sign in sign up
<<
Home , Geographical zone

Jozef Goldblat

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES: A HISTORY AND ASSESSMENT

by Jozef Goldblat

Jozef Goldblat has been involved in arms control negotiations in Geneva and New York for nearly 40 years, including service for the United Nations. From 1969 to 1989, he directed the arms control and disarmament program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Since 1989, he has been a Senior Research Fellow at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies and Senior Lecturer at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. He is also Vice-President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute and consultant to the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research. His latest publications include Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (1994) and The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Régime: Assessment and Prospects (1997).

he idea of establishing many, but other European countries parts of the world have been more nuclear-weapon-free zones would have the opportunity to ac- successful. By now, three regional T (NWFZs) was conceived cede. In the area in question, the sta- denuclearization agreements—the with a view to preventing the emer- tioning, manufacture, and 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco regarding gence of new nuclear weapon states. stockpiling of nuclear weapons and , the 1985 Treaty of As early as 1958, 10 years before of nuclear delivery vehicles would Rarotonga regarding the South Pa- the signing of the Treaty on the Non- be prohibited. The nuclear powers cific, and the 1992 Declaration on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would have to respect the nuclear- Denuclearization of —have (NPT), the Polish government, weapon-free status of the zone and entered into force, while two other which feared the nuclearization of undertake not to use nuclear weap- such agreements—the 1995 Treaty West Germany and wanted to pre- ons against the territory of the zone.1 of Bangkok regarding Southeast vent the deployment of Soviet In the political of the 1950s, Asia and the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty nuclear weapons on its territory, put the Rapacki Plan had no chance of regarding —have been opened forward a proposal, called the becoming a subject of serious inter- for signature. Also, certain uninhab- Rapacki Plan (after the Polish for- national negotiation. Nonetheless, ited areas of the globe have been eign minister), for a NWFZ in Cen- several of its elements were later formally denuclearized. They include tral . The zone was to adopted as guidelines for the estab- under the 1959 comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, lishment of denuclearized zones. Treaty; outer space, the moon, and the German Democratic Republic, Efforts to ensure the absence of other celestial bodies under the 1967 and the Federal Republic of Ger- nuclear weapons in other populated Outer Space Treaty and the 1979

18 The Nonproliferation Review/- 1997 Jozef Goldblat

Moon Agreement; and the seabed, the zone; (e) the zone arrangements arrangements; and the conditions for the floor, and the subsoil must contain an effective system of the entry into force of the zonal thereof under the 1971 Seabed verification to ensure full compli- agreement, as well as for its denun- Treaty.2 ance with the agreed obligations; ciation. Although each consecutive Article VII of the NPT affirmed (f) the arrangements should promote NWFZ treaty has brought some sub- the right of states to establish the economic, scientific, and tech- stantive improvements, all treaties NWFZs in their respective territo- nological development of the mem- suffer from shortcomings. These are ries. The United Nations, in its nu- bers of the zone through international described below along with sugges- merous resolutions, went further by cooperation on all peaceful uses of tions as to how they could be rem- encouraging the creation of such nuclear energy; and (g) the treaty edied. Current international events zones, and the 1995 NPT Review establishing the zone should be of highlight the importance of this and Extension Conference partici- unlimited duration. analysis. The active discussion of pants expressed the conviction that The has laid down new NWFZs, such as in Central regional denuclearization measures its own criteria as conditions for sup- Asia, at the 1997 NPT Preparatory enhance global and regional peace porting the creation of NWFZ.5 Committee meeting in New York, and security.3 NWFZs have become Among other things, these conditions suggests that the breadth of the cov- part and parcel of the nuclear non- stipulate that the establishment of the erage of these zones may continue 6 proliferation regime. It is now zone should not disturb existing se- to expand. Thus, it is useful to take widely recognized that the univer- curity arrangements to the detriment stock of what zones exist—particu- sality of this regime, which would of regional and international security larly in inhabited areas of the globe— require attracting to it the remain- or otherwise abridge the inherent in order to understand better their ing nuclear threshold states (, right of individual or collective self- significance and relationship to other , and Israel), can be defense guaranteed in the U.N. Char- international nonproliferation efforts. achieved only by establishing de- ter. Moreover, a zone should not nuclearized zones in the regions of affect the rights of the parties under THE TREATY OF and the . international law to grant or deny TLATELOLCO In 1975, the U.N. General Assem- other states transit privileges, includ- During the 1962 Cuban missile cri- bly recommended that states setting ing port calls and overflights; and no sis, a draft resolution calling for a up NWFZ should be guided by the restrictions should be imposed on the NWFZ in Latin America was sub- following principles4 : (a) obliga- high freedoms of navigation and mitted at the U.N. General Assem- tions relating to the establishment of overflight, the right of innocent pas- bly by but was not put to a 7 such zones may be assumed not only sage of territorial and archipelagic vote. In April 1963, at the initiative by groups of states, including entire seas, and the right of transit passage of the president of , the presi- continents or large geographical re- of international straits. dents of five Latin American coun- gions, but also by smaller groups of This article examines the extent tries announced that they were states and even individual countries; to which the above principles and prepared to sign a multilateral agree- (b) NWFZ arrangements must en- criteria have been observed, given ment that would make Latin America 8 sure that the zone would be, and that dissimilar geographical circum- a NWFZ. This announcement re- would remain, effectively free of all stances, as well as different politi- ceived the support of the U.N. Gen- nuclear weapons; (c) the initiative cal, cultural, economic, and strategic eral Assembly, and the Latin for the creation of a NWFZ should considerations of the states con- American nations started negotia- come from states within the region, cerned, prevent any uniform pattern tions among themselves. On Febru- and participation must be voluntary; of denuclearized zones. The main ary 14, 1967, at Tlatelolco, a district (d) whenever a zone is intended to differences relate to the scope of the of Mexico City, the Treaty for the embrace a region, the participation obligations assumed by the parties; Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in of all militarily significant states, and the responsibilities of extra-zonal Latin America was signed by a num- preferably all states, in that region states; the geographical area subject ber of Latin American states. Two would enhance the effectiveness of to denuclearization; the verification Additional protocols annexed to the

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 19 Jozef Goldblat

Treaty of Tlatelolco were intended nuclear energy, both countries under- of compliance with the obligations for signature by extra-zonal states. took to prohibit in their respective ter- arising therefrom. The General Con- ritories the testing, use, manufacture, ference, composed of all parties to Scope of the Obligations and production, or acquisition by other the treaty, is the supreme organ of Verification means of any nuclear explosive de- OPANAL. It holds regular sessions, vice, as long as no technical distinc- as well as special sessions if circum- In Article I, the Treaty of Tlate- tion can be made between nuclear stances so require. The OPANAL lolco prohibits the testing, use, manu- explosive devices for peaceful pur- Council—able to function continu- facture, production, or acquisition by poses and those for military pur- ously—is composed of five members any means, as well as the receipt, poses.9 Thus, the controversy over elected by the General Conference. storage, installation, deployment, and whether indigenous development of The General Secretary is the chief any form of possession of nuclear nuclear explosive devices for peace- administrative officer of the Agency weapons in Latin America. Encour- ful purposes is compatible with par- (Articles 7 to 11). aging or authorizing or in any way ticipation in the Treaty of Tlatelolco participating in the testing, use, manu- has been set aside. It is obvious that facture, production, possession, or Area Subject to allowing any kind of nuclear explo- control of any nuclear weapon is Denuclearization sion would defeat the purpose of a equally prohibited. Research and The zone of application of the NWFZ. development directed towards ac- Treaty of Tlatelolco embraces the ter- quiring a nuclear weapon capability One of the purposes of the trea- ritory, territorial , airspace, and is not expressly forbidden. ties establishing zones free of nuclear any other space over which the zonal weapons is to make a nuclear attack Explosions of nuclear devices for state exercises sovereignty in accor- against states parties militarily unjus- peaceful purposes are allowed un- dance with its own legislation (Ar- tifiable and, consequently, less likely. der the treaty, and procedures for ticle 3). Upon fulfillment of several To achieve this goal, all potential tar- carrying them out are specified in requirements specified in Article 28, gets of a nuclear strike would have Article 18. However, a proviso is it will also include vast areas in the to be removed from the denuclear- made that such activities must be Atlantic and Pacific , hun- ized areas. These targets include conducted in conformity with Article dreds of kilometers off the coasts of nuclear-weapon-related support fa- 1, which bans nuclear weapons, as Latin America (Article 4). These re- cilities, such as communication, sur- well as with Article 5, which defines quirements are: adherence to the veillance, and intelligence-gathering a nuclear weapon as any device ca- treaty by all states of the region; sig- facilities, as well as navigation instal- pable of releasing nuclear energy in nature and ratification of Additional lations, serving the nuclear strategic an uncontrolled manner and having Protocols to the treaty by all the systems of the great powers. The characteristics appropriate for use states concerned; and conclusion of Treaty of Tlatelolco does not, how- for warlike purposes. (An instrument agreements with the IAEA for the ever, specifically ban such facilities. that may be used for the transport or application of safeguards to the propulsion of the device is not in- Each party must conclude an nuclear activities of the parties. The cluded in this definition if it is sepa- agreement with the International extra-continental or continental rable from the device and not an Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for states that are internationally respon- indivisible part thereof.) Most coun- the application of safeguards to its sible, de jure or de facto, for territo- tries interpret these requirements as nuclear activities (Article 13). The ries lying within the limits of the prohibiting the manufacture of all Agency for the Prohibition of geographical zone established by the nuclear explosive devices, unless or Nuclear Weapons in Latin America treaty—France, the Netherlands, the until nuclear devices are developed (OPANAL) is responsible for hold- United Kingdom, and the United that cannot be used as weapons. For ing periodic or extraordinary consul- States—have undertaken to apply a long time, and Brazil tations among member-states on the statute of military denucleariza- contested this interpretation. How- matters relating to the purposes, tion to these territories by adhering ever, in their July 18, 1991 agreement measures and procedures set forth to Additional Protocol I of the treaty. for the exclusive peaceful use of in the treaty and to the supervision All nuclear powers have unreserv-

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat edly assumed an obligation under Security Assurances of Extra- The treaty is of a permanent na- Additional Protocol II to respect the Zonal States ture and is not subject to reserva- denuclearization of Latin America as Additional Protocol II to the tions (Articles 30 and 27). However, “defined, delimited and set forth” in Treaty of Tlatelolco provides for as- any party may denounce it with the treaty, that is, as covering the surances to be given by the nuclear three-months’ notice if, in its opin- designated portions of the high seas powers not to use or threaten to use ion, there have arisen or “may arise” as well. However, in statements con- nuclear weapons against the parties circumstances connected with the tradicting this obligation, the signa- to the treaty. However, the obliga- content of the treaty or of the Addi- tories of the protocol pointed out that tions that the nuclear powers have tional Protocols that affect its su- they would not accept any restric- actually assumed under this protocol preme interests or the peace and tions on their freedom at sea. are conditional. The United States security of one or more parties (Ar- Furthermore, since transit of and the United Kingdom made spe- ticle 30). nuclear weapons was not explicitly cial interpretative statements at the prohibited by the treaty, the question time of signing and ratifying Proto- Amendments arose whether such activity is actu- col II, which reflected their current In 1992, at the initiative of Argen- ally permitted. According to the in- military doctrines. They reserved the tina, Brazil, and , the General terpretation given in 1967 by the right to reconsider their non-use ob- Conference of OPANAL decided to Preparatory Commission for the ligations with regard to any state in amend the articles relating to verifi- Denuclearization of Latin America the NWFZ in the event of an armed cation (Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and (COPREDAL), it is the prerogative attack by that state carried out with 20) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The of the territorial state, in the exer- the support or assistance of a nuclear most important of these amendments cise of its sovereignty, to grant or power. The Soviet Union formulated concerns the so-called special in- deny permission for transit.10 In join- a similar qualification with regard to spections envisaged in Article 16. ing Additional Protocols of the a party to the treaty committing an According to the original version of treaty, the United States and France act of aggression with the support this Article, special inspections may made a declaration of understanding of, or together with, a nuclear weapon be arranged not only by the IAEA— to the same effect, while the Soviet state. For France, its non-use under- in accordance with the safeguards Union expressed the opinion that taking would present no obstacle to agreements concluded with the par- authorizing transit of nuclear weap- the full exercise of the right of self- ties—but also by the Council of ons in any form would be contrary defense enshrined in the U.N. Char- OPANAL, following a request by a to the objectives of the treaty. China ter. party which suspects that some pro- believes that transport of nuclear hibited activity has been or is about weapons through Latin American Entry into Force and to be carried out in the territory of territory, territorial sea, or airspace Denunciation another party, or following a request is prohibited. Indeed, once nuclear The Treaty of Tlatelolco enters into by a party which has been suspected weapons are allowed in transit, even force among states that have rati- of or charged with having violated if such transit is limited to port visits fied it only when certain conditions the treaty. In the latter case, the ac- or overflights, it will be difficult to have been met—the same as are re- cused country would have an oppor- maintain that the zone has been to- quired under Article 28 for the ex- tunity to prove its innocence. tally denuclearized. In any event, tension of the geographical area of Inspectors would be granted full and since the great powers refuse, as a the Treaty’s application. These con- free access to all places and all in- matter of policy, to disclose the ditions may be waived, and most par- formation necessary for the perfor- whereabouts of their nuclear weap- ties have in fact done so. The treaty mance of their duties. The costs of ons, they are unlikely to request per- became operative in April 1968, special inspections arranged by the mission of transit for specific ships when El Salvador joined Mexico in OPANAL Council would normally or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. ratifying it and in waiving the require- be borne by the requesting party or The right of zonal states to deny per- ments for its entry into force. parties, except where the Council mission for transit of nuclear weap- concludes that in view of the “cir- ons is thus purely hypothetical.

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 21 Jozef Goldblat

cumstances existing in the case” of Mexico, which is the depositary the countries of the zone. It also bans such costs should be borne by OPA- of the treaty, considers the amend- seeking or receiving assistance in the NAL. According to the amended ments to be in force for those states manufacture or acquisition of nuclear version of Article 16, the IAEA will which have ratified them and waived explosive devices. Protocol 3, pro- have the exclusive power to carry out the requirements specified in Article hibiting tests of any nuclear explo- special inspections. The role of the 28.12 sive device anywhere within the OPANAL Council will be reduced zone, was opened for signature by in this respect to submitting requests THE TREATY OF all the nuclear powers, but it was to the IAEA to put into operation the RAROTONGA clearly addressed to France, the only mechanisms of inspection. Informa- state at the time of signing which was In 1983, in the context of growing tion regarding the conclusion of the engaged in such tests in the region. concern over the activities of the special inspection will be transmit- nuclear powers in the South Pacific, By “nuclear explosive device” the ted to the General Secretary of OPA- and especially over nuclear test ex- treaty means any nuclear weapon or NAL only after it has been plosions, proposed the es- other explosive device capable of forwarded by the Director General tablishment of a nuclear-free zone releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of in the region. The proposal was offi- of the purpose for which it could be Governors. These modifications may cially submitted at the annual South used. The term includes such a have set an unfortunate precedent Pacific Forum, the high-level meet- weapon or device in unassembled for future denuclearization agree- ing of independent or self-governing and partly assembled forms, but does ments. Certain countries in regions South Pacific countries. It was en- not include the means of transport of international tension may be re- dorsed the following year. Subse- or delivery of such a weapon or de- luctant to entrust the protection of quently, as a result of negotiations vice if separable from and not an in- their vital security interests entirely among Australia, the , divisible part of it (Article 1). As in to an international organization, even , , , , the Treaty of Tlatelolco, research and an organization of such high stand- , Papua New , the So- development directed towards ac- ing as the IAEA. lomon Islands, , , Van- quiring nuclear-weapon capability Another amendment, adopted in uatu, and Western —all are not expressly forbidden. 1990, added to the official title of the member-states of the South Pacific In addition to banning nuclear ex- Treaty of Tlatelolco the words “and Forum—a treaty establishing the plosive devices, the Treaty of Raro- the ” in order to incorpo- proposed zone was signed on August tonga contains a ban on dumping rate the English-speaking states of 6, 1985, at Rarotonga in the Cook radioactive matter at sea anywhere the Caribbean area into the zone of Islands. (Republic of Marshall Is- within the South Pacific zone (Ar- application of the treaty. By yet an- lands and Federated States of Micro- ticle 7); hence the zone is called other amendment in 1991, all the in- nesia became eligible to sign only “nuclear-free,” which conveys a no- 13 dependent states of the region upon joining the Forum in 1987.) tion wider than “nuclear-weapon- became eligible to join the regime Three protocols annexed to the treaty free.” The relevant provision reflects of denuclearization. (According to were intended for signature by ex- the concern, often voiced in the the original Article 25, a “political tra-zonal states. United Nations and other interna- entity,” part or all of whose territory tional organizations, over the inabil- was the subject of a dispute or claim Scope of Obligations and ity of the nuclear industry to dispose between an extra-continental coun- Verification safely of its wastes. try and one or more Latin American The South Pacific Nuclear Free states, could not be admitted.) As regards weapon-related pro- Zone Treaty, called the Treaty of Owing to this amendment, Belize hibitions, the Treaty of Rarotonga Rarotonga, in force since 1986, pro- and Guyana could join the treaty.11 appears to be stricter than the Treaty hibits, in its Article 3, the manufac- of Tlatelolco, because it prohibits the Conditions for the entry into force ture or acquisition by other means, possession or testing of nuclear ex- of the amendments are not clearly as well as the possession or control, plosive devices for peaceful pur- stated in the treaty. The government of any nuclear explosive device by poses. Nevertheless, as in the Treaty

22 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat of Tlatelolco, the denuclearization as the Treaty of Tlatelolco does protocol, the Soviet Union stated that measures taken in the South Pacific through an additional protocol—to in case of action taken by a party or region have not removed all the po- have nuclear-weapon prohibitions parties violating their major commit- tential targets for nuclear attack, be- applied to a larger ocean area. This ments concerning the status of the cause the Treaty of Rarotonga has omission seems to be justified by a zone, it would consider itself free of not prohibited the facilities serving specific reference to international law its non-use commitments. The same nuclear strategic systems. with regard to freedom of the seas, would apply in case of aggression Full-scope IAEA safeguards must although no law, including the law of committed by one or several parties be applied to nuclear activities of the the sea, can exclude constraints on to the treaty, supported by a nuclear parties, and no nuclear exports to any any activity, if the constraints are in- weapon state, or together with it, in- non-nuclear weapon state may take ternationally agreed. Establishment volving the use by such a state of place without the application of such of extensive nuclear-weapon-free the territory, airspace, territorial sea, safeguards. As distinct from the maritime areas adjacent to nuclear- or archipelagic waters of the parties Treaty of Tlatelolco, safeguards are weapon-free territories would rein- for visits by nuclear weapon-carry- also required (though not of full-scope force the sense of security of zonal ing ships and aircraft or for transit of type) for nuclear exports to nuclear states. nuclear weapons. Eventually, the So- weapon states (Articles 4 and 8; An- Article 5 of the treaty allows each viet Union ratified Protocols 2 and 3 nex 2). The Consultative Commit- party to make an exception for without reference to the above state- tee—a forum for consultation and nuclear weapons that may be aboard ment. co-operation on any matter arising foreign ships visiting its ports or China signed the same protocols in relation to the treaty—may be navigating its territorial sea or archi- with an understanding that it might convened to consider complaints by pelagic waters, and for weapons that reconsider its obligations if other the Director of the South Pacific may be aboard foreign aircraft visit- nuclear weapon states or parties to Bureau for Economic Co-operation, ing its airfields or transiting its air- the treaty took action in gross viola- the depositary of the treaty. The space. The frequency and duration tion of the treaty and its protocols, Committee, which is constituted of of such permitted visits and transits thus changing the status of the zone the representatives of the parties, are not limited. Thus, it is not clear and endangering the security inter- may direct that a special inspection to what extent they differ from the ests of China. This understanding be made by a team of three quali- “stationing” (defined in Article 1 as was not referred to at the time of fied inspectors, accompanied, if so “emplantation, emplacement, trans- ratification. requested, by representatives of the portation on land or inland waters, The United States stated that its party complained of. If the Commit- stockpiling, storage, installation and practices and procedures in the South tee decides that there has been a deployment”) of nuclear weapons, Pacific were not inconsistent with breach of the treaty, the parties shall which is prohibited. Under Protocol the treaty and its protocols, while the meet promptly at a meeting of the 1 to the Treaty of Rarotonga, open United Kingdom said that it would South Pacific Forum (Articles 9 to for signature by France, the United respect the intentions of the states 10 and Annex 4). Kingdom, and the United States, the in the region. In October 1995, both signatories are to apply the prohibi- countries and France announced Area Subject to Denuclearization tions contained in the treaty to the jointly their intention to sign all the territories in the zone for which they Although the Treaty of Rarotonga protocols in the first half of 1996 are internationally responsible. claims to have set up a nuclear-free (that is, after the planned termina- zone stretching to the border of the tion of the last series of French Latin American NWFZ in the east, Security Assurances of Extra- nuclear tests in the Pacific).14 The and to the border of the Antarctic de- Zonal States signing of the protocols by the three militarized zone in the south, it bans Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Raro- Western nuclear powers took place the presence of nuclear weapons tonga provides for the nuclear pow- on March 25, 1996.15 In its state- only within the territories of the South ers to give assurances not to use or ment of reservation and interpreta- Pacific states, up to the 12-mile ter- threaten to use nuclear weapons tion, the French government made it ritorial sea limit. It does not seek— against the parties. In signing this clear that it did not consider its in-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 23 Jozef Goldblat

herent right to self-defense to be re- for in that Treaty, the Democratic North Korea to withdraw from the stricted by the signed documents, and People’s Republic of Korea NPT—although subsequently sus- that the assurances provided for in (North)—party to the NPT since pended—placed in jeopardy and, in Protocol 2 were the same as those 1985—refused to sign a safeguards any event, delayed the realization of given by France to non-nuclear agreement with the IAEA within the the NWFZ agreement. weapon states parties to the NPT. time-limit prescribed by the Treaty. If brought fully into effect, the The U.K. government stated that it It put forward several political con- Korean Declaration would signifi- would not be bound by its undertak- ditions for signing that were not di- cantly complement the global non- ing under Protocol 2 in the case of rectly related to the NPT. proliferation regime. Its ban on an invasion or any other attack car- Following the decision by the reprocessing and enrichment activi- ried out or sustained by a party to United States to withdraw most of ties—which goes beyond the obliga- the treaty in association or alliance the tactical nuclear weapons de- tions assumed by the parties to other with a nuclear weapon state, or if a ployed outside its borders and the NWFZ treaties—is particularly note- material breach of the nonprolifera- statement by the South Korean worthy. However, since these activi- tion obligations under the treaty President that there were no such ties, which have legitimate civilian 16 were committed. The U.S. govern- weapons in his country, the govern- applications, are not prohibited by the ment signed the protocols without ment of North Korea finally accepted NPT, they may not be banned in reservation, but its spokesman said the NPT safeguards. On January 20, other zonal denuclearization agree- that “certain declarations and under- 1992, both Korean states signed a ments. standings” would be proposed to the Joint Declaration on the Denuclear- U.S. Senate for incorporation in the ization of the Korean Peninsula. The THE TREATY OF resolution of ratification.17 stated aim of the Declaration was to PELINDABA “eliminate the danger of nuclear On November 24, 1961, in the af- Entry into Force and war” and, in particular, to “create an termath of the first French nuclear Denunciation environment and conditions favorable weapon tests in the desert, for peace and peaceful unification of According to Article 15, the Treaty the U.N. General Assembly called our country.” of Rarotonga entered into force upon on member states to refrain from the deposit of the eighth instrument The parties agreed not to test, carrying out such tests in Africa, and of ratification. This procedure was manufacture, produce, receive, pos- from using the African continent for much simpler than that provided for sess, store, deploy, or use nuclear storing or transporting nuclear weap- in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also the weapons. They further undertook to ons.19 Nearly three years later, the denunciation formula of the Treaty use nuclear energy solely for peace- African heads of state and govern- of Rarotonga is different. It is more ful purposes, and not to possess ment participating in a summit con- restrictive than that of the Treaty of nuclear reprocessing or uranium ference of the Organization of Tlatelolco, because it concedes the enrichment facilities. To verify com- African Unity (OAU) solemnly de- right of withdrawal only in the event pliance, each side may conduct in- clared that they were ready to un- of violation of a provision essential spection of the objects agreed upon dertake, through an international to the achievement of the objectives by both sides.18 A South–North Joint agreement to be concluded under of the treaty, and it requires a 12 Nuclear Control Commission is to be U.N. auspices, not to manufacture or months’ notice (Article 13). Reser- in charge of implementing the Dec- control atomic weapons.20 The Dec- vations are not allowed (Article 14). laration. laration was endorsed in resolutions The Joint Declaration was to en- of the United Nations, but no con- THE DECLARATION ON crete action was taken to carry it into KOREA ter into force upon the exchange of appropriate instruments following the effect. Only in 1991, after South Whereas the Republic of Korea completion of the procedures re- Africa—the only country on the Af- (South)—which joined the NPT in quired by each side. This exchange rican continent possessing the tech- 1975—has all along been subject to took place in February 1992. How- nical capability to produce nuclear full-scope safeguards, as provided ever, the March 12, 1993 decision by weapons—had acceded to the NPT,

24 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat did real prospects appear for the es- nuclear explosive device in exactly transit by foreign ships and aircraft tablishment of an African NWFZ. the same way it is defined in the with nuclear weapons aboard may be In 1995, as a result of several years Treaty of Rarotonga. allowed by the parties on the rather work, OAU and U.N. experts suc- In a clear allusion to the past South vague condition that no prejudice ceeded in elaborating a draft treaty African nuclear weapon program, should be caused to the purposes and which, after some amendments, was Article 6 of the Treaty of Pelindaba objectives of the treaty (Article 4). approved by the OAU Assembly. As requires the dismantlement and de- Nor is it prohibited in the African in the case of the Treaty of Tlate- struction of any nuclear device that zone to establish facilities serving lolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, was manufactured prior to the com- nuclear strategic systems of the the protocols annexed to the Treaty ing into force of the treaty, as well nuclear powers. on the African Nuclear-Weapon- as the destruction of the relevant fa- Verification of the uses of nuclear Free Zone are to be signed by extra- cilities or their conversion to peace- energy is to be performed by the zonal states. (The treaty is also called ful uses. All such operations must IAEA, which must apply full-scope the Treaty of Pelindaba, after the take place under the supervision of safeguards to prevent the diversion former seat of ’s the IAEA. These provisions aim to of nuclear material to nuclear explo- nuclear-weapon-related activities). dispel any lingering suspicion that sive devices (Annex II).22 Parties to Other aspects the Treaty of some nuclear items have been hid- the treaty may supply nuclear mate- Pelindaba also followed the pattern den away in South Africa or that rial or equipment to non-nuclear of the NWFZ arrangements in force certain prohibited activities are still weapon states only if the latter ac- in Latin America and the South Pa- taking place there. Article 6 sets a cept full-scope safeguards (Article cific. On December 12, 1995, the precedent for future nuclear weapon- 9c). Furthermore, the treaty obliges U.N. General Assembly welcomed free-zone treaties concluded with the the parties to observe international the Treaty of Pelindaba,21 and on participation of nuclear threshold rules regarding the security and April 11, 1996, the treaty was opened states. physical protection of nuclear mate- for signature. Like the Treaty of Rarotonga, the rials, facilities, and equipment in or- Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits the der to prevent their theft or Scope of Obligations and dumping of radioactive matter any- unauthorized use (Article 10). Any Verification where within the African zone, but it action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against The Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits also contains, in Article 7, an under- nuclear installations in the African the manufacture, testing, stockpiling, taking by the parties to implement or zone is forbidden (Article 11). or acquisition by other means, as well to use as guidelines the measures as possession and control of any contained in the Bamako Convention The African Commission on nuclear explosive device (in as- on the Ban of the Import into Africa Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), which sembled, unassembled, or partly as- and Control of Transboundary Move- will have its headquarters in South sembled forms) by the parties. In ment and Management of Hazard- Africa, is to be charged with ensur- addition—and this is an important ous Wastes within Africa, in so far ing compliance with all the above novelty—research on, and develop- as it is relevant to radioactive waste. undertakings (Article 12). It will be ment of, such a device are banned. The parties undertake to strengthen composed of 12 members elected by Moreover, the treaty bans seeking, the mechanisms for co-operation at the parties for a three-year period, receiving, or encouraging assistance bilateral, subregional, and regional bearing in mind not only the principle in the above-enumerated activities levels, with a view to promoting the of equitable geographical distribution, (Articles 3 and 5). Under Protocol use of nuclear science and technol- but also the advancement of the II, open for signature by the five ogy for economic and social devel- members’ nuclear programs. The nuclear weapon states, the signato- opments. Chairman and Vice-Chairman are to ries should undertake not to test or While stationing of nuclear explo- be elected by AFCONE, while the assist in or encourage the testing of sive devices in the territory of the Executive Secretary is to be desig- any nuclear explosive device within zonal states is prohibited, visits and nated by the Secretary-General of the African zone. Article 1 defines the OAU (Annex III). The Commis-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 25 Jozef Goldblat sion may request the IAEA to con- and of its protocols is illustrated in a United Kingdom, and the United duct an inspection on the territory of map annexed to the treaty. The main States, the signatories should under- a party suspected of violating its ob- difficulty in drawing up this map was take not to use or threaten to use a ligations and designate representa- the status of the Chagos Archi- nuclear explosive device against any tives to accompany the Agency’s pelago, including the island of Di- party to the treaty, or any territory inspection team, but it may also set ego Garcia that harbors a U.S. within the African zone for which a up its own inspection mechanisms. military base. The Archipelago is state that has become party to Pro- Established breaches may be re- covered by the map with a proviso tocol III is internationally responsible. ferred to the OAU which, in turn, that this is “without prejudice to the However, in signing this protocol, the can refer the matter to the U.N. Se- question of sovereignty” claimed by United States, the United Kingdom, curity Council (Annex IV). both the United Kingdom and and France declared that they would Mauritius. It was thus made clear not be bound by it in case of an inva- Area Subject to that the resolution of the sovereignty sion or any other attack upon them, Denuclearization issue would have to take place out- carried out or sustained by a party to side the framework of the treaty. the treaty in association or alliance The Treaty of Pelindaba bans However, the United Kingdom with a nuclear weapon state. nuclear weapons in the territory of stated that it did not accept the in- made a similar statement, but added the continent of Africa, island states clusion, without its consent, of the that it did not consider itself bound members of the OAU, and all islands British Territory, of by the obligations under Protocol I in considered in OAU resolutions (pre- which Diego Garcia is part, within respect of the Chagos Archipelago sumably also resolutions that may be the African NWFZ, and that it did islands. adopted in the future) to be part of not accept any legal obligations in Africa. For the purpose of the treaty, Parties to the protocols would un- respect of that Territory. In a related “territory” means land territory, in- dertake not to contribute to any act statement, the United States noted ternal waters, territorial seas, and ar- constituting a violation of the treaty that neither the treaty nor Protocol chipelagic waters and the airspace or the relevant protocol. This under- III applies to the activities of the above them, as well as the seabed taking, however, is unverifiable with- United Kingdom, the United States, and subsoil beneath (Article 1). A out the transparency of the nuclear or any other state not party to the reference is made to the freedom of powers’ naval and air deployments treaty on the Island of Diego Garcia the seas (Article 2)—identical to that in the NWFZ as well as in the areas or elsewhere in the British Indian appearing in the Treaty of Raro- adjacent to the zone.25 Ocean Territories, and that, accord- tonga; it is clearly intended to pre- ingly, no change was required in U.S. clude restrictions on the presence of Entry into Force and armed forces operations there.23 nuclear weapons beyond the territo- Denunciation Russia, however, pointed out that, as rial sea limits of the zonal states. long as a military base of a nuclear The Treaty of Pelindaba is not Under Protocol III of the Treaty of power was situated on the Chagos subject to reservations. It will enter Pelindaba, open for signature by Archipelago islands, and as long as into force on the date of the deposit France and Spain, the signatories certain nuclear powers considered with the Secretary-General of the should undertake to apply, in the ter- themselves free from the obligations OAU of the 28th instrument of rati- ritories for which each of them is de under the protocols to the Treaty of fication. The treaty is of unlimited jure or de facto internationally re- Pelindaba with regard to these is- duration, but any party may with- sponsible and that are situated in the lands, Russia could not regard them draw from it at 12-months’ notice, African zone, the denuclearization as meeting the requirements of if some extraordinary events have provisions contained in Articles 3 to nuclear-weapon-free territories.24 jeopardized its supreme interests. 10 of the treaty, and to ensure the The denunciation clause is thus less application of IAEA safeguards rigorous than in the Treaty of Raro- there. Security Assurances of Extra- Zonal States tonga, which permits withdrawal The geographic extent of the ap- only in the event of a material breach plication of the Treaty of Pelindaba Under Protocol I, open for signa- of the treaty. ture by China, France, Russia, the

26 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat

THE TREATY OF BANGKOK nition if they are separable from and mentation of the treaty and ensure In , the idea of set- not an indivisible part thereof. compliance with its provisions. The ting up a NWFZ was developed as Nuclear explosive devices in Executive Committee, a subsidiary part of the Declaration on the Zone unassembled or partly assembled organ of the Commission—also of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality forms are not explicitly covered. composed of all parties—is to en- (ZOPAN) issued in 1971 by the As- Dumping at sea or discharge into the sure the proper operation of verifi- sociation of Southeast Asian Nations atmosphere within the zone of any cation measures, decide on requests (ASEAN). In recent years, states of radioactive material or wastes is not for clarification and for a fact-find- the region have revitalized the de- allowed. Nor is it allowed to dispose ing mission, set up such a mission nuclearization proposal,26 and a radioactive material or wastes on (which would consist of three in- working group, established by the land, unless the disposal is carried out spectors from the IAEA who are Association, engaged in preparatory in accordance with IAEA standards neither nationals of the requesting work to implement the initiative. and procedures. Seeking or receiv- state nor nationals of the receiving This work gathered momentum af- ing assistance in the commission of state), decide on its findings, and ter the United States had closed its acts which would violate the above request the Commission to convene military bases in the and provisions, as well as assisting in or if necessary. The decisions of the appeared to support the ASEAN encouraging the commission of such Executive Committee and those of project. On December 16, 1995, the acts are equally prohibited (Articles the Commission are to be taken by Treaty on the Southeast Asia 1 and 3). consensus or, failing consensus, by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was Parties, which have not yet done a two-thirds majority of the mem- signed in Bangkok. It is referred to so, must conclude an agreement with bers present and voting (Articles 8 as the Treaty of Bangkok. the IAEA for the application of full- and 9). In case of an established scope safeguards to their peaceful breach of the treaty, the Commission must decide on measures to cope Scope of Obligations and nuclear activities (Article 5). In ad- with the situation, including submis- Verification dition to these safeguards, the con- trol system will comprise reports and sion of the matter to the IAEA and— Parties to the Treaty of Bangkok exchanges of relevant information; where the situation might endanger may use nuclear energy for their requests for clarification of situa- international peace and security—to economic development and social tions that may be considered am- the Security Council and the Gen- progress, but are prohibited, both in- biguous or may give rise to doubts eral Assembly of the United Nations side and outside the zone, from de- about compliance; and requests for (Article 14.3). Disputes arising from veloping, testing, manufacturing or fact-finding missions to clarify and the interpretation of the treaty may otherwise acquiring, possessing, or resolve such situations in accordance be referred to arbitration or the In- having control over nuclear weap- with the procedure laid down in the ternational Court of Justice (Article ons. (Unlike in the Treaty of annex to the treaty (Article 10). Prior 21). Pelindaba, research on nuclear ex- to embarking on a peaceful nuclear Stationing—defined as deploying, plosive devices is not expressly energy program, each party must emplacing, emplanting, installing, banned.) The parties will not allow subject the program to rigorous stockpiling, or storing nuclear weap- other states to engage in such activi- nuclear safety assessment conform- ons—in the Southeast Asia Zone is ties, including the use of nuclear ing to the guidelines and standards prohibited. However, each party, on weapons, on their territories. recommended by the IAEA for the “being notified,” may decide for it- “Nuclear weapon” is defined in protection of health and minimization self whether to allow visits by for- somewhat simpler terms than in of danger to life and property (Ar- eign ships and aircraft to its ports and other denuclearization treaties, ticle 4b) . airfields, transit of its airspace by namely, as any explosive device that foreign aircraft, and navigation by is capable of releasing nuclear en- A Commission for the Southeast foreign ships through its territorial sea ergy in an uncontrolled manner. The Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, or archipelagic waters and overflight means of transport or delivery of such composed of all states parties, is to of foreign aircraft above those wa- a device are not included in this defi- be established to oversee the imple- ters in a manner not governed by the

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 27 Jozef Goldblat rights of innocent passage, archipe- protocol, the Executive Committee be reviewed 10 years after its entry lagic sea lanes passage or transit may convene a special meeting of into force at a meeting of the Com- passage (Article 7). As elsewhere, the Commission to decide on appro- mission specially convened for this it is doubtful whether the presence priate measures to be taken. No other purpose (Article 20). Amendments of nuclear weapons on foreign ships denuclearization treaty provides for can be adopted only by a consensus or aircraft would ever be announced. such action. decision of the Commission (Article The United States expressed con- 19). Area Subject to cerns (shared by some other nuclear Denuclearization powers) that because of the geo- PROPOSALS FOR OTHER The Southeast Asia Nuclear- graphical extent of the Zone— which DENUCLEARIZED ZONES Weapon-Free Zone comprises the it considers inconsistent with the In the Middle East—one of the territories of Brunei Darussalam, Law of the Sea Convention—regu- most explosive regions in the Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malay- lar movement of nuclear-powered world—the concept of a NWFZ sia, Myanmar, Philippines, Sin- and nuclear-armed naval vessels and was advanced by and Egypt in gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as aircraft through Southeast Asia 1974.28 Since then, the U.N. Gen- well as their respective continental would be restricted and regional se- eral Assembly adopted several reso- shelves and exclusive economic curity arrangements disturbed. It is lutions supporting this concept, and zones (EEZ) (Articles 1a and 2.1). reluctant to provide what it deems to in recent years it has done so by con- The inclusion of continental shelves be sweeping security assurances as sensus.29 Also the U.N. Security and of EEZ is a novelty, but, accord- demanded by the Southeast Asian Council cease-fire resolution 687, ing to the language of the treaty, the zonal states. China made known its passed after the 1991 right of states with regard to free- objection to the geographical scope War, emphasized the need for a de- dom of the high seas and innocent of the treaty, specifically to the in- nuclearized Middle East. clusion of parts of the South China passage or transit passage of ships The zone in the Middle East, as Sea to which it and some ASEAN and aircraft, are not to be prejudiced. envisaged, overlaps, to a large ex- members have conflicting claims.27 tent, with the NWFZ in Africa, but it It is possible that the signatories of Security Assurances of Extra- is aimed primarily at Israel which re- the treaty will revise the language of Zonal States fuses to join the NPT. Israel ac- the protocol to make it acceptable to Under the protocol annexed to the knowledges having nuclear weapon the nuclear weapon states. Treaty of Bangkok and open for sig- capabilities, but has neither con- nature by China, France, Russia, the firmed nor denied the possession of Entry into Force and United Kingdom, and the United nuclear weapons. It made an am- Denunciation States, the signatories would assume biguous statement to the effect that the following obligations: to respect The Treaty of Bangkok will enter “it will not be the first country to in- the treaty and not to contribute to any into force upon the deposit with the troduce nuclear weapons into the act that would constitute its viola- government of Thailand of the sev- Middle East.”30 A U.N. study on tion, and not to use or threaten to use enth instrument of ratification (Ar- “effective and verifiable measures nuclear weapons against any state ticle 16). Reservations are not which would facilitate the establish- party to the treaty and, in general, permitted. The treaty is to remain in ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone within the zone. The protocol is of a force indefinitely, but—like in the in the Middle East,” published in permanent nature, but each party Treaty of Rarotonga—each party 1990, suggested that the process of may withdraw from it, if it decides will have the right to withdraw from creating the proposed zone should that extraordinary events related to it, at 12 months’ notice, in the event be preceded by confidence-building the subject matter of the protocol of a breach by any other party that measures.31 have jeopardized its supreme inter- would be essential to the achieve- In April 1990, President Mubarak ests. ment of the objectives of the treaty of Egypt proposed the establishment (Article 22). In the event of a breach of the in the Middle East of a zone free of The operation of the treaty is to all types of weapons of mass destruc-

28 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat tion.32 Thus, not only nuclear weap- nuclear installations, formal pledges Treaty Organization (WTO). How- ons would be banned in the area in not to manufacture nuclear weapons, ever, there is no consensus among question, but chemical and biological and, finally, the establishment of a the countries of Central and Eastern weapons as well, and probably also South Asian zone free of nuclear Europe about the need for such un- certain categories of ballistic missiles. weapons. India has rejected the dertakings. Proposals for a Nordic In any event, complete and verified above proposals, arguing that with- NWFZ, made repeatedly during the denuclearization of the Middle East out a proper definition of the geo- Cold War, were never subject of real is not likely to take place before a graphic extent and the security needs negotiation. successful conclusion of the peace of the region (an allusion to the neigh- The suspected acquisition of process, which would end threats of boring China), endorsement of the nuclear weapons by North Korea the use of force in the region. concept of regional denuclearization gave rise to a discussion about the The proposal for the establishment would be inappropriate. It also con- advisability of setting up a NWFZ in of a NWFZ in South Asia has been siders nuclear disarmament as a mat- , which would cover on the agenda of the U.N. General ter requiring a global rather than a not only the two Korean states but Assembly since the early 1970s, and regional approach. also Japan and Taiwan. a number of resolutions have been In Europe, all states have joined , too, has been men- adopted recommending such a mea- the NPT. Moreover, the elimination tioned by the countries of the region sure. The proposal is aimed at India by the United States and Russia of as an area lending itself to denucle- and Pakistan, the major powers in ground-launched missiles with a arization. Numerous key steps have the region not bound by the NPT. range of 500 to 5500 kilometers, in already taken place, including the ta- In 1974, India conducted a test of compliance with the INF Treaty, as bling of several documents before a nuclear device, which it called a well as the two powers’ unilateral the United Nations. 38 Most signifi- peaceful explosion, but it claims that withdrawals of their short-range mis- cant among these developments has it has never “weaponized” the results siles and most other tactical weap- been the Almaty Declaration of Feb- of this test.33 Nonetheless, accord- ons, have transformed much of the ruary 28, 1997, in which the presi- ing to some reports, India has already European continent into a zone of dents of the five states of the region manufactured nuclear weapons and considerably thinned-out nuclear ar- (Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, perhaps made preparations for an- maments. In addition, according to Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) ex- other nuclear explosion.34 Even if the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settle- pressed their joint support for the these reports are not correct, the very ment with respect to Germany, after formation of a NWFZ. The five possession of a growing stockpile of the withdrawal of Russian forces states have created a working group nuclear weapon-usable material from the former German Democratic and intend to meet in Tashkent, gives India the ability to “go nuclear” Republic, no nuclear weapons may Uzbekistan, in September 1997 to within a short period of time. In re- be stationed in that part of Ger- draw up plans for a formal U.N. reso- 36 taining the nuclear option India may many. Nevertheless, over the lution announcing their plans and wish to counterbalance China’s years, proposals have been made for calling on other states for their sup- nuclear arsenal and its superiority in a formal denuclearization of differ- port in the formation of the zone.39 non-nuclear armaments. ent parts of Europe. Recently, the government of Belarus suggested Moreover, an even broader con- Pakistan has the ability to produce creating a NWFZ that would com- cept of establishing a “nuclear- nuclear weapons, and may have al- prise countries situated between the weapon-free ready done so,35 but Pakistani lead- and the .37 The and adjacent areas” was launched ers deny it. To demonstrate their good suggestion grew out of concern that at the 1996 U.N. General Assem- will, they have proposed various de- the planned eastward expansion of bly.40 Finally, proposals for “zones of nuclearization arrangements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- peace” in the Indian Ocean, the India, such as simultaneous acces- tion (NATO) could lead to the de- Mediterranean, the South Atlantic, sion to the NPT, mutual acceptance ployment of Western tactical nuclear and imply at least of full-scope IAEA nuclear safe- weapons on the territories of the some measure of denuclearization in guards, bilateral inspections of all former members of the Warsaw these regions.

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 29 Jozef Goldblat

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE Zealand-United States (ANZUS) weapon powers. Eventually, under COUNTRIES alliance to resist armed attack.43 pressure exercised within NATO, In 1987, the Parliament of New In his address to the U.N. Gen- mainly by the United States and the Zealand decided to establish the New eral Assembly, in September 1992, United Kingdom, (a mem- Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.41 The the President of Mongolia declared ber of NATO) agreed as a compro- zone comprises all of the land, terri- the territory of his country a NWFZ. mise to proceed on the assumption tory, and inland waters within the ter- He said that his government would that its decision to keep its territory ritorial limits of New Zealand; the strive to have its status internation- free of nuclear weapons in peace- internal waters and the territorial sea ally guaranteed.44 time would be respected by visiting foreign ships or aircraft. Denmark of New Zealand; as well as the air- In response to the above declara- space above all these areas. In addi- decided not to seek specific assur- tion, the United States made a state- ances.45 tion to prohibitions on the acquisition, ment in which it noted that, as a stationing, and testing of nuclear ex- non-nuclear party to the NPT, Mon- In neutral , visiting war- plosive devices in the zone, the Prime golia benefited from the U.S. com- ships are not permitted to carry Minister may grant approval to the mitment to seek Security Council nuclear weapons. In 1987, the ruling entry of foreign warships into the in- assistance in the event of a nuclear Social Democratic Party decided that ternal waters of New Zealand only attack, and from the assurances that efforts should be made to make the if he is satisfied that the warships will nuclear weapons would not be used nuclear powers forgo the practice of not be carrying any nuclear explo- against a non-nuclear weapon state not giving information regarding the sive device upon their entry into these not allied with a nuclear weapon presence of nuclear weapons on their waters. Similarly, approval of land- state. The United Kingdom and warships. ings in New Zealand by foreign mili- France made a similar statement. Several other countries as well, in- tary aircraft may be granted by the Russia referred to its treaty on cluding members of the military alli- Prime Minister only if he is satisfied friendly relations and co-operation ances, have formally prohibited (as that the aircraft will not be carrying with Mongolia, in which it undertook have Japan, , , and any nuclear explosive device when to respect the policy of the Mongo- Spain) foreign ships or aircraft from it lands. Entry into the internal wa- lian government aimed at preventing entering their territories with nuclear ters of New Zealand by any ship the deployment of foreign troops as weapons aboard . However, to avoid whose propulsion is wholly or partly well as of nuclear and other weap- antagonizing the great powers, the dependent on nuclear power is pro- ons of mass destruction on its terri- governments of some of these states hibited. In this respect, the Parliamen- tory or their transit through its chose to pretend not to be aware of tary Act establishing the New territory. the presence of nuclear weapons on Zealand Zone went beyond the re- board the visiting foreign craft.46 strictions set by other NWFZs; none In 1988, the Parliament of Den- of them prohibits the presence of mark passed a resolution requesting SUMMARY AND nuclear-powered engines.42 the government to notify all visiting warships that they must not carry CONCLUSIONS New Zealand’s anti-nuclear pos- nuclear arms into Danish ports. In a To the extent that the incentive to ture proved unacceptable to the sense, the resolution merely elabo- acquire nuclear weapons may United States, which canceled its rated on the official Danish policy emerge from regional con- naval exercises with New Zealand, proclaimed more than three decades siderations, the establishment of ar- stopped its long-established intelli- earlier, namely, that in time of peace, eas free of nuclear weapons is an gence relationship with that country, introduction of nuclear weapons to important asset for the cause of and suspended its security obligations the country is prohibited. In fact, how- nuclear nonproliferation. Countries to it. The argument put forward by ever, the resolution appeared to re- confident that their enemies in the the United States was that, by bar- ject the practice of “neither region do not possess nuclear weap- ring U.S. warships, New Zealand confirming nor denying” the presence ons may not be inclined to acquire had placed in jeopardy the collective of nuclear weapons, which is fol- such weapons themselves. The capacity of the Australia-New lowed by the navies of all the nuclear zones that have been established to

30 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Jozef Goldblat date meet other postulates as well. of nuclear weapons through the limitations. For an analysis of these areas, see Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Ne- Besides prohibiting the acquisition of territories of zonal states, includ- gotiations and Agreements (Oslo and London: nuclear weapons by zonal states, ing visits by foreign ships and air- PRIO and SAGE, 1994). they proscribe (unlike the NPT) the craft with nuclear weapons 3 1995 NPT Review and Extension Confer- ence document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2. stationing of these weapons in the aboard. 4 U.N. document A/10027/Add.1. territories of non-nuclear weapon 9. The withdrawal clauses of the 5 U.S. State Department Briefing Document, states. Zonal procedures to verify Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty December 8, 1995. 6 See U.N. document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/ compliance with the nonprolifera- of Pelindaba, which refer to the 14 (14 April 1997), “Proposed elements for tion obligations are even stricter than “supreme interests” of the parties, inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session,” submitted by the procedures prescribed by the are too permissive. (The Treaty of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni- NPT. Moreover, zonal states benefit Rarotonga and the Treaty of stan, and Uzbekistan. from some legally binding security Bangkok concede the right of 7 U.N. General Assembly document A/C.1/ L.312/Rev.1-2 and Add.1, 1962. assurances of the great powers. withdrawal only in the event of a 8 U.N. General Assembly document A/5415/ material breach of the parties’ ob- Rev.1, 1963. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the 9 ligations.) PPNN, Briefing Book, document G-1, 1993. preceding sections, the present 10 A. Garcia Robles, El Tratado de Tlatelolco, NWFZ treaties are deficient in sev- 10. The nuclear powers’ under- (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1967). taking to respect the status of the 11 For the text of all these amendments, see eral respects. In particular: 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference 1. None of the treaties specifies denuclearized zones is unverifi- document NPT/CONF.1995/10. 12 that the denuclearization provisions able. By February 26, 1997, only 11 parties to the 11. Assurances not to use nuclear Treaty of Tlatelolco (out of 32) had ratified all are valid both in time of peace and the amendments. These were: Argentina, Barba- in time of war. weapons against zonal states, as dos, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, 2. Research on nuclear explosive given by the nuclear powers, are , , , and . (Infor- not unconditional. mation obtained by author from OPANAL.) devices is explicitly prohibited only 13 1995 NPT Review and Extension Confer- in the Treaty of Pelindaba. 12. Only the Treaty of Bangkok ence document NPT/CONF.1995/11. calls for action in the event of vio- 14 U.S. Department of State, Office of the 3. Only the Treaty of Rarotonga Spokesperson, October 20, 1995. and the Treaty of Pelindaba make lation of the obligations assumed 15 International Herald Tribune, March 26, by the nuclear powers. 1996. it clear that the bans cover nuclear 16 Communication from the Legal and Politi- explosive devices also in The above deficiencies could be cal Officer, South Pacific Forum Secretariat, unassembled or partly assembled removed through amendments of the Suva, Fiji, August 5, 1996. 17 White House Press Briefing by NSC Senior forms. existing NWFZ treaties and should Director Bell, March 22, 1996. 4. So-called peaceful nuclear ex- be avoided in the drafting of such 18 During negotiations, North Korea rejected plosions may be allowed by the new treaties, provided due account South Korea’s proposal for a system of chal- lenge inspections to be conducted upon the Treaty of Tlatelolco (though only is taken of the particularities of each initiative of the requesting party (L. Niksch under certain conditions). region. Unilateral formal declarations and Z. Davis, “North Korean Nuclear Contro- versy: Defining Treaties, Agreements, and Terms,” 5. Nuclear-weapon-related sup- on the denuclearization of individual CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Re- port facilities serving the strate- countries may contain undertakings search Service. The Library of Congress, Septem- gic systems of the nuclear powers stricter than treaties. Therefore, they ber 16, 1964). 19 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI). are not banned by any NWFZ should be encouraged to further 20 OAU document AHG/Res.11(1), July 21, 1964. treaty. strengthen the nonproliferation re- 21 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 50/78. 6. Only the Treaty of Pelindaba gime. 22 So far, four African states—, Egypt, Libya, and South Africa—have nuclear programs prohibits attacks on nuclear facili- requiring the application of safeguards. Of these, ties. only South Africa is in possession of nuclear power reactors. 7. Only the Treaty of Tlatelolco 23 PPNN Newsbrief, 2nd Quarter 1996. and the Treaty of Bangkok pro- 24 Letter from the Russian Ambassador to the vide for the denuclearization of Secretary-General of the Organization of Af- 1 A. Albrecht, The Rapacki Plan—New As- rican Unity, Addis Ababa, November 5, 1996. maritime areas adjacent to the ter- 25 pects (Poznan, Poland: Zachodnia Agencja France was the first nuclear power to ratify ritorial waters of zonal states. Prasowa, 1963). all the three protocols. 26 2 A comprehensive discussion of these treaties U.N. document A/47/80. 8. All treaties tolerate the transit 27 is beyond the scope of this article, due to space International Herald Tribune, December 9-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 31 Jozef Goldblat

10, 11, 14, and 16-17, 1995. P. Samuel, and F.P. Serong, “The Troubled Wa- 28 U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ ters of ANZUS,” Strategic Review ( 3263 (XXIX). 1985). 29 For the historical background of this pro- 44 U.N. document A/47/PV.13. posal, see M. Karem, Nuclear-Weapon-Free 45 Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), April 15, Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Pros- 1988; Le Monde, June 9, 1988. pects (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). 46 Certain cities have declared themselves 30 For a detailed account of Israel’s nuclear nuclear-weapon free, but such declarations are weapon capabilities, see Leonard S. Spector, not binding on the governments of the coun- Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colo.: Westview tries concerned. Press, 1990), pp.149-174. 31 U.N. document A/45/435, October 10, 1990. 32 Conference on Disarmament document CD/ 989, April 20, 1990. 33 More tests might be needed to develop a reliable nuclear warhead. 34 The New York Times, December 15 and 16, 1995, and January 9, 1996. 35 For a detailed account of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities, see Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 63-117. 36 NATO Review (Brussels), No. 5 (October 1990), p. 30. 37 1995 Review and Extension Conference docu- ment NPT/CONF.1995/SR 3. For an elabora- tion of this idea, see A. I. Shevtsov, ed., Analysis of the problem to create a new security system. An initiative to establish a denuclearized zone in Central and (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995); J. Prawitz, “A Nuclear-Free Zone From the Baltic to the Black Sea,” Security Dialogue 27 (June 1996); and J. Prawitz, PPNN Issue Review, No. 10 (Febru- ary 1997). 38 See U.N. General Assembly document A/52/ 112 (March 18, 1997), Annex “Almaty Declara- tion, adopted by the leaders of Kazakstan, Kyr- gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, of 28 February 1997”; also, see U.N. General Assembly document A/C.1/51/L.29 (Oc- tober 29, 1996) submitted to the First Commit- tee, “Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia: draft resolution. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central Asian region.” 39 Information provided by the Center for Non- proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, based on a trip by senior staff members to the region in May 1997. 40 U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/ 45. 41 The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Arms Control and Disarmament Act 1987. 42 The Act reflected public opinion in New Zealand, where an overwhelming majority of people desired their defense to be arranged in a way that ensured that the country remained nuclear-free (Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want and the “Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security,” annexed to the Report, Wellington, July 1986). For a discourse on threat assessment in New Zealand, see Wade Huntley, “The Kiwi that Roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a Nuclear-Armed World,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996). 43 The Washington Post, December 18, 1986;

32 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997