Events, Globalization, and the Human Condition
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Infinite Hermeneutics: Events, Globalization, and the Human Condition Author: Lynn Sebastian Purcell Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1816 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2011 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Philosophy INFINITE HERMENEUTICS: EVENTS, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE HUMAN CONDITION A Dissertation by Lynn Sebastian Purcell Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2011 © copyright by LYNN SEBASTIAN PURCELL 2011 Abstract It has been held in philosophical practice that some matters of reflection have more import than others, and that some are so significant that they may be termed “first philosophy.” In contemporary Continental philosophy, the term “event” has become a watchword for a profound change in the orientation of philosophic thought. Indeed, one may say that the discourse surrounding events marks the first decisive development in philosophy since Martin Heidegger penned Being and Time. This is not to say, however, that any consensus has emerged concerning either the character of events, or more importantly what they entail for the meaning of human historical consciousness. To provide such statements, ones that have at least a relative superiority with respect to their rivals, might thus be considered the basic task for first philosophy today. It is to accomplish this double aim that the present work is devoted. These two tasks, articulating the character of events and their significance for human historical consciousness, are here assayed by a movement that is itself double, by a movement of suspicion and affirmation. In the specific case, the present work undertakes a retrieval of Heidegger’s understanding of “Ereignis” (or event) after passing through a hermeneutics of suspicion, posed by the criticisms of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, and returning to an articulation of “Emergence” as a complementary hermeneutics of affirmation. The method by which I undertake this inquiry is what may be called an “infinite hermeneutics,” which I intend to be opposed to “finite hermeneutics.” By this latter program, “finite hermeneutics,” I mean any form of philosophical hermeneutics that is committed to the thesis that human understanding (Verstehen) is finite, or that the objective of inquiry itself is finite, or both of these points. The thesis that human understanding is finite may be found in Kant’s proposal that human knowing is distinct from divine knowledge in the respect that human knowing is dependent on receptive intuition, and thus finite, while infinite knowledge is founded on a productive intuition. In the relevant sense, I argue, it may also be found in Heidegger’s own thought. One of the major points of the present investigation is to demonstrate in what way a commitment to finitude is highly problematic, and that human knowing, human comprehension, and even the very character of what is known is not finite in any relevant sense. The motivation for such a departure is provided by the criticisms of Badiou, which are here treated as a moment of suspicion. I begin the work with a “Prolegomenon,” which reviews in detail the specific challenge Badiou has posed for phenomenological hermeneutics, or any other philosophical position that is committed to the notion that human thought or understanding is finite. As a “Prolegomenon,” however, nothing positive for my own position is accomplished there; instead the net result of the study is to produce: (a) an argument against Heideggerian finite hermeneutics, (b) a summary critique of the Badiou’s own position, and (c) a clear statement on the eight separate tasks that I set out to accomplish in the argument that follows. The positive aspect of the text, the beginning of the movement of affirmation, thus occurs in “Part I: Infinite Hermeneutics,” in which I present a defense of phenomenological hermeneutics as a viable philosophical method. In chapter three I begin by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. My argument is that he is both the very first philosopher to articulate an infinite hermeneutics, and that this account, suitably elaborated throughout his career, is able to meet most of the specific challenges Badiou poses. There does remain, however, three separate points that Ricoeur’s thought does not fully explore. In order to remedy those deficiencies, and in order to demonstrate the relative advantage of my hermeneutical position with respect to its competitors, I thus move to produce a new model for hermeneutical thought. Articulating the conditions for this model is the task for chapter four. My task here resolves into three parts. First, I argue for a Galoisian Revolution in phenomenological study, which sets forth a new between hermeneutics and phenomenology study. This relation, second, requires a rearticulation of phenomenological method such that it is “impersonal,” as Jean-Paul Sartre’s early work suggests. Additionally this relation, third, requires that one be attentive to the structures of consciousness, which is what completes the Galoisian Revolution. In order to support my account of an impersonal phenomenology I engage the contemporary Anglo- American discussions in the philosophy of mind concerning the character of first-person consciousness. In order to specify what is intended by a structure of first-person consciousness, provide a provisional phenomenology of eros. In chapter five I move to articulate the structure of consciousness that serves as the third model for phenomenological hermeneutics. It is at this point that I engage with the work of Bernard Lonergan. My central contention in chapter five is that it is possible to retrieve Longergan’s work on cognitional structure as a phenomenology of inquiry for hermeneutical purposes. Taken together, these points, the Ricoeurean defense of hermeneutics, the development of an impersonal phenomenology, and the retrieval of a phenomenology of inquiry, form the hard core of my proposal for infinite hermeneutics. “Part II: On Worlds” concerns the fruits that I can reap from the harvest sown in Part I. In particular, I aim to develop an ecological sense of worlds in response to Badiou’s category- theoretic and Heidegger’s (early) existential world. My argument moves from an ecological account of natural worlds (chapter six), through a signifying account human worlds (chapter seven), to an account of human historical consciousness and a consideration of catastrophes such as the Shoah and the Encounter (chapter eight). In each of these chapters I focus on developing an account of different kinds of Events, with the aim not only of providing a more serviceable account than my rivals, but also with the hopes of providing a new and better picture of world process. The final section, “Part III: The Metaphysics of Excess” expresses the central Metaphysical claims of the work, especially those concerning Events and the peculiar form I call Emergence. This chapter, in short, constitutes the moment of affirmation in response to the moment of suspicion occasioned by Badiou’s criticism of phenomenological hermeneutics. Additionally, however, I produce an argument for the intelligible relation of cosmic space and time with human (lived) space and time, a statement on the new forms of causation entailed by the possibility of Events, and a new account of Truth (to rival Badiou and Heidegger’s). The work closes with a summary review of what I have achieved and what yet remains to be accomplished. Though as the title of the conclusion suggests, its main aim is to provide a new statement on the world-view that I work to articulate over the course of the investigation. That world-view, and this is the justification for the subtitle of the present work, is the trans-modern condition, which articulates the existential character of our modern globalized world. vii Acknowledgements The present project has been made possible by the continued support of many people and institutions. I am especially thankful to the Boston College Graduate School of Arts and Sciences that awarded me a Dissertation Fellowship for the 2009-2010 academic year, and which allowed me the time to write the bulk of the present work. I would also like to thank the participants at the 14th annual Philosophy Conference at Villanova, themed “New French Thought,” for their insightful comments on a draft of what turned into the third chapter of the present work. Additionally I thank the participants of the second annual conference for the Society of Ricoeur Studies, who helpfully criticized my essay “Space and Narrative,” which essay furnished much of the intellectual work for the eighth chapter of the present essay. My dissertation readers Richard Kearney and Frederick Lawrence have my profound gratitude. Richard’s openness to new challenges and methodological innovations made it possible for me to develop some new approaches to problems. Also, I am thankful to Frederick for his willingness to help me out rather quickly and to provide his always acute critique. To Patrick H. Byrne, my director, I owe special thanks. Not only was he patient enough to reread the various drafts of the present work as they sometimes developed rather substantially, but also he proved a fruitful interlocutor on many technical points that would have been underdeveloped or infelicitously stated without his keen analytical discernment. The work benefited enormously by his criticisms and through our discussions. Finally, I must thank my family for supporting me throughout my graduate studies, and in particular my wife Elizabeth Purcell. She not only supported me throughout the work, but also as a philosopher herself was honest enough to tell me when my arguments lacked sufficient warrant for their claims, no matter how it made me grumble at the time. Indeed, various crucial insights in the present piece would not have been made without our discussions.