Chinese “Inner Cabinet” Leaders: A Neglected Group and Preliminary Findings from a Longitudinal Biographical Research Project

Tong Zhang*

A draft paper submitted to the First International PUPOL (Public and Political Leadership) Conference at the Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands, in April 2016

Please do not cite or circulate without the author’s permission

* Tong Zhang is a Research Associate Postgraduate in Queen Mary University of London and a Ph.D. student in Renmin University of . Contact address: School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London, E1 4NS, UK. Email: [email protected].

The author wishes to thank the China Scholarship Council for its financial support, Kangzhi Zhang for his inspiration and Lee Jones for his research assistance. 1

Abstract: In the study of Chinese politics and government, the State Council Executive Meeting, roughly comparable to Western “inner cabinet”, and its members including the Premier, Vice- premiers, State Councilors and the Secretary-general, have been largely neglected by researchers. This article examines the history, structure and process of the State Council Executive Meeting and highlights the importance of the State Council Executive Meeting and its members as a key policy- making institution and group in China. The article then discusses available data and methods for the study of this group. Finally, a research project of a longitudinal biographical analysis of State Council Executive Meeting members is proposed and some preliminary findings of this project are reported. Keywords: State Council Executive Meeting, Inner Cabinet, Leadership, Biographical Study, China

In the study of Chinese politics, and its leadership research and policy study in particular, there has been a spate of interest in such bodies in as the Central Committee of (CCP) and its members, Politburo and its members, the Standing Committee of Politburo and its members, as well as Military Committee of CCP’s Central Committee and its members. However, the State Council Executive Meeting (SCEM, Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi1, roughly comparable to Western “Inner Cabinet”) that is usually held on a regular base in headquarters2 and its members (Guowuyuan Changwuhuiyi Zucheng Renyuan) including the Premier, Vice-premiers, State Councilors and the Secretary-general, have received little attention from scholars and researchers on Chinese politics and government. The meeting of SCEM is the centre for policy discussion and decision making in Chinese government and one of key loci of policy making in China at large. Members of SCEM, also officially named “State Council leaders” (Guowuyuan Lingdao)3, occupy the highest positions in Chinese government and are definitely among top political elites in China. Many researchers have not recognized the importance of SCEM in Chinese policy-making. Some have noticed SCEM’s significant role in Chinese laws and formal organizational charts, but assumed that the importance is only reflected on paper not in practice. As a result, although it is not uncommon for authors to mention SCEM in their work, SCEM has never been adequately and seriously examined. It is the purpose of this paper to call attention to the neglected institution of SCEM and the high-level group of SCEM members. Firstly, it examines and describes the history, role, structure and process of SCEM and its members, shows various examples of the neglect of SCEM in the scholarly community and discusses parts of reasons for the neglect. Then, it explores various available data and some

1 One of the most widely used English translation for this group is “Standing Committee of the State Council” (e.g. Boden, Jeanne. The Wall behind China’s Open Door: Towards Efficient Intercultural Management in China. Brussels: ASP-VUB Press, 2008; Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making In China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Press, 1988; Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. University of California Press, 1966). This translation is rather misleading, as it seems to imply that it is similar to other bodies like Standing Committee of Politburo (Zhengzhiju Changwu Weiyuanhui). The fact is that the of SCEM is quite different from that of the latter. The term of “Executive Meeting” (Changwu Huiyi) highlights the uniqueness of SCEM. Besides, other English translations of SCEM also include “Executive Committee of the State Council” (e.g. Joseph, William A., ed. Politics in China: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2010; Heath, Mr Timothy R. China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014.) and “Standing Conference of the State Council” (e.g. Bartke, Wolfgang, and Peter Schier. China’s New Party Leadership. London: Macmillan Reference Books, 1985). The inconsistency in the English translation, probably, partly contributes to the neglect of SCEM. The best translation would be “State Council Executive Meeting” (abbreviated as SCEM in this paper) or “Executive Meetings of the State Council” as what is used in the official English version of Chinese Constitution by NPC. 2 The meeting of SCEM has always been held in the First Conference Room of State Council (Guowuyuan Diyi Huiyishi) in Zhongnanhai since 1949 when the first Premier presided the first meeting of Government Administrative Council, see Lin,Yan. “Jiedu Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi” (On the State Council Executive Meeting), Zhongguo Qingnianbao, 26 February, 2014: 12, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2014-02/26/nw.D110000zgqnb_20140226_1-12.htm 3 The term “State Council leaders” is officially used in some government documents (e.g. Guowuyuan Bangongting de Zhuyao Zhize (Main Responsibilities of the General Office of the State Council), 1998, http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005- 07/28/content_17979.htm) and on the State Council official website (http://www.gov.cn), but it has not been formally defined on any law or regulation that who belongs to this group of “State Council leaders”. On the official website, under the label of “State Council leaders” are all SCEM members. 2

research methods that can be used to study this important body, especially the biographical analysis. Further, it proposes a longitudinal biographical research project in order to understand SCEM members and its changes over time, along with some preliminary findings from this study. Finally, the paper concludes with a call to pay more attention to SCEM and its members.

SCEM: its Importance and Neglect Since the State Council, the Chinese Central Government, came into being in September 19544, SCEM has always existed and served as the most important formal decision-making mechanism of the State Council. Initially, SCEM “is composed of the Premier, Vice premiers and the Secretary- general”5. From 1975 to 1979, the Secretary-general was not in SCEM as the post of Secretary- general was abolished in 19756 until 1979 when it was restored and got back into SCEM. In 1982, SCEM was restructured by the Resolution on Institutional Reform of the State Council7 passed by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) that created new posts of State Councilors and added them to SCEM. Since then, the composition of SCEM has remained the same until today (for details of the changes of SCEM’s composition, see Table 1). In December 1982, SCEM, for the very first time in history, appeared in the Constitution, the current version of Chinese Constitution8. Although, by law, it acts as one of the two types of regular meetings in the State Council including “the plenary meetings of the State Council and the executive meetings of the State Council”9, in reality, it goes without saying that SCEM plays a much more important role in the State Council for policy discussion and decision making. As SCEM involves much less members than the plenary meeting (from dozens to hundreds, including not only SCEM members and heads of departments of the State Council as stated in law, but also various members from relevant organizations), it is much easier for this small group to gather frequently and to have effective discussions and decisions. Therefore, the meeting of SCEM should be (by law) and is (in practice) held more frequently10. Moreover, partly because of the large size of the plenary meeting which makes it difficult to work effectively and hence “many attendees are not familiar with issues and topics under discussion in the meeting”11, the plenary meeting has turned to, more or less, a briefing at which decisions made by the State Council, especially SCEM, are communicated to relevant staff. As a result, to some extent, we can say that the meeting of SCEM has become the only real formal body for decision-making in the State Council.

4 From 1949 to 1954, it is the Government Administrative Council (GAC, Zhengwuyuan) that holds the executive power. Since GAC is quite comparable to SCEM, it is better to be included in the discussion and analysis of SCEM (see further discussions below). 5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Zuzhifa (The Organic Law of the State Council) [hereafter Organic Law], 1954. 6 In Constitution 1975 and Constitution 1978, the post of Secretary-general was deleted from the composition of State Council. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) [hereafter Constitution], 1975, and Constitution, 1978. In practice, the post was abolished possibly in as early as 1970 when the Secretariat of the State Council (Guowuyuan Mishuting) was changed to the Office of the State Council (Guowuyuan Bangongshi), see Zhonguo Gongchandang Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1921-1997 (A Collection of the Organizational History of China’s Communist Party, 1921-1997), Appendix 1. Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000, p.11. Around 1970, then Secretary-general Zhou Rongxin, the last one before 1979, was purged by “the ”. (Fu, Yi. “Jiaoyu Buzhang Zhou Rongxin de Zuihou Suiyue” (Final Yeas of the of Education). Bainianchao, No.2, 2002). During the , many government organizations, including the State Council, were severely impacted, thus it is difficult to find out the exact date that the post of Secretary-general was abolished. 7 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Wenti de Jueyi (Resolution on Institutional Reform of the State Council), 1982, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_1293.htm 8 Constitution, 1982. 9 Organic Law, 1954 and Organic Law, 1982. 10 A more detailed discussion with evidence is made later. 11 Wang Jinsong. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu yu Zhengzhi (Chinese Government and Politics). Beijing: Party School of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China Press, 1995, p.79. 3

Obviously, the importance of SCEM is highlighted by both the meeting of SCEM as an important decision-making mechanism and members of SCEM as “State Council leaders”. For the latter, of course, virtually all studies on Chinese politics and government would deal with the Premier as well as some Vice-premiers because of their preeminent titles and overlapping positions they have in the CCP since the Premier is usually a member of the Standing Committee of Politburo and Vice- premiers are usually members of Politburo12. However, few studies deal with the Premier and Vice- premiers from a point view of SCEM members; rather they only treat them as individual top leaders in general Chinese politics and government. In addition, the State Councilor and Secretary-general have not received much attention, from whatever perspectives. The importance of these two posts, like that of the Premier and Vice-premier, for Chinese politics and policy making, are not only defined by their high position in the State Council, also by the concurrent posts they hold in the State Council as well as other organizations and the network of personal ties they have in the whole country. Actually, in 1982 when the post of State Councilor was created and eleven new State Councilors were appointed, ten of them had been Vice-premiers before the reshuffle, which means that they simply changed the title from Vice-premier to State Councilor13, although after that all State Councilors have been promoted from lower levels. At the same time, it is also clearly stated on paper that the State Councilor is at the same cadre rank with Vice-premiers14. In 1993, it is stipulated that both posts of State Councilor and Vice-premier are in the same “vice-state level” (Fuguoiji) of civil servants ranking system15 as Politburo members of CCP are16. While the Premier is to take full responsibility for the State Council, every Vice-premier and State Councilor is responsible for one or two specific fields and “is entitled to undertake activities of foreign affairs in the name of the State Council”17. All these evidence suggest that the differences between Vice-premiers and State Councilors are not as clear-cut as it seems from the title.18 The Secretary-general, responsible for daily work of the State Council19 and organizing work of SCEM, is playing an equally, if not more, important role, partly due to the fact that, after 1993, the Secretary-general had always been hold by one State Councilor simultaneously. Therefore, the post of State Councilors and Secretary-general deserve more attention from researchers. For the meeting of SCEM itself, researchers to date have tended to show little interest. In existing literature on general Chinese politics and government, some studies make no mention of SCEM in

12 There are many exceptions. For example, in the Seventh State Council (1988-1993), two Vice-premiers including and were not Politburo members at that time. 13 The title of nine were directly changed from Vice-premier to State Councilor in May 1982 and one () was removed from Vice-premier but reappointed as State Councilor after 6 months. This was part of CCP’s (especially ) efforts to reduce the number of deputies after 1980s. See Deng Xiaoping, Dang Guojia Lingdao Zhidu de Gaige (Reform of the Party and State Leadership), 18 August, 1980. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005- 02/04/content_2547080.htm 14 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Wenti de Jueyi (Resolution on Institutional Reform of the State Council), 1982, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_1293.htm 14 Constitution, 1982. 15 Guojia Gongwuyuan Zanxing Tiaoli (Temporary Regulations on National Civil Servants), 1993. 16 Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu (The Organization Department of CCP), Guanyu Zhongguo Gongchandang Jiguan Canzhao Shixing “Guojia Gongwuyuan Zanxing Tiaoli” de Shishi Yijian (Suggestions Regarding Implementation of Personnel Management in Organizations of Chinese Communist Party with Reference to “Temporary Regulations on National Civil Servants”), 1993, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855076.html 17 Guowuyuan Gongzuo Guize (Working Rules of the State Council) [hereafter Working Rules], 2004 and Working Rules, 2008. 18 Of course, this does not mean that there is no difference between these two posts. One of the essential differences can be seen from the concurrent hats they wear in CCP. By examining the biographies of these leaders in recent decades, it appears that Vice-premiers are usually Politburo members while State Councilors are only members of Central Committee instead of Politburo, although with exceptions. 19 Organic Law, 1982. In 1998, the Working Rules stipulates that, minutes of SCEM and other two main types of meetings in the State Council should “be signed by the Secretary-general” and it should be agreed by the Secretary-general if decisions made in SCEM are to be reported publicly. The Secretary-general’s role of organizing SCEM in 1980s is supported by Michel Oksenberg’s work, Oksenberg, Michel. “Economic Policy-Making in China: Summer 1981.” The China Quarterly 90 (1982), pp.165-194. 4

their research at all when introducing the State Council,20 while some only give it a very brief mention, like its name and composition21, sometimes its meeting frequency, and in some cases its brief functions22. Although understandable, to some extent, in terms of the space limit for a general introduction, this does have some regrettable effects, especially for students of Chinese politics. In some cases, the simple sentences about SCEM in these books even contain some inaccurate or incorrect information. The simplification and mistakes would send wrong messages to learners and even some researchers of Chinese politics, creating an illusion that SCEM is not important, which in turn would aggravate the neglect situation. For example, a common mistake is about the meeting frequency of SCEM. Though many researchers have pointed out that SCEM is held more frequently than the plenary meeting, they have not noticed the fact that, both on paper and in practice, the meeting frequency of SCEM has always been in a state of flux varying, sometimes greatly, from one to another. It seems that most researchers just arbitrarily write down one frequency they happen to know. For instance, among a great many examples, Boden, in a book published in 2008, simply claims that the meeting is gathered “once every two weeks”23 when mentioning SCEM. The fact, however, is that, from 2003 to 2008, the meeting should be held “three times per month” as stipulated by law and it is, in reality, gathered every 9 days. Such non-preciseness and arbitrariness appears to reflect a usual, but certainly wrong, underlying assumption or stereotype some researchers have that, SCEM, similar to many other formal meetings like NPC or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), mainly act as a kind of window dressing for decisions already made by other more important bodies in CCP. N. Jayapalan after introducing the State Council and its executive meeting, claims that “what it exactly happens is that the Party Politburo, which has among its members nearly all those who constitute the inner-ring of the State Council, formulate the decisions. In order to give them a legal shape, the executive meeting of the State Council is held.”24 This is a serious misunderstanding of SCEM. SCEM is a formal mechanism for discussing, analysing and making decisions over Chinese domestic and foreign polices, deliberating on drafts of laws submitted to NPC, passing and promulgating administrative regulations, as well as undertaking various management functions including, drawing upon Henry Fayol’s pioneering theory of management25, planning, organizing (allocating responsibilities and tasks among SCEM members26 and among different departments within the State Council), commanding, coordinating (coordinating various parties concerned including departments under the State Council and local governments in order to build consensus and to take uniform actions) and controlling (listening to and assess reports on actual performance of departments and local governments). For all these functions, SCEM, unquestionably, is playing a real role, not a formality. A classic example is, within 18 days from 22 October to 9 November 1956, then Premier Zhou Enlai convened as many as 10 meetings of SCEM, probably the most frequent in the history, to discuss the economic development plan for the next year, a highly controversial issue among top level leaders, and finally decided to considerably slow down the speed of economic growth. The next day on 10 November, on the Second Plenum of the Eighth CCP Congress, this proposal won the backing of the majority though

20 For example, Christiansen, Flemming, and Shirin M. Rai. Chinese Politics and Society: An Introduction. Routledge, 2014. 21 For example, Tung, William L. The Political Institutions of Modern China. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012; Joseph, William A., ed. Politics in China: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2010; Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. 2nd Edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968. 22 For example, Yan Xu and Dali L. Yang. “The Central Government”, in Goodman, David SG, ed. Handbook of the . Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015; Palekar, Comparative Politics and Government. New Delhi: PHI learning, 2009. 23 Boden, Jeanne. The Wall behind China’s Open Door: Towards Efficient Intercultural Management in China. Brussels: ASP-VUB Press, 2008, p.79. 24 Jayapalan, N. Modern Governments. Atlantic Publishers & Dist, 1999. pp.122-123. 25 Fayol, Henri. General and Industrial Administration. London: Pitman, 1949. 26 The first meeting of new SCEM members of every new State Council, several days after the closing of new NPC conference which has selected these SCEM members, is usually to define the division of labour among SCEM members. 5

Chairman Mao and some other leaders did not fully agree.27 This example, with others, might reflect a policy making process in which the State Council, especially SCEM and its members, decides on both concrete polices and some general principles before presenting these decisions in the CCP conference, which is exactly contrary to the traditional belief of policy-making process in China—it is CCP’s organizations and meetings that make broad decisions and the State Council is only to implement these directives, or ,at best, to formulate concrete polices or secondary decisions to put these directives into practice.28 The fact that scholars tend to neglect the institution of SCEM is partly due to a tendency that scholars and researchers on China studies have paid increasingly more attention and efforts to dig in the hidden parts of Chinese politics or to ”penetrate that wall of secrecy”29 that do not appear in any formally publicized document30. This tendency has led some researchers to “wonder whether it is worth spending much time on the formal organization structure at the centre”31 and thus to exert relatively less efforts to study formal institutions like SCEM. Formal institutions in China, at least, offers a general framework or platform of politics with well-defined structures and clearly-stated rules and “shape the politics by providing the context within which leaders and citizens alike act politically”32. SCEM is such a formal institution and group stipulated in the Constitution as well as other laws, shown on formal organizational chart of Chinese Central Government, and widely reported on Chinese media. Especially considering the fact that China has surely been in the process of moving away from personal dictate and towards a more institutionalized politics and policy making33, formal institutions like SCEM would play an increasingly important role in Chinese politics. This can be well illustrated by the abolition of the Premier Office Meeting (Zongli Bangong Huiyi), a non- institutionalized meeting for decision making34 in the State Council. From 1950s and 1960s till 2004, in practice, the Premier Office Meeting has also been an important mechanism in addition to SCEM. However, there are no legal provisions for this meeting.35 It is held on a non-regular base and little information is available about the function, responsibility, attendee, and process of this meeting. After 2003, the new State Council under abolished this meeting mainly because of its unlawful status.36 As a result, the role of SCEM has been further strengthened. One exception of the literature reviewed would be Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg’s seminal book Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes, in which they identify four tiers of leadership of decision-making at top level in China. The highest tier is a group of 25 to 35 leaders which “at any moment in time…constitute China’s top leadership” or “China’s power elite”37. Members of SCEM, unquestionably, belong to this very top group. The book not only stresses the

27 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi eds. Yun Nianpu, 1949–1976 (Chronicle of , 1949–1976), Vol.2. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000, pp.337-338; Bo, Yibo. Ruogan Zhongda Juece yu Shijian de Huigu (Reflections on Several Major Decisions and Events). Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1993, pp. 555-558. 28 Some researchers, though having some reservations, have recognized such a process or possibility. For example, Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd., 1985. 29 Pye, Lucian. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Oelschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981, p.2. 30 For examples of researchers’ efforts on informal institutions of Chinese politics, see Bo, Zhiyue. “The Institutionalization of Elite Management in China”. In Naughton, Barry J., and Dali L. Yang, eds. Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era. Cambridge University Press, 2004. pp. 70-100. 31 Saich, Tony. Governance and Politics of China. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p.145. 32 Blecher, Marc J. China Against the Tides: Restructuring Through Revolution, Radicalism, and Reform, 3rd Edition. New York: Continuum, 2010.p.92. 33 For a discussion on this, see Miller, Alice L. “Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics”. In Li, Cheng, ed. China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy. Press, 2009. 34 It is argued that this meeting, initially, is to enhance communication within State Council cadres. However, as time passes, it has become a mechanism to make decisions. See Guo, Gaozhong, “Jiedu Quxiao Zongli Bangong Huiyi” (Interpreting the Abolishment of the Premier Office Meeting), Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan, Vol. 8, 2004. 35 Provisions about the Premier Office Meeting have only appeared in Working Rules of the State Council, the inner regulations made by the State Council, not in any laws or regulations. 36 For discussions, see Zhao, Suisheng. "The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?." Journal of Contemporary China 19.65 (2010): 419-436. 37 Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton University Press, 1988. p.35 6

importance of SCEM members, also highlights the importance of SCEM itself as a decisional meeting. Occasionally, Lieberthal and Oksenberg seems to imply that SCEM, to some extent, should be regarded almost as significant as the Politburo and Secretariat of CCP in the policy making of China.38 However, even in this exceptional study, at times, the authors appear to locate the function of SCEM mainly at cooperating and directing activities of various departments in the State Council and local governments, which is only part of SCEM’s functions. It also should be noted that, surprisingly, they omit the post of Secretary-general when describing the composition of SCEM39 and never, in this book, mentioned this post. Another exception is Doak Barnett’s “The Making of Foreign Policy in China”. Barnett clear points out the importance of SCEM as “the key day-to-day decision-making body in the government”40. SCEM with the CCP Secretariat has become two “key centers for policy making on most issues”41 and they have replaced, to some extent, the role of Politburo and its Standing Committee on daily decision making. Barnett also makes comparisons between SCEM members and secretaries in CCP Secretariat and argues that SCEM “is more competent to address most foreign policy issues than any other top group in either the Party or government, and because it meets twice a week, it has ample opportunity to discuss such issues”42 of foreign policies. The comparability between members of SCEM and CCP secretariat again reveals the importance of SCEM. Doak Barnett also refers SCEM to “inner cabinet”, a widely used term by some western researchers to facilitate understanding of SCEM, as the State Council is roughly comparable to western “cabinet”.

Studying SCEM: Data and Methodology As shown above, there is a great gap between what we should know about SCEM (as implied by the importance of SCEM) and what we know (as suggested by the neglect of SCEM in scholarly community).Then the next question is how to close the gap? Specifically, what data are available and what methods can be applied to study SCEM ant its members. The study of SCEM can be broadly divided into two categories in terms of its subject including SCEM as a meeting institution and members of SCEM. For the former subject, to study such a top level meeting as SCEM, like other China studies, highly depends on what data are available, as data problems (e.g. scarcity, poor quality, diversity in sources) have always been barriers in China studies.43 However, we should also notice, the neglect fact that little attention has been given specifically to SCEM cannot be justified by the scarcity of data. In fact, even before the new millennium, there were plenty of information related to SCEM available to researchers, including news reports dealing with some SCEM meetings, autobiographies or biographies of former SCEM members in which stories of some SCEM meetings are told, a couple of collections of important

38 When discussing the role of some high level specialized officials, they say, these officials “are brought into the deliberations at the highest level on a selective basis, when their subject matter is on the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party of State Council bodies (the Politburo, Secretariat and Standing Committee of the State Council)”. See Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton University Press, 1988. p.38. 39 Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton University Press, 1988. p.35. Although, as noted previously, since 1993, the Secretary-general had always been hold by one State Councilor concurrently, before then, such members like , , Zhou Rongxin, Jin Ming, Du Xingyuan, Chen Junsheng, and had been solely Secretary-generals without siting other posts within SCEM. 40 Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd., 1985, p.53. Interestingly, like Lieberthal and Oksenberg, he also ignored the post of Secretary-general as part of SCEM. 41 Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd., 1985, p.3. 42 Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd., 1985, p.64. 43 For discussions on how data could affect Chinese studies, see Oksenberg, Michel. “Sources and Methodological Problems in the study of Contemporary China”. In A. Doak Barnett ed. Chinese Communist Politics in Action. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969. pp.577-606; Goodman, David S.G. “The Methodology of Contemporary Chinese Studies: Political Studies and the PRC”. In Shaw, Yu-ming eds. Power and Policy in the PRC. Westview Press, 1985. pp.340-352. 7

meetings in China in which SCEM are involved44, and a great many draft laws deliberated in and regulations passed by SCEM45. Especially after 2003 when Premier Wen Jiabao led the new State Council, much more information about SCEM become available46. Since then, the government website would publicize a summary of the content and decisions of almost every meeting of SCEM47, and much more extensive reports about SCEM appear in various Chinese media48 including both CCP’s state-run media and independent media. As the meeting is held roughly on a weekly base since 2003, such information has accumulated to a high volume which enables us to make valuable analysis. As Donald Kelein argues, the information about an individual meeting might “is of little value, but in aggregate terms it provides a considerable body of knowledge about the State Council”49. As a result, besides extensive news reports, a great number of commentaries and analysis appeared in China, one common type of which is using content analysis to find out what issues are usually on the agenda of SCEM and how the Central Government’s focuses or policy priorities has changed over time. For example, after examining totally over one hundred SCEM meetings in 201350, 201451 and 201552, it is found that the topic that most frequently appeared in SCEM of Government is “streamlining the administration and decentralization” (Jianzheng Fangquan), that is to cancel or reduce numerous administrative permits of the Central Government to create a more favourable environment for business development and to decentralize power to lower government, market or society. The large amount of information available, at the very least, allow us to answer a basic and essential question, once clearly posed by James Wang, “how often does the premier hold his cabinet meetings [referring to SCEM]? ”53. Answering this question, as Wang argues, is essential for us to understand how such an enormous body as State Council works and how the Premier leads and controls it with the support of other SCEM members as the State Council is following a “premier-responsibility system” (Zongli Fuzezhi). Moreover, a simple number of meeting frequency might appear to be of little value, but the changes of the meeting frequency of SCEM would the most obvious indication of the changing roles of SCEM in the past. For example, the meeting, by law, should be held from 1-2 times per month in 199854, to 3 times per month in 200455, to once every week in 200856 and 201357. In reality, the meeting frequency, as calculated by the author, has changed from every 15 days during the 7th SCEM (1987-1993) and every 27 days in the 8th (1993-1998) under , to every 27 days in 9th SCEM (1998-2003) under Zhu Rongji, to every 9 days in 10th SCEM (2003-2008) and every 8 days in 11th SCEM (2008-2013) under Wen Jiabao, to every 9 days in 12th SCEM (2013 till now)

44 For example, Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi Disi Bianyanbu. Xinshiqi Zhongyao Huiyi Tonglan, 1978-1998 (A Collection of important meetings in new periods, 1978-1998). Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1999; Fang, Zhou etc. eds. Zhongguo Bainian Huiyi Dadian (Chinese Meetings in the past century). Huawen Chubanshe, 1995. 45 The regulations passed by SCEM usually begins in following format: “the State Council Decree No. XXX. “NAME OF THE REGULATION” has been discussed and passed by the XXXth State Council Executive Meeting on YEAR/MONTH/DAY. Now it is promulgated. It will become effective after YEAR/MONTH/DAY”. 46 This is part of Wen Jiabao Admnistration’s efforts to develop open government, with the result that in 2007 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli (The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information) was passed by SCEM. 47 Moreover, interestingly, after 2013 when incumbent Premier Li Keqiang took office, the government official website also regularly publicizes an easy-reading and nice picture indicating main issues discussed in each meeting, in the hope that it could help more citizens to know proceedings of the Central Government. 48 Few studies has noticed this change except MacFarquhar, Roderick, ed. The Politics of China: Sixty Years of the People’s Republic of China. Cambridge University Press, 2011. p.580. 49 Klein, Donald W. "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution." The China Quarterly 35 (1968), p.79. 50 Cong 2013 Nian Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi Kan Zhengfu Shizheng Silu (Train of Thought of the Government: From the Perspective of State Council Executive Meeting in 2013), 2014. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0102/c1001- 24006706.html 51 Chen, Yixin. 2014 Nian Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi Sanbuqu (State Council Executive Meeting in 2014), 2014. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/12-25/6909127.shtml 52 Liu, Xinyuan. 2015 Nian Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi Sanda Gaopinci Quanjiedu (Three Most Frequently Used Terms of State Council Executive Meeting in 2015), 2015. http://www.china.com.cn/cppcc/2015-08/31/content_36463096.htm 53 Wang, James CF. Contemporary Chinese politics: An Introduction. Prentice Hall, 1999. p.101. 54 Working Rules, 1998. 55 Working Rules, 2004. 56 Working Rules, 2008. 57 Working Rules, 2013. 8

under current Premier Li Keqiang58. Obviously, the changes over time generally reflects the increasing importance of SCEM, which is more evident if making comparisons between the meeting frequency of SCEM and that of the State Council Plenary Meeting59. For policy analysts as well as others, their most concerned issue of SCEM would be such questions as how does an issue get into the board of SCEM? What really happens in the meeting? Who says what? How are discussions and debates, if any, going? How is the final decision made? Although outsiders have no opportunity to experience a real meeting, the available information can offer us some insights. In recent years, a couple of news reports disclosing some details of SCEM meeting were published on Chinese media.60 These reports, very few of its kind in the history, show that the meeting is “very pragmatic and efficient”, and “speakers are required to get straight to the point and dissenting opinions if any, not to use any polite formulas or complimentary remarks”. At times, the Premier would “pound the desk” to show his anger to some problems and frequently “query” reports by ministers. This is quite different from the public’s conventional fixed picture of any formal government meeting which is ritualistic or formalistic and harmonious on the surface. Obviously, in order to fully understand SCEM, compared with studying SCEM as a meeting, studying members of SCEM is equally, if not more, important. This type of study belongs to a broad discipline of elite study or leadership study. One widespread assumption in this discipline is that there is an association between one’s life experiences and his/her values, attitudes, thinking modes, decisions, and behaviours61, although researchers would debate on the question that to what extent and how one’s life experiences influence other variables. To explain an individual leader’s interest orientations or behaviours, analysts would always go back to his/her background information to find possible answers. In practice, the election, selection, recruitment or appointment of personnel would also take candidates’ experiences into consideration. Among various research methods in elites study, the one that probably most rely on such an assumption and deeply rooted in elites study is biographical approach—making statistical analysis of biographical data of many leaders rather than only focusing on one specific leader’s biography. As Wright Mills seems to imply, “the ‘best’ social science research is located at the intersection of histories and biographies”62 because one’s life experiences as recorded in the biography are definitely intertwined with, not isolated from, the historical environment these experiences occurred, an even more so for elites if we believe that elites have more control or influence on the society than the rest. Therefore, by collecting, analysing and interpreting the biographical information, researchers are able to build connections between factual data of leaders’ life experiences and histories related, to understand leaders as well as the organizational, political, and social environment they sit in.

58 For information before 2003, the calculation is based on the “number of times” of probably the last SCEM during each term. For example, according to available information, the 68th SCEM (held on 19 February, 2003) might be the last one under Zhu Rongji, which means that from the 1st SCEM on 1998/3/22 to 2003/2/19 totally 68 meetings had been held. For information after 2003, the total number of meetings in each year is counted according to the records on Renmin website (http://www.people.com) and the State Council official site (http://www.gov.cn). 59 The frequency of State Council Plenary Meeting, in practice, has decreased significantly, for example, from every 25 days (between 1954 and 1965) to every 251 days (between 2008 and 1013). More importantly, in 1982 Organic Law, also the current version, the article about the frequency of plenary meeting was deleted. 60 Lin, Yan. “Jiedu Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi” (On the State Council Executive Meeting), Zhongguo Qingnianbao, 26 February, 2014, 12. http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2014-02/26/nw.D110000zgqnb_20140226_1-12.htm; Fu, Yiming. “Zhongguo Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi Zenmekai” (How Does the State Council Executive Meeting Go: The Media Discloses Details), , 10 January, 2016. http://news.china.com.cn/2016-01/13/content_37563148.htm 61 Edinger, Lewis J. "Political science and political biography: reflections on the study of leadership (I)." The Journal of Politics 26.02 (1964): 423-439. 62 Goodwin, John. “Editor’s Introduction: Biographical Research – Researching ‘Lives’ at the Intersection of History and Biography”. In John Goodwin ed. SAGE Biographical Research. 2012. XIX. 9

Specifically, a cross-sectional biographical study of a specific group of leaders (leaders in a real organization, a categorical group of leaders63, or some leaders in a specific period of time64) could help us, for example, to summarize and describe characteristics of some leaders with descriptive statistics of individual variables recorded in biographies (e.g. average, percentage, and frequency- distribution of leaders’ demographic and social features like date of birth65, gender and education), to define and analyse new variables that researchers are interested (e.g. “factional affiliation” is used to define whether an official is in a personal tie with a particular preeminent leader66 or in a corporate affiliation67), to find out and depict some patterns of these leaders (e.g. career paths before assuming a position, experiences of some political events), to yield more meaningful arguments or hypotheses by examining the interrelation between different variables (e.g. leaders’ birthplace and regions they are serving68), and to explore the links between some variables with external environment (e.g. the association between purge rate and external political events69) . In comparison, a longitudinal biographical study, by comparing and contrasting all variables, patterns, and correlations of different variables over time, could be more fruitful. It could answer such questions like how many leaders are new comers by comparing present groups with former groups (e.g. turnover rate70), whether leaders have become more professional,71 how has the balance of power among different factions of leaders among a group (e.g. military vs civilian72) changed. In addition to the descriptive and explanatory power, such a longitudinal biographical analysis could also have predictive value. Though studying biographical data telling us stories about where leaders come from, it is possible to find out norms and trends of, for example, leader selection and personnel mobility. Then it can offer us some insights or clues to such questions as where they will go and who will come and replace them73.

63 Leaders in such categorical groups (e.g. provincial leaders) are not in any real organization, but they probably have similar interests and goals because of their similar posts. For an example of such, see Bo, Zhiyue. “The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups.” Journal of Contemporary China 13.39 (2004): 223-256. 64 For example, George C.S. Sung analysed secretaries in CCP provincial committees from 1970 to 1971, see Sung, George CS. “China’s Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach.” Asian Survey (1975): 346-365. 65 Some researchers categorize Chinese leaders into different “generations” by their date of birth. For example, Cheng Li defines the “fourth generation” as leaders born from 1941 to 1956 who experienced or had memories of the Cultural Revolution, see Li, Cheng. China’s Leaders: The New Generation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.pp.6-14. For a discussion on political generation, see Yahuda, Michael. “Political Generation in China”. The China Quarterly 80 (1979): 793-805. For a discussion on military generation, see Whitson, William W. “The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case.” Asian Survey 8.11 (1968): 921-947. 66 Personal ties include, for example, kinship (e.g. ) and working relationships (personal secretaries) someone has with a particular leader (e.g. general secretaries and chairmen of CCP or other elder CCP leaders). For example, one criteria for Shih et al’s definition of an official being in a leader’s faction is that the official has worked in the leader’s organization for more than one year, see Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” American Political Science Review 106.01 (2012): 166-187. 67 Corporate affiliation include, for example, regional ties (e.g. Gang), organizational ties (e.g. Chinese Communist Youth League), and school ties (e.g. Tsinghua University). For discussions on the distinction between personal tie and corporate tie, see Bo, Zhiyue. “The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups.” Journal of Contemporary China 13.39 (2004): 223-256. 68 For example, Cheng Li, after comparing leaders’ birthplace with regions they serve, argues that CCP tries to restrain the trend of rising localism (i.e. leaders act as governors of their birthplace), see Li, Cheng. China’s leaders: The New Generation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. 69 George Sung, for example, finds that a high purge rate is always related to some political events, see Sung, George. A Biographical Approach to Chinese Political Analysis. Vol. 1665. No. ARPA. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1975. 70 Cheng Li, comparing the Sixteenth and Fifteenth CCP Central Committee members, argues that CCP might want to make half of CCP Central Committee members new, see Li, Cheng and Lynn White. “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey 43.4 (2003): 553-597. 71 For examples, see Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. “Governing Capacity and Institutional Change in China in the Reform Era.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 28.1 (2009): 20-35. 72 For example, it is found that the history from 1966 to 1971 witnessed an increasing trend of the control of provincial power by military leaders rather than civilian leaders, see Sung, George CS. “China’s Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach.” Asian Survey (1975): 346-365. 73 For example, Cheng Li, partly relying on the biographical analysis, had tried to forecast the Chinese leadership change of 2012, see Li, Cheng. “China’s midterm jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 (Part 1: Provincial chiefs).” China Leadership 10

In the case of China, because of these inherent value of biographical method, also because of the fact that Chinese top leaders’ biographical data, compared with other types of data that need to be gained through such methods as survey and interview, are relative more available, the biographical approach has always been one of the most effective way to study Chinese top level political elites. In past decades, there have been a significant increase in the utilization of biographical methods in the study of Chinese political elites. This trend also has generated a high demand of compiling biographical data of Chinese elites, which in turn stimulates the biographical analysis based on these data. Among a range of books and dictionaries about Chinese leaders’ biographies are Wolfgang Bartke’s three editions of Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China74, Jerome Cavanaugh’s six editions of Who is Who in China, 1918-195075, Max Perleberg’s Who’s who in Modern China76, and Donald Klein & Anne Clark’s Biographic Dictionary of Chinese , 1921-196577. Their potential contribution to research on Chinese politics is clearly considerable. However, their work, to varying extent, has neglected GAC and SCEM as some members of GAC and SCEM are not included in their reference book. For example, all these four sources cited here have not included two former GAC Councilors Chen Shaoxian, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese , and Zhang Naiqi, the first minister of the Ministry of Food. Surprisingly, in Wolfgang’s book, probably the most widely referenced in this kind, eight former Vice-premiers (e.g. and ) and one Secretary-general Zhou Rongxin are not included. The data miss, reflecting that GAC and SCEM are not included in their standards of inclusion when these researchers collect data and compile these biographies, again shows that SCEM is neglected.78 Partly due to the neglect in the biographical dictionaries, in the existing biographical analysis of Chinese political elites, the focus of the majority has been given to members in CCP’s organization, especially the Central Committee of CCP79, its Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the Military Committee. None research has given special attention to SCEM members, although a couple of studies have dealt with SCEM members as part of their whole research80. In addition, another weakness in existing biographical study of Chines political elites is that, though with some exceptions, most studies are done within a relatively short period of time, rather than over a long enough time or in an overall insight. In general, it is necessary to conduct a longitudinal biographical study of SCEM members over the past sixty years from 1949 to now, to firstly understand these Central Government leaders in terms of where they are from, how are their stay in SCEM and what do they do after they leave SCEM, also to offer a basis for further studies like making compassions between SCEM members and other top political elites in China and making contrast between Chinese SCEM and “inner cabinet” in other counties.

Monitor 31 (2010): 1-24. Li, Cheng. “China’s midterm jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 (Part 2: Cabinet ministers).” China Leadership Monitor 32 (2010): 24p. Li, Cheng. “China’s midterm jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 (Part 3: Military Leaders).” China Leadership Monitor 33 (2010): 1-17. Li, Cheng. “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-Owned Enterprises).” China Leadership Monitor 34.4 (2011). 74 Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1981; Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. 2nd Edition. München; New York: K.G. Saur, 1987; Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. 3rd Edition. München; London: K.G. Saur, 1991. 75 Jerome Cavanaugh. comp. Who’s Who in China, 1918-1950: With an Index. : Chinese Materials Center, 1982. 76 Max Perleberg. Who’s Who in Modern China. Hong Kong: Ye Olde Printerie, 1954. 77 Donald Klein & Anne Clark. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971. 78 The neglect of SCEM members becomes more obvious when taking account of the fact that many people in regional level and even some in mass organizations are included in these reference books. 79 Researchers have shown long-standing interest on members of Central Committee. Each Central Committee from 12th all the way to 17th has been studied using biographical methods by researchers, for example, Bartke, Wolfgang, and Peter Schier. China’s New Party Leadership: Biographies and Analysis of the Twelfth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. ME Sharpe Inc, 1985; Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers.” Asian Survey 28.4 (1988): 371-399. Zang, Xiaowei. “The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?” Asian Survey 33.8 (1993): 787-803. Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Zemin.” Asian Survey 38.3 (1998): 231-264. Bo, Zhiyue. “The Sixteenth Central Committee: Technocrats in Command?” Asian Profile 32.6 (2004): 497-517. 80 For example Li, Cheng. “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 2: Cabinet Ministers).” China Leadership Monitor 32 (2010). 11

Biographical Analysis of SCEM Members: Some Preliminary Findings Some preliminary findings, especially from the perspective of SCEM members’ ages, of the author’s continuing research project of a longitudinal biographical study of SCEM members are reported in following, as an example to indicate what a biographical analysis could tell us about SCEM and its members as well as the general Chinese politics, and as an attempt to illustrate the importance of SCEM for the understanding of Chinese politics and values of the biographical approach. Although, in the sphere of biographical approach, the very broad term “biography” can refer to various data from one’s private diaries, letters and notes, one’s public speeches, voices, videos, photos, articles, books and autobiographies, to biographical information written and published by others, this study only focuses on the brief biographical data (Jianli) of SCEM members compiled and published others, because of the availability of and consistency in the data and also because it is necessary to firstly depict a general picture of SCEM through analysing brief biographies before moving on to further studies based on other types of data81. The data of this project mainly comes from Chinese government official website since it contains the most comprehensive data, with other sources to complement the missing data82. This longitudinal study covers the time from 1949, the founding of the People’s Republic of China, to now. Although the State council and its SCEM was established in 1954, given the fact that GAC (from 1949 to 1954), in many aspects, is comparable to SCEM, GAC is also included in this study so that we can have a full understanding of Chinese “inner cabinet” since CCP came to power in 1949. This study, covering all 113 SCEM members in the past, is to analyse several characteristics of SCEM members including their demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, and birthplace), social background (party affiliation and education), pathways to SCEM (working experiences, experiences in major events), career itself (duration and interlocking posts), and post-career (departure and post-jobs), to find out where, how and why these top leaders come to, stay at, and leave from SCEM and to explore the changes over time. Table 1 shows the changes of the size and composition of SCEM from 1949 till now. Overall, the SCEM has become increasingly more institutionalized in several aspects. Firstly, after 1982, the composition has stabilized, including Premier, Vice-premier, State Councilor and Secretary-general. Secondly, after 1998, the size of SCEM has stabilized to encompass 1 Premier, 4 Vice-premiers, 5 State Councilors and 1 Secretary-general and in total 10 members since the Secretary-general has always been held concurrently by a State Councilor since 1993. Table 1 also suggests that GAC is more comparable to SCEM than to the State Council and thus challenges a widely accepted argument that GAC is the predecessor of the State Council83. First, GAC, consisting of “the Premier, several

81 Other types of “biography”, though limited, also can be useful sources for analysis of SCEM members. These data include letters (e.g. Zhou, Enlai. Zhou Enlai Shuxin Xuanji (Selected Letters of Zhou Enlai), complied by Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), speeches (e.g. Zhu, Rongji. Zhu Rongji Jianghua Shilu (Records of the Speeches of Zhu Rongji), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2011), collections of articles (e.g. Chen, Yun. Chen Yun Tongzhi Wengao Xuanbian, 1956-1962 (Selections of Chen Yun’s Manuscripts, 1956–1962). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), potries (e.g. Ma, Kai. Makai Shici Cungao (Manuscripts of ’s Potries). Beijing: Zuojia Chubanshe, 2004) and diaries (e.g. Li, Peng, Li Peng Waishi Riji (Foreign Affairs Diary of Li Peng), Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2008). 82 Including Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1981; Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. 2nd Edition. München; New York: K.G. Saur, 1987; Bartke, Wolfgang. Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China. 3rd Edition. München; London: K.G. Saur, 1991; Bartke, Wolfgang. Biographical Dictionary and Analysis of China’s Party Leadership: 1922-1988. KG Saur Verlag Gmbh & Company, 1990; He, Meirong etc. eds. Who’s Who: Current Chinese Leaders. Hong Kong: Wen Wei Publishing, 2003; Editorial Board of Who’s who in China. Who’s who in China: Current leaders. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989; Editorial Board of Who's Who in China. Who’s Who in China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994; Zhongguo Renming Dacidian: Dangdai Renwu Juan. Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1992; Donald Klein & Anne Clark. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971. 83 Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. University of California Press, 1966; Wang, James C.F. Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction, 6th Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1999; Yan Xu and Dali L. Yang. “The Central Government”. In Goodman, David SG, ed. Handbook of the Politics of China. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 12

Vice-premiers, General-secretary, and several Administrative Councilors”84, has the same composition with SCEM, rather than the State Council which also includes heads of departments subordinate to the State Council. In 1982, the creation of the post of State Councilor, to some extent, can be seen as a restoration of Administrative Councilors in GAC. Second, the size of GAC (24 members in total) is also comparable to that of SCEM, while the total number of State Council members (Guowuyuan Zucheng Renyuan) is much larger. In addition, GAC is essentially different from the State Council in other aspects like the legal status and jurisdiction85. Therefore, GAC should not be seen as the “predecessor” of the State Council. Although this does not mean that GAC should be treated as the “predecessor” of SCEM instead, GAC does have many similarities with SCEM, suggesting that it should be involved in the study of SCEM.

Table 1: Size and Composition of SCEM from 1949 to Now Term1 Year Composition Total2 Premier Vice Premier State Secretary- Councilor general GAC 1949-1954 1 5 16* 2† 24 1 1954-1959 1 12 - 1 14 2 1959-1965 1 16 - 1 17 3 1965-1975 1 16 - 1 18 4 1975-1978 2† 12 - - 13 5 1978-1982§ 2† 23 11 3† 27 6 1983-1988 2† 5 11 2† 18 7 1988-1993 1 5 10 2† 16 8 1993-1998 1 6 8 1 15 9 1998-2003 1 4 5 1 10 10 2003-2008 1 4 5 1 10 11 2008-2013 1 4 5 1 10 12 2013-now 1 4 5 1 10 Total3 7 58 57 13 113 Note: 1 The appointment of SCEM members is “decided” by NPC, thus the term of each SCEM is the same as that of NPC (PRC, 2004). The number in this column refers to the term of NPC that elects the SCEM. For example, “1” refers to the SCEM elected by the first NPC. 2 This column shows the number of all members in each term of SCEM, not necessarily the sum of left numbers in the row since some members have hold more than one posts in one term. 3 This row shows the total number of members at each position over the past, not the sum of above numbers in each column since some members have hold the same position for more than one term. * From 1949 to 1954 during the period of GAC, the post these 16 leaders held was called Councilors of GAC (Zhengwu Weiyuan) not State Councilors (Guowu Weiyuan). † There is only one Premier and one Secretary-general during any specific period of time. But during one term of SCEM, there can be more than one Premier/Secretary-general because of personnel mobility. § During the Fifth SCEM from 1978 to 1982, there have been several times of personnel mobility and reforms. One common practice is to divide the Fifth State Council into two parts: pre-1982 (or pre-reshuffle) and post-1982 (or post- reshuffle) (e.g. State Council website), but the fact is much more complicated than that. It should be noted, the number 23 means that, from 1978 to 1982, there have been 23 Vice-premiers in total. However, at any given point of time, the number of Vice-premiers has varied from 18 (between September 1979 and September 1980) to 2 (between May 1982 and June 1983).

Table 2 shows the changes of average ages of SCEM members when they take the office. The average age of both all members and newly appointed members peaked at the Fifth State Council between 1978 and 1983. For example, was 77, the eldest of all SCEM members when elected, when he was appointed as Vice-premier in 1978. Three other members of the Fifth SCEM were more than 70 when elected. The problem that too many elderly top level cadres were in office had been one major concern of CCP leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, after late 1970s when Deng

84 The Organic Law of the Central People’s Government, 1949. 85 In terms of legal statuses, the GAC organized by “the Central People’s Government Committee” is “the highest executive organ of state affairs” (The Organic Law of the Central People’s Government, 1949), while the State Council is “the Central People’s Government, is the executive organ of the highest state power, is the highest state administrative organ”(Constitution, 1954). Secondly, The GAC is formally responsible to the Central People’s Government Committee, and its chairman (), whereas the State Council is formally responsible to and reports to the NPC and its Standing Committee (Constitution, 1954). 13

Xiaoping took power. Since then, CCP has taken many steps to replace elderly leaders with younger people. Under such circumstances, as shown in Table 2, the average age of newly elected SCEM members has decreased significantly from 65.31 of the Fifth SCEM to 58.75 of the Sixth SCEM. This trend is also supported by other evidence from the perspective of average ages, for example that of members in Central Committee, Secretariat, Politburo and its Standing Committee86. However, the changes of average age need to be interpreted with caution because the average only can reflect the central tendency of the subject. Table 2 shows that the average age of SCEM members reduced to the level around sixties in 1988 and has remained stable after then, which might be interpreted as that the reform “towards younger cadres” (Nianqinghua) had completed or achieved desirable outcome in late 1980s. The fact, however, is that the reform took much longer time. If we change the view to the composition of ages, as shown in Table 3, we can see that in the Seventh SCEM between 1988 and 1993, there were still two members older than 70. Studies of other groups like Politburo members have shown similar results. Therefore, it supports the argument that it was not until 1997 when the 15th CCP’s Congress started that the “70 limit”—any top elite should not be re-elected if he is more than 70 when the election begins—become some kind of unwritten law or informal retirement regulation inside CCP.87 In addition, Table 3 also suggests that, after 1993, SCEM members are in a rather narrow age cohorts between 51 and 70, which could be another indication of CCP’s continuing efforts to institutionalize personnel management and “to normalize legitimacy for rulers chosen from successive, officially defined generations”88.

Table 2: Average Ages when Elected to Each SCEM 1 Term Year Average of All Members Average of New Members GAC 1949-1954 53.67 53.67 1 1954-1959 51.43 52.75 2 1959-1965 55.82 55.00 3 1965-1975 60.39 56.00 4 1975-1978 58.85 55.10 5 1978-1982 65.52 65.31 6 1983-1988 63.78 58.75 7 1988-1993 61.38 60.44 8 1993-1998 61.80 61.00 9 1998-2003 63.90 60.33 10 2003-2008 63.30 63.38 11 2008-2013 62.60 62.00 12 2013-now 62.20 61.29 Note: 1 The year each member elected to each SCEM does not necessarily equals to the starting year of each term of SCEM.

Table 3: Composition of SCEM Members’ Ages Term Year Less than 41 41-50 51-60 61-70 More than 70 Total GAC 1949-1954 1 9 7 6 1 24 1 1954-1959 0 7 7 0 0 14 2 1959-1965 0 2 11 4 0 17 3 1965-1975 0 1 9 8 0 18 4 1975-1978 2 0 5 4 2 13 5 1978-1982 0 0 3 20 4 27 6 1983-1988 0 0 5 11 2 18 7 1988-1993 0 0 7 7 2 16 8 1993-1998 0 0 5 10 0 15 9 1998-2003 0 0 3 7 0 10 10 2003-2008 0 0 1 9 0 10 11 2008-2013 0 0 2 8 0 10 12 2013-now 0 0 5 5 0 10

86 Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey 43.4 (2003): 553-597. 87 Chang, Chun-chih. Zhonggong Zhengzhi Jingying zhi Yanjiu (A Study on CCP’s Elite Politics: The Rise of Technocracy and Its Influence). : Master Dissertation of National Chengchi University, 2005. pp.70-73; Miller, Alice L. “Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics”. In Li, Cheng, ed. China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy. Brookings Institution Press, 2008. p.63. 88 Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey 43.4 (2003). p.565. 14

It is also necessary to compare the ages of SCEM members with that of leaders in other high level organizations. Barnett, after making some simple comparisons in terms of average age and education level, argues that, SCEM, “even more than that of the Party Secretariat, symbolizes the changes in the character of the leadership that has been occurring in China.”89 Barnett’s argument is based on his observations in 1984 when SCEM members were younger than secretaries in the Secretariat. Nevertheless, the evidence after then cannot support this argument, as all average ages of SCEM members from 1988 to 2003 are bigger than that of Secretariat members (see Table 4). What is more obvious and important than the differences is the similarities among these groups. Table 4 shows that, after 1993, the average age of these three groups are similar. The similarity suggests that making comparisons among SCEM, Politburo and Secretariat, as what some researchers like Barnett and Lieberthal & Oksenberg have done, are reasonable given the fact that CCP’s recruitment of cadres has a principle of age echelon from the street level up to the top level. The comparability also can be justified by the fact that members in all these three groups belong to the same “vice-state level” in the Chinese cadre ranking system90. In short, SCEM members are definitely among Chinese top level leaders.

Table 4: Average Ages of SCEM Members and Other Top Group of Elites Term of SCEM Starting Year of SCEM Politburo* Secretariat* Each SCEM 6 1983 63.78 72.8 64.7 7 1988 61.38 65 57.2 8 1993 61.80 62.9 60.3 9 1998 63.90 63.9 63.9 10 2003 63.30 61.4 60.4 Note: * These figures are based on Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey 43.4 (2003): 553-597. To compare with average ages of SCEM members, the data shown here equals to the original data PLUS 1, because the Central Committee meeting that elects Politburo members and secretaries in Secretariat has been held one year before the election of SCEM members since 1980s.

Concluding Remarks Generally speaking, at least two reasons highlight the importance of SCEM and its members and the importance for the scholarly community of paying close and adequate attention to them. Firstly, SCEM is playing and will play an increasingly important role in decision making in Chinese government and China in general. It is vital, especially for policy analysists, to understand the role, structure and process of SCEM in order to better understand Chinese policy-making. Secondly, SCEM members are definitely at the climax of Chinese government as one branch of China’s power and are among the very top political leaders all over China since they are comparable to other such well-known key leaders as Politburo members and secretaries in Secretariat. Therefore, in Chinese political leadership study, SCEM members should be put on the research agenda to analyse the differences and similarities among these groups of top leaders. As increasingly more information are available to researchers, there are various ways to study SCEM members. One of the most effective way would be longitudinal biographical analysis. From preliminary findings shown above, this method could offer us rich insight into some critical issues as well as propose some meaningful questions. For example, by examining such features like gender, birthplace, and ethnicity of SCEM members and its changes over time, it could help us to understand

89 Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd., 1985.p.54. 90 Except that, the Premier is at the state level (Zhengguoji). For the ranking system of government civil servants, see Guojia Gongwuyuan Zanxing Tiaoli (Temporary Regulations on National Civil Servants), 1993. Members and alternate members of Politburo, Secretaries in the Secretariat and the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are at the same level, see Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu (The Organization Department of CCP), Guanyu Zhongguo Gongchandang Jiguan Canzhao Shixing “Guojia Gongwuyuan Zanxing Tiaoli” de Shishi Yijian (Suggestions Regarding Implementation of Personnel Management in Organizations of Chinese Communist Party with reference to “Temporary Regulations on National Civil Servants”), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855076.html 15

the representativeness issue in the appointment of Chinese leaders. From 1993 to now, there is one female in each term of SCEM, while in other comparable groups like Politburo and Secretariat female members are very rare. Has this already become an unwritten convention in the appointment of SCEM members? Another example is that, through exploring which minister of the State Council are hold concurrently by SCEM members, it could shed light on the focuses of Chinese government and its changes over time. For example, the Minister of Defence is always sitting as the State Councilor simultaneously. However, the situation of the Foreign Minister is rather complicated. The first Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (1949-1958) had been the Premier at the same time; Chen Yi (1958- 1972) and Hua (1976-1982) held the Vice-premier concurrently during their terms of Foreign Minister; (1982-1988) was State Councilor simultaneously; (1988-1998) was State Councilor and then became Vice-premier during his stay as the Foreign Minister; While (1971-1974), Li Zhaoxin (2003-2007), (2007-2013) and Wangyi (2013 to now) are not concurrently sitting in SCEM. How to explain this change? What does this mean for the Chinese foreign policy making? Research on Chinese politics and government would be much more fruitful if it begins to address such questions from the perspective of SCEM.