Angola HUMAN Democracy or Monopoly? RIGHTS Angola’s Reluctant Return to Elections WATCH Democracy or Monopoly? Angola’s Reluctant Return to Elections Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-445-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org February 2009 1-56432-445-1 Democracy or Monopoly? Angola’s Reluctant Return to Elections Glossary of Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 1 I. Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 3 II. Methodology .................................................................................................................. 5 III. Background ................................................................................................................... 6 IV. Electoral Institutions and the Legal Environment ........................................................... 8 Legal Framework............................................................................................................. 8 Election Administration .................................................................................................. 8 Media Environment ....................................................................................................... 10 V. Violations of Media Freedom in the 2008 Election ......................................................... 13 Unequal Access to State Media ..................................................................................... 13 Threats against Independent Media .............................................................................. 16 Implications for the media environment in a 2009 election ..................................... 17 VI. Flaws in the 2008 Election Process .............................................................................. 19 Possible Partiality in Candidate Registration .................................................................. 19 Performance of National Electoral Commission as Oversight Body ................................. 19 Unequal Access to State Funding and Resources ........................................................... 21 Preferential treatment of some voters from abroad ................................................. 22 Buying Political Favor ................................................................................................... 22 Unequal Access to Public Facilities and Space .............................................................. 23 Government Obstruction of Independent National Observers ....................................... 24 Irregularities in Conduct of Voting, Counting, and Tabulation ........................................ 27 Flawed voter verification ......................................................................................... 28 Lack of independent scrutiny of the tabulation process .......................................... 29 Need for an independent post-elections inquiry ..................................................... 30 VII. Election-Related Violence in Huambo and Benguela .................................................... 32 Incidents in Huambo ..................................................................................................... 33 Incidents in Benguela ................................................................................................... 34 Government Response .................................................................................................. 35 VIII. Ongoing Armed Insurgency and Intimidation in Cabinda ............................................ 38 IX. Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 43 To the Angolan Government .......................................................................................... 43 Regarding management and oversight of the elections ........................................... 43 Regarding the media environment .......................................................................... 43 Regarding acts of political violence and intimidation .............................................. 44 To Future National and International Observers ............................................................ 44 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 45 Glossary of Acronyms AJPD Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia (Association Justice Peace and Democracy) CNCS Conselho Nacional de Comunicação Social (National Council on Media) CCDH Conselho de Coordenação dos Direitos Humanos (Coordination Council for Human Rights) CIPE Comissão Interministerial para o Processo Eleitoral (Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Electoral Process) CNE Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (National Electoral Commission) EU EOM European Union Election Observer Mission FCD Fórum Cabindês para o Diálogo (Cabindan Forum for Dialogue) FICRE Ficheiro Central do Registo Eleitoral (Central voter register database) FLEC Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda) FNLA Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola) FpD Frente para a Democracia (Front for Democracy) GURN Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional (Government of National Unity and Reconciliation) MPLA Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) OPSA Observatório Político e Social de Angola (Political and Social Observatory of Angola) PNASCAE Plataforma Nacional da Sociedade Civil Angolana para as Eleições (National Angolan Civil Society Electoral Platform) 1 Human Rights Watch | February 2009 PRS Partido de Renovação Social (Party of Social Renewal) RNA Rádio Nacional de Angola SADC Southern African Development Community Sinfo Serviços de Informação (State security Information Services) TPA Televisão Pública de Angola UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) Democracy or Monopoly? 2 I. Executive Summary 2009 should see a presidential election in Angola, for the first time since 1992. Parliamentary elections held in September 2008 failed to fully meet regional and international standards. Urgent reforms are essential if the people of Angola are to be able to freely exercise their civil and political rights and vote for the presidential candidate of their choice. Those reforms need to be entrenched ahead of Angola’s first local elections, to be held in 2010. The parliamentary elections on September 5-6, 2008, were the first in 16 years. They brought a resounding victory for the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), in power since 1975, with 81.7 percent of the vote. The elections were contested by 14 political parties and coalitions, but only four opposition parties were able to secure representation in parliament, where the MPLA’s landslide translated into 191 of the 220 seats. In 2008, in the months before the official parliamentary election campaign, Human Rights Watch raised doubts about prospects for the elections being free and fair: The oversight body, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) lacked impartiality because it is dominated by the ruling party; the media environment was unfavourable to the opposition and freedom of expression restricted; unchecked intimidation and political violence by ruling party supporters was preventing opposition parties from campaigning freely throughout the country; and a climate of repression prevailed in the enclave of Cabinda, where armed conflict has continued despite a 2006 peace agreement. During the one-month official election campaign period, which opened on August 5, 2008, Human Rights Watch witnessed some improvement. Unlike during the pre-campaign period, the police provided protection to opposition parties, meaning they could campaign freely. However, in many other ways the playing field remained considerably slanted in favour of the ruling party. The CNE failed in its role as oversight body, doing nothing to prevent or respond to major violations of election laws during the campaign, such as unequal access to state funds and to the state media. It also obstructed accreditation for national election observers from civil society. On polling day, important safeguards against manipulation such as the use of voter’s rolls were breached, and the CNE obstructed independent monitoring of the tabulation process. Opposition parties and observers have not presented evidence of deliberate government manipulation of the polls, and political