Iran's War Preparations
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4/2/2012 Iran’s War Preparations Israel and the West are not the only countries preparing for a largescale military operation against Iran's nuclear facilities. The Iranians, in exchange, are honing in on their enemies as well. IsraelDefense outlines Iran's air, space, sea, ground, and cyber preparations Moriya BenYosef 4/Feb/2012 In early November, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned, "Any country attacking Iran better be prepared to suffer retaliation from the Iranian armed forces. Anyone thinking about invading the Islamic Republic of Iran better be able to withstand a powerful response from the Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian army." The recent report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explains that once Iran decides to manufacture a nuclear bomb, it will only take a few months to assemble. In Israel and the West, this report intensified discussions on the need for an all‐out attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. So far, Western media has focused on questions concerning a possible Israeli and/or Western attack. What has yet to be discussed is what Iran is doing to counter an inevitable clash. For several years, the Iranians have publicized their military capabilities in an effort to deter an attack. Occasionally, they unveil a new, locally produced, state‐ of‐the‐art weapon based on foreign technologies. "In reality, their conventional military forces are poor," says Yiftah Shapir, a senior research fellow and director at the Institute for National Security Studies’ Middle East Military Balance Project. "Looking at the layout of Iran’s conventional forces, they have a large but antiquated army that has suffered from cutbacks and sanctions in recent years. Since they find it difficult to procure new advanced weapons, they have begun to produce their own. Every two months or so, we hear of something new: airplanes, helicopters, missiles, weapons systems, radar, and so forth. "True, we must not underestimate Iran’s industry, as in the past it received assistance from North Korea, and today, knowledge flows in the opposite direction in some areas. Still, Tehran's public announcements should be viewed with some degree of skepticism. The question is: what do they have and what is actually operational?" mulls Shapir. Mickey Segal, a senior research fellow at Terrogence Company and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and former head of the Iranian Desk in the Research Department at the Directorate of Military Intelligence says, "The Iranians believe that the revolutions in the Arab world play into their hands. From their viewpoint, the old regimes are being pushed out and being replaced by the Islamic organizations. As they see it, they are the next ‘big thing.’ They expect nuclear weapons to increase their influence." Defense, defense, defense The Iranian government invests enormous sums of money in an effort to conceal their numerous nuclear sites. The main sites are the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, the conversion plant in Isfahan (where the November 2011 explosion occurred), the nuclear power station in Bushehr, and the uranium enrichment plant near Qom that remains under construction. Many of the facilities are underground and shielded by a concrete‐reinforced ceiling and walls up to two and a half meters thick. "From the outset, they built facilities underground and concentrated their efforts on the surrounding air defenses," says Dr. Ephraim Kam, principle research fellow and deputy director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The Iranians spend huge sums of money on camouflage. According to Western assessments, Russia supplies Iran with the technological means to hide its nuclear facilities. During the Cold War, Russia developed special camouflage nets capable of blocking the view from space, including thermal sensors and synthetic aperture radars (SAR). In addition, it is likely that Iran also employs advanced methods to distort a facility’s geometric pattern and render them unidentifiable by spy satellites and UAVs equipped with optical payloads. Besides camouflage, Iran is doubling efforts to reinforce its air defense layout, especially its anti‐aircraft systems—even though these consist mainly of antiquated anti‐aircraft missiles acquired from foreign sources or produced domestically. These include Russian SA‐5s for intermediate to long‐range interception, SA‐2s for intermediate and very high altitudes, and an Iranian‐ made Shahin version of the American Hawks (that the Iranians claim can reach an altitude of forty kilometers). They also possess several advanced SA‐15 units that they received from Russia around five years ago, and frequently release photos of their batteries deployed near the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. "Few of the systems pose an immediate threat to advanced Western aircraft,” asserts Tal Inbar, head of the Space and UAV Research Center at the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies. Inbar asserts that, "Following Russia's refusal to supply Iran with advanced S‐300 missile systems (that have a range of over 100 kilometers)—a result of American and Israeli pressure—Iran now claims that it succeeded in developing an improved version of the S‐300 (that it calls Bavar‐373). Official Iranian sources note that the system performs better than the Russian missiles—but this is an empty claim.” Be that as it may, the Iranians seem to have managed to get ahold of a Chinese version of the S‐300, designated HQ9, and on the basis of this imitation, they have developed their own system. Israeli sources recently acknowledged that Iran is beginning to produce multi‐layered systems that will further complicate any operation against its nuclear sites. Iran also tried to obtain a number of Russia’s Pantsir‐1 anti‐aircraft missile systems from Syria. The system's development was financed by the United Emirates and became operational in Russia only last year. It is uncertain whether it has been transferred to other countries since then. Planes Most aircrafts in the Iranian air force are aging Russian‐made planes that Iraq transferred to Iran during the First Gulf War. The Iranians also have some old F‐4 Phantoms and F‐14 Tomcats that the Americans delivered when the Shah was in power. Iran’s first line of fighters is compromised of MiG‐29s purchased from Russia in the early 1990s, as‐well‐as the aging F‐14s purchased from the US. In late 2007, Iran announced that it was developing two new fighters: the Azaraksh (Lightning) and the Saeqeh (Thunderbolt); both are based on outdated American F‐5s. "The Iranians claim that these planes perform better than F‐18s. The truth is that they still look like F‐5s, but have an extra tail (stabilizer) added to resemble the F‐18s. It is doubtful that the Iranians succeeded in developing the avionics and other systems necessary to retrofit an airplane into a first‐class modern weapon. Still, Iran has made impressive advances in the maintenance of its systems through improvisation and the acquisition of spare parts from the black market. They are also experts at cannibalizing parts from planes and missiles. For example, they can disassemble twenty old planes in order to keep thirty others in flying condition," explains Yiftah Shapir. Iran also has several dozen Cobra attack helicopters from the 1970s, Bell‐205s and 214s, and MI‐171s that they bought from the Russians a decade ago. In recent years, Iran has made significant progress in developing and producing UAVs, some of which are capable of carrying munitions. Last year, Iran announced they had developed an attack UAV armed with a bomb, while referring to their jet‐propelled air vehicle (which is based on an outdated American target drone that was later manufactured by South Africa). According to Mickey Segal, the Iranians are currently working on two UAVs: one for attack—the Karrar (Striker), and the other for attack and reconnaissance—the Ababil (Swallow). These UAVs appear to be pre‐programmed, and not controlled in real‐time. The Iranian developers of the UAV layout will probably glean valuable technical information from the recent capture of an American RQ‐170 Sentinel surveillance drone. The stealth UAV malfunctioned during a reconnaissance operation over Iran in early December 2011, and was picked up by Iranian security forces. American military sources note that, "Iran gained a great prize from a technological point of view by getting its hands on the RQ‐170, one of the most advanced UAVs in the world." Radar Today, Iran possesses a number of outdated European radars, such as the British AR‐3D for air defense and an unknown quantity of Chinese JY‐14s acquired in the late 1990s. Last June, during a weapons exhibition in memory of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranians gave a sneak peak at a phased array radar that is considered one of the most advanced of its kind. According to Tal Inbar, the first analyst in Israel to identify the radar, "The Iranians didn’t officially reveal the radar, but it can be seen peeking out behind Khamenei in the exhibition. They claim that it was their own development, and at face value, the system appears genuine." Only in late 2011 did the Iranians hold a large‐scale air defense exercise, to evaluate the performance and operability of intelligence and communications equipment designed to "protect sensitive sites around the country." Mickey Segal believes that during their latest exercise, the Iranian successfully tested a locally produced wide‐range‐frequency passive‐radar‐detection system. Rapid response units using modern EW (electronic warfare) equipment succeeded in jamming a simulated enemy’s radar and communications systems. Tests were also carried out on the latest fiber‐optic communication equipment and electro‐optic systems for air‐defense detection. In the second stage of the exercise, Iran's air‐defense forces quickly jammed enemy combat aircraft and employed active and passive means to protect their own radar network and communication lines.