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Constantinos Georgiou Athanasopoulos Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 1 Constantinos Georgiou Athanasopoulos Supervisor Mary Haight Title The Metaphysics of Intentionality: A Study of Intentionality focused on Sartre's and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind and Language. Submission for PhD Department of Philosophy University of Glasgow JULY 1995 ProQuest Number: 13818785 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 13818785 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 GLASGOW UKVERSITT LIBRARY Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 2 ABSTRACT With this Thesis an attempt is made at charting the area of the Metaphysics of Intentionality, based mainly on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. A Philosophical Analysis and an Evaluation o f Sartre’s Arguments are provided, and Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality is supported by recent commentaries on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality is proposed, with few improvements by the author, as the only modem theory of the mind that can oppose effectively the advance of AI and physicalist reductivist attempts in Philosophy of Mind and Language. Discussion includes Sartre’s critique of Husserl, the relation of Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality to Realism, its applicability in the Theory of the Emotions, and recent theories of Intentionality such as Mohanty’s, Aquilla’s, Searle’s, and Harney’s. Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 3 Acknowledgements Firstly and foremost I would like to thank God for allowing me to finish this project: AOEAIOIO 0EOS HMQN AOEA EOI. Secondly, my parents, George and Charicleia who with great financial sacrifices have equipped me with a University Education, lasting more than seven years now. Thirdly, my Supervisor, Mary Haight, who has put up with me for four years, and has supported me fully for the duration of my research (and I hope long after), Fourthly, my brother John and sisters Ioanna and Eurikleia, their spouses and children, relatives, teachers, and the many special friends in Greece, Canada, and Scotland who have supported me emotionally (and not only) in this long road towards submission. Undoubtedly, the importance on the role of the Emotions and Intentionality that this thesis is emphasising is the result of my associations with people who could dress my existence with the comfort of sympathy and friendship in times of hardship. Special thanks I owe to all the members of the Glasgow Department and other Departments of Philosophy across Scotland, and in my alma matter, Brandon University, Canada, who have supported with their warmth and help a “budding Greek Philosopher”, and especially Dr.Jim Edwards, Mr.Dudley Knowles, Mr.David Campbell, Mr.John Porter, Dr.Christopher Martin, Mr. Terry Greenwood, Dr. Scott Meikle, Dr.Nick Zangwill, Dr John Divers, Prof.Robin Downie, Prof.Alexander Broadie, Mr.Ephraim Borrowski, Mr. Richard Stalley, Mr.Pat Shaw, ProfEva Schaper, Prof.Timothy Sprigge, Prof.John Skorupski, Prof. Crispin Wright, Dr.John Haldane, Mr.Lesley Stevenson, Dr.Berrys Gaut, Prof.Eric Matthews, Dr.Gordon Graham, Dr.Peter Clark, Prof.Bob Hale, Mr.Christopher Bryant, Dr.Theodore Scaltsas, and the Dundee-St.Andrews Discussion Group on the Mind and AI (1990-1) and Profs.K.Hanly, P.Gosselin, and M. Yoh, (I know I have forgotten many, please forgive me). Also I developed some of the ideas expressed here during my attendance and participation in Conferences; for some of these I was supported financially by The Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, The British Society for the Philosophy of Science, The Philosophical Quarterly, and the Departments of Logic and Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews. Finally, but most importantly, I owe a lot to the Fathers and Sisters (in Scotland, in Essex, in Geneva, and in Greece) that have prayed (and I hope will keep praying) for me; with their freely and abundantly offered hospitality, kindness and support, have helped me greatly in keeping mind and soul together during my stay here. Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 4 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION (pp.6-12). i) Intentionality: First Use in Brentano. (pp.6-7) ii) What any proposed account of Intentionality must have as components and criteria, (pp.7-8) iii) What additional components and criteria any valid theory of Intentionality should have, (pp.8-12) II. HUSSERL’S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY (pp.12-18). m . SARTRE’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL’S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY AND SARTRE’S OWN THEORY (pp. 19^ 114). i) The Transcendence of Ego: The Negative Critique of the Husserlian Consciousness, (pp.20-67) ii) ’’Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology”: The Positive Critique of the Bursting Consciousness, (pp.68-73) iii) Critical Evaluation and Analysis of the Essays: The Superiority of Sartre's Theory. (pp.74-I14) IV. INTENTIONALITY AND REALISM (pp.115-168). i) Introduction, (pp.115-116) ii) Is Sartre a Realist or an Idealist? (pp.l 16-155) Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 5 iii) Can Sartre be a McCullochian Realist? (pp.155-160) iv) Can Sartre be a Hegelian in his views on Being? (pp.160-165) v) Sartre and Wittgenstein on Reality, (pp.165-168) V. INTENTIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (pp.169-245). i) Sartre’s Theory of the Emotions, (pp.169-218) ii) Critical Evaluation of Sartre’s Theory, (pp.218-230) iii) Sartre and Language, (pp.230-238) iv) Wittgenstein and Sartre on the Emotions and Language. (pp.238-245) VI. CRITIQUES ON SARTRE’S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY (pp.246-266). i) Jitendra Nath Mohanty: Intentionality and Indian Philosophy of Consciousness, (pp.246-254) ii) Richard E. Aquilla: Intentionality as the Study of Mental Acts. (pp.255-257) iii) John R. Searle; Intentionality of the Speech Acts, (pp.257-264) iv) M aurita Harney: Intentionality of Sense, (pp.264-266) VH. CONCLUSION (pp.267-268). VHL BIBLIOGRAPHY (pp.269-275) Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 6 L Introduction. In the Introduction I shall attempt a description of the first use of the term ’'Intentionality” by Brentano; in addition, I shall provide an outline of some of the components any theory of Intentionality has to have in order for it to use the term comprehensively and to follow the legacy that Brentano left us. i) Intentionality: Brentano’s Use of the Term. The word comes from the Latinmtendere (to stretch, to point at), and means the metaphorical stretching of consciousness in order to beo f something, i.e., to have an object, which may or may not actually exist. Brentano1 first coined the termIntentionality for distinguishing (from other kinds of acts) and characterising mental acts as "the direction of the mind to an object" in perception, judgement or belief approval or disapproval. In Brentano's theory the mental acts contain their object intentionally within themselves. With what is called "Brentano's Irreducibility Thesis" it is claimed that Intentionality is an irreducible feature of mental phenomena, and since no physical phenomena could exhibit it, mental phenomena could not be a species of physical phenomena. 1 See in Franz Brentano,Psvcholoeie vom emvirischen Stancbunkt (1874). Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 7 Brentano also coined the phrase "Intentional Inexistence of the Intentional Objects of Mental Acts", to indicate that the intentional object may or may not exist in reality. By this he meant that even though we cannot want or believe without wanting or believing something, what we want or believe may not necessarily exist. For example, we may want the care of ex-associates of ours, while they disregard us and it is almost certain that they shall not care for us in the future; or we believe that ex-associates of ours still care for us, even though it is almost certain that they do not. ii) What any proposed account of Intentionality must therefore have as components and criteria. (These are necessary components and criteria but not sufficient. I am not certain whether we can ever establish the necessaryand sufficient criteria of Intentionality. These criteria can be as varied as the human minds themselves!) Three major truths have to be taken into consideration, if any proposed account of Intentionality is to be faithful to the legacy of Brentano: a) The modes of Intentionality may or may not be only symbols, sentences, propositions. Intentionality is far more complex than any known mode of representation, having as parts logical, linguistic, emotive, imaginary, conscious and unconscious elements and relations. These elements and relations that can involve the body, the will and the intellect, cannot be easily put in any single category of representation. Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 8 b) Intentionality does not only have as objects things that exist, or have existed, or that shall exist. It may also have things that never existed, or shall never exist (e.g. things such as fictional beings, and even logically impossible beings). c) Intentionality is also of things that are not ours, i.e., do not belong to human intellects, neither to their artifacts. An example of this is a cliff for a geologist and a painter, or a poet; a drift-wood for an artist, etc. The cliff and the drift-wood do not actually have Intentionality in the same way as for example a book has Intentionality for a reader, however they are treated as if they had it (this point shall become clearer later on). iii) Additional components and criteria that any valid theory of Intentionality should have.
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