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The Alliance System EUROPEAN HISTORY Unit 11 Causes of the First World War Form 4 1 Unit 11.1 The European Alliances System, 1871-1914 1. The situation of the Great Powers in 1871 had no ties with other countries for it gave more importance to the building of Britain her colonial empire. Britain was said to be in ‘splendid isolation’. Germany, Austria- These were tied to each other by an agreement called the Three Emperors Hungary and Russia League. had very few friends because she had been defeated by Prussia in 1871 France (Franco-Prussian War) and it was still licking her wounds. Had just been united and it was still not strong enough. It was trying, however, Italy to build up her army and her Mediterranean navy. The Ottoman Turkey was in rapid decline. It had lost most of her lands in the Balkan Empire peninsula. By this time it was called ‘the sick man of Europe.’ 2. How the European Alliance came into being Agreement 1 Agreement 2 This three-way friendship worried 1879 The Dual Alliance 1882 The Triple Alliance France and Russia that they could be GERMANY GERMANY attacked by three powers acting AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY together. So in 1892 they agreed to ITALY help each other if either of them was attacked. For a while, agreement no. 3 calmed their fear. But soon it was Britain’s turn to become worried. During the Boer War in South Africa, Germany showed sympathy with the Dutch Boers against the British. Britain started to mistrust Germany and looked for France for a friend in Europe. In 1903 King Edward VII visited France and signed the Entente Cordiale, meaning ‘Friendly Understanding’. This meant that Britain was no long in ‘splendid isolation’. Agreement 3 Agreement 4 Agreement 5 1892 The Franco-Russian Alliance 1904 The Entente Cordiale 1907 The Triple Entente FRANCE - RUSSIA FRANCE - BRITAIN FRANCE - BRITAIN - RUSSIA Three years later, Britain made a similar agreement with Russia who was already in alliance with France. So by 1907 the European Great Powers were grouped into two opposing armed camps. Alliance No 2 Alliance No.4 Alliance No.5 2 Unit 11.1 - The European Alliance System 1871-1914 1. Europe’s Alliances in 1914 3 Unit 11.2 Planning for War on Land and Sea 1. The Schlieffen Plan 2. German dreadnaughts 1. The German Schlieffen Plan In 1905 the German General Alfred von Schlieffen prepared a plan of how Germany could fight her enemies if a war broke out in Europe. His plan was aimed to avoid a war on two fronts. If war began, the whole German army should invade France by travel at high speed through neutral Belgium and capture Paris. Having defeated France in six weeks, the German army would then be sent in on the eastern front to fight the Russians. Although it was a simple plan, it actually made a war on two fronts even more likely. By attacking France first, Germany made certain that France would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia. Schlieffen had made sure that any war fought by Germany would be a ‘European’ war. 2. The French Plan Seventeen The French had been planning a war of revenge against Germany. They made many plans. Finally, in 1913, General Joffre came up with Plan Seventeen – if war broke out, the French army would make an all-out attack on their lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. They would then cross the River Rhine and head for Berlin. Plan 17 relied also on high speed. 3. Other plans Britain, Russia and Austria-Hungary also had their war plans. Britain formed an Expeditionary Force whose task was to cross quickly to France as soon as war was declared. Russia started to build up her armies in 1909. Austria started making enormous cannons in their Skoda arms factory. By 1914, the rival alliances were armed to the teeth and ready to fight each other using detailed plans for high-speed attacks. What remained was the excuse to start a fight. 4. The Anglo-German Naval Race The naval race began when Kaiser William II wanted Germany to become a great world power. To achieve this, she needed a navy that challenged Britain’s largest navy in the world. Britain, however, was not prepared to allow this. She needed a large fleet to protect their colonies and her trade routes. So the British naval chiefs decided to enlarge the Royal Navy even more. The race began in 1900 when the German Navy Law ordered the building of 41 battleships and 60 cruisers. The German Naval League was set up to make the people more informed and interested in the navy. Britain responded by building a new type of battleship called Dreadnought. She was faster, had thicker armoured plates and fired within a range of 32 km. 4 Unit 11.3 Two Tests of Strength – The Moroccan Crises 1. The Kaiser 2. Sultan Abdulaziz 3. Sultan Andulmehid 4. An Entente Cordiale Poster 5. The German Panther at Agadir, 1911 1. The Tangier Crisis, 1905 In 1905 the French were getting ready to make Morocco into one of their colonies. Kaiser William opposed this and went personally to Tangier to promise the Sultan of Morocco against a French attack. As the news spread all over Europe, people wondered whether it would lead to war between Germany and France. For several weeks there was tension in Europe, until in the end they decided against war. Instead they decided to hold a conference in the Spanish town of Algericas. The conference was a great disappointment for the Kaiser. France gained special rights in Morocco, but that country remained independent. But the Kaiser found out want he wanted to know – that Britain and France would support each other by diplomacy, but would not join together to fight a war against Germany. 2. The Agadir Crisis, 1911 Five years later, the Kaiser interfered again in the affairs of Morocco. In 1911 Moroccan rebels attacked the town of Fez. The French government sent an army to help the sultan drive them out. William accused the French of invading Morocco and so he send a German warship to the Moroccan port of Agadir. Britain feared Germany would turn Agadir into a German naval base close to Gibraltar. The Royal Navy was made ready for war. This time it seemed that there would be war between Germany and Britain. At the last moment, the Kaiser gave way and ordered the German warships to leave Agadir. War was avoided but the incident scared both Britain and France. One result of this crisis was that the race to build breadnoughts became even more frantic. Both countries prepared themselves for the next confrontation. 5 Unit 11.4 The Balkan Problems 1. How the Great Powers became involved in the Balkans 2 an 3. Poster of the First Balkan War, 1912 1. The Crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1908 The powerful countries surrounding the Balkan Peninsula (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy) were all interested in what was going on in Turkey. They could take advantage of Turkey’s weakness to grab land and increase their influence in that area. The chance to do so came suddenly in 1908. In that year the Young Turk Revolution broke out in Turkey. A group of army officers took control of the government in Constantinople and forced the sultan to grant a liberal constitution. On hearing of what happened in Turkey, the King of Bulgaria declared his country independent from Turkey. The people of Crete broke away from Turkey and united with Greece. But it was Austria-Hungary that took the most advantage by seizing the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Turkey and joined it with Austria-Hungary. But this turned out to be a fatal mistake – the people of these provinces were mostly Serbs who wanted to unite with Serbia not with Austria- Hungary. This development was to bring more trouble in the Balkans, this time between Serbia and Austria- Hungary. 2.The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 After the Young Turk Revolution, Turkey grew more and more weak. The Balkan countries now saw a chance to drive out the Turks out of Europe. In 1912 the Kings of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro joined together in the Balkan League and attacked Turkey. The First Balkan War was cruel and costly. The League proved stronger and after only 50 days of fighting Turkey surrendered. Turkey gave up their remaining lands in the Balkans and these were shared between the four victors. A new country, Albania was created. But now the four kings of the League quarrelled about their share of the land. This quarrel brought about the Second Balkan War in 1913. Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Romania and Turkey joined against Bulgaria which was attacked from four sides. The country which came out best from the two Balkan Wars was Serbia. King Peter of Serbia had doubled the size of his country and his people. The Serbs living in Bosnia-Hezegovina became restless and wanted more than ever before to unite with Serbia. The Austrians became even more worried that these people would rebel. 6 Unit 11.5 The Sarajevo Murders, 28th June 1914 1. The last living moments of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, 28th June 1914. 1. The Black Hand In 1911, in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, ten young army officers founded a secret society named Unity or Death, more commonly called The Black Hand. Their aim was to unite all the Slav peoples in the Balkans into a single country called Yugoslavia.
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