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Chinese “Inner Cabinet” Leaders: a Neglected Group and Preliminary Findings from a Longitudinal Biographical Research Project

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Chinese “Inner Cabinet” Leaders: a Neglected Group and Preliminary Findings from a Longitudinal Biographical Research Project Chinese “Inner Cabinet” Leaders: A Neglected Group and Preliminary Findings from a Longitudinal Biographical Research Project Tong Zhang* A draft paper submitted to the First International PUPOL (Public and Political Leadership) Conference at the Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands, in April 2016 Please do not cite or circulate without the author’s permission * Tong Zhang is a Research Associate Postgraduate in Queen Mary University of London and a Ph.D. student in Renmin University of China. Contact address: School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London, E1 4NS, UK. Email: [email protected]. The author wishes to thank the China Scholarship Council for its financial support, Kangzhi Zhang for his inspiration and Lee Jones for his research assistance. 1 Abstract: In the study of Chinese politics and government, the State Council Executive Meeting, roughly comparable to Western “inner cabinet”, and its members including the Premier, Vice- premiers, State Councilors and the Secretary-general, have been largely neglected by researchers. This article examines the history, structure and process of the State Council Executive Meeting and highlights the importance of the State Council Executive Meeting and its members as a key policy- making institution and group in China. The article then discusses available data and methods for the study of this group. Finally, a research project of a longitudinal biographical analysis of State Council Executive Meeting members is proposed and some preliminary findings of this project are reported. Keywords: State Council Executive Meeting, Inner Cabinet, Leadership, Biographical Study, China In the study of Chinese politics, and its leadership research and policy study in particular, there has been a spate of interest in such bodies in Beijing as the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its members, Politburo and its members, the Standing Committee of Politburo and its members, as well as Military Committee of CCP’s Central Committee and its members. However, the State Council Executive Meeting (SCEM, Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi1, roughly comparable to Western “Inner Cabinet”) that is usually held on a regular base in Zhongnanhai headquarters2 and its members (Guowuyuan Changwuhuiyi Zucheng Renyuan) including the Premier, Vice-premiers, State Councilors and the Secretary-general, have received little attention from scholars and researchers on Chinese politics and government. The meeting of SCEM is the centre for policy discussion and decision making in Chinese government and one of key loci of policy making in China at large. Members of SCEM, also officially named “State Council leaders” (Guowuyuan Lingdao)3, occupy the highest positions in Chinese government and are definitely among top political elites in China. Many researchers have not recognized the importance of SCEM in Chinese policy-making. Some have noticed SCEM’s significant role in Chinese laws and formal organizational charts, but assumed that the importance is only reflected on paper not in practice. As a result, although it is not uncommon for authors to mention SCEM in their work, SCEM has never been adequately and seriously examined. It is the purpose of this paper to call attention to the neglected institution of SCEM and the high-level group of SCEM members. Firstly, it examines and describes the history, role, structure and process of SCEM and its members, shows various examples of the neglect of SCEM in the scholarly community and discusses parts of reasons for the neglect. Then, it explores various available data and some 1 One of the most widely used English translation for this group is “Standing Committee of the State Council” (e.g. Boden, Jeanne. The Wall behind China’s Open Door: Towards Efficient Intercultural Management in China. Brussels: ASP-VUB Press, 2008; Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making In China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton University Press, 1988; Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. University of California Press, 1966). This translation is rather misleading, as it seems to imply that it is similar to other bodies like Standing Committee of Politburo (Zhengzhiju Changwu Weiyuanhui). The fact is that the Chinese name of SCEM is quite different from that of the latter. The term of “Executive Meeting” (Changwu Huiyi) highlights the uniqueness of SCEM. Besides, other English translations of SCEM also include “Executive Committee of the State Council” (e.g. Joseph, William A., ed. Politics in China: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2010; Heath, Mr Timothy R. China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014.) and “Standing Conference of the State Council” (e.g. Bartke, Wolfgang, and Peter Schier. China’s New Party Leadership. London: Macmillan Reference Books, 1985). The inconsistency in the English translation, probably, partly contributes to the neglect of SCEM. The best translation would be “State Council Executive Meeting” (abbreviated as SCEM in this paper) or “Executive Meetings of the State Council” as what is used in the official English version of Chinese Constitution by NPC. 2 The meeting of SCEM has always been held in the First Conference Room of State Council (Guowuyuan Diyi Huiyishi) in Zhongnanhai since 1949 when the first Premier Zhou Enlai presided the first meeting of Government Administrative Council, see Lin,Yan. “Jiedu Guowuyuan Changwu Huiyi” (On the State Council Executive Meeting), Zhongguo Qingnianbao, 26 February, 2014: 12, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2014-02/26/nw.D110000zgqnb_20140226_1-12.htm 3 The term “State Council leaders” is officially used in some government documents (e.g. Guowuyuan Bangongting de Zhuyao Zhize (Main Responsibilities of the General Office of the State Council), 1998, http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005- 07/28/content_17979.htm) and on the State Council official website (http://www.gov.cn), but it has not been formally defined on any law or regulation that who belongs to this group of “State Council leaders”. On the official website, under the label of “State Council leaders” are all SCEM members. 2 research methods that can be used to study this important body, especially the biographical analysis. Further, it proposes a longitudinal biographical research project in order to understand SCEM members and its changes over time, along with some preliminary findings from this study. Finally, the paper concludes with a call to pay more attention to SCEM and its members. SCEM: its Importance and Neglect Since the State Council, the Chinese Central Government, came into being in September 19544, SCEM has always existed and served as the most important formal decision-making mechanism of the State Council. Initially, SCEM “is composed of the Premier, Vice premiers and the Secretary- general”5. From 1975 to 1979, the Secretary-general was not in SCEM as the post of Secretary- general was abolished in 19756 until 1979 when it was restored and got back into SCEM. In 1982, SCEM was restructured by the Resolution on Institutional Reform of the State Council7 passed by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) that created new posts of State Councilors and added them to SCEM. Since then, the composition of SCEM has remained the same until today (for details of the changes of SCEM’s composition, see Table 1). In December 1982, SCEM, for the very first time in history, appeared in the Constitution, the current version of Chinese Constitution8. Although, by law, it acts as one of the two types of regular meetings in the State Council including “the plenary meetings of the State Council and the executive meetings of the State Council”9, in reality, it goes without saying that SCEM plays a much more important role in the State Council for policy discussion and decision making. As SCEM involves much less members than the plenary meeting (from dozens to hundreds, including not only SCEM members and heads of departments of the State Council as stated in law, but also various members from relevant organizations), it is much easier for this small group to gather frequently and to have effective discussions and decisions. Therefore, the meeting of SCEM should be (by law) and is (in practice) held more frequently10. Moreover, partly because of the large size of the plenary meeting which makes it difficult to work effectively and hence “many attendees are not familiar with issues and topics under discussion in the meeting”11, the plenary meeting has turned to, more or less, a briefing at which decisions made by the State Council, especially SCEM, are communicated to relevant staff. As a result, to some extent, we can say that the meeting of SCEM has become the only real formal body for decision-making in the State Council. 4 From 1949 to 1954, it is the Government Administrative Council (GAC, Zhengwuyuan) that holds the executive power. Since GAC is quite comparable to SCEM, it is better to be included in the discussion and analysis of SCEM (see further discussions below). 5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Zuzhifa (The Organic Law of the State Council) [hereafter Organic Law], 1954. 6 In Constitution 1975 and Constitution 1978, the post of Secretary-general was deleted from the composition of State Council. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) [hereafter Constitution], 1975, and Constitution, 1978. In practice, the post was abolished possibly in as early as 1970 when the Secretariat of the State Council (Guowuyuan Mishuting) was changed to the Office of the State Council (Guowuyuan Bangongshi), see Zhonguo Gongchandang Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1921-1997 (A Collection of the Organizational History of China’s Communist Party, 1921-1997), Appendix 1. Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000, p.11. Around 1970, then Secretary-general Zhou Rongxin, the last one before 1979, was purged by “the Gang of Four”. (Fu, Yi. “Jiaoyu Buzhang Zhou Rongxin de Zuihou Suiyue” (Final Yeas of the Minister of Education).
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