attack, the Russian forces will not interfere to help Tehran as long as Russian forces are safe away from danger. 51

Endnotes

(1) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ روﯾﺪاد 24: رﯾﭽﺎرد ﻧﻔﯿﻮ، ﻋﻀﻮ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﺗﯿﻢ ﻣﺬاﮐﺮهﮐﻨﻨﺪه آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮ ﺑﺎ روﯾﺪاد۲۴: ﺑﺎزﮔﺸﺖ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻢھﺎی آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﮔﺬﺷﺘﮫ را ﻧﺨﻮاھﺪ داﺷﺖ، https://bit.ly/2Io1TBg ( 2) REBECCA KHEEL: Clouds form over Iran deal as Trump deadline nears, the hill, 3 April 2018, http://cutt.us/btOaH (3) ﺑﻲ ﺑﻲ ﺳﻲ ﻋﺮﺑﻲ: ھﻞ ﺗﻨﺴﺤﺐ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي ﻣﻊ إﯾﺮان؟، 29 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ/ ﻧﯿﺴﺎن http://cutt.us/j5ETe ،2018 (4) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ روﯾﺪاد 24: رﯾﭽﺎرد ﻧﻔﯿﻮ، ﻋﻀﻮ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﺗﯿﻢ ﻣﺬاﮐﺮهﮐﻨﻨﺪه آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮ ﺑﺎ روﯾﺪاد۲۴، ﻣﺮﺟﻊ ﺳﺒﻖ ذﻛﺮه. (5)ﺻﺤﯿﻔﺔ ﺟﺎم ﺟﺎم أون ﻻﯾﻦ: ﺑﺎجﺧﻮاھﯽ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ از اروﭘﺎ وآﯾﻨﺪه ﻣﺒﮭﻢ ﺑﺮﺟﺎم، ﭼﮭﺎرﺷﻨﺒﮫ 15 ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ http://cutt.us/ ،1397 ID0FM (6) ﺳﻲ إن إن ﻋﺮﺑﻲ: ﻣﺎﻛﺮون ًﻣﻮﺿﺤﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻓﺮﻧﺴﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﻲ: ﻟﻦ ﻧﺘﺮك اﻟﺴﺎﺣﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﻮﺿﻰ، 25 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ 2018، http://cutt.us/mYEhU (7) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﻧﺖ: ﻣﯿﺮﻛﻞ: اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي ﻏﯿﺮ ٍﻛﺎف، 28 أﺑﺮﯾﻞ http://cutt.us/dy5g1 ،2018 (8) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺳﺒﻮﺗﻨﯿﻚ ﻋﺮﺑﻲ: ﺑﺮﯾﻄﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﻓﺮﻧﺴﺎ وأﻟﻤﺎﻧﯿﺎ ﺗﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﺮورة دﻋﻢ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي اﻹﯾﺮاﻧﻲ، http://cutt.us/FawpC (9) ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﺟﻤﮭﻮری إﺳﻼﻣﯽ: دﺑﯿﺮﮐﻞ ﺣﺰب آزادی: ﺗﺮاﻣﭗ در ﺑﺮﺟﺎم ﺑﮫ دﻧﺒﺎل ﺑﺎج ﺧﻮاھﯽ اﺳﺖ، http://cutt.us/i40FT (10) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﺮس ﺗﻮداي ﻓﺎرﺳﻲ: ﮐﺎرﺷﻨﺎس ھﺴﺘﮫ ای آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ: ﺧﺮوج آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ از ﺑﺮﺟﺎم ﺑﺎﻋﺚ اﻧﺰوای ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﻠﻠﯽ واﺷﻨﮕﺘﻦ ﺧﻮاھﺪ ﺷﺪ، http://cutt.us/Thl6H (11) اﻧﺪﯾﺸﮑﺪه راھﺒﺮدی: ﻧﮭﻤﯿﻦ ﮔﺰارش ﺑﺮﺟﺎﻣﯽ وزارت اﻣﻮر ﺧﺎرﺟﮫ وﮐﺎرﺷﮑﻨﯽھﺎی آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ، https://goo.gl/iNvVoY (12) ﯾﺪﯾﻌﻮت أﺣﺮوﻧﻮت، איראן: «נעשיר אורניום במרץ» אם ארהב תפרוש מההסכם، http://cutt.us/rFDSi (13) ﺻﺤﯿﻔﺔ ﺟﺎم ﺟﻢ أون ﻻﯾﻦ: ﻣﻌﺎون ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن اﻧﺮژی اﺗﻤﯽ اﯾﺮان: ﺑﺮای ﺧﺮوج آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ از ﺑﺮﺟﺎم آﻣﺎده اﯾﻢ، /http://cutt.us UZ2eJ

(14) اﺷﮕﺎه ﺧﺒﺮﻧﮕﺎران ﺟﻮان: ﺳﺠﺎدی در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺎﺷﮕﺎه ﺧﺒﺮﻧﮕﺎران ﺟﻮان: اﯾﺮان ﺑﮫ ﺑﺮﺟﺎم ﺗﺎ ﺟﺎﯾﯽ ﭘﺎﯾﺒﻨﺪ ﻣﯽﻣﺎﻧﺪ ﮐﮫ آﻧﮭﺎ ﻧﯿﺰ ﻣﺘﻌﮭﺪ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ/ ﺗﺮاﻣﭗ ھﻤﻮاره ﺑﮫ دﻧﺒﺎل دور زدﻧﮭﺴﺘﮫای اﺳﺖ http://cutt.us/FRte8، واﻧﻈﺮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ: ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﺧﺎﻧﮫ ﻣﻠﺖ: رﺋﯿﺲ ﮐﻤﯿﺴﯿﻮن اﻣﻨﯿﺖ ﻣﻠﯽ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﺮد: ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖ ﺟﻤﮭﻮری إﺳﻼﻣﯽ درﻗﺒﺎل ﺧﺮوج آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ از ﺑﺮﺟﺎم ﭼﯿﺴﺖ؟ /http://cutt.us gCclb (15) ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﺮس ﺗﻮداي: ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮫ ﺳﭙﺎه ﭘﺎﺳﺪاران در ﻣﺤﮑﻮﻣﯿﺖ ﺣﻤﻠﮫ ﻣﻮﺷﮑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ، http://cutt.us/G7Eyd (16) ﺻﺤﯿﻔﮫ اﻋﺘﻤﺎد: واﻛﻨﺶ ﻣﺘﺤﺪان ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ، goo.gl/1XeFQj (17) ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری داﻧﺸﺠﻮﯾﺎن اﯾﺮان – اﯾﺴﻨﺎ: ﯾﮏ ﮐﺎرﺷﻨﺎس ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮ ﺑﺎ اﯾﺴﻨﺎ: ﺣﻤﻠﮫ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ ﺗﻐﯿﯿﺮی در ﺷﺮاﯾﻂ ﻣﯿﺪاﻧﯽ اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮر اﯾﺠﺎد ﻧﻤﯽﮐﻨﺪ، https://www.isna.ir/news/97012608643 (18) ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت ﺣﻤﻠﮫ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ، اﻧﮕﻠﯿﺲ وﻓﺮاﻧﺴﮫ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ/ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮫ ﭘﺪاﻓﻨﺪ ھﻮاﯾﯽ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ ﺑﺎ ﻣﻮﺷﮏھﺎی ﮐﺮوز، ﻣﺸﺮق، .http://cutt us/s3BdA (19) ﻣﻠﮫ ھﻮاﯾﯽ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ و ﻣﺘﺤﺪاﻧﺶ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ/ آﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ: ﺣﻤﻼت ﻣﺤﺪود ﺑﻮد و ﭘﺎﯾﺎن ﯾﺎﻓﺖ، اﯾﺴﻨﺎ، http://cutt.us/3JXkp (20) واﮐﻨﺶ اﯾﺮان ﺑﮫ ﺣﻤﻼت ﻣﻮﺷﮑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ: اﻣﺮﯾﮑﺎ وﻣﺘﺤﺪاﻧﺶ ﻣﺴﺆول ﻋﻮاﻗﺐ اﯾﻦ ﻣﺎﺟﺮاﺟﻮﯾﯽ ھﺴﺘﻨﺪ، رواﯾﺖ زﻧﺪه، //:http cutt.us/TgFON (21) وزارت دﻓﺎع روﺳﯿﮫ: ﻣﻮﺷﮏھﺎی ﺷﻠﯿﮏ ﺷﺪه ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ وارد ﻣﺤﺪوده ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖ ﻣﺎ در ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ ﻧﺸﺪﻧﺪ، اﯾﺴﻨﺎ، /http://cutt.us gta8f (22) روﺳﯿﮫ ﻣﯽ ﮔﻮﯾﺪ ﺳﯿﺴﺘﻢ دﻓﺎع ﺿﺪ ھﻮاﯾﯽ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﯽ ﻣﻮﺷﮑﮭﺎی ﮐﺮوز ﺷﻠﯿﮏ ﺷﺪه ﺑﮫ ﭘﺎﯾﮕﺎه ھﻮاﯾﯽ آن ﮐﺸﻮر را ﺧﻨﺜﯽ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ، ﻓﺮدا، http://cutt.us/n3exK (23) ﭘﻮﺗﯿﻦ ﺣﻤﻠﮫ اﺋﺘﻼف ﻏﺮﺑﯽ ﺑﮫ ﺳﻮرﯾﮫ را ﺗﺠﺎوز ﺑﮫ ﯾﮏ ﮐﺸﻮر ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻧﺎﻣﯿﺪ، ﺳﺒﻮﺗﻨﯿﻚ، http://cutt.us/5HPLS (24) ﭼﺮا روﺳﯿﮫ ﺑﮫ ﺗﮭﺪﯾﺪات ﺧﻮد ﻋﻤﻞ ﻧﮑﺮد؟، ﯾﻮروﻧﯿﻮز، http://cutt.us/GlN2z (25) ﺿﺎﺑﻂ إﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻠﻲ ﯾﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﺪد اﻟﻐﺎرات ﺿﺪ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻠﮫ، اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﻧﺖ، http://cutt.us/J8WGp 52 Iran Case File, April 2018

(26) שיימינג רוסי לישראל. ארדן: «ביטחוננו חשוב מהגינוי»، ﯾﺪﯾﻌﻮت أﺣﺮوﻧﻮت، http://cutt.us/7aXkd (27) פוטין הורה להחריף את טון ההתבטאויות והפעולות הרוסיות נגד ישראל וצהל. רואה בהפצצה הישראלית פעולה לקראת תקיפה אמריקנית، ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺗﯿﻚ دﯾﺒﻜﺎ، http://cutt.us/ReNag (28) ﻧﻔﺴﮫ. (29) ﻧﻔﺴﮫ. 53

Conclusion

Internal Affairs » Despite the weakness of President Hasan Rouhani’s economic policies, the Hardliner interference and their extreme positions are considered as the real reasons behind Iran’s economic crises. » The devaluation of Iran’s currency against the US dollar might worsen other economic problems such as smuggling, recession, inflation, and unemployment. » The questioning of the Iranian President Hasan Rouhani in parliament will not solve Iran’s economic crises as the real solution comes from it opening to the outside world and bringing back public money rather than wasting it on foreign adventures. » The hardliners and their institutions might hinder the passage of any law that prevents the importation and utilization of listening devices. » The Hardliner control over key security institutions allows them to impose a tight security control over opponents. » The Iranian regime is tapping politicians. » Iran deployed fighter drones in battles in Syria and Yemen. » Iran has achieved a significant improvement in drone manufacturing since 2012. » The Iranian regime failed to destroy the Arab identity of the Ahwaz people. » According to statistics, more than eight million Arab people are ignored by the Iranian media and this cannot be justified as an unintentional mistake. » The silence of Iranian officials on the discrimination of Iran’s official media against the Arab minority in Iran might be explained as an undeclared support for any action that might destroy the Ahwaz identity. » The US dollar rose against the Iranian Toman in two days to make approximately a 20% record. Consequently, the Iranian Central Bank fixed the exchange rate at low levels against the US dollar on April 10 and threatened to imprison anyone who exchanged it for a different rate. » There were divergent explanations for the sharp rise of the US dollar in the month of April. The explanations ranged between fears from a possible US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the Iranian businessmen and wealthy elite manipulation of the currency and the IRGC withdrawal 54 Iran Case File, April 2018

of thirty billion USDs from the Iranian market to send outside of Iran in preparation for repelling any possible US attack on Syria (the United States struck Syrian sites and Iranian elements in Iran on April 14). Whatever the explanation is, the sharp shortage of the US dollar in the local market led to an increase of prices and it is expected inflation is to increase during the next period. » The decline of Iran’s currency against the US dollar can be for many reasons, such as Iran’s regional interference, geopolitical tensions related to its practices, the international banking and oil sanctions, foreign investor fears from making business with Iran, the decline of foreign currency supply and the freezing of the Iranian oil revenue outside the country. These problems resulted in economic recession and inflation in Iran. » The US dollar continued its appreciation against the Iranian Toman after the exchange rate was fixed by the Iranian Central Bank at less than its real value in the free market. This means that the government will have to pay the difference between the two prices. However, with the increasing financial pressure and the inability to meet the demands of individuals and businessmen for the US dollar, the Iranian government will, most likely, increase the dollar exchange rate again. » Some media outlets in Iran advised Iranian diplomats to make exertions to prevent the US withdrawing from the nuclear deal as they feared the resumption of economic constraints that would result in a trade balance deficit, the end of foreign investments in Iran, and big shortages in hard currency, which will reflect on Iranian business, unemployment, and raise poverty rates.

Arab Affairs » Iran preserved its role in Syria and was not influenced by the US-led strike except from suffering some losses due to the targeting of its T-4 drone airbase. » The Commander of the Iranian drone’s unit was killed in the Israeli airstrikes on T-4 airport in Syria. » The continuity of military and political coordination between Iran, Turkey, and Russia. » Iran helped the Syrian regime in eliminating the opposition forces in the countryside of Damascus. » Iran supplied Houthi rebels in Yemen with ballistic missiles to target the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. » The Arab coalition was aware of the Iranian support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. As a result, it launched decisive airstrikes against these rebels and took control of some Houthi districts. Also, the coalition targeted Houthi arsenals, command sites, and elements.

International Affairs » The nuclear deal is at risk and Iran has one of two choices: to accept the US and European demands and requirements or face the policy of escalation that aims to deprive the Iranian regime from implementing its plans and ambitions, especially its regional role and nuclear program. » The United States is about to withdraw from the nuclear deal three years after signing the international agreement, which means going back to square one and the imposition of sanctions and isolation on Tehran. 55

» The possibility of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear plants has increased because of Iran’s constant hostile policies and its disregard of regional and international powers by relying on the success it has achieved following the Arab Spring. » The mutual war of words between the United States and Russia limited the US-led strike on Syrian military sites. » Russia renounced its allies- the Syrian regime and Iran- and did not take any action to prevent the US-led strike on their forces in Syria. » End of Russia-Israel coordination on sorties in Syria. » Iran faced the Israeli strikes on its forces in Syria with complete silence. » It has come clear that Iran is unable to protect its forces in Syria against the US and Israeli strikes.

The materials contained in the report should not be quoted without indicating their sources, and should not be republished without Rasanah’s permission.

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