The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons for Pakistan
A thesis submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan in partial fulfillment of requirement for degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the subject of International Relations
By
Arshi Saleem Hashmi
2014
CONTENTS
iii Acknowledgement
vii Abstract
List of abbreviations x
Glossary xii
List of figures ( 1-6)
1-Map of India xxii
2-Map of Pakistan xxiii 3-Map of Deoband in UP , India xxiv 4- DarulUloomDeoband in Deoband India
5-Map of AkoraKhattak in Khyber - xxv
PakhtoonKhwan –Pakistan xxvi 6-Darul UloomHaqqania in AkoraKhattak- xxvii Pakistan
Introduction 1
CHAPTER 1 26
Theoretical Framework
CHAPTER 2 51 DeobandiMadrassa System in Historical Perspective
CHAPTER 3 102
Intrusion of Politics in Deobandi Madrassas in Pre and Post-Independence India and Pakistan
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CHAPTER 4 131
State of Religion and Nature of State in Pakistan and India
CHAPTER 5 180
International Political Environment (1979-2001) and Internal Politics of India and Pakistan: Implications on Regional Politics
CHAPTER 6 203
Existing Indian and Pakistani Deobandi Madrassa System in Comparative perspective: Serving Religion or Politics of Religion?
CONCLUSION 221
APPENDICES
Appendix I 245
Appendix II 250
Appendix III 251
Appendix IV 260
Appendix V 261
Appendix VI 271
Bibliography 273
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Acknowledgement
I owe deep gratitude to my supervisor, Dr.LubnaAbid Ali, for providing me the opportunity to learn from her expertise and work under her guidance to complete this research thesis. It was her constant support, encouragement and help that kept me in the right direction to analyse the research questions. She helped me in reading the authors whose contribution in the field of international relations is remarkable. It was due to her that I found great treasures of knowledge that will continue to help me in future as well.
I am thankful to the School of Politics and International Relations and particularly the faculty for a welcoming environment that is always helpful for students.
I got great help from the JamiaMilliaUniveristy in New Delhi India, especially Prof. Syed Sajjad and Prof. AkhtarulWasey , for the material and interviews with many religious scholars and Muslim leaders in India.
I am indebted to the Institute of Regional Studies for providing me the opportunity to use their books collection on India. The National Defence University Library was also a great source for me for the books not available otherwise. I also benefitted from the huge collection of Library of Congress, Washington DC during my visits to the US in 2012 and the Middle East Institute in Washington DC.
I would also like to thank Naseer Hussein for his great help in arranging interview and my several visits to madrassas which would have been otherwise difficult. I appreciate the help provided by Mariam Shah and Hasan Hakeem.
Last but not the least, my beloved family, my father’s confidence and encouragement that I can complete my thesis and my mother’s prayers cannot be expressed in words. My husband’s patience and support will always be remembered and above all my son Mustafa’s understanding of the importance of the work enabled me to carry out the research without disturbance.
ArshiSaleemHashmi November 2012
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Declaration
I , ArshiSaleemHashmi, registration no. 03130813002, PhD Scholar in the subject of International Relations at the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan hereby declare that the matter printed in this thesis titled: “The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their Elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons for Pakistan” is my own work and has not been printed, published and submitted as research work , thesis and publication in any form in any university or research institution in Pakistan or abroad.
------Ms. Arshi Saleem Hashmi PhD Scholar SPIR, QAU
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CERTIFICATE
This thesis titled: “The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their Elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons for Pakistan”, is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations by ArshiSaleemHashmi, PhD Scholar at the SPIR.
1- ______Dr. LubnaAbid Ali Supervisor School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) Qaudi-e-AzamUniveristy-Islamabad
2- ______Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Director School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) Qaudi-e-AzamUniveristy-Islamabad
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Dedication
Dedicated to Moazzam, My life partner, My supporter and my best critic
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Abstract
The madrassa system has been the source of traditional Islam providing the inspiration for intellectual philosophy. In South Asia, they have been actively involved in maintaining the traditional Islam and providing a cultural alternative. South Asian Muslims found in Madrassas, the centre of classical Islamic studies keeping the orthodox culture intact. Madrassa have been the torch bearer of conservative values within Islam and at times worked as reactionary forces against the “cultural invasion” from other religious traditions, especially Hinduism in South Asia. Post 9/11, the once little known educational institutions became a significant part of the public discourse, thanks to media coverage. But in this, hysterical coverage the most pertinent question remained unanswered. Why some of these Islamic educational institutions have been transformed drastically? Rather, a simplistic, readymade, and already known answer has been repeated over time, while ignoring the actual spirit of these madrassas being rooted in the historical unveiling of Islamic spirituality.
However, following the collapse of Islamic self-confidence that accompanied the deposition of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, disillusioned scholars founded an influential madrassa at Deoband, a 100 miles north of the former Mughal capital in Delhi. Feeling that they were pushed against the wall, the madrassa's founders reacted against what they saw as the degenerate ways of the old elite. The Deobandimadrassa, therefore, went back to Quranic basics and rigorously stripped out anything “Hindu” or “European” from the curriculum. Founded in 1866 byMaulanaQasimNanautavi and Maulana Rashid Gangohi, the school did take part in the freedom struggle against the British. Since the departure of the British, Indian Deobandis remained apolitical while Pakistani Deobandis got into politics. In the same way, it rejected any state influence. That role in the colonial period was not overtly political. The brutal repression of the so-called Mutiny of 1857 against the British had fallen very hard on north Indian Muslims. In the aftermath, the `Ulema, not surprisingly, adopted a stance of a-political quietism. As the Indian nationalist movement became a mass movement after World War I, the Deobandileadership did something of an about turn. They were never a political party as such, but, organized into the Association of the `Ulema of India (Jamiat `Ulema-i Hind). Thus threw in their lot with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress in opposition to British rule. Deobandi histories written before 1920 insisted that the Ulema did not participate in the anti-colonial rebellion of 1857. However, the histories written after independence, give freedom-fighters pride of place. In the aftermath of Soviet interventions into Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran 1979, a kind of "surrogate" competition emerged between Saudis and Iranians, each side patronizing religious institutions which fueled sectarian violence. The surge in the number of madrasas in the 1980s coincided with the ideology of Jihad in Afghanistan due to Russian intervention that resulted in the influx of millions of Afghan refugees. The madrasas located along the frontier frequently provided the only available education. One school in particular, the Madrasa Haqqaniya, in AkoraKathaknear Peshawar, trained many of the top Taliban leaders. These students (talib; plural, taliban) were indoctrinated by many of the core Deobandireformists
vii encouraged by Arab and Uzbek volunteers in Afghanistan. Deobandis followed Saudi-Wahabi injunctions including rigorous concern with fulfilling rituals; opposition to custom laden ceremonies like weddings and pilgrimage to shrines, and a focus on seclusion of women as a central symbol of a morally ordered society. Theirs was, according to Ahmed Rashid, “an extreme form of Deobandism, which was being preached by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan." 1This focus on a fairly narrow range of shari'a law, which emphasized strict ritual, was something the Taliban shared with other Deobandimovements, while the severity of the Taliban indoctrination made them known to the world as inhuman and terrorist. DarulUloomDeoband India,on the other hand, forbade their students from going to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The clerics drew an important boundary line between theologically conservative views and political violence. A successful story of Muslim education in India is DarulUmoor, a one-year institute for madrassa graduates in the southern state of Mysore. There, religious students supplement their education with English literature and comparative religion before returning to their communities to teach in madrassas and preach in mosques. Many observers agree that local, Muslim-run projects like this one are essential if Muslims are to genuinely integrate into the Indian mainstream. Asgar Ali Engineer, head of an interfaith organization in Mumbai states, “Indian Deobandis and Pakistani Deobandis are quite different. Islam is in the majority over there. The Ulema have been politicized, they want and they use Islam. There is a very interesting phenomenon here (India). The Deobandis here are attacking terrorism and militancy. Deobandis have held largest demonstrations in India against terrorism. They are puritan otherwise and against Sufism, but in the Indian environment, their behavior is very different.”2
On the other hand, in Pakistan, study of madrassas in Pakistan, gives us a totally different picture, while most of them are nonviolent, that does not mean that they are apolitical. As compared to Indian Deobandi Madrassas, if we just focus on Pakistani Deobandi madrassas and include Jamaat-i-Islami’sAhle Hadith madrassas as well, it appears that Deobandi and JI madarsassas are more inclined towards politics, they have political affiliations. The Barelviesdo not focus much on their political tradition.3 The issue however remains that the preservation of a distinct Muslim identity is one of the principal concerns of the madrassas. This theological hardening however, does not lead to an embrace of militancy in India. In addition to forbidding participation in holy war abroad, Indian Deobandileaders specifically condemn violent jihad at home, saying Muslims have a compact to live in peace and harmony with others that cannot be broken unless they are actively persecuted in matters of faith. Deobandis in India insist that it is possible, within a pluralistic India, to practice rigorous Islam and send their children to religious schools without being opposed to the state.
1Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia”, New Haven, Yale Univeristy-2000 p-88 2Asghar Ali Enginner quoted in Tom Heneghen, Faith World: Religion, Faith and Ethics, Reuter , April 27, 2009 available at http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2009/04/27/religion-and-politics-in-bewilderingly-diverse-india/ accessed on August 8, 2011 3Amir Rana, Mapping the madrassa mindset- Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2,Number-1 Jan-Mar , Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, 2009. viii
For Indian Deobandis, the Indian madrassas are not a part of mainstream politics through any political linkage unlike their Pakistani counterparts. More importantly, they are not yet a part of the transnational Pan-Islamic network of Al-Qaeda, as seen by the 9/11 attacks and after. At most they are reactions to domestic problems caused by bad governance and accentuated by petty vote bank politics as seen in states like UP, Bihar and J &K. Hence, it can be safely said that madrassas in India continue to provide Islamic knowledge and tradition rather than political Islam.
Argument about the Deobandi being the violent sect of Islam is too simplistic. Though it is fair to state that violent expression did find its roots in pre-Independence India, the very fact that the Deobandi Madrassa split in to two, between those who wanted to continue imparting religious knowledge and preserving Muslim identity and those who took up arms first against British, then Soviets and now Americans declaring Jihad. It is unfortunate that in all three examples, the rank and file for Jihad were provided by the people from the mountains. This however does not prove that it is a particular people who are inherently violent as the leadership for all these expeditions was first from Sayid Ahmed of Rae Brailly, then Maulana Mehmoodul Hasan of Deoband, then General Zia who endorsed it and used the Deobandis. The construction of the “threat” from outside powers was mainly based on political interests than religious ideologies. Political and military intrusion by the west was on strategic basis and not to wipe out particular religion from the area as it was conceived and presented by successive Muslim leadership of pre independence India and later of Pakistan. The threat to Islam was so constructed that convinced the tribesman who have been always ready to lay their life in the name of God while the real purpose was and is power politics.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AHJS Ahl-e-Hadith JuboSangha ASM AnjumanSipah-i-Mustafa ASS Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba ASSP Anjuman-i-SipahSahaba Pakistan BJP BharatiyaJanata Party
CIA Central Intelligence Agency EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance HEC Higher Education Commission HUM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen ICNA Islamic Circle of North America
IDSA Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses IPCS Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies IRS Institute of Regional Studies ISI Inter-Service Intelligence Agency ISM IttihadSubbanul Mujahedeen ISO IthnaAshariya Student Organization ISSI Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad JI Jamaat-i-Islami JIH Jamaat-i-Islami Hind JNU Jawaharlal Nehru University JUH JamiatUlama-i Hind JUI JamiatUlema-e-Islam JUIH JamiatulUlema-i Hind JUI-F JamiatUlema-e-Islam (FazlurRehman) JUI-S JamiatUlema-e-Islam (Sami ulHaq) JUP Jamaat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan KNM Kerala Nadvathul Mujahedeen KPK Khyber PakhtoonKhwa
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LJ Lashkar-e- Jhangvi LT Lashkar-e-Tayyaba MMA Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal MMCP Muslim Mass Contact Program MSM Mujahid Students Movement NDA National Democratic Alliance NWFP North West Frontier Province OBC Other Backward Classes P.B.U.H Peace Be Upon Him (S.A.W) PDP Pakistan Democratic Party PIPS Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies PML Pakistan Muslim League PPP Pakistan People's Party RSS RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan ST Sunni Tehreek TIP Tehrik-i-Islam TJ TablighiJamaat TJP Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan TNFJ Tehrik-i-Nafaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jafria TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan UGS University Grants Commission UP Uttar Pradesh VHP Viswa Hindu Parishad
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Glossary of Non-English Words
A Adr-mudarris Dean Ahl-e-Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB) Ahl-e-Hadith Movement Bangladesh Ahl-e-Hadith JuboSangha (AHJS) Youth faction of Jami’at-i-Ahl-e- Hadith formed by Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib Ahl-e-SunnatwaJama’at People of Sunnah and the Community Ahl-i Hadith An Islamic doctrine which focus on Hadith and Quran. Often refeerd to as Salafi or Wahabbi. Ahmadiyya Akali Dal party A Sikhism-centric political party in India, mainly active in the Indian state of Punjab Al-Fiqh Islamic Jurisprudence Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin The Muslim Brotherhood Alim A Muslim learned in religious matters, Muslim Scholar All India Majlis-e- Ittehadul Muslimen A Muslim political party in India. Al-Qaeda A global militant organization Amanat Safe custody Amir Chief Amn and Salamti Peace and security Anjuman-e-Ahl-e-Hadith Association of people of Hdith was formed in West Bengal in 1951 Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS) Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS) Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions, later named the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Anjuman-i-SipahSahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Stance of TNFJ was very aggressive and offensive that provoked a reaction from Deobandi in the shape of Anjuman-i-Sipah Sahaba Pakistan.
AryaSamaj A Hindu reform movement founded by Swami Dayananda in 19th century
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Asharites Orthodox Atiat Gifts B Bahmani Sultanate (Bahmanid Dynasty) It was a Muslim state in located in the northern Deccan Bait-al-hikmas Houses of wisdom Barelvi A movement in Sunni Islam. Inspired by Sufism and Sufi practices. Bida’t Wrongful innovations C Chaadaraur char deewari The veil and four walls D Dalits Untouchables DarulHarb Abode of wars DarulUloomDeoband It is an Islamic school in India where the Deobandi Islamic movement was started Dar-ul-Umoor It is an Islamic theology school in India Deen Religious/sacred Deen-i-Ilahi (Divine Faith) Akbar’s effort to initiate new religion during his reign
Deobandi Followers of DarulUloomDeoband Dharmashastra It a genre of Sanskrit texts and refers to Indic branch of learning, pertaining to Hindu dharma, religious and legal duty Dirayat Reasoning Duniya World (temporal)
F Fatimids It was an Arab Shi'a Muslim caliphate first centered in Tunisia
Fatwas It is a juristic ruling concerning Islamic law issued by Islamic scholar
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Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence H Hadd Un-amendable Hadith Traditions of the Prophet S.A.W Haj It is the fifth pillar of Islam and is the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia Hanafi school (madhhab) within Sunni Islam Hanbali A school (madhhab) within Sunni Islam. Haq Real, Truth, Right Harijans Hindu cast,untouchables, literal meaning childrenof God. Now they are called Dalits, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan based Islamic militant group Hashiya Glosses or marginal notes Hijri Islamic calendar Hindutva This term is used to describe movements of Hindu nationalism Hudood Islamic codes I IbadatKhana House of Worship Ijtihad Independent reasoning Imams Islamic leadership position, often a prayer leader of a mosque Isma’ili Follower within Shi’ite sect IttihadSubbanul Mujahedeen (ISM) The youth wing of KNM J Jama`at Assembly TablihiJamaat (TJ) Though an independent movement, it has motives similar to the Deoband’s dawato tablighwing) and the JamiatulUlema-i Hind (JUIH, Association of Indian Ulema). Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) A Islamist religious political party in Pakistan Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) Assembly of Islamic Clergy. It’s a religious Politicalparty in Pakistan
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Jamiatul-Ansar A movement for armed rebellion against the British in the Subcontinent. JamiatUlema-e-Hind Association of Religious Scholars of, India. A leading Islamic organization in India Jamiat-i-Khilafat-i-Hind All-India Khilafat Conference Jihad Striving in the way of God, struggle Jihad-e-Akbar to The greater jihad), the struggle against one's ego or self (nafs) Jihad-e-Asghar The lesser jihad, the external, physical effort, oftenimplying fighting Jizya Per-head tax on non-Muslims K Kafir Infidel or nonbeliever, pl. kuffar Kafiya Urdu word , Rhyme
Khans Hostels for students and teachers later Called Khanka Khilafat Caliphate
L Lahori group They call themselves Ahmadis Lashkar-i- Jhangvi (LJ) The Army of Jhangvi, formed in 1994. The rganization was named after Haq Nawaz Jhangvi Lashkar-i-Tayeba (LT) It’s the militant wing of Jammat-ut- Dawa. The LT, which grew out of the MarkazDawa-walIrshad, LokSabha House of the People is the lower house of the Parliament of India M Madhabs Schools of thoughts, spell mazhab, pl. mazahib, also spelled madhab) Madina Muslim’s holy city in Saudi Arab Madrassa Literally "a place of study", outside of mosques, offering both secondary and college disciplines Majlis-e-Shura Parliament
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Maktabs or kuttubs Traditional educational institutions, writing schools
Manqulat Such as hadith MarkaziJami’at-e-Hadith It was founded at Lahore in 1948 Maslak Groups Maulana Diesel MaulanaFazlur-Rahman was titled as “Maulana Diesel, due to his involvement in Diesel permits and making a lot of money during 2nd term of Benazir Bhutto Mawlwi, Maulvi, Moulvi Religious titles for Muslim scholars and Ullema Millat-i-Islami The SSP entered into mainstream politics in 1990. The organization was renamed Millat- i-Islamiafter being banned in 2002. Modus Vivend It is a Latin phrase signifying an Agreement between those whose opinions differ (A manner of living; a way of life) Mosque circles Halqha Mosque schools Masjid Mozarab Christians who lived under Arab Islamic rule in Al-Andalus Muballig Preacher Muezzin He is the chosen person at a mosque who leads and recites the call to prayer (Adhan) Mufti He is a Sunni Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Islamic law Mughals Muslim Empire from 1526–1857 Muharram It’s the first month of Islamic calendar Muhtamim Vice-Chancellor Mujaddid Renewer Mujahid A mujahid is one who struggles for the sake of Allah and Islam (plural Mujahedeen) Mujahid Students Movement (MSM) It emerged as a student wing of the Kerala Nadvathul Mujahedeen (KNM), in the state of Kerala in the early 1970s.
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Dars-i-Nazami MullaNizamUddin standardized the curriculum known as the Dars-i- Nazami Mu'min Believer, A person that has complete submission to the Will of Allah Mutazilites Rationalist Mutehada Qoumiat United nationalism N NadwatulUlama The Council of the Ulema NahdatulUlama The Movement for Religious Scholars Qaum Nation Nawabs It is an honorific title ratified and Bestowed by the reigning Mughal Emperor to semi-autonomous Muslim rulers of princely states in South Asia Nazim-e-Salat Controller of Prayers Nikhil Banga O Assam Jami’at-e-Hadith All Bengal and Assam Jami’at-e- Hadith, formed at Calcutta in 1946 O Ottoman Ottoman Empire, historically referred to as Empire or Turkey P Parsi A member of the larger of the two Zoroastrian communities in the Indian Subcontinent Pashtun Ethnic Afghan or Pathan, having major population in Afghanistan and Pakistan Pathshalas Traditional educational institutions Q Qadi/ Qazi Judge Qadiani Followers of Mirza Ahmed , declared non- Muslim in Pakistan Qazf False accusation of adultery (zina) in Islam Qur'aan, al-Tafsir Qur'anic exegesis R Ramayana It is an ancient Sanskrit epic
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RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh (RSS) Hindu right-wing organization Rathyatra It’s a huge Hindu festival associated with lord Jagannath Riwayat Comprehensive in tradition S Sadaqah Charitable giving Safavid Empire One of the most significant ruling dynasties of Iran
Salafi An Islamic doctrine which focus on Hadith and Quran. Often referred to as Ahl-e- Hadiith or Wahabbi
Sahih-e-Bukhari, Sahih-e-Muslim, Jama’e –Timrizi, Sunan-e-AbiDa’ud, Sunan-e-Nasa’I, Sunan-e-IbneMaja, Mu’atta-e-Imam Malik,
There are six books on Hadith that the Ulema consider most authentic. Hence Six books on Hadith that have been termed most authentic by Ulema constitute Saha-e-Sitta
Salar Commander SamaratutTarbiyat Results of Training SanghParivar Family of militant Hindu organizations. Combination of BJP, the Rashtriya SwayamsevakSangh (RSS), the Bajrang Dal, the Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Shiv Sena Sarf-e-Meer Arabic grammer Sarparast Chancellor Sawad-e-AzamAhl-e-Sunnat Greater Unity of the Sunnis Sawad-e-AzamAhl-e-Sunnat Greater Unity of the Sunnis Shafi`i A school (madhhab) within Sunni Islam. Shahadah al-alamiyaah Equivalent to a master’s in Arabic or Islamic Studies accredited by HEC Shaikhul Hind The Leader of India
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Sharh Commentaries Shariah Islamic Law Shastric A suffix in the context of technical or specialized knowledge in a defined area of practice; Shia Second largestdenomination of Islam. Adherents of Shia Islam are called Shi'as or Shias."Shia” means "followers", "faction", or "party" of Muhammad's son-in-law Ali, whom the Shia believe to be Muhammad's successor Shiv Sina It is a right-wing organization in India founded on 19 June 1966 by BalThackeray Sipahe- SahabaPakistan (SSP) It’s a Sunni Deobandi organization in Pakistan Sipah-i-Muhammed (SM) Army of Mohammed in Pakistan was founded in 1991. It’s as Shi’a community militant group Sufi A practitioner of Sufism tradition is generally known as a ṣūfī Sufism Sufism or taṣawwuf is defined by its adherents as the inner, mystical dimension of Islam Sunnah Sunnah refers to anything narrated or related about the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), authentically traced to him regarding his speech, actions, traits, silent approvals, before and after the revelation. Sunni The largest branch of Islam and they are referred to in Arabic as ʾAhlu-s- Sunnatiwal-Jamaah "people of the tradition of Muhammad (SAW) Sunni Tehreek A political organization formed by Barelvis in 1990’s in Pakistan T
Tablighi Preacher TablighiJamaat (TJ) Though an independent movement, it has motives similar to the Deoband’s dawa to tabligh wing) and the JamiatulUlema-i Hind ( JUIH)
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Tafseer/Tafsir Explanation/details of Quran Tahrik-e-reshmirumal The silk handkerchief conspiracy/Silk Letter Conspiracy Takfiri Is a Muslim who accuses another Muslim of apostasy Talib Seeker, Student (plural Taliban) Taqarir Super-commentaries Taqlid It's an Arabic term in Islamic legal terminology connoting "blind following' or "imitation", that is; following the decisions of a religious authority without necessarily examining the scriptural basis or reasoning of that decision Tasawwuf Traditional Islamic theology (the practice of Sufism) Tatbiq Islamic Philosophy Tawhid Doctrine of oneness of God and the Most fundamental concept in Islam Tazir In Islamic law, it refers to punishment Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) A shia movement banned by the government in 2002, but revived under the banner of Tehrik-i-Islam (TIP) Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafria Pakistan’s Shi’a Movement later namedTehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan—TIJ. Their militant student wing (Ithna AshariyaStudent Organization(ISO) Twelver Shi’aStudent Movement Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Militant organization in Pakistan
Tib Eastern medicine TNFJ Movement for enforcement of the Jafaria Shia Law and it was a Religious/political force. Tughluq Dynasty (1290–1302) It was a Muslim Dynasty, which Established a Delhi sultanate. Muhammad bin Tughluq (1325–1351) U Ulema Religious scholars Ummah) Muslim community
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Usher Agricultural, farming tax Usul al-Hadith Principles of the Traditions Usull al-Fiqh Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence W Wahhabi An Islamic doctrine which focus on Hadith and Quran. Often referred to as Salafi or Ahl-e-Hadith Waqf. A pious donation to the community of Muslims of private funds, (endowment; pl. awqaf) Z Zakat Compulsory alms-giving, wealth tax Zina It is generally defined by Islamic Law as unlawful sexual intercourse, i.e.intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to one another. This encompasses extramarital sex and premarital sex Zina-bil-jabr Rape Zulm Arabic word used interchangeably for cruelty or unjust act exploitation, oppression, and wrongdoing
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Figure -1 Map of India Source: WorldAtlas.com
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Figure-2 Map of Pakistan
Source: WorldAtlas.com
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Figure -3 Deoband’s Geographical Positin in India
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Figure-4 Darul Uloom Deoband in India Source: http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/
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Figure-5 AkoraKhattak (Nowshera district-Pakistan)
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Figure-6 DarulUloomHaqqania at AkoraKhattak-Pakistan Pictures by ArshiSaleemHashmi
Outside the Madrassa
Inside view
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Introduction
The establishment of Deobandi Madrassa in 1867 in India was to preserve the orthodox tradition of Islam. The eclipse of Muslim political power was to be countered by training generations of Islamic religious scholars and functionaries. The underlying objective was to reawake the consciousness of Muslim making recourse to Islamic teachings and the Islamic way of life.
The madrassa system has been the source of traditional Islam providing the inspiration for intellectual philosophy. In South Asia, they have been actively involved in maintaining the traditional Islam and providing a cultural alternative. South Asian Muslims found in
Madrassas, the centre of classical Islamic studies keeping the orthodox culture intact.
Madrassa have been the torch bearer of conservative values within Islam and at times worked as reactionary forces against the “cultural invasion” from other religious tradtions, especially Hinduism in South Asia. Mumtaz Ahmed states, “Indeed, it is fair to argue that madrassas constitute the core of the religio-cultural complex of Islam in South Asia. As interpreters, they resolve religious disputes and issue fatwas, providing the faithful with religious guidance on all kinds of issues. As religious functionaries, they organize and lead congregational prayers, supervise the celebration of Islamic religious occasions, and conduct marriage ceremonies and burial rituals. The madrassa education is critical for all of these concerns and functions of life.”1
1 Mumtaz Ahmad, Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh in Satu P. Limaye et al, (eds) Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawai, 2004-p 102 1
Post 9/11, the once little known educational institutions became a significant part of the public discourse, thanks to media coverage. But in this, hysterical coverage the most pertinent question remained unanswered. Why some of these Islamic educational institutions have been transformed drastically? Rather, a simplistic, readymade, and already known answer has been repeated over time, while ignoring the actual spirit of these madrassas being rooted in the historical unveiling of Islamic spirituality.
Between the 7th and 12th centuries, madrassas produced freethinking luminaries such as
Al-Beruni, Ibn Sina and al-Khwarizmi. They also produced the 13th century Sufi mystic and poet of love and longing, Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi, who, being trained as a Muslim jurist, and throughout his life taught Sharia law in a madrassa.2
Organized madrssa system has been around since the 11th century. The Seljuk Vizier
Nizam ul-Mulk Hassan bin Ali Tusi founded a seminary in Baghdad to train experts in
Islamic law. Islam had become the religion of a large community, stretching from North
Africa to Central Asia. However, apart from the holy Quran, which Muslims believe to be the word of God revealed through Prophet Mohammed, no definitive theological texts existed. The dominant Muslim sect, the Sunnis, did not have a clerical class, leaving groups of believers to follow whoever inspired them in religious matters. But Sunni Muslim rulers legitimated their rule through religion, depending primarily on an injunction in the Quran binding believers to obey the righteous ruler. Over time, it became important to seek religious conformity and to define dogma to ensure obedience of subjects and to protect rulers from rebellion. For instance, Nizam ul-Mulk's madrassa was intended to create a
2 Lubna A. Ali, Unity in Diversity, Asian Civilization, xxx no.1 , July 2007 2 class of Ulema, muftis, and qazis (judges) who would administer the Muslim empire, legitimize its rulers as righteous, and define an unalterable version of Islam3.
Abul Hassan al-Ashari, a ninth-century theologian, defined the dogma adopted for this new madrassa (and the tens of thousands that would follow) in several polemical texts, including al-Sharh wa al-Tafsil fi al-Radd `ala Ahl al-Ifk wa al-Tadlil (The Detailed
Explanation in Refutation of the People of Perdition) and Al-Luma` fi al-Radd `ala Ahl al-
Zaygh wa al-Bida` (The Sparks: Refutation of Heretics and Innovators).4 This canon rejected any significant role for reason in religious matters and dictated that religion be the focus of a Muslim's existence. The Madrasas adopted a core curriculum that divided knowledge between 'revealed sciences' and 'rational sciences.' The revealed sciences included study of the Quran, Hadith, Quranic commentary, and Islamic jurisprudence. The rational sciences included logic, rhetoric, and philosophy, Al Chemia, geometry, mathematics, physics, and medical sciences, all existed in Muslim intellectual traditions in the Middle East.5
However, following the collapse of Islamic self-confidence that accompanied the deposition of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, disillusioned scholars founded an influential madrassa at Deoband, a 100 miles north of the former Mughal capital in
Delhi. Feeling that they were pushed against the wall, the madrassa's founders reacted against what they saw as the degenerate ways of the old elite. The Deobandi madrassa, therefore, went back to Quranic basics and rigorously stripped out anything “Hindu” or
“European” from the curriculum.
3 Hussain Haqqani, Islam’s Medieval Outposts, Foreign Policy, November/December 2002 4 R McCarthy, The theology of Abul Hassan al-Ashari,, Beirut, Imprimerie Catholique-1953 5 See details in Jamal Malik, Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan, Lahore, Vanguard Book, 1996 3
Founded in 1866 by Maulana Qasim Nanautavi and Maulana Rashid Gangohi, the school did take part in the freedom struggle against the British. Since the departure of the British,
Indian Deobandis remained apolitical while Pakistani Deobandis got into politics. In the same way, it rejected any state influence. According to Barbara Metcalf, “the `ulama who founded this school were above all specialists in prophetic hadith. The narratives and traditions of the holy Prophet (PBUH) constitute sayings and practices which serve either directly or analogously to guide every aspect of moral behavior. Their lives were meant to embody those teachings. Through the giving of fatawa, they responded to inquiries with advisory opinions to guide daily lives their followers as well.”6
Metcalf cites anthropologist Olivier Roy calling such movements "neo-fundamentalist" to distinguish them from what can be seen as a different set of Islamic movements, often called "Islamist."7 Limited, as he puts it, to "mere implementation of the shari`a" in matters of ritual, dress, and behavior, "neo-fundamentalist" movements are distinguishable from
Islamist parties primarily because, unlike them, they have neither a systematic ideology nor global political agenda. A more precise label for them is, perhaps, "traditionalist" because of their continuity with earlier institutions, above all those associated with the seminaries and with the `Ulema in general.8
That role in the colonial period was not overtly political. The brutal repression of the so- called Mutiny of 1857 against the British had fallen very hard on north Indian Muslims. In the aftermath, the `Ulema, not surprisingly, adopted a stance of a-political quietism. As the
6 Barbara Metcalf, Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tabligh and Talib, ISIM papers, International Institute for the study of Islam in modern world, Netherlands, 2002 p-5 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 4
Indian nationalist movement became a mass movement after World War I, the Deobandi leadership did something of an about turn. They were never a political party as such, but, organized into the Association of the `Ulema of India (Jamiat `Ulema-i Hind). Thus threw in their lot with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress in opposition to British rule.
Deobandi histories written before 1920 insisted that the Ulema did not participate in the anti-colonial rebellion of 1857. However, the histories written after independence, give freedom-fighters pride of place.
Most Deobandis opposed the creation of what in 1947 would become the independent state of Pakistan – a separate state for Muslims to be led by a westernized, secular leadership.
They preferred operating in an officially secular context, apart from the government in pursuit of their own goals.
Mai Yamani describes that “the "Wahhabis" were followers of an iconoclastic late l8th century reform movement associated with tribal unification who were to find renewed vigor in internal political competition within Arabia in the l920s.”9
Barbar Metcalf expert on madrassa education in India explains the complex labels that have complicated the understanding of Islamic teachings, role of madrassas and violent expression of the militant ideology:
“From colonial times until today, it is worth noting, the label
"Wahhabi" is often used to discredit any reformist or politically
active Islamic group. Another group that emerged in these same
years was popularly known as "Barelvi," and although engaged in
the same process of measuring current practice against hadith,
was more open to many customary practices. They called the
9 Mai Yamani, “Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz, and the Quest for an Arabian Identity, London, I.B Taurus, 2004 5
others "Wahhabi." These orientations --"Deobandi," "Barelvi" or
"Ahl-i Hadith" -- would come to define sectarian divisions among
Sunni Muslims of South Asian background up to present. Thus,
`Ulema, mosques, and a wide range of political, educational, and
missionary movements were known by these labels at the end of
the twentieth century, both within the South Asian countries of
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, as well as in places like Britain
where South Asian populations settled. She further states,
beginning in the colonial-era, `Ulema competed in public life to
show themselves as the spokesmen or defenders of "Islam". This
was a new understanding of Islam, as a corporate identity in
competition with others, and it created a new role in public life for
religious leaders. In all their complexity, the Deobanid
movements serve as an example of one important model of
contemporary Islamic thought and action, a major example of
what can be called "traditionalist" Islamic activism.”10
Politicization of Deobandism
The transition from purely academic religious educational institution to a politically mobilized platform for the Muslims against the British rule is well explained by Barbara Metcalf in these words:
“A minority group among the Deobandi Ulema dissented
from support for the secular state and the privatization of
10 Barbara Metcalf, op cit 6 p-6 6
religion espoused by the Indian nationalist movement. They
organized, instead, as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam to support
the Muslim League and the demand for a separate Muslim
state. In independent Pakistan after 1947 they became a
minor political party led by `Ulema and a voice in the on-
going debate over the nature of the Pakistani state. Should
it be the secular state presumably intended by its founders,
or a state meant to be shaped in accordance with Islam?
The JUI has never had more than minute popular support,
and the content of the party's programs over the years, it is
probably fair to say, has been a fairly simplistic call for the
primacy of Islam in public life.”11
Leadership role has been quite prominent in the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam JUI like other political parties in Paksitan. The JUI divided into factions who were more concerned with the personalities rather than issues. It struck alliances with any party that would win them influence. In the 1970s, for example, they allied with a Pashtun regionalist party in opposition to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), a party that was, in principle, socialist. In the mid 1990s, in contrast, they allied with that same PPP, led by Benazir
Bhutto. And in 2002, they aligned with Gen. Musharraf’s regime. “Its `Ulema were given to realpolitik with a vengeance and like any other party in Pakistan, not immune from corruption. Their most famous leader at one point, for example, was referred to as
"Maulana Diesel" because of his reputed involvement in fuel smuggling earlier in the
11Op cit 6 7
1990s. When the JUI was excluded from power, its Islamic rhetoric became a language of opposition, often invoking a discourse of "democracy" and "rights."12
At the same time, the `Ulema of the JUI were engaged with the madrassas that imparted
Deobandi teachings. From the 1980s, the number of seminaries in Pakistan soared, used as a tool of conservative influence by the military dictator Ziaul Haq (in power 1977-1988).
As Dr. Luba states, “He (Gen. Zia) remained particularly sympathetic to the Deobandi approach.The seminaries were not only a resource in domestic politics but external as well.” 13
Deobandi-JUI- Pukhtoon Nexus
In the aftermath of Soviet interventions into Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran
1979, a kind of "surrogate" competition emerged between Saudis and Iranians, each side patronizing religious institutions which fueled sectarian violence. The surge in the number of madrasas in the 1980s coincided with the ideology of Jihad in Afghanistan due to
Russian intervention that resulted in the influx of millions of Afghan refugees. The madrasas located along the frontier frequently provided the only available education. One school in particular, the Madrasa Haqqaniya, in Akora Kathak near Peshawar, trained many of the top Taliban leaders. These students (talib; plural, taliban) were indoctrinated by many of the core Deobandi reformists encouraged by Arab and Uzbek volunteers in Afghanistan.
Deobandis followed Saudi-Wahabi injunctions including rigorous concern with fulfilling rituals; opposition to custom laden ceremonies like weddings and pilgrimage to shrines, and a focus on seclusion of women as a central symbol of a morally ordered society. Theirs was, according to Ahmed Rashid, “an extreme form of Deobandism, which was being preached
12 Ibid 13 Lubna A. Ali, Post Revolutionary Iran: Foreign Policy, Research Society of Pakistan: Punjab University 2008 8 by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan." 14This focus on a fairly narrow range of shari'a law, which emphasized strict ritual, was something the Taliban shared with other Deobandi movements, while the severity of the Taliban indoctrination made them known to the world as inhuman and terrorist. “Particularly after the fall of
Buddha Statue in Bamiyan, Madelline Albright increasingly labeled Afghanistan as a single issue country, i.e. terrorism.”15
Darul Uloom Deoband India, on the other hand, forbade their students from going to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The clerics drew an important boundary line between theologically conservative views and political violence. A successful story of Muslim education in India is Darul Umoor, a one-year institute for madrassa graduates in the southern state of Mysore. There, religious students supplement their education with English literature and comparative religion before returning to their communities to teach in madrassas and preach in mosques. Many observers agree that local, Muslim-run projects like this one are essential if Muslims are to genuinely integrate into the Indian mainstream.
Asgar Ali Engineer, head of an interfaith organization in Mumbai states, “Indian
Deobandis and Pakistani Deobandis are quite different. Islam is in the majority over there.
The Ulema have been politicized, they want and they use Islam. There is a very interesting phenomenon here (India). The Deobandis here are attacking terrorism and militancy.
Deobandis have held largest demonstrations in India against terrorism. They are puritan
14Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia”, New Haven, Yale Univeristy-2000 p-88 15 Ibid. page 197 9 otherwise and against Sufism, but in the Indian environment, their behavior is very different.”16
Significance of Research
Debates about the alleged linkage between the Madrassas and terrorism have created more confusion in the already vague issue of Madrassas’s historic role as the source of Islamic learning in the sub-continent. The aim of the study is to critically investigate the reasons behind radicalization of Madrassas, if it is due to the ideology, then why does it happen only in Pakistan and not in India, if it has to do with the international political environment then why India does not get the “invitation” to play its role against communism during cold war period? If it is due to the democratic system in India that blocks extremism of all kinds, then the same democratic system helps flourishes the Shiv Sina and BJP?
Research would be an original contribution to the study of politics of Jihad based on the case study of Deobandi Madrassas in India and Pakistan. Though the issue has been taken up by scholars in the past yet a comprehensive comparative analysis of the Deobandi
Madrassas in India and Pakistan has never been done.
An important accomplishment of the research will be the study which would highlight the examples where religious institutions positively playing their role without delving into politics and militancy. Some examples of the madrassas, particularly in India which have been concentrating only on imparting knowledge through continuing traditional system along with modern education help students professionally will be cited for the purpose of
16 Asghar Ali Enginner quoted in Tom Heneghen, Faith World: Religion, Faith and Ethics, Reuter , April 27, 2009 available at http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2009/04/27/religion-and-politics-in-bewilderingly- diverse-india/ accessed on August 8, 2011 10 recommendation that concerned entities in Pakistan. It may be taken into consideration for the purpose of disinfecting the society from the disease of militancy and extremism to which unfortunately some madrassas have made their contribution for variety of reasons. It would also highlight the politicization of religion and its aftermath in one society ( i.e.
Pakistan) and apolitical religious movement to keep the Muslim identity intact in India.
Rationale of the Research
A gathering of clerics at the Darul Uloom in Deoband strongly condemned terrorism and called it "un-Islamic."17 It urged all Muslims to rise above sects and denominations and close ranks to fight terrorism. It also denounced what it called the deliberate targeting of
Muslims in the name of tackling terror. Although India was originally the home of the
Deobandi madrassas, such institutions in India have no record of producing violent
Islamists, and are strictly apolitical and quietist, it was endorsed by the famous scholars and expert on Deobandi movement. Dr. Metcalf discusses in her article:
“The Taliban ( movement) identified themselves, as part
of a Sunni school of thought that had its origins in the late
nineteenth century colonial period of India's history, a
school named after the small, country town northeast of
Delhi, Deoband, where the original madrasa or seminary
of the movement was founded in 1867. Many of the
Taliban had, indeed, studied in Deobandi schools, but one
spokesman for the movement in its final months went so
17 Indian Express, February 28, 2008 11
far as to declare "Every Afghan is a Deobandi."This
comment may be disconcerting to those familiar with the
school in its Indian environment where its `Ulema --
those learned in traditional subjects and typically
addressed as "maulana"-- were not directly engaged in
politics and were primarily occupied in teaching and
providing both practical and spiritual guidance to their
followers.”18
Indeed, several of modern India's greatest scholars - such as the Mughal historian Muzaffar
Alam of the University of Chicago - are madrassa graduates. An important study of the madrassas of India by the Indian scholar Yoginder Sikand, author of Bastions of the
Believers, 19demonstrates how forward-looking and dynamic some madrassas can be. In the southwest Indian state of Kerala, for example, Sikand found a chain of educational institutions run by the Mujahid group of professionals and businessmen which aim to bridge the differences between modern forms of knowledge and the Islamic worldview.
On the other hand, in Pakistan, study of madrassas in Pakistan, gives us a totally different picture, while most of them are non violent, that does not mean that they are apolitical. As compared to Indian Deobandi Madrassas, if we just focus on Pakistani Deobandi madrassas and include Jamaat-i-Islami’s Ahle Hadith madrassas as well, it appears that
18 Op cit 6 19 Yoginder Sikand, Bastion of the Believers : Madrasas and Islamic Education in India, Penguin India 2005 12
Deobandi and JI madarsassas are more inclined towards politics, they have political affiliations. The Barelvies do not focus much on their political tradition.20
The issue however remains that the preservation of a distinct Muslim identity is one of the principal concerns of the madrassas. This theological hardening however, does not lead to an embrace of militancy in India. In addition to forbidding participation in holy war abroad,
Indian Deobandi leaders specifically condemn violent jihad at home, saying Muslims have a compact to live in peace and harmony with others that cannot be broken unless they are actively persecuted in matters of faith. Deobandis in India insist that it is possible, within a pluralistic India, to practice rigorous Islam and send their children to religious schools without being opposed to the state.
Barbara Metcalf aptly stated that, perhaps most striking about the Deoband-type movements is the extent to which politics is an empty "box," filled expediently and pragmatically depending on what seems to work best in any given situation. Islam is often spoken of as "a complete way of life"21. A modernist and misleading distinction from other historical religious traditions covering aspects of political life to be informed by Islamic principles, in fact, as these movements illustrate, virtually any strategy is legitimated by invoking religious injunctions to justify both mundane goals protecting life and property, social honor and political power, to the dignity that comes from pious adherence to divine commands. Indeed, these movements often work well in the context of secular regimes where they can pursue their emphasis on disseminating adherence to correct practice with relative freedom.
20 Amir Rana, Mapping the madrassa mindset- Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2,Number-1 Jan-Mar , Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, 2009. 21 Barbara Metcalf, op cit, 6 13
Central questions of this study are therefore:
1. Are all Deobandi madrassas followers of Wahabism? What are the similarities and
differences between the two?
2. What is the level of politisization of Madrassas in India and do they manage to stay
away from Jihadi Politics?
3. To what extent Pakistan’s anti-democratic regime and support to Sunni orthodoxy
(Deobandis) led to Jihadi politics in Pakistan?
4. Do the Democratic structure of Indian society and secular constitution prevent
Deobandi groups to endorse Jihad?
5. Contrary to other examples in the world, Indian Muslims despite being in minority
do not support religious groups with violent political agenda, why?
6. Are there lessons to be learnt from India’s experience?
Hypothesis
India, despite being the home of Deobandi school of thought, did not get into Jihadi Politics because of a strong democratic system and secular constitution that restrain the legislature to initiate public policy initiatives based on a single religion/sect. Comparatively, in Pakistan “Islamization” based on Sunni Orthodoxy was initiated as a public policy by the state supported by international political environment and funding from the outside sources leading to jihadi politics against Soviets and “Jihadization” of the country since then.
Two ways to look at the hypothesis:
1- Jihad/violence is not endorsed by the school of thought and due to absence of state policy intervention; Muslim politics in India was not influenced by politics of Jihad.
14
2: Deobandi School is non-violent and that is why Jihad was never endorsed by the school in India but in Pakistan, state’s role was eminent in misusing the Deobandi ideology for political purposes.
Time Frame
The study would focus on the policies adopted by the successive governments of India and
Pakistan during the time between the occupation of Afghanistan by the former USSR in
December 1979 to the US occupation of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the implications of these policies in contemporary politics. The research would be based on the internal, external events and policy decisions that were made. It was during this time that religious extremism as a political tool was not only used but encouraged in Pakistan. While Indian
Deobandis managed to stay away from violent extremism, in Pakistan this policy of using
Deobandi sect to train religious radicals who could fight against the Soviets backed fired.
The hundreds and thousands of children who were indoctrinated if not all trained militants, evolved into mature fanatics who would kill anybody who disagree with their world view.
The absence of the US from the area in the next ten years after Soviet withdrawal led to the strengthening of Saudi influence on Deobandi sect which became all powerful to make
Pakistani society hostage of its ideas and at the same time developed linkages with religious extremist from other countries, hence creating a transnational network of extremism and militancy.
15
Methodology
Historical, analytical and scientific approaches of research are followed in this study. Both
Primary and secondary sources will be utilized for the purpose of analysis. The research questions is analysed from a wide variety of perspectives. It is possible that judgmental interpretation is made but only if supported by the relevant and substantial data by historical facts and figures. Interviews are conducted both in India and Pakistan with scholars associated with these madrassas and those Ulemas who are not associated with the madrassas. Indian and Pakistani political analysts as well as journalists who have witnessed the transformation of Pakistani society from a tolerant to a most vulnerable and impatient one in the aftermath of the Jihad in Afghanistan as well as the Indian society untouched by the changing religious dynamics all over the world.
An extensive field research in India and Pakistan was conducted to attain first hand information through people who have dealt with the issue in different capacities, for instance, major religious –political parties in Pakistan and India are also contacted. The leaders of major religious groups were interviewed. Political and military leadership which was instrumental during the time of Afghan Jihad were also contacted. Scholars in the west who have critically studied this movement are interviewed.
In this research study, clearly-defined formal methodologies of analyses and interviews were applied appropriately. Historical, analytical, and scientific approaches were followed according to the requirement. A number of primary and secondary sources were also consulted. Archives and documents were consulted for the facts and data related to the issue. Research facilities at institutions in Pakistan, for instance, Institute of Regional
Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies and Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, and in India,
16
Jamia Millia University, IDSA, IPCS, JNU, are utilized. In Pakistan, visit to Darul Uloom
Haqqania at Akor Khatak, Banori Town Madrassa in Karachi, think tanks in Islambad and meetings with former civilian and military officials were conducted. In India, visits were made to meet Head of Jamaat-e-Islami India, Secretary General Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind and the office of Darul Uloom Deoband in Delhi besides others. An effort has been made to seek balance, in the sense that competing sides of an issue are given fair treatment by making the arguments objectively. The research questions in this study are analyzed from a wide variety of perspectives and those views synthesized into a coherent whole; in other words, this study is not just an analysis of the problem of politicization of religion, decision making and lack of democratic system but various viewpoints that have contributed in creating a world view about politics of Jihad.
An attempt has been made to keep the arguments logical and consistent, and the line of reasoning transparent. Effort is made to avoid value judgments and present the case as it is.
However, judgmental interpretations may be presented where supported by evidence. To that extent possible, alternative interpretations are considered and evaluated on the basis of international standards of omission and submissions.
Literature Review:
Three groups of writers who support the argument that a direct or indirect Deobandi-
Militancy equation does exist:
First - Islamic Education and Extremism nexus
This group of scholars believes that Islamic education based on extremist ideology is responsible for extremism; the ideological training provided to young minds both poor and wealthy is dangerous enough to lay ground for Jihad. Charles Allen a historian who
17 strongly believes that Deobandi Philosophy is itself violent in nature. More than the politicization of the madrassas system, it is rooted in the perceived failure of Islam to achieve its destiny as a global religion, resulting in attempts to renew Sunni Islam and set it back on course to become the new world political order. Although, he agrees that international politics had something to do with resurrection of Sunni orthodoxy, but blames the Wahabism as the reason behind it, he writes, Saudi Wahhabism would have remained a merely regional blot on the face of Islam but for the combination of three events in the late
1970s: the coming to power in Pakistan of the dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, determined to turn his country into an Islamic state; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan next door in
December 1979; and the dramatic hike in oil prices, which allowed the Saudis to devote huge sums to promoting the Wahhabi creed overseas – particularly in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.22
Others while blaming the ideology being taught at Madrassas take another angle, for instance, Lisa Curtis and Krueger and Malecková have suggested that a living standard above the poverty line may be positively associated extremists they analysed were overwhelmingly from high paid jobs, hence ideology is more responsible than poverty.23
Likewise, in a study of four hundred international terrorists associated with Al Qaeda, Marc
Sageman found that three quarters came from upper or middle class backgrounds and over sixty percent had been to university, leaving him to conclude that these are the best and brightest of their societies in many ways. 24
22 Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists, Da Capo Press, 2006 23 Lisa Curtis, U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Through Education Reform, Heritage foundation, June 8, 2007 & Krueger and Malecková , Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a causal connection? NBER working paper W9074, July 2002 page: 28-29 24Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Network, Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 1 2004 18
Also using a country-wide analysis, Daniel Pipes observes that Kuwait’s Islamist party is traditionally dominant in parliament despite the wealthy nature of the state. He also argues that Muslims in Europe and North America are normally wealthier than the general population, and yet this has not stopped the flourishing of militant Islam in the West
(2002)25. Malečková concludes from these studies, that ‘neither the participants nor the adherents of militant activities are recruited predominantly from the poor [and] poverty on a national level does not predict the number of terrorist attacks carried out by individuals coming from a country’.26If anything, there seems to be a more convincing relationship between wealth and terrorism. There are criticisms of these studies. Having quoted a senior member of Hamas claiming he has difficulty choosing from the ‘hordes of young men’ who are desperate to become terrorists. De Mesquita argues that if screening is occurring, it’s not possible to draw conclusions about the pool of willing applicants merely by analyzing those who do become terrorists.27 Li and Schaub point out that the definition of poverty is also problematic, as wealthy people (who are more likely to be better informed about the world) may not define their wealth with relation to their fellow countrymen. 28
P J Smith wrote that, ‘before the 11 September attacks, experts generally considered suicide bombers to be usually poor, [and] not particularly well-educated’.29 However, numerous studies and surveys, both prior to and since September 2001, have suggested that people who resort to terrorism are normally far from below the poverty line. Following
25 Pipes, Daniel ‘God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?’, National Interest, Winter 2002 Edition, Accessed online:
Second- Politicization of Madrassas at Local level
Second group of scholars believes that nothing wrong with madrassas system but it was politicization of Madrassas at local level as well as due to grand international strategy; madrassas like other institutions were instrumental in the cause of containment of communism. Barbara Metcalf, for example, explains the response of Islamic religious scholars (ulema) to the colonial dominance of the British and the collapse of Muslim political power.31 Focusing on Deoband, the most important Islamic seminary of the period, she discusses the ways in which the ulema enhanced a sense of cultural continuity in a period of alien rule. Deprived of a Muslim state, the leaders of Deoband sought to renew
Islamic spiritual life by teaching early Islamic principles. To this end, they concerned themselves with popular behaviour and the education of both elite and non-elite Muslims through the spoken language, Urdu. Barbara while discussing the original Deobandi states,
“original Deobandis were both `ulema and Sufis, offering "a composite" form of religious leadership.
Yogin Sikand, incriminates Western and non-Muslim interference with Islamic institutions.32 Similarly, Hussain Haqqani believes that the failings of the post-colonial elite
30 Ibrahim, Eddin Saad, ‘Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, Dec, (1980), pp 423-453 31 Barbara Metcalf, “, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982) 32 Yoginder Sikand, Penguin Global, 2006, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India- and Yoginder Sikand, Chapter 8 in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia edited by Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Maliki, APCSS, 2004 and Understanding Madrasahs Alexander Evans, 20 in most Muslim countries paved the way for Islamic political movements such as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) in the Arab world, Jamaat-e-Islami (the Islamic
Party) in South Asia, and the Nahdatul Ulama (the Movement for Religious Scholars) in
Indonesia.33 These movements questioned the legitimacy of the Westernized elite, created reminders of Islam's past glory, and played on hopes for an Islamic utopia. In most cases, the founders of Islamic political movements were religiously inclined politicians with a modern education. Madrasas provided the rank and file. The Iranian Revolution and the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, both in 1979, inspired a profound shift in the Muslim world-and in the Madrasas. Iran's clergy managed to overthrow the shah and took power, undermining the idea that religious education was useless in worldly matters. Although,
Iranians belong to the minority Shiite sect of Islam, and their Madrasas have always had a more political character than Sunni seminaries, the image of men in turbans and robes running a country provided a powerful demonstration effect and politicized Madrasas everywhere. Fawaz Gerges of London School of Economics discusses the politicization of
Islamist groups for grand political objectives by the US. Gerges writes that al-Qaeda enjoyed only the tiniest support in the Islamic world; it was effectively ejected from
Somalia and other Arabic nations and was never as close to the Taliban as Western intelligence sources claimed. But then came the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and there came the policy of pitting fundamentalists against fundamentalists and elevating the pariah to hero.34
Foreign Affairs, 2006 Yoginder Sikand, Penguin Global, 2006, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India- and Yoginder Sikand, Chapter 8 in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia edited by Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Maliki, APCSS, 2004 and Understanding Madrasahs Alexander Evans, Foreign Affairs, 2006 33 Hussain Haqqani, Islam’s medieval outposts, Foreign Affairs, November /December 2002 34 Fawaz Gerges, “Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy”, Pennsylvania, Harvest Books, 2007 21
The best account on the clash of civilization thesis and creation of us versus them mentality is given is given by Arshin Adib, in his book, A Metahistory of Clash of Civilization35
Arshin says that this constant feeding of us versus them results in legitimizing the “clash regime”, a regime he refers to as :
“a(A) vast system; that its exclusionary logic is re-
inscribed into society and that its structural tenets
have not emerged recently. The issue to be noticed
about the logic of this regime, which continuously
accentuates and legitimates the necessity of conflict,
is how strategically important it has been, how often
its exclusionary violence has been invoked in order
to legitimate domestic and international aggression,
how successful it has been in reifying memories of
war and oppression. By continuously attempting to
persuade us that the supposed conflict between, 'us'
and 'them', especially between 'Islam' and the 'West',
has always existed, the disciples of the regime
concoct a historical field in which the exclusionary
logic of the clash can reveal itself as such.
Deliberately placed within it, we are continuously
alerted to the undue presence of the 'other'.”36
35 Arshin Adib, A Metahistory of Clash of Civilization: Us and them between Civilization, NY, Columbia University Press- 2011 36 Ibid, 27 22
Three- Poverty and Inept Governance
Third group of scholars comprise those who believe that due to poverty and lack of governance, Madrassas provided platform to the have-nots who were later exploited. Issues such as poverty are important for extremists in order to legitimize their actions. Daniel
Pipes quotes Hamas leader Mahmud az-Zahar’s claim that ‘It is enough to see the poverty stricken outskirts of Algiers or the refugee camps in Gaza to understand the factors that nurture the strength of the Islamic Resistance Movement.37 Liu and Ehlrich observe that although some terrorists are very wealthy themselves, the socioeconomic conditions in their nations often ‘provide a good basis’ for moral indignation. Terrorist organizations use issues such as poverty in order to ‘exhort the individual to act on behalf’ of the masses.
Therefore, whilst a terrorist might not be poor, poverty remains an important factor behind terrorism.38
Poverty also has an important role in creating support for the use of terrorist tactics.
However, it is important to note the possibility that support for terrorism may not be a consequence of poverty itself, rather a consequence of political instability (of which poverty is often a symptom). Brynjar and Skjølberg report that poverty becomes structural and leads to ‘predatory and praetorian’ political systems, ‘which in turn fosters endemic social unrest and civil.39 Whilst prolonged poverty has been observed to lead to apathy there is also significant evidence that structural problems within a country can lead to terrorism. Alex Schmid states that ‘almost a quarter of terrorists in Kashmir cited
37 Pipes, Daniel, ‘God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?’, National Interest, Winter Edition 2002 38 Liu, Jiangua and Ehrlich, Paul, ‘Some Roots of Terrorism’, Population and Environment’, Vol. 24, No. 2, November 2002, pg 186-187 39 Brynjar, Lia and Skjølberg, Katja ‘Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature’, FFI Research Report No. 04307 (Kjeller, Norway: FFI), 2004 Page 29 Accessed Online:
‘joblessness’ as a recruiting motive’40, and Sassen argues that ‘socioeconomic devastation’ in the ‘global south’ provides a landscape where terrorism can thrive.41 Structured poverty inequality within countries ‘are breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically’.42 Although they do not exist in a mechanistic cause- effect relationship, poverty facilitates terrorism by enabling terrorists to rationalise their acts; by creating a basis of support for terrorist tactics and by contributing to structured inequalities which increase the likelihood of political violence. Organization of Study/Division
The thesis comprises an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion, appendixes and bibliography.
Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework on which the research is based on .Within the broader framework of critical school of thought, Habermas’s theory of communicative action and Alexander Wendt’s theory of social construction of power politics and its relevant is also discussed.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Deobandi Madrassas System in historical perspective. This chapter would in details discuss the evolution of Deobandi Madrassas in both India and
Pakistan. What contributed in its creation and development? This chapter would also discuss the journey from its inception in Deoband, India to its status at the time of partition, its role during the independence movement.
40 Scmid, Alex P, ‘Prevention of Terrorism, Towards a multi Pronged Approach’ , in Tore Bjergo (ed), ‘Root Causes of Terrorism, Myths, reality and ways forward’ , Routledge -2005 41 Sassen, Saskia, ‘Governance Hotspots: Challenges We Must Confront in the Post-Septemeber 11 World’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, ‘Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order’, Palgrave Macmillan 2002 42 Gurr, Ted, (ed.), Economic Factors That Contribute To Terrorism in Social and Political Context‘, Working Group report, International Summit On Democracy, Terrorism And Security, 8-11 March, 2005, pg 20.Accessed online:
Chapter 3 discusses Intrusion of Politics in Deobandi Madrassas in Pre and Post independence India and Pakistan.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the state of religion and nature of the State in India and
Pakistan- What are the Constitutional Guarantees for Religious freedom & their Policy implications in both countries.
Chapter 5 gives an insight about the International Political Environment, 1979-2001,
Soviet expansionism, the US Containment policy, Interest of Iran Saudi Arab and differing response from India and Pakistan.
Chapter 6 discusses an overview of the existing Indian and Pakistani Madrassa System in
Comparative perspective: Concept of real Jihad in Indian madrassas and Politicization of
Jihad in Pakistani Madrassas with Deobandi-Pushtoon nexus.
Conclusion analyzes the findings of the study, based on field research, primary and secondary data analysis, the policy decision made during 1979-2001 and long term implications for Pakistan, the region and beyond.
The study is documented with a Bibliography in the end. It has Appendixes (1, 3, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
25
Chapter 1
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this thesis helps understand the two parts of hypothesis:
a) Importance of democracy and secular constitution in preventing religious extremism through Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and b) Artificial construction of compelling international political environment to justify foreign policy having Jihad as important component and Islamization process to facilitate the policy of jihad. Here, Alexander Wendt’s Theory of Social Construction of Power Politics is consulted. These two major works provides the theoretical basis within the broader framework of critical theory. As compared to the traditional conception of theory, where theory is only possible on condition that an inquiring subject can withdrawn from the world it studies (and in which it exists) and without any biases, critical conceptions view theory as irreducibly related to social and political life.43
Habermas’s work is quite relevant to democratic theories but very little work has been done to relate these theories to the political challenges of the Third World. “Habermas sees human rights not as an external constraint on popular sovereignty, but rather as a key ingredient of true democracy. Yet, Habermas asserts that democratic deliberation involves moral, ethical, pragmatic, and negotiated matters. Habermas's theory takes more seriously the possibility that deliberative democracy may vary across societies. All the same,
43 Richard Devetak, Critical Theory, in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, (Eds) Theories of International Relations, ( New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 26
Habermas excessively limits the extent of legitimate variability inasmuch as he shares the conviction that moral reasons are universal and ultimately decisive.”44
Habermas’s work is also relevant in understanding religious dimension in a society. A critical theory of society provides a critique of theology and religious thought. Habermas’s theory of social evolution and communicative rationality explains and accounts for the function of religion within processes of socialization and individuation. Habermas’s political theory outlines a programmatic understanding of the appropriate place of religion and religious language within ethical, moral, and political discourses.
Since the research enquires about the role of democratic process along with secular constitution that blocked any political decision in India based on religion, unlike Pakistan, it was obvious to religious groups particularly the Deobandis Muslims, not to get into
Jihadi politics or endorse and facilitate Jihad in Afghanistan. The participatory democracy that Habermas talks about provides enough space for religious plurality that as a result prevents extreme behavior or decision making. Hence, we find that Indian Deobandis, despite facing many problems as a minority in Hindu majority state, did not channelize their grievances into Jihadi politics. Their discontentment often expressed through protests and political alliances.
44 Angel R. Oquendo, Deliberative Democracy in Habermas and Nino, Oxford J Legal Studies (SUMMER)22 (2): 189-226. 27
Deliberative Democracy through Communicative Action: Key to Pluralism and
Tolerance
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action shows his “attachment to issues of autonomy and participation within the practice of everyday communication.”45 As Borradori explains,
"His assumption has been that we learn who we are as autonomous agents from our basic relations with others. The most basic among these relations is the act of communicating through language".46
In this perspective, Habermas promotes the model of "deliberative democracy", based on the participation of civil society and a consensus between rational citizens. Habermas applied the idea of justification by appeal to generally acceptable reasons to the deliberations of free and equal citizens in a constitutional democracy. “The primary function of the system of basic rights, he argued, is to secure personal and political autonomy; and the key to the latter is the institutionalization of the public use of reason in the legal-political domain.”47
Habermas sketched a theory of socio cultural evolution as the historical development of forms of communicative interaction and mutual understanding. Habermas argues, “Our basic moral intuitions spring from something deeper and more universal than contingent features of particular traditions, his discourse ethics sought to reconstruct the intuitive grasp
45 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, T. McCarthy (trans.). Boston: Beacon. [German, 1981, vol. 1) 46 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Chicago University Press, 2003). Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Chicago University Press, 2003). 47 Habermas Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, W. Rehg (trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996 28 of the normative pre-suppositions of social interaction possessed by competent social actors generally”.48
Habermas emphasizes on the importance of empathy towards other’s point of view.
Agreement is not desirable and can not be achieved but we need to take into consideration the viewpoints of all who would be affected by the adoption of a certain moral action or normative claim. Habermas talks about participating in a discourse where all are fully aware of the other's perspectives and interpretations.
Public Sphere, Orthodoxy and Democracy
In order to understand the relevance of theory of communicative action to the thesis questions, it is important to understand the real meaning of the idea Habermas trying to convey. In communicative action, speakers coordinate their action and pursuit of individual
(or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. Whereas strategic action succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the actors freely agree that their goal (or goals) is reasonable, that it merits cooperative behavior.
To support his conception of communication action, Habermas specify the mechanism that makes rationally motivated agreement possible. But rather than linking meaning with representational semantics, Habermas takes a pragmatic approach, he ties the meaning of speech acts to the practice of reason giving: Speech acts inherently involve claims that are in need of reasons — claims that are open to both criticism and justification. In our
48 The Theory of Communicative Action. 2 vols. Translated by T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, 1987. 29 everyday speech (and in much of our action), speakers tacitly commit themselves to explaining and justifying themselves, if necessary.
For Habermas, "public reason" includes the "unofficial arenas of the political public sphere." Indeed, these unofficial arenas, independent public forums, distinct from both the economic system and the state administration, focusing on voluntary associations, social movements, and other networks and processes of communication in civil society - including the mass media - are the basis of popular sovereignty. 49 Ideally, not only are these unofficial forums translated via legally institutionalized decision-making procedures - for example, electoral and legislative procedures - into the administrative power of the state in point of fact, "In this model of a deliberative de-centering of political power, the multiple and multiform arenas for detecting, defining, and discussing society's problems, and the culturally and politically mobilized publics who use them, serve as the basis for democratic self-government and thus for political autonomy." 50
Absence of such forums creates gaps in the society which are filled by those available authoritarian forces whether they are in the shape of regimes or religious groups. This is what happed in Pakistan where the gaps due to lack of public sphere, were filled by extremist, religio-political forces with limited worldview. Thus, the key to the democratization is an effectively functioning cultural and political public sphere which should not be restricted by one particular sect of a faith.
49 Thomas McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," Ethics 105 (October 1994): pg 49 50 Ibid 30
Emancipation from non-Democratic Polity
Diverse cultures and individuals may vary from one another in terms of religious convictions, traditions, sentiments, etc - reason (at least in potential - a potential that must be developed by education) stands as a universally shared capacity of humanity; ( in case of
Deobandi School, though equally enjoying religious conviction vis-à-vis Deobandi School of thought, reason and logic worked on one side of the border while other justified lack of reason and logic as strength of their faith which led to the radicalization of the society and their involvement in politics of Jihad in the name of religion.
As an example of such a universal norm if one has to exercise one’s freedom by choosing goals and projects, this freedom requires that others respect these choices by not attempting to override them. But if one logically requires others to respect one’s freedom as an autonomous rationality, then reciprocity demands that one respects others' freedom as well.
This norm of respect then issues in the political demand for democracy: only democracies, as resting on the [free and rational] consent of the governed, thereby respect and preserve the fundamental humanity of its citizens ( i.e., precisely their central character as rational freedoms).51
Relativism argues that no such universal human characteristics and norms exist.
Habermas’s universal rights narrative has not been taken overwhelmingly and emphasis on localized narrative and traditions are presented against it, which indirectly helps the
51 This argument, initially launched by John Locke, finds its way into Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, and from there into the arguments for women's emancipation in writers such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and the arguments for civil rights as articulated by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr, in his Letter from the Birmingham Jail
31 traditionalist/realists to continue with their policies in the name of national interests and local needs.
For Habermas, the loss of the Universalist claims of the Enlightenment to postmodern (and other sorts of) relativism opens the door to authoritarian politics in all its forms. And this is precisely what happened in Pakistan. With believe in “super –faith” “puritanical Islam” going back to the original text led to intolerance in society of other believes and faiths, which was successfully used by the regime in collaboration with its foreign supporters to fulfill their agenda. As a result though, the process of radicalization, intolerance and extremism unleash which is now our biggest problem.
Habermas seeks to ground a discourse ethics in what he takes to be a fundamental assumption of conversation or discourse. Especially, when we make statements such as one ought to be a good Muslim, here is intended to signify that these moral norms (avoiding racism, providing just rewards) are not valid solely for the individual who happens to accept them. Rather, if we seek to bring others to accept our views on fundamental issues - we tacitly assume that these norms are valid for all people: our arguments are designed to persuade others that they should agree with us regarding these norms. The radicalization of
Pakistani society where Jihad found its acceptance even among those who otherwise would not dare to go for it, is the result of such assumption of being the best, the righteous and the one who knows what is best for the entire world. This sense of self righteousness and patronization of all those who take up the task to “bring Muslims back to the righteous path” has contributed to the current mess that Pakistani is facing these days. Freedom and space to tolerate different world view particularly on religion,
32
This usually tacit assumption of the universal validity of our claims is fundamental to what
Habermas calls communicative action, the process of giving and criticizing reasons for holding or rejecting particular claims - a process apparent especially in the natural sciences, law, and criticism. Insofar as one grants that such argumentation leads to universally valid claims - an admission one is most likely to make with regard to the sciences - one then concedes Habermas's central point: communicative action defines rationality capable, through discourse, of arriving at universal norms.
Habermas emphasizes the need for individual freedom; he states that every person with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. He says that freedom mean everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever, everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse, everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. He talks about a situation where no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights. Applying this to the Deobandis in Pakistan, such rights are unacceptable to the absolutists who believe that what they know and practice is the only right way. They take difference of opinion in religion equal to questioning the religion in itself, hence presenting Islam as an exclusivist religion where there is no space and acceptability for different faiths or even different interpretation within
Islam.
Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and non-coercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project oneself into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives, there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of
33 their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of successfully taken abstractions, the core of universal interests can then emerge step by step.
For Habermas, the general conditions of the ideal speech situation and the rules of reason, especially as coupled with this sense of solidarity, describe the necessary conditions of democratic polity. At the same time, these conditions and rules establish the legitimacy of pluralism. That is, a diversity of communities and participants, while following the same set of rules regarding discourse, may establish diverse sets of norms as legitimate for given, but not all, communities.
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas treated religion primarily from a sociological perspective, as an archaic mode of social integration. However, since then he has explored the role of religion in politics, on the one hand, and the relationships between religious and philosophical modes of discourse, on the other.
Habermas does not completely dismiss religion. He describes his approach “as a
“methodological atheism,” by which he means a kind of experiment in radical demythologization whose outcome remains open. He does not reject faith and theological reflection; indeed, he asserts that meanings are preserved in religious language, a potential that has not been fully reduced to philosophical and secular reasons.”52At the same time,
Habermas insists on the difference between theological and philosophical modes of discourse: as a reflection on faith, theology must not renounce its basis in religious experience and ritual. Consequently, he resists apologetic attempts to generate religious belief from philosophical premises. Rather, philosophers must satisfy themselves with the
52 E.Medieta (ed) , Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Quoted in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#HabDisThe accessed on August 27, 2011 34
“transcendence from within” given with the context-transcending force of claims to truth and moral rightness.
Habermas argues that religious communities still harbor potentials of meaning from which philosophy can learn, a potential that has been lost elsewhere and that cannot be restored by the professional knowledge of experts alone. For instance, he refers to the “differentiated possibilities of expression” and “sensitivities” regarding “lives that have gone astray, societal pathologies, the failure of individual life projects, and the deformation of misbegotten human relationships”.53 In acknowledging that religious modes of expression can harbor an integral cognitive content that is not exhausted by secular translations, he thus calls for a dialogue in which secular and religious forms of thought mutually inform and learn from each other.
Analyzing Deobandis in India and their policy of accommodation within the secular political system explains that the policy actually helped them to sustain and continue with their ideas without politicization or compromising for political purposes. Any linkage between secular political system and religious thoughts was considered an attempt to moving out of the religion. This inflexibility, exclusivist approach and lack of pluralism has actually exposed the Deobandis and made it difficult for them to now claim their school of thought on purely religious basis. Their involvement in politics and endorsement by the state in the past has made it impossible for any kind of accommodation. In India Deobandis evolved as soft, inclusivist school that has no problem in accommodating with the Braelvis.
Unlike Pakistan where Braelvis though in majority were sidelined and Deobandi’s got state patronage hence the political Jihad that was waged by the then regime of Gen. Zia ul Haq became a religious Jihad with the endorsement of Deobandi School of thought in Pakistan.
53 Ibid. 35
The Legislative system that was evolved under Zia provided the Sunni-Orthodox religio- legal protection needed to support the paradigm shift in a country of Indo-Persian civilization. Deobandis in Pakistan facilitated the Salafi school of thought to gain grounds while on the other side of the border, Salafi School could never find acceptance among the
Deobandis. Also, because of the secular system, any public policy legislation based on religion or one particular religion was not possible in India, hence no religio-legal endorsement from the state in India on the issue of Jihad or religious wars.
This broad point on the relation between religious and secular modes of thought flows directly into the position Habermas takes in his “Religion in the Public Sphere regarding the relation between religion and public reasons.”54 At the center of contention are the duties of believing citizens to translate their religiously based claims into secular, publicly accessible reasons. In contrast to what Habermas offers, Audi places the heaviest burden on believers, requiring them to support only those laws for which they have sufficient public reasons; each citizen thus has a duty to translate religiously based arguments into secular ones. Rawls presents a “wide view” of public reason, according to which citizens may introduce reasons from reasonable comprehensive doctrines (which can include religious views), without translation, at any time into public discourse about constitutional essentials, provided that at some point in the future these reasons are translated into generally accessible public arguments.55
Habermas does not reject the existence of religion, in fact, he offered the hypothesis that both believers and non-believers are involved in a complementary learning process in which each side can learn from the other. As a cooperative learning process, translation
54 J. Gaines , Religion in the public sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14: 1–25, 2006 55 John Rawl The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Chicago Law Review , University of Chicago, (1997), 64 (3): 765-807. 36 makes demands on both sides: the believer must seek publicly accessible arguments, whereas the non-believer must approach religion as a potential source of meaning, as harboring truths about human existence that are relevant for all.
Jihad against the Infidels: Construction of a Myth or Reality?
Alexander Wendt’s theory of social construction of power politics helps explain the politics of jihad and politicization of religion. This theory also helps us to understand the second part of the hypothesis which talks about the artificial construction of international political environment that was presented as the reason for getting into Jihadi politics as foreign policy instrument and Islamization process as domestic policy using the Deobandis that led to International Jihad against the Soviets and “Jihadization” in Pakistan.
Alexander Wendt’s work on the social construction of power politics is based on the fundamental idea of constructivism, which primarily seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of Neo-realism and Neo- liberalism, socially constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction.
Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism:
"(1) that the structures of human association are determined
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that
the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by
these shared ideas rather than given by nature" Constructivists
such as Wendt emphasized that while ideas and processes tend to
explain the social construction of identities and interests, such
37
ideas and processes form a structure of their own which impact
upon international actors. Their central difference from Neo-
realists is to see the structure of international politics in primarily
ideational, rather than material, terms.”56
Constructivism is often presented as an alternative to the two leading theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, but some maintain that it is not necessarily inconsistent with one either or both. Wendt shares some key assumptions with leading realist and neorealist scholars, such as the existence of anarchy and the centrality of states in the international system. However, Wendt renders anarchy in cultural rather than materialist terms; he also offers a sophisticated theoretical defense of the state-as-actor assumption in international relations theory.
Wendt emphasized in his work to show that even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is socially constructed – that is, not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human practice – Wendt opened the way for a generation of international relations scholars to pursue work in a wide range of issues from a constructivist perspective.
According to Alexander Wendt, “the system of self-help is only one of various possible structures under anarchy. The reason for the existence of a self-help system is not causally determined by anarchy. Rather, it has developed out of interaction and is reinforced by interaction – identities and interests of states arise only in relation to others.”57 Interaction
56 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.1 57Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, in International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992 38 is based on inter-subjective meaning, thus constituting the structure (e.g. self-help). Actors’ identities play a key role in the process of achieving inter-subjective meaning.
Most important and unlike structural realism, Wendt considers identities and interests as
“acquired by the states through interaction, thus being socially constructed and not exogenously given”58. Wendt’s work explains it well that contrary to the analysis of most western scholars, religious extremism in not something given in a particular nation or people of a particular area. Hence, saying that Pushtun are all inherently prone towards radical Islamic ideas is tantamount to ignoring the contribution of the political and military establishment in constructing in creating the “identity” crisis and then presenting a completely an artificially constructed national identity narrative.
The role of the actors both political and non political in construction of this identity narrative based on certain ideological understanding is perhaps one of the most important reasons for a lost nation with vague ideas about religion, politics and status in the world.
Based on what Alexander Wendt’s theory provides, it is not the given geo-strategic location of Pakistan that led to the involvement of Deobandi Madrassas in Jihad while
Indian Deobandi by nature more accommodative did not get into it. Instead, it was the artificial construction of Pakistani identity detached from Indo-Persian Civilization and close to Arab Islamic identity that encouraged spread of certain school of thought believing in the validity of those ideas that created the Frankenstein monster very hard to get away with.
By changing actors’ identities, change of socially constructed realties is possible. We should not necessarily treat interests and identity as given. Although Wendt agrees with a statist view, he argues that an important field of research should treat state interests and
39 identity as the dependent variable. Wendt concedes that there are those who study how first- and second-image factors affect state identity and interests; Wendt argues that international institutions ( read policies) can change state identities and interests, as in the case of Pakistan, the agenda of Afghan jihad led to Islamization process in Pakistan where
Deobandi/Wahabi sect got state patronage and hence Pakistan was led to believe that they are supposed to align themselves with Arab identity then looking back to Indus valley civilization. This Arabist shift in the identity brought more confusion and created gaps which later filled with various extremist, militant groups claiming to provide sense of direction to the young generation of Pakistanis. This artificial identity formation was at the expense of Pakistan’s relations with the countries in the region.
He argues that the concept of self-help as defined by realists (and mainly by Waltz) originates from the interaction of the units in the system, and not from anarchy. This conception conflicts with the structural, deterministic arguments that realists’ advance in which anarchy is the key explanatory variable that drives interactions. Wendt says that states interact with each other and, based on the results of that interaction, can become characterized by self-help, but this result does not necessarily need to follow. Whatever is observed, self-help or not, is defined by process, not structure. Wendt says that neo-realism and neo-liberalism cannot account for changes in the system, but norms-based constructivisim can. (threats are socially constructed.)
To explain the phenomenon of Jihad and its politicization and use of Deobandi Madrassas in this regard, one cannot rely on traditional conception of theory, which tend to work in favor of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order and theory accompanying inequalities of power and wealth. Critical theory starts from the premises that theory is
40 always situated in particular time and place, hence like all knowledge, it is necessarily conditioned by social, cultural and ideological influence and one of the tasks of the critical theory is to reveal the effect of this conditioning. It seeks to bring to consciousness latent perspectives, interests, or values that give rise to, and orientate any theory.
An overall critical theory framework is also important in analyzing Deobandi Madrassas and politics of jihad, because it provides that human do not make history under conditions of their own choosing so a detailed examination of present conditions must necessarily be undertaken. Critical theory views the prevailing order of social and political relations as a historical production which must be explained. Critical international theory takes the global configuration of power relations as its object and asks how that configurations came about, what costs it brings with it, and what other possibilities remain immanent in history. It helps in explaining the historical-sociological analysis of the structures of modern world politics. Critical international theory’s understanding of emancipation of knowledge involves rethinking and reconstructing security and community in modern political life.
The achievement of a rational, just and democratic organization of global politics can not be advanced, however, without first taking account of the procedures by which political principles, social norms and institutions are decided upon.
Why Critical theory framework?
The study needs to be explained within the framework of Critical theory because it is not only concerned with providing explanations of the existing realities of world politics, it also intends to criticize in order to transform them and to find avenue for change that would rectify some of the policy mistakes by our leaders. Based on the theory, the study would
41 focus on the transformation that took place during the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet
Union in 1979 and the time when the US forces occupied Afghanistan in 2002. This transformation is the result of the policies that was adopted by the leaders. Hence, the emergence of the radical Islamist movement in the shape of Taliban and its links with Al-
Qaeda is the direct consequence of the politicization of a school of thought that was otherwise apolitical in nature. A new dimension to study the socio-political nature of the religious group is necessary to understand the phenomenon of Islamic Jihad with particular reference to the politics of the Sub-continent.
In order to deal with the research we need to see the five basic assumptions of Critical
Theory. Basic to work in the critical theory tradition is cultural critique. The term critical is used in critical theory to refer to a systematic process of review and analysis (i.e. critique) of cultural phenomenon. In the process, hidden assumptions underlying accepted but problematic cultural practices are exposed along with their negative aspects.
Criticalists believe that the widespread cultural oppression in contemporary societies is most forcefully reproduced when non-privileged groups accept their lesser social status as natural, necessary or inevitable. The reproduction of cultural oppression means that accepted patterns of inequity are transmitted to new members who are born to or join the culture. The acceptance of these patterns takes the form of internalized oppression, meaning that individuals help to maintain their oppression through thoughts and actions that are consistent with their disempowered status. Hegemony involves a struggle in which the powerful win the consent of those who are oppressed, with the oppressed unknowingly participating in their own oppression.
42
Critical theory seeks to disclose the true interests (i.e, the needs, concerns and advantages) of different groups and individuals. Those who are privileged always have an interest in preserving the status quo in order to protect their advantages. Critical theory strives to highlight the sense of frustration and powerlessness that non-privileged groups feel with respect to their opportunities to realize their potential, and to provide insight to guide them towards greater autonomy and ultimately, the emancipation.
Critialists continually subject to critical analysis both the texts of the hegemony and those that convey popular culture. The critical analysis of texts, which originated in philosophy and literary criticism, is called deconstruction. Deconstructionism asserts that a text has no definite meaning, that words can refer only to other words and that playing with text can yield multiple, often contradictory interpretations. Criticalists view most of the texts in education and research as problematic (i.e, capable of structuring a written statement, for example, they examine the connotations of each term, thus opening the text to multiple interpretations, with none privileged over any other. Criticalists even question the authority of their own emancipatory agenda by deconstructing the terms and statements that comprise the text expressing that agenda.
This is where the focus of the thesis is, while deobandis in India interpret the same text in a different manner, the deobandis in Pakistan found themselves interpreting the text under the influence of International Political demands and policy adoption of the local regime.
Criticalists believe that thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically constituted. In the context of education, this assumption implies that education is inevitably affected by their experiences with power and dominance, both
43 within and outside the educational system. Thus the particular belief and activities of such groups or individuals can only by understood in reference to the unique context in which they occur.
Within the framework of critical theory, we need to analyze the different perspectives by the Deobandi Madrassas in Pakistan and India towards Jihad and involvement in Politics.
Issues like political autonomy, democracy, participation of the citizens in public policy and a secular system of government are the Independent variable in this analysis which may and may not have contributed in the politicization of Madrassas which is dependent variable.
According to John Christman, “Political Liberalism shifts the focus from a philosophical conception of justice, formulated abstractly and meant to apply universally, to a practical conception of legitimacy where consensus is reached without pretension of deep metaphysical roots for the principles in question. More than merely a “modus vivendi” for the participating parties, justice must be affirmed in a way that finds a moral basis for all participating citizens, albeit from different frameworks of value and moral obligation. The operation of public reason and deliberation, then, serves as the means by which such a consensus might be established and hence public discussion and democratic institutions must be seen as a constitutive part of the principles of justice rather than a mechanism for collective determination of the social good.”59
The role of autonomy in the specification of this picture should not be under- emphasized
(or the controversies it invites ignored). For such a consensus counts as legitimate only when achieved under conditions of free and authentic affirmation of shared principles. Only
59Christman, John, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
Therefore, social conditions that hamper the equal enjoyment of capacities to reflectively consider and (if necessary) reject principles of social justice, due, say, to extreme poverty, disability, ongoing injustice and inequality, or the like, restrict the establishment of just principles. Autonomy, then, insofar as that concept picks out the free reflective choice operating in the establishment of legitimacy, is basic to, and presupposed by, even such non-foundational (political) conceptions of justice.
Habermas proposes a process of attempting to arrive at rational consensus through participatory deliberation."Communicative action" is Habermas’s term for the shared process of giving and criticizing reasons for holding or rejecting particular claims. In this deliberative process, all affected parties should have their say; all should be able to accept the reasons and the consequences of decisions, everyone must be allowed to introduce any argument they desire, and there is an expectation that everyone listen to and consider the arguments of others.
It is important to remember that Habermas is resisting both absolutism and relativism. He does not propose a communicative free-for-all. Rules are important, but it is equally important that the rules be co-created by the participants and not serve to preserve already- existing hierarchies. Methodology, science, and rationality are all important, but they must
45 belong to the people rather than being imposed as a matter of metaphysical necessity from above. Norms, and truth itself, must be created from the ground up.
Some scholars associate critical theory with postmodernism. Postmodernism is a philosophy based on assertion that no one approach to developing knowledge about the human world is privileged over any other. Criticalists are indeed skeptical of any theory or method that claims to have timeless or universal application to understanding or improving the human condition. Nonetheless, they remain committed to form of social inquiry and action that promote the emancipation of non-privileged individuals and groups.
The second part of this assumption refers to ideological inscription. As applied to education, ideological inscription means that ideas about how teaching and learning operate always involve preformed systems of values and beliefs, which usually reinforce the power of dominant` groups in society.
Linking Habermas’ Communicative Action theory and Alexander Wendt’s Social Construction of Power Politics to the Politics of Jihad and Deobandi Madrassas
Habermas’ theory provides an explanation that lack of freedom of expression and autonomy can result into extremism, be it religious extremism or political extremism, when there is little space, total control and communication gaps within the society, extreme behaviours are expected. In case of Pakistan, it happened, while in India, because of being in minority, the Muslim community in general and Deobandis in particular expressed and spoke every minutes thing that they felt against them, since India has an established democratic system, one sided, authoritative decisions were not made, even if there were extremism from Hindu radicals, the society reacted strongly against it. Acceptance, sympathy for extremism does not exist, as compared to Pakistan, one side flow of
46 information, lack of discourse, made it possible for radicals to have sympathizers and have significant level of acceptance.
Alexander wendt’s theory of social construction of power politics well describe Pakistan’s political situation, the idea of Islamic republic as the rulers believe fit , was promoted, the enemies were created and level of social and religious tolerance was defined by those who thought they have better understanding of the nation. As a result, a confused nation with no sense of direction, marred with all sorts of ethnic and ideological difference exists today. The construction of our honour and identity based on the world view of one particular sect is what Wendt talks about. As he says that nothing is given, especially in political arena. It is always constructed based on the interests and needs of the time. The present “Islamic Identity” is also created which appears to be narrow and self destructive rather than an overarching concept of “Amn and Salamti” (peace and security) it is more of a myopic view of Islam versus the rest of the world. Pakistan unfortunately became the victim of such policies. It is not the race, the geography and problems associated because of it that defined the policies as assumed by few in Pakistan but a deliberate construction of the geo-political situation, formation of enemies, creation of alliances and confronting others that has resulted in the problems that Pakistan is facing now and India managed to stay away from that.
If we analyze the situation now, it appears that with the process of “Islamization”, Pakistan increasingly became an ideological state. However, there was no single definition available to explain what Islamization was. With a number of sects and varied types of “Islam”, the
Deobandi school of thought became the official school to look up to for theoretical explanations. With its close resemblance to Saudi Wahabism, Saudi Arabia became the
47 patronizing factor, even though a majority of Pakistanis were and still adhere to the
Braelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam.
Dr. Hasan Askari aptly states, “Domestic and international politics as well as societal issues were articulated in purely religious Idiom. Such Islamic indoctrination emphasizes that political and social developments are shaped primarily by the conflict-based interaction between Islam and other religions, especially Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity.”60 What
Edward Said emphasized many years ago in his work on Orientalism can be aptly applied here. According to Said, 'without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage — and even produce — the Orient'.61 Said points out that it is the product of ideological fiction with no real linkage to the cultures and peoples it claims to explain.
Beyond this, Said took seriously Foucault's idea that power and knowledge are joined together: Orientalism does not only constitute a particular discourse, it produces the Orient
'politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period'.62
Instead of emphasizing the notion of Pakistan as a nation state based on cultural and religious pluralism, ideas like Islamic universalism; militancy and “Islam versus the other” are highlighted by the radical religious groups which have affected the psyche of the whole nation.
As Arshin Adib states:
“Delineating the infidel from the pious, civilization from
barbarism, juxtaposing a 'free world' to an 'evil empire',
60 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “ ReSociolising Pakistan, Daily Times, June 7, 2009 61 Edward Said, Orientalism , Vintage books, 1978 62 Ibid 48
presenting an Islam in opposition to a West, differentiating
the in-group from the out-group, does not refer to or cause
detachment. Such processes of 'othering' do not result in
autonomy; 'we' and 'they' continue to inhabit a social field,
our 'self' continues to be entirely interdependent with the
'other'. One cannot be the 'leader of the free world' without
some understanding about the realm beyond this zone. One
cannot be 'civilized' without inventing the attributes of the
'barbarian' other.63
The artificial construction of ideologization of the Pakistani society was never successfully completed. In Pakistan, the educational system was the first sector that was axed during the
Islamization process, when on the pretext of providing free education to the poor, madrassas were established all over the country. The degrees that these institutions awarded qualified young men to preside over Qazi courts or work as Ulama in various departments of the government.64
Prof. Jamal Malik in his work on Colonization of Islam65, criticized the Islamization process, he states:
“The diverse tendencies of Islam in Pakistan suggest that a
single uniform policy of Islamization as envisaged under
the regime of Zia-ul-Haq in collaboration with
63 Arshin Adib, A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilization, NY, Columbia University Press, 2011 page 8-9 64 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, Pakistan, Politics, Religion & Extremism”, IPCS Research Paper 21, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), May 2009 p6 65 Jamal Malik, Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan, Lahore, Vanguard Book, 1996 49
fundamentalist forces was doomed to failure from the very
start. Failure being inherent in the Islamization policy, the
question arises as to the purpose in trying to bring it about.
Islamization really appears to be a means of legitimation
for the regime. It is, in fact, Islam from the cantonment far
from a visualization of the needs of the overwhelming
majority of the population.”66
Thus, Deobandi Madrassas under state patronage appeared to be more organized than others and with the supports coming from Saudi Arabia and of course Pakistan government, the foundation was laid for an alliance between Pakistani Deobandis-Saudi
Arab and Pakistan. This led to the emergence of a strong minority group within Sunni sect to Islamize Pakistan (according to their interpretation).
This patronage of Deobandi madrassas by the government, led to the emergence of Islamic constituencies, which were always ready to vote for religious parties, as they did when a referendum was held for General Zia, where the choice was largely construed as one where the people could either vote for the Quran or not. Interestingly, despite the United States’ contribution to help Pakistan establish its religious credentials during the Cold War, the
US, in the initial years of its engagement with Pakistan, did not realize the troubling potential of Islamist politics.67
66 Jamal Malik, Colonization of Islam, op cit, p-8 67 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, Arabist Shift from Indo-Persian Civilization & Genises of Radicalization in Pakistan”, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) available at san-pips.com/download.php?f=25.pdf 50
Chapter 2
Deobandi Madrassa System in Historical Perspective
Culture of Madrassa and Islamic Education
To discuss the history of madrassa system, it is very important to understand the culture of madrassa in general and in Indian sub-continent in particular. From the tenth through the beginning of the twelfth century, a system of self-contained and privately funded institutions of higher learning called madrasas appeared throughout the Islamic world, becoming centers for the production of knowledge and normative practices in Islamic society.
Islamic culture was culminated over the years by scholarly work by the earlier intellectuals as well as the educational system that was institutionalized through madrassa system. The madrassas became sites for the production of knowledge, and for the production of a knowledgeable subculture, that of the ulema. As medieval Muslim intellectual and religious life took shape, madrassa became the platform for discourse that later contributed in the development of Islamic jurisprudence and understanding of Fiqh.
As the Muslim communities developed during and after the Arab conquests, the issues related to rights and obligations of an individual towards the community got attention.
Among the doctrines which evolved out of these concerns was that of the waqf. A waqf is and was a pious donation to the community of Muslims of private funds. The funds were often used to construct mosques, libraries, guesthouses for travelers, hospitals etc or were given to the poor. The religious objective in making such a donation was to attain God’s
51 blessings. The waqf donations would also used in providing boarding and lodging to poor students who would stay in a madrassa for religious education. The tradition still continues since then and charity money is pivotal in the sustainibity of the thousands of small madrassas throughout the Muslim world and same is in India and Pakistan.
It was during the 9th century that four major schools of thougt of Islamic law, the Shafi`i,
Hanafi, Malika and Hanbali—developed. The schools of thought are basically modes of legal interpretation among Sunni Muslims. The more these schools of thought evolved, it also led to more complication among the followers. It was thought that more efforts and deep study was required in a systemetic manner. Thus the study and teaching of the increasingly complex nuances of Islamic law each became full-time vocations.
An organized system providing a school system consisted of institutions for students and teachers to study and stay called khans (later called Khanka) sprang up in proximity to mosques in which legal studies took place. This helped encouraged the development of local communities of scholars and students all over the Muslim world fostering continuity of legal theory and practice. Well to do Muslims, rulers, and others contributed financially to build these Khankas. These places were welcoming to travelers and pilgrims as well as students and teachers.
In the 10th and 11th century, the donations and charities were institutionalized under
“waqf “system which was the foundation of the madrassa (literally "a place of study"). This led to the spread of madrassa complexes throughout the Islamic empire, and especially in
Iraq by the powerful Seljuk executive officer Nizâm al-Mulk (d.1092).68 Among Nizâm's most noteworthy foundations was the Madrasa Nizamiya in the intellectual hub of
68 Hisham Nashabe, Muslim Educational Institutions, Institute of Islamic Studies ,Beirut ( Michigan, International Book Centre, 1989) p. 6 52
Baghdad, which was an immensely rich and prestigious institution that attracted the brightest and most revered scholars in Islam and that also housed vast collections of books.69
The conditions of the waqf foundations varied from madrassa to madrassa--sometimes they provided a salary for teachers and stipends for students, sometimes only salaries for teachers, sometimes only the physical facilities themselves. It was not uncommon for the funds associated with the madrasa's initial foundation to derive from an orchard or some other form of productive capital.
The prime purpose of madrasa was total devotion to the study of Islamic law along with the study of Arabic grammar, prophetic tradition and Qur'anic commentary. The method of instruction was typically a lecture by a respected master of a given field of knowledge, during which his students would surround him and take notes. The work on jurisprudence, religious doctrine, and traditions of Prophet (PBUH) were recited, shared by the teachers and then memorized. Students were encouraged to memorize the knowledge they
"collected" and free themselves of the need for the written word.
Madrassa provided the space for the community to discuss and develop consensus on issues related to the religion which were beyond the understanding of a common Muslim.
Hisotrically Islamic society had no institutional system to help develop such consensus or to interpret the text from the holy book. One important reason is there is no hierarchical system that exists in Islam. The madrassa became the site in which the legal scholars whose voice was authoritative in such matters debated matters of custom and law and other questions concerning the daily life of Muslims. According to Nakosteen, quoting in
69 Ibid 53
History of Islamic Origin of Western Education the organization of Muslim education from
750-1350 in Maktabs was as follows:
Organizations of Muslim education, 750–1350 ( maktabs or kuttubs writing schools)70
1) Mosque schools (masjid)
2) Mosque circles (halqha)
3 Madrassas, outside of mosques, offering both secondary and college disciplines
Bait-al-hikmas (houses of wisdom)
Bookshops as centers of research
Literary salons as centers of exchange of views , disputation of issues Ages 5 or 6 to
14
Elementary mostly outside the mosque in shops or tutors’ houses Ages to 18 and
above
Secondary—college The transition from secondary to college was flexible and
based upon individual initiative University education and post university education
Public libraries, semi-public libraries, and private libraries in homes of scholars, as
centers of research and scholarship higher education also was carried on in some
mosques exclusively, such as al-Azhar
70 Nakosteen, History of Islamic Origins of Western Education: A.D. 800–1350, 45.( (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1964)
54
Origin of Deobandi School of thought and Establishment of Darool –ul- Uloom Deoband Characteristic of early Deobandi madrassa
Though the early Madrassas were established in South Asia taking inspirations from the
Arab world, they were apolitical and remained dissociated with politics till the time British regime explicitly came out with certain policies that were thought to be based on religio- cultural confrontation. The early Madrassas in Indian sub-continent were not homogenous, due to differences between various schools of thoughts, the institutions that emerged engaged in imparting religious knowledge based on their world view, having specific characteristics to shape the nature and scope of the Madrassas.
Mumtaz Ahmed in his work on Madrassa Education in Bangladesh talks about the socio- religious aspect of the Madrassas representing Islamic orthodoxy. He writes:
“The persistence of traditional Islam as a significant cultural
alternative and as the intellectual mode of still vital religious
institutions in South Asian Muslim societies is nowhere more
salient than in the madrassa system. Madrassas have long been
the centers of classical Islamic studies and the guardians of the
orthodoxy in South Asian Islam. They are the social sites for
the reproduction of Islamic orthodoxy. Hence, to say that the
ideological orientation of madrassa education is conservative
is to state the obvious: they are supposed to be conservative as
their very raison d’etre is to preserve the integrity of the
tradition. Indeed, it is fair to argue that madrassas constitute
55
the core of the religio-cultural complex of Islam in South
Asia. 71
The fact can that cannot be ignored is that madrassa education in Indian Sub-continent has been affected by the development outside the region. The politicization of madrassa has been directly linked to the changes that were taking place in the Muslim world particularly in the Arab world. But the establishment and growth of the madrassas education had been shaped by the historical and social conditions of the region. Many of the pre-colonial rulers of South Asia, including the Mughals (1526–1857), played key roles in promoting education and providing patronage of various educational institutions, including madrassas.
Ali Riaz states, “the policies of British colonial rule (1757–1947), however, made the most indelible marks on madrassa education, not only directly, wherein their policies have impacted on the structure, functions, and curriculum of madrassas, but also indirectly, through the prompting of responses from the ulema and the Muslim community that determined the contours and the content of madrassa education. These responses, in large measure, revolved around the concept of Muslim identity, and therefore, were laced with political activism.”72
Religious Education and Political Activism
The 1857 mutiny as British called it or war of independence as referred by the Indian
Muslims was the benchmark that brought in forefront the anger and frustration among
Muslim community in India. Nothing substantial happened after the war, it only led to
71 Mumtaz Ahmed, “Islamic Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh”, Paper Presented in the Conference on “Religion and Security in South Asia,” 19-22 August 2002, Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, pp 2-3 72 Ali Riaz, Madrassah Education in Pre Colonia and Colinia South Asia, Journal of Asian and African Studies, February 2011 vol. 46 no. 1 69-86 56 further pressure on Muslims by the British administration. But an urge to secure the fading
Muslim Identity got stronger. There could have been many ways to do that, but due to lack of organization, collective approach was never applied. It was again, the religious forces, looking at the situation with religious glasses, came forward with their idea of saving the receding identity.
The defeat and the humiliation faced by the Muslims in terms of both the loss of material wealth and power and spiritual integrity, resulted in the Muslim Ulema of the later days to shun any pursuit of worldly knowledge and go back to the basics. In other words, they closed the door to Ijtihad – independent reasoning. Going back to the basics for this cadre of Muslim scholars meant following those trends and gaining that level of spirituality due to which the earlier Muslims were able to acquire great power and wealth.
When this region came under the British rule and a new educational system was introduced, which was perceived to be a threat to the Islamic identity of the Muslims, the
Madrassa system in India took upon itself the task of opposing the cultural and educational hegemony of the British. It is important to point out, however, that the madrassa system in the Indian Subcontinent was the only one that underwent drastic changes in terms of
Islamic education curriculum and teaching styles and quality and abandoning of the earthly science studies. The madrassas in the Arab world also changed a little in terms of the orientation of the Islamic curriculum but they carried essentially the same system of education that was established in the early development of the madrassa in Baghdad, and to this day accommodate the teaching of the secular subjects. This is especially true for
Egypt where, under the Al-Azhar education system, the secular subjects compliment the
Islamic education.
57
During the British rule in India, the educational system saw a sharp divide within the
Muslim community. The emergence of English learning at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh (UP); on the one hand and development of anti-British/Western education, the madrassa of
Deoband (also in UP) on the other hand was to keep the traditional Islamic learning and
“purity” of religious ideas intact. It was obvious that the conservative traditionalists were threatened by English education and Western sciences. Interestingly, in opposition to the traditionalists, progressive Ulema such as those of Farangi Mahall in Lucknow sought to preserve Islam by introducing changes in the Dars-e-Nizami. Darul Uloom Deoband, established in 1867, however, laid emphasis on scriptural studies, ‘purification' of the belief system, and outright rejection of imperialism and its values.
Mawlana Burhanuddin Qasmi’s work shows that Dar al-‘Uloom represents the very quintessence of the perfect balance between the formal and spiritual currents within
Islam.73 Its spiritual component is rooted in the legacy of a well known Sufi-reformer Shah
Waliullah Dehlwi (1703-1762) and, hence, goes back over 100 years before its foundations were laid in Deoband. Shah Waliullah was ahead of his time. He led an intellectual campaign years before the ‘first war of independence’ and ‘the quit India movement’ and drew the attention of those who would hear him to the extensive moral and spiritual corruption of the company and the values of the West, the East India Company represented.
His basis for the critique of the Company and its values essentially stemmed from the spiritual experience he is said to have had while on a pilgrimage to Mecca.
73 Burhanuddin Qasmi, Darul Uloom Deoband: A Heroic Struggle against the British Tyranny (Mumbai: Markazul Ma’arif, 2001.) 58
Buhanuddin Qasimi continues:
“The hall-mark of his message was the commitment to
establishing equality and justice in India – objects widely
perceived to be lacking in British India then as also during the
period when Dar al-‘Uloom became a participant in the
freedom movement. His son, Shah ‘Abdul Aziz Dehlwi,
continued his critique of the British rule at the beginning of the
century and began a long drawn Indian struggle for Freedom in
which the spiritually inclined ‘Ulema’ provided significant
leadership. The ‘sepoy mutiny’ led to the death of over 50000
‘Ulema’, and in Delhi alone nearly 500 of them were hanged.
So actively were these engaged in the freedom movement that
the ‘Ulema’, known popularly as the mawlwis, became
synonymous with the term ‘rebel’? It was in the aftermath of
this tragic state of affairs (apparently, it took years for the
‘Ulema’ to recover from the shock of the policy of ‘Ulema’
hunting’), that the Dar al-‘Ulum came into existence. The
original objective of this institution was to establish a spiritual-
intellectual base for revolution against what was generally
perceived by this group of the elite as injustice, oppression,
suppression of culture, knowledge and endowments.74
The foundation history of Darul Uloom dates back to the fall of Muslim Empire in India in
1857 in the hands of East India Company. Nearly, all the Muslim educational places, which
74 Ibid 59 used to survive on the donations of Muslim rulers ceased to exist and the entire Muslim culture and Islamic heritage was at verge of destruction and perishing. In this critical time, some of the ulemas planned to start a madrasa in Deoband as centre of their activities with public contributions and co-operations. On May 30, 1866 (15 Muharram, 1283) the foundation stone for the madrassa was laid in the Deoband. The head of founding committee of Darul Uloom Deoband was Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotavi. The other founding members were: Haji Aabid Hussain, Maulana Mahtab Ali, Maulana Zul Faqqar
Ali, Maulana Fazrulr Rahman and Munshi Fazle Haq.75
Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanatawi and Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi were the founding fathers of the Darul Uloom Deoband. The idea was to ensure central role of religion in individual and social life, freedom from slavery within and without, and simplicity and hard work.
The Darul-‘Uloom began teaching at an open mosque in Deoband on 30 May 1866. The first teacher to be appointed was a spiritual leader, Mullah Mahmood Deobandi. The school had a single student named Mahmud al-Hasan. This student who later came to be known as shaykh al-hind (leader of India) led a resistance movement that cut across the Hindu-
Muslim divide. He formed a government in exile headquartered in Madina with Mahmud al-Hasan as its Amir (chief), Barkutullah Bhopali as its minister, and Mahraja Pratap Singh as its President. This government in exile began then to seek international support against the British rule. 76
75 Muhammadullah Khalili Qasmi, Darul Uloom Deoband: 1866-2010 = 1283-1431, July 5, 2011 available at Deoband Online, http://www.deoband.net/1/post/2011/5/darul-uloom-deoband-1866-2010-1283-1431.html 76 Burhanuddin Qasmi Darul Uloom Deoband: A Heroic Struggle against the British Tyranny (Mumbai: Markazul Ma’arif, 2001) 60
David Singh gives us an analysis of the situation during the Brisitsh Raj. He says:
It is interesting to note how close Gandhi’s own philosophy of life, in
the early 20th century, involved some of these principle objectives
internal communications between these leaders was written on a silk
cloth giving details of the conspiracy against the British. This letter
fell into the hands of the British in 1916 and gave rise to the well
known tahrik-e-reshmi rumal (the silk kerchief conspiracy). Over 200
‘Ueama’ were arrested as a result (many of whom later released).
Muslims, related to this Madarasa, continued to participate in the
various other movements led by the Indian National Congress
(established in 1885), such as the non-cooperation and civil
disobedience movements.77
Fundamental Principles of Darul Uloom
According to Mohammadullah Qasimi, Darul Uloom Deoband defines its fundamental principles as following: 78
Imparting and teaching the Holy Quran, Tafseer, Hadith, Beliefs and other useful
sciences
Providing Muslims with complete knowledge of Islam
Nurturing Islamic morals and inculcating Islamic spirit in students
Propagating, preserving and defending Islam through pen and tongue.
77 David Emmanuel Singh, The Independent Madrasas of India: Dar al-‘Ulum, Deoband and Nadvat al-‘Ulama, Lucknow, Oxford centre for mission studies (OCMS) available at http://www.ocms.ac.uk/docs/madrasas_deoband.pdf 78 Muhammadullah Khalili Qasmi, op cit, 5 61
Keeping Darul Uloom away from the influence of government and maintain the
freedom of knowledge and thought
Establishing madrasas at various places in order to spread Islamic sciences
Administrative and Financial structure of early Deobandi Madrassa
Madrassas have always been supported by the wealthy patrons. They have been the source for poor to survive besides their main objective that is to impart Islamic education. The
Ulema would be closer to the poorer than the rich. Barbara Metcalf in her study of
Deoband endorses that the pioneers of that seminary took very modest salaries if at all, and lived as poor men. The average expense of Darul Uloom Deoband on each graduate between 1867 and 1967 was Rs 1,314 which is modest whichever way one looks at it.
79The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas, which were patronized by wealthy people in British India, also lived in the same frugal manner. The departments for waqf (endowment) affairs, however, were established to look into the management of Muslim properties. In India, the central waqf board and its state subsidiaries functioned and continue to function through government grants and individual donations.
The establishment of madrassas for Islamic education was seen as the way by which
Muslims in India could be revitalized. These were Madrassas that remained independent from the government controlled endowed madrasas. Darul Uloom, Deoband (1866) and
Nadwat al-‘Ulama’, Lucknow (1893) are two chief examples of the several other similar traditional schools in India established in the latter part of the 19th century.
Administratively, Darul Uloom never accepted the control in the form of financial
79 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) pg 111 62 assistance from the British government.80 One obvious reason was Darul Uloom’s anti
British stance.
Syllabus at the pre-partitioned Deoband madrassa
In the words of Prof. Sayyid Mohammed Saleem:
There was a slumber after the battle of 1857 in which
Maulana Qasim Nanautvi 1880 thought to save the
religious treasury of Indian Muslims. So he collected all
the four religious educational tradition of that time, i.e.
Khairabad, Firingi Mahal, Punjab and Delhi. Thus this
treasury was made safe but the syllabi of Darul Uloom
Deoband became very lengthy.81
Francis Robinson states that before Mulla Nizam Uddin standardised the curriculum known as the Dars-i-Nazami, different teachers taught different texts to students. Shah Abdul
Rahim (d. 1718) had made an attempt to create a fixed curriculum which was taught at the
Madrassa-i-Rahimiya and emphasized the manqulat (such as hadith). The Dars-i-Nazami, on the other hand, emphasized the maqulat. Thus there were more books on grammar, logic and philosophy than before. 82
According to Dr. Tariq Rahman in his paper published in IPRI research Journal:
“The significance of the enhanced emphasis on ma’ qulat in the
Dars-i-Nizamiyya lies in part in the superior training it offered
80 Darul Uloom Deoband’s official website- http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/ 81 quoted by Prof. Akhtarul Wasay, in “ Madrassas in India : trying to be relevant”, Global Media, 2005, pg 29 82 According to Francis Robinson in The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic culture in South Asia (Feroz Sons, Lahore 2002) 63
prospective lawyers, judges and administrators. The study of
advanced books of logic, Philosophy and dialectics sharpened
the rational faculties and, ideally, brought to the business of
government men with better-trained minds and better-formed
judgement. While this may have been the intention of Farangi
Mahall’s ulema, it is also true that the Arabic madrassas were
much fewer (150) than the Persian schools (903) in 1850,
presumably because they offered a more thorough grinding in
Persian which facilitated entry into administrative jobs for their
pupils. However, Farangi Mahall was established before the
British created the category of ‘Persian schools’ and it does
appear that the Dars-i-Nizami educated men were sought for
employment outside the domain of religion at that time. 83
According to the Darul Uloom Deoband, “the teaching of Hadith in Darul Uloom has been comprehensive in tradition (Riwayat) and reasoning (Dirayat). The Hadith is commentary and exegesis of the book of Allah and the second most important source of the Islamic law. Darul Uloom Deoband has developed a significant status in the learning of Hadith. At Darul Uloom Deoband, three to four hundred students attend from different parts of the world for the study of Hadith.” 84
83 Dr. Tariq Rahman, The Madrassa and the State of Pakistan, IPRI Research Journal, Winter , 2005 available at http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml 84 Darul Uloom Deoband official website http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1712-.html 64
Syllabus and Method of Teaching at Darul-Uloom Deoband in India
The syllabus of Darul-Uloom Deoband in India is based on four phases, Primary, Middle,
High, and Post–Graduate. Students at the Darul Uloom are supposed to complete the primary course in order to reach the Arabic Classes. The post-graduate class is not compulsory, if the students want to acquire expertise in a subject, they can continue with admission in post-graduate classes. The curriculum for Arabic classes and post-graduate are given in appendix 1.
The teaching can be divided into three grades: Primary, Intermediate and Fiqh. The students are encouraged in primary classes to focus on what is given in the books prescribed by the institution. They are taught to concentrate on memorizing the important teachings and text. In the middle or intermediate classes, along with the comprehension of the holy book, their ability to understand the teaching is also highlighted. In the higher classes, complete stress is on the teaching and understanding of the subject under study in order to develop experts. The students first read the text, the teacher then lecture comprehensively to make the students understand the text. In the study of Hadith, the following books are included in the course: Sahih-e-Bukhari, Sahih-e-Muslim, Jama’e –
Timrizi, Sunan-e-Abi Da’ud, Sunan-e-Nasa’I, Sunan-e-Ibne Maja, Mu’atta-e-Imam Malik,
Mu’atta-e-Imam Muhammad, Sharh-e-Ma’anil-Athaar Tahavi, Shama’il-e-Tirmizi.85
The first four books are thoroughly studied and discussed while others are also touched upon. The arguments of the four Imams, i.e Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Sha’afai, Imam
Maliki and Imam Hanbal, their principles of the deduction of propositions and the answers on behalf of the Hanafite to the arguments of the three Imams are discussed with the
85 Ibid 65 students academically. The three Imams besides Imam Abu Hanafia are discussed in comparative analysis. Since most of the books of Hadith and Tafsir taught at Darul Uloom have been Compiled by Sha’afite and Malaki’ites scholars, it becomes all the more important for the teachers at the Seminary not to lead students developing any distinction between the Imams at this stage particularly in the field of Hadith. 86
The medium of instruction at Darul-Uloom is Urdu; the students at higher level developed expertise in Arabic and study the text in Arabic too. It is interesting to note that while in
Pakistan, expertise in Arabic is considered as the ultimate objective, in India, Darul
Uloom’s emphasis on Publication in Urdu was to preserve both religious and cultural.87
Madrassas in Pakistan
Pakistani Madrassas came into existence as a result of local initiatives, often by local devout Muslims and philanthropists, and tend to center on mosques, but that does not mean that they remain completely autonomous. The state kept an eye through madrassa education board, which is called as wafaq. Of these boards, four are organized according to sects and schools of thoughts, while the fifth board is associated with the prominent Islamist political party—the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan (JIP).
Based on their affiliation, the madrassas in Pakistan can be categorized into five types.
“There are three Sunni madrassah boards:
1. The Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabia (Deobandi tradition, established in 1955),
2. The Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabia (Barelvi tradition, established in 1959),
86 Ibid 87 As quoted in Al-Jami’at Daily, June 18, 1955: During a visit to Russia by Pandit Nehru, the address by an Uzbek was delivered in Urdu. Pandit Nehru also replied in Urdu which was appreciated and applauded by the audience. 66
3. The Wafaq al-Madaris al-Salafia (Ahle-Hadith tradition, established in 1959,
initially named the Markaz-e-Jamiat-Ahl-e-Hadith)
4- Shi’a madrassahs are under the Wafaq al-Madaris (Shi’a) Pakistan (established in
1959, originally named the Majlis-e-Nazarat-e-Shi’a Madarise-Arabia)
5- The fifth board—the Rabat al-Madaris al-Islamia (established in 1983)—is a supra-
sectarian umbrella organization. Until the early eighties, the affiliation of
madrassahs with one or another board was a matter of choice.”88
Since 1983-84, it has become a de facto requirement, because without affiliation a madrassa cannot award an officially recognized shahadah al-alamiyaah degree. Although the lower degrees awarded by madrassahs have not been recognized as equivalent to any general education degrees, in 1982 the University Grants Commission (UGC) now Higher
Education Commission (HEC) recognized the shahadah al-alamiyaah as equivalent to a master’s in Arabic or Islamic Studies. It is worth mentioning that the UGC had little control over these boards with regard to the curriculum and texts used in the courses.
Syllabus in Pakistani Deobandi Madrassas
In Pakistan, the Dars-i-Nizami has been modified but the old school of thought continues.
The traditionalists views are used as a symbol of continuity and identity thus the madrassas, despite the desire to reform their courses, did not give up the canonical texts.
The greatest critic of the madrassa curriculum was Maulana Maududi who argued that, being based on memorization of medieval texts, the madrassas were not providing relevant education to the Muslim society.89
88Tariq Rahman, op cit 82
89 Ibid 67
Dr. Tariq explains that though ancient works like Sarf-e-Meer and Kafiya remain in the course, easier and more modern books are used to supplement them. Arabic, for instance, is taught through modern and much easier texts than the works mentioned in the Dars-i-
Nizami. The traditional texts are taught in Arabic but, because students do not really gain competence in the language, they are either memorised or understood from Urdu translations available in the market. The believe that the Muslim past was the golden era and the best has already been written so the best way is to preserve it and keep it for coming generations. That is why the Dars-i-Nizami has come to symbolise the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught with the help of commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes (hashiya) and supercommentaries (taqarir). There are commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries.90
In India-Pakistan subcontinent, due to lack of proper Arabic language training, very few students actually understand the text, they prefer to learn by heart which makes students use only their memory not their analytical powers. What was true of Jamia Azhar in 1902, is judged to be true of South Asian madrassas, or at least the Dars-i-Nizami component taught here, even today — and the judges are Arabic-knowing authorities such as
Maudoodi and not only Western critics of the madrassas.91
90 Ibid 91 It was the backward-looking nature of core madrassa texts which made Taha Hussain (1889-1973), the famous blind modernist scholar of Egypt, disillusioned with Jamia Azhar in Cairo. According to Abderlarshid Mahmoudi, the writer of a 1998 work on Taha Hussain’s education: On the collective level, entanglement in what was derivative and purely verbal, meant, among other things, the relegation of major and original works to oblivion. Thus a procedure whose role raison d’etre was to the conservation of tradition, resulted in a grave form of collective amnesia concerning what was best in Islamic culture, namely the classical heritage 68
Religious and Socio-Political Status of Deobandi Madrassas in Indian
Subcontinent
Religious Importance of Madrassa
In The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, George Makdisi has verified that “how terms such as having "fellows" holding a "chair," or students
"reading" a subject and obtaining "degrees," as well as practices such as introductory lectures, the oral defense, even mortar boards, tassels, and academic robes, can all be traced back to the practices of madrasas. It was in cities not far from Islamic Spain and Sicily—
Salerno, Naples, Bologna, and Montpellier, that the first universities in Christendom were developed, while the very first college in Europe that of Paris was founded by Jocius de
Londoniis, a pilgrim newly returned from the Middle East.”92Throughout the Middle Ages,
Christian scholars such as Adelard of Bath would travel to the Islamic world to study the advanced learning available in the madrassas. Alvaro of Córdoba, a Mozarab, or Christian living under Muslim rule, wrote in the fourteenth century:
“My fellow Christians delight in the poems and romances of
the Arabs; they study the work of Muslim theologians and
philosophers, not in order to refute them, but to acquire a
correct and elegant Arabic style. Where today can a layman be
found who reads Latin commentaries on Holy scripture? At
92 George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh University Press, 1981, pg: 240). 69
the mention of Christian books they disdainfully protest that
such works are unworthy of their notice.” 93
Even though the quest of knowledge was a factor in the spread of madrassas in the tenth to twelfth centuries, which is often described as “the golden age of the madrasa”, and it was not the only inspiration for originating madrassas in rapid sequence and progression. The patronizing of madrassas by various ruling dynasties and their officials, either as private citizens or as representatives of the state, was also associated with Shi’a–Sunni rivalry, contention between various madhabs (schools of thought) within the Sunni Islam, and philosophical debate between the rationalist Mutazilites and orthodox Asharites.94 Despite the theological differences, political, military, and intellectual enmity between the Sunnis and Shi’as reached a high point in the eleventh century as the Shi’as confidently established their rule through the Fatimid Dynasty (910–1171), which is the present-day
North Africa and Egypt. Fatimids are famous to have established various centers and institutions for coaching, training and preaching. Besides that, they also went to established study and research centers.95
The establishment of Al-Azhar in 975 and simultaneous other scholarly expansions created a threat to the Sunni rulers, as great as the military strength of the Fatimids, which encouraged the Abbasid Empire to consider the propagation of Sunni Islamic thought through networks of educational and learning institutions. Nizam ul-Mulk “used the
93 William Dalrymple . Inside The Maddrassas. This article is PART TWO of a longer essay which appeared first in the New York Review of Books, Volume 52, Number 19, December 1, 2005. (www.nybooks.com/articles/18514). Part one was published in the July 2006 edition of this journal. (www.interreligiousinsight.org) 94 Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg, 56. 95 Tibawi, A. L. “Origin and Characteristics of ‘al-madrassah.’” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25. (1962): 234 70 foundations of the madrasas as an instrument of the policy of strengthening Sunni
Orthodoxy against the serious threat of Isma’ili Shi’ism.”96
Yoginder Sikand while discussing the clash of ideas within the two sects in Islam states,
“Besides the enmity and competition with Shi’as, an intensified debate within the Sunni community with respect to various interpretations and explanations of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) started. As Islam spread to new areas, Muslims were confronted with new circumstances for which neither the Qur’an nor the Hadith enclosed any specific recommendation. From the middle of the eighth century onwards, this led to the founding of several schools (spell mazhab, pl. mazahib, also spelled madhab) of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh.”97
Though the initial number of madhabs (schools) within the Sunni faction was in the hundreds, eventually they decrease to just four, the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shafi’i, and the
Hanbali, named after their originators, (Abu Hanifa al-Numan, Malik ibn Anas,
Muhammad ibn Idris as-Shafi’i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal), respectively. Likewise, one school of thought came out within the folds of Shi’a creed, the Ja’fari school (named after
Ja’far as-Sadiq). The increase in the madhabs (schools) started intellectual discussions and raised question among the learned individuals in particular and within the Muslim community in general. Onwards, this whole scenario, brought breakups and differences within the community. Factions and practitioners of these schools often established institutions, including madrassahs, to spread their explanations and understanding.
96 Arjomand, Said Amir. “The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development of the Institutions of Learning from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Century.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 2 (April 1999): 284 97 Sikand, Yoginder. Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India. New Delhi: Penguin, 2005. Pg:34. 71
Social Importance of Madrass
Despite the ongoing deterioration of the Delhi Sultanate and the emergence of various political structures, the Islamic educational institutions, which started to spread under the monarchs of the Delhi Sultanate, continued their task. Support from the local Muslim rulers was one of the reasons and grounds for the growth. In some cases, madrassas came into sight because of the preachers and in some other situation they appeared as a community reaction to the requirements of providing education and learning to the children.
It is significant to note, that no single representation of madrassa was replicated. These madrassas were autonomous in their functions, and had absolute liberty in deciding their program of study. Furthermore, “both ‘transmitted’ as well as ‘rational’ sciences were taught at the madrassas, for the idea that the two were someway contrasting to each other or that there was a clear distinction between religion and the secular world was, as in other contemporary Muslim societies, quite foreign to the medieval Indian Muslim educational system.”98
Stress on both teachings facilitated the madrassa graduates in acquiring employment in royal courts and various branches of administration. In addition to the Madrassas, Maktabs were also opened. These institutions were comparable to preschools or kindergartens, but they typically taught only the memorization of the Quran. 99
Barbara Metcalf writes, “during Mughal regime the royal support for education was harmonized by individuals belonging to the upper class of the society. Due to this extensive support, educational institutions grew and developed incredibly. The ulema held an
98 Ibid 99 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 72 esteemed place in the royal courts. The Scholars frequently go along with emperors on their military expeditions.100 The close relationship between the state and the ulama was not unique to the Mughal Empire but was also a characteristic of the Ottoman and Safavid empires, and neither was it solely due to the emperors’ proclivities for patronage. The ulema were also interested in being a part of the state, not only to have successful careers but also to oversee the implementation of their religious ideas and interpretations.” 101
Even though, the support to education, arts, music, and architecture was the trademark of the Mughal emperors, they seem to have been unenthusiastic to embrace new knowledge and technology, and lagged behind in the acceptance of contemporary inventions. Saiyid
Naqi Husain Jafri insists, “in so far as reception of new ideas and technologies was concerned, the Mughals were not much interested.”102
The attractiveness and enthusiasm of the study of rational sciences began to diminish in the later years of the Mughal period, and the manqulat tradition—the tradition of emphasis on revealed sciences––began to regain its position in the eighteenth century. This was, in large measure, an input of the consideration of Shah Waliullah Dehalvi (1703–1762) and also that of Madrassa-i-Rahimia, a madrassa where he taught for more than twelve years. 103
The madrassa gained attention and notice of the public when Shah Abd al-Aziz (1746–
1823), son of Shah Waliullah, became its main in charge and mentor.
100 Jafri, Saiyid Naqi Husain. “A Modernist View of Madrasa Education in Late Mughal India.” In Islamic Education, Diversity, and National Identity: Dini Madaris in India Post-9/11, edited by Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut Reifeld, 39–55. New Delhi: Sage, 2006. Pg:49 101 Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pg: 21-22 102 Jafri, “A Modernist View of Madrasa Education,” pg: 46 103 Ashraf, Mujeeb. “Madrasa-i-Rahimiah: Growth and Pattern of Educational Curriculum, Origin and Character of Islamic Education.” In Madrasa Education in India–Eleventh to Twenty First Century, edited by S. M. Azizuddin Husain, 59–75. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2005 73
Riaz Ali writes:
“Shah Waliullah dedicated himself to the study and learning of
Islam from childhood under the guidance of his grandfather Sheikh
Wajihuddin, a soldier turned intellectual, and his father Shah Abd
ar-Rahim, and well-known scholar who established the Madrassa-i-
Rahimia and taught at this institution. After his father’s death in
1719, Shah Waliullah took control of the madrassa at the age of
seventeen. Shah Waliullah was capable of being the head of the
institution at such an early stage of his life because he had
demonstrated high qualities of leadership and learning. After
completion of his basic education, Shah Waliullah acquired the
knowledge of logic, fiqh, hadith, tib (Eastern medicine), algebra,
mathematics, and oratory from his father. After twelve years of
teaching, he went to Arabia in 1731, where he stayed for about two
and a half years and studied under Medinese hadith scholar
Muhammad Haya al-Sindi (d.1750).104
Shah Waliullah extensively worked on the subject of lack of unity among Muslims. This was one of the central themes of Waliullah’s writings and, therefore, political issues featured considerably in his work. “His success, however, rested neither in curricular and institutional innovation nor in the compilation of mere commentaries, but rather in his major individual effort at intellectual synthesis and systematization, an unprecedented tatbiq of the whole range of Islamic knowledge. Yet his persistence on studying hadiths,
104 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg, 66. 74 his complete rejection of maqulat, criticism of the influence of Greek philosophy on the ulema, criticisms of the local customs of Muslims as bida’t (wrongful innovations) strengthened the study of revealed sciences among his followers and in the Madrassah-i-
Rahimia under the stewardship of his son Abd al-Aziz, who declared India under British rule a Darul Harb (abode of war).105 This explains the earlier political influences on the students of Madrassas, particularly the Deobandis. This also explains the division between those following Shah Walliullah’s teaching and emphasis on Hadith later got closer to
Salafi teachings and those who remained contend with Darul Uloom Deoband’s teaching with sympathetic attitude towards Sufism.
Political Importance of Madrassa
After the destruction of learning institutions, by the invasion of Mongols, many educated refugees fled to Delhi, turning northern India for the first time into a major center of learning. By the time of the Mughal emperor Akbar in the sixteenth century, the curriculum in Indian madrasas merged the learning of the Islamic Middle East with that of the teachings of Hindu India, so that Hindu and Muslim students would together study the
Koran (in Arabic), the Sufi poetry of Sa'adi (in Persian), and the philosophy of Vedanta (in
Sanskrit), as well as ethics, astronomy, medicine, logic, history, and the natural sciences.
Many of the most brilliant Hindu thinkers, including, for example, the great reformer Ram
Mohan Roy (1772–1833), were the products of madrasas.106Numerous monarchs belonging to the Delhi Sultanate, which existed between (1201 and 1528) showed respect and admiration for education and religious learning. They appreciated and promoted the
105 Ibid. Pg, 66 106 William Dalrymple, Myths And Maddrassa. Asia times online. 2005. Viewed from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GK24Df01.html 75 learning centers, many of them built mosques and religious learning centers, and some built madrassas in the areas they ruled including the capital, Delhi.
The foundation of the first madrasaa in Delhi was laid by Shams-ud-din Iltutmish (or
Altamash, 1211–1236) in the early years of his control and was named Madrassah-i-
Muizzi. Among the rulers of the Tughluq Dynasty (1290–1302), Muhammad bin Tughluq
(1325–1351) was the most enthusiastic founder of madrassas and he promoted the education. There were nearly one thousand madrassahs in Delhi during his rule.107 Though, these madrassas were not established and founded by a single ruler, they usually served a similar purpose of educating people for state employment and their model closely followed that of the well-established madrassas in the Muslim world.
The curricula of these madrassas, particularly those located in the north, were influenced by the scholars who migrated to India following the demise of the Abbasid Dynasty, when the
Mongols ransacked the main centers of Islamic rule and madrassas. A significant number of these scholars belonged to the Hanafi school of thought, and thus established the characteristic and nature of many madrassas.108 Examining the whole India, this can’t be said for the whole area, as the nature of madrassas varied widely by region.
As the Delhi-based rule weakened over time, a number of regional empires with different characteristics emerged on the scene. Deccan, an independent and sovereign Muslim kingdom was founded in the south. The Bahmani Sultanate (or Bahmanid Dynasty), located in the northern Deccan, lasted for almost two centuries beginning 1347, and is
107 Ahmad, Khurshid. “Muslim Tradition in Education,” Islamic Education (Journal of All Pakistan Islamic Education Congress), (November-December 1968): pg:44 108 Sikand, Yoginder. Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India. New Delhi: Penguin, 2005. Pg:33 76 known for establishing a number of madrassas. The first of these madrasss was built in
109 1378 by Mahmud Shah.
The most well known of the madrassas was built in Bidar in 1472, under the direction of
Khwaja Mahmud Gawan, the prime minister of Shams-ud-din Muhammad Shah Bahmani
(also known as Muhammad Shah III Lashkari, 1463–1482). The standing of this madrassa attracted the most renowned theologians, philosophers, and scientists. An interesting aspect of this madrassa was that, unlike most of those elsewhere in India, it was built to reaffirm
Shi’ism, which received state support. The madrassa, named after Mahmud Gawan, was the embodiment of the excellence of Persian architecture. The curriculum of the madrassas in the south, various accounts indicate, included both religious and secular subjects. This is largely due to the rulers’ patronage of education in general. For example, the first madrassa established by Mahmud Shah provided education to orphans; expenses for lodging and food were borne by the state, and government subsidies were provided to other educational institutions.110
The establishment and the institutionalization of Islamic education in Bengal started during the period of the Delhi Sultanate. The foundations were laid before, when Sufis and saints arrived in this region. Sufis and saints used to travel far from the region, and outside the local place, and generally formed organized centers of learning in their khanqas (that is, their place of worship and residence). These gatherings were chiefly for adults and mainly to discuss the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. These meetings and foundations were not planned to offer education or literacy in any language, nor designed for basic education.
109 Kaur, Kuldip. Madrasa Education in India: A Study of Its Past and Present. Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1990. Pg: 24. 110 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg :59 77
The rulers were not very supportive for these khanqas, thus they were completely reliant on
Sufis, saints, and support from their local followers. Eventually, some of these khanqas began to resemble regular centers of basic primary education, called maktabs. Maktabs were also organized at mosques, and at the homes of Muslims who could afford to provide space.
Equally important is the trend that the royal patronage of education for all in the early days of the Mughal Empire changed over time and became skewed toward coreligionists in the late Mughal period. “We see in Akbar, perhaps for the first time in [Indian] history, a
Muslim monarch sincerely eager to further the education of the Hindus and the
Muhammadans alike.”111Akbar shaped up, established and supported institutions, including madrassas, where Hindu and Muslim children learned jointly. Efficient and organized policies were followed by the royal court to make sure that Hindu children and youth were educated about their religion and culture. Hindu scholars received royal benefaction in almost equal with Muslim scholars. These actions were steady with Akbar’s other policies and his approach toward religion. He abolished the pilgrimage tax on Hindus, and of jizya
(per-head tax on non-Muslims), supported and encouraged debates among scholars of various religions in the Ibadat Khana (House of Worship) established by him. Akbar’s effort to initiate a new religion called the Deen-i-Ilahi (Divine Faith) indicates his desire, to bridge the differences between Hindus and Muslims.
During Jahangir’s rule, changes in the educational curriculum, particularly the emphasis on rationalist content continued. It faced resistance, the conventional ulema hurdled his reforms. Some ulema, for example Shaikh Abd ul-Huq during Akbar’s control, attempted
111 Ibid pg 63 78 to revitalize the manqulat tradition. Shaikh Abd ul-Huq later fled to Hijaz “to escape the lax atmosphere of Akbar’s court.”112In comparison with Akbar and Jahangir, Aurangzeb’s rule reveals a less liberal and narrow-minded face of the Mughal Empire. Aurangzeb not only cared little about the education of Hindus but also ordered the provincial governors to destroy Hindu schools and temples in 1669.113 He keenly tried to promote the education of
Muslim youth and spread Islamic learning. Muslim students received royal patronage in the form of stipends, and the emperor provided financial help to educational institutions.
Aurangzeb founded innumerable madrassas during his rule, as he was known for his discontent with the education communicated by his teachers.
Taking into account, Aurangzeb’s affirmed adherence to a puritanical version of Islam, his support for the establishment of Farangi Mahall is intriguing, to say the least. Equally notable is the role of the nawabs of Awadh, who made the continued existence of the
Farangi Mahall and particularly the adoption of the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum possible. It must also be acknowledged that Aurangzeb’s initial support was fundamental in bringing the institution to existence, and that the accommodation expenses of students who studied in the Farangi Mahall were paid by the Mughal emperor.
By the early eighteenth century, the Farangi Mahall had become one of the largest centers of learning in India, and students from outside Lucknow were attending this institution in great numbers. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the rationalist tradition, adopted by the Farangi Mahall, spread, and the Dars-i-Nizami became the genuine standard syllabus of madrassah education. Metcalf correctly noted, “the most important measure of the Farangi Mahalli ulama was their systematization of a new
112 Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, pg: 14. 113 Faruki, Z. Aurangzeb and His Time, Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala Sons, 1935. Pg 117 79 curriculum which, with modifications, has dominated religious teachings in South Asia to the present.”114 The wide acceptance of the Nizami syllabus since its commencement was due to two reasons: first, that it enabled the students to gain employment, especially in government—“the skills it [Dars-i-Nizami] offered were in demand from increasingly sophisticated and complex bureaucratic systems of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
India”; and second, that members of the Farangi Mahall families traveled throughout India
“from court to court, from patron to patron, in search of teaching opportunities” and devoted themselves to teaching. This increased the number of students exponentially.115
On the other hand, subsequently, after the collapse of Islamic self-confidence, evident by the fall down of last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, in 1858, disappointed and disillusioned scholars founded an influential but narrow-minded Wahhabi-like madrasa at
Deoband, The Deoband madrassa therefore went back to Quranic basics and thoroughly stripped out anything Hindu or European from the syllabus.116
As the Mughal rule ended, the practice of manqulat within the madrassa education program had recovered its leading place. This is not to say that the maqulat tradition was demolished, for the Farangi Mahall existed and variations of Dars-i-Nizami curriculum were followed by many madrassas, but Shah Waliullah’s ideas began to find more supporters within the Muslim community. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that the madrassas and ulema during Mughal rule made a remarkable contribution to the discipline of revealed knowledge; “their contribution is indeed significant in the Islamic world.”117
114 Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pg: 31 115 Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, pg: 53. 116William Dalrymple, Myths And Maddrassa. Asia times online. 2005. Viewed from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GK24Df01.html 117 Jafri, “A Modernist View of Madrasa Education,” pg: 51 80
David Emmanuel Singh reported:
“The Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, a Muslim organization based in India, was
started in 1919 by the ‘Ulema’ of this Madrasa. Mawlana Abul Kalam
Azad, a well-known freedom fighter and a product of Madrasa education,
along with the Indian National Congress played an important role in the
freedom of India. This Madrasa inspired organization opposed the two-
nation theory of the Muslim league on grounds that culture, not religion,
defines a nation’s identity. A split occurred however in 1937, and Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam came into existence. After the partition it came to be in
Pakistan. Though the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind claims to represent all Indian
Muslims, majority of its members are from Dar al-‘Ulum, Deoband. This
Dar al-‘Ulum in Deoband is known today as ‘the Al-Azhar’ and ‘the
Mother of all Religious Institutions’ in India. It seeks to combine the
divergent intellectual and spiritual streams within Islam with the selected
items from the modern western system in order to equip generations of
Muslim leaders in India.”118
Political activism of the madrassas and the ulema, the products of the madrassas, were driven by the urge to define and redefine the identity of the community, especially under adverse circumstances. Aside from their success or failure, these developments created the background against which came the independence of India in 1947. The change also partitioned the subcontinent, and a new country, Pakistan emerged.119
118 Singh, David Emmanuel. The Independent Madrasas of India: Dar al-‘Ulum, Deoband and Nadvat al- ‘Ulama, Lucknow. Pg:11 119 Riaz, Ali. Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg :78
81
Relationship between the state and Deobandi Madrassas
British regime
The British East India Company took the charge of political power in Bengal in 1765.
Nawab of Bengal was defeated by British soldiers under the command of Robert Clive, and this defeat, started the phase of British colonialism in India. Soon after the death of
Aurangzeb in 1707, the Mughal Empire was in serious collapse, and almost unsuccessful as a political strength. This instability was an invitation to the rise of various non-Muslim powers (for example, the Jats, the Marathas, the Sikhs) in areas previously under Mughal rule. Furthermore, the raid of Nadir Shah (1739) from Persia and the successive sacking of
Delhi destabilized the material base of the Mughal Empire without any end. Therefore, the
East India Company’s policy measures, initially successful for the eastern part of India
(Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa), lay the foundation for future rule all over India.
Even though the colonial administration’s direct and extended involvement in education started in 1813 with the Charter Act, it came under extensive discussion and debate. In the early days of company’s charge, it restrained from entering and shifting the educational sector, so this, in other way, allowed the continuation of traditional educational institutions such as pathshalas, maktabs, and madrassas established during Mughal rule with state patronage, and as community responses outside state involvement. There were also proposals to introduce new educational institutions. These initiatives largely came from the
Christian missionaries. The first missionary school was established in Calcutta in 1702, before the East India Company emerged as an alarming political unit. Soon after the Battle of Plassey, Robert Clive invited a missionary activist from Madras to open a school in
82
Calcutta. The number of students of the school rose to 174 in the second year, in 1759, from 48 in its first year.120
The East India Company did not show much favor and kept a distance from missionary activism, restricted missionary activities within Company-controlled region. Missionaries not only needed permission from the Company to conduct their activities but were also discouraged through various means. Certainly this policy was deliberate: “Afraid of the reaction that meddling in the religious beliefs of its Indian subjects might provoke, the East
India Company made it clear to these subjects as well as to its own British officials that it was not in India to challenge or undermine existing religious beliefs.”121
Regardless of the marked religious impartiality of the Company, the first direct involvement of the Company in education came at the patronage of Warren Hastings, the governor general of Bengal, in 1780 with the establishment of the Calcutta Madrassa.
Hastings’s statement delineating the rationale for the establishment of the madrassah indicates that political consideration was the driving force behind the decision. The madrassah was established “to conciliate the Mahomedans of Calcutta… to qualify the sons of Mahomedan gentlemen for responsible and lucrative offices in the state, and to produce competent officers for Courts of Justice to which students of the madrassa on the production of certificates of qualification were to be drafted as vacancies occurred.”122
120 Islam, Shahidul. Prosohongo: Shiksha (Issue: Education, in Bengali). Dhaka: Shikshabarta Prokashona, 2002. Pg: 27. 121 Seth, Sanjay. “Secular Enlightenment and Christian Conversion: Missionaries and Education in Colonial India.” In Education and Social Change in South Asia, edited by Krishna Kumar and Joachim Oesterheld, 27–43. New Delhi, Orient Longman, 2007. Pg: 27, 28 122 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg:68 83
The decision to set up the Calcutta Aliya madrassa followed the decision to use different laws for Muslim and Hindu communities. Warren Hastings and William Jones in 1772 decided to apply “the laws of Koran with respect to Mohammedans and that of the Shaster with respect to Hindus.”123The Calcutta Aliya madrassa assumed the Dars-i-Nizami prospectus and continued to follow the curriculum until 1790. Adoption of the Dars-i-
Nizami in the Calcutta Madrassa was a justification of the practical value of the curriculum introduced by Farangi Mahall in the early eighteenth century. In 1791, however, with the dismissal of the first principal, changes were made in the curriculum. The company also offered support to the establishment of the Sanskrit College in Benaras in 1791, and Fort
William College in Calcutta in 1800.
The missionaries somehow, influenced the administration of colonial authorities. The choice to bring in English education indicates the power of the influence of the missionaries on the administration’s education policy. Alexander Duff of the Church of
Scotland, after his arrival in Calcutta in 1830, insisted on English as the medium of education. The school founded by him, which in due course developed into the Scottish
Church College, not only set the standard for other missionary schools but also inclined the decision of 1835 to devote state funds to Western education through the medium of
English. Ultimately, the education policies, especially the persistence in carrying Western education (labeled as secular education), which colonial administration brought in the region impacted in two major ways: first it segregated the education in two spheres secular and religious.
Yoginder Sikand has appropriately called educational dualism; religion was pushed to the private sphere and was identified as a “distinct sphere of life and activity, neatly separate or
123 Ibid 84 separable from other similarly defined spheres.”124By implication, the madrassa was consigned to provide religious education as opposed to general education. This bifurcation—religious versus secular—was also interpreted as sacred versus irreverent, and within the discourse of the ulema this translated into education of deen (religious/sacred) and duniya (temporal). It is interesting to note here that basically both the colonial administration and ulema subscribed to the post-Enlightenment Western approach of inflexible compartmentalization between these two, although in reverse order of importance. But for ulema this was also a mode of resistance to colonialism: “the din- duniya separation should be construed as a form of cultural resistance, an effort to protect the ‘inner world’ from Western intrusion.”125
The second major impact is the formation of a new social space for religio-political activism. Religious education was marginalization and the elimination of explicit religious texts in schools, created a space for religious movements to attain a new public through their own educational institutions and bodies.
The issue of identity emerged as a separate subject matter in the middle of nineteenth century in India. Muslim community started to recognize and lament the collapse of the
Mughal Empire and began an effort to locate their place within the changing political makeup. The whole process began with the scholarly tradition of Shah Waliullah, but gained salience within the Muslim public discourse as a result of the failure of the Mutiny of 1857. After the crisis, the religious reform movements grow stronger and spread wider, because people question that why the glories of their religious community have washed out. These reform movements time and again take a range of shapes and employ various
124 Sikand, op cit 26 125 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg:71 85 methods. In nineteenth century, the reformist movements in India took shape of various movements including sectarian, revivalist activism and educational movements. All the reforms movements somehow were interconnected, but the education movements, maddrassas played Vitol role, a medium for awakening and identity politics.
The beginning of the modern madrassa in South Asia started with the foundation of
Calcutta Aliya madrassa in 1780. It was basically limited to awaking Muslims consciousness and encouraging political, especially in comparison to other community- initiated madrassas such as the the Deoband Madrassa and the Darul Uloom Nadwatul
Ulama, established in the mid-nineteenth century in north India. The basic purpose and objective to initiate the Calcutta Madrassa , was to facilitate Muslims to join the colonial government. Since its beginning, the madrassa followed the curriculum known as Dars-i-
Nizami. Some alterations were made in the curriculum in 1853 following the suggestions of an investigation committee appointed by the government to look into its administration but in the main the focus remained the same. The whole suggestive policies by the government left very little room for the institution and its ulema to play any role in social activism. Few other madrassas were also founded in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Rajshahi on the basic structure and objectives of the Calcutta Madrassa. The similar patterned madrassas increased significantly in the early twentieth century.
Mainly as a consequence of the drive to include English in the school curriculum and to continue providing monetary support to these madrassas, there was a major change in their curriculum in early twentieth century. English was included as a mandatory subject, replacing Persian, and the introduction of mathematics, geography, history, and physical education to the curriculum. Those madrassas that implemented the renewed curriculum
86 were called reformed (or new-scheme) madrassas. This modification created two separate trends within the institutions that followed the Calcutta Madrassa curriculum as the old- scheme madrassas and the new-scheme madrassas followed different curriculum. The government policy was to support the new-scheme madrassas with financial aid. These changes were quite important and significant but received very little acknowledged by the ulema, because by then a distinct tradition of the madrassa with an agenda of Muslim consciousness, empowerment, and activism, which originated in Deoband, had already made its mark. Darul Uloom, commonly referred to as the Deoband Madrassa, was founded in Deoband, a small town about a hundred miles north of Delhi in 1866—ten years after the historic rebellion against British colonialism. Maulana Muhammad Qasim
Nanautawi (1833–1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829–1905), two originators of the institution, reportedly participated in the uprising, and viewed this effort as their new means to counteract the debilitating effect of the colonial education system and uphold traditional Islamic education. In large measure, the establishment of the
Deoband Madrassa in 1866 and raising it to an uloom in 1867 were calculated responses of the conventional ulama to contemporary politics. Although the madrassa adopted a revised version of the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum, it was intended to continue the intellectual tradition of Shah Waliullah and therefore emphasized the manqulatbn (revealed knowledge) rather than maqulat (rational sciences) in its curriculum; “fiqh formed the core of the curriculum.”126
Deobandi ulema were against had conflicting views on modern education are debatable, but they in case, were not willing to compromise the integrity of what they considered “Islamic
126 Sikand, Bastions of Believers op cit 26 87 education.” Like all other contemporary reform movements, the objective of the Deobandis was the “correction of [the] defective state of Islam and Muslim life in India,” but they insisted that it must begin with the revival of faith and piety.127
The Deoband Madrassa was established on very nominal resources and finances, from a small group of people who visualized a spiritual awakening of individual Muslims in particular and as well as politically movement for the community in general. The Ulema of
Deoband considered that the Muslim society was facing threats from the colonial power as much as from the within the community. The modernist efforts of the Anglo-Mohammedan
College at Aligarh, founded by Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and the growing influence of reformist liberal Muslim leaders who favored English education and closer cooperation with the British colonial administration was viewed as one of these challenges.
Furthermore, Deobandis were opposed to Sufi tradition, and the Shi’as. The founders of
Deoband, Nanautwi and Gangohi, challenged the reality of the Shi’a faith on many occasions and wrote extensively against it. According to Maulana Samiul Haq, head of
Darul Uloom Haqqani, “the Ulema of Deoband not only stick to the Hanafi School, but also insisted that any deviation from taqlid was a grave concern and must be challenged because it was no less than bida’t (innovation). Deobandis were strongly against the bida’t
(innovation) in the religious practices.”128
127 Reetz, Dietrich. Islam in the Public Sphere, Religious Groups in India, 1900–1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pg:83 128 Maulana Samiul Haq, head of Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak told the author during an interview at the Madrassas on October 22, 2011. 88
One significant focus that made the Deobandi Ulema specifically different was their stance in regard to local practices: “the Deobandis opposed folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a major place, seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation, and miracles and other such phenomena were seen as the crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They did not oppose mysticism altogether but did argue that adherence to the Islamic law (sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation.”129
The previous madrassa were not much organized, but Deoband has a well-organized administrative structure. The implementation of a hierarchical structure within the madrassa showed the success of Western thoughts of education. It was having a planned and structured curriculum, set requirements for admission and graduation, well thought-out examinations, a building of its own and a well-structured bureaucracy to serve the administrative needs. One can point fingers at Dars-i-Nizami for the structural dimensions, but it is well to bear in mind that the ulema of Farangi Mahall never organized their activities as an institution, and that the Deoband Madrassa was founded in resistance to the colonial educational system, not to imitate it. But these characteristics can also be interpreted as the capability of the ulema to adapt to changed circumstances. Indeed, they helped the Deoband to become known as one of the leading Islamic educational institution, which was serving a wide audience.
At its beginning, Deobandi Madrasa did not created much political activism, but when
Maulana Mahmud ul-Hasan (1851–1920) took its charge and came to control it; the
129 Rahman, Tariq.“The Madrassa and the State in Pakistan.” Himal, February 2004, www.himalmag. com/2004/february/essay.htm (2 September 2004). 89 institute marked itself at the front position of sociopolitical movements. According to
Burhanuddin Qasimi:
“Maulana Hasan was amongst the first student of the madrassa,
often called the Shaikhul Hind (the Leader of India), founded an
organization called Samaratut Tarbiyat (Results of Training),
organized the Jamiat ul-Ansar for armed rebellion against the
British, and was deeply involved with a futile effort to
internationalize the independence movement. In 1919 the
Deoband madrassa was also active and influential in originating
the Jamiat-i-Khilafat-i-Hind (All-India Khilafat Conference), and
Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind (Association of Religious Scholars of,
India), two very active political organizations. 130 Besides very
active in political struggles and movements, the fine repute of the
Deoband madrassa spread eventually. It started attracting
students from far and wide, and the madrassa was replicated in
many places. Metcalf discussed that the Deoband madrassa and
its close replication in Shahranpur, few miles from Deoband,
drew students in great numbers from as far as Bengal131.
Apart from the great appreciation and name the Madrassa received, it also drew criticism from various spheres of Sunni Muslim community because of its rigorous measures, the
Deobandi ulema’s strict stance on taqlid, their Puritanism, and their insistence on the
130 Qasmi, M. Burhanuddin. Recounting Untold History, Darul Uloom Deoband: A Heroic Struggle against the British Tyranny. Mumbai: Markazul Ma’arif Education and Research Center, 2001. 131 Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pg: 135 90 correctness of their interpretation of religious texts. Emergence of many new schools of thought and subsequently new madrassas was due to this fact. Ahl-e-Sunnat wa Jama’at
(People of Sunnah and the Community), commonly referred to as Barelvis, under the command of Maulana Ahmed Riza Khan (1855–1921) in the late nineteenth century emerged due to this reason.
Maulana Ahmed Riza Khan was born in Bareilly in northern-central India (currently in
Uttar Pradesh), undertook the traditional Dars-i-Nizami courses under the direction of his father Maulana Naqi Ali, a scholar of hadith, and never attended any structured madrassa.
At the age of fourteen he assumed the responsibility from his father for writing fatwas, and continued to do so for the rest of his life. He performed the hajj twice. Since his childhood,
Riza Khan had demonstrated unique qualities, including an outstanding capacity for memorization and scholarship. In 1900, Maulana Ahmed Riza was proclaimed a mujaddid
(renewer) of the fourteenth-century Hijri by like-minded ulama meeting in Patna. After several failed attempts to establish a madrassa, he succeeded in founding the Madrassa
Manzar al-Islam in Bareilly in 1904. Another school, Darul Uloom Numaniyyah of Lahore, established in 1887, shared his thought and identified itself as Barelvi. Riaz Ali writes, the defining characteristic of the Ahl-e-Sunnat wa Jama’at, as the name suggests, is the claim that it alone truly represents the sunnah (the Prophetic tradition and conduct), and thereby the true Sunni Muslim tradition. Despite the fact that Barelvis are adherents of the Hanafi madhab, like the Deobandis, they differ on issues such as the acceptance of Sufi tradition, respect for the saints, and traditional practices. While Deobandis are opposed to these,
Barelvis encourage these practices”132.
132 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg:75 91
The Deobandis and Barelvis differ in their practices and this difference rose to complete and bitter fight in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when both engaged in a fatwa war. It grew bitterer, when in 1906 Ahmed Riza issued a fatwa accusing most important figures at Deoband, including the creators of the madrassa, Rashid Ahmed
Gangohi, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, and Ashraf Ali Thanvi as kafir (infidel or nonbeliever, pl. kuffar). They were also termed Wahhabis (the followers of the Arabian puritanical reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab). The Deobandi’s countered Ahmed
Riza’s fatwa with one of their own, confirming that the Deobandis were the only Hanafi sunnis. Barlevis’ violent and heated opposition to Deobandis and other contemporary reformists led Barbara Metcalf to conclude that the Barelvis were “an oppositional group as much as they were reformers.”133 Dars-i-Nizami curriculum was followed by Barelvis in their madrassas, however, they added a considerable number of texts on sufi tradition. As
Deobandis were very much politically active, the Barelvis acted quite conservatively and did not take any major part in mass movements, such as non-cooperation movement. The two, Barelvis and Deobandis remained deviating and oppositional to each other in later years as well. Pakistan movement was opposed by Deobandis, while Barelvis extended their support to the Muslim League.
The constant heated debate, unfriendly relationship and opposite ways between the
Deobandis and the Barelvis revealed that in the late nineteenth century a division had become very obvious within the Muslim community. The educational institutions that were meant for intellectual grooming became the medium of persistent quarrel within the
Muslim community. In longer runs, the main purpose of these madrassas, therefore, was to
133 Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pg: 296 92 define the true Muslims and the role of the Muslim community at a grave moment of history. No doubt, there were efforts to bridge the gaps for reconciliation between the two schools. One such effort was the establishment of an association of scholars, Nadwatul
Ulama (the Council of the Ulema) in 1893 under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad
Ali Mungari (1846–1927).134
The main objective of the association was to uniting the Muslim community on the basis of common concerns, and raising awareness of Muslim identity. The beginning was truly promising and unifying, as the council brought together representatives of almost all shades of opinion including the Shi’as, who otherwise were left out of Sunni initiatives of any kind. The council was expected to bridge between the old ideas and the new realities, and thus creates a common ground of activism for the entire community.
These all hope faded very soon, and the efforts went in wane as many groups parted, and
Barelvis began a scornful attack on the council and its ideas. Carrying their ambitions and undeterred by these condemnations, the leading members of the council decided to establish a madrassa in 1896, thus the Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama (in short Nadwa) came into existence. Later Shibli Numani, an eminent scholar who taught at the
Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College (commonly known as Aligarh College) for more than a decade, joined the Nadwa in 1905. Shibli Numani joined the madrassa almost ten years after its founding, but is considered the inspiration behind the council and the madrassa.135 The relationship between the state and madrassas dwells from time to time.
The history of South Asian madrassas reminds that there is no sole pattern of interaction
134 Ibid Pg: 335-347 135 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg:76 93 between the madrassa and the state and/or society; for example, madrassas have received state support at one point and the anger of state power on another.
The lessons from the history of madrassa in South Asia during the colonial era are enlightening in many ways. Their nature and scope was shaped not only by the internal dynamics of the Muslim community, but also by the policies of the colonial administration, the challenges from other communities, such as Christian missionaries and the Arya Samaj and the desire of the Muslim community to be part of the emerging political system, to name but a few.136
Post independence Indian regime
Deoband always followed its conventional approach in following Islam. It believes in inclusive nationhood, support and promotes patriotism and look for equal justice for all.
Deobandis were very much politically active; they did take part in mass movements, such as non-cooperation movement. Pakistan movement was opposed by Deobandis and extended their support to the congress.
After 1915 when Mohandas Gandhi returned from South Africa and with the help of the modest group led by Ghokhale became President of Indian National Congress, he formed an alliance with the Khilafat Movement and Deoband scholars’ led Jamiatul Ansar, which later reformed as Jamiat Ulama-e Hind in 1919 to avoid a ban by the British Raj in 1913.137
Being together in various important struggles in subcontinent, both Deoband scholars and
Congress enjoyed a strong political bond with each other and it continued till late 1990s.
As Deobandis and Congress, both were against the division of the region, so they worked
136 Ibid Pg:78 137 Qasmi M Burhanuddin, Deoband in nation’s heritage . Asian tribune, 2011. Viewed from http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/07/29/deoband-nation%E2%80%99s-heritage 94 together at various stages. Their good and supportive relation continued till late 1990s, before the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992.
During independent days of India when most ‘modern’ educated Muslims trapped into the idea of nation being based on religion, as expressed by Jinnah, Deoband scholars posed strong opposition. They unequivocally presented from Islamic scriptures that nationhood had nothing to do with religion. It is rather formed on the basis of one’s birthplace and the sense of homeliness. They proclaimed Hindus and Muslim are one nation (Qaum) and debated vigorously for composite nationalism, thus rejecting Jinnah’s two-nation theory of parting India.138
Few individuals have this argument as well, that many Deobandi maulvis have been consistent supporters of the Congress, a party that has itself been responsible for several anti-Muslim pogroms as Yoginder Sikand points out, “It is not just the BJP, but the
Congress, as well, whose hands are stained with Muslim blood. It was the Congress that planned the destruction of the Babri Masjid, and that it was the Congress that was principally responsible for the sharp decline in Muslim conditions throughout its many decades of misrule.”139
In recent years, the Government of India, as well as some state governments, has launched some small schemes ostensibly to assist some madrassas, such as providing them paid teachers to teach modern subjects. These efforts have, however, failed to make much of an impact, and only a few smaller madrassas have taken advantage of these schemes, for fear of government interference and control, which they see and probably rightly so as aimed at
138 Ibid 139 Yoginder Sikand. Dirty politics in Deoband. 2011. Viewed from http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-yogi-sikand-on-dirty-politics-in deoband/ 2011 01 31.htm 95 weakening their Islamic identity by introducing the teaching of government-prescribed books.140
Today, severely anti-Muslim Hindutva groups and large sections of the Indian press seem to have raised an intensive movement to dismiss the madrassas not just as fortress of conservatism and reaction but also as training grounds for Islamic “terrorists.” In February
2001, the Indian government brought out a document prepared by the Group of Ministers on National Security, claiming that madrassas, mainly in some border regions, were working in league with “pan-Islamist militant outfits” and “radical organizations” in
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and some other West Asian states. 141
Situation also got worse after 9/11. In the wake of these attacks, the madrassas have been branded as centers of anti-national, pro Pakistan propaganda, allied with the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence, and as dens of Islamic “terrorism.” After September 11, 2001, as madrassas came under increasing attack in India from right-wing Hindu organizations and leading sections of the Indian press, the largest and most influential madrassa in India, the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, was moved to firmly deny any organizational links with the
Taliban or with other radical Islamist organizations. 142
Pakistani regime
It is generally assumed that the role of Deobandi Ulemas actually started in late 70s with
Gen Zia’s Islamization process, but the truth of the matter is that it started right from the beginning as Jamal Malik states in his work, Colonization of Islam, “when Jamiat e Ulema
140 Yoginder Sikand. Reforming the Indian Madrassas: Contemporary Muslim Voices. Eds. Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, Robert G. Wirsing. Religious Radicalism and Security In South Asia. 2004. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 141 Ibid 142 Ibid . 96
Hind rejected the idea of Pakistan and other religious parties and scholars were also not in favor of a state for Muslims on western ideas, there was a group of Deobandi Ulemas who supported the idea of Pakistan and they were present right from the beginning to support
Islamization in Pakistan.”143
The defining features of madrassas in contemporary Pakistan are their close connections with political activism, their transformation into institutions of indoctrination from predominantly educational institutions, and their interplay with national and international politics. An intimate relationship between madrassas and politics is not new in South Asia, as the history of madrassa education demonstrated.144 Madrassas have played a vital role in political activism in south Asia, since late nineteenth century. The political struggles by madrassas in south Asia, includes mass movements and the anti-colonial struggle. The relation between politics and madrassas as observed in Pakistan over the last three decades is not a continuation of this practice; instead, it has taken a new form. For this reason, to understand the nature, scope, and roles of the Pakistani madrassas requires closer examination of domestic political dynamics and the interaction of the Pakistani state with the global political system. Domestic limitations, the external pressures imposed on the
Pakistani state, the choices made by the elites of the society, and the ulema’s perception of their roles have shaped the forms and the content of madrassas in Pakistan. Therefore, the relation between madrassa and politics in Pakistan is not that easy to understand, it quite complex, the interaction is very multilayered and multifaceted.
143 Jamal Malik, Colonization of Islam. ( Lahore, Vanguard Books-1996) page 48 144 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. Pg:79 97
Categories and Organization of Madrassahs Classification of madrassahs by region and sect in Pakistan, 1988
Deobandi Barelvi Ahl-e-Hadith Shi’a Other Total
Punjab 590 548 118 21 43 1320 NWFP 631 32 5 2 8 678
Sindh 208 61 6 10 6 291
Balochistan 278 34 3 1 31 347
A.J. Kashmir 51 20 2 --- 3 76
Islamabad 22 20 --- 2 3 47
Northern areas 60 2 27 11 2 102
Total 1840 717 161 47 96 2861
Source: Government of Pakistan, Deeni Madaris Pakistan ki Jam’e Report 1988. Madrassahs listed under “other” include but are not limited to the Jamaat-i-Islami affiliated madrassahs.
New madrassas in Pakistan, 1947–1987 (Numbers in parentheses show the average number of new madrassahs per year.) 1947 1947–1960 1960–1980 1980–1987
Punjab 121 195 (15) 620 (31) 384 (55)
NWFP 59 87 (7) 426 (21) 106 (15)
Sindh 21 66 (5) 156 (8) 48 (7)
Balochistan 28 131 (10) 131 (5) 57 (8)
A.J. Kashmir 4 4 (.3) 39 (2) 29 (4)
Islamabad --- 1 26 (1) 20 (3)
Northern areas 12 4 (.3) 47 (2) 40 (6)
Source: A. H. Nayyar, “Madrassah Education Frozen in Time,”232.
98
(NWFP) and Balochistan, two provinces bordering Afghanistan, have substantial numbers of madrassahs. The latter two provinces have seen more madrassahs established between
1979 and 1988. In NWFP, the number has increased from 218 in 1979 to 678 in 1988.
Corresponding figures for Balochistan are 135 in 1979 and 347 in 1988. The information is provided in the next table “Regional breakdown of madrassas in Pakistan pre-1947–2000”.
These figures support the conventional understanding that the support of American and
Pakistani security services for the Afghan mujahideen was a major driving force in the proliferation of madrassas in Pakistan during the eighties. Andrabi et al., who are highly cynical of the number of madrassa students suggested in various media, concur with this finding:
“The notion that the madrassa movement coincided with resistance to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is supported by the 1988 data from
the population census. The increase in the stock of religiously educated
individuals starts with the cohort that came of age in 1979 (the year of
[the] Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and the largest increase is the
cohort co-terminus with the rise of the Taliban. Combined with the fact
that the largest enrollment percentage in Pakistan is in [the] Pashtun belt
bordering Afghanistan, this suggest events in neighboring Afghanistan
influence madrassa enrollment.”145
145Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijwaz Khwaja, and Tristin Zajonc. “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at Data,” http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/ wpaper.nsf/32181f04b09f9d158525694d001bc47d/aa32877e356dc9eb85256fb9005430dc/ $FILE/MadrassaFinal_wps3521.pdf (7 March 2005).
99
Regional breakdown of madrassas in Pakistan, pre-1947–2000
Pre-1947 1950 1979 1982 1988 2000
Punjab 87 137 1,012 910 1,320 3,153
NWFP 20 31 218 572 678 1,281
Sindh 19 25 380 277 291 905
Balochistan 7 11 135 59 347 692
A.J. Kashmir 4 6 — 12 76 151
Islamabad — — 34 47 194
Northern areas — — 32 102 185
Total 137 210 1,745 1,896 2,861 6561
Sources: Jamal Malik, Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan, 180, except figures for 1988 and 2000. For 1988 and 2000 figures, see Hasan Mansoor, “Pakistan Sees 2745 Percent Increase in Seminaries since 1947.”
The statistics mentioned above are quite open to discussion. They raised few very important and relevant questions. First, why has there been a progressive increase in madrassas in Pakistan during its entire history? There must be some very plausible explanation for this rapid growth in maddrassas. Second, does the U.S. support for the
Afghan war during the eighties alone is responsible for the growth of madrassas? Third, and very important, how and why did the development prolonged after the CIA abandoned its Afghanistan operation after the Soviets withdraw in 1989?
Madrassas in present-day Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Some of them are also given financial assistance by foreign governments — the Saudi government is said to help the Ahl-i-Hadith seminaries and the
Iranian government the Shia ones — but there is no proof of this assistance. And even if
100 such assistance did exist, it would go only to a few madrassas whereas the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts, etc). 146
146Rahman, Tariq. Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
101
Chapter 3
Intrusion of Politics in Deobandi Madrassas in Pre and Post Independence India and Pakistan
In recent decades countries with Muslim majority populations have witnessed the rise of
Islam as a political ideology and Islamists as alarming political forces in their domestic political show grounds. Dominance of these religio-political forces has produced many questions, including that of their relationships with conventional foundations. Over the years, societies with a Muslim majority have experienced infrequent Islamic revivalist movements that give emphasis to the need for the spiritual sanitization of the supporters, but Islamism is definitely different from this renaissance, and has extensive consequences.
Islamism is “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives” and which “provides political response to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re- appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.” 147
Islamism, thus, is essentially a political phenomenon and by no means simply an Islamic one. Islamists absolutely highlight explicit courses of action to improve their political power, and implement various strategies to declare themselves on the social and political plane. In sharp contrast to the fundamentalists, who are concerned first with the erosion of
147 Denoeux, Guilian. “The Forgotten Swamp.” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (June 2002), mepc.org/public_asp/journal_v019/0206_denoeux.asp 102 religion and its proper role in society, Islamists focus on politico-economic interests.148 For
Islamists, “a true Islamic society—and flowing from this, a just, prosperous and strong one—is not simply comprised of pious Muslims; it requires an Islamic state or system.”149
The madrassas were not established and founded by a single ruler; they usually served the purpose of educating people for state employment and later to aware the Muslims socially and politically. With the passage of time their model closely followed that of the well- established madrassas in the Muslim world. Maddrassas have played a vital role in political activism in south Asia, since late nineteenth century. The political struggles by maddrass in south Asia, includes mass movements and the anti-colonial struggle.
Deobandism is a nineteenth century Indian school of Islam that was joined closely to the anti-British movement, and that had always been more severe and strict than the milder south and Southeast Asian Islamic.150 Deobandis were very much politically dynamic; they did take part in mass movements, such as non-cooperation movement against the British
Raj. In comparison with Barelvis, Deobandis were much active in political domain. After
1915 when Gandhi returned from South Africa and with the help of the modest group led by Ghokhale became President of Indian National Congress, he formed an alliance with the
Khilafat Movement and Deoband scholars’ led Jamiatul Ansar, which later reformed as
Jamiat Ulama-e Hind in 1919 to avoid a ban by the British Raj in 1913.151
Congress enjoyed a strong political bond with Deoband scholars, as both were together in various significant struggles in subcontinent and it continued till late 1990s. As Deobands
148 Marty, Martin E., and R. Scott Appleby, eds. Fundamentalisms Comprehended. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 149 Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia. Washington, D.C.: Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, 2005. 150 Marquand, Robert. “The Tenets of Terror.” Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 2001. 151 Qasmi M Burhanuddin, Deoband in nation’s heritage . Asian tribune, 2011. Viewed from http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/07/29/deoband-nation%E2%80%99s-heritage 103 and Congress, both were against the partition of the region, so they worked together at various junctures. Their good and supportive relation continued till late 1990s, before the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992. This case of the destruction and disgrace of the mosque, created a bitter flavor in the existing relation between Congress and Deoband scholars. After the incident of Babri Masjid, the sore relationship between Congress and
Deoband never restored truly and situation also got worse after 9/11. There are divergent views however on congress-Deoband alliance, Maulana Nauman of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-
Hind (JUH) believes that in pre-independence India, Congress and JUH had strong alliance but that nexus does not exist anymore, in fact it is more of an opposing position that the two are found in present day Indian politics.152
After September 11, 2001, as madrassas came under increasing attack in India from right- wing Hindu organizations and leading sections of the Indian press, the largest and most influential madrassa in India, the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, was moved to firmly deny any organizational links with the Taliban or with other radical Islamist organizations. 153
In the contemporary Pakistan, madrassas are in close connections with political activism.
They have transformed from mainly an educational institutions to institutions of indoctrination. They have a great interaction and influence in national and international politics. A close and warm relation between madrassas and politics is not new in South
Asia, as the history is full of the evident. Before partition, madrassas have played a significant role in the political process, including the anti-colonial struggle. The bond between politics and madrassas as observed in Pakistan over the last three decades is not a
152 Interview of Maulana Abdul Hamid Noumani, Secretary Press and Publication of JUH with the author at JUH office and Madrassa in New Delhi on November 23, 2010 153 Yoginder Sikand. Reforming the Indian Madrassas: Contemporary Muslim Voices. Eds. Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, Robert G. Wirsing. Religious Radicalism and Security In South Asia. 2004. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 104 continuation of the past tradition; instead, it has taken a new form and profile. The interaction of the madrassa and politics in Pakistan is multilayered and complex, because
Domestic constraints, the external compulsions imposed on the Pakistani state, the choices made by the elites of the society, and the Ulema’s perception of their roles have shaped the contours and the content of madrassas in Pakistan. That’s why, it’s not easy to assess and analyze. 154
The role of Deobandi Ulemas and the process of Islamization started back, when Jamiat e
Ulema Hind discarded the idea of the creation of Pakistan and other religious parties and scholars were also not in favor of a state for Muslims on western ideas, but there was a group of Deobandi Ulemas who supported the idea of Pakistan and they were present right from the beginning to support Islamization in Pakistan. Apart from that, in late 70s with
Gen Zia’s Islamization process, the things went on changing and new scenarios were there to emerge.
Violent and non- Violent efforts by the Deobandis
The four wide movements can be identified in Sunni Islam, with the principal divide occurring between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools and the modernist-revivalist streams, such as the influential Jamaate-Islami, all of which are exclusively South Asian in character and origin. The Ahl al-Hadith, inspired by Wahhabism and enjoying momentous support and funding from Saudi Arabia, is the fourth major ideological stream.
Deobandi is the oldest one, came into view in 1867, through the establishment of the Dar- ul-Uloom seminary in Deoband (a small town in western Uttar Pradesh in India, from which the movement takes its name). The institution developed a well thought-out
154 Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 109 105 curriculum with a great stress on religious education based on original Arabic texts rather than on later and ruined interpretations. The momentum for these developments took place significantly as a reaction to the colonial order, the marginalization of the Muslim community in British India, and growing apprehensions regarding Westernization and other non-Islamic influences.
Deobandi movement can hardly be seen as having a clearly defined goal. Rather, it seems to have multiple objectives. Deobandi was to some extent was a conservative movement.
The Deobandi ullema moved closer to politics and created Jamiat Ullam-e-Hind (JUH) in
1919. This occurred amidst competition with other organizations that were politically active for the independence of India. The prominent founders of the JUH included figures such as Maulana Mahmood Hassan and Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni. This association’s strategy was to adopt a non-violent approach against British rule in order to gain independence for India.155
In 1914 Maulana Mahmudul Hassan, chancellor at Darul Uloom Deoband, conceived a movement for the liberation of India by which armed units would be deputed to organize the Pakhtuns of the tribal areas, and rally support in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the
British Indian government and provide a convenient point for the Turkish army to open a new front against the British. The movement was rooted in the politics of anti-colonialisms and pan-Islamism galvanized by the start of the First World War, but the founders of the movement highlighted the differences in their militaristic outlook and the politics of non- violent non-cooperation which dominated the nationalist Indian arena at that time. 156
155 Farhang Morady, Ismail Siriner (eds). Globalization, Religion & Development. IJOPEC (International School of Politics & Economics). 2011 156 Sana Haroon. Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland. Columbia University Press 2007. Pg:93 106
The Deobandis formally subscribe to the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence. They emphasize a puritanical interpretation of Islam that rejects the strong proclivities to syncretism characteristic of local, pre-Islamic, and Sufi influences, which mark much of
South Asian Islam. In 1919 Deobandi leaders created a political front, the Jamiat Ulema-e-
Hind (JUH). The issue of the demand for the creation of Pakistan split the JUH, and the
Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam (JUI) came into being under the leadership of Mawlana Shabbir
Ahmed Usmani in 1945. The JUI united supporters of partition, who lent their support to the dominant political group favoring the division of British India along religious lines, the
Muslim League (ML). The JUI and a variety of Deobandi formations, including the
Tableeghi Jamaat, have been immensely influential both socially and politically in
Pakistan, even as they have directly contributed to and shaped the course of sectarianism, extremism, and militancy in and exported from the country.157
The radicalization of the Deoband movements can be traced to the policy of conservative re-Islamization instituted by General Zia-Ul-Haq after his seizure of power in Pakistan in
1977. It was afterwards nurtured by the hardening stance of the Pakistani state and of the radical movements which shared the same enemies-namely India, the communists and, to a lesser extent, the Shi’ites. However, the “militants” in due course turned to autonomous action and while conserving their close connection with the service of ISI, imposed their own strategy. 158
After the establishment of Pakistan as an independent Muslim state, it was further divided into many ethnic identities. Pakistan was fragmented by the splits between Sunni majority
157 Barry Rubin .Guide to Islamist Movements. M.E.Sharpe Inc. 2010. Pg: 348 158 Mariam Abou Zahab, Olivier Roy. Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection. Columbia University Press. 2002. Pg: 22 107 and Shia minority. The Sunni doctrine was further divided into three main groups,
Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahli Hadith. The Deobandi advocates the strict application of
Islamic laws including the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. The Deobandi doctrine was also the doctrine of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the leaders of which were trained in Deobandi schools in Pakistan. The Ahli Hadith, if anything, is more extreme in its interpretation of Islam than the Deobandi and has largely been funded by Saudi Arabia.
For all intents and purposes, it has embraced the Wahabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Each of the three main Sunni doctrines has its own schools and mosques and has generated its own political parties. The parties have spawned radical spin-offs, many of which have been active in jihadist violence. Jihadist violence has been most closely associated with the
Deobandi and Ahli Hadith groups, both of which have seen their influence expand since the mid-1970s. The Deobandi has been favored by the Pakistani government and the Ahli
Hadith by Sauida Arabia. 159
Until 1979, the relation within Sunni doctrine (Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith) and between Shia and Sunni remained friendly and calm. The first case of sectarian violence emerged in 1953, when the Jaamat-i-Islami launched a violent campaign against the small
Ahmadiyya community. The process of Islamization by Zia-ul Huq set free the forces of sectarianism and helped these forces to spread throughout the country. Following this, the civilian governments continued exploiting sectarian differences and used militant sectarian groups for their short-term benefit.160
159 Monte Palmer & Princess Palmer .Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, and Challenges. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2008. Pg 126 160 Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 108 108
Being a minority, the Shi’a population maintained a low profile in the political scene in the early days of the country, but later extended implicit support to the secularist Pakistan
People’s Party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Besides, the two major Sunni groups,
Deobandis and Barelvis also organized their political parties in the forties. The Deobandis, who were opposed to the establishment of Pakistan, formed the Jamaat-i-Ulama-i-Hind in
1945 and broke away from their parent organization after 1947 to form the Jamaat-i-
Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), while the Barelvis formed the Jamaat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) in
1948.The political influence of these parties, was far more limited than their sectarian following. The election results of 1970 bear testimony to this fact—each secured only seven seats. In fact, the results demonstrated that religious or sectarian identity had very little political appeal to the Pakistani population. For instance, the nonsectarian Islamist political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), did not do well, either: it won only four seats.161
The Islamization process and strict and authoritarian implementation of Sunni laws by Zia ul Haq also raised sectarian differences.
The sectarian trend was also influenced by the Iranian revolution in 1979. This incident grew the sectarian consciousness of the Shi’a population in Pakistan, helped them highlight their Shi’a identity, encouraged forcefulness, and made them confident of their aspiration to gain political power. This particular event sparked the Shia’s political struggle in
Pakistan. Both ideological and material support from Iran began to pour in and influence the activism of the Pakistani Shi’a community. 162
The revelation of the newborn power of the Shi’a community was both a defensive act and a preventative measure. From the time when the Ahmadiyya movement was declaration to
161 Ibid pg 108 162 Zahab, Mariam Abou. “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan.” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot, 115–130. New Delhi: Monohar, 2002. 109 be non-Muslim in 1973, the Shi’a community feared a similar destiny. Thus their demonstration of force and power was a result of that apprehension. It was also to create a room in domestic politics. As the political setting was undergoing a change, the Shi’a community was trying to claim a stake in it. The formation of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-
Jafria (later named Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan—TIJ, Pakistan’s Shi’a Movement) and their militant student wing (Ithna Ashariya Student Organization—ISO, Twelver Shi’a Student
Movement) in 1979 testify to this. Shi’as in Pakistan successfully challenged the Zia-ul
Huq regime on the zakat ordinance and secured a success when Zia declared that the Shi’a population would be exempted from the mandatory zakat fund. The growing strength of the
Shi’a population bothered the Sunnis as well as two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. Iraq was at that time engaged in a bloody war with Iran with the support of the West, especially the United States. For Saudis, the main challenge was to enclose the Iranian brand of Islamism within Iran by freezing the Sunni identity in countries around Iran and through building a “Sunni wall” around Iran.163 Riaz Ali believes that “Saudis did this by providing funds to madrassas of the Ahl-e-Hadith in point of view of a counterbalance.”164
After this gesture by Shia community, Deobandis showed an immediate and aggressive reaction by founding the Sawad-e-Azam Ahl-e-Sunnat (Greater Unity of the Sunnis) and demanded that Pakistan should be declared a Sunni state, and Shi’as as non-Muslim. In
1985, the Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS, Society of the Army of the Prophet’s
Companions), later named the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was formed in Punjab, to encourage violence against the Shi’as as one its main objectives.165
163 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. “Islam, the State, and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan.” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot, 85–114. New Delhi: Monohar, 2002 164 Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 109 165Ibid 110
The virulence of their expression and actions were unparalleled. The SSP, although apparently an independent organization, was strongly connected to the Jamaat-i-Ulama-i-
Islami (JUI) until 1989. (The SSP entered into mainstream politics in 1990. The organization was renamed Millat-i-Islami after being banned in 2002.) During the Zia-ul
Huq regime the military establishment extended support to the SSP to answer growing
Shi’a political influence, made it an integral part of its anti- Iran policy at home, and engaged it in raising fighters for the Afghan war. The SSP gradually spread to the southern parts of the province from its base in the central region. 166
The politicians associated with the Ahl-e-Hadith faction structured a militant group in 1988 named Lashkar-i-Tayeba (LT, renamed Jamaat Dawa in 2002 after banned by the government). The LT, which grew out of the Markaz Dawa-wal Irshad, comprised veterans of the Afghan war and soon became engaged in violence at home and in Kashmir. A spiral of violence was unleashed by the SSP and the LT. This resulted in a backlash from the
Shi’a community: a militant group named the Sipah-i-Muhammed (SM, Army of
Mohammed in Pakistan) was founded in 1991. As the SSP moved to the mainstream and was trying to tone down its violent rhetoric, a split occurred and some members formed a more aggressive organization called the Lashkar-i- Jhangvi (LJ, the Army of Jhangvi) in
1994. The organization was named after Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, to demonstrate that it is carrying on the work of Jhangvi, who was assassinated by his adversaries. By then the Barelvis had their own militant groups––Sunni Tehrik (ST) and the
Anjuman Sipah-i-Mustafa (ASM). The Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) was banned by the government in 2002, but revived under the banner of Tehrik-i-Islam (TIP). 167
166 Ibid , pg 110 167 Ibid , pg 110 111
The table below shows the sectarian parties, their political and militant groups in Pakistan.
Every sect has its military and political wings, formed for the fulfillment of various
objectives.
Sectarian parties and militant groups in Pakistan
Denomin Deobandi Barelvi Ahl-e-Hadith Shi’a ation
Political Jamaat-i- Jamaat-i- Jamaat-i- Tehrik-i- party Ulema-i-Islam Ulema-i- Ulema-i-Ahle- Islami (TII) (JUI) Pakistan Hadith (JUP) (JUAH)
Militant Sipah-i- Sunni Lashkar-i- Sipah-i- organizat Sahaba (SSP) Tahrik (ST) Tayeba (LT) Muhammad ions Lashkar-i- (SM) Jhangvi (LJ) Anjuman Tehreek-ul-
Jaish-i- Sipah-i- Mujahideen Ithna Ashariaya Muhammad Mustafa (TuM) (LT Student (JM) (ASM) and TuM also Organization Harkat-ul- operate in (ISO, Twelver Mujahideen (HM) Kashmir) Shi’a student
movement) Harkat al- Jihad al-Islami Mukhtar (HUJI) Force Sipah-i-
Abbas
Source: Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 111
112
Wahabism, Al-hadith, Ahle Sunnat
Among the Sunni doctrine, the Ahl-e-Hadith sub-sect established in the early twentieth century in India and it’s the most conservative and strict one within Sunni Islamic consideration. Enthused by an eighteenth-century scholar, Muhammad bin Wahhab of
Saudi Arabia, Ahl-e-Hadith (commonly referred to as Wahabbis, or Salafis), came into existence as a response to the disparity between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Imam
Ahmad Reza Khan of Bareilly in 1906 advanced the teachings of the Barelvis, formally known as Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat. This was a flexible alternative to the strict path followed by the Deobandis. In contrast, the Ahl-e-Hadith movement went for a more orthodox and conventional attitude. After 1947, the supporters and followers of the Ahl-e-
Hadith school of thought established three separate commissions to carry on their organizational work: one in India, and two in the provinces of Pakistan. 168
In 1948, the Pakistan Markazi Jami’at-e- Hadith was founded at Lahore. The Nikhil Banga
O Assam Jami’at-e-Hadith (All Bengal and Assam Jami’at-e-Hadith) formed at Calcutta in
1946 shifted its headquarters to Pabna, a northern city in what was then East Pakistan. The
Anjuman-e-Ahl-e-Hadith was formed in West Bengal in 1951, with the result that after two years, the Ahl-e-Hadith movement renamed itself East Pakistan Jami’at-i-Ahl-e-Hadith. In
1956 its headquarters was shifted to Dhaka. Followers of the Ahl-e-Hadith school preserved their presence and remained visible in what was then West Pakistan, but were organizationally weak. Until his death, Abdullahil Kafi al-Quareshi led the East Pakistan committee. Dr. Abdul Bari, a university lecturer, assumed the leadership in 1960. After the
168 Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 123 113 independence of Bangladesh, like many other religious organizations, Ahl-e-Hadith disappeared from the public scene. 169
The Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith is a comparatively small movement that has gained a great deal from Saudi support in recent times and represents one of the most radicalized elements within the Sunni fundamentalist sections in Pakistan. Inspired by Sayyed Ahmad, it wanted to bring back Islam to the purity of the original faith according to the Quran and the
Hadith. The Ahl al-Hadith have formally claimed to be distinct from the Wahhabis, but their beliefs and practices have much in common with the dominant creed of Saudi Arabia, and in Pakistan they are often referred to as Wahhabis or Salafis. While the Ahl al-Hadith insists that they do not follow any one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, they have moved progressively closer to the Hanbali interpretation that is also the basis of
Wahhabi practices. Their interpretation of Islam is puritanical and legalistic, and they reject all manner of perceived deviations and “idolatrous” practices that they claim have crept into the other major traditions. While their numbers are believed to be small—one tentative assessment by the International Crisis Group places them at 6 percent of the Muslim population of Pakistan—they have exercised disproportionate influence and demonstrated a great capacity for violence in recent years.170
After the surfacing of few major political changes in the mid-seventies, the devotees of the
Ahl-e-Hadith restructured themselves and the Jami’at-i-Ahl-e-Hadith became engaged in community activities. Few disparities emerged inside the leadership in 1978 when
Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, a young university student and a radical activist, formed the youth faction, Ahl-e-Hadith Jubo Sangha (AHJS). The youth faction got a height and a
169 Ibid Pg 124 170 Barry Rubin .Guide to Islamist Movements. M.E.Sharpe Inc. 2010. Pg: 349 114 boost in 1980 when Ghalib moved to the northeastern town of Rajshahi and joined the university as a faculty member. Dissimilarities with regard to the manner and approach of operation, mainly the issue of organizing youth for jihad, created a split within the Jami’at- i-Ahl-e-Hadith. This resulted in the formation of a breakaway group in 1984, who later established the Ahl-e- Hadith Tablig Jamaat. During this decade, Rajshahi continue to be the foundation of the former organization, while its activities stretched out to various parts of the country and various layers of the society.
The Ahl-e-Hadith Jubo Sangha (AHJS) maintained a low profile until 1990, the year
Ghalib left the Jamaat and established the Ahl-e-Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB, Ahl- e-Hadith Movement Bangladesh). This move came after Ghalib succeeded in creating a financial base for running an independent organization. The funding came under the guise of a welfare organization, the Tawhid Trust. Ghalib also established a publication wing, the
Hadith Foundation Bangladesh. Both the trust and the foundation began to receive funds from external sources to assist the running of the vast network of madrassas the AHAB had established in the previous decade.171 An Indian Islamist, Abdul Matin Salafi, a muballig
(preacher), was expelled by the Bangladesh government for anti-state activities in late eighties, was the most important channel for external finances. Still, he left a huge amount to his adherent Ghalib, seemingly generated from a number of Saudi sources.172
The leaders of the Ahl-e-Hadith were not able to prevent the breakage within the organization. Through the establishment of mdrassas in 1994, the influential leadership of the Ahl-e-Hadith Jami’at initiated an attempt to recover the lost position. The Ahl-e-Hadith
Jubo Sangha (AHJS), the opponent group to the Jami’at, considerably established the
171 Op cit 163 pg -124 172 Ibid 115 madrassas with a political goal throughout the eighties. The main goal was to engage the students in jihad against Islamic failings, including treating shrines with respect. This was the main point of argument when Ghalib left the Jami’at-i-Ahl-e-Hadith and shaped up his own organization.
The Daily Star, quoting a student of the Salafi madrassa, remarked that activism is an essential part of the education provided in these madrassa: “Every student of the nearly
700 Ahab madrasas across the country must work with a suitable front organization of
Ahab, sources said yesterday. For example, students up to class seven works with
Sonamoni, the children’s wing of Ahab, while students of upper classes are usually involved with Ahl-e-Hadith Jubo Shangha, Ahab’s youth wing, until they are mature enough for Ahab membership, said Hussain, an Alim student at Salafi Maddrassa.” The newspaper further mentioned that “Ahab has its own process of recruiting imams and muezzins for its mosques. ‘Just anybody can’t be an imam at our mosques. Our imams are trained on how to bring about a social revolution through preaching and know how to recruit new members,’ said a teacher at Salafi Maddrassa.”173
Are Deobandis inspired by Wahabism?
The term ‘Wahhabism’ bears connotations of an extreme or fundamentalist, pan-Islamic political agenda. It is commonly used by writers on political Islamic movements as well as in the media around the world. Where a definition for Wahhabism can be found, it is
173 “Ahab Men on the Run, JMJB Flouts Ban.” Daily Star, 26 February 2005, 1. Cited in Riaz Ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 125 116 usually a repetition of the same themes: ‘Saudi Arabia’, ‘Bin Laden’, ‘Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’ and ‘purist Muslims’.174
The Deobandi are a Muslim religious revivalist movement that emerged in India in reaction to the apparent threat to Islam from British colonialism. Like the Wahhabis, the Deobandis believe certain Sufi-related practices, such as seeking mediation of saints, to be “an innovation” and thus un-Islamic. Also, like the Wahhabis, they give superiority to the jurisprudence of former Islamic scholars than the later ones. The concept of jihad is also more open to Wahhabi understanding and thought than the Sufi’s conception of jihad. The
Taliban follow the teachings of Deobandi school of thought. 175
Niblock studied that the more conservative circles of Saudi Wahhabism had for long perceived an affinity between Wahhabism and Deobandi movement, from which the
Taliban sprung. Some Wahhabis, indeed saw the Deobandis as their closest equivalent in south Asia. On this basis, Saudi private and charitable funding had flowed to the
Maddrassa run by the Doebandi movement in Pakistan since 1970s. 176
Wahhabism is deemed to have links with the Deobandi School of the Indian sub-continent and to have begun to infiltrate western nations, including Britain. The purist Islamic perspective is seen to have influenced a large number of mosques within the UK in which hate speeches are allegedly delivered in which curses are sought on the ‘enemies of Islam’ including Christians and Jews.177
174 Anis Ghani Kotia. ‘Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Sufism: A study into the reasons behind and a remedy for increased violent radicalization among British Muslims’. Masters Dissertation. Islamic College for Advanced Studies and Middlesex University. 2010. Pg:7 175 Op cit, 165, pg - 173 176 Tim Niblock. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival. Routledge. 2006. Pg: 157 177 Anis Ghani Kotia. ‘Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Sufism: A study into the reasons behind and a remedy for increased violent radicalization among British Muslims’. Masters Dissertation. Islamic College for Advanced Studies and Middlesex University. 2010. Pg:4 117
The Tablighi movement's rapid penetration into non-Muslim regions began in the 1970s and coincides with the establishment of a synergistic connection between Saudi Wahhabis and South Asian Deobandis. While Wahhabis are indifferent of other Islamic schools, they distinguish Tablighi Jamaat for praise, even if they disagree with some of its practices, such as willingness to pray in mosques housing graves. The late Sheikh 'Abd al 'Aziz ibn
Baz, perhaps the most influential Wahhabi cleric in the late twentieth century, recognized the Tablighis good work and encouraged his Wahhabi brethren to go on missions with them so that they can direct and give advice to them. 178
Indian Politics and Muslim Community: Deobandi-Congress alliance
Deoband always followed its conventional approach in following Islam. It believes in inclusive nationhood, support and promotes patriotism and look for equal justice for all.
Deobandis were very much politically active; they did take part in mass movements, such as non-cooperation movement. Pakistan movement was opposed by Deobandis and extended their support to the congress. Being together in various important struggles in subcontinent, both Deoband scholars and Congress enjoyed a strong political bond with each other and it continued till late 1990s. As Deoband and Congress, both were against the division of the region, so they worked together at various stages.
The congress and its allies such as JUH were determined to oppose Muslim leagues advocacy of Pakistan and to test the party’s claim that it was the sole representative organization of the Indian Muslims. The party established a UP congress parliamentary board for the purpose of organizing for the elections. Nehru especially was convinced that if the congress made a determined push to educate the Muslim voters during the election
178 "Fatwa of Shaykh 'Abdul-'Azeez ibn Baaz regarding the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh," fatwa-online.com, 1993. Cited in Alex Alexiev. Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions. Middle East Quarterly. 2005, pp. 3-11 118 campaign. Nehru, therefore sought to make a pitch to the Muslim masses who he felt would respond to the congress call. Nehru hence declared that the congress was resuming its
Muslim mass contact program (MMCP) which was first initiated in 1937, but vanished within a year. 179
The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, the most prestigious organization of the Ulema, saw nothing
Islamic in the idea of Pakistan. Its president, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, who was also Mohtamim or principal of Darul Ulum Deoband opposed the idea of two-nation theory, pleading that all Indians, Muslims or Hindus were one nation. He argued that faith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries but that nationality was a matter of geography, and Muslims were obliged to be loyal to the nation of their birth along with their non-Muslim fellow citizens. Maulana Madani said: "all should endeavor jointly for such a democratic government in which Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs,
Christians and Parsis are included. Such a freedom is in accordance with Islam” He was of the view that in the present times, nations are formed on the basis of homeland and not on ethnicity and religion.180 JUH felt that their objectives can be fulfilled by having an association with congress. According to Dr. Akhtar-ul Wasay, head of Islamic Studies
Department at Jamia Millia Islamia, “Deobandis are progressive in political attitude and consevative in religious position”181, hence there has been a strong political nexus that existed throughout Indian political history. However, Prof. Wasay believes that this association between the two is overrated , as there has been differences of opinion within the Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind (JUH) on supporting congress. Maulana Asad Madani has been
179 Venkat Dhulipala. Rallying around the Qaum: The Muslims of the United Provinces and the movement for Pakistan, 1935--1947. PhD dissertation. University of Minnesota pg: 334 180 Abdus Sattar Ghazali. Islamic Pakistan: Illusions & Reality. National Book Club, 1996. Pg 31 181 Prof. Akhtar-ul Wasay, Head of Department of Islamic Studies at Jamia-Millia Islamia in New Delhi during a talk with the author on November 22, 2010 119 traditionally a congress supporter while the Genereal secretary of JUH Syed Ahmed
Hashmi opposed the alliance with congress. 182
Maulana Nauman of JUH during a meeting with the author stated, “ individuals from his jamaat can participate in politics and they have been participating but JUH platform has not been used to propagate certain political ideas, on the other hand, in Pakistan, JUI is a distinct religio-politcal party with a clear political agenda. This intrusion of religious parties in the politics of Pakistan has negatively contributed in maligning the image of religious groups working for Islam.”183
Current attitude of Congress towards Muslims and JUH
There is a general agreement that in the eighties, India like its neighbors experienced a rise in the number of madrassas. The rise in numbers can be attributed to the growing sense of disenfranchisement among the Muslim population, and the gradual rise of the Hindu chauvinist parties and their front organizations. By the mid-nineties, as the Sangh Parivar–
–that is, the combination of BJP, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Bajrang
Dal, the Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the Shiv Sena––assumed a pivotal position within mainstream politics, the Muslim community began adopting an inward-looking stance. This is reflected in their growing affiliations with institutions that help preserve their Muslim identity, and continue Islamic traditions. The events in 1992, particularly the demolition of Babri Mosque and subsequent atrocities against the Muslim community, sent a clear signal to the Muslim community that secularism in India was on the wane.184
182 Ibid 183 Maulana Nauman , representative of JUH during a meeting with the author at JUH office in New Delhi on November 23, 2010. 184 Riaz ali, Faithful Education /Maddrasaaaha In South Asia, Rutgers University Press, USA. 2008. Pg 172 120
Government of India tried to extend some support to Muslim religious seminaries to bring them in the fold of modern education by providing teachers to teach modern courses however, public response and particularly response from the religious scholars was not that positive. The main reason was fear of government control and interference and any support from the government would compromise the purity of the knowledge that the Muslim community feels fit.
Today, severely anti-Muslim Hindutva groups and large sections of the Indian press seem to have raised an intensive movement to dismiss the madrassas not just as fortress of conservatism and reaction but also as training grounds for Islamic “terrorists.” In February
2001, the Indian government brought out a document prepared by the Group of Ministers on National Security, claiming that madrassas, mainly in some border regions, were working in league with “pan-Islamist militant outfits” and “radical organizations” in
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and some other West Asian states.
Situation also got worse after 9/11. In the wake of these attacks, the madrassas have been branded as centers of anti-national, pro Pakistan propaganda, allied with the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence, and as dens of Islamic “terrorism.” After September 11, 2001, as madrassas came under increasing attack in India from right-wing Hindu organizations and leading sections of the Indian press, the largest and most influential madrassa in India, the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, was moved to firmly deny any organizational links with the
Taliban or with other radical Islamist organizations. 185
Since the Congress-led government took power in 2004 till now when they are running the government for the second time, the government’s position in regard to the allegation of a madrassa terrorism nexus has changed. In July 2006, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil
185 Ibid 121 stated that madrassas are not the center of terrorism. The Human Development Resources
Minister Arjun Singh echoed the position in December 2006, saying that the allegation that madrassas were a breeding ground of terrorists was untrue.186 But the BJP and its ilk continued with their claims and the campaign to demonize the madrassas goes on.
Islamization in Pakistan: Gen Zia, Muslim League & Deobandi alliance
The era of 1970 brought great changes with it, the former East Pakistan voted in favour of pro autonomy Awami league supporting Mujeeb ur Rehman. In the West Pakistan, it was f
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s party that won the elections. The political confrontation on transfer of power led to civil disturbance and chaos. The civil war in East Pakistan brought India in the picture and the political crisis turned into a Pakistan-India war and culminated in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Najum Mushtaq in his paper, “Islam and Pakistan” writes
“the ideal of a nation based on religion, transcending ethnic diversity and bridging the geographic distance, fell apart. The leftover West Pakistan assumed the title of Pakistan.
Refusing to learn the lessons of the post-independence 25 years, the framers of the new constitution led by Bhutto continued to play the religion card. The new constitution of
Pakistan was full of Islamic content. General Zia ul-Haq, who toppled Bhutto in 1977, further strengthened these Islamic provisions. His 11-year rule coincided with the final decisive juncture in the Cold War: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S.- sponsored jihad led by Zia’s Islamized Pakistan.”187
186 Ibid, Pg, 56 187 Najum Mushtaq, “Islam and Pakistan”, in John Feffer (Editor), Foreign Policy In Focus. December 21, 2007 http://www.fpif.org/ articles/islam_and_pakistan
122
Najum Mushtaq further writes:
“The Zia government introduced new laws based on ultra-
orthodox Sunni interpretations of Islam and formulated Islamic
rules and regulations for every institution. It thus subjected all
sectors of society -- from education to the media and from the
cultural policies to official rules of business -- to an Islamic
code of conduct. Sectarianism flourished. This growing army
of extremists in Pakistan fought the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad
alongside the Arabs and Afghans and then served the cause of
jihads from India to Bosnia to Chechnya. The next generation
of the same mujahedeen groups is now the main protagonist in
America’s war on terrorism. The momentum of militancy
created by Zia has continued after his demise in 1988. The
semi-civilian rule of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto could
do little to stem the tide of Sunni militancy which has taken a
two-track approach to advance its cause: at home against the
Shias and other minorities and internationally against western
targets. During the Musharraf period many of them have turned
against the military itself.”188
Murtaza Haider in his article published in Dawn explains, “Whereas the population increased by 29 per cent during 1972 and 1981, the number of graduates from religious schools in Pakistan increased by 195 per cent during the same period. This resulted in an oversupply of graduates from religious schools who had limited employment prospects.
188 Ibid 123
The military and civil governments that followed the Zia regime also did little to address the dramatic increase in the number of madrassas and the students enrolled in such institutions. The number of madrassas jumped from 2,800 in 1988 to 9,900 in 2002. The
Deobandi madrassas saw the largest increase during that period reaching a total of 7,000 institutions. In fact, the increase in the number of Deobandi madrassas was higher than the number of all other madrassas combined.”189
Jihad-e-Akbar to Jihad-e-Asghar: Politicization of Notion of Jihad
There is enough empirical evidence to support the fact that the zealous 'Islamization' during the eleven years rule of General Zia conferred a specific religious tone to various social and political phenomenon's in that era. In purely religious context, Jihad –e-Akbar or the greater Jihad is to control our ego and fight against vices in a person. Jihad –e-Asghar or smaller Jihad is basically the last option where armed struggle against the enemy is allowed in certain circumstance. Unfortunately, the emphasis of the Zia regim was Jihad-e-Asghar, encouraging armed struggle against the infidels (Communits). Haider Ali Naqvi states:
“Government apparatus operated with many factions in order to distribute ammunitions and train individuals which was instrumental in defeating the ambitions of expanding communist government. The resistance fighters were called Mujahedeen and the struggle was called Jihad.”190
189Murtaza Haider. How and Why Madrasa Graduates gravitate towards militancy and extremism. 2011. http://urdutahzeeb.net/articles/blog1.php?p=12809&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 190 Haider Ali Naqvi, Syed Faraz Kazim, Shafqat Huma. Suicide Bombing: A Geopolitical perspective. Journal of Pakistan Medical Association. 2011. http://jpma.org.pk/full_article_text.php?article_id=2540 124
Asghar Ali engineer, a famous intellectual of India mentioned the concept of jihad in his article as:
“A real jihad for a Muslim is to fight against all forms of
injustices and all forms of exploitation and make all forms of
sacrifices to remove these injustices to establish real peace on
earth. As long as there is any trace of injustice and
exploitation on earth there will be violence in some form or
the other and it is duty of a mu'min to wage struggle to
remove all traces of injustice. An engaged Muslim has to be
committed to peace on earth and without peace this earth will
not be worth inhabiting for all human beings. And peace can
be established only through jihad against all forms of zulm on
earth. Another important value is truth called haq by the
Qur'an. Allah Himself is referred to as Haq in the Book.
Thus an engaged Muslim has to fight for truth. Truth is God
and thus god cannot be realized without realizing truth in all
its forms.”191
He further pointed out:
“For this we need a strong force of committed Muslims
equipped with Islamic values and modern knowledge. It has to
wage jihad against medievalism and authoritarianism and
obsolete knowledge systems. This jihad would be true jihad
191 Asghar Ali Engineer. “Engaged Islam”, Islam and Modern Age. 2003. Available at http://www.religiousconsultation.org/engaged_islam.htm 125
and it needs not only utmost efforts but also sacrifices. This
jihad would be for peace, progress and change and has to be
waged against selfish rulers. The Holy prophet is reported to
have said that best form of jihad is speaking truth in front of a
tyrant ruler. We need Muslims to wage this kind of jihad and it
is only this quality of jihad, which would rid Muslim world of
tyrants and authoritarian rulers who suppress all basic rights
and deny democracy to people. It would greatly improve the
quality of governance in the Muslim world and would help
greatly in fighting terrorism of the frustrated youth. It would
bring real glory to Islam and Islamic teachings.”192
Debandi-Taliban Nexus
The traditionalist Deobandi networks appear to be playing an important and recognizable role in the insurgency. Indeed as a rule Taliban networks stem from old or newly created
Deobandi networks. 193 The Taliban are Sunni Muslims, influenced by the Deobandi school of thought. After 1947, at the time of independence and partition, when the Muslim areas of colonial India were established as the separate state of Pakistan, the centers of Deoband learning shifted to Pakistani cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. Afghans were a part of steady stream of scholars traveling to Deoband and later to Pakistani madrassa, to
192 Ibid 193 Antonio Giustozzi (ed). Decoding the new taliban: insights from the afghan field .Columbia University Press. 2009. 126 receive the teachings of the Deobandi School. The Taliban were the heirs to the tradition.194
Afghan students generally join Deobandi Madrassas because of historical links between the afghan Ulema and the Dar Ul-Uloom Deoband Madrassa in India. Even today the relationship between this Madrassa and the Pakistani Deobandi movement is limited.
Christophe Jaffrelot writes, “Under the generic term Deobandi one finds, in fact, different kinds of discourses and one cannot overestimate the education of their Ulema and the coherence of their ideology.”195
Most of the Taliban Ulema have been educated in the NWFP (renamed Khyber
PukhtunKhwan-KPK) during the war. In particular, the Dar Ul Uloom Haqqaniyah in
Akora Khattak, NWFP (KPK) has trained some of the most important cadres of the movement. There are strong links of solidarity between the Ulema trained in this Maddrassa and its Taliban students. The Ulema who are in control of the Taliban movements have a strong sense of group identity even if, as in any other organization. Besides the presence of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani madrassa are directly linked to the Afghan war because participation in jihad is seen as a natural next step for its students. Most of the volunteers are
Afghan but some Pakistani students also participate in the jihad. The generally came from
NWFP and Baluchistan and occasionally from Sindh or Punjab. 196
194 Roland Jacquard. In the name of Osama Bin Ladin: global terrorism and the Bin Ladin brotherhood. Duke University Press. 2002. pg: 38 195 Christophe Jaffrelot. Pakistan : Natioalism without a nation. Manohar publishers and distributors, New Delhi. 2002. Pg: 168 196 Ibid 127
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (S)- Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (F) and Al-Qaeda?
The Jamiate Ulema-e- Hind and Jamiate-Ulema-e-Islam both look towards Darul Uloom
Deoband for allegiance, their political ideology differes from each other. As Barbara
Metcalf explains:
“In the final years of colonial rule, a minority group among the
Deobandi Ulama dissented from support for the secular state and
the privatization of religion espoused by the Indian nationalist
movement. They organized, instead, as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam to
support the Muslim League and the demand for a separate Muslim
state. In independent Pakistan after 1947 they became a minor
political party led by Ulama and a voice in the on-going debate over
the nature of the Pakistani state. Should it be the secular state
presumably intended by its founders, or a state meant to be shaped
in accordance with Islam? The JUI has never had more than minute
popular support, and the content of the party's programs over the
years, it is probably fair to say, has been a fairly simplistic call for
the dominance of Islam in public life.”197
Like other Pakistani parties, the JUI has been subject to factional splits joining together the personalities more than issues, and there were possibly a half-dozen sections and reorganizations over its first half century.198
197 Metcalf, Barbara. Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tabligh and Talib, ISIM papers, International Institute for the study of Islam in modern world, 2002 198 Sayyid A.S. Pirazda, The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971-77 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 128
JUI made alliances with many parties. In the 1970, they allied with a Pashtun regionalist party in opposition to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), a party that was, in principle, socialist. In the mid 1990s, in contrast, they allied with that same PPP, now led by Benazir
Bhutto. Just like every party in Pakistan, not protected from corruption, in this case because they were clerics. “Their most famous leader at one point, for example, was referred to as "Maulana Diesel" because of his reputed involvement in fuel smuggling earlier in the 1990s. When the JUI was excluded from power, its Islamic expression became a language of opposition, often invoking a discourse of "democracy" and
"rights."199
At the same time, the Ulema of the JUI were engaged with the madrasas that furthered
Deobandi teachings. From the 1980s on, the number of seminaries in Pakistan climbed in the era of the military dictator Ziaul Haq , who was, in fact, predominantly concerned about the Deobandi approach. The seminaries were not only a resource in domestic politics but at times found themselves engaged in a kind of "surrogate" competition between Saudis and
Iranians, as each patronized religious institutions likely to support their side.200 It was in this atmosphere of politics and education that the origin of the Taliban is to be found.201
The flow in the number of madrasas in the 1980s corresponded with the arrival of almost three million Afghan refugees. The madrasas located along the frontier frequently provided the only available education to the migrated boys. One school in particular, the Madrasa
Haqqaniya, in Akora Kathak near Peshawar, trained many of the top Taliban leaders. These sometime students (Talib; plural, Taliban) were shaped by many of the core Deobandi
199 Op cit 193 200 Vali R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-98" (Comparative Politics 32:2 [January 2000) pp. 171-190). 201 Op cit 195 129 reformist causes, all of which were further encouraged by Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.
Ahmed Rashid, a long time observer said, "An extreme form of Deobandism, which was being preached by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan."202
202 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 88. 130
Chapter 4
State of Religion and Nature of State in Pakistan and India
The period between 1979 -2001 is marked with political upheavals within Pakistan where the state focused on security concerns making it security state. The biggest role in this regard was played by the first Afghan war that legitimized the 4th Chief Marital Law
Administrator Gen. Zia ul Haq’s rule.
To further legitimize Gen. Zia’s authority, his security oriented policies used institutions as the ISI and religious parties as instruments to flourish and encourage ethnic and sectarian divide in the state. His Islamization campaign resulted in the introduction of a party less parliament and instrumented religion as a tool to forcefully exert his will. Dr. Hasan Askari writes, “General Zia-ul Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative interpretation of the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made several Administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious extremism in Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against the notion of participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights as western implants in Pakistan.”203
203 Hassan Askari Rizvi, “Democracy in Pakistan”, Paper presented for the Project, State of Democracy in South Asia- Publsihed by Oxford University Press in November 2007. Lokniti (Programme of Comparative Democracy) Centre for the Study of Developing Societies Delhi, available at http://www.democracy- asia.org/qa/pakistan/Hasan%20Askari.pdf P -9 131
Bob Woodward writes on similar lines, “Zia held absolute power and had no need to bother with appearances, yet he did - not just in his deference to visitors, but also in legal matters.
His constitutional amendments sewed up every possible loophole, down to the point where all the actions of the martial law government were not only unchallengeable in any court, but also where all orders made, proceedings taken, acts done or purporting to be made, taken or done by any authority or person would be deemed to have been made, taken or done in good faith and for the purpose intended to be served thereby.204”
Dr. Hasan Askari argues that since its inception, Pakistan was hectically involved in security concerns of its region of which Kashmir was the most pioneer issues. Hence, granting importance to security apparatus of Pakistan. He writes, “Pakistan’s security problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the military’s position in the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated a substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The military’s position in the polity received additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances in the mid- 1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans in Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the military’s efficiency and strike power.205”
The subsequent governments that followed Gen. Zia’s regime were ready to make compromise that eventually led to weakening of the democratic process in Pakistan.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s alternative governments lacked the confidence to assert themselves over the military brass; providing the Islamic policies of Gen. Zia yet a new dimension where Islamic ideology stood paramount in policy making. “The generals were
204 Bob Woodward. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA . London: Simon and Schuster, 1987.P 310-311 205 Op cit 203, page 7 132 prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their professional and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for Benazir Bhutto (December
1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-
July 1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.206”
Though there was a policy shift in the subsequent governments to Gen. Zia, however, these democratic administrations were weak and heavily dependent on the military apparatus of the state. Dr. Hasan Askari writes:
“The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power
since the mid-1950s were either floated by the establishment
(the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence
agencies) or these enjoyed its blessings…The post-Zia
civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws
made by the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. General
Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing
principle for the Pakistani political system but he too did not
revise the Islamic laws and punishments introduced by
General Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the
support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a
conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in
power. The rise of Islamic orthodoxy has also increased
206 Op.cit. 204, Pg 5 133
Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the
fabric of the Pakistani society. The inconclusive debate on
Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political
system adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Most
conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject democracy
as a western system or support it to the extent of using the
electoral process to attain power and then implement their
notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of
consensus on the precise relationship between Islam and the
Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and political system,
democratic institutions and processes would not fully develop
and become sustainable.207”
In the words of Maulana Nauman of Jamaiate-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), Muslims in India are loyal to state no matter which government is in power, across the border in Pakistan, loyalty to government is considered as loyalty to state that has been creating problem in
Pakistan’s political history.208
Parallel to these events, Indian state was focusing on internal politics and state building.
The state’s focal point of attention was her internal administrative issues. Since its independence from the British raj, the state evolved her political structure and apparatus into a multiparty, pluralist and secular system, the factors that helped Congress party to assume the role of a dominant ruling party in the wake of Independence and consolidate
207 Op.cit. 204, Pg 9 208Maulana Nauman, JUH expressed his view during the meeting with the author in New Delhi meeting on November 23, 2010 134 itself are well known. With partition, the main rival to the Congress, the Muslim League, was removed from the electoral scene. Electoral politics that replaced the politics of freedom struggle had severely constricted the space available to non-Congress parties earlier. the presence of other parties in legislatures was much below their popular support.
As the Congress eclipsed the non- Congress liberal parties, those who aspired to continue in politics had to seek space within the Congress fold. Its ability to use the nationalist movement’s organisational network, to mobilise political support and at the same time permit dissenting elements to organise themselves into oppositional factions within the party led to the Congress dominance.209”
In India, this period (1977-1999) is marked with diverse political aspirations, contextualization of new electoral systems, and addition of political parties. “The agitations led by Jayaprakash Narayan, the imposition of Emergency, and finally the formation of the Janata party in 1977 brought far-reaching changes in the structure of party competition… Yogendra Yadav says that in the social and political churning that India went through this period several dormant social identities acquired a new salience in the context of electoral competition (1999)… Congress was no longer the pole against which every polity formation was defined. The constraint on voter to vote for or against it was no more there. The political space was occupied by three forces: the Congress, BJP and others.
The third space became the spring of political alternatives.210”
The period is marked with exponential increase in the number of political parties, transformation in the relative electoral strength of the National and State parties, heightened political awareness of the electorate making Indian polity reach a situation
209K.C. Suri. “Parties under Pressure: Political Parties in India Since Independence.” State of Democracy in South Asia, P 9. (Can be accessed at http://www.democracy-asia.org/qa/india/KC%20Suri.pdf) 210 Op.cit. 210 pg 10 135 where “no single party is in a position to form governments at the national level or accommodate in it the Indian multiversity – of class, caste, religious, linguistic, ethnic and regional interests.211”
Secular Constitution and Democracy versus Authoritarian “Democracy” and Religion based Constitution
The Pakistan’s national identity, based on the quasi-democratic and dictatorial governments that it saw in 64 years since its inception, has always been influenced by its military and intelligence agencies. These institutions have, in turn, used Islamist groups to achieve agendas; resulting in a national identity that is “ostensibly pro-Western” with “strategic commitment to Jihadi ideology”. Husain Haqqani in ‘Pakistan: Between Mosque And
Military’ writes, “Pakistan’s state institutions, especially its national security institutions such as the military and the intelligence services, have played a leading role in building
Pakistani national identity on the basis of religion since Pakistan’s emergence as an independent country in August 1947. This political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to Jihadi ideology.212”
Since religion held a paramount position all this time, religious bodies always enjoyed an upper hand in policy formulation. The writer asserts that Pakistan’s rulers have always promoted pro-Western policies under the cover of Islamism. However, “General Zia ul-
Haq went farther than others in “Islamizing” Pakistan’s legal and educational system, but his policy of Islamization was the extension of a consistent state ideology, not an aberration.213” The author argues that Pakistan’s pan-Islamic aspirations must be viewed as a tool to regulate state affairs, “During Pakistan’s formative years, however, pan-Islamism
211 Op.cit. 210 pg-12 212 Husain Haqqani, Husain. Pakisan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2005. 213 Op.cit. 204 pg 2-3 136 was more important for Pakistan’s efforts to consolidate its national identity than as the mainstay of its foreign policy.214”
The reason for weak democratic culture in Pakistan dates back to its independence when lack of “real political party system” resulted in military’s involvement in political affairs of the state. “With the entry of General Ayub Khan in the federal cabinet as Defense
Minister, the military emerged as the most politically influential institution in the country.
This tortuous emergence of a new political power in Pakistan, and the consequences of institutional and demographic imbalance, led to the atrophy of parliamentary politics in the country. Constitutional assemblies failed to design a working constitution for the country.
One of the main reasons for the successful entry of the military and civil bureaucracy into the politics of Pakistan was the absence of any real political party system, which is an essential element of democracy in any country.215”
In 1958, after the declaration of Martial Law in Pakistan, General Ayub Khan promised a civilian led democratic government. However, the military- centred quasi democratic government was under total control of the military, “General Ayub Khan, after strengthening his grip on political and administrative affairs, introduced a new law banning several popular political parties and arrested any political leaders he perceived might create trouble for his government. To defame the politicians and former members of constitutional assembly, several laws including the Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) were enacted.”216
214 Op.cit. 204 pg 19 215 Riaz Ahmed Shaikh. “A State of Transition: Authoritarianism and Democratization in Pakistan.” Asia Journal of Global Studies, 2009: Vol 3, No 1 04 -21. (Can be accessed at http://ajgs.org/index.php/AJGS/article/viewFile/48/105) 216 Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan: The enigma of political development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980. 137
General Zia promoted religious parties to gain legitimacy as well as ‘cleanse’ the society of
‘liberal Western’ ideas. Hence different religious bodies were formed during this period.
“The most dangerous action of the military government under General Zia was the use of religious ideology to muster support among the general public against democratic forces.
The alliance of the military with religious parties and the promotion of Islamic culture were meant to establish hegemony over democratic society (Nasr, 2002). The creation of the office of Nazim-e-Salat (Controller of Prayers) and the introduction of Sharia law and
Islamic banking were some of the means used to fight the secular system linked to Western democracy. These measures gave the military dictator a symbolic legitimacy.”217
Failure of democracy in Pakistan is not only accounted for the interruptions by military in the form of martial laws but by the paramount position given to religious authority.
Historian, Lawrence Ziring writes, “Building a democracy in a country devoted to religious tradition has been a problem in numerous states. The founding fathers of the United States constitutional system acknowledged the problem in eighteenth-century Europe and it was their judgment that only by a strict separation of church from state was democracy attainable.”218
Even today, Pakistan has failed to separate the mosque from the state because this nexus has served the interests of those in power. Khalid Bin in his book “Politics in Pakistan” analysed the situation in these words:
“The common man had been told that perhaps the greatest
factor responsible for the establishment of Pakistan against
overwhelming odds was the Islamic bond, which could
217 Op.cit. 216, p14 218 Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History. Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2005. p276- 277 138
overcome any divisions. After the establishment of
Pakistan, the wranglings of politicians, the dismissal of
governments – all accompanied by intense regional
conflicts between Bengalis and West Pakistanis and
between Punjabis and Sindhis, and Punjabis and Pakhtuns –
confirmed the common scepticism and disillusionment
about Islamic unity and the Islamic state.”219
ARTICLE 2A --- PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION TO BE EFFECTIVE PART OF THE CONSTITUTION:220
“This Article was added on 2nd March, 1985, to the original 1973 Constitution, by the late
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator by President’s Order No. 14 of 1985 dated 2nd March, 1985. It reads as under:
2A. The principles and provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution reproduced in the
Annex are hereby made substantive part of the Constitution and shall have effect accordingly. The purpose of insertion of Article 2A, is the enforcement of the Qur’an and
Sunnah through Courts of Law within the framework of the principles and provisions of the
Objectives Resolution.221”
219Khalid Bin Sayeed. Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change. New York: Praegers Publishers, 1980.p 167 220 The Constitution of Pakistan1973 amended in 1985 221 Dr. Tanzilur Rahman. “Islamic Provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.” Annual Qur’anic Seminar, 22 April 1997.p 2 (can be accessed at http://data.quranacademy.com/QA_Publications/ariticles/English/Misc/IslamicProvisionsInPakistanConstituti on1973.pdf) 139
The problem of sectarian divide in Pakistan stems directly from the fact that the preamble of her constitution staples the state with religion.222 In comparison to what the Indian constitution reads, the social fiber rests on a ‘secular’ preamble of law making mechanism.223 The Constitution of Pakistan promises to facilitate in observance of Islamic values224 and obligates the teaching of Holy Quran and Islamiat. 225
Reading through the Hudood Ordinance 1979, one realizes how “hadd”226 has been introduced in friction to basic fundamental rights of citizens that had lived 32 years since the creation of Pakistan under swinging authoritarian and democratic regimes. “Hadd” referring to (unamendable) punishments under the principles of the Holy Quran, was deemed unquestionable in the ordinance. However, the word was interpreted and therefore put to practice in a way objectionable to the teachings of Islam.
The ordinance promulgated at the time of General Zia-ul-Haq clearly denies the citizens, especially women, of their right of protection in the light of Islamic rules and principles when put to practice. The definition of Zina and Zina bil -jabr as described in the Hudood
Ordinance under Article 2 does not differentiate between rape, extra-marital relationship and fornication, which is why the definition becomes vague when, put to practice. The loopholes within the offence of Zina ordinance have resulted in increased violence against women rather than curtailing the criminal acts. More and more women were accused of adultery under this ordinance if they could not produce four witnesses to support their case, leading to accusation on the victims and imprisonment in accordance with “hadd” or
222 1973 Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Constitution, preamble 223 India, Constitution, preamble 224 1973 Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Constitution, art. 31(1), chapter 2, section I 225 Ibid., art. 31(2a), chapter 2, section I 226 The Offence of Zina (Enforcement Of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, 2(b)
140
“tazir”. Thus this law could easily be used as a tool by the law enforcement authorities to victimize innocent citizens and put them behind bars.
Moreover, the law of Qazf does not promise authenticated protection and check against accusations either. Firstly, because the law itself is seen to be weak in terms of allowing bail and being non-cognizable. Secondly, during the subsistence of marriage, a husband cannot be punished for allegations of Qazf according to section 3 of the ordinance.
Such laws may be seen as principally flawed and amount to the discrimination within our society against the weaker class. Laws formulated within the framework of Islam but implemented in exploitative tendencies have led to the instability and corrosion of the social fabric of our society. Thus it may not be wrong to question the credibility of the
Pakistani constitution to be viable in associating itself to a democratic state or a theocratic state.
Where does Religion and Religion –based politics stand in India and Pakistan?
Achin Vanaik in his book ‘The Furies of Indian Communalism’ defines secularism as a set of, “specific practices and policies the state uses to assert its independence from the religious domain. On the other hand, secularization is used to refer to a more general process of decline in religious influence and religious identity in modern life.227”
Ajay Darsha of Pakistan Studies Center at Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi states that Indian secularism is unique as compared to western secularism; it promotes minority religious commissions and minority institutes, hence we have religio-political parties in India actively working as watchdog to highlight any discrimination in the local law or governance against the specific religious minority. Mosques and Madrassas come
227 Achin Vanaik. The Furies of Indian Communalism. New York: Verso , 1997.p 103-105 141 under civil and welfare boards constituted by the government. It is essentially because of this dependence on government that Muslim religio-political parties do not come against the government very often. 228
Deobandis and other Muslim Schools in India have become an amalgamation of development and secularization in modern times. Dietrich Reetz observes that, “Traditional and historical Muslim networks in India, such as the Sunni madrasah traditions of the
Deobandis and modern Muslim schools, have adopted new leadership formats. These include utilizing new forms of communication, pursing non-religious agendas focused on education and development, and networking traditional religious schools with secular and female education. They should be encouraged to become part of mainstream society and invited to assume social and political responsibilities.229” This clearly reflects the disconnect between religious groups and the political apparatus of the Indian state.
Right after the partition of Subcontinent in 1947, “Muslim religious leaders remained devoted to the traditional conditions and forms of the practice of Islam while demonstrating little to no political ambition of their own national issues of Muslim politics have been taken up more by mainstream political parties than by religious organizations. The
Congress Party and regional parties became prime movers in the public arena to articulate the concerns of Indian Muslims, joined by a number of clerics and public Muslim
228 Ajay Darshan interviewed by the author at Pakistan Studies Center , Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi on November 24, 2010. 229 Dietrich Reetz. “Muslim Grassroots Leaders in India: National Issues and Local Leadership.” The National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2010. p 30 (Can be assecced at http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR22_preview.pdf) 142 intellectuals, many of whom claimed the newly emerging constituency of “secular
Muslims.”230
Surfacing of Muslim leadership in India was witnessed in three phases, “During this first phase, Indian Muslim leaders deliberately renounced political ambitions and focused on rebuilding the religious and cultural identity of the community.” The initial period of the second phase witnessed “socio-economic and political changes triggered the emergence of radical politics and regional, cultural, and ethnic conflict” of the 1970s. However, in 1980s and 1990s
“Muslim groups in India shared in the rising religious consciousness across the Muslim world and expanded religious institutions at a significant pace.” During the third phase
“Muslim activism in India intensely refocused on the status and development of the Indian
Muslim community, especially general education, the schooling of girls, and professional, technical, and computer education.”231
Over the years, the traditional seminary of Deoband has focused on non-political agenda, for instance launching of a modern website with large data reserves available online spotlighting social and religious projects.232 Even in the political field, the focus has now moved from being strictly in contact with Congress party to other options, presently,
Deobandis do not have direct collaboration with Congress but Individual members of
Darul Uloom Deoband or Jamiat-e- Ulema-e- Hind are politically active and still maintain alliance or membership with the Congress party.”233
With clearly defined objectives, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind aims to focus on non-political agendas including educational and social welfare projects through its trusts, welfare and
230 Ibid, p31 231Ibid, p32 232 For the official website of Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, see http://jamiatulama.org/index.html 233 Ajay Darshan interviewed by the author at Pakistan Studies Center, Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi on November 24, 2010. 143 uplift of general public, aid and relief to poor, publication of Islamic literature, improvement of economic conditions of Indian Muslims, and conducting theological research.234
JUH was never formed as a political party neither did it ever take the colour of a political entity. Barbara D. Metcalf argues:
“They were never a political party as such, but, organized
as the Association of the Ulema of India (Jamiat- Ulema -
i- Hind), they threw in their lot with Gandhi and the Indian
National Congress in opposition to British rule. Deobandi
histories written before 1920 insisted that the Ulema did
not participate in the anti-colonial rebellion of 1857; within
India at least the Ulema of Deoband continued their pre-
independence pattern: they did not become a political party
and they justified political cooperation with non-Muslims
as the best way to protect Muslim interests.”235
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), a sub division of Deobandi Ulema supported the creation of an independent state in the subcontinent, “In the final years of colonial rule, a minority group among the Deobandi Ulema dissented from support for the secular state and the privatization of religion espoused by the Indian nationalist movement. They organized, instead, as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam to support the Muslim League and the demand for a
234 For information on aims and objectives of Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, see http://jamiatulama.org/about_us.html 235 Barbara D. Metcalf. “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs.” Leiden ISIM, 2002. p7-8 (Can be accessed at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/10068/paper_metcalf.pdf?sequence=1) 144 separate Muslim state. In independent Pakistan after 1947, they became a minor political party led by Ulema and a voice in the ongoing debate over the nature of the Pakistani state.
Should it be the secular state presumably intended by its founders, or a state meant to be shaped in accordance with Islam? The JUI has never had more than minute popular support, and the content of the party’s programs over the years, it is probably fair to say, has been a fairly simplistic call for the primacy of Islam in public life.”236
Since the creation of Pakistan, JUI has shown indicators common to other political parties in the country, “Like other Pakistani parties, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam JUI has been subject to factional splits coalescing around personalities more than issues, and there were perhaps a half dozen factions and reorganizations over its first half century.”237
Sayyid A Peerzda writes:
“The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), like other political parties
in Pakistan made coalitions with different governments in
pursuit of its interest,” Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam JUI struck
alliances with any party that would win them influence. In
the 1970s, for example, they allied with a Pashtun
regionalist party in opposition to Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP), a party that was, in principle, socialist. In the
mid- 1990s, in contrast, they allied with that same PPP, now
led by Bhutto’s Harvard and Oxford educated daughter. Its
Ulema were given to Realpolitik with a vengeance and, like
just about every party in Pakistan, not shielded from
236 Ibid, pg 12 237 Sayyid A. S Pirazda. The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971-77. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000. 145
corruption, in this case because they were clerics… When
the JUI was excluded from power, its Islamic rhetoric
became a language of opposition, often invoking a discourse
of ‘democracy’ and ‘rights’. At the same time, the Ulema of
the JUI were engaged with the madrassas that furthered
Deobandi teachings.”238
Analysing international politics and rise of extremism in his paper, Vali Nasr writes: “From the 1980s on, the number of seminaries in Pakistan soared, used as a tool of conservative influence by the military dictator Zia ul Haq (in power 1977-1988), who was, in fact, particularly sympathetic to the Deobandi approach. The seminaries were not only a resource in domestic politics but at times found themselves engaged in a kind of ‘surrogate’ competition between Saudis and Iranians, as each patronized religious institutions likely to support their side.”239
However, there has existed a contrast between the functionality and objectivity of
Deobandis in Pakistan and India, “In the fragmented, factionalized world of Pakistan’s gasping democracy, the winning side seems to be whatever party - regional interest, secular, or Islamic - offers some leverage… As for the Deobandis in India, sometimes the winning team seemed to be the British colonial power; sometimes the Indian National
Congress”.240
238 Ibid, pg 13 239 Vali R. Nasr. “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan.” Comparative Politics 32, no. 2, 2000 January : 171-190. 240 Op.cit. 7 pg 16-17 146
In early 1990s, BJP being only a minor party, but having Hindu religious aspirations was successful in mobilizing the public in support of Hindu temple as merely a question of history. Re-establishing the Ram temple in place of Babri mosque by Hindu nationalist/
’moderate’ BJP spoke volumes of the party drawing its inspiration from Ramayana, ‘rich political symbology’ which inculcated a sense of Indian nationalism in the Hindus; of which Gandhi spoke a lot during his debates and presentation of independent Indian subcontinent. Though Babri mosque was demolished in December 1992, it became a representation of Hindutva politics at its maxima. The short lived violence had less impact on the society because the state never patronized these violent acts241.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Constitutional guarantees to religion based public policy
Pakistan has always been in struggle with the military and civilian supremacy and thus has faced different phases of military rule and civilian democratic regimes. Yet it has been hard for Pakistan to alleviate itself to the level of a stable democratic state. One major reason that most analysts argue about is the impact of religion in Pakistani state policies and the exploitation of the principles of Islam by different politicians within their regimes to fulfill certain political goals. The constitution of Pakistan as promulgated in 1973 is based on the
Islamic Sharia law which guarantees its citizens equal rights as promised by the Sharia law. Moreover these laws were intensified and amended within the Zia regime to establish a pure Islamic state within the boundaries of the Islamic law. However, it is interesting to note that Pakistan since its establishment never really adopted the nature of a theocratic
241 Bharat Wariavwalla , “Religion and Nationalism in India: Ram the God of the Hindu Nation” The Round Table, 2000: 593–605.
147 state until president Zia-ul-haq intended to mold the democratic procedures to theocratic principles.
Most people argue, especially the military elites that Pakistan cannot hold itself as a stable democratic state given that the country’s literacy rate is considerably low and that the religious factions are entrenched deep within the society as well as the political realm of the state. In theory the constitution of Pakistan according to Article 20 states that
Subject to law, Public order and Morality,
a) Every citizen has the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and
b) Every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to
establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions242
However, in practice it is seen that most political factions when coming into power limit the freedom of religion in the society. Sectarian rivalry is seen to be increasing expressively in the past decade and religious intolerance paves way to undemocratic system of governance. Discriminatory legislation such as the blasphemy laws and anti-Ahmedia provisions has encouraged religious intolerance and communal violence against minorities.
According to article 36 of the constitution:243
Article 36 The state shall safeguard the legitimate right and interests of minorities including their due representation in the federal and provincial services
However according to article 295C of the Pakistan penal code:
Article 298-C Persons of Qadiani group, etc, calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or any other name), who directly or indirectly, possess himself as a
242 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 243 Ibid 148
Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Thus the state displays a contradictory notion when it comes to minorities like the
Quadianis and thus societal discrimination flourishes within different institutions.
Moreover by a unanimous decision of the elected representatives of the supreme law- making body of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Constitution of 1973 was amended by the Constitution (Second Amendment ) Act, 1974 (Act XLIX of 1974) to amend Article
106 and Article 260 thereof. Clause (3) was added to Article 260 to declare those persons as non-Muslims who do not believe in the “absolute and unqualified finality of
Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon Him) or claims to be a Prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (PBUH) or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or a Religious Reformer". The Qadianis of the two groups are inter alia covered by this definition and they were thus declared non-Muslims.
According to this law the Quadiani minority sect cannot obtain a visa for Haj due to them being declared by the constitution as non-Muslims and unsuitable to perform Haj. Such clauses have penetrated deep into the roots of the Pakistani society, brooding cultural and communal violence and encouraging the religious entities to use these clauses to exploit and discriminate against minorities and victims of religious disbelief.
Thus it is evident from the constitutional pattern of Pakistan that it encourages religious based politics and propagates religious based public policy within the society leading to an
149 unstable democratic regime. Moreover, what is important to note is that both Pakistan and
India at the time of establishment followed the British rule of governance but with time and continuous inconsistent political regimes, followed by rigorous amendments to the constitution of Pakistan, the accountability and credibility of the document drifted away.
Corruption also facilitates the undemocratic form of governance within the states.
Religious parties have often opposed any amendment that limits the propagation of the principles of Islam and thus have protested against laws that provided freedom of speech wholly considering the protection and the promotion of derogatory titles, comments or remarks in terms of Islam, the prophet (P.B.U.H) and the Holy Quran. Freedom of speech was subject to "reasonable" restrictions in the interest of the "glory of Islam," as stipulated in sections 295(a), (b), and (c) of the penal code. The consequences for contravening the country's blasphemy laws were death for defiling Islam or its prophets; life imprisonment for defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Qur'an; and 10 years' imprisonment for insulting
"another's religious feelings." Some individuals brought charges under these laws to settle personal scores or to intimidate vulnerable Muslims, sectarian opponents, and religious minorities.
All these notions do not promise a sustainable democratic rule of governance for Pakistan and thus with the increase of sectarian violence brooding in Pakistani politics, it has become difficult for the state to move out of its realm of authoritative democracy and unstable system of governance, leading to some of the most major issues of the country like terrorism, protection of rights of citizens and the spread of democratic process within various institutions.
150
Sunni Orthodoxy
The Deobandi school of thought in Pakistan has been closely associated with the Wahabi school from Saudi Arabia. The religious nexus that binds the two together has had political aspirations during the Zia period, “The Wahabi school of thought is predominant in Saudi
Arabia. However, it should be emphasised that a vast majority of Muslims in Pakistan do not adhere to either Salafist or Wahabi traditions. The Deobandis opposed the formation of
Pakistan on the lines of a modern nation-state and regard themselves as the main voice of
Sunni Islamic orthodoxy in Pakistan. In their beliefs, particularly their emphasis on Sharia, the Deobandis echo many of the puritanical Sunni Wahhabi traditions of Islam.”244
Creation of JUI in Pakistan made it socially relevant within the polity in the state, “The
Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam (JUI) is the political organisation of orthodox Sunni Muslim clerics and is led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who is the son of JUI’s founder Maulana Mufti
Mehmood. The Islamist JUI and Jamaat-i-Islami are also socially relevant – even if they are restricted to narrower ethnic and sectarian pockets – because their histories are linked to social and political developments in their areas of influence.”245
JUI is known for its intolerance and lack of political and religious acceptability, “Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam, better known by its abbreviation, JUI is a hard-line Islamist party, widely considered a political front for numerous jihadi organizations… pro-Taliban, anti-
American and spiked with promises to implement Shariah, or Islamic law.”246
244 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 245 Haris Gazdar. “Pakistan’s Precious Parties.” Economic and Political Weekly, 9 Feburary 2008: 8-9. 246 Nicholas Schmidle. “Next-Gen Taliban.” The New York Times, 6 January 2008. (Can be accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06PAKISTAN-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)
151
The Deobandi School is the closest to the Salafi/ Wahabi Schools of Thought that completely reject Sufism and hence the rituals held at shrines. This has been witnessed in a number of incidents like Haji Baba Turangzai’s shrine in Safi tehsil in Mohmand Agency being taken over by 200 militants on July 31, 2007, Lal Masjid incident in July 2007, killing of 40 people in suicide attacks on Data Darbar Lahore in July 2007 among many incidents of sectarian violence due to the intolerance and lack of acceptability of the other school by the Deobandis247.
Gen. Zia, in order to gain public acceptance of his authoritarian regime and legitimize the
Afghan war Jihad, used the intolerant Islamic parties, Stephen Cohen writes, “Zia was known as a devout Muslim who sympathised with hard-line religious groups. Under Zia, a close alliance emerged between the military and orthodox Sunnis.248”
After the introduction of Zakat Ordinance and its rejection by the Shia’ community the
Deobandi political parties reacted, “The immediate and most violent reactions came from the Deobandis, who founded the Sawad-e-Azam Ahl-e-Sunnat (Greater Unity of the Sunnis) and demanded that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state, and Shi’as non-Muslim. The movement, which encouraged violence against the Shi’as, was institutionalized in 1985 as the Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS, Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions), later named the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The militant organization was founded in the Punjab with only one objective to confront the Shi’a population violently. The virulence of their rhetoric and actions were unprecedented. The SSP, although apparently an independent organization, was closely connected to the Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) until 1989… During the Zia-ul Huq regime the military establishment extended support to
247 Saba Imtiaz, Iftikhar Firdous. “Targeting symbols of spirituality.” The Express Tribune, 25 September 2010. (Can be accesssed at http://tribune.com.pk/story/54204/targeting-symbols-of-spirituality/) 248Stephen P. Cohen. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 152 the SSP to counter growing Shi’a political influence, made it an integral part of its anti-
Iran policy at home, and engaged it in raising fighters for the Afghan war.249”
Role of Deobandis in Pakistani Politics and Influence on Public Policy
The Deobandi parties played a major role in the legislative process of the period; augmenting an ‘Islamic’ constitution of 1973 that had little to do with what Jinnah had imagined for Pakistan, “Consequently, Zia introduced controversial Islamic legislation such as Hudood (Islamic codes), and other measures that included Zakat (compulsory alms- giving), Usher (agricultural tax), Islamic banking, and blasphemy laws through a handpicked and non-party undemocratically “elected” Majlis-e-Shura (Parliament) which gave indemnity to his actions that were illegal according to the 1973 Constitution.250” The
1973 constitution was contradictory to what Jinnah was propagating before the independence. Dr Murphy & Dr Rashid Malik. “Pakistan Jihad: The Making Of Religious
Terrorism, writes:
“In his efforts to promote an independent Muslim State,
Jinnah was opposed by Muslim religious parties and groups
namely Deobandis as well as the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam,
Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious oriented groups. They
were the supporters of Congress’s notion of undivided and
united India… Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan as a tolerant,
modern, Islamic democratic State was later hijacked by
religious elements who found in the new State an
249 Ali Raza. Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia. Rutgers University Press, 2008. 250 Richard Kurin. “Islamisation in Pakistan: a view from the countryside.” Asian Survey 25, no.8, August 1985: 852-62. 153
opportunity to advance their causes along conservative
religious lines. From within and outside the State, religion
was thus being used as a tool in advancing the political
motives of religious parties and groups. The constitutional
debate, the role of religious minorities, Islamisation, and
Sharia were some of the examples that explained such
trends and tendencies, which partly contributed toward the
rise of religious extremism.”251
In addition to political activism of Deobandis, the group played a major role in all spheres of political decision making during the Zia era, Hussain Haqqani writes, “Islamists were appointed to important government positions in the judiciary, civil services, and educational institutions. Sharia courts were established to try cases under Islamic law, while Islamisation was promoted through the government supported media.252”
Zia raised the rhetoric of religion that plucked the masses’ hearts and pleased the Ulema who would in return provide him an umbrella to rule. In the 1978 cabinet formation. Dr.
Hasan Askari writes:
“parties which accepted representation in the federal cabinet
included Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Jamiat-ul-Ulama-
Islam Pakistan (JUIP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) and
Jamaat-i-Islami… However, this was the first time for the
Ulema and other religious parties to be associated with power
251 Dr Eamon Murphy & Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik. “Pakistan Jihad: The Making Of Religious Terrorism.” IPRI Journal IX, no.2, Summer 2009: 17-31. 252 Husain Haqqani. Pakisan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2005. 154
structure of the government. If one glances through the past
record of the Ulema and religious parties, it appears that they
had failed to win a substantial majority in any elections. Once
in the government, they vehemently started advocating the
establishment of a religious state bordering on theocracy
rather than a modern democratic Islamic state. Such a point
of view was helpful to the military government to sidetrack
the demand of early Elections during 1979-85.”253
Zia regime introduced the Hudood Ordinance to change the legal system of the country to a more Islamic colour. “Zia’s campaign to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state consisted of two measures. The first one, already mentioned above, consisted of the introduction of hadd offenses into the system of criminal laws. The hadd offenses are those offenses for which the Qur’an specifies fixed punishments as long as certain conditions, such as the rules of evidence governing a particular hadd offense, have been fulfilled. The second measure consisted of creating an entirely new court with exclusive jurisdiction to examine whether or not a law is in accordance with the injunctions of Islam.”254
The ordinance covers drunkenness, rape, theft and criminalizes Zina-bil-jabr; and views it a symbols of religious affinity to make the state more ‘Islamized’. “Women, non-Muslims and minor sects were the direct victims of such reforms. The Blasphemy Law, the Law of
Evidence, Hudood punishments and several other edicts upheld by the Pakistani judicial
253 Hassan Askari Rizvi. Military and Politics in Pakistan. Progressive Publishers, 1974. 254 Martin Lau. “Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances— A Review.” WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 2007. 155 system are in direct contravention of the human rights commitment that the Government of
Pakistan has made to the international community.”255
The ordinance was brought in through direct presidential orders without being discussed through the relevant political institutions i.e. the parliament, prominent human rights activist Asma Jahangir explains, “The Hudood laws, promulgated in 1979 and enforced in
1980, are a collection of five criminal laws, collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances.
The Offences Against Property Ordinance deals with the crime of theft and armed robbery.
The Offence of Zina Ordinance relates to the crime of rape, abduction, adultery and fornication. The word Zina covers adultery as well as fornication. The Offence of Qazf
Ordinance relates to a false accusation of Zina. The Prohibition Order prohibits use of alcohol and narcotics. The last is the Execution of Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, which prescribes the mode of whipping for those convicted under the Hudood
Ordinances.”256
Historian Ayesha Jalal writes that General Zia used the women’s card, “realizing that very few had been persuaded, the General, a wily social tactician, calculated that playing the women's card could confirm his regime's commitment to Islam and, by extension, its legitimacy.”257
255 Ishtiaq Ahmed. “Pakistan's Human Rights Obligations.” Daily Times, 30 November 2003. (Can be accessed at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-11-2003_pg3_2) 256 Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani. The Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction?. Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003: 23. 257 Ayesha Jalal. “The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan.” In Women, Islam and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti. Macmillan Press, 1991: 101 156
State patronage to Sunni orthodox-Wahabi in influenced Deobandis to ensure Islamization
In pursuit of its interest, the General Zia regime patronized Islamic groups to further the concept of ‘Jihad’. US help to General Zia to sustain his foreign policy and as a result ensure continuity of his regime. Though one can not say that US support was the only factor in consolidating General Zia’s regime, nevertheless, it certainly contributing in endorsing his policies through financial and diplomatic support. Dietrich Reetz in his work, “Migrants, Mujahedin, Madrassa Students, writes, “It was particularly General Zia- ul-Haq who, with the express consent and encouragement of Western nations, and the U.S. in particular, politicized Islam to stabilize his own hold on power. During his reign several
Islamic actors allowed themselves to be instrumentalized hoping to advance their own ideological objectives. This state intervention grossly “distorted” the Islamic field and created new players, institutions and concepts which later on acquired an identity and life of their own.”258
After Zia’s death and the resultant 1988 elections, Benazir Bhutto became the PM of
Pakistan. However, she was unable to alter the Islamic colour her predecessor had given to the state; hence she continued with most of his policies. “A major stumbling-block to the
Bhutto government turned out to be the existence of the constitution as amended by Zia ul
Haq. An attempt by the PPP to have the constitutional changes of 1985 declared null and void by the Supreme Court, failed.259” This resulted in a number of political crises that
258 Dietrich Reetz. “Migrants, Mujahedin, Madrassa Students: The Diversity of Transnational Islam in Pakistan.” South Asia-Chronicle, January 2011: 182. 259 Olivier Immig and Jan Van Heugten, “A Taste of Power: Uneasy Reign of Benazir Bhutto-1988-1990” immigvanheugten, 1994: 4. 157 included rift between the Prime Minister and the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, central authority versus provincial autonomy among many others.
Nawaz Sharif’s government (1990-1993), the national conservative saw the continuation of the preceding Islamist policies. The period was marked with Gulf crisis with Kuwait invasion by Iraq. Defense analyst, Ayesha Siddiqa wirtes, “The intial decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia was taken by the interim government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. This decision was, howeever, upheld by the incoming Nawaz Sharif governemt. The new government had found itself in a situation where the Army chief had taken a position almost totally opposed to that of the government’s.”260
Hudood Ordinace and “Islamizing” the society
Reading through the Hudood Ordinance 1979, one realizes how “hadd”261 has been introduced in friction to basic fundamental rights of citizens that had lived 32 years since the creation of Pakistan under swinging authoritarian and democratic regimes. “hadd” referring to (unamendable) punishments under the principles of the Holy Quran, was deemed unquestionable in the ordinance. However, the word was interpreted and therefore put to practice in a way objectionable to the teachings of Islam.
The ordinance promulgated at the time of General Zia-ul-Haq clearly denies the citizens, especially women, of their right of protection in the light of Islamic rules and principles when put to practice. The definition of Zina and Zina bil -jabr as described in the Hudood
Ordinance under Article 2 does not differentiate between rape, extra-marital relationship and fornication, which is why the definition becomes vague when, put to practice. The
260 Op cit, 261 261 The Offence of Zina (Enforcement Of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, 2(b) 158 loopholes within the offence of Zina ordinance have resulted in increased violence against women rather than curtailing the criminal acts. More and more women were accused of adultery under this ordinance if they could not produce four witnesses to support their case, leading to accusation on the victims and imprisonment in accordance with “hadd” or
“tazir”. Thus this law could easily be used as a tool by the law enforcement authorities to victimize innocent citizens and put them behind bars.
Moreover, the law of Qazf does not promise authenticated protection and check against accusations either. Firstly, because the law itself is seen to be weak in terms of allowing bail and being non-cognisable. Secondly, during the subsistence of marriage, a husband cannot be punished for allegations of Qazf according to section 3 of the ordinance.
Such laws may be seen as principally flawed and amount to the discrimination within our society against the weaker class. Laws formulated within the framework of Islam but implemented in exploitative tendencies have led to the instability and corrosion of the social fabric of our society. Thus it may not be wrong to question the credibility of the
Pakistani constitution to be viable in associating itself to a democratic state or a theocratic state.
Democratic Republic of India
Constitutional guarantees for religious freedom and refrain from religion based public policy
The state of India since its establishment, adopted a secularist agenda with respect to the formation of rules and procedures of the state and the government. The constitution of
India 1949 thus promulgated, delivers a secularist ideology and preaches religious freedom for all citizens as their fundamental right and thus totally disseminates religion from the
159 workings of the state and government. The constitution clearly states in Part III, article
(15), the right to equality, that:262
Article 15. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
1[(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.]
2[(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the
State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.]
Moreover, while looking at the constitution of India, it is clear that religious freedom is granted to all citizens and some clauses contradict the principles of Hindu religion. For
262 Constitution of India adopted by the Constitutuent Assembly on November 26, 1949 and promulgated on January 26, 1950 160 example the law of the abolition of un-touchability which guarantees the citizens of equal rights and opportunities and also of non-discriminatory acts. The notion of un-touchability penetrated deep into the roots of Hindu culture. Apart from the four major castes in Hindu society, there are the untouchables that are ranked lower than the sudras (a caste considered to be the lowest in the society).
According to babu gojeneni, “In the 1500s, during the rule of the Marathas and the
Peshwas in today's Maharastra state, 'untouchables' were not allowed within the gates of the capital city Poona between 3.00 pm and 9.00 am. The reason was that during this time their bodies were likely to cast long shadows, with the attendant danger that the shadow of an 'untouchable' might fall on a Brahmin and pollute him. An 'untouchable' had to carry an earthen pot around his neck so his spittle may not pollute the earth. In Maharashtra an
'untouchable' wore a black thread either in his neck or on his wrist for ready identification, while in Gujarat a horn had to be worn for identification. Mahatma Gandhi called them
Harijans or children of God. Now they are called Dalits, which means broken people.263”
The constitution of India however offers un-touchables protection under the abolition of un-touchability law which clearly states under Article 17 of the constitution that:
Article 17 “Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
The law clearly reflects the secular perspective of the constitution that separates the state from religion. Furthermore, according to article 25 of the constitution, all persons have the right to practice their own religion:
263 Babu Gojineni. International Humanist and Ethical Union. November 30th, 2005. (Can be accessed at http://www.iheu.org/node/1814 161
Article 25. (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.
The constitutional guarantees paid in terms of religious freedom and freedom of speech further strengthens the democratic process in India. This however does not denote that the
Indian society is free of all sorts of discrimination and communal violence. Being a multi- cultural and multi-religious society India faces a dilemma of a semi-secularist agenda where the society is unclenched within the Hindu and Muslim rivalries and the abundance of Hindu population influences and broods communal violence within the society as seen in practice. The incident of Babri masjid marks a devastating blow to India’s secularism portraying religious intolerance and political upheaval in the name of religion264.
Article 28 of the constitution guarantees a secularist agenda at the educational sector as well, promising a policy of a non-religiously influenced educational institution. The article states:
28. (1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in
264Ashis Nandy. "An anti secularist manifesto." international quarterly, 1995: 14-24. 162 such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.
The Democratic processes as compared to many of the other developing democracies stand strong in India perhaps due to the accountability of freedom of rights and religion that the constitution guarantees to the people. However according to Asghar Ali, “India, as pointed out, is a multi-religious and multi-cultural country and modern secular democratic polity can survive only if religious people are determined to promote religious and spiritual values. This globalised world cannot escape being religiously plural, secular and democratic. Globalization is creating pressures of its own which disrupt our religious values and culture. In this period of globalization we have to be firmly rooted in our religious values. Indian plurality alone can be our valuable asset and religious response has to be based on tolerance, respect and compassion for others.265”
It is interesting to note that the word “secular” was not immersed in the Indian constitution until the 42nd amendment in 1976 and now with the advancement of social and economic democracy, secularism has become a major structural part of the constitution of India.
Religion is only a matter of faith and thus should be kept away from the state procedures.
However, despite the related efforts of India to become a pure secularist state, there is no denying the fact that religion and religious pluralism lies deep within the societal patterns and cannot be ignored that easily.
265 Engineer Ali Asghar. www.docs.google.com. april 1-15, 2005. (Can be accessed at https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:ornfutgGFE4J:www.rightlivelihood.org/fileadmin/Files/PDF/ Literature_Recipients/Engineer___Agnivesh/Engineer_- _Contemporary_challenges.pdf+&hl=en&gl=pk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESinMTt5biXTHF08OgZx7AEgZ9k 7baVXFKYxyx-q7GV8) 163
Indian Legislature and Religious Minorities
The Indian constitution holds a secular preamble that recognizes the rights of minorities groups and socially and economically backward classes. These Other Backward Classes
(OBC) were allowed to “to avail of fifty per cent of seats in all government educational institutions and all government-aided and sponsored educational institutions” through a legislative enactment of the parliament in 2006.266
Though anti-conversion law is applicable only in 7 Indian states (out of 28 states), the constitution has attempted to guarantee forced conversions from one religious faith to the other by ‘improper means’. “While these anti-conversion laws, on their face, appear to protect religious adherents only from attempts to induce conversion by improper means, the failure to clearly define what makes a conversion improper bestows governments with unfettered discretion to accept or reject the legitimacy of religious conversions.267”
The In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225, is considered a landmark decision by the supreme court of India that benchmarked ‘secularism’ as bases for the Indian constitution in 1973. “In the case Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
(1973) 4 SCC 225, the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that secularism was a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.268”
Article 13 (2) of the Indian constitution states, “"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void." The term Part refers to Part
266 India.” World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People . December 2008. http://www.minorityrights.org/5648/india/india-overview.html (accessed April 19, 2012). 267 Religious Freedom and Religious Persecution Issues In India. European Centre for Law and Justice, February 2008. (Can be accessed at http://eclj.org/PDF/080303_Persecution_Memo_India.pdf) 268 Vivek Salathia. “Secularism and Indian Constitution- Is the Secular Character of Indian Democracy Under Threat.” Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, 2. (Can be accessed at http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/SalathiaVivek%28India%29.pdf)
164
III of the Constitution which lists the fundamental rights of the citizen.” Similarly Article
368 “that contained provisions related to the amendment of the Constitution, merely laid down the mending procedure. Article 368 did not confer upon Parliament the power to amend the Constitution.”269
Both articles prohibit any amendments to guarantee the secularization of the constitution.
“The article (Article 13 (2)) provides for the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizen. Parliament and the state legislatures are clearly prohibited from making laws that may take away or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen. They argued that any amendment to the Constitution had the status of a law as understood by Article 13
(2). In 1952 (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India5) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v.
Rajasthan6), the Supreme Court rejected both arguments and upheld the power of
Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution including that which affects the fundamental rights of citizens. Significantly though, two dissenting judges in Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan case raised doubts whether the fundamental rights of citizens could become a plaything of the majority party in Parliament.270” However, it was later decided that
“Article 368 contained both the power and the procedure for amending the Constitution.
However, the Indian legislature guarantees the protection and justness for the religious minorities through the constitution, “The state has chosen to interpret secularism as the responsibility to ensure the protection and equality of all religions and provide for regulation and reform, rather than the strict separation or religion and state. Yet, there is no mistaking the overall secular design articulated in three salient principles. The first is the
269Constitution of India, 1949 270 Venkatesh Nayak. “The Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution.” Human Rights Initiative. http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/const/the_basic_structure_of_the_indian_constitution.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012). 165 principle of religious freedom, which covers not just the right to religious thought, but every aspect of faith, including belief and rituals, and also freedom from discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, place of birth, or gender. The second principle of the secular state is articulated in Articles 17 and 25(2), 30(1 and 2) which permit the state to intervene in religious affairs, regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political, or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. The third feature was the emphasis on social welfare and reform. In pursuit of this agenda, the state abolished untouchability and threw open Hindu temples to all sections of the community.
Additionally, the state is involved in administering religious trusts, declaring holidays for religious festivals, preserving the system of personal laws for different communities, undertaking the reform of religious law, and besides all this, secular courts interpret religious laws.271”
Although there have been amendments to the Indian constitution under the secular congress government, however the minority rights were left out at times. Zoya Hasan explains:
“Hindus, like Muslims, have considered personal law based on the
‘dharmashastra’, a part of their religious tradition. Nonetheless, the
Congress government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru
went ahead within a year of Independence to enact a number of
progressive laws in relation to marriage and divorce (1955),
adoption and maintenance (1956), minority and guardianship
(1956), succession and inheritance (1956), etc. These broke away
from the shastric tradition and represented the initial but important
271 Zoya Hasan. “Gender, Religion and Democratic Politics in India.” Heinrich Böll Foundation, September 2009: 7. 166
steps in the direction of, first, the liberalization and secularization of
Hindu personal law. More contentious than the shortfalls of Hindu
law reform was the state’s reluctance to adopt a similar approach
towards reform of the religious personal laws of minority
communities, i.e. Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Parsis to bring
them in line with modern notions of gender justice. The critics have
directed their energies on what they perceive as unequal exercise of
power of the state, providing for reform of the institutions and
practices of Hinduism, while not deploying this power in relation to
Indian Islam. This created an aberration in the very notion of equal
citizenship: if it was accepted that the state could intervene to
provide equal rights to members of one community, then what
ground was there for not doing the same for others?272”
Secular congress leaders always attempted to maintain a secular colour of the state through their policies. Even with the decline of its popularity in the 1960s, Congress never resorted to religio- politico agenda. Zoya Hasan further writes:
“The Congress’s political supremacy began to decline from the late
1960s, and with it India’s secular framework began to be weakened.
From the early 1980s, the Congress was confronted with a politics
of segmentation and sectarianism arising from identity conflicts in
the political process. Before this period, the political impact of
religion was limited and communal parties won few seats. Even in
the face of pressures from Hindu communalists, Nehru never
272 Ibid, P. 8 167
countenanced a political role for religion, as that would endanger
India’s national integrity. While Indira Gandhi retained a strong
commitment to India as a secular state, the clear separation between
politics and religion required to maintain the secularist polity
became blurred. The readiness to overstep the bounds of
constitutional propriety on matters of religion and secularism
created the space for the rapid rise of an anti-secular alternative.273”
Ultra – Orthodox Hindu Extremism Groups and Local Politics
Though BJP was established in 1980, it was almost a decade later that it joined the mainstream Indian politics reflecting the fact that secular identity of political parties was more popular among the masses in India. Today, the major religiously backed political party considered in Indian politics is BJP. Nevertheless, the major ruling parties are based on secular agendas. “In both the 1998 and 1999 elections the BJP emerged as the single largest party winning 182 out of 543 seats Lok Sabha seats. This marked a crucial turning point in modern Indian politics as, for the first time the BJP, India's main rightwing political party and the front party of a family of militant Hindu organizations (known as the
Sangh Parivar) formed a government at the Centre ending decades of erstwhile political isolation. Apart from six years of the BJP-led coalition government in Delhi, India has not been governed by a political party or a coalition of parties that make explicit appeals to religion.274”
273 Ibid. P. 11-12 274 Zoya Hasan. “Gender, Religion and Democratic Politics in India.” Heinrich Böll Foundation, September 2009: 4. 168
Although a plural society and home to Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews, the country has faced some orthodox Hindu extremist acts. For instance, “The unravelling of the secularist fabric began with demands for regional autonomy in Punjab and the manner in which the
Indian state responded to those demands. In response the Congress decided to play ‘the
Hindu card’ to undercut the popularity of its regional rival, the Akali Dal party.”275
The Ayodhya dispute put the secular character of the country into danger, Jan Peter
Hartung writes,
“This latent communalism made it possible for Hindu
nationalist movements to 'work out strategies for a cultural
and political genocide on Muslims, in the result of which
Muslims would no longer persist as a culturally distinct
community within this society.' One of these strategies, as
Muslim leaders were quite aware of, was the conversion of
historic mosques - symbols of Muslim cultural identity -
into temples, which was tolerated, if not even encouraged,
by the central and local governments. Exemplary for this
was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's assurance to Muslim
leaders during talks in February 1986 that he would
strongly vote for the Muslims in the Babri Masjid dispute,
which almost coincided with the re-opening of the mosque
for Hindus only.276”
275Ibid 276 Jan Peter Hartung. “The Ayodhya Conflict and Muslim Leadership.” ISIM NEWSLETTER, November 2002: 12. (Can be accessed at 169
The Ayodhya dispute speaks volumes Hindu extremism that paved the path for BJP taking over the elections. The dispute was turned into a local political rivalry escalated by Hindu
Muslim tensions, “Several decisions of the Congress, which included unlocking the disputed site, launching the party’s 1991 electoral campaign from Faizabad a town near
Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in north India, and allowing the foundation stones of the proposed temple to be laid near the mosque were aimed at arousing Hindu sentiment for electoral purposes but had the effect of compromising the secular principle of separation of religion and politics and encouraging the BJP to intensify its campaign for a Ram temple.
Overall, the decision to turn a dispute between two religions over a piece of holy ground into a national issue was intended to appease the majority community which was unhappy with the government’s decision to overturn the Shah Bano court verdict.
Even as Congress flirted sporadically with the politics of religion, it was eventually to become its principal victim paving the way for the emergence of BJP as a major political force in the name of protecting the majority community against the excesses of minority appeasement and the vote-bank politics of the Congress. It undermined its secular credentials by giving one concession to a particular community and offsetting it by granting concessions to other communities in a process that emboldened both Hindu communalists and Muslim fundamentalists.277”
The Hindu nationalist party, BJP gained momentum during the 1980s; prior to which it had never gained a great degree of popularity. Though India fought two wars with Pakistan
(1965 and 1971), the party was unable to secure votes within the contemporary political atmosphere in the society. Furthermore, Hindutva campaigns were targeted to promulgate https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/16795/ISIM_10_The_Ayodhya_Conflict_and_Musli m_Leadership.pdf?sequence=1) 277 Op.cit. 278. P. 13 170 anti-Muslim sentiment in order to unite the Hindus. Hence, “it is only from the 1980s that there has been a resurgence of their influence in India’s public life… The growing appeal of Hindutva and its inherent antagonism towards Muslims was an expression of social tensions between caste groups, especially lower castes, breaking out of their subordination within the Hindu caste system. These shifts have coincided with broader processes at work, particularly the deepening of democratic process.
The restructuring and dislocation of politics and society affected by these tendencies of integration, on the one hand, and differentiation and fragmentation, on the other, needed an ideology that political Hinduism sought to provide. The Hindutva campaigns have consistently sought to exploit a sense of anxiety about Hindu identity and the alleged partiality of the state towards religious minorities, especially Muslims. What is significant is that this force has legitimized itself on the basis of the feeling that Hindus were subject to discriminatory treatment even though upper-caste Hindus dominate all political institutions in independent India and are economically and culturally powerful. Even so, they have created a pervasive sense that Hindus have not received their due even after the Partition of
India. This approach posits Muslims as the adversary for all Hindus regardless of their internal differences, beliefs, and practices. It derives its charge from an external principle of coherence which is central to establishing unity among Hindus. There is an obsessive focus on the Muslim danger, even though India faces no serious threat from this minority.278”
Political campaigns launched by the RSS - VHP in the 1980s are a true reflection of Hindu chauvinism that was prominently visible in the Gujarat riots. “During this period, politics began being dominated by religion in contrast to the politics and movements prior to the
278 Op.cit. 278. P. 14 171
1980s which focused on broader social and material issues. The period was also marked by waves of communal rioting culminating in the election of the first ever BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government at the Centre. In 2002, the state of Gujarat was engulfed by brutal communal violence against Muslims. It is estimated that 2000 people were massacred.
In one way the violence in Gujarat stands out from the innumerable incidents of communal violence in India over half a century: the BJP government in the state was directly involved in acts of omission and commission. Gujarat is a vivid example of the politics of religion going horribly wrong, when a political party bases its appeal on ideas of religious nationalism and ethnic homogeneity, and when violence is aided and abetted by the highest levels of government and no action is taken against those who perpetrated it.279”
Other Muslim groups and Role of Deobandis in Indian Politics
Religious activism of Muslims in India has never been violent and extremist; majorly because of the provision of civil liberties and freedom of religion in her secular constitution. Hence, religious activism has always been benign in India. Animesh Roul explains:
“Unlike other parts of the world where Islamic activism is intense,
this activism is relatively moderate in India. Demographically a
minority, the Muslim population in India feels rather safe and
secure under India’s constitution and largely supports the secular
concept of the Indian state and India’s composite culture. The overt
279 Ibid p - 16 172
drive to implement Shari‘a (Islamic law) has never been as intense
in India as in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since
independence, the Indian government has allowed its minority
Muslim citizenry to follow shari‘a in civil life and does not
promote the majority Hindu religion and practices. Even though
Muslims feel secure in India, their confidence has been largely
shaken by the rise of right-wing Hindus and militant groups who
have challenged Indian Muslims’ “loyalty” to the land, questioning
their true allegiance, and increasing communal violence targeting
the Indian Muslim community.280”
The role of Deobandis in Local Indian politics has always been its close association with the congress party and probably that was the reason that there has not been any link established between the Deobandi groups and Kashmir “Jihad.”281
The Deobandi school, has usually abstained itself from any sort of reactionary politics.
Rather, the group has always withheld an apolitical stance on various issues. Arguably, the
Deoband’s influence spread due to two of its inspired offshoots, Tablighi Jamaat (TJ, though an independent movement, it has motives similar to the Deoband’s dawat o tabligh wing) and the Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind (JUIH, Association of Indian Ulema). The Deoband movement was not overtly apolitical even though it strictly adhered to the principle of keeping politics at bay. It had supported the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement during World
War I and the freedom movement in India (prior to 1947). The Deoband’s activist stance
280 Animesh Roul. “Transnational Islam in India: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics.” The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2009. P. 105 281 Adeel Mehdi, Lecturer and author of book on Madrassas in India, during an interview with the author at Jamia Millia Islamia , New Delhi, November 22, 2010. 173 was evident from its goal for freedom from foreign rule and preservation of the Muslim faith and its historical institution. Retaining its semi-apolitical character in post- independence India, the Deoband School has largely refrained from active political participation while working for Muslim identity and interests in the country. As a religious organization, it was closely associated with the Muslim League with the demand for partition and then with the Congress Party and some contemporary regional political groupings. With its nationwide network, besides reaching the Indian parliament, the JUIH has been involved in charity, minority educational reforms, and continues to fight for the rights of Indian Muslims. “282
The head of JUH, Maulana Mahmood A. Madani strongly believes that the aggressive characteristic of Deobandi politics is found in the Pakistan’s Pukhtoon province its proximity to Afghanistan. He states that in India, institutions (in this case Darul Uloom
Deoband, India) and politics are separate.283
According to him, before independence its main goal was to struggle for freedom of India.
After realization of that goal it concentrated upon the religio-socio-economic as well as educational uplift of Indian Muslims. The JUH made notable contribution towards making
India secular state and farming a secular Constitution. Though the constitution provides freedom to all minorities, practically, it is a long way to go.”284
The Ahle Hadith School, with its Saudi Wahhabi connection has close links to Diasporas around the world and has mostly focused on engaging in non-violent activities as preaching of religion and Islamic ideals. “The Ahle Hadith (AH, also Ahle Hadees) has been
282 Op.cit.284. P.107 283 Interview with Maulana Mahmood A. Madani, General Secretary of JUH, at his residence, New Delhi India on November 26, 2010 284 Ibid 174 influential in the subcontinent with active ties with Saudi Wahhabis and strong diasporas links Ahle Hadith propagates openly the doctrine of jihad in India, however, under special circumstances. 285According to AH, jihad can be invoked when and where the Islamic community is facing hardships and tyranny. In southern India AH inspired, among others, the Mujahid Students Movement (MSM) in the state of Kerala in the early 1970s which emerged as a student wing of the Kerala Nadvathul Mujahedeen (KNM), the Salafi group active in Kerala with Gulf ties. Initially a part of the Ittihad Subbanul Mujahedeen (ISM), the youth wing of KNM, MSM engages in Islamic da‘wa and propagates Islamic ideals and principles among the student community in Kerala and facilitates deliberations on
Islam.”286
It is interesting to note that Deobandis in India tend to keep separate their relationship with Saudi Wahabism while the nexus between Al-Hadith and Saudi Wahabism appears more stronger in India though the number of al-Hadith followers are of course very little as compared to Deobandis. 287
Though Jamaat-i-Islami Hind (JIH) has been known for abstaining from participation in the first Afghan war, it supported the Zia regime in Pakistan, “Overwhelmed by the success of the Iranian revolution, the Indian Jamaat supported another Islamic icon in neighbouring
Pakistan. Jamaat-i-Islami Hind was supportive of Zia ul- Haq’s agenda of establishing
God’s rule in Pakistan and overtly critical of pro-democratic forces including Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto’s family members in that country.
285 Adeel Mehdi, Lecturer and author of book on Madrassas in India, during an interview with the author at Jamia Millia Islamia , New Delhi, November 22, 2010. 286 Op.cit.284. p 111-112 287 Adeel Mehdi, op cit, 86 175
As per JIH, Zia was working not only for Pakistan’s stability, but for the unity of the
Muslim world.” Maulana Jalal udin Oomri, Amir-e-Jamaat-i-Islami Hind, believes that
Jihad cannot be declared by individual or individual groups rather a state or ruler is the only authority to declare Jihad; this endorses the fact that JIH was supporting Jihad declared by Gen.Zia of Pakistan against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. 288
This period is marked with a transformation and restructuring of these groups in India where organizations as JIH reformed itself to struggle for the Indian Muslims and showed a flexible stand. “Gradually, JIH structured itself like the Hindu right-wing organization, the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and refrained from direct political participation, but continued to work closely with secular and other regional Islamic political parties like the
All India Majlis-e- Ittehadul Muslimen. It became the key interventionist force in India to fight for Muslim identity. More or less, it followed a relatively flexible Maududi model to suit Indian conditions. 289 Among other established religio-political groups in India during this period, All India organization of Imam of Mosques also emerged as a neutralizing factor in the time of religious extremism and radicalization.
Imam Umer Ahmed Ilyasi , President of the organization has been supported by the Indian state to present the soft image of Indian Muslim. According to him, “internal Jihad or
Jihad-e-Akbar is the priority number one for all Muslims hence waging violent struggle against other faiths and sects is not desirable, Indian Muslims are moderate and in order to protect the existence of Muslims in India , this moderate face should be promoted.”290
288 Syed Jalaluddin Oomri , Amir Jamaat-i-Islami Hind spoke with the author at JIH headquarter New Delhi on November 24, 2010 289 Op.cit.284. p 114-115 290 Interview with Imam Umer Ahmed Ilyasi at his home in New Delhi on November 26, 2010 176
During the 1970-80 decade, the Deobandi School in India refrained from getting politically involved in the Afghan Jihad, though the group that strong linkages with the Saudi
Wahhab. “In the 1970s, JIH had reportedly developed close links with the Gulf countries when thousands of Indian Muslims migrated to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries for livelihood, mostly in the field of construction. The contribution of Mohammad Yusuf, the ameer of JIH in the 1970s, to build strong ties with Saudi Arabia is well documented.
Jamaat-i-Islami Hind’s transnational reach and influence came to light during the movement’s Hyderabad convention in 1981 where Islamic activists from Saudi Arabia participated.291”
Role of Deobandis in Indian Muslim politics
Deobandi madrassas have under gone changes in Northern India. It is essential to realise that from their own perspective these institutions have undergone dramatic changes since the 1970s; the gradual modernisation of the institution and its teaching methods; and the strong articulation of non-religious concerns in ideology, politics, and society.292
Historically, Deobandi madrassas were seen as institutions of disloyalty to the British.
“After the defeat of the anti-colonial uprising of 1857-58, in which many Muslim princes and scholars took part, Islamic institutions were suspected of disloyalty and sedition by the
British rulers. Religious scholars decided instead to concentrate on the reconstruction of
291 Op.cit.284. p 115 292 Dietrich Reetz. “Change and Stagnation in Islamic Education: The Dar al-Ulum of Deoband after the Split in 1982.” In The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, by Yoginder Sikand & Martin van Bruinessen (eds.) Farish A. Noor. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. P. 71 177 religious knowledge and religiosity. Politically, they preferred to prove their loyalty to the
British during this period.293”
Deobandi scholars were associated with the Khilafat movement in the post WW I period.
“Deoband scholars, in particular, identified with Ottoman rule, defending if after WWI and together with Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), they initiated the broad-based but unsuccessful Khilafat movement (1919-1925).294”
Deobandi School is marked with orthodox ways of interaction. “Deoband scholars were characterised by a marked orthodoxy, as well as by purism and asceticism. Relations between Deobandis and groups (maslak) representing other interpretations of Islam were burdened by controversy… Today’s Deoband School stands out as an orthodox reference point for the rest of the Muslim world.295”
The Deoband School has branched into Jam-iyat-ul-ulama-i Hind (JUH) in India and Jam- iyat-ul-ulama-i Islam (JUI) in Pakistan as two twin political parties. “It had spawned public activism in the form of an association of religious scholars known as the Jam-iyat-ul- ulama-i Hind (JUH), which had already emerged as a political party by the time of partition, and continued its political activities in Pakistan under the name of Jam-iyat-ul- ulama-i Islam (JUI). Its Indian counterpart, the JUH, concentrated on religious, educational and cultural activities.”296
An analysis of Indian and Pakistani Deobandis provides that in Pakistan it appears to be working on aggressive political Islam while in India the Deobandis are more
293 Ibid. . P. 73 294Ibid P. 73 295Ibid . P. 74-75 296 Ibid, . P. 75 178 accommodative of the existing political system. Maulana Madni of Jamaiat-e-Ulema-e-
Hind talked about composite nationalism, he believed that Prophet Muhammed (SAW)’s first regime was based on pluralism hence he put forwarded the idea of United nationalism or “ Mutehada Qoumiat” and that is why we find early Deobandi politics in alliance with secular politics of Congress party.
179
Chapter 5
International Political Environment (1979-2001) and Internal Politics of India and Pakistan: Implications on Regional Politics
The world has seen some of the most drastic and surprising episodes in the political world during the years 1979 to 2001. The political shifts witnessed during these decades include tumbled regimes, deadly invasions, social and political revolutions and radical shifts in polices. The most significant of these changes occurred in the close proximity of Pakistan.
The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iranian revolution effected the international environment, besides both of them open doors for regional problems and unpredicted circumstances for the region. The third most important incident was the attack on twin towers in USA by a terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda in September, 2001. This provoked an immediate reaction by US government in the shape of Afghanistan invasion in
October, 2001.
The country most affected by all these events is Pakistan. First the USSR invasion in
Afghanistan caused an internal instability, structured with external threats. The political scenario in Pakistan has also seen some of the most dramatic policies shift in Pakistan. The dictatorial regime of Gen Zia-ul-Haq fully backed the Afghan mujahedeen against USSR in
Afghanistan. Here we can also see the alliance between USA and Pakistan, crossing all boundaries of cooperation and assistance. USA hugely funded the Pakistan’s regime and
Taliban to fight against Russian invasion. This whole scenario badly affected the internal state of security in Pakistan majorly because of the porous borders between Afghanistan
180 and Pakistan and secondly because of the huge influx of the Afghan refugees. This invasion in Afghanistan pushed Pakistan in a serious threat of security dilemma.
Besides this invasion, in the regional context there were many severe riots going on between Hindus and Muslims in India at that time. Besides international pressures and emerging scenarios Pakistan also had to face the regional issues and their impact on the domestic politics and affairs. During the Afghan Jihad after Russian invasion, somehow jihad was extensively used as a political tool in Pakistan. It became a state policy and it worked together with the process of Islamization during Zia’s regime. Pakistan was thoroughly involved in the Great Jihad in Afghanistan and it left behind its own outcomes.
Afghanistan has somehow remained a focus of the world powers for years. After ten long years, USSR pulled out its troops from Afghanistan and another invasion was waiting in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Due to continuous ups and downs, still after three long decades the stability is not present in this region. The uncertain situation in Afghanistan directly affects the stability in Pakistan.
Cold war and clash of ideologies
Cold war was clearly a clash of ideologies: capitalism against communism. It was a clash between the two world powers at that time, Soviet Union and America. Soviet wanted to spread communism throughout Eastern Europe. At that time there were visibly two power blocs, one comprised and influenced by USA and allies and the other dominated by USSR and it was divided as east and west. Both of the ideologies, capitalism and communism were nearly complete opposite to each other and from these differences the conflict and clash emerged.
181
During that time, there was an element of distrust and suspicion between both the blocs, which further intensified the situation. USSR spread communism in the Eastern Europe and this created insecurity dilemma for the Europeans. Being the world power, to spread communism besides many other objectives, USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979. This invasion was very critically received by the states. United States found an opportunity to strangle and break the Soviet empire by supporting the Mujahedeen factions fighting in
Afghanistan against Soviets and Pakistan for supporting these mujahedeen.
According to the narrations available at the website of US department of State, the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, killed Hafizullah Amin and made Babrak
Karmal as the Prime Minister of the state. The Karmal regime was supported by Soviet troops and it was not able to spread its authority beyond Kabul’s boundaries. More than
80% of the country was not having any effective government control. Majority of the
Afghans opposed this invasion and the puppet regime under soviets. The Mujahedeen faction widely opposed the regime and did not allow it to govern outside few areas. In the earlier stage the Mujahedeen were not properly armed to confront the Russian troops, so within few years they start receiving assistance for US and other powers. 297
The fight against the Soviet invasion was somehow became a “Great Jihad” and Muslims all over the world participated in this struggle. According to the author Wynbrnadt, “the
United States provoke and encourage the Muslim countries to support their aim covertly.
US provided huge financial support to the Afghan Mujahedeen fighting against Soviet
297 US Department of State. November 28, 2011. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Background Note: Afghanistan. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm 182 troops. US actually spread this war propaganda, covertly financed the fighting factions and tried to defeat the Russian invasion at the hands of Muslims.” 298
Invasion in Afghanistan was a very crucial event at the later stage of the cold war.
According to Pierre Allan and Albert Stahel during this war the image of many characters have widely changed and perceived. The Islamic faction of Mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets’ gained a favorable spot in the media. They were portrayed in a highly positive way in the western media, and their negative attributes were quite ignored. Also, in academic circles these guerilla fighters were positively explained. 299
It will not be an exaggeration that US very thoroughly planned the strategic maneuvers while defeating the Soviets at the hands of Muslims. Mujahedeen were made as heroes and appreciated all over the world. After the cold war, the Taliban government took the charge of the state. Now, the image of the Taliban is more negative although they have originated from the same guerilla fighters which were heavily invested by west. 300
Pakistan-US military alliance and the beginning of great Jihad
The role of Pakistan was very important during the whole episode of invasion in
Afghanistan. US sensed and used the commitment of the Muslims to this “holy war”, so they financed it to realize the defeat of the Soviets at the hands of Mujahedeen, covertly assisted by US and other powers. In wake of the soviet invasion another US-Pak alliance was formed. US assisted Pakistan in the proxy war which was waged in Afghanistan against Russia.301
298 James Wynbrnadt, A brief history of Pakistan. ( Facts on File, 2009) 299 Pierre Allan and Albert A . Stahel , “Tribal Guerilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1983), p. 590. 300 David N. Gibbs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect. University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA. International Politics 37: 233 - 246 , June 2000. Kluwer Law International . USA 301 Samina Ahmed, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond,” International Security, winter 2001/2, p. 80. 183
Again a great alliance between Pakistan and United States emerged on the scene soon after the Russian invasion. US provided money and material through Pakistan to support the
Mujahedeen who were countering the invaders. 302 Pakistan military and intelligence were fully at the front and US covertly supported the Mujahedeen section who were trained by
Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the CIA.303 Pakistan supported the covert cause of US by supporting the Mujahedeen faction. Pakistan was also awarded the most-favored-nation trading status for the support extended at that time. 304 General Hamid
Gul asserts that the American public which is now anti-Taliban, was all praise during the days of anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad, he said that at the time, when the cauldron of Russian-
Afghan war was boiling, the US used to praise the mujahideen as the holy warriors and the western girls used to idealize their long beards, turbans and their dusty flipflops. But now they are calling them wild savages and terrorists. He said this shows America runs after its interests. Muslim jihadi fights with faith; not with arsenal, whereas the US forces depend upon technology.305
The Afghan became more hostile towards the Soviets and their Afghan allies. The Soviets never imagined the intensity of counter response from the Afghan Mujahedeen. This was also very astounding and unbelievable for the west to witness that a poor country can fight back to the invaders for so long. Somehow, Afghanistan remained a favorite place for the
302 James Wynbrnadt, A brief history of Pakistan. ( Facts on File, 2009) 303 Samina Ahmed, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond,” International Security, winter 2001/2, p. 80. 304 Ibid Wynbrnadt, A brief history of Pakistan 305 General Hamid Gul’s views at a meeting with the author after the seminar organized by IPRI on May 24, 2012 184 invaders “but all previous intruders learnt at their cost that taking Afghanistan is one thing, keeping it is quite another. It took the Soviets ten years to realize this” 306
In a way, Afghanistan was the battle ground but Pakistan was the military and financial and guerilla supplier. US fully supported the Muslim fighters as they posed a threat to USSR.
Stephen Cohen, Pakistan expert in the US writes, “ In this alliance, Pakistan suffered many internal threats including uneven economic development, gradual collapse of the education system and the most important and fast spreading growing Islamic radicalism.”307
These all went unnoticed by US, as the great power was just focused on calculated strategy planned to defeat the Soviets. After soviets left Afghanistan, US felt no need to provide assistance to Pakistan, it end the alliance, leaving Pakistan many internal wars to fight alone. After the Soviet and USA left, Pakistan continued its support to the Mujahedeen groups who later became Afghan Taliban. With the passage of time, Pakistan developed warm and friendly relations with Taliban and Pakistan was among the only three countries to recognize the Taliban as the lawful regime of Afghanistan.308
After the soviet invasion, US-Pak ties attained new heights. Dr. Parvez Cheem anlysed the prevailing political situation in the region in these words, “the growing and deepening US-
Pak relation and the amount of financial aid Pakistan was receiving send waves of panic among the Indian government. Relations with India went on a slower pace as India very raucously criticized the aid package Pakistan was receiving. This created a sense among
306 Dr Misdaq, Nabi , Afghanistan: Political frailty and external interference . Routledge 2006. pg139 307 Stephen Philip Cohen, “America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?” Current History, March 2005, p.132. 308 Collins, Liam. United States diplomacy with Pakistan following 9/11. A case study in coercive diplomacy. WWS 547: The Conduct of International Diplomacy. 2008 185
Pakistanis that the danger from Indian side had not receded and should not be treated calmly.”309
Afghanistan: The battlefield, Pakistan: The frontline state
In 1979, General Zia sided with US and supported Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Pakistan military and intelligence vigilantly carried out the clandestine war against soviet in
Afghanistan. Besides arms and ammunition, Pakistan also provided trained guerilla fighters.310
Pakistan was fully engage in this war, as the training and support was delivered by her. The
US monetary and material help to Afghan Mujahedeen was channeled through Pakistan. In
May 1985, a guerilla organization based in Peshawar shaped up a coalition to organize their political and military operations against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. This proved successful as in later that year the Mujahedeen faction was quite active in and around
Kabul.311
The invasion spread fear and developed apprehensions among the Pakistani population that it will be the subsequent target of the great power. Many believed that after strengthening its position in Afghanistan, Soviet will try to extend its authority beyond Afghan boundaries.312
This invasion caused a lot of stress and strain in the neighboring environment and all the nearby countries including China, Iran, and Pakistan were affected by this invasion. There is no doubt that the country most suffered at the hand of world powers due this invasion is
309 Cheema, Parvez Iqbal. Afghanistan's Crisis & Pakistan's Security Dilemma. Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No.3 (March 1983), pp 227-243 310 Talal Hassan . Afghanistan Complex Situation and Its Implications on Pakistan. 311 US department of state. November 28, 2011. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Background Note: Afghanistan. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm 312 Ibid Talat Hassan 186
Pakistan. The battle was taking place in Afghanistan but Pakistan was at the forefront of this whole episode. Besides the external threats and regional shifts, this war caused unimaginable damage to the internal thread of Pakistan. The internal problems of Pakistan especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan were at the verge to be exploited by the great powers. The influx of refugees was huge somehow it can create an environment of instability in the region. Pakistan clearly faced a security dilemma during that period. The internal threat cannot be overlooked nor could the Indian threat be taken lightly. Pakistan was in a three-front scenario, Indian, soviet and the Afghan attack, which no other South-
Asian country faced. 313
India was never pleased with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan314and it was worried about the military and economic aid delivered to Pakistan in wake of this invasion. India at that time worked with the puppet regimes under the soviet control in Afghanistan. Pakistan was supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen factions on behalf of the United States, and India cared less for the Islamist ideology shared by these Mujahedeen factions.315
India also supported the Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance because of its hostility toward the Pakistani-supported mujahedeen groups. Even after the Soviet left Afghanistan,
Pakistan maintained cordial ties with Taliban which was a threat to India, and India on the other hand continued its support to Northern Alliance.316
313 Cheema. Afghanistan's Crisis & Paksistan's Security Dilemma. 314 G.S. Bhargava, South Asian Security After Afghanistan (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983) 315 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 316 Howenstein, Nicholas & Ganguly. Sumit, Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional Threats : India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University. Vol. 63, No. 1, 2009 Page 127-140. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/india-pakistan-rivalry-afghanistan 187
Communal politics at its peak in India
During 1980’s there were many other significant incidents happening across the region. In
India, the communal politics and the rise of Hindu nationalism was on the rise. The religious Hindu organizations used religion as a tool to instigate Hindu masses and to increase their vote bank. The overall scenario shaped by these parties created country wide sectarian riots among Hindus and Muslims. The demolition of Babri mosque in 1992 was also an incident provoked by the religious militant Hindu organizations in India and many thousands of people were killed in the Hindu-Muslim clashes country wide.
The religious political parties of Hindus in India are based on the concept or ideology of
Hindutva. This ideology is the core of the Sangh Parivar headed by Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This includes organizations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), Bajrang Dal and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This concept is based on the notion that this land belongs to Hindus and different nations have invaded this land, so RSS is there to counter all threats.317
Ashgar Ali Engineer while addressing a workshop in India in 2002 said that the communal politics in India was at its peak in 1980’s. This era witnessed worse riots and dreadful carnages which claimed the lives of thousands of individuals. That time period was the most dangerous in terms of communal politics. He said that Advani's "rath yatra" in 1991 proved to be a "bloody yatra", as "this triggered off several riots in the country. The
Mumbai riot, Surat riot and the Bhagalpur riots were the worst".318
317 Kamdar, Mira, “The Struggle for India’s Soul”, World Policy Journal, vol. 19, issue 3, Fall 2002. http://www.worldpolicy.newschool.edu/journal/articles/wpj02-3/kamdar.html 318 '80s saw communal politics at its peak, The Times of India, Jan 9, 2002. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-01-09/patna/27118301_1_communal-politics-riots-ansis 188
The Ahmedabad riots of 1981 severely hit the dalits (untouchables) too. Ashgar Ali
Engineer mentioned in one of reports that some of the leaders of the dalits explained him that they were used by BJP for their political purposes and now they have well understood their game and politics and will not become a tool at the hands of BJP and will not kill
Muslims. Communal politics is very heady and stimulating, so unfortunately once again the poor dalits were used in 1992 and 2002 riots.319
Since early 1980’s and 1990’s communal politics has reached to new heights. A panic has been created by the political parties as they devise new electoral policies which increased an emphasis on religion and caste politics, the minority factions of the society felt insecure and threatened. These are the reasons that the communal violence, religious and caste based violence has increased in India.320
The Hindu political parties formed on the religious agenda have used the Hind-Muslim conflicts for their own vote banks in India. The religious Hindu parties wanted to transform
India into a Hindu religious state. 321
Muslim-Hindu Violence and anti-communal policies of Deobandis in India
In 1980’s there was an increase in the communal politics which led to communal violence across India. Varshney in his study identifies that Hyderabad has been one of the most riot- struck city in India. Between 1950 and 1995 Hyderabad has seen greatest percentage of deaths in India322.
319 80s saw communal politics at its peak, The Times of India. 320 Parikh, Sunita. 1998. “Religion, Reservations and Riots: The Politics of Ethnic Violence in India.” in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli, eds., Community Conflicts and the State in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-57. 321 Kamdar, Mira, “The Struggle for India’s Soul” 322 Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) p. 5-7 189
Around 80 percent of the total deaths of all Hindu-Muslim or communal riots occurred in
Hyderabad. The city was swallowed up with the unremitting communal bloodshed as it faced around one to three riots once a year between 1978 and 1986.323 The Hindu extremists committed unparalleled sectarian violence against Sikhs in Delhi after the killing of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguard in October 1984. This incident resulted into the killing of more than 2,000 people.324
The rise of BJP as a political force based on religious ideology
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was formed in 1980’s. It was originated from RSS Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh as its electoral department. Its prime aim was to become a Hindu nationalist party as a substitute to the secular Congress party. RSS through BJP wants to come in power in India. Apart from being active in the social and civil society RSS became influential in the state structure.325
In India religion was used for political purposes and to create fervour among Hindu masses about Hindu nationalism. The Hindu nationalist parties gain political advantages through the exploitation of religion. Christophe Jaffrelot explains that Hindu nationalism is religious just because they used religion for their political ends. The religion based organizations in India have inflamed many religious confrontations in the political scene.
Using religion as a tool BJP gathered many votes from the Hindu majority. RSS is responsible for many communal riots and sectarian violence in India, as they provoked the
323 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. p. 5-7 324 Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C. Oberst, Government and Politics in South Asia, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).. 325 Paola Bacchetta, “Sacred Space in Conflict in India: The Babri Masjid Affair”, Growth & Change, vol. 31, 2000. DOI: 10.1111/0017-4815.00128 190
Hindu masses against the minorities especially Muslims just for gaining political strength
326 and mileage.
The period of late eighties saw the height of communal politics in India. BJP lost the elections held in 1984 very badly and were not able to secure more than two seats in the parliament. This was the time, when BJP started the use of religion in politics. BJP with other religious parties started to play the communal game for their political ends. They stirred the Hindu masses on the basis of Hindu nationalism and especially the lower caste
Dalits.327
In 1989, militant Hindu nationalists provoked the wave of riots and initiated the communal violence. Hindus were more inclined to vote the Hindu nationalist parties like
BJP. 328 In 1990’s BJP rose to new heights, as they gathered mass support from the low caste Hindus. L.K.Advani took out Rath Yatra to arouse the Hindus 329 and this campaign waged by the Hindu militants reached its climax in 1991 because of the Advani’s Rath
Yatra.330
The creation of Sangh Parivar was the root cause of sectarian, inter-communal and inter- class conflicts and riots in India. Founded in 1960’s, it posed a great threat for the secular
India, as it based its agenda on religion and Hindu nationalism.331 Since its creation, Sangh
326 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Politics of Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots, Atul Kohli and Amrita Basu (ed.) Community Conflicts in India, OUP, 2001 327 Engineer, Asghar Ali. Communal Politics Climax and Downfall. October 1-15, 2005 Center for Study of Society and Secularism. http://www.csss-isla.com/arch%20105.htm 328 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Politics of Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots, Atul Kohli and Amrita Basu (ed.) Community Conflicts in India, OUP, 2001 329 Ibid Engineer, Asghar Ali , Communal Politics Climax and Downfall 330 Bhatty, Maqbool Ahmad, “Terrorism and Religious Extremism in South Asia”, Contemporary Affairs (Lahore), no. 29 (2002), p. 195 331 Mahmood, Sohail, “Hindu Extremism, Indian Muslims & the issue of Human Rights. 191
Parivar has been involved in militant activities and inflaming sectarian violence. Its members were also involved in the demolition of Babri Masjid.332
Babri Mosque incident which took place in December 1992 was the worst display of hatred and sectarian violence. The Babri Mosque was raised at the site of Ayodhya. It was also believed by Hindus that it’s the birth place of god Ram. The site soon become controversial and a symbol of Hindu identity, as the extremist Hindu parties began their struggle for liberating the site.333 Sangh Parivar took this opportunity and spread the argument of the destruction of mosque and construction of Ram temple.334
The religious Hindu organizations and the Sangh Parivar used this issue of Babri mosque for their political gains and votes for its party BJP. 335 The fervour which was created by these Hindu nationalist parties was clearly visible when Babri Mosque was demolished in
December 1992. This demolition was followed by country wide Hind-Muslim riots and conflicts in which more than 2,000 people were killed. 336
Congress carrying forward secular politics
According to Asghar Ali Engineer the secularism in India was a strong point for the minorities in India, especially for Muslims. If Hindu religious nationalist organizations come into power then the minorities especially Muslims suffer a lot. The wave of communal riots in late eighties and early nineties spread fear and apprehensions among
Muslims all over India. The congress had good relations with Muslim scholars before these
332 Asghar Ali Shad, “Bharat main Inteha-Pasand Hindu Nazariyaat ka Faroogh” (Rise of Extremist Hindu Ideology in India), IPRI Paper (Islamabad), no. RP2/02, p. 21 333 H. D. S. Greenway, “Hindu Nationalism Clouds the Face of India”, World Policy Journal, vol. 18, issue 1, Spring 2001. 334 Mahmood, Sohail, “Hindu Extremism, Indian Muslims & the issue of Human Rights 335 Paola Bacchetta, “Sacred Space in Conflict in India: The Babri Masjid Affair”, Growth & Change, vol. 31, 2000. DOI: 10.1111/0017-4815.00128 336 Maqbool Ahmad, Terrorism and Religious Extremism in South Asia, Contemporary Affairs. (Lahore), no. 29 (2002), p.195. 13. 192 incidents of riots and communal violence. The point which s very important is that, congress always used Muslim population just for their vote bank. Being in good relations with Muslims gave a lot of advantage in their political arena. Congress has not done anything substantial for Muslim progression and betterment. The economic and educational condition is also not very good and it has never been thoroughly addressed by congress.
Many Muslims opposed the creation of Pakistan for having a secular Indian where they would be having equal rights and religious freedom. On the other hand, things were not according to the wishes and dreams of Muslims. Although Nehru was committed to the secular manifesto and rights to minorities but all congress leaders were not. All Congress leaders did not share the commitment to the secular manifesto.337
Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind and Congress alliance
Deoband and Congress have a strong alliance from the time period of Khilafat movement.
The Deoband scholars under Jamiat Ulama-e Hind and the Congress under Gandhi formed a strong bond for the Khilafat movement. Both factions have a great political alliance, as
Jamiat Ulama-e Hind stood with congress and never supported the creation of Pakistan.
Deoband scholars also negated the idea of tow nation theory out forward by Jinnah for the creation of Pakistan.338
The president of JUH Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani openly opposed the idea of two nation theory and found nothing Islamic in this concept. He discarded the notion that
Muslims are one nation, rather emphasized that all Indians, Muslims or Hindus were one
337 Engineer , Asghar Ali ,Islam and Muslims in India - Problems of Identity and Existence. April 1-15, 2001. Center for Study of Society and Secularism. Http://www.csss-isla.com/arch%20206.htm 338 Qasmi, M. Burhanuddin. Eastern Crescent, Mumbai. Deoband is nation’s heritage. 30-7-2011. Asian Tribune http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/07/29/deoband-nation%E2%80%99s-heritage 193 nation. He was of the view that in the present times, nations are formed on the basis of homeland and not on ethnicity and religion.339
Congress having a secular mandate did well with Deoband scholars even after partition.
Since that time Deoband scholars have a strong political bond with the Congress and it continued as late as 1990s. The demolition of Babri Mosque in 1992 by religious Hindu nationalist parties broke the thread of the strong bond between JUH and Congress. The waves of communal riots across the country damaged the secular mandate of congress340
Islamization in Pakistan
In 1977 Bhutto’s government was toppled by Gen Zia as he imposed martial law in the country. He reinforced the Islamic laws and provisions in the country. His rule was in completely coincided with one of the most important events of the history. Russian invasion in Afghanistan and US funded battle which put Pakistan in the frontline was one of the most important international events at that time. 341 Islamization of the sate by Gen
Zia was one of the political tools to prolong his rule. Besides population increase in that era, an incredible increase in the Madrassa graduates was seen. This great increase in the student of religious schools went unnoticed both by military and civil leadership. The increase in the Deobandi madrassas was the largest during that period reaching a total of
7,000 institutions.342
In history, religion has been used time and again for political motives by different states.
Pakistan has also used the religious ideology for political gains and motives. During Zia’s
339 Abdus Sattar Ghazali. Islamic Pakistan: Illusions & Reality. (National Book Club, 1996) Pg 31 340 Ibid. Qasmi. Eastern Crescent, Mumbai. Deoband is nation’s heritage 341 Mushtaq Najum, Islam and Pakistan. Foreign Policy in Focus. 2007 http://www.fpif.org/ articles/islam_and_pakistan 342 Haider, Murtaza. How and Why Madrasa Graduates gravitate towards militancy and extremism. 2011. http://urdutahzeeb.net/articles/blog1.php?p=12809&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 194 regime, for the first time in Pakistan, religion was used a political tool and in order to prolong his tenure. He introduced different laws and ordinances and Islamic courts and tried to form an Islamic society. After soviet invasion, the government sponsored maddrassaa grew in large numbers which also later become training centres for militants.343 Zia tried to strengthen the power and say of Islamic organizations and Ulema in the matters of government and society. Coincidently, Zia’s Islamization was there with the Soviet invasion, which provoked the Jihad from across the globe. Zia supported the establishment of militant groups which was covertly supported by USA. 344
The roots of Islamic fundamentalism can be traced back to Gen Zia’s regime. He thoroughly supported the establishment of the religious schools and maddrassa all over the country. The government used to collect funds as “zakat” for founding these maddrassa.
Afghan war had started, and Pakistan was there to support Jihad in Afghanistan which was covertly funded by USA. 345 The policies initiate by Zia also promoted the growth of militant groups that used to go and fight in Afghanistan against Russian invasion. 346
Jihad as state policy
With the initiation of the process of Islamization in Pakistan, Gen Zia for prolonging his rule he went on using Islam as a political tool. The parliament was reduced to just a consultative council and jihad was proclaimed a pillar of state policy. He went doing adventures in the name of Islam, and for the first time politicization of religion was done at such a large scale.347
343 Nasir, Sadia. Rise of Extremism in South Asia. IPRI Paper. October 2004. http://ipripak.org/papers/riseofextremism.shtml 344 Wynbrnadt, A brief history of Pakistan. 345 Hussain, Akmal, “Terrorism, Development and Democracy: The Case of Pakistan”, Khatri and Kueck (ed.), Terrorism in South Asia, p. 127. 346 Op cit, 336 347 Kunwar Idris. Religion and murders, Dawn, 11 July, 2010. http://archives.dawn.com/archives/27478 195
Gen Zia’s Islamization process coincided with his military rule in which jihad was declared a state policy. The Islamization was based on the Sunni laws and conventional interpretations of Islamic laws. At that time the Shia Iranian revolution had arrived and it stimulated the Sunni sentiments in Pakistan. 348
With the invasion of Russia in Afghanistan, it was generally felt that Islam was being threatened by the powers. Pakistan’s intelligence supported by USA played a very important role in Afghanistan. Muslims from across the globe were trained in Pakistan and
Afghanistan in the military training camps established for this specific purpose. These
Mujahedeen used to go and fight the soviet army in Afghanistan.349 Jihad and Islamic ideology was politically used by Gen Zia to prolong his tenure, but has left uncontrollable and unmanageable circumstances for Pakistan to face alone. Covertly sponsored by USA, soviet faced a defeat at the hands of mujahedeen supported by Pakistan.
Re-creation of a state influenced by Saudi Islamic system: Saudaization of Pakistan
Pakistan was established in the name of Islam. When Zia came in power he tried to form a society based on strict laws and principles, rather a manipulative version of orthodox Sunni doctrine was implemented. He established and encouraged the formation of many maddrassas for the training of Mujahedeen which later fought against soviet in
Afghanistan. Once soviet withdrew from Afghanistan, US interests shifted and Pakistan was left alone in the middle of the ocean to face the circumstances, including the increased militancy in the country.
Besides internal factor and moves, many external dynamics were also played an important role in flourishing extremism in Pakistan especially in that era. Iran, soon after the Iranian
348 Mushtaq Najum, Islam and Pakistan. Foreign Policy in Focus. 2007 http://www.fpif.org/ articles/islam_and_pakistan 349 Wynbrnadt, A brief history of Pakistan. 196 revolution started supporting the factions in Pakistan to promote their version of Islam and
Saudi Arab started doing the same for the promotion of their practices. A mushroom growth of both Shia and Sunni Maddrassa led to strengthen the radical and extremist element in Pakistan and things went out of control.350
Sectarian conflict leading to violence
The real beginning of sectarian violence first ignited during the time of Iranian revolution and Islamization process by Gen Zia in 1979. Shia community got strength and courage from the revolution in Iran especially about the assertive role in the state affairs and in society. This completely clashed with the ingredients of Zia’s Islamization process, as it was entirely focused to implement Sunni laws and principles. So a clash started between the two communities. 351
Gen Zia went for a pro Saudi stance in his process of Islamization. In this Islamization, it was insisted to pay the amount of zakat to the government. This situation created a feeling of anger among the Shia community particularly and unease in Iran. From that time there is a sectarian tension between the two states. Situation became worse when an Iranian diplomat was killed in early nineties in Lahore. 352
The crucial moment in the Shia-Sunni radicalization was basically the Iranian revolution in
1979 and General Zia’s dissemination of zakat (wealth tax) and ushr (farming tax) ordinances under Sunni Islamic law in 1980. This Suuni law clashed with the Shia laws, thus Shia community objected this. In 80’s sectarian politics was growing and it drastically shifted towards Shia-Sunni violence. Shias were active and supported by Iran and Sunni
350 Ibid 351 Nicholas Howenstein .The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir. Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU). Research report 1, 5th February 2008. http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/resrep1.pdf 352 Kumar, Sumita. 2008. Pakistan-Iran relations: the US factor. Strategic analysis, 32:5, 773-789 197 activism was locked on to declare Shia as non-Muslims. In 90’s there were many sectarian clashes especially in the northern areas of Pakistan including Parachinar and Hangu.
Sometimes the situation even looked like a civil war. Many hundreds of people were killed in these clashes and sometimes army and paramilitary forces were called to restore the peace situation. 353
As Afghan war there as well, so General Zia permitted the Sunni Afghan mujahedeen and their local Sunni cohorts to cut down the Turi Shias of upper Parachinar for obstructing the use of their territory as a launching pad against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul.354
It’s on the record that in most of the sectarian violence the militant organizations of the
Deobandi school of thought were involved.
This was the time when Shia felt insecure and threatened. They formed TNFJ (Movement for enforcement of the Jafaria [Shia] Law) and it was a religious-political force. The stance of TNFJ was very aggressive and offensive that provoked a reaction from Deobandi in the shape of Anjuman-i-Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). It was formed in mid 80’s by the
Deonbandi Ulemas355 . Sectarianism flourished during Zia’s regime because of the policies, internal problems and external interferences of Iran and Saudi Arab. The army of extremists in Pakistan fought the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad alongside the Arabs and
Afghans. 356
353 Irfani, Suroosh. Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia. Edited By Satu P. Limaye Mohan Malik Robert G. Wirsing. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Honolulu, Hawaii 354 Khaled Ahmed, “When the State Kills,” Friday Times, September 2001. 355 Irfani, Suroosh. Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia. Edited By Satu P. Limaye Mohan Malik Robert G. Wirsing. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Honolulu, Hawaii 356Mushtaq Najum, Islam and Pakistan. Foreign Policy in Focus. 2007 http://www.fpif.org/ articles/islam_and_pakistan 198
Jamat-e-Islami- & JUIF -Gen Zia Allaince
Jamaat-e-Islami followed the Deobandi school of thought. In Pakistan Deobandis are in majority so the maddrassas of this doctrine are also in majority. Gen Zia was also a follower of Deobandi school of thought so during the process of Islamization he particularly focused on the implementation of Sunni policies and laws in relevance to
Deobandi. There was an increase in the Maddrassas during Zia regime as it coincided with the USSR invasion in Afghanistan. During the Islamization process, Gen Zia incorporated
Islamic laws and principles in the constitution and make an alliance with many religious- political parties, particularly with Jamaat-e-Islami.357
The Ulema of JUI were trying to deepen the roots of maddrassa which were particularly inclined to promote teachings of Deobandi school of thought. There was a sharp increase in the growth of maddrassa in Pakistan during Zia period, as he was particularly concerned about the Deobandi approach.358
Jihad within Jihad: Collapse of Soviet Union and shift of policy of Jihad
With the invasion of USSR in Afghanistan there was a change in the internal and external dynamics of the region. Pakistan politically pressurized Russia to withdraw besides covertly supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen in Afghanistan which was also funded by
USA. This created a very effectual resistance force in Afghanistan which at last forced the
USSR to leave Afghanistan. After Soviet withdrawal Pakistan had to face a number of external and internal threats and challenges. Most of the emerged factors were not
357 Ali Riaz. Alliances Unholy. Dec. 23, 2011, issue. http://newsweekpakistan.com/features/690 358 Barbara D. Metcalf. "Traditionalist" Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/ essays/metcalf.htm 199 anticipated before the Soviet withdrawal. In all these complex and uncertain circumstances,
Pakistan was left alone in the middle to deal with all the issues. 359
After Soviet withdrawal there were many serious issues which surrounded Pakistan at that time. Taliban had emerged as a power in Afghanistan, so Pakistan had to decide whether or not support and recognize Taliban. There were three important factors which shaped the policies and decisions of Pakistan at that time. First the friendly government in Afghanistan will cooperate with Pakistan and help in providing access to Central Asian States. Secondly a friendly government in Afghanistan will also collaborate with Pakistan on border issues and thirdly it will not provide safe haven for India or any other power. So in away, Pakistan would be having peace at the western border with Afghanistan and it will focus its attention to Kashmir issue and some other internal issues. 360
After USSR left Afghanistan, things were not simple and easy to handle, as there started a power struggle in Afghanistan between Mujahedeen and Najibullah’s government.
Pakistani intelligence supported the Mujahedeen in overthrowing the Najibullah’s government.361 Mujahedeen were not able to bring down his government till 1992. Soviet continued its support to Najibullah’s government but USA lifted up all support to
Mujahedeen. 362
The residue of Afghan Jihad and Kashmir
After Soviet withdrawal there was a great struggle for power between some factions in
Afghanistan. Taliban were mostly the young Afghanis who got their education and training
359 Babar Shah. Afghanistan Policy: An Evaluation. http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=56 360 Khawar Hussain ,. Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. 2005, Master’s Thesis 361 Ibid 362 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan : A military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (USA : Da Capo Press, 2002), 208. 200 in Pakistani Maddrassas. The played an important part with Afghan Mujahedeen in forcing the Soviet forces to leave Afghanistan. Mullah Omar was an ex-Mujahid and the Taliban faction was gathering under his command. 363
From anti Soviet Union to anti-US
After September 11, Pakistan faced a difficult scenario. Due to its continuous support to
Taliban community, Pakistan always faced condemnation from the international community. Pakistan had two options at that time, first to side with USA in the fight against Al-Qaeda or to have pro-Taliban policies and face international isolation and denunciation. Pakistan kept the notion of national interest and turn around its Taliban and
Afghan policies.
There was a shift in Pakistan’s policies towards Taliban after 9/11. Aiming for the national interests Pakistan did not supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan cooperated with
United States after the 9/11 incident.364 Pakistan supported the US-led coalition forces in their military operations inside Afghanistan. Since US invasion in Afghanistan, Pakistan military is actively involved in hunting down Al-Qaeda members in the tribal belts of
Pakistan. 365
Al-Qaeda and Taliban Nexus
Taliban gradually reduced their dependence on Pakistan and started gaining independence.
Taliban strengthen their ties with Osama-Bin-Laden. During 90’s he established camp in
Jalalabad. He financially supported Taliban and also send many Arab-Afghans to take part in Taliban military operations which they have started in North. As Bin Laden was
363 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, (London: Yale University Press, 2001) 364 Khawar Hussain , Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. 2005, Master’s Thesis 365 Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, ICG Asia report. (Islamabad/Brussels, 2002) 201 involved in some terrorists’ activities so Taliban came under an international pressure and
UN also put some sanctions in late 90’s. Taliban again faced some international sanctions in 2000. 366
The relations between Taliban and US got worse especially after Taliban offered refuge to
Osama-Bin-Laden. 9/11 attacks shook the whole world and Al-Qaeda was held responsible for arranging the twin tower attacks. So in October 2001, USA launched its military operation to crack down the Al-Qaeda. 367 The entire Afghan population which is primarily
Pashtun is not Taliban nor all Taliban members are Al-Qaeda followers. Taliban are an important part of Afghanistan and are also Pashtun. 368
Taliban in Pakistan
The Tehrikeek-e-Taliban in Pakistan has sprung out of the residue of the Mujahedeen after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. These Mujahedeen formed a large number of groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir, and TTP is also one of those factions. 369 There is a strong argument about categorizing the TTP as the takfiris, E. Sivan analysed the situation of Talibanization emphasizing that the TTP has adopted the Takfiri doctrine of Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, and revived by Sayyid Mawlana Abul Ala
Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb.”370 The Islamic scholars or Ulema consider the takfiris as
“heretics of Islam”.
366 Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Washington DC: University of Washington Press, 2001. 367 Khawar Hussain ,. Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. 2005, Master’s Thesis 368 Ibid 369 H. Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror. (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005) 370 E. Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 90f 202
Chapter 6
Existing Indian and Pakistani Deobandi Madrassa System in Comparative perspective: Serving Religion or Politics of Religion?
The Dar ul-Uloom at Deoband, considered a prominent Madrassa of the Deoband School has faced a lot of criticism from other Muslim schools of thought; for the mentioned Madrassa is known for its religious conservatism in India. Though the Madrassa played a significant role for anti-British rule and opposing the Partition of India, the school has been hit by huge controversies over the time. Allegations against Ghulam Vastanvi, rector Dar ul-Uloom speak volumes of these disputed accusations371.
Contemporaries to the Deoband School in India have, however, advocated reforms. With much criticism coming from the media, think tanks and social institutions; this younger lot of educated religious scholars has proposed restructuring and transformation of the syllabus of
Deobandi Madrassas. Owing to the much talked about Afghan Taliban nexus with Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan, the government of India has been pressurizing the Indian Deoband
Madrassas to bring reforms. Nonetheless, it will take time till these budding scholars can make their voices heard and ideas materialized in the presence of established conservative scholars.
The conservatism of these elder scholars has always hindered the path of reform; for they prefer to maintain the status quo.
Yoginder Sikand states, “Given the relentless pressure of the media and governments on the madrasas, demanding that they should ‘modernize’ their syllabus, it is hardly surprising that,
371 Yoginder Sikand. “Deoband power struggle could change the face of Muslim society in India.” Tehelka Magazine, 05 February 2011: Vol 8, Issue 5.
203 as the book reveals, the question of curricular reform is being hotly debated in Deobandi circles today. Clearly, new generations of Deobandi scholars, some of whom have also had the benefit of university education and advocate considerable changes in the syllabus, are yet to become effective enough to make their presence felt in the Federation’s circles.”372
Owing to the constitutional right granted by the state of India that “allows all communities to establish and manage educational institutions of their choice”373, Deoband scholars have condemned the government’s moves to regulate and finance Madrassas in India. Lately, the government has started to pressurize Madarras and appreciated reforms. It has also pushed to structure a ‘Central Madrasa Board’ that would oversee all Madrassas in India. However, the
Deoband School has denounced the move, citing it unconstitutional, as per the constitution.
Sikand believes that Numerous resolutions passed at the Federation’s annual meetings also roundly condemn reported efforts on the part of the Government to regulate the madrassas through the setting up of a Central Madrassa Board or funding them provided they follow certain norms. Hence, it argues, the Government’s offers of aid actually aim to rob madrassas of their independence, destroy their religious character and bring them under close governmental control.374
372 Yoginder Sikand. “Madrasa Reforms and the Deobandi Ulema’s Response.” Indian Muslims: A Window Into The Indian Muslim Life, 3 December 2007. (Can be accessed at http://indianmuslims.in/madrasa- reforms-and-the-deobandi-ulemas-response/) 373 Constitution of India. Part III, Article 30 374 Op.cit. 375 204
Deobandi School in India –religious education and ensuring political survival
Spanning over a century, the Islamic landscape of India has always remained local and indigenously influenced. The political activism of these groups has always been benign. With minority status and rights acknowledged in the constitution of India, minority Muslims feel safe and their rights safeguarded by the state. The secular conception of the Indian constitution is well recognized and socially accepted by the Muslim communities in India and hence, blends well within the versatile cultural scenery of the country.
Comparatively analyzing the socio-religio-political activism of Deoband Muslims in Pakistan with that of India, the vigor attached with the historic activities of Pakistani Deoband School has striking contrasts with their Indian counterparts and their movements. With intense and fierce demands for the implementation of Shari’a (Islamic Law) by the Deoband School in
Pakistan, Indian religio-political history has been relatively moderate and free from such demands. Over the decades, spikes of such demands have been witnessed in Pakistan and
Bangladesh alike; while the Indian state remained protected from such demands375.
Nevertheless, the Indian constitution has always promoted religious rights to be practiced within the civil life however, it does not approve of promoting the majority Hindu religion.
Historically, the Deoband School in Indian Subcontinent was always considered a centre of learning and focused on individual spiritual wellbeing rather than an adaptation of political aspirations. The social acceptability and recognition of the Deoband School is accredited to
Tablighi Jamaat (TJ, though an independent movement, it has motives similar to the
Deoband’s dawat o tabligh wing) and the Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind (JUIH, Association of Indian
375 Animesh Roul. “Transnational Islam in India: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics.” The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2009. P. 105 205
Ulema)376. Though the Deoband School was the vanguard of Khilafat Movement during the
World War I, the School has always had apolitical agenda; focusing on preservation of Muslim faith and its historical institutions. Its motive of keeping politics at bay while the focal ambition being learning and social development of Deoband Muslims in India has won it laurels among scholars and critiques who acknowledge its apolitical character. Its efforts to maintain an apolitical color and endeavors to strictly follow the Muslim identity and state interests has kept it at distance from national and religious scandals.
Though Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind (JUIH) was actively involved in the 1920s Khilafat
Movement, the later period to the episode is marked with a diminutive political activism of the
Deoband School. The School turned its focus on social development of its believers rather than achievement of political schema. The period and the consequent time witnessed JUIH forming alliances with non-Muslim political parties for the persuasion of their interests. This resulted in nexus of the Deoband School with the Congress Party in support of a secular constitution.
“The JUIH has been part of the Indian political landscape since 1920s. As a religious organization, it was closely associated with the Muslim League with the demand for partition and then with the Congress Party and some contemporary regional political groupings.377”
The consequent period saw a rising coalition of Dar- ul- Uloom with the Congress Party; face of which became Maulana Asad Madni and PM Indira Gandhi during the 1980s378. The era highlighted some very notable events where the Congress Party was backed by the Deoband
School; the former patronized the later in the political arena.
376 Barbara D. Metcalf. Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. 377 Op. cit. 369 p-107 378 S. Raju. “Anti-Vastanvi wave: Jamiat trying to regain prominence.” Hindustan Times, 28 January 2011.
206
With the political coverage being offered by Congress Party, the Deoband School turned its focus to minority rights, education, charity and social restructuring of the Muslim community.
After the partition of the Indian subcontinent, JUIH shifted its focus from establishment of an
Islamic state to more social issues. According to Maulana Nauman of JUH, Indian Ulema do not endorse present Jihad, only state can declare jihad, Indian Deobandis were sympathetic towards the Mujahideen fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, similarly Deoband supports jihad in Palestine and Iraq but present they Taliban movement has no support in
Indian Deobandi groups.379 The new ambitions of the School were defined in light of the secular socio-political landscape in India that envisaged practicality of religious doctrines.
With initiatives to fight for rights of minority Muslims, the School evolved itself to social reform, education for all, and charity organizations; completely disposing of the initial prophecy of an Islamic state. The new vision was now more aligned to the state’s defined parameters under her secular constitution that guarantees religious freedom in civil life of citizens.
Today, Jamaat-i-Islami Hind (JIH) stands as a forerunner to advocate the identity of Muslims in India; refraining from direct political involvement. With active women wing and student bodies, its influence has grown locally as well as globally. Having close association with gulf countries due to presence of large number of Indian Muslim Diasporas, the Deoband School has influenced Muslims to form alliance such as Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and
Muslim Aid and the Islamic Foundation (UK) among many others. JIH has double facet
379Maulana Nauman of JUH interviewed by the author on November 23, 2010 at JUH headquarter in New Delhi , India. 207 agenda, 1) Dispelling the doubts and misgivings about Islam that exist in the minds of non-
Muslims, and 2) Refining the Muslims as a community.380
The present day graduates of Deobandi Madrasssa in India are now exploring fields other than the traditional areas for religious scholars. Many graduates of Darul Uloom Deoband have joined media working as journalists and focusing more on socio-economic issues of the
Muslim community.381
Deobandis in Pakistan- Resentment against loosing the status acquired during state patronage
From the 1980s, the number of Deoband seminaries exponentially increased in Pakistan. The
Zia regime (1977-1988) granted patronage to these seminaries and used them as instruments of influence in a multi-purpose fashion. These seminaries provided legitimacy to General
Zia’s unconstitutional government. The “chaadar aur char deewari” approach became a popular religious jargon, appreciated and promoted by these seminaries. Furthermore, Zia’s sympathies lay with the Deobandi approach for the School was the string-puppet between
Saudi – Irani antagonism; conflict zone of which became Pakistan. Today, 65% of
Madrassas in Pakistan belong to the Deoband School and as a result, the Deobandis amount to being the second largest sect in the country constituting to 25% of the total population of
Pakistan. The intense demand of these Madrassas for the state to convert to a true Islamic state has ever amplified. These demands have been translated through militant wings that most of these Madrassas maintain under the umbrella of Deoband School of thought382.
380 Op.cit. 378. P 115 381 Interview with Mr. Ajay Darshan , Scholar at Pakistan Studies Center at Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi on November 24, 2010 382 Stephen Philip Cohen. “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan.” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003: 10.
208
The Deobandi beliefs and movements have long been considered as stringent and harsh against other sects thus revealing an image of an extremist Islamic faction inclined to bring in a true Islamic system of governance; akin to the ideas of most terrorist organizations. This being evidently visible after the afghan war and the 9/11 attacks, the consequences of those events in Pakistan have had a great impact on the religious factions of community, especially when one sheds light on the Deobandi school of thought. But as discussed before, it is important to relate the Deoband politics in Pakistan with Zia’s regime where it took flight under the guise of Islamisation and militant groups like the Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamat-e- ulama-e-Islam (JUI) paved way to extremism.
President Zia-ul-Haq came in power in 1977 and stayed for eleven years (1988) through a military coup. Zia’s political motives were connected with the intention of bringing in a pure
Islamic political system thus the president gave much attention to the Islamic madrassas and their role in politics. However, it is important to note that religious sects like Shiites and
Quadianis were suppressed and minimum women representation was given. The Deoband school of thought, with its strict Islamic policies was deeply encouraged. “At the time of
Pakistan’s independence there were an estimated 250 Madrassas in the country. By 1987 it rose to 2,862, producing around 30,000 graduates each year, presently there are estimated
7000 to 8000 Madrassas in Pakistan and between 60,000 to 70,000 students are attending them. Mostly in 1980s, these Madrassas were established by Zia’s regime, as these
Madrassas were needed to produce anti-Soviet fighters for the Afghan War and could also be used to counter the Shia influence at home.”383
383 Muhammad Sikander Khan. Studying Islam. march 06, 2005. http://www.studying- islam.org/articletext.aspx?id=949 (accessed 2012).
209
These Madrassas were largely of Deoband origin and had a strong hold in the social as well as political fragment of the society. Moreover, these Madrassas were highly funded by both international and national entities which bore a strong foundation for them to spur their activities around the country.
The Deobandi Madrassas were established in the name of Muslim brotherhood, equality and
Islamic supremacy under the Deobandi school of thought, yet they have spurred more sectarian divide than any other extremist entity. According to most scholars, the Tablighi
Jamaat is an off-shoot of the Deoband School and it works on the same orthodox principles of Islam that follows through the Deobandi organizations.384
Moreover participants of Tabhlighi activities defined their efforts as “jihad”; a term quite common under the Taliban agenda and also the Deoband School. Throughout the 19th century and till the end of 20th century these Islamic factions had been putting pressures on the government to limit the other group’s legitimacy over religion in Pakistan. Furthermore, organisations like the JUI would support any establishment that would win them influence over other religious factions. For example, in 1970, the organization allied with Pashtun regionalist party against the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP), while in 1990, JUI allied with the same PPP when Benazir Bhutto came into power. The influence grew bigger as Deobandi religion became effectively popular in regions of NWFP, Baluchistan and even some parts of
Punjab. This influence gave them the legitimacy to reel out their principles during the afghan war against the Soviet Union and spread the name of Islam across the region. However, these factions did less to bring in radical Islam than to breed sectarian violence and keep their political legitimacy.
384Barbara D. Metcalf.Traditional Islamist Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. research paper, netherlands: ISIM, 2002. 210
Even after the wake of year 2002, the Deoband militant organizations remained an influential entity in Pakistani politics. With the Taliban now gone, organizations like Lashkar-e-
Tayyaba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen etc were still on the top list of U.S government’s terrorist organizations. It was not until the mid of 2002, that the Deoband inspired madrassas experienced a devastating blow in terms of autonomy and political legitimacy when the military regime outlawed the two successive factions of the JUI in August 2002.385 The SSP
(Sipah-e-Sahaba) group was also declared as an extremist organization under the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1997 and was banned. However, the Deoband resentment to political humiliation deepened the sectarian divide and violence in the region. There were incidents of massive killings against different sectarian groups especially the Shiite and Barelvis. The
Ahmedi’s were also targeted in resentment to the diminishing political power of the
Deobandi’s. One of such incidents could be seen on “18th May 2001 when Sunni Tehreek leader Saleem Qadri was assassinated by the SSP. His successor, Abbas Qadri, charged
President Pervez Musharraf’s regime with “patronising terrorists” and “standing between us and the murderers.” Various Sunni Barelvi outfits alleged that the country’s intelligence agencies were responsible for the killing of Maulana Saleem Qadri.” 386
In Pakistan the Sunni-Shiite resentments and sectarian violence still looms the streets of the country, yet how far does this divide take us and to what extent do these religious organization struggle to deter secularist ideals remains to be seen. So far it is only evident
385 Gabriel Palmer Fernandez. Encyclopedia of religion and war. research, New York London: routledge, 2004.
386Alaiwah. Pakistan cannot progress with sippah sahaba given a free hand. february 20th, 2012. http://alaiwah.wordpress.com/2012/02/20/pakistan-cannot-progress-with-siphae-sahaba-given-a-free-hand/ (accessed june 2012). 211 that with the spread of democracy and modern ethics around the so society, the dictatorial ideas of these organizations may very well be difficult to absorb if taken in consideration.
Preserving religious institution of higher learning in India
The Deoband School in India holds a significant and historical position in the Indian
Muslim community. The school was established in 1866 during the British colonial rule in
India. The founder of the Deobandi School in India, Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi, built the school on the basis of a true vision of Islam387. He wanted this school to be a symbol of safe haven for Muslims to retreat to the pure type of Islam that was preached at the time of the prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) and his companions. In the following years, the Deoband School became one the most significant centers of Islamic learning in the
British Colonial Empire.
At the time of decolonization, when India was experiencing partition, the religious scholars, having heavy resentments against the idea of partition, nevertheless sided with
Mahatma Gandhi rather than Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In 1947, consequently, most of the
Deobandis after partition settled in India. The general enmity between the two recently developed states did not hamper the process of Deobandi movement. Rather, it strengthened the influence even in Pakistan with new leaderships governing the same principles of orthodox Islam. Thus the Islamic school of Deobandi, in both the states, had a massive influence amongst religious teachings. There were several schools that were established in India following the Deobandi style of teaching. The most Prominent among these institutions was the Dar-ul-uloom Madrassa.388
387 R. Upadhyay. "DEOBAND MOVEMENT – And its Repercussions in Modern India ." South Asia Analysis Group. december 23, 2010. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers43%5Cpaper4243.html (accessed june 20th, 2012). 388 Farhat Tabassum. Deoband Ulemefs. New Delhi: Manak Publictions pvt. ltd, 2006. 212
Dar-ul-uloom being the oldest and most significant of madrassas in India was established in 1857 in the British colonial empire. Since that time, this institution has been preaching
Islamic teachings across India and has had its sub-branches established all across the region in order to preserve its identity. Although, the political influence of religious Deobandi movement has waned quite considerably following the 19th century, the institution remains to be seen as a pioneer institute of Deobandi religion. It is estimated that “over 15,000 graduates have passed out of Dar-ul-uloom in Uttar Pradesh, India, and have gone out for higher studies in different foundations all across the world to spread their knowledge.
Darul-ul-uloom’s Curriculum is based on the 17th century Indo-Islamic syllabus known as
“Dars-e-Nizami”. The Basic Curriculum teaches Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Islamic Law or Shariah, Traditional Islamic theology (known as tasawwuf, which is the practice of
Sufism), as well as several other aspects of Islamic study. The current syllabus consists of four stages, where the first three stages can be completed in a total of eight years. The final stage is a post graduate stage where students focus in a number of advanced sciences, like the study of hadeeth, Fiqh and so on.”389
The Dar-ul-uloom Deobandis claim to have preserved the ever so waning practices and education of ancient Islamic principles for centuries to come. However, with strict adherence to the orthodox teaching methods, Deobandis have come to be labeled as
“extremists” or “fundamentalists” groups that may have connections with Taliban and these organizations may be sponsoring terrorism. This may be evident in the unnumbered
“Fatwas” the Deoband schools have issued against various issue, especially on women.
Dar-ul-uloom is known for its Taliban inspired, anti-Shiite and anti-Quadiani Fatwas that
389 Dar-ul-uloom deoband, Islamic school in India. february 10, 2011. http://www.indianetzone.com/37/darul_uloom_deoband_islamic_school_india.htm (accessed june 20, 2012). 213 gave the Deobandi school of thought the very conservatism that most scholars talk about.
For example in the city of Lucknow, Dar-ul-uloom, the guardian of the Indian Muslim community, issued a fatwa that it is “haram” and illegal for a Muslim family to accept a woman’s earning, consequently declaring it illegal for a woman to work and earn for her family390. This fatwa received a lot of criticism from around the world, claiming that even the most stringent of Islamic societies have not barred women from working and earning.
Even the Taliban have restricted women on certain work professions for example, medicinal profession. Thus such stringent fatwas enhanced the conservative ideology that the Deobandi schools have been preaching their students.
Madrassas in India have attracted immense attention probably due to the growing perception that fundamentalism, Islamization and extremism, all have their roots in these religious Madrassas whereby, on the basis of religion extremist ideologies are preached.
“Madrassas of India do not form a single system. There are Shi‘a Madrassas and Sunni
Madrassas. The Sunni Madrassas themselves are divisible into, at least, three different streams: Those that are endowment (waqf) board-run; the government of India keeps a close tab on such Madrassas, since their funding is controlled by boards acting under the government supervision. Although not managed centrally, ‘the Deobandi Madrassas’ are the largest independent group of Madrassas dotting the entire subcontinent; they are inspired by one of the premier traditional Muslim Seminary, Dar al-‘Ulum at Deoband in
North India. A relatively smaller number of Madrasas are inspired and run along the line of
390 Deoband fatwa: It's illegal for women to work, support family. april 4, 2011. http://www.defence.pk/forums/members-club/57423-deoband-fatwa-its-illegal-women-work-support- family.html (accessed june 20th, 2012) 214
Nadvat al-‘Ulama’ at Lucknow in North India. Both of the latter two types are managed independent of the Government.”391
There are growing arguments that in India Madrassas have had exponential growth within the Muslim communities due to various reasons. One of these reasons are subjected to the lower status of Muslim community where there is not much access to better schooling systems. It is argued that probably the government of India has failed to provide an authentic secular system of education and thus most Muslim societies have no other option but send their children to Madrassas .392 Such arguments enhance the credibility of
Madrassas in Muslim societies, yet it is interesting to note that madrassas in India are not as much politically oriented as seen in other parts of south-Asia like Pakistan and
Afghanistan. However, their role in the society still signifies great developments and consequences.
Following the events of 9/11, India has experienced grave threats to its national security and the events of terrorism have also increased. At the same time, it is seen that the growth of Madrassas have been immense as well. In the recent years India has seen a mushrooming of religious schools especially in Indo-Muslim societies.
Although the Indian religious institutes are still a symbol of moral and social education and of historical and cultural revivalism, yet what remains to be seen is the fact that whether these institutes, if left unchecked, may turn out to be the suspects of national security and
391 David Emmanuel Singh. "The Independent Madrasas of India: Dar al-‘Ulum, Deoband and." june 1, 2003. http://www.ocms.ac.uk/docs/madrasas_deoband.pdf. 392 Aisha Sultanat. "Madrassas in India." november 2003. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:2DtnAYLya4gJ:www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1850403881IB1 4- AishaSultanatMadrassasInIndia.pdf+&hl=en&gl=pk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjFcXcTvZSF7mVM8Fbmy0U qpJYVbN6HdQpy4qgN71nK8IwQ3y7BFdbxkPTqwumbiJkexd313_xR3_Ww7xsGAQmnvi8 (accessed june 20, 2012 215 whether these institutes may spread religious extremism and political and sectarian violence in the society or not.
Violent struggle for preserving political status of Deobandis in Pakistan
Preserving the religious influence within the governing system of Pakistan has been an avid ritual amongst religious factions. This has in turn helped such entities redeem their social and political objectives in the fluctuating political realm of the country. Moreover, this phenomenon has been a good pressurizing tool for the governing authorities as well (so as to snatch votes) whenever they fear threats of demise or political unrest. On the basis these facts a number of events have promulgated sectarian and political violence, thus disturbing the social fabric of the society. General Asad Durrani, former Director ISI strongly believed that one has to be very careful dealing with the radicals, they certainly worked for short term goals but in the longer term, the policy can easily backfire. An indepth political acumen was needed throughout the recent political history, which has not been the case.393
The Deobandis, with an increasing mushroom growth of their institutions all across
Pakistan, have been struggling to maintain the same political edge in the system as mentioned above. This struggle, starting in the mid-1970s initially to counter the soviet influence in the country, developed into an extreme form of struggle for Islamization and the eradication of other factions of non-Islamic religions. The Madrassas were thoroughly funded by national as well as international sources and the general enmity between Shia-
Sunni sects culminated into a disastrous violent movement of power in the country. It is important to know that as Islam evolved, it grew different interpretations with time, the larger being the Sunni and the Shiites.
393 General Assad Durrani’s comments during a meeting with the author on February 15, 2012 in Islamabad. 216
Since the 1990s, with the advent of Afghan war and the intrusion of Talibans in Pakistan,
Deobandi groups have been known for their religious violent activities. Especially in areas like KPK (Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa) and Baluchistan these groups gained power as well as a strong hold in FATA region. The TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), known to be following the Deobandi school of thought, not only attacked the westerners but also the local people and Shiite community. The TTP was known to be largely supported by extremist religious groups established in Punjab, which served as the army’s proxies in
Afghanistan and India as well. Groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) have been the principle allies of Al-Quaida group. They provided weapons, recruits, finances and other resources to Pakistani Talibans and were involved in violent attacks targeted at militant FATA.394 Lashjar-e-Jhangvi was supported by the
Pakistani government to counter the rising influence of shiism followed by the Iranian revolution. It was not until 2001 that this organization along with its parent organization were banned by the Pakistani government following the 9/11 incident, after which these organizations retaliated with massive raid of violent attacks including the higher leadership
(Prime Minister Nawaz sharif and President Pervaiz Musharraf). The political resentment of these organization still reflects through the turn of events followed by 9/11 attacks with target killing and attacks against Shiites.
Another organization that has gained significant attention in religious politics is the
Jammiat Ullema-e-Islam, which is further sub divided into different leaderships, most prominent of which are Mualana fazl-ur-Rehman and Maulana Sami-ul-haq’s Party. These parties have had a strong hold on religious politics especially in the region of Khyber
394 Pakistan: Millitant Jihadi Challenge. International crisis group, 2009.
217
PukhtunKhwan and Baluchistan. The Party has had a strong political support since the Zia regime and up till now it is capable of putting pressure on the establishment where needed.
In 1999, JUI has let street protest against the Lahore peace process between Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. JUI’s support has not diminished in Kashmir with its militant activities running wild in that area. This organization is rigorously devoted to impose strict shariah law in the country and have condemned all efforts of secularization.
Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, known to be the Father of Talibans, has claimed constantly of their agenda of a strict and binding Islamic Shariah Law.395
These organizations in the surge of maintaining political status and resisting sectarian supremacy have aggravated the situation to a more violent environment. Incidents at
Karachi marked with the political hold of MQM speak of the horrors of sectarian divide and political unrest. The Assassination of the governor of Punjab Mr. Salman Taseer was also a sorry tale of extremism etched in the roots of the society where the governor was assassinated by his own security guard who was a staunch Sunni Muslim and declared that the governor passed blasphemy comments against Islam and was fit to be put to death.
The Lal Masjid incident (2007) was also an unfortunate incident reflecting Islamic extremism and the extent of militancy in the country. A madrassa run by Pro-Taliban leaders, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi who claimed to overthrow the establishment of General Pervaiz Musharraf quite rigorously, came under attack by the government to eliminate Pro-taliban terrorist factions. The crisis led to severe repercussions especially with respect to Pak-Afghan ties. The issue till remains under discussion between different scholars’s whether it was a strategic planning or a reaction to
395 "Islamic Parties in Pakistan." Crisis Group. december 12, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south- asia/pakistan/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed june 20th, 2012). 218
Islamic extremism. Pervaiz Hoodboy writes, “The Lal Masjid crisis is a direct consequence of the ambivalence of General Musharraf's regime towards Islamic militancy. In part it comes from fear and follows the tradition of appeasement. Another part comes from the confusion of whether to cultivate the Taliban - who can help keep Indian influence out of
Afghanistan - or whether to fight them.”396
It is unfortunate to note that with the suppression of Islamic religious groups, more militant organizations have developed to fight in the name of God. Under such recent development, the Haqqani network holds the utmost significance. This organization is known to be sponsored by Pakistani government and has received much international condemnation, labeling it as a terrorist organization. “To Pakistan, the Haqqani network is playing a role in Afghanistan in the 2010s similar to the role the Taliban played for Pakistan in
Afghanistan in the 1990s: it's Pakistan's proxy force, a partner in the shadows that enables
Pakistan to maintain its hegemony over the region, while presuming to be the power-broker that can deliver the Haqqani network to the peace table.”397
Foreign pressure urges the U.S to put this network under the list of international terrorist organizations but till now it has not happened so. In most recent times this group has paced up its activities and has attacked India’s project coupled with strict resistance against anti-
Islamic factions.
Such series of organizations and incidents define the violent political struggle of religious groups to maintain their status of political power. However, under this power struggle, sectarian violence and terrorist activities continue to threaten the national security of the
396Pervez Hoodbhoy. three quarks daily. july 12, 2009. http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/2007/07/preventing-more.html 397Pierre Tristam. "What Is the Haqqani Network in Pakistan and Afghanistan?" Middle East Issues. jan 12, 2012. http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/f/haqqani-network-faq.htm (accessed june 20th, 2012). 219 country. According to some scholars “Due to their immense historic importance, seminaries such as Darul Uloom could today act as a constructive platform on which to debate the political, religious, economic and social challenges confronting Muslims in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and simultaneously to engage in dialogue with non-
Muslims. Likewise, in order to retain their past glory, Deobandi scholars will themselves have to take the initiative to evolve and reform the institutional structures of their seminaries, in order to creatively and effectively respond to the contemporary challenges facing South Asia’s Muslims.”398 But the continuous spurring and revelation of the
Deobandi institutes can intensify the sectarian violence generated for quite some time now.
General Talat Masood during a meeting with the author commented that the government of
Pakistan policy to check the seminaries was a decision in the right direction for it would help reshaping the role of seminaries in Pakistan. The real test; however was to properly manage the policy and to provide an alternative to the madrassa students all over the country as parents send their childrens to these madrassas for free education, food and lodging.399 It is only reasonable to assess that such organizations need to be checked and controlled thoroughly in time to limit their contributions towards the defragmentation of the society.
398Luv Puri. "Deoband's battle for survival and relevance." Himal SouthAsian. december 2009. http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/700-deobands-battle-for-survival-and-relevance.html (accessed june 20th, 2012). 399 General Talat Masood during a meeting with the author commented, August 19, 2009 220
Conclusion
The analysis of Deobandi Madrassas in India and Pakistan provides some insights into the issue of religiosity in the sub-continent and its different manifestations. On the one hand, we see deep politicization of religion and prioritization of one particular sect with in Sunni
Muslim majority in Pakistan that led to in tolerance in the society. On the other hand, in
India, the particular Deobandi school of thought, being politically strong because of its support to congress party since India’s independence, refrains from any violent expression against the “infidels”.
This however does not mean that Deobandi-Wahabi nexus never existed or it happened only after Gen. Zia collaborated with the US against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and used the Deobandi Madrassas students (Taliban) as Mujahideen. Long before the arrival of the US politics in the region, it was during the British regime that we found, Sayyid Ahmed who died while fighting against the Sikhs in Balakot, as the orthodox Sunni influenced by
Wahabi school of thought and not only conservative but approved violent Jihad against those who did not accept his teachings, in other words puritanical Islam in India. Although,
Wahabism did penetrate in other parts of India especially in Patna and Calcutta by Maulana
Karamat Ali and Al-Shariati, both the men defied violence and focused on bringing the
Indian Muslim back to original teaching based on the holy Quran and Prophet Muhammed
(PBUH). It was Sayyid Ahmed who strongly believed in using violence against the infidels to spread the message. He got instant following in the North West Province and tribal areas. The Badshah (King) of Swat, Sayyed Akbar Shah (died 1857) was an ardent follower of Syed Ahmed. It was this nexus that we find among the Pushtuns of present day
Pakistan’ s Khyber Pukhtoonkhwan that always welcome violent struggle against those
221 whom they think are threatening the purity of Islam. Their brethren in India though following the same Deobandhi Sunni orthodox Islam but they are mainly the followers of
Maulana Karamat Ali in Bihar and Shariat-Allah in Bengal later Maulana Mehmood Hasan who was a staunch nationalist and supported a secular India.
Charles Allen in his study gives a detailed account of the rise of Syed Ahmed and his followers, especially in the mountains of Khyber Pass. He writes:
“The internal zeal and remarkable success that attended the preaching of
Sayyid Ahmad indicate an unusual personality. Reform of Muslim
practices is a serious matter; and as it then engaged the attention of
some of the best minds of Muslim India, so it still forms a matter of
earnest concern for those advanced leaders of Muslim thought who
would like to see Islam purged of all the hurtful, degrading, and un-
Islamic practices that keep it from being fashioned on more rational and
progressive lines. Since these reforming doctrines went right to the
heart of the everyday life of Muslims in the villages of India, the
approach of a “Wahabi” preacher was as likely to create a storm as to
produce a following”400.
An interesting outcome of my research is about the fact that the Pushtun were already indoctrinated by the Wahabi influenced Deobandi school of thought; it was this group of people who were ready to take up the “holy war” against the infidel Soviets. Charles’s account further proves this in his study. He writes,
400 Murray T. Titus, Islam in India and Pakista: A Religious History of Islam in India and Pakistan, ( New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers- 2005) p- 193 222
“The influence of the so-called Wahabi Movement still continues in
two directions; one is in the organizations that it has left behind and
the other in the effects on the development of the larger orthodox
group. Traces of the original community left by Sayyid Ahmad are still
to be found on the North –West Frontier, as are also similar traces of
the schools of Shari’at Allah and Karamat Ali found in Bengal; but the
most vigorous line of descent goes by the name of the Ahl-e-Hadith
(People of Tradition.”401 He further states, “ The leaders of the Ahl-i-
Hadith sect declare that it is no way related to the founder of the
Wahabi Movement of Arabia: but , however vigorously they may deny
any connection, the spirit and the aims of this group appear to be
identical with those of the Najdi reformer,”402
My field research and talks with various Deobandi scholars in India shows that present day
Indian Deobandis have made a deliberate decision to keep them away from violence of any kind and their focus has been since 1947 to become part of the Indian polity that they chose and work for Muslim community through preaching and providing right kind of religious knowledge to the Muslims. However, Pre-partition Indian history reveals many historical facts about the Deobandi school and their association with violence. For example, the rise of Maulana Mahmood ul Hasan, rector of the Darul Uloom Deoband and its first student.
“In 1877, after graduating from the Darul Uloom, with the full support of the founder of the Darul Uloom, Maulana Qasim Nanautvi , he went on to establish an organization called
401 Ibid- pg 195 402 Ibid 223
“ Samaratut Tarbiyat” (Results of the training) This was a quasi-military body in which volunteers known as fedayeen , or men of sacrifice were taught to prepare themselves for armed jihad against the British-although in practice this preparation was limited to marching and drilling in Khaki uniforms, for weapons carrying nothing more lethal than staves. To the British authorities this body was about as menacing as a cadet cops and
Mahmood-ul Hasan’s fedyeen were allowed to parade about freely.”403
After the death of both founders of Darul Uloom Deoband, Maulana Qasin and Maulana
Rashid, Mahmood ul Hasan took over as the leader of this institution. With that the focus on ensuring Deobandi Seminaries all over India to follow the puritanical Islam that was introduced by Imam Ibn Taymiyya, Abdul Wahab and Shah WalliUllah. While more conservative theology reshaped mainstream Sunni thinking in India, its political philosophy of jihad lost ground through withdrawal. Muslims with growing fear of having a British model government led by Hindu majority paved way for a separate Muslim organization, the All India Muslim League, but Mahmood-ul Hasan and other radicals saw it as playing in the hands of British authorities by helping them in divide and rule.
It was against this background that Mahmood ul Hasan held a grand meeting in April 1911 at Darul Uloom Deoband to announce the armed struggle against the British government.
In his address he raised the question: “Did Maulana Qasim Nanautvi found this madrassa only for teaching and learning? He demanded, “It was founded in 1866 to teach and prepare Muslims to make up for the losses of 1857”. This address was not approved by the alumni of the madrassa which led to a split. Mahmood ul Hasan contibued with this and his quasi-military organization was reconstituted as Jamiat-ul-Ansaar, the party of the volunteers. Deobandi graduates would provide the Party of Volunteers with its officers
403 Ibid- pg 261-62 224 and religious commissars, while its rank and file would be drawn from the Pathan tribes of the North West Frontier Province.404
Those who differed with this violent approach continued with their teaching an imparting knowledge throughout India, while at the same time a more violent Deobandi following was being groomed in the mountain.
This interesting account proves the argument that the Indian Deobandis parted their ways when Mufti Mehmood Madni becoming the rector of the Darul Uloom Deoband, he developed strong alliance with Indian National Congress and opposed the idea of a nation state in the name of religion. The young lot from JUH moved on and created JUI with
Maulana Shabbier Usmani and Mufti Mehmood.
An important aspect that comes often in discussion is the distinction between the sacred and the secular knowledge. The idea of a differentiation between secular and sacred knowledge was nonexistent in the early years of Islam. Rather, to Prophet Muhammad and his companions, knowledge of the religious (dini) and secular (duniavi) were of equal importance.
This approach was evident in the early madrassas that were established in the Arabian
Peninsula. However, in the sub-continent, we find a shift from the original model of madrassa education based on Din and Dunya, to educational dualism. This led to Dini-
Dunyavi divide and continued even after the British left and the two independent countries came into being.
The clergy remained suspicious about the secular education imparted by the modern school system under British rule, any attempt to harmonize modernity and Islam by
Muslim reformers were opposed severely.
404 Ibid-pg 262-3 225
While there are some examples where madrassas have taken up some reforms and have tried to introduce modern education parallel to the religious education. The Deobandi
Madrassas, however, is still reluctant to open up to completely engage with the modern education. This is true in both India and Pakistan. Compared to other sects, the Deobandi madrasas are more rigid when it comes to main course of studies and interpretation.
Indian Deobandi madrassas are not very well endowed, charity is one source and rich followers working in the Gulf and west are the other source of finances. Still we find few examples of reforms and adaptation where the students are prepared for the life outside the madrassa to make their living. Cases in point are madrasahs in Kerala, the Jama'atul Falah in eastern Uttar Pradesh, and Dar ul-'Umoor in Karnataka. Graduates of these educational institutions are said to be contributing to various sectors of the Indian economy and society.
Social Construction of Politics and Use of Religion
In the chapter on theoretical understanding of what has been happening in the region and in
Pakistan, in particular, is explained by Alexander Wendt’s theory of social construction of power politics, which helps explain the politics of jihad and politicization of religion in
Pakistan. This theory also helps us to understand the artificial construction of international political environment that was presented as the reason for getting into Jihadi politics as foreign policy instrument and Islamization process as domestic policy using the Deobandis that led to International Jihad against the Soviets and “Jihadization” in Pakistan.
Wendt considers identities and interests as acquired by the states through interaction, thus being socially constructed and not exogenously given. It explains that contrary to the analysis of most western scholars, religious extremism in not something given in a particular nation or people of a particular area. Hence, limiting the analysis on the
226 argument that Pushtun are all inherently prone to radical Islamic ideas is tantamount to ignoring the contribution of the forces in constructing and creating the “identity” crisis and then presenting a completely artificially constructed national identity narrative.
Also based on what Alexander Wendt’s theory provides, it is not the given geo-strategic location of Pakistan that led to the involvement of Deobandi Madrassas in Jihad while
Indian Deobandi by nature more accommodative did not get into it. Instead, it was the artificial construction of Pakistani identity detached from Indo-Persian Civilization and close to Arab-Islamic identity that encouraged spread of certain school of thought believing in the validity of extremist interpretation of the religion.
Alexander Wendt’s theory describes well Pakistan’s political situation, the idea of Islamic republic as the rulers believe fit, was promoted, the enemies were created and level of social and religious tolerance was defined by those who thought they have better understanding of the nation. As a result, a confused nation with no sense of direction, marred with all sorts of ethnic and ideological difference exists today.
The present “Islamic Identity” is also created which appears to be narrow and self- destructive rather than an overarching concept of “Amn and Salamti” (peace and security) it is more of a myopic view of Islam versus the rest of the world. Pakistan unfortunately became the victim of such policies. It is not the race, the geography and problems associated because of it, defined the policies as assumed by few in Pakistan. But, a deliberate construction of the geo-political situation, formation of enemies, creation of alliances and confronting others that has resulted in the problems that Pakistan is facing now and India managed to stay away from that.
227
Preservation of identity of a minority community and assertion of power by a sect (Sunni Orthodox) within Islam
According to the Government of Pakistan report on Madrassa in 1988, Deobandi Madaras were1,840 and it was the largest number among the madarras of all religious sects. The
Deobandi Madarssa flourished and gained this huge number, especially during and after
Zia period. Before that, it was clear that Barelvis were on the rise, but because of the
Afghan Jihad and participation of the Deobandi community in it, flourished the Deobandi community in Pakistan. Deobandis were also having a hold on the state machinery during
Zia regime.
Jamaat-e-Islami though followers of Ahle Hadith school of thought, facilitated the state-
Deobandi nexus. This led to the exploration of Deobandi Madrassas in Pakistan. Being the follower of Hanafi doctrine, Gen Zia during the process of Islamization, particularly focused on the implementation of Sunni policies and laws. There was an increase in the
Maddrassas during Zia regime as it coincided with the USSR invasion in Afghanistan.
During the Islamization process, Gen Zia incorporated Islamic laws and principles in the constitution and make an alliance with many religious-political parties, particularly with
Jamaat-e-Islami.405 The Ulema of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam were trying to deepen the roots of madrassa which were particularly inclined to promote teachings of Deobandi school of thought. There was a sharp increase in the growth of madrassa in Pakistan during Zia period, as he was particularly concerned about the Deobandi approach.406
405 Ali Riaz. Alliances Unholy.Dec. 23, 2011, issue.http://newsweekpakistan.com/features/690 406Barbara D. Metcalf. "Traditionalist" Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs.http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/ essays/metcalf.htm 228
During Afghan Jihad, ironically, the US also played an important part in spreading these
Deobandi madrasas. The students of the madrassas were taught courses that helped them in pursuing Jihad against the Soviets. Fortunately, the Deobandi tradition remained in a secular environment in India and did not take a violent turn unlike Pakistan where the schools were used to recruit anti-Soviet fighters. Deobandis are mostly found in the
Pashtun belt, in the KPK province of Pakistan, northern Balochistan, northern Punjab and have a significant presence in urban Punjab and Sindh. 407
Bearing in mind the limited career opportunities offered to the students of Madrassa, only those who were dedicated to become religious scholars and clerics joined madrassa, especially before Zia era. Therefore the numbers of Madrassa were very small till 1,977.
There were only 244 madrasas in Pakistan in the 1950s. This number went up to about 500 in the 1960s and about 700 in the early 1970s.408
Existing Linkages between the Deobandis across the border: Role of JUH and JUI (F) & (S)
Deobandis both in India and Pakistan follow the same ideology. Only those Deobandis who were involved in Afghan jihad distanced themselves from Indian version of Deobandi sect. Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) is the political face of Deobandi sect in India. A group of scholars from JUH did not support the separate state for Muslims; they remained in
India, and continued with their politics for the Muslims of India. Those who supported the idea of a separate Muslim state came to Pakistan and launched Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam which later on split into two factions. One is Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur- Rehman
407RohanBedi, Have Pakistanis Forgotten Their Sufi Traditions? (Part I). International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research IDSS Singapore.April 2006. Retrieved from http://www.newageislam.com/articledetails.aspx?ID=1908 408 B. Raman, Pakistani Madrassas: Questions and Answers, OutLook , India, August 5, 2005 229
(JUI) (F) and the other is Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (S). Interestingly, the differences between the two are more political in nature than religious.
Both the factions of JUI have strong hold in the regions of KPK and Baluchistan. The JUI
F has had a strong political support since the Zia regime and up till now it is capable of putting pressure on the establishment where needed. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, known to be the Father of Talibans, has claimed constantly of the agenda of a strict and binding Islamic
Shariah Law.409Practically Deobanids in India are more close to Barelvis and have many similar practices but Deobandis in Pakistan have transformed and they have created an affinity with Salafi practices. Still a large number of Deobandis in Pakistan are in the middle of both Barelvis and Salafis.
The Taliban leadership is in fact a product of Deobandi schools in Pakistan’s frontier region where they were refugees after the Soviet invasion.410The radical Deobandi groups are more in Pakistan and Afghanistan but the Deoband’s intellectual and spiritual base is still in Deoband India. Most experts say that followers of Barelvi sect are considerably more than Deobandis not just among Indian Muslims but in Pakistan as well. Especially after Afghan Jihad, the Deobandi movement got a wide range of criticism from both local and international ends. Many critics discussed the linkages between the Deobandi
Madrassas and the terrorists’ organization. Despite all these issues, Darul Uloom Deoband remains a highly esteemed institution in the region. Many advocates of the movement denounce the radical madrassa in its name and also declared that Taliban extremists are
409"Islamic Parties in Pakistan." Crisis Group. december 12, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south- asia/pakistan/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed june 20th, 2012). 410 Barbara D. Metcalf. “Traditionalist” Islamic Activism: Deoband and Deobandis, Ten Years later. http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/%E2%80%9Ctraditionalist%E2%80%9D-islamic-activism- deoband-and-deobandis-ten-years-later/ 230 only loosely affiliated with the Deobandi movement, and that no graduate of Darul Uloom
Deoband itself has ever been associated with a terrorist organization. 411
Jihadization of Deobandi Madrassas in Pakistan
Here we find the foundation of Deobandi Jihadi expression in Pakistan which took shape in 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Indian deobandis who refused to take up violence moved on with teaching and preaching in India. After the death of Mahmood ul Hasan, when Mufti Hussain Ahmed Madni became rector, he developed strong alliance with
Congress and since then Darul Uloom Deoband remained politically aligned with
Congress’s secular nationalist politics under the name of JUH.
The young members of JUH parted ways from JUH and supported the idea of Pakistan; they established JUI under Maulana Shaabbir Ahmed Usmani and later Maulana Mufti
Mahmood who became the main proponent of an Islamic state of Pakistan. Mufti
Mahmood’s son Fazl ur Rehman is now head of JUI(F) (Fazl faction) while Maulana
Samiul Haq is head of JUI (S) (Sami faction) both still adhere to the Darul Uloom Deoband teachings. Maulan Samiul Haq still believes in a strong connection between the main school in Deoband India and the many madrassas that follow it in Pakistan. 412
The question that has been in discussion on the issue of jihad and Deobandi followers in
Pakistan is why only the Deobandi madrasas and no other traditions supported Jihadi agenda during the period between Soviet occupations of Afghanistan. As discussed earlier we cannot deny the fact that the Deobandi madrasas that dominated in the tribal belt of
Pakistan and the areas were the entry point for most Afghan refugees, the tendency and
411Martin Lewis. Deobandi Islam vs. Barelvi Islam in South Asia. October 7, 2010. Retrieved from http://geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/deobandi-islam-vs-barelvi-islam-in-south-asia 412 Interview conducted with Maulana Samiul Haq by the author at Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khatak on October 16, 2011. 231 religious zeal of the Afghans were a great influence on the tribal people of Pakistan. It was a marriage of convenience that the regime of Gen Zia-ul-Haq thought of using that already convinced the Deobandi followers to use them in the Afghan Jihad. Historically,
Afghanistan’s Emir was a major patron of Darul Uloom Deoband and had many of Afghan students studying at the Darul Uloom, therefore the connection was already there and
Deobandi school of thought of a guiding source for them. The important point to ponder is, if there was a diversion in the mainstream Deobandi school of thought towards Jihad that led to the suspicion of all Deobandi Madrassas. Has there been a shift in the madrassas in
Pakistan that caused a complete separation of Pakistani and Indian Deobandis or not?
Regional political ambitions also played an important role besides religious affinity. In the aftermath of Soviet interventions into Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran 1979, a kind of "surrogate" competition emerged between Saudis and Iranians, each side patronizing religious institutions which fueled sectarian violence.
The chapter on International Political Environment (1979-2001) and Internal Politics of
India and Pakistan particularly focuses on the changing international environment from
1979 till 2001. These years saw some of the most dramatic changes across the globe, as both the international and national environment underwent transitions. The political shifts witnessed during these decades include tumbled regimes, deadly invasions, social and political revolutions and radical shifts in polices. The most significant of these changes occurred in the close proximity of Pakistan.
The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iranian revolution effected the international environment, besides both of them opened doors for regional problems and unpredicted circumstances for the region. The third most important incident was the attack
232 on twin towers in the USA by a terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda in September, 2001. This provoked an immediate retaliation by the US government in the shape of Afghanistan invasion in October, 2001.
Russian invasion in Afghanistan shifted the world attention to this region and drastic shifts in the policies were seen both nationally and internationally. In the wake of the Soviet invasion another US-Pak alliance was formed. The US assisted Pakistan in the proxy war which was waged in Afghanistan against Russia. The US very thoroughly planned the strategic maneuvers while defeating the Soviets at the hands of Muslims. Besides arms and ammunition, Pakistan also provided trained guerilla fighters. The US monetary and material help to Afghan Mujahedeen was channeled through Pakistan. In other words,
Afghanistan was the battlefield and Pakistan became the frontline state.
Apart from the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, revolution in Iran and Pakistan’s changing environment, communal politics was at its peak in India. In the regional context there were many severe riots going on between Hindus and Muslims in India at that time. Besides international pressures and emerging scenarios Pakistan also had to face the regional issues and their impact on the domestic politics and affairs. In 1980’s there was an increase in the communal politics which led to communal violence across India. Meanwhile, BJP came in limelight as political party with a religious ideology and backing. Its prime aim was to become a Hindu nationalist party as a substitute to the secular Congress party. Babri
Mosque incident which took place in December 1992 was the worst display of hatred and sectarian violence. The congress had good relations with Muslim scholars before these incidents of riots and communal violence, the relationship came under stress and huge trust deficit was observed during this time. This is true that being in good relations with
233
Muslims gave a lot of advantage to their political arena. After partition Deoband scholars developed a strong political bond with the Congress and it continued as late as 1990s.
The demolition of Babri Mosque in 1992 by religious Hindu nationalist parties broke the thread of the strong bond between JUH and Congress. With Gen. Zia’s regime in place in
1977, a number of laws and ordinances were introduced and Islamic courts were established. This paved the way for inclusion of religious, rightist conservative forces in the state machinery. Post-Soviet withdrawal scenario brought with it new realities, civil war in
Afghanistan led to Taliban’s victory and Pakistan was first to recognize the regime.
Pakistan continued with its policies in the region till the unfortunate event of 9/11.
September 11, 2001, was a turning point not in the US policy vis-à-vis religion based politics but for Pakistan as well. In Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt, there was a clear shift from anti-Soviet to anti-US, as those fighting with the soviets were now engaged with
US forces in Afghanistan. The policy shift in Pakistan led to the emergence of resistance forces who opposed the government for supporting the US on war on terror. Disgruntle groups who claimed their allegiance to Mullah Omer and supported the ideology of Osama bin Laden against the US, grouped together and a strong militant group called Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under Baitullah Mehsud emerged unleashing violence in the name of religion. For a decade now, TTP has been in direct conflict with the armed forces of
Pakistan, government of Pakistan and the civil society calling them America’s paid servants. The religious parties especially JUI (F) and (S) both blame the military and government for shifting their policy.413
413 Mualana Samiul Haq blamed the military and the government for siding with the US forgetting the Jihad and their Afghan brothers at Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, KPK, Pakistan October 16, 2011. 234
The madrasas located along the frontier frequently provided the only available education.
One school in particular, the Madrasa Haqqaniya, in Akora Kathak near Peshawar, is known to have many top Taliban leaders as students. These students (talib; plural, taliban) were indoctrinated by many of the core Deobandi reformists encouraged by Arab and
Uzbek volunteers in Afghanistan. Deobandis followed Saudi-Wahabi injunctions.414
An extreme form of Deobandism, which became a normal course of instruction in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan focused on a narrow range of Shari'a law, which emphasized strict rituals, was something the Taliban shared with other Deobandi movements, while the severity of the Taliban indoctrination made them known to the world as inhuman and terrorist.
Darul Uloom Deoband India, on the other hand, forbade their students from going to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The clerics drew an important boundary line between theologically conservative views and political violence.
The issue, however, remains that the preservation of a distinct Muslim identity is one of the principal concerns of the madrassas. This theological hardening however, does not lead to an embrace of militancy in India. In addition to forbidding participation in holy war abroad,
Indian Deobandi leaders specifically condemn violent jihad at home, saying Muslims have a compact to live in peace and harmony with others that cannot be broken unless they are actively persecuted in matters of faith. Deobandis in India insist that it is possible, within a pluralistic India, to practice rigorous Islam and send their children to religious schools without being opposed to the state.
414 Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, CSIS, Washignton DC, June 2012 235
Democracy with Secular Constitution versus Democracy with Islamic Constitution
The two arguments help us to understand if democracy and Islamic constitution can co- exist. The arguments that due to religious pluralism and secular constitution; Indian
Muslim politics was not influenced by politics of violence/Jihad or that the Deobandi
School is non-violent and that is why Jihad was never endorsed by the school in India but in Pakistan, state’s role was eminent in misusing the Deobandi ideology for political purposes.
Analyzing Deobandis in India and their policy of accommodation within the secular political system explains that the policy actually helped them to sustain and continue with their distinct religious education. In the past 60 years in post-independence India,
Deobandis maintained a strong link with Congress party while in Pakistan the linkage between secular political system and religious thoughts was considered an attempt to moving out of the religion.
In India Deobandis evolved as soft, inclusivist school that has no problem in accommodating with the Braelvis. Unlike Pakistan where Braelvis though in majority were sidelined and Deobandi’s got state patronage hence the political Jihad that was waged by the then regime of Gen. Zia became a religious Jihad with the endorsement of Deobandi
School of thought in Pakistan.
An in-depth analysis of Pakistani state shows that the Legislative system evolved under Zia provided the Sunni-Orthodox religio-legal protection needed to support the paradigm shift in the country. Deobandis in Pakistan facilitated the Wahabi school of thought to gain grounds while on the other side of the border, Wahabi School could never find acceptance
236 among the Deobandis majority, though exceptions were there, because of the secular system, any public policy legislation based on religion or one particular religion was not possible in India, had there been extremist Hindu legislations, we might have seen extreme behaviour on part of Deobandis to preserve their identity.
The chapter on the constitutional nature of states and democratic process explains that in
Pakistan, the two decades following 1970s witnessed a rise in political upheavals in
Pakistan. The biggest role in this regard was played by the first Afghan war that legitimized the fourth Chief Marital Law Administrator Gen. Zia ul Haq’s rule. To further legitimize the authoritarian regime, General Zia used institutions as the ISI and religious parties as instruments that resulted in ethnic and sectarian divide; ever increasing the orthodox and conservative interpretation of Islam and harbouring conservative religious groups.
Animosity towards India, First Kashmir war, and the US sponsored military alliances in the mid- 1950s; all led to strengthening the military’s position in the polity, justifying strong defence posture of Pakistan and a heavy national budget towards defence and security policies of the state.
The subsequent governments led to weakening of the democratic process and lacked the confidence to assert themselves over the military brass; providing the Islamic policies of
Gen. Zia yet a new dimension and paramount position in policy making. The relationship of religion with the state and the political system adversely affected the democratic culture of Pakistan. Orthodox Islamic groups used double facet policy with changing times; either rejected democracy as a western value or supported it for the electoral process to gain power and employ their notion of Islamic system.
237
Since religion held a paramount position most of the time, religious bodies always enjoyed an upper hand in policy formulation. Hence, the state promoted pro-Western policies under the cover of Islamism. Pakistan’s pan-Islamic aspirations were a tool to regulate state affairs, in order to consolidate its national identity. And, the religious parties became tools to gain legitimacy as well as ‘cleanse’ the society of ‘liberal Western’ ideas. This religious enterprise helped authoritarian regimes over time, muster support among the general public against secular system based democratic forces.
Parallel to the continuously changing political topology in Pakistan, the Indian state was focusing on internal politics and state building by the introduction of a multiparty, pluralist and secular system. Heightened political awareness was due to the exponential increase in the number of political parties, transformation in the relative electoral strength of the
National and State parties, and the initiation of economic plans targeted to increase domestic competitiveness.
The principles and provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution under the 1973 constitution of Pakistan directly staple the state with religion. The Hudood Ordinance 1979 was introduced on similar lines in friction to basic fundamental rights of citizens. The loopholes within the ordinance resulted in increased violence against women rather than curtailing criminal acts like rape. In the Indian constitution, the social fiber rests on a
‘secular’ preamble of law making mechanism. Different Muslim Schools in India, including the Deobandi School became an amalgamation of development and secularization during this period. The period saw modern Muslim schools adopting new leadership formats, new forms of communication, agendas focusing on education and development, and networking traditional religious schools with secular and female
238 education. Over the years, the traditional seminary of Deoband focused on non-political agenda. The Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind never formed as a political party neither did it ever take the colour of a political entity.
On the other hand, since the creation of Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam has shown indicators common to other political parties in the country. There has existed a contrast between the functionality and objectivity of Deobandis in Pakistan and India. The constitution of Pakistan as promulgated in 1973 is based on the Islamic Sharia law which guarantees its citizens equal rights as promised by the Sharia law. Most people argue, especially the military elites that Pakistan cannot hold itself as a stable democratic state given that the country’s literacy rate is considerably low and that the religious factions are entrenched deep within the society as well as the political realm of the state. Though the constitution of Pakistan guarantees religious freedom, however sectarian rivalry, religious intolerance leading to discriminatory legislation such as the blasphemy laws and anti-
Ahmedia provisions has encouraged communal violence.
The orthodox Sunni Muslim clerics have been closely associated with the Wahabi school from Saudi Arabia. Resultantly, the Deobandi School played a major role in Pakistani politics to influence public policy and all spheres of political decision making during authoritarian regimes and martial laws. Hence, politicized Islam was used to hold power.
The Deobandi parties played a major role in the legislative process specifically augmenting an ‘Islamic’ constitution of 1973.
At the same time, the Democratic Republic of India adopted a secularist agenda. The
Constitution guaranteed religious freedom and refrained from religion based public policy.
Religious activism of Muslims in India has never been violent and extremist; majorly
239 because of the provision of civil liberties and freedom of religion in her secular constitution.
The existing Deobandi madrassas in India and Pakistan and Politics of religion
The section on the existing situation explains that ever since politics has been turned into a religio-politik entity in the sub-continent, the defining parameters of the indigenous political topology of the region have shifted into the hands of religious outfits and parties. Looking at it more precisely, the Madrassa system has played a significant role in either serving religion or politics of religion. The Deobandi School in India has always aspired for religious education and well-being while ensuring political survivability of the Muslim community.
Spanning over a century, the Islamic landscape of India has always remained local and indigenously influenced. The political activism of these groups has always been benign. The
Deoband School in Indian Subcontinent has always been considered a centre of learning and has focused on individual spiritual well-being rather than an adaptation of political aspirations.
With minority status and rights acknowledged in the constitution of India, minority Muslims feel safe and their rights safeguarded by the state. The secular conception of the Indian constitution is well recognized and socially accepted by the Muslim communities in India and hence, blends well within the versatile cultural scenery of the country.
Today, contemporaries to the Deoband School in India advocate reforms. The younger lot of educated religious scholars has proposed restructuring and transformation of the syllabus of
Deobandi Madrassas. However, the conservatism of elder Deoband scholars has always hindered the path of reform; for they prefer to maintain the status quo.
240
Comparatively analyzing the socio-religio-political activism of Deobandi Muslims in Pakistan with that of India, the vigour attached with the historic activities of Pakistani Deoband School has striking contrasts with their Indian counterparts and their movements. Putting it in comparative perspective, the Indian religio-political history has been relatively moderate when balanced against the Pakistani religio-political demands. In India, the Deoband School’s motive of keeping politics at bay while the focal ambition has been learning and social development of Deoband Muslims in India. This has won it laurels among scholars and critiques who acknowledge its apolitical character. Its efforts to maintain an apolitical colour and endeavours to strictly follow the Muslim identity and state interests; keeping it at distance from national and religious scandals.
It is true that the School has always focused on social development of its believers rather than achievement of any political schema. During the 1920’s Khilafat Movement Jamiatul Ulema-i
Hind (JUH) formed alliances with non-Muslim political parties for the persuasion of their interests. This resulted in a nexus between the Deoband School and the Congress Party in support of a secular constitution. As a religious organization, historically a faction of JUH had close association with All India Muslim League for the demand for partition. However, in the post-partition period JUH associated itself with the Congress Party; the latter patronizing the former in the political arena.
With political coverage being offered by the Congress party, the Deoband School has directed all her energy towards the social uplift of the Deobandi community. After the partition of the
Indian subcontinent, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) shifted its focus from establishment of an
Islamic state to new ambitions defined in light of a secular socio-political landscape in India that envisaged practicality of religious doctrines. With initiatives to fight for rights of minority
241
Muslims, the School evolved itself to social reform, education for all, and charity organizations; completely disposing of the initial prophecy of an Islamic state.
In Pakistan the Deobandi School had been politically involved in major decision making of the state, influencing policy making at the highest level. From the 1980s onwards, the number of
Deoband seminaries exponentially increased in Pakistan. The Zia regime (1977-1988) granted patronage to these seminaries and used them as instruments of influence in a multi-purpose fashion. In return, these seminaries provided legitimacy to General Zia’s unconstitutional government.
However, the political setting in which the school operated changed drastically in the post 9/11 period. By mid-2002, the Deoband inspired madrassas experienced a devastating blow in terms of autonomy and political legitimacy when the regime of General Musharraf reacted strongly against the enrollment of foreign students in the madrassas to disrupt any linkages between the institutions of learning and militancy. Political humiliation deepened the resentment of the
Deobani Madrassas against losing the status acquired during state patronage. Though General
Musharraf maintained that the purpose of madrassa reforms and surveillance was to bring the religious institutions into the fold of proper administration to avoid any misuse by the extremists groups, the religious groups considered it as an aggressive action by the state.415
Today, while the Deoband School in India aspires to preserve religious institutions of higher learning, the violent struggle for preserving political status of Deobandis in Pakistan escalates in the form of sectarian divide and target killing.
415 General Musharraf’s comments during a meeting with the author at his official residence after his resignation as President of Pakistan , September, 2008. 242
Indian Deobandis on Pakistani Madrassas: Lessons for Pakistan
Post-independence Deobandi madrassas in India while teaching Dars-e-Nizami and Saha- e-Sitta ( six books on tradition) focus on social tolerance, which is not found or expressed in majority of Deobandi Madrassas in Pakistan where emphasis is on being exclusivist teaching and ideals.
Another argument is that the Indian Muslims maintain a front of unity or tolerance because they have to put up a strong front against Hindu hardliners like the Bhartiya Janata Party
(BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which leaves them with little time and energy to entangle in sectarian discords."
Most of the Indian Deobandi scholars interviewed for this research are of the view that
Indian madrassas could never become the terrorist incubators that they are sometimes accused of being for many reasons, not least the protections written into India's democratic constitution, the political climate could never approximate Pakistan‘s.416 And the sense of having to survive as a minority in a hostile environment prevents Muslims from stepping too far outside the bounds of the law.
Still, it is argued that the hardline attitude of India's Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has been prompting a hardening of theological positions in the country's Muslim institutions.
So far, this theological hardening has not led to an embrace of militancy. In addition to a fatwa forbidding participation in holy war abroad, Indian Deobandi leaders specifically condemn violent jihad at home.
416 Interviewed conducted by the author with Ajay Darshan, Associate professor at Third World Studies and Coordinator for Pakistan Studies Program, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi , India on November 24, 2010
243
For Indian Deobandis, the Indian madrassas are not a part of mainstream politics through any political linkage unlike their Pakistani counterparts. More importantly, they are not yet a part of the transnational Pan-Islamic network of Al-Qaeda, as seen by the 9/11 attacks and after.
At most they are reactions to domestic problems caused by bad governance and accentuated by petty vote bank politics as seen in states like UP, Bihar and J &K. Hence, it can be safely said that madrassas in India continue to provide Islamic knowledge and tradition rather than political Islam.
A national discourse is on in India to accommodate the madrassas into the mainstream through concrete and deliberate attempts by the government and the Muslim community, in particular, the clergy. It is suggested by many to acknowledge the fact that the problem is not with the madrassas per se but intrusion of violent extremism. Deobandi Madrassas are under severe pressure to revamp the syllabus and opening up their services to other communities in order to continue their apolitical role of center of Islamic education.
It is fair to state that though violent expression did find its roots in pre-Independence India but the very fact that the Deobandi Madrassa split in two, between those who wanted to continue imparting religious knowledge and preserving Muslim Identity and those who took up arms first against British, then Soviets and now Americans. It is unfortunate that in all three examples, the rank and file for Jihad were provided by the people from the mountains. This however does not prove that it is a particular people who are inherently violent as the leadership for all these expeditions was first from Sayid Ahmed of Rae
Brailly, then Maulana Mehmoodul Hasan of Deoband, then Gen.Zia who endorsed it and used the Deobandis. The construction of the“threat” from outside powers was mainly based
244 on political interests than religious ideologies. Political and military intrusion by the west was on strategic basis and not to wipe out particular religion from the area as it was conceived and presented by successive Muslim leadership of pre independence India and later of Pakistan. The threat to Islam was so constructed that convinced the tribesman who have been always ready to lay their life in the name of God while the real purpose was and is power politics.
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Appendix I
THE EIGHT-YEAR COURSE OF THE ARABIC CLASSES
FIRST YEAR
Subject Books Bio Graph of Prophet Syrat-e-Khatimul Anbiya (By: Mufti Md. Shafi) (syrat) Conjugation-Grammar Arabic Primer; Mizanus-Sarf and Munsha'ib (Sarf) (complete); Panj Ganj (complete Syntax (Nahv Memorizing of Nahv-e-Mir (complete); Sharh-e- Mi'ata A'mil (complete). Arabic Literature Miftahul Arabia Part 1,2, & Alqira'atul Waziha (1) Logic Taiseer al-Mantiq Chirography Correct writing and Dictation
(Khush-navisi) Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation in the first quarter of the Para-e- Amm
SECOND YEAR
Subject Books Conjugation-Grammar Ilmus Segha & Fusool-e-Akbari (Sarf) Syntax (Nahv Hidaytun Nahv (complete) & Kafiya (chapter: Fail & Harf) Arabic Literature Alqira'atul Waziha (2) & Nafhatul Adab Jurisprudence: (Fiqh) Noorul Izah & Qudoori (To Haj chapter) Logic A'san Mantiq & Mirqat Chirography (Khush- Correct writing and Dictation navisi) Cantillation: (Tajvid) Jamalul Qra'an & Exercise in cant illation of the Para-e- Amm
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THIRD YEAR
Subject Books Quranic Exegesis Tarjumatul Quran (From Sura-e-Qaf to end) Jurisprudence: (Fiqh) Qudoori (From Kitabul Boyoo to end) Syntax (Nahv) Sharah Shuzuruz Zahab (complete) Arabic Literature Nafhatul Arab & Alqira'tul Waziha (3) Hadith Mishkatul A'thar Logic Shrah Tahzeeb (complete) Islami Akhlaque Talimul Muta'allim Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation of the five Para External study Tareekh Millat (Khilafat-e-Rashida)
FOURTH YEAR
Subject Books Quranic Exegesis Tarjumatul Quran (From Sura-e-Yousuf to Qaf) Jurisprudence: (Fiqh) Sharah Wiqayah (Part 1 coml. & part 2 up to Itaque) Principles of Tasheelul Usool Arabi & Usoolus Shasi Jurisprudence Rhetorics Darusul Balaghah (complete) Hadith Alfiyatul Hadith Logic Qutbi (complete) History Khilafat-e-Bani Umayya, Abbasiya, Turkiya (By: zamullah Shahabi) Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation of the five Para Modern Sciences Sciences of Madaniyyat, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries.
FIFTH YEAR
Subject Books Quranic Exegesis Tarjumatul Quran (From beginning up to Sura-e-Hood) Jurisprudence: (Fiqh) Hidaya Part 1 (complete) Principles of Noorul Anwar up to Sunnah & Matan Alminar ( form Jurisprudence Kitabus Sunnah up to end) Rhetorics Mukhtasarul Ma'ani 1st subject & Talkhisul Miftah (2nd & 3rdSubject) Beliefs (Aqa'id) Aqidatut Tahavi Logic Sullamul Uloom (up to subject of Shartiyat) Arabic Literature Muqamat ( up to 15 Muqama) Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation of the five Para External study History of Indians Kings (up to 1947 A.D.)
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SIXTH YEAR
Subject Books Tafsir Tafsir Jalalayn (complete) Jurisprudence: (Fiqh) Hidaya Part 2 (complete with Itaque subject) Principles of Tafsir & Alfauzul Kabeer & Husamy (complete) Jurisprudence Arabic Literature Deevan-e-Mutanabbi (appointed chapter) & Deewan-e- Himasa (Babul Adab) Philosophy Mabadiul Falsafa & Mabazi (Complete) Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation of the five Para Study of Sirat Asahhus Siyer
SEVENTH YEAR
Subject Books Hadith Mishkat, Sharah Nukhba & Muqadma Shaikh Abdul- Haque Jurisprudence: (Fiqh Hidaya Part ¾ Aqa'ed Shrah Aqa'ed Fra'iz Sirajy Cantillation: (Tajvid) Exercise in cant illation of the five Para External Study Al-Mazahibul Islamia Urdu (Shaikh Abu Zahra )
EIGHTH YEAR (Daura-e-Hadith)
Subject Books Hadith Bukhari Sharif (Complete) Hadith Muslim Sharif (Complete) Hadith Tirmizi Sharif (Complete) Hadith Abu Da'ud Sharif (Complete) Hadith Nasa'i Sharif (Complete) Hadith Ibn-e-Maja Sharif (Complete) Hadith Tahavi Sharif (Complete) Hadith Shama'il Tirmizi Sharif (Complete) Hadith Mu'atta Imam Malik (Complete) Hadith Mu'atta Imam Mohammad (Complete) External Tajvid
Note: After the successful completion of this 8-year course of the Arabic classes the student becomes eligible for receiving the graduate degree (Sanad-e-Faraghat) of Darul Uloom.
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POST-GRADUATE CLASSES
Mastery in Tafsir
Subject Books Tafsir Tafsir Ibn-e-Kathir (Sura Saffat up to sura Najam) Tafsir Tafsir Ibn-e-Kathir (Para 17 up to last Quran) Tafsir Baizavi (Sura A'al-e-Imran up to sura A'araf) Tafsir Baizavi (Sura-e-Baqra) Usool-e-Tafsir Manahilul Irfan (some chapter) Usool-e-Tafsir Sabiluri Rishad
Mastery in Theology
Subject Books Hikmat-e-Shariyah Hujjazrullah-il-Baligha Ilm-e-Kalam Musamira Usool-e-Hadith Muqadma ibne Salah Fiqh Al-Ashbah Wannazair Usool-e-Fiqh Musallemus Saboot Usool-e-Fiqh Sabilur Rishad
Mastery in Fiqh
Subject Books Faraiz Siraji (with training) Ifta Uqood Rasm-il-Mufti Qawaid Al-Ashbah Wannazair Qawaid Qawaid-ul-Fiqh Fiqh Durr-e-Mukhtar (Nikah, Talaq, Waqf etc) Ifta Tamreen-e-Fatwa
Mastery in Literature
Subject Books Prose Asalibul Insha Prose An-Nathrul Jadid Poetry Deevan-e-Hemasa, Sab'a Mu'allaqa History Tareekh-ul-Adab-il-Arabi Balaghat Albalaghatul Waziha Insha Insha-e-Arabi External Study Hiyati, Al-iyam, Abarat, Abqriyat
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Mastery in Literature (contd.)
Subject Books New Prose Rijal minat Tareekh (P.1 up to 40)
Min Nafahat-il-Hiram (P.1up to 50)
Hayati (P. 1 up to 60) Old Prose Wafayatul Aayan (Some chapter)
Kitabul Bukhla (Part 1)
Kalila w Dimna Insha Al-Insha-ul-Arabi Tabirat 200 Tabirats clips from Arabic news papers and magazines. ` Maqala Arabic article in 100 pages.
Mastery in Fiqh (Contd.)
Subject Books Usool Muqadma Durre Mukhtar, Rasmul Mufti Fatwa writing Training of Fatwa writing in light of Rasmul Summary of selected Summary of selected chapters from Raddul Muhtar, Al- chapters Bahrur Ra’ique, Fathul Qadeer, Al-ashbah wan Naza’ir (3rd subject) & another chapters from Shami. Introduction of books Introduction of Fatawa’s books and their specialization. on Fatawa Tamreen-e-Fatawa Learning of Fatwa writing.
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Appendex II
Pakistani Madrassas Curriculum
Year 1 Biography of the Prophet (syrat), conjugation-grammar (sarf),syntax (nahv), Arabic literature, chirography (khush-navisi), chant illation (tajvid)
Year 2 Conjugation-grammar, syntax, Arabic literature, jurisprudence (fiqh),logic, chirography (khush-navisi), chant illation
Year 3 Qur’anic exegesis (analysis of text), jurisprudence, syntax, Arabic literature, hadith, logic, Islamic Brotherhood, chant illation, external study (Tareekh Millat and Khilafat-e- Rashida—these are Indian Islamic movements).
Year 4 Qur’anic exegesis, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, rhetoric, hadith, logic, history, chant illation, modern sciences (sciences of cities of Arabia, geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries)
Year 5 Qur’anic exegesis, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, rhetoric, beliefs (aqa’id), logic, Arabic literature, chant illation, external study (history of Indian kings)
Year 6 interpretation of the Qu’ran, jurisprudence, principles of interpretation and jurisprudence, Arabic literature, philosophy, chant illation, study of Prophet’s traditions.
Year 7 sayings of the Prophet, jurisprudence, belief, responsibility (fra’iz), chant illation, external study (Urdu texts)
Year 8 Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings of the Prophet
Source: Uzma Aznar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Pedagogical Practices,” 15–16.
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Appendix III 417
Syllabus for local and foreign students at Jamia Uloom ul Islamia, Banori Town, Karachi
Level Duration Degree Remarks
Basic level of Degree: Witness of Equivalent to Primary learning heart by the learning/Protecting Level numbers the Holy Quran by (Hifzul.A'Dadia) learning it heart.
Level: Middle Duration: Degree/certification: Equivalent to Middle/ 1year Witness certificate of Lower Secondary Middle Level
Equivalent; Lower- Level Duration: 2year Equivalent to Middle Secondary Secondary Certificate of Matriculation / (general) Secondary (general) Secondary Level
Level Intermediate- Duration: Certificate: Equivalent to Higher special 2years Certificate of Secondary / Intermediate special- Intermediate Level Higher secondary
Level Higher Duration: Certificate of Equivalent to (Graduation- 2years graduation Bachelor degree Bachelor)
Level Post-Graduate Duration: Certification of Equivalent to Master 2years Alimia in Arabic and Degree Islamic Science
Level: Tajweed-ul- Duration: Certificate of Tajweed Basic Level Quran (Reading the 1year (Reading the Holy Holy Quran with Quran with Phonetic Proper Phonetic Sounds sounds)
417 http://www.binoria.org/academics/local.htm#n 252
Details of studies for Alim (Islamic Scholar) Course at the Jamia
Year 01 Class 01
The Holy Quran: Noorani Qaida, Yessernal Quran. Teachings First Kalima(Kalima Tayyaba), Second Kalima (Kalima- (Diniyat): e-Shahadat), Sana (Eulogy)with translation. Writing (Hand Urdu Qaida & Urdu Kitab (Urdu for Jamat Awal). writing): Units Writing, Numbers Writing up to 100 Arithmetic: Alphabets Writing. English:
Year 02 Class 02
The Holy Quran Recitation of the last section (para) & Learning the last ten Chapters by heart. Islamic teachings Namaz (Prayer). (Diniyat): Urdu writing: Urdu Kitab (Book) for Class Two. Arithmetic: Compound Number Writing, Mathematics for Class Two. English: My Children (A book).
Year 03 Class 03
The Holy Quran: Recitation of the First five sections (Paras). Islamic teachings: Namaz-E-Hanafi (Other than the poetry) Part 1. Urdu writing: Urdu Book for Class Three. Arithmetic: Dictation of Compound' Mathematics for Class Three. English: Faisal English Book #1
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Year 04 Class 04
The Holy Quran: Recitation from the 6th to 15th Section (Para). Islamic Teachings: Taaleem-Ul-Islam Part 1. Urdu writing: Urdu Book for Class Four. Mathematics: Writing in Words, Mathematics for Class Four. English: Faisal English Book #2
Year 05 Class 05
The Holy Quran: Recitation from the 16th to the 30th Section (Para). Islamic Teachings: Taaleem-Ul-Islam Part 2. Urdu writing: Urdu Book for Class Five, Dictation & Oral. Mathematics: Mathematics for Class Five. English: Faisal English Book #3
Year 06 Class 06
Exercise in learning Section One (Derivation of basic roots). of the Holy Quran: Teachings of Islam Taaleem-Ul-Islam Part 3 & Arabic Book for Class Six. Part 3: Urdu Writing: Urdu Book for Class six, Writing from Urdu book for Persian: Islam. Social science: Rehbar-E-Farsi (Guide to Persian) & Karima. Mathematics: Social Science for Class Six. English: Mathematics for Class Six. English for Class Six.
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Year 07 Class 07
Exercise in The Derivation From section 11 to 20 (Properties of words). Holy Quran & Phonology: Taaleem-Ul-Islam Part 4 & Arabic Book for Class Seven. Islamic Teachings and Arabic: Pundnama Gulistan-e-S'adi Chapter 1 to 4. Persian: Urdu Book for Class Seven & Dictation from Urdu Book. Urdu writing: Social Sciences for Class Seven. Social Science: Mathematics for Class Seven. Mathematics: English for Class Seven. English:
Year 08 Class 08
Exegesis in The Holy From Section (Para) 21st to the 30th along with Izhar & Ikhfa Quran and etc. Phonology: Character and Language-Arabic, Behashti Gohar. Personality Islamic Teachings: of the Prophet(PBUH) in Urdu, Arabic Book for Class Eight.
Gulistan S'adi, Chapter 7-8 & Bostan Chapter-1. Persian: Urdu book for Class Eight & Dictation from Urdu book. Urdu writing: Social Science for Class Eight. Social Science: Mathematics for Class Eight. Mathematics: English for Class Eight. English:
Year 09 Class 09
Exegesis and Jamal-Ul-Quran Section 30 Last Quarter with Exercise in Phonology: Phonetic Recitation of section 30 the Last Quarter.
Traditions and Benevolent for the worlds (Rahmal-ul-Alameen). Personality of the Holy Prophet: Irshad-Us-Sarf. Grammar: Seeghoon Ki Tamreen. Tamreen: Nahv-E-Mir, (Explanation) Sharah Miaat-Ul-Aamil. Syntax: Al-Tareeqahtul Jadeeda & Al-Tareeqahtul Asariyyah.
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English: English for Classes 9th & 10th.
Year 11 Class 11
Exegesis Translation & Exegesis From Surah Ankaboot to the End of Surah Mursalaat. Hadith: Riaaz-Us-Saaliheen, Kitaab-Ul-Adab & Kitaab-Ul-Fazail. Jurisprudence: Kanz-Ud-Daqaaiq. Principles of Usool-Us-Shashi. Jurisprudence: Grammar: Kaafiyah & Sharah Ibn-E-Aqeel. Logic: Sharah-E-Tahzeeb. Arabic Language and Essay writing: Nafhat -Ul-Arab & Muallim-Ul-Insha Part 2. Phonetics: Muqadma-Tul-Jazriah.
Year 12 Class 12
Exegesis & Translation & Exegesis From Surah Yunus to the End of Phonology: Surah Ankaboot. Riaaz-Uz-Saaliheen. Hadith: Sharih-E-Wiqayah (The First two Parts). Fiqh: Principles of Noor-Ul-Anwaar. (Upto Qiaas) Jurisprudence: Sharih-E-Jaami. (Upto Mubayyinaat) Logic: Qutbi. (Upto Aks-E-Naqeez) Grammar: Maqamaat-E-Hareeri & Muallim-Ul-Insha Part 3.
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Year 13 Class 13
Exegesis and Translation & Exegesis From Surah Fatiah to Surah Phonology: Yunus. Jurisprudence: Hidayah Part1. Principles of Jurisprudence: Balagah: Noor-Ul-Anwar (Qiyaas), Husaami. Logic: Mukhtasar-Ul-M'aani. Arabic Language: Sullam-Ul-Uloom. (Tasavvurat) Deewan-E-Mutanabbi.
Year 14 Class 14
Exegesis: Jalalain. (Complete) Hadith: Kitaab-Ul-Aasaar. Jurisprudence: Hidayah Part2. Principles of Jurisprudence: Tauzeeh Talwih. Logic & Belief: Meebzi & Sharah-E-Aqaaid. Grammar: Deewan-E-Hammasa. Al-Frooz: Muheet Al-Daairah.
Year 15 Class 15
Exegesis: Tafseer-E-Bayzaavi. Principles of Al-Fauz-Ul-kabir. Exegesis: Mishkaat Sharif. Hadith: Nukhba-Tul-Fikr. Principles of Hadith: Hidayah Part3 & Part4. Jurisprudence:
257
Year 16 Class 16
Hadith: Bukhari Sharif. Hadith: Muslim Sharif. Hadith: Tirmizi Sharif. Hadith: Abudawood Sharif. Hadith: Nasaai, Ibn-E-Maaja & Shamail-E-Tirmizi. Hadith: Tahavi, Muatta Imam Malik & Muhammad.
Books in the Alim (Islamic Scholar) course for External / Foreign Students'
Level 01
Jurisprudence: Al-Tahseel Aldharoori. Grammar: Al Nehav Al Maisar wa Sharah Mata Amil. Syntax: Abwab Al Sarf. Arabic Language: Tariqa Jadeeda. Hadith: Zaad Al Talaibeen. Phonetics: Tashee-ul-Talafuz Ma al Marajaat......
Year 02 Class 02
Jurisprudence: Al-Mukhtasar Al Qadoori. Grammar: Hidia Al Nahen. Syntax: Ilmol Sigha. Al-Tafseer: Juza Um. Hadith: Moalam-ol-Insha, Al Qirat-al-Rashide. Phonetics: Haydat-ul-Mustafeed.
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......
Year 03 Class 03
Al-Tafseer: Aisar-ul-Tafaseer (From the starting to the end of 7th Chapter) Hadith: Asaar-Us-Sunan. Jurisprudence: Al Hidayat-Ul-Mujallad (Part 1). Principles of Jurisprudence: Usul Al Shashi. Grammar: Arabic Language: Al-Nehav Al-waadheh (1,2 & 3 part). Logic: Nafhatul-Arab & Al-Qirat-Ur-Raashida. Tahseel-Ul-Mantiq......
Year 04 Class 04
Al-Tafseer: Aisar-ul-Tafaseer (From the begining of 8th to the end of 18th Chapter). Hadith: Mishkat al Masaabih (The 1st half). Jurisprudence: Al Hidayat-Ul-Mujallad (Part 2). Principles of Jurisprudence: Al-Husaami. Principles of Hadith: Eulogy: Mustalah-Ul-Hadith. Grammar: Al-Balagh Al-wadha. Qatarun nadi......
Year 05 Class 05
Tafseer: Aisar-ul-Tafaseer (From the beginning of 19th to the end Hadith: of the Holy Quran). Jurisprudence. Mishkat al Masaabih (The 2nd half) & Kitab-Ul-Aasaar. Quranic Science: Al Hidayat-Ul-Mujallad (Part 3 & 4). Science of heritance: Al Tibyaan Fi Uloom-Ul-Quran. Personality of the Al-Siraaji. Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) Noor-Ul-Yaqueen, Al-Adyaan Wal Furq.
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Appendix IV
1. Text of articles in Indian Constitution on religious freedom and tolerance for other faith
Article 25 in The Constitution Of India 1949 2. 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion 3. (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion 4. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law 5. (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; 6. (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus Explanation I The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion Explanation II In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly
Article 26 in The Constitution Of India 1949 7. 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right 8. (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; 9. (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 10. (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 11. (d) to administer such property in accordance with law
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Appendix V
The Offence of Zina (Enforcement Of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.
Ordinance No. VII of 1979
February 9th, 1979
An Ordinance to bring in conformity with the injunctions of Islam the law relating to the Offence of Zina.
WHEREAS it is necessary to modify the existing law relating to zina so as to bring it in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
AND WHEREAS the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action;
Now, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July 1977, read with the Laws (Continuance in Force), Order, 1977 (C.M.L.A. Order No. l of 1977), and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance:-
1. Short title, extent and commencement (1) This Ordinance may be called the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall come into force on the twelfth day of Rabi-ul-Awwal, 1399 Hijri, that is, the tenth day of February, 1979.
2. Definitions In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject of context: (a) "adult" means a person who has attained, being a male, the age of eighteen years or, being a female, the age of sixteen years, or has attained puberty;
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1[(aa) "confession" means, notwithstanding any judgement of any court to the contrary, an oral statement, explicitly admitting the commission of the offence of zina, voluntarily made by the accused before a court of sessions having jurisdiction in the matter or on receipt of a summons under section 203A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898)."] 1 (b) "hadd" means punishment ordained by the Holy Quran or Sunnah; 2[] 2 (d) "Muhsan" means (i) a Muslim adult man who is not insane and has had sexual intercourse with a Muslim adult woman who, at the time he had sexual intercourse with her, was married to him and was not insane; or (ii) a Muslim adult woman who is not insane and has had sexual intercourse with a Muslim adult man who, at the time she had sexual intercourse with him, was married to her and was not insane; and 3[] 3
4[] 4 4. Zina A man and a woman are said to commit 'Zina' if they wilfully have sexual intercourse without being 5[] 5 married to each other. Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of Zina.
5. Zina liable to hadd. (1) Zina is zina liable to hadd if- (a) it is committed by a man who is an adult and is not insane with a woman to whom he is not, and does not suspect himself to be married; or (b) it is committed by a woman who is an adult and is not insane with a man to whom she is not, and does not suspect herself to be, married.
(2) Whoever is guilty of Zina liable to hadd shall, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, - (a) if he or she is a muhsan, be stoned to death at a public place; or (b) if he or she is not muhsan, be punished, at a public place; with whipping numbering one hundred stripes.
(3) No punishment under sub-section (2) shall be executed until it has been confirmed by the Court to which an appeal from the order of conviction lies; and if the punishment be of whipping; until it is confirmed and executed, the convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to simple imprisonment.
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6[ 5A. No case to be converted, lodged or registered under certain provisions:- No complaint of zina under section 5 read with section 203A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and no case where an allegation of rape is made shall at any stage be converted into a complaint of fornication under section 496A of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) and no complaint of lewdness shall at any stage be converted into a complaint of zina under section 5 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 (Ordinance No. VII of 1979) or an offence of similar nature under any other law for the time being in force.
] 6 7[] 7 8. Proof of zina 8[] 8 liable to hadd. Proof of zina 9[] 9 liable to hadd shall be in one of the following forms, namely:- (a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a confession of the commission of the offence; or (b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied, having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-shuhood, that they are truthful persons and abstain from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eye-widnesses of the act of penetration necessary to the offence: Provided that, if the accused is a non-Muslim, the eye-witnesses may be non- Muslims.
9. Case in which hadd shall not be enforced (1) In a case in which the offence of zina 10[] 10 is proved only by the confession of the convict, hadd, or such part of it as is yet to be enforced, shall not be enforced if the convict retracts his confession before thehadd or such part is enforced.
(2) In a case in which the offence of zina 11[] 11 is proved only by testimony, hadd or such part of it as is yet to be enforced, shall not be enforced if any witness resiles from his testimony before hadd or such part is enforced, so as to reduce the number of eye-witnesses to less than four.
12[] 12
13[] 13 17. Mode of execution of punishment of stoning to death The punishment of stoning to death awarded under section 5 16[] 16 shall be executed in the following manner, namely :- Such of the witnesses who deposed against the convict as may be available shall start
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stoning him and, while stoning is being carried on, he may be shot dead, whereupon stoning and shooting shall be stopped.
17[] 17 20. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and amendment (1) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, hereafter in this section referred to as the Code, shall apply, mutatis mutandis in respect of cases under this Ordinance: 18[] 18 20[ Provided 21[] 21 that an offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be triable by a Court of Session and not by a Magistrate authorised under section 30 of the said Code and an appeal from an order the Court of Session shall lie to the Federal Shariat Court: Provided further that a trial by a Court of Session under this Ordinance shall ordinarily be held at the headquarters of the Tehsil in which the offence is alleged to have been committed. ] 20
(2) The provision of the Code relating to the confirmation of the sentence of death shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to confirmation of sentences under this Ordinance.
22[] 22 (4) The provision of sub-section (3) of section 391 or section 393 of the Code shall not apply in respect of the punishment of whipping awarded under this Ordinance.
23[] 23 (6) In the Code, section 561 shall stand repealed.
21. Presiding Officer of Court to be Muslim. The Presiding Officer of the Court by which a case is tried, or an appeal is heard, under this Ordinance shall be a Muslim: Provided that, if the accused is a non-Muslim, the Presiding Officer may be a non- Muslim.
22. Saving Nothing in this Ordinance shall be deemed to apply to the cases pending before any Court immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance, or to offences committed before such commencement.
Source:: Manual of Hudood Laws in Pakistan, Kausar Brothers, Law Publishers, Lahore
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Notes
1 Inserted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 10(i).
2 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 10(ii) : : (c) "marriage" means marriage which is not void according to the personal law or the parties, and "married" shall be construed accordingly;
3 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 10(ii) : : (e) "tazir" means any punishment other than "hadd", and all other terms and expressions not defined in this Ordinance shall have the same meaning as the Pakistan Penal Code, or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
4 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 11 : : 3. Oridnance to override other Laws. The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect nothwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.
5 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 12 : "validly".
6 Inserted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 12A.
7 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 13 : : 6. Zina bil Jabr (1) A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabrif he or she has sexual inter-course with a woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly married, in any of the following circumstances, namely:- (a) against the will of the victim; (b) without the consent of the victim; (c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or (d) with the consent of the victim , when the offender knows that the offender is not validly married to the victim and that the consent is given because the victim
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believes that the offender is another person to who the victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly married. Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual inter-course necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr.
(2) Zina-bil-jabr is zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd if it is committed in the committed in the circumstances specified in sub-section (1) of section 5.
(3) Whoever is guilty of zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd shall subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, - (a) if he or she is a muhsan, be stoned to death at a public place; or (b) if he or she is not muhsan, be punished with whipping numbering one hundred stripes, at a public place, and with such other punishment, including the sentence of death, as the Court may deem fit having regard to the circumstances of the case.
(4) No punishment under sub-section (3) shall be executed until it has been confirmed by the Court to which an appeal from the order of conviction lies; and if the punishment be of whipping until it is comfirmed and executed, the convict shal be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to simple imprisonment.
7. Punishment for Zina or zina-bil-jabr where convit is not an adult. A person guilty of zina or zina-bil-jabr shall, if he is not an adult, be punished wiht imprisonment of either description for a term whic may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both, and may also be awarded the punishment of whipping not exceeding thirty stripes: Provided that, in the case of zina-bil-jabr, if the offender is not under the age of fifteen years, the punishment of whipping shall be awarded with or without any other punishment.
8 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 14(ii) : "or zina-bil-jabr".
9 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 14(i) : "or zina-bil-jabr".
10 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 15(i) : "or zina-bil-jabr".
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11 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 15(ii) : "or zina-bil-jabr".
12 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 15(iii) : : (3) In the case mentioned in sub-section (1), the Court may order retrial.
(4) In the case mentioned in sub-section (2), the Court may award tazir on the basis of the evidence on record.
13 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 16 : : 10. Zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 7, whoever commits zina or zina-bil- jabr which is not liable to hadd, or for which proof in either of the forms mentioned in section 8 is not available and the punishment of qazf liable to hadd has not been awarded to the complainant, or for which hadd may not be enforced under this Ordinance, shall be liable to tazir.
(2) Whoever commits zina liable to tazir shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with whipping numbering thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever commits zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which 14[shall not be less than four years nor more than] 14 twenty-five years and shall also be awarded the punishment of whipping numbering thirty stripes.
15[(4) When zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir is committed by two or more persons in furtherance of common intention of all each of such persons shall be punished with death.] 15
11. Kidnapping, abducitng or inducing women to compel for marriage etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit inter-course, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit inter-course, shall be punished with imprisonment for life and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever by means of criminal intimidation as defined in the Pakistan Penal Code, or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any
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woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit inter-course with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid.
12. Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to unnatural lust. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected, to the unnatural list of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with death or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-five years, and shall also be liable to fine, and, if the punishment be one of imprisonment, shal also be awarded the punishment of whipping not exceeding thirty stripes.
13. Selling person for purposes of prostitution, etc. Whoever sells, lets to hire, or otherwise disposes of any person with intent that such person shall at any time by employed or used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any time be employed or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment for life and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations: (a) When a female is sold, let for hire, or otherwise disposed of to a prostitute or to any person who keeps or manages a brothel, the person so disposing of such female shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have disposed of her with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution. (b) For the purposes of this section and section 14 "illicit intercourse" means sexual inter-course between persons not united by marriage.
14. Buying a person for purposes of prostitution, etc. Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of any person with intent that such person shall at any time be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any time be employed or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment for life and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: Any prostitute or any person keeping or managing a brothel, who buys, hires or otherwise obtains posession of a female shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have obtained possession of such female with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution.
15. Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit with him in that belief, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-five
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years and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine.
16. Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman Whoever takes or entices away any woman with intent that she may have illicit inter- course with any person, or conceals or detains with intent any woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine.
14 Substituted by Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Ordinance III of 1980), Section 14 for : "may extend to".
15 Inserted by Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) (Amdendment) Act, 1997.
16 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 17 : "or section 6".
17 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 16 : : 18. Punishment for attempting to commit an offence Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable under this Ordinance with imprisonment or whipping, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such atttempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with any two of, or all, the punishments.
19. Application of certain provisions of Pakistan Penal Code, and amendment. (1) Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Ordinance, the provisions of sections 34 to 38 of Chapter II, sections 63 to 72 of Chapter III and Chapters V and VA or the Pakistan Penal Code shall apply, mutatis mutandis, in respect of offences under this Ordinance.
(2) Whoever is guilty of the abetment of an offence liable to hadd under this Ordinance shall be liable to the punishment provided for such offence as tazir.
(3) In the Pakistan Penal Code, - (a) section 366, section 372, section 373, section 375 and section 376 of Chapter XVI and section 493, section 497 and section 498 of Chapter XX shall stand repealed; and (b) in section 367, the words and comma "or to the unnatural lust of any person,"
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shall be omitted.
18 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 18(i) : : Provided that, if it appears in evidence that the offender has committed a different offence under any other law, he may, if the Court is competent to try that offence and award punishment therefor, be convicted and punished for that offence 19[:] 19
19 Substituted by Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Ordinance XX of 1980), Section 2 for : ".".
20 Inserted by Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Ordinance XX of 1980).
21 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 18(i) : "further".
22 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 18(ii) : : (3) The provisions of section 198, section 199, section 199A or section 199B of the Code shall not apply to the cognizance of an offence punishable under section 15 or section 16 of this Ordinance.
23 The following was omitted by Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act VI of 2006), Section 18(iii) : : (5) The provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Code shall not apply in respect of punishments awarded under section 5 or section 6 of this Ordinance.
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Appendix VI
List of Interviews in India and Pakistan
India
Maulana Mahmood Madni, general secretary, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) Syed Jalal-uddin-Oomri, Amir Jamat-e-Islami Hind ( JI-Hind) Imam Umer Ahmed Ilyasi- All India Organization of Imams of Mosques Maulana Abdul Hameed Nomani- Secretary Press and Publications, JUH Waris Mazrahi- Spokesperson Darul-uloom-Deoband, India Prof. Akhtar-ul-Wasey- Director Islamic Studies Department, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi Dr. Ajay Darshan- Director Pakistan Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia Mr. Adeel Mehdi- Lecturer, Jamia Millia Islamia Former Deobandi Madrassa graduates studying at Jamia-Millia Islamia, New Delhi spoke on condition of ananoymity.
Pakistan
Maulana Samiul Haq Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, JUI (S) Mufti Naeem (Head of Jamia Binoria –Karachi) Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed (Jamiat-e- Islami, JI) Agha Murtaza Poya –Religious Scholar/Vice President, Pakistan Awami Tehrik Allama Talib Jauhri- Islamic Scholar (Shiite sect) Prof. Hassan Askari (Professor Emeritus, Punjab University) Prof. Tariq Rehman (Former Director Natioal Institute of Pakistan Studies at Qauid-e-Azam University , Islamabad) Muhammed Amir Rana- (Director- PIPS)
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Dr. Hassan Abbas, Professor of International Security Affairs at National Defence University , Washington DC Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed, Professor and head of Ibne Khuldun chair at School of International Service, The American University in Washington DC Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf (Former President of Pakistan) Gen. Hamid Gul (Former DG ISI) Gen. Asad Durrani (Former DG ISI) Gen. Talat Masood (Defence Analyst) Spokesperson, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Govt of Pakistan Ambassador Shamshad Ahmed Ambassador Tariq Fatimi Ambassador Rustum Shah Madrassa students from Rawalpindi and Islamabad spoke on condition of anaynomity Fied officers from Pakistan army, ISI who want to be anynomous
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