MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NAPOLEONIC NORMANDY Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021

GAVIN DALY*

Despite the richness of Napoleonic historiography, the impact of the Continental Blockade upon France's maritime commerce and the experiences of the French Atlantic merchants during the Consulate and Empire remain underdeveloped fields of historical enquiry.1 With the noted exception of Bordeaux, there is a shortage of regional port studies under Napoleon. This article aims to further our understanding of Napoleonic social, economic and regional history by investigating the impact of the Napoleonic wars and the Continental Blockade upon the maritime commerce of the ports of Rouen and Le Havre in the Norman department of the Seine-Inferieure. Whilst Pierre Dardel has traced the evolution of these major French ports throughout the golden commercial age of the eighteenth century, his study ends with the devastation wrought to ocean commerce in 1792-3-2 From this point in time until the end of the First Empire, the exact fate of maritime commerce in the Seine-Inferieure remains obscure. Furthermore, this article illuminates the fate of the Rouen merchants, members of a social class traditionally marginalized in national accounts of the Napoleonic notables but important in understanding the socio-economic impact of the Revolution and the social foundations of Bonapartism. Commonly held views on the national maritime experience under Napoleon, incorporating the influential thesis of Francois Crouzet, establish a broad context for understanding Rouen and Le Havre, whilst Paul Butel's findings on

* Gavin Daly is a lecturer in Modem European History in the School of Social Inquiry, Murdoch University, Australia. His book, Inside Napoleonic France, state and society in Rouen, 1800-1815, will be published by Ashgate later in 2001 1 For Bordeaux, see P Butel, 'Crise et mutation de l'activite economique a Bordeaux sous le Consulat et l'Empire', Rev HlstAf, 17 (1970), 540-58, idem, 'Guerre ct commerce: l'activite du port de Bordeaux sous le regime des licences, 1808-1815', Rev Hist M, 19 (1972), 128-49, idem, 'Revolution and the urban economy maritime cities and continental cities', Reshaping France: town, country and region during tbe French Revolution, ed. A Forrest and P Jones (Manchester, 1991), pp 37-51, and F Crouzet, 'La mine du grand commerce', Bordeaux au 18" siede, ed. F Pariset (Bordeaux, 1968), pp 486-510 2 P Dardel, Navires et tnarcbandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au xviif siede (1963), idem, Commerce, Industrie et navigation a Rouen et au Havre au xviif siede (Rouen, 1966).

O Oxford University Press 2001 French History, Vol 15 No. 1, pp 26-50 GAVIN DALY 27 Bordeaux provide an important comparative dimension.3 The miserable state of the French ports throughout the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era is widely accepted. The Revolutionary wars with Britain and the loss of Santo Domingo devastated France's Atlantic commerce. The French Atlantic ports that had traditionally prospered through colonial trade were shaken by almost twenty- five years of constant warfare against an enemy whose maritime hegemony, especially following Trafalgar, rendered the sea lanes virtually unnavigable to French merchants. The British blockade of French ports was made complete Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 under Napoleon. French shipping was almost completely paralysed during the years 1800-14, aside from the brief respite offered by the Peace of Amiens, and the late imperial traffic in licences. The Continental Blockade proved ineffective in crippling Britain's economic might and provoked an intensifica- tion of the Royal Navy's blockade of French controlled ports. The French ports were forced into a painful slumber, with most merchants under the misapprehension that they would reawaken to find the old trading world had returned. This old trading world, however, was lost for ever. Increasingly, a distinction has been made between the economic fate of continental and maritime cities.4 Whilst inland entrepots such as Strasbourg flourished, the maritime ports stagnated. Crouzet has perceived this development in terms of broad economic structural change, not only within France, but within the emerging capitalist modern world economy.5 The collapse of traditional colonial-orientated sea ports in France was representative of much wider economic change and a shift in the world balance of power. It represented the demise of the old world Atlantic economies dependent upon luxury colonial products and the emergence of modern trade servicing the development of the Industrial Revolution. The era of the Revolution and Empire was a period of transition from the age of sugar, coffee and tobacco, to one of cotton, coal and iron.6 The merchandise of the world economy increasingly gravitated towards London and New York, and English and American businessmen became the power- brokers of Caribbean trade.7 As the maritime commerce and ancillary maritime industries of ports such as Bordeaux and Nantes declined in importance, a process of de-industrialization occurred in the south-west that was part of a

3 F Crouzet, 'Wars, blockade and economic change In Europe, 1792-1815',/ Econ Hist, 24 (1964), 567-88, and Veconomie btitannique et le Blocus continental, 2nd edn (1987) For an Introduction to the experience of Napoleonic maritime commerce G. Lefebvre, Napoleon (1963), a. 107-47, 205-63, L Bergeron, France under Napoleon (Princeton, NJ, 1981), pp 167-70, G. Ellis, Tbe Napoleonic Empire (Atlantic Highlands, NJ., 1991), pp. 96-101, M Lyons, Napoleon Bonaparte and tbe legacy of tbe French Revolution (Bastngstoke, 1994), pp. 214-20, 265-70, and diverse writers In the special edition of Revue iconomique, 40, no. 6 (1989). 4 This is one of the central themes of G FJlis, Napoleon's Continental Blockade- tbe case of Alsace (Oxford, 1981) See also Butel, 'Revolution and the urban economy1 ' See especially Crouzet, "Wars, Blockade and Economic Change' * Crouzet, 'Crise et mutation', p 510. 7 Butel, 'Revolution and the urban economy", pp 41-4. 28 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY geoeconomic shift within France from south to north, from littoral society to the industrial heartland of continental Europe.8 Bordeaux, however, remains the only Atlantic port under Napoleon to be studied in depth. Paul Butel's work has established a yardstick for future port studies. Butel, through indicating important chronological distinctions in the experience of Bordeaux's commercial shipping between 1800 and 1814, has challenged the traditionally perceived monolithic nature of the British blockade of French ports. The port of Bordeaux was not in a state of complete paralysis Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 throughout the entire Napoleonic era. Aside from the commercial renaissance during the Peace of Amiens, bordelais merchants enjoyed a commercial recovery via neutral, especially American, shipping in the period 1803-7. It was only from 1807, with the beginning of the Continental Blockade and British attacks on neutral shipping, that Bordeaux's merchants became economically stricken. Yet the commercial misery from 1807 onwards was partly alleviated in Bordeaux through trade in licences, especially American permits. One of the central themes of this article is the degree to which the maritime experience of Rouen and Le Havre differed from that of Bordeaux. In contrast to Bordeaux, the ports of the Seine-Inferieure remained in a severely depressed state throughout almost all the Napoleonic era; the only exceptions being the spectacular recovery enjoyed during the Peace of Amiens and the survival of coastal and interior navigation - an important but neglected aspect of the history of commercial shipping. Significantly, the recovery enjoyed by Bordeaux between 1803 and 1807 should not be regarded as typical for French ports. In contrast to Butel's findings for Bordeaux, Rouen and Le Havre did not receive a comparable flow of neutral and American shipping prior to the application of the Continental Blockade. This was due to the stricter blockade measures adopted by the British navy towards Channel ports and neutral ships in the vicinity. Given that Rouen and Le Havre did not enjoy neutral shipping prior to 1807, the Continental Blockade and the escalation of the economic war between Britain and France had only a negligible impact on shipping - maritime commerce was already in a state of devastation. Moreover, unlike Bordeaux, Rouen and Le Havre did not receive a large number of licences and American permits during the late Empire. The fate of Rouen's maritime merchant community also challenges a number of established historiographical views. French merchants remain a neglected group within the historiography of the Napoleonic notables. As businessmen represented only 10.8 per cent of the 1810 Napoleonic notables, as denned by electoral college membership, discussion of the merchant classes has traditionally been secondary to highlighting the importance of proprietaires and fonctionnaires within Napoleon's 'masses

• Sec especially Crouzet, 'Les origincs du sous-developpement econontique du Sud-Ouest', Ann Midi, 71 (1959), 71-9 GAVIN DALY 29 of granite'.9 The national social composition of the Napoleonic notables, therefore, has tended to divert historical attention away from the socio- economic position of merchants within maritime and commercial commu- nities. Whilst the work of Louis Bergeron and Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret has highlighted the continuities in wealth between pre- and post-Revolutionary elites - a central theme of revisionist Revolutionary historiography - it is generally agreed that the French Atlantic merchants under Napoleon experienced a significant decline in their wealth and local standing. In Nantes, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 for example, the slave trade was ruined and there was an overall fall in the wealth and status of the city's merchants.10 As established merchant houses along the Atlantic coast suffered, there was a growing ruralization of commercial capital as merchants sought safety in landed property.11 As traditional merchant houses suffered, new business elites emerged on the back of speculation and war profiteering.12 The experience of the Rouen merchants, however, does not conform to these national findings. Drawing upon the local studies of Jean-Pierre Chaline and John Dunne on the Napoleonic notables of Rouen and the Seine-Inferieure, and a number of important archival sources not utilized in the past, this article shows that the traditional Rouen merchant families sustained the economic shocks wrought by the Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars, remaining the pre- eminent socio-economic and political force within local society.13 Their story is one not only of survival but of adaptability and consolidating the social and political gains of the Revolution. The history of Rouen's maritime commerce and merchant class, therefore, reveals regional port variations along the

9 Whilst no fiscal criterion existed for membership to the arrondissement colleges, the members of the more prestigious departmental colleges were chosen from amongst the department's 600 highest taxpayers This tax criterion was based on xhefondere - land tax - rather than the mobiliere or patente, and so the departmental college significantly favoured landed property-owners above businessmen: G Ellis,'Rhine and Loire Napoleonic elites and social order*, Beyond tbe Terror essays in French regional and social history, 1794-1815, ed G. Lewis and C Lucas (Cambridge, 1983), p 239- For the national study of the electoral colleges' L. Bergeron and G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'Les masses de granif. cent mille notables du Premier Empire (1979) For other works on the notables L Bergeron, G Chaussinand-Nogaret and R. Forster, 'Les notables du "Grand Empire", en 1810', AtmalesESC, 26(1971), 1052-75 For Jean Tulard's contributions- Napoleon et la noblesse d'Empire (1979); 'Problemes sodaux de la France imperiale', Rev HistM, 17 (1970), 639-63; 'Les composants d'une fortune le cas de la noblesse d'Empire', Rev Hist, 253 (1975), 119-38 See also Fills, 'Napoleonic elites and social order", pp 232-67, A -M Boursier and A. Soboul, 'La grande propriete fondercal'epoquenapoleonienne',/4nn//faf/f, 245(1981), 405-18, P Bouyoux, 'Les six cents plus imposes du departement de la Haute-Garonne en l'an X', Ann Midi, 70 (1958), 317-27 10 Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire, p 100 11 Bergeron, France under Napoleon, pp 170-1. 12 See, for instance, J Tulard, Napoleon, the myth oftbe saviour (1985), p 186, and Bergeron, France under Napoleon, p. 143. 13 For Chaline 'Les notables rouennais a l'epoque napoleonienne vision etatique et realite d'une 611te sociale', Etudes Normandes, numero special (1979), 123-34, and Les bourgeois de Rouen, une ilite urbaine au xto? siede (Rouen, 1982) For Dunne: J. Dunne and J Decoux, Seine- Infihieure, vol 20 of Grands notables du Premier Empire, ed. L. Bergeron and L. Chaussinand- Nogaret (1993), and J Dunne, 'Notables and society in Napoleonic France- the Seine-Infericure, 1799-1815', unpub. Ph.D thesis (University of London, 1987) 30 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY Atlantic coast, highlighting important distinctions in the French experience under Napoleon.

In the late eighteenth century, upper Normandy was among the most economically diverse and advanced regions of France.14 Rouen, with a Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 population of 80,000, was in the unique position of being both a large port and a cotton manufacturing capital; whilst on the Channel coast, Le Havre and Dieppe were major commercial and fishing ports respectively. Rouen's favourable location on the Seine with access to the Channel was instrumental in making it the economic capital of Normandy and one of the great commercial entrepots of western Europe, distinguished by its extensive maritime commerce and the quality of its textile industry. The Seine was the only navigable river in the region and Rouen was in the privileged position of being 150 km upstream of the Seine estuary, between Le Havre and Paris. The Seine allowed ships of up to 300 tonnes to sail from the Channel upstream to Rouen.15 The stretch of the Seine between Rouen and Paris, however, was difficult to navigate and allowed only the passage of barges and flat-hulledboats . Consequently, Rouen acted as a major staging-point for goods sent to Paris. The eighteenth century was a golden commercial age for the maritime merchants of Rouen and Le Havre.16 Prior to the Revolutionary decade, the merchants of the Seine-Inferieure, like the commercial classes of Nantes and Bordeaux, reaped spectacular profits from the booming Atlantic economy In 1801, Rouen counted seven millionaire merchants.17 Rouen and Le Havre were amongst the nation's premier ports. They were at the heart of an extensive maritime trade network, supporting commercial relations with the Caribbean, northern and southern Europe, the Americas and Africa. Their most important trading partners were the French Caribbean islands - Guadeloupe, Martinique and especially Santo Domingo - the Iberian states, the Low Countries, England and Germany. Within this trading network, Le Havre played a more important role in international shipping, especially with the Caribbean, whilst Rouen was more active in domestic shipping with other French ports. From the Caribbean and North America, Le Havre and Rouen imported raw cotton, their biggest import, and sugar and tobacco. These colonial products supported Rouen's own domestic manufacturing industry. Aside from its large cotton industry, Rouen supported five sugar refineries and three tobacco-processing plants.18

14 For an overview of Upper Normandy during the late eighteenth century- La Revolution en Haute-Normandie 1789-1802, collective work published by the Comlte regional d'hlstoire de la Revolution francaise (Haute-Normandie), 2nd edn (Rouen, 1989) " Annuaire statistiaue du dipartement de la Seine-In/Srieure, 1807, p 5. 16 For the maritime commerce of Rouen and Le Havre in the eighteenth century see the previously cited works of Pierre Dardel. 17 La Revolution en Haute-Normandie, p. 18. " A[rchives] D[epartementales de la] S[eine-]M[aritime] 6M 1069, Rapport sur le commerce de Rouen redigS par un membre de Vadministration mundpale de cette vWe GAVIN DALY 31 Rouen also acted as a major entrepot for colonial products for Paris and northern Europe. For instance, 67 per cent of the sugar that Rouen and Le Havre imported between 1772 and 1776 was re-exported to northern Europe.19 On the export side, Rouen merchants sent abroad locally manufactured goods, especially textiles, and the production of the French interior. The most important single export market was the French Caribbean. Aside from textiles, the city produced glassware, earthenware and crockery, leather goods, hats, ribbons, playing cards, pipes and books. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 Throughout the eighteenth century, shipping tonnage entering Rouen increased from 55,450 tonnes in 1700 to 112,009 in 1788,20 whilst Le Havre's tonnage increased from 55,362 in 1723-4 to 172,984 in 1789-90.21 Le Havre therefore enjoyed a faster rate of shipping growth than Rouen during the eighteenth century, and had greater overall shipping numbers and tonnage. Relative to Rouen, however, Le Havre's shipping statistics are misleading because much of the trade that entered Le Havre was ultimately destined for Rouen. Throughout the eighteenth century, Rouen merchants to ensure the passage of their goods up the Seine established many of the commercial houses in Le Havre.22 Rouen merchants therefore controlled a significant proportion of the merchandise and colonial goods that passed through Le Havre. The great merchant ships arriving in Le Havre of up to 500-600 tonnes that plied the Guinea and Caribbean sea routes were too large to navigate the difficulties of the Seine. The goods were therefore loaded on to smaller ships of 60-120 tonnes to make the inland journey upstream to Rouen. Thus, foreign cargoes arriving in Rouen often came indirectly via Le Havre. For example, 35 per cent of the shipping tonnage that entered Rouen in 1771 came from Le Havre.23 Given the extraordinary wealth generated by transatlantic maritime commerce in the eighteenth century, it is not surprising that Rouen's merchants represented a powerful force within local society. They sat together in the prestigious Norman Chamber of Commerce, forming a prominent voice in national economic affairs. Aristocratic and ecclesiastical power in anden regime Rouen was tempered by the presence of this powerful commercial class. Indeed, municipal power in pre-Revolutionary Rouen was shared equally between the merchants and the nobility.24 With the coming of the Revolution, however, it was the merchant community who dominated local politics, steering Rouen on a relativelysmoot h political and social passage throughout the Revolutionary decade.25

" Daniel, Navires et marcbandises, p. 54. 20 IbkL p. 15. 21 La Revolution en Haute-Normandie, p. 15. 22 Dardel, Commerce, Industrie et navigation, pp. 308-9 23 Dardel, Navires et marcbandises, pp. 582-3- 24 La Resolution en Haute-Normandie, p 37 25 For the history of the merchant community during the Revolution; Ibid., cap. pp. 26-32, 51, C. Mazauric, Sur la Revolution francaise: contributions a Vbistoire de la revolution bourgeoise (1970), pp. 163-92; M Bouloiseau, Cabiers de doliances du Tiers Etat du baiHiage de Rouen pour les Etats gtnerawc de 1789 (Rouen, I960). 32 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY Yet the Revolutionary wars in the early 1790s brought an abrupt end to the golden commercial age of Rouen and Le Havre. The first blow was dealt by the slave revolt in Santo Domingo on 22 August 1791- In 1791, Le Havre received 95 ships from the French Caribbean, but this fell to only 9 in 1793-26 The collapse of maritime commerce was made complete with the coming of war against England in early 1793. The superiority of the British navy and its proximity to the Seine estuary ensured that French shipping was paralysed - neutral ships were now the only option available for interna- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 tional maritime commerce. Consequently, the shipping tonnage entering Rouen plummeted from 118,439 in 1792 to 54,792 tonnes during the first ten months of 1793-27 The maritime commerce of the Seine-Inferieure remained in this depleted state throughout the Revolutionary wars. The port activity of Rouen and Le Havre had therefore languished under the weight of nearly a decade of maritime conflict with Britain before Napoleon came to power. The department's conseil general at its inaugural meeting in the Year Vm lamented the disastrous state of ocean commerce: 'C'est done sous les mines, c'est au milieu des decombres qu'il faut aller chercher le commerce.l28 The conseil put forward a number of rather Idealized remedies: the restoration of former French colonies in the Caribbean, a French monopolization of colonial trade and domestic coastal shipping, the establishment of trading houses in northern Europe, and trade treaties with Russia and England. The conseil, reflecting the public mood, desired peace above all. Table 1 reveals that the conseil general was not exaggerating the disastrous state of shipping during the early Consulate. This table compares the port activity of Rouen and Le Havre in the Year LX (22 September 1800-21 September 1801) to that of 1789, a year indicative of the shipping levels enjoyed by these ports prior to the beginning of the Revolutionary wars. The prefectoral statistics for the port activity of Rouen and Le Havre during the Year LX include arrival and departure figures for both interieur (shipping involving French ports) and extSrieur shipping (foreign ports). For comparative purposes with 1789, however, only the departure figures have been included in the tables. Arrival figures for 1789 are not available, but as Pierre Dardel has noted, departure and arrival shipping statistics were roughly similar in any given year.29 Table 1 indicates the dramatically reduced state of Rouen's shipping in the Year IX relative to 1789- The total shipping tonnage of the Year LX (44,142) was only 27 per cent of its 1789 level (165,754 tonnes). Moreover, Rouen was no longer involved in international shipping, and no foreign ships engaged in either domestic or international commerce entered or departed the port of Rouen during the Year LX. Rouen's commerce was now solely restricted to French ships in coastal and river trade.

26 La Revolution en Haute-Normandie, p 88 27 G. Lemarchand, La fin dufiodalisme dans le Pays de Caux (1989), p. 418 28 A[rchives] Rationales] Flc V Sdne-Inferieurc 1, 'Memoirc du conseil general', Year Vm w Dardel, Navtres et marcbandises, p 611 GAVIN DALY 33

Table 1 Ports of Rouen and Le Havre: number and tonnage of ships departing 1789 and Year EX

Interior navigation Exterior navigation Total Port Year Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage

Rouen 1789 1,858 116,611 638 49,143 2,496 165,754 DC 1,037 44,142 0 0 1,037 44,142 Le Havre 1789 1,825 139,481 760 93,734 2,585 233,215 EX 2,082 54,925 44 4,647 2,126 59,572 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 Source- The Year EX figures for Rouen and Le Havre have been compiled from AN F12 1683, monthly prefectoral tables, 'Etat dc Navigation', Year EX The 1789 figures are from Dardel, Navires et marcbandises, pp 588-9, 592-5, 628-9, 632-5. Le Havre had fared little better than Rouen, although differences between the performances of the two ports are apparent. Le Havre's total shipping tonnage for the Year LX represented only 26 per cent of its 1789 level, comparable to the decline in Rouen's. However, Le Havre's total shipping numbers had declined by only 18 per cent from their 1789 level (from 2,585 to 2,126), whilst Rouen's had fallen by 58 per cent (from 2,496 to 1,037). This disparity between Le Havre's tonnage and shipping numbers is easily explained. As the maritime war with Britain rendered the sending of large ships on international and major domestic sea routes a risky venture, local merchants shifted their attention to smaller boats prying coastal and river trade (petit cabotage). Thus the number of ships engaged in int&rieur commerce rose from 1,825 in 1789 to 2,082 in the Year LX, whilst the tonnage fell from 139,481 to 54,925 tonnes. Whereas in 1789 the average tonnage for a ship involved in interieur commerce was 76, this fell to only 26 tonnes in the Year LX - large French ships could no longer sail from Le Havre to major French ports. Significantly, Le Havre, unlike Rouen, retained a semblance of its international traffic. A total of 64 foreign ships (all neutral save one English ship) docked in Le Havre during the Year LX: 20 Danish, 17 Prussian, 13 Swedish, 7 from Papenburg, 4 American, 2 from Oldenburg and one English. The department's international maritime commerce was therefore almost completely paralysed. Rouen did not directly receive any foreign ships, whilst Le Havre's level of international shipping was only a shadow of its former self. The only positive point was that, despite the presence of the British navy, the extensive coastal and fluvial trading networks of Normandy continued to function. Yet with the Peace of Amiens, the harbours of Rouen and Le Havre were once again 'forests of masts'.30

II The Peace of Amiens (which lasted from March 1802 to May 1803) represents a significant period in the history of Napoleonic France. For the first time since

30 During his travels in France on the eve of the Revolution, Arthur Young referred to Le Havre's harbour as a 'forest of masts' quoted in J Lough, France on the eve of revolution. British travellers' observations 1763-1788 (1987), p. 92. 34 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY 1793, France was at peace with England. Crouzet has referred to the Peace of Amiens as bringing a renaissance to the maritime commerce of Bordeaux.31 A similar recovery was enjoyed by Rouen and Le Havre. The Peace allowed Rouen and Le Havre to regainbriefl y their standing as major international ports, and provided a tremendous fillip to business confidence. As the Seine- Inferieure's first Napoleonic prefect, Jean-Claude Beugnot, buoyantly remarked to the conseilg&n6ral at its meeting for the Year X: 'Le commerce a retrouve ses routes anciennes: de nouvelles ont ete ouvertes devant lui; et, dans le moment Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 ou je parie, deja 1'actMte franchise embrasse le monde dans ses speculations.'32 Table 2 compares the number of ships entering the ports of Rouen and Le Havre between the Years LX and X This table adheres to the format of the prefectoral shipping statistics for the Year X, which distinguished between foreign and French shipping rather than interieur and exterieur. Fortunately, it has been possible to determine the nationality of each ship appearing in the statistics for the Year LX, and thus offer a comparative analysis between the two years The table indicates the extraordinary shipping recovery enjoyed by Rouen during the Peace of Amiens. The total shipping tonnage for the Year X increased threefold from the previous year. A total of 368 foreign ships entered Rouen with the most common nationalities as follows: 103 Prussian (representing 28 per cent of all foreign ships), 59 Dutch, 58 Hanseatic, 47 English, 39 Portuguese and 37 Spanish. Le Havre staged a more spectacular recovery than Rouen. Its total shipping tonnage level in the Year X had increased fourfold from the Year LX, whilst its number of foreign ships increased from 64 to 653. These foreign ships included 133 English (20 per cent of the totaO, 98 American, 93 Prussian, 86 Hanseatic, 51 Danish, 47 Dutch, 43 Spanish, 34 Swedish and 32 Portuguese. As was customary in the eighteenth century, English ships preferred to dash back and forth across the Channel between England and Le Havre rather than spending time sailing up the Seine to Rouen; likewise, the transatlantic American ships carrying raw cotton for Rouen generally preferred to off-load their cargoes in Le Havre. How did this shipping performance during the Peace of Amiens compare to that of the pre-Revolutionary war period? Despite the fact that Santo Domingo was no longer a French possession and the golden era of French trade with the Caribbean was lost for ever, both Rouen and Le Havre regained a significant proportion of their former shipping activity. This is revealed through comparing the total number and tonnage of ships departing the ports of Rouen and Le Havre between 1789 and the Year X.33 With 2,379 departing ships (combined tonnage of 126,909) for the Year X, Rouen recaptured 95 per cent of its 1789 shipping numbers (2,496) and 77 per cent of its 1789 tonnage (165,754 tonnes). Le Havre's shipping numbers had actually Increased by 64

31 Crouzet, 'La mine du grand commerce', p. 497. 32 AN AF IV 1053, 'Expose sommalre de son administration', presented by the prefect to the conseti g£n£ral. Year X. 33 The 1789 departure figures are taken from Table 1, whilst the Year X departure figures are from prefectoral shipping tables for the Year X in ADSM 6M 1058 GAVIN DALY 35

Table 2 Ports of Rouen and Le Havre: number and tonnage of ships entering Years LX-X

Foreign navigation French navigation Total Port Year Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage

Rouen EX 0 0 949 39,858 949 39,858 X 368 29,671 1,950 96,328 2,318 125,999 Le Havre EX 64 7,408 2,026 49,151 2,090 56,559 X 653 93,167 3,633 134,283 4,286 227,450 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 Source- The Year X statistics for both Rouen and Le Havre are from ADSM 6M 1058, prefectoral tables on the state of shipping entering and leaving the ports of the Seine-Infeneure during the Year X The Year EX figures are based on the sources used in Table 1 per cent relative to those of 1789 (from 2,585 to 4,232), whilst its Year X tonnage figure of 217,145 was 93 per cent of its 1789 level (233,215 tonnes). Yet the Peace of Amiens and the shipping recovery it inspired proved fleeting. The commercial renaissance and the hopes of a lasting peace ended in May 1803- Hostilities resumed between France and Britain, and the British naval blockade of France continued in earnest. Crouzet has described the period 1803-7 as the best years of Bordeaux's shipping in the history of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.34 During this period neutral carriers provided a lifeline for the bordelais merchants. French merchants used existing neutral ships or 'neutralized' French ones. During 1805, 1806 and early 1807, Bordeaux's overall volume of shipping was about half its level prior to the Revolution.35 In 1805, approximately 875 foreign ships entered Bordeaux, including 247 Danish and 201 American.36 Bordeaux was able to export its wine through Danish, Prussian and Hanseatic ships, and trade with the colonies via American shipping. In contrast, the ports of Rouen and Le Havre never enjoyed this level of shipping activity over the same period. In its report for the Year XI (22 September 1802-21 September 1803), the conseil general wrote: 'Le commerce considere sous le double rapport de l'exportation des produits francais et de rimportation des matieres premieres a ete presque nul dans le departement.'37 Rouen received no foreign shipping at all, whilst Le Havre's international commerce paled in comparison to Bordeaux's. For instance, from 1 vendemiaire XTV to 10 nivose XTV (22 September-30 December 1805), Le Havre received 8 foreign ships compared to Bordeaux's 417.38 In February 1806, Le Havre received only one foreign ship to Bordeaux's 81.39 Le Havre was simply not a player in neutral shipping.

M Crouzet, 'La mine du grand commerce', p 497 " Ibid, p 498 36 ButeL. 'Crise et mutation', p. 546 57 AN F1C V Sdne-Inferieure 1, conseilgfritrai, 'Cahier de l'etat et des besoins du departement de la Sdne4nferieure', Year XL M AN F12 611A, conseil general de commerce, monthly reports on the 'situation commerdale' of Bordeaux and Le Havre w Ibid., conseil general de commerce, reports on the 'situation commerciale' of Le Havre and Bordeaux for the month of February 1806. 36 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY Crouzet claims that during the period 1803-7 the British maintained a 'blocus modere et prudent' and tolerated neutral commerce.40 Yet the disastrous state of shipping in Le Havre and Rouen compared to the shipping recovery enjoyed by Bordeaux appears to be the product of regional differences in the severity and application of the British naval blockade. Reports from the Seine-Inferieure indicate that Le Havre was blockaded much more rigorously than Bordeaux, and that neutral shipping in the Channel was not always tolerated by the British. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 The British navy prior to the anti-neutral Orders in Council of November- December 1807 seized neutral ships in the Channel. On the high seas, the British navy failed to honour its official tolerant stance on neutrals. During ventose XIII, for example, a Portuguese brig departed from Le Havre bound for Lisbon. Two days later, however, this 'neutral' ship was sighted sailing north amidst British naval vessels, having been boarded by the British in the Bay of Caen.41 American shipping was also vulnerable. According to prefectoral reports for the Years Xm and XIV, the British boarded American ships and those suspected of carrying cargoes from the French colonies were seized.42 In July 1806, the Chamber of Commerce of Rouen claimed that no neutral shipping was allowed to enter the department's ports: 'Les ports du Departement de la Seine-Inferieure se trouvant dans un etat de Blocus depuis le renouvellement des hostilites, il ne peut y entrer aucun navire, sous pavilion neutre, et leur mouvement se reduit au petit cabotage que les malheureuses circonstances de la guerre peuvent encore permettre.'43 There were also problems with petit cabotage.44 Le Havre was able to maintain coastal trading links with Cherbourg, Caen and Isigny. However, the obligation to sail in fleets, the rarity of escort ships and the difficulty of obtaining a permit to navigate without an escort, often kept ships in the port of Le Havre for up to two months. Napoleonic bureaucratic procedure was perceived as an impediment to this type of maritime commerce. Some ships left port secretly during the night, but their owners and captains were subsequently punished. The merchant community wanted the government to make the convoys more numerous and to allow ships to sail without a convoy whenever the enemy was not about. British war ships were a constant and formidable presence off the coastline of the Seine-Inferieure during these years. For instance, in June 1806, three British corvettes blockaded Le Havre; four months later, two frigates and two brigs hovered around Le Havre and the mouth of the Seine.45 Whilst small

*" Crouzet, 'La mine ctu grand commerce', p 497. 41 AN F12 611A, conseil gtniral de commerce, report on the 'situation commerciale' of Le Havre for the month of ventose Xm a Ibid., conseil gbiiral de commerce, reports on the 'situation commerdale' of Le Havre during the months of thennidor and fiructidor xm and vendemialre XIV 43 ANF12 1661, Chamber of Commerce of Rouen to Minister of the Interior, Rouen, 21 July 1806 H AN F" 611A, reports by the conseil general de commerce on the 'situation commerciale' of Le Havre for the months of thermidor and fructidor XIII 45 AN F7 364314, sulvprefect of Le Havre to Real, Councillor of State responsible for the First Police arrondissement, Le Havre, 15 June 1806, prefect to Minister of Police, Rouen, 21 Oct 1806. GAVIN DALY 37 French ships could hope to avoid the blockade by hugging the coastline, large high-sea merchant ships stood almost no chance of avoiding capture in the deeper waters. It was mainly fishing boats, however, that were constantly chased, shot at, captured and questioned by the British.46 Often the fishing boat's catch was confiscated and sometimes the crew were taken aboard the British ship for questioning. However, not all Channel ports were blockaded to the same degree. The blockade of Cherbourg was not as tight as that of Le Havre and this explains Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 why American ships entered Cherbourg rather than take their chances with Le Havre.47 Historically, Le Havre was a more important port for American shipping than Cherbourg. However, the blockade of Le Havre led to a temporary transfer of this shipping to Cherbourg, and consequently, several of Le Havre's commercial houses temporarily relocated their operations to Cherbourg.48 It is evident, then, that the Channel ports of the Seine-Inferieure were rigorously blockaded by the British and that neutral traffic was severely impeded. The high volume of neutral traffic entering Bordeaux indicates that its blockade by the British was slight relative to Le Havre's, and suggests that neutral traffic was respected. It is uncertain whether the British had a deliberate policy of clemency towards neutral shipping in south-west France. Certainly the size of the Bay of Biscay and its notoriously rough seas prevented a more rigorous application of the British naval blockade. The Channel ports, however, were much easier to blockade because the British navy's theatre of operation was more limited and manageable given the Channel's small expanse of water. The British fleet was also much closer to its naval bases when operating in the Channel. It is therefore important to emphasize local differences in the application of the British blockade along the Atlantic coast. The Channel ports endured a harsher blockade than ports such as Bordeaux and Bayonne in the south. Consequently, the introduction of the Continental Blockade, the retaliatory measures of the British and the official end of neutral shipping, meant very little for the maritime commerce of Rouen and Le Havre.

Ill Between November 1806 and October 1810 a series of French decrees established the Continental Blockade. This formed the centrepiece of France's economic war against Britain. The Blockade had two aims: first, to destroy the British domestic economy by denying the British access to European ports and markets. Second, Napoleon hoped to generate new markets for French products by removing British competition from the continent. Whilst the

46 Ibid , diverse letters and reports. *7 AN F1 J 611\ conseil general de commerce, report on the 'situation commerciale' of Le Havre for the month of ventose XID «" Ibid 38 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY British economy stumbled at times throughout the later Napoleonic years, the Continental Blockade proved ineffective. Napoleon did not have an adequate naval force to patrol the entire European coastline, and English contraband proved a major problem. Nor was Napoleon ultimately able to keep grumbling European powers locked into a market system that rendered all economies subservient to that of France. Moreover, an unavoidable truth was that France needed English goods and markets. Napoleon's Berlin decree of 21 November 1806 heralded the beginning of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 the Continental Blockade.49 The decree declared Britain to be in a state of blockade. France and all its allies, including Holland, Denmark, Prussia and later Russia, were to adhere to this decree. Commerce with Britain was banned and the continental ports could not receive any ships having called into Britain or its colonies. All British merchandise could be seized. Britain responded with Orders In Council in November and December 1807. This dealt a death blow to neutral shipping, which had begun to suffer setbacks prior to the legislation of the Continental Blockade. Prussian and Hanseatic shipping had suffered since the end of 1806 and the British attack on Copenhagen was a serious blow to Danish shipping in the summer of 1807.50 American shipping had also been hesitant throughout 1807. The British Orders in Council banned any maritime trade between French controlled ports. The British were to seize any neutral carriers that adhered to the Berlin decree. All neutral vessels heading for French ports were now required to unload their cargoes in British ports, pay a tax and buy a licence. Neutrality on the seas had ended. Napoleon responded with the Milan decree of 17 December 1807, which declared as lawful prize any ships that adhered to the British Orders in Council. Earlier in the month, President Jefferson, wanting to protect American ships from seizure, banned American ships from leaving their home ports. Relations between France and America further deteriorated. In the Bayonne decree of 17 April 1808, Napoleon declared as lawful prize all American ships in Europe. Further changes to the Continental Blockade came with the introduction of licences in 1809, which were then institutionalized by the Saint-Cloud decree of 3 July 1810. Finally, the Fontainebleau decree of 18 October 1810 instituted harsh measures against smuggling and ordered the destruction of British contraband. What was the impact of this escalating economic war on Rouen and Le Havre? Importantly, the impact was negligible relative to the experience of these ports during 1803-7. In essence, Rouen and Le Havre had few neutral ships to lose Reports on maritime commerce by the prefects of the Seine- Inferieure and the Chambers of Commerce of Rouen and Le Havre describe the miserable state of international shipping throughout the later imperial years. In 1807, the conseil gSnSral remarked: 'Ces ports ne recevant presqu'aucuns

49 For a summary of the major decrees constituting the Continental Blockade J Tulard, Dictionnaire Napolion (1987), pp 219-38. w Butel, 'Crlse et mutation', pp. 547-8. GAVIN DALY 39 chargements neutres, et n'expediant rien a l'etranger, il n'existe point de commerce exterieur.'51 That same year, the Chamber of Commerce of Le Havre wrote: 'Les maisons etrangeres, qui etaient venues se fixer sur cette place, portent leur Industrie en d'autres ports; quelques maisons du pays forment ailleurs des etablissements.'52 In 1810, the conseilgeneral wrote that external commerce would be in a state of perfect 'nullite', if not for the few prizes that French corsairs occasionally brought into the department's Channel ports.53 Indicative of the growth in statistical reports of the late Empire, from 1811 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 onwards the prefectoral administration diligently completed detailed monthly reports on the state of Rouen's shipping. Table 3 compares the port movement of Rouen in the years 1811-13 with the Years LX-X. The most significant point to emerge from the table is that the maritime situation had deteriorated from the Year EX: 949 entries in the Year EX, as opposed to an annual average of 824 entries in 1811-13. All the ships that visited Rouen in 1811-13 were French and involved in coastal trade and interior navigation. E)etailed statistics for the month of August 1810 provide a breakdown of the local ports that were engaged in commerce with Rouen and the composition of the ships' cargoes.54 The month was unusual as the total of 49 ships included 2 foreign vessels trading under licence (the licensing system will be discussed shortly), one with a Lubeck flag and the other Dutch. The 47 French ships came from diverse Norman ports: 22 from Honfleur, 12 from Le Havre, 4 each from Caen and Quai-au-coq, 3 from Isigny, and one each from Fecamp and Saint-Sauvenir. Nearly all of the cargoes comprised wood and cider. A total of 48 French ships departed Rouen in the last fortnight of August 1810, all plying the river and coastal trade routes of Normandy: 9 departed for Le Havre, 8 each to Caen and Honfleur, and the rest to a diverse array of ports including Cherbourg, Saint-Samson, Villerville, Isigny and Quai-au-coq. Their cargoes included barrels, plaster, flour, timber, coal, glassware, wine, pottery, building stones, iron and earthenware. With shipping in such a depressed state, the local ancillary maritime industries suffered. Prior to the Revolutionary wars, the Seine-Inferieure had a rich and diverse maritime ancillary industry. Rouen and Le Havre each supported several shipbuilding yards, with Le Havre supplying frigates and corvettes to the French navy.55 Between 1762 and 1787, Le Havre constructed 240 ships (total tonnage of 37,166) and Rouen 185 (tonnage 23.212).56 Whilst not as large as the ship industries in Bordeaux and Nantes, which constructed

51 AN F1C V Seine-Inferieure 2, conseil general, 'Cahler de l'etat et des besoins du departement de la Seine-Infericure', 1807. 52 ADSM 6M 1059, 'Reponses de la chambre de commerce du Havre sur les questions proposees par Monsieur le Prefet', Le Havre, 1 Aug. 1807. " AN F1C V Seine-lnfericure 1, conseilgeneral, 'Cahier de l'etat et des besoms du departement de la Seine-Inferieure', 1810. M AN F12 1690, prefectoral tables on the port movement of Rouen for the two fortnights of August 1810 " Annuatrt statistique du departement de la Seine-Inferieure pour Van XII, p. 206. * Dardel, Naviret et marcbandises, p. 444. 40 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY

Table 3 Port of Rouen ships entering Years K-X, 1811-1813

Ships entering Year Number Tonnage

DC 949 39,858 X 2,318 125,999 1811 833 36,540 1812 829 35,951

1813 809 36,135 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021

Source- The figures for 1811-13 are from monthly prcfectoral reports on the port movement of Rouen Sec AN F12 1710 for 1811, F12 1729B for 1812, and F" 1749 for 1813.

492 and 759 ships respectively throughout this same period,57 these shipyards provided valuable employment. Fecamp, Dieppe and Saint-Valery also had shipyards. There were rope industries in Le Havre and Rouen, anchors were made in Le Havre and Dieppe, and net-making provided a vital source of employment for women and children along the coastline from Le Treport to Dieppe.58 Fishing hooks and barrels for storing fish were also made in Dieppe.59 These groups were adversely affected from the time of the Revolutionary wars, yet their plight was made worse under Napoleon. The prefect of the Seine-Inferieure wrote of the misery endured by sailors and their families during the Year XTV: 'La navigation est reduite au petit cabotage. Ceux qui faisaient le grand cabotage ou les voyages de long cours, sont ou sans occupation ou employes dans la marine imperiale. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les families dont ils etaient le soutien, se voient reduites a une extreme misere.'60 Unfortunately, archival sources are scarce on the ancillary maritime industries in Napoleonic Rouen; however information is available for Le Havre and especially Dieppe. Reports on Le Havre for thermidor (19 July-17 August) and fructidor XIE (18 August-16 September 1805) highlight the plight of the industrial classes who had formerly worked in maritime support industries: 'Le commerce du Havre est dans l'aneantissement le plus complet; les constructions maritimes, le mouvement des flotilles donnaient encore quelqu'activite dans ce port, il n'y regne maintenant que l'inaction, et par suite le besoin et la misere parmi la classe industrieuse des ouvriers et des artisans.'61 Le Havre's rope- making industry, regarded as superb prior to the Revolution, diminished considerably. Dieppe had employed fifty rope-makers in 1790, yet this number had fallen to just twenty under the Consulate.62 Table 4 shows the devastation

57 ibid * Annuatre statistique du dipartement de la Seine-Inf&ieure pour Van XH, p. 207 59 IbkL 60 AN F20 256, prefcctoral report on the situation of the department for the month of vendemiaire XTV 61 AN F12 611A, conseil general de commerce, report on the 'situation commerdale' of Le Havre for the months of thermidor and fructidor xm 62 ADSM 6M 1053, Grand Mfrnoire for the department GAVIN DALY 41

Table 4 The fishing industry In Dieppe 1789, 1800 and 1810

Year No of sailors No of ancillary workers" No of net-makers Fish sales (million francs)

1789 7,500 1,300 1,600 5 1800 4,500 850 1,200 28 1810 3,300 750 950 2

'Carpenters, rope-makers, blacksmiths and barrel-makers

Source: ADSM 6M 1072, statistical tables for Dieppe's petite pScbe and grande pecbe, 8 Nov 1811 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 wrought upon Dieppe's fishing and fishing-support industries. It reveals that between 1789 and 1810, the sales from the fishing industry fell by 60 per cent and the number of people employed fell by 52 per cent. These figures cover all forms of fishing, but grande pecbe had been more adversely affected than petite pecbe.6* Significantly for the Napoleonic regime, Dieppe's fishing industry had declined between 1800 and 1810. Whilst the propertied wealth of the merchant community partly shielded them from the economic war with Britain, shipyard workers and fishermen felt its full impact. During the imperial years, the only way in which the merchants of the Seine- Inferieure could engage in international maritime commerce was via government issued licence. Through the licences a limited amount of trade was maintained with England. The licences that were granted from 1809 until 1814 subverted the principles of the Continental Blockade, but acknowledged the economic reality that England was an important market and redistribution centre for France's wines and silks, and that France's industry also needed raw materials. The licences began in 1809, initially to find export markets for France's grain surplus of that year.64 They allowed French merchants to export to England cargoes of wine, brandy, fruit, vegetables, grain and salt; and import wood, hemp, iron, quinine and medicinal drugs. The importation of colonial goods or English manufactured goods was not allowed. In practice, the merchants could safely use only neutral ships. These first licences, known as the ancien systhne, were delivered from June 1809- A second type of licence, still under the ancien systeme, was introduced in December 1809. These licences catered for the needs of French industry. Whilst agricultural products had to form three-quarters of the export cargo, the remaining quarter could be made up of French manufactured products. The number of permissible importation goods was increased to include dyes, sulphur and soda. The licensing system was renewed and institutionalized in the Saint-Cloud decree of Jury 1810. Under the new licences, silkstuffs generally made up a third to a half of the export cargoes, and colonial goods could be imported. In addition, special licences or permits were granted to American ships from 5 July 1810. Relative to other major French ports, few licences were granted to the ports of the Seine-Inferieure. For example, of the 354 licences granted between June

« ibid. 64 For a summary of the licensing laws. Tulard, Dicttonnatre Napoleon, pp 229-31, and Lefebvre, Napoleon, 11. 124-7 42 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY 1809 and July 1810, Bordeaux received 123, compared to Rouen's 10 and Le Havre's 665 The number of licences accorded to rouennais merchants diminished throughout the late imperial years. A government report dated 25 November 1811 reveals that from August 1810, the beginning of the new licences, up to the date of the report, 1,153 licences were granted throughout the Empire.66 The port of Rouen received only 10 of these licences, compared with 39 licences for Le Havre and 34 for Dieppe. The ports of the Seine- Inferieure also received very few of the special licences or permits granted to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 American ships from July 1810. Prior to the Revolutionary wars, Le Havre, Bordeaux and Nantes had shared France's slice of American shipping. During the licensing era, however, American ships were almost non-existent in the ports of the Seine-Inferieure. Of the special American permits that were granted up to 26 March 1812, Bordeaux received 36, Bayonne 6, Nantes 2, and Cherbourg, Brest and Le Havre received only one each.67 Bordeaux's dominance of the American permits continued until the end of the Empire. During 1813, Bordeaux received 429 American permits, Nantes 167, Bayonne 30, La Rochelle 29, Marseilles 21 and other French ports received 20, including only 2 permits for Dieppe.68 How important were the licences for Rouen's merchant community? Quantitatively, as indicated by the statistics, the number of licences granted to rouennais merchants was insignificant compared to most other major French ports. The licences had very little impact on Rouen's major export industry - textiles. Rouen faced the problem that its textile products were similar to those produced by England, and were therefore excluded from the English market.69 England's passion for Bordeaux wines did not extend to Rouen's textiles. The licensing system in Rouen was also the domain of a rather exclusive mercantile club. Only the great commercial houses could afford to take the risks involved. The prefect wrote: 'S'il etait possible de simplifier ce genre de commerce, il serait a la portee d'un plus grand nombre. Reserve aux maisons les plus connues, il devient en quelque sorte exclusif.'70 Furthermore, operating with a licence was a risky venture. The merchant community had to brave conflicting reports and decisions by its own government. Changes introduced overnight in France to the licences could not be implemented immediately into vast international trading networks.71 Poorly timed and publicized changes to

65 The following statistics have been compiled from two registers on the itat general des licences de I'Anden systeme found in AN AF IV 1342 and F12 253 66 AN AF IV 1342, government report on the state of licences from August 1810 until 25 November 1811, Paris, 25 Nov 1811 67 AN FIJ 596, government report on the 'tax des marchandlses importees dans les ports de France par navires americains munis de permis' *FE MeMn, Napoleon's navigation system: a study of trade control during tbe Continental Blockade (New York, 1919), p 344 69 AN F1C HI Seine-Inferieure 8, report by the prefect for the first quarter of 1812, Rouen, 26 June 1812 70 IbkL, report by the prefect for the third quarter of 1812, Rouen, 29 Jan 1813. 71 See the case of the licensed ship La Maria In AN F12 2050 GAVIN DALY 43 the licensing system did not encourage business confidence and made even short-term economic decisions a potential risk. The licensing system therefore gave few advantages to the ports of the Seine- Inferieure. The licences were few in number, benefited only a select minority of local merchants, could not be used to export the department's manufactured goods, and were often shrouded in administrative secrecy and confusion. They did allow some raw materials and colonial produce to be imported, but this hardly compensated for the pitiful state of maritime commerce during the late Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 imperial years.

IV Given Rouen's maritime commercial history during the Napoleonic era, one would expect to detect a significant decline in the power and status of the local merchant community. This is certainly the common perception of the fate of the French Atlantic merchants under Napoleon: commercial livelihoods ultimately shattered by war and blockades, with a resulting fall in local status. Yet the Rouen merchants provide an important counter to such general- izations, as they remained the most important economic and political force in Rouen. The continued fiscal predominance of the Rouen merchants within local society is clearly evident from the diverse lists of notability drawn up by the local prefectoral administration. These lists reflect that property ownership and taxation contributions remained the fundamental basis for defining notability throughout the era. Within these criteria the Rouen merchants fared remarkably well. For instance, commercial and industrial notables made up 46 per cent of the Rouen notables elected to the electoral college of the arrondissement of Rouen for the Year Xm.72 On the 1812 list of Rouen's 100 highest taxpayers, a total of 44 notables were described as negotiants or commerfants, making them the single largest class on the list.73 Furthermore, on the 1809 list of 218 principal families in the arrondissement of Rouen (which included the surrounding countryside and hence many proprie'taires), the merchant community was the second largest group with 56 (representing 25.7 per cent of the total), just behind 58 Individuals listed as 'vivant de son revenu' (generally proprie'taires)?* Moreover, as Challne has highlighted, the Rouen merchants remained far wealthier than the local cotton manufacturing magnates who emerged with the cotton boom of the late eighteenth century. From the 1810 lists of the department's 'most distinguished' merchants and manufacturers, the average annual revenue of 20 Rouen merchants was 22,500 francs, compared to the

72 Challne, 'Les notables rouennais', p 126 73 AN F1" n Seine-Inferieure 20, 'Liste dcs cent plus fort contribuables de la ville de Rouen', 1812. 74 AN 6M 1181, Tableaux des prindpales families, arrondissement de Rouen', Rouen, 13 July 1809. 44 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY average 9,250 francs that 11 'distinguished' Rouen manufacturers earned.75 The capital holdings of the Rouen merchants also dwarfed those of the manufacturers: the average capital holding for a 'distinguished' Rouen merchant was 502,780 francs, compared with an average of 263,888 francs for the distinguished manufacturers. Indeed, the merchants held the largest capital investments of any Rouen notables: Manoury had one million francs in capital and 3 million francs in annual turnover, Quesnel had 1.5 million in capital and 3 million in turnover, Sellier had one million in capital and 4 million in turnover; Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 and the Lezurier freres enjoyed 800,000 in capital and a turnover of 1.5 million. What factors account for the continued fiscal might of the merchant community? The answer does not lie with the survival of maritime commerce, although some profits could be realized through shipping. First, and most importantly, the Peace of Amiens offered a short but temporary reprieve that enabled traditional trade routes to be resumed and a limited financial recovery to take place. Second, Rouen's merchants also had strong ties with Le Havre, a port that fared marginally better than Rouen in terms of ocean-bound commerce over this period. Third, the continued survival of coastal trade provided a life-line for some merchants. Finally, a select number of 'distinguished' merchants - Rondeaux, Manoury, Berat fils, Flouest, and Bouchon and Vincent Dupont - were occasionally able to profit from the late imperial traffic in licences. Nevertheless, the reality was that Rouen's commercial shipping during the Napoleonic era was only a shadow of its former self, with the most lucrative aspects of ocean commerce - colonial trade and international shipping - virtually non-existent. Rouen's merchant community, however, had never been solely dependent upon ocean commerce. Whilst the majority of Rouen's manufactured goods, especially textiles, had traditionally been exported overseas, they were also sent into the French interior. These interior, and indeed continental, market outlets grew in importance for Rouen's merchants under Napoleon. It is commonly argued that the economic dislocation caused by the Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars and Continental Blockade led to a shift in France's market design, away from the Atlantic-bound markets and towards those of the interior continent.76 An analysis of the list of most 'distinguished' Rouen merchants reveals the role that interior markets, reached by overland trade routes, and locally manufactured products played in the business concerns of local merchants. At least 11 of the 42 'distinguished' Rouen merchants were involved with French or continental markets.77 Three of these merchant houses exported to

75 The figures have been calculated from AN F" 936", 'Liste des negotiants et commercants les plus distingues', 1810, and AN F12 937, 'liste des manufacturicrs et fabricants les plus distingues', Rouen, 22 July 1810. 76 Sec Ellis, Napoleon's Continental Blockade. 77 The list of 'distinguished merchants' has a column referring to the area where each commercial house had its principal market concerns, but unfortunately this has often been left blank by the prefectoral administration GAVIN DALY 45 other French departments: Vincent Arnault (a new commercial house) exported 'produits des manufactures de Rouen' to Lyon and the Dauphine; Vincent Arnault's brother, Deschaux, was engaged in exactly the same trade; and Balicorne (a new commercial house) exported locally manufactured goods to diverse departments, especially the Haute-Vienne. Three other houses exported goods specifically to Switzerland: Dupont, who ran an old commercial house and was president of the Rouen Chamber of Commerce; Elie Lefebvre freres, another old trading house, exported cotton yarn to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 Switzerland; and Martin freres, a new house, had extensive commercial relations with Switzerland. Two houses, Muret and Lachesnez Heude, had commercial relations with 'le Nord'. Finally, 3 of the 11 commercial houses had business interests in Spain and Portugal prior to the Peninsular war the Garvey freres had traded with Spain, whilst Quesnel freres and Fremery had traded in coton en laine (raw cotton) with Portugal. In these French and continental trading networks plied by Rouen's merchants, the local cotton industry played an important role. In this respect, Rouen's merchants were more fortunate than their counterparts from Bordeaux and Nantes who did not live in a cotton-manufacturing centre. During the Consulate, the Rouen cotton industry grew at unprecedented rates, and was France's premier cotton capital.78 During the late Empire, however, the local industry struggled to find raw cotton supplies, and felt the impact of competition from the emerging cotton capitals of Ghent, Lille, Mulhouse and Paris. Nevertheless, the cotton industry provided commercial opportunities for Rouen's merchants, not only for exporting finished products, but importing raw cotton. Until the beginning of the Peninsular war in 1808, Portugal provided a life- line to the Rouen cotton industry, and played an important role in the survival of some of Rouen's merchants. Following the loss of raw cotton supplies from the Caribbean, the Rouen textile industry was chiefly supplied with Brazilian cotton, which Rouen merchants imported overland via Lisbon. One such merchant, Quesnel, was described by the prefectoral administration as presiding over the premier commercial house of Rouen. The Quesnel family was amongst the most prestigious and wealthy in Rouen, having been in the process of ennoblement prior to 1789.79 Yet in shifting its trading focus to Portugal, this entrenched and elite merchant house had proven flexible and responsive to the changing economic, political and military climate of Revolutionary-Napoleonic France. Furthermore, following the loss of Portugal as a source for raw cotton, Rouen's merchants were again forced to look for

78 For the Rouen cotton Industry under Napoleon: A Chabert, 'L'cconomle rouennalse sous I'Empire et au debut de la Restauration, 1806-1820', These complementaire dactytographiee (Paris, Sorbonne, 1948), and G. Daly, 'Napoleonic Rouen society, the state and the prefectoral administration in the Seinc-Inferieure', unpub. Ph.D thesis (University of New South Wales, 1997), pp. 190-224. 79 Challne, Les bourgeois de Rouen, p. 99. 46 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY alternative sources, and increasingly turned to supplies from the Levant and Italy during the late Empire.80 Some Rouen merchants also diversified their economic activities by directly investing in the local textile Industry, which although beset by problems during the late Empire, provided far better prospects than commercial shipping. From a national sample of 148 cotton filateurs between 1785 and 1815, Serge Chassagne found that 82 (55 per cent) came from a commercial background.81 Whilst the movement from commerce into the textile industry was a more Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 frequent occurrence in Paris and Saint-Quentin, it was not uncommon for Rouen merchants to do likewise.82 For instance, two commercial houses from the list of most distinguished commerfants fall into this category: Quesnel freres,83 and Jacques Levasseur who purchased a paper mill in Le Houlme (10 km north-west of Rouen) in 1810 and established there a hydraulic spinning mill with 3,000 brocbes (spindles).84 Sometimes merchants helped provide the capital investment rather than directly participate in the manufacturing industry. For instance, the great Rouen merchant and armateur, Joachim- Angelique Manoury, helped his son-in-law, the Rouen merchant Francois- Philippe Fontenilliat, purchase a former aristocratic estate in the department of the Manche in 1803 and establish there a hydraulic spinning mill.85 Most importantly, however, the merchant community relied upon its considerable landed property interests to remain as a potent socio-economic force. As John Dunne has found, most merchant notables in the Seine- Inferieure were property-owners as well as businessmen. Whilst land was purchased for its currency in social prestige, it was also a rational and wise economic decision as land could act as security for credit, as well as providing rental and farming revenue.86 Amidst the turmoil and uncertainty that beset many traditional commercial ventures in Rouen throughout this epoch, land represented a sound economic investment. Moreover, property ownership was duly rewarded by the Napoleonic state, providing the most important criterion for defining notability. The importance of landownership within the merchant community is reflected in the list of the department's 60 most distinguished propriitairesF1 Negotiants and armateurs constitute 17 of the names, with 9 coming from Rouen including Quesnel, Eudeline, Delahaye-Descombes, Demadieres and Lezurier de la Martel. Lezurier, although classified by the regime as a merchant,

80 Daly, 'Napoleonic Rouen', p 207. 81 S. Chassagne, Le coton et ses patrons: France 1760-1840 (1991), p 274. 82 Ibid. pp. 284-5. 83 Challne, Les bourgeois de Rouen, p 69 w Chassagne, Le coton et ses patrons, p. 285 85 Ibid, p. 284. 86 Bergeron, France under Napoleon, pp. 139-42; Lyons, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp 164-5 The movement from maritime commerce Into property ownership was not unique to Rouen's merchants, but occurred elsewhere along the Atlantic coast Bergeron, France under Napoleon, pp 170-1. 87 Dunne and Decoux, SeineJnftrieure. GAVIN DALY 47 had two country houses, a farm and woods, and enjoyed landed revenue in 1811 of 25-30,000 francs.88 Rouen's merchants had enlarged their property portfolios during the Revolutionary decade: the sale of biens nationaux benefited Rouen's elites more than any other social group, with the upper bourgeoisie of Rouen purchasing 49 per cent of biens nationaux of first origin sold in the district of Rouen.89 Biens nationaux holdings are noticeable amongst several 'distinguished proprietaire' merchants including Delahaye- Descombes, Defontenay and Quesnel. The tatter's biens nationaux purchases Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 in Rouen included four maisons and the church of Saint-Cande-le-Jeune which was used for commercial purposes.90 Indeed, the example of Francois-Prosper Quesnel indicates just how vast the property investments were amongst some of Rouen's greatest merchants. Quesnel owned all manner of properties- chateaux, farms, biens nationaux and commercial buildings. At the time of his death in 1817, Quesnel owned six houses in Rouen and a warehouse (formerly a church); a farm at Gratienville; two forests at Lyons-La-Foret; the chateau of Angerville-sur-Ry including 49 hectares of woods and 7 of land; and 4 hectares of land at Saint-Denis-le- Thiboult.91 Quesnel's property interests were certainly not typical for a Rouen merchant, yet nearly all merchants owned property to some degree. From a study of the estates of 12 deceased merchants in the Seine-Inferieure during the Napoleonic era, it was found that 10 owned urban buildings such as townhouses which were used for residential or commercial purposes, whilst all 12 extracted some form of rental income.92 Moreover, 9 owned rural land, with seven owning either an extensive farm or several smaller holdings. This highlights the difficulties that historians face with the official compartmentali2ation of notables according to professions such as proprietaire and negodant. The term negodant cannot fully capture the diverse economic interests of Rouen's commercial notables. They were propriitaires as well as merchants, and the Revolution and sale of biens nationaux had only enhanced their status as property-owners. Moreover, the professional classification of proprietaire is problematic as it sometimes hides merchant backgrounds For example, amongst the 30 proprietaires appearing on the 1812 list of Rouen's 100 highest taxpayers, at least 9 were retired merchants. The extensive property holdings of the Rouen merchants points to another significant characteristic of this group. They belonged overwhelmingly to the old commercial houses. Indeed, of 38 Rouen trading houses appearing on the list of 'most distinguished' merchants, 76 per cent are described as 'andenne

88 Ibid pp 66-7 89 M Matias, 'La vente des Wens nationaux de premiere orlgine dans le district de Rouen 1790- 1855', in A trovers la Haute-Normandie en Revolution 1189-1800, collective work published by the Comiti regional d'histoire de la Revolution franchise (Haute-Normandie) (Rouen, 1992), pp 197-203 90 Dunne and Decoux, Setne-InfMeure, p 40. 91 Ibid pp. 74-5. 92 Dunne, 'Notables and society", pp 86-7 48 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY maison', and only 26 per cent are listed as 'nouvelle'. These findings differ from the common notion that the Napoleonic era, with its war environment and its dislocation of established trading patterns, favoured new businessmen above the old.93 This was certainly not a marked feature of the Rouen notables. It is true that 45 per cent of the Rouen 'distinguished manufacturers' were new businesses.94 Yet financially,sociall y and politically, these new businessmen were secondary to the traditional merchants.95 The Rouen merchant community was more entrenched, resilient and responsive to change than is generally Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 assumed was the case for France's Atlantic merchants during this epoch. In keeping with their continued economic dominance, Rouen's merchants retained their hold over municipal power. The four mayors that served Rouen during the Consulate and Empire were all from wealthy merchant back- grounds: Pierre-Nicolas Defontenay (1800-6), Pierre-Prosper Demadieres (1806-12), Alexandra Hellot (1812-13) and Louis Lezurier de la Martel (1813-15).^ The merchant mayors were all of moderate political persuasion, with both Defontenay and Lezurier having been imprisoned during the Terror. Furthermore, 9 of the 15 adjoints that served were also merchants.97 Not surprisingly, as illustrated in Table 5, the merchants were the largest social group in the municipal council.98 Rouen's merchants dominated the municipal council of the Year VIE, and remained the most prominent group in 1812. In keeping with their lower financial and social standing relative to the merchants, Rouen manufacturers are poorly represented. By 1812, the number of propriitaires had increased dramatically, yet three of their number - Demontmeau, Lecointre and Lebertois - were former merchants. Interestingly, 6 former aristocrats were amongst the 11 propriitaires in 1812, reflectingth e growing attachment between aristocrats and the Napoleonic regime in the Seine-Inferieure during the late Empire.99 Yet unlike the pre-Revolutionary municipal council, the aristocrats no longer shared power with the merchant community. Despite the catastrophic state of maritime commerce during the years 1792-1815, Rouen's merchants remained the pre-eminent force in local politics.

93 Bergeron, France under Napoleon, p. 143 91 AN F12 937, 'Liste des manufacturers ct fabricants les plus distingues', Rouen, 22 July 1810 " For the differing social worlds of the Rouen merchants and manufacturers. Challne, Les bourgeois de Rouen, p. 83 96 R. Eude, Les maires de Rouen, 1800-1950- itude bistorique et biograpbique (Dieppe, 1950), pp. 45-53 97 See the lists of Rouen adjoint* in AN F" n Seine-Inferieure 3, list of the departmental administration in the Year XII, and ADSM 6M 1181, list of the administrative personnel of the department in 1811 98 The Napoleonic state greatly reduced the autonomy and power of municipal government Nevertheless, from the Year X the council's members were chosen by the government from amongst the city's 100 highest taxed citizens, and were therefore among the wealthiest and most influential members of local society: J Godechot, Les institutions de la France sous la Revolution et VEmpire (1968), p 596 99 For the aristocratic raUiement in the Seine-Inferieure under Napoleon- Dunne, 'Notables and society'. GAVIN DALY 49

Table 5 Professional status of the Rouen municipal councillors, Year VHI and 1812

Professional group Municipal councillors Municipal councillors YearVm 1812"

Merchants 14 13 Proprietaires 4 11 Manufacturers 3 1 liberal professions 9 1

Fonctionnaires 0 2 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021

It has been possible to identify the professional backgrounds of all 30 Rouen councillors in the Year Vm, and of 28 councillors in 1812 Source: The Year vm council has been compiled from Analyses des deliberations de I 'administration munidpale du canton de Rouen. Du 1" vendentiaire an VII au 30frtmaire an IX (Rouen, 1910), p. 141 The membership of the 1812 council appears in AN F1B n Seine-Inferieure 4, list of the departmental administration, 1812.

In early 1814, before the collapse of the First Empire, the ports of Rouen and Le Havre had endured, with the exception of the period of the Peace of Amiens, twenty-one years of incessant Anglo-French naval conflict. It is important to stress, therefore, that the maritime economy of the Seine-Inferieure had been in decline since 1792, a victim first of the Revolution and its wars, and then of the imperial war machine and Continental Blockade. Yet whilst the Napoleonic regime may have inherited the legacy of the Revolutionary wars, it intensified and enlarged the scale of the conflict, and ultimately had only a detrimental impact on the shipping of Rouen and Le Havre and on the maritime commercial profits of the local merchant communities. The pre- and post-Continental Blockade periods in Rouen are barely distinguishable, countering important chronological distinctions that Butel has found for Bordeaux. This article, however, has not argued for a return to the traditional view that French ports were in a universal state of misery during the Napoleonic era. Rather, it has emphasized the need to consider regional variations in the impact of the Napoleonic wars. Until 1807, the south-western ports fared far better than their Channel counterparts. This is not to suggest, though, that the Channel ports should be treated as a homogeneous group. Important differences existed within these ports: Cherbourg, as indicated, was blockaded less rigorously than the mouth of the Seine. Only with more regional studies will a greater appreciation be gained of the complexity and nuances of economic life under Napoleon. For all the difficulties that the port of Rouen endured under Napoleon, its merchant class retained its hold over local society, further highlighting the diverse nature of local life under Napoleon. The survival of the traditional merchants both challenges and confirms dominant currents in the historio- graphy of the Napoleonic notables. It challenges the common notion that the French Atlantic merchants suffered a significant fall in their wealth and standing under Napoleon. It confirms, however, the general national findings of Bergeron and Chaussinand-Nogaret on the continuities between pre- and 50 MERCHANTS AND MARITIME COMMERCE IN NORMANDY post-Revolutionary elites. Yet in Rouen it was the merchants, and not just the proprUitaires, who provided this degree of social continuity. Furthermore, the merchants of Napoleonic Rouen were not in the exact image of their ancten regime counterparts: they had extended their claims as a property-holding class; were engaged, through necessity, in a more diverse array of economic activities; and now dominated local politics. Given that the Rouen merchants were able to maintain their social and economic standing under Napoleon, it is not surprising that they supported the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fh/article/15/1/26/603683 by guest on 28 September 2021 Napoleonic regime until well into the late Empire.100 This was a regime that valued their standing as wealthy individuals and property-owners; that restored law and order to the department following the chaos of the Directory, that healed the divisive religious schism; that resolved the vexing issue of biens nationaux in favour of the new secular owners; that maintained the social hierarchy; and offered a lasting period of political stability. These were qualities that drew the local Rouen merchants to Napoleon and helped soften the blow of the collapse of maritime commerce. Napoleon was warmly greeted by the Rouen notables when he visited the city during the Peace of Amiens, and in contrast to the national trend, electoral participation in the Seine-Inferieure for the plebiscite on the hereditary Empire in the Year XII actually increased relative to the plebiscite on the Consulate for life in the Year X.101 It was only from 1812, with the Russian disaster and the growing realization that the wars would not cease whilst Napoleon remained in power, that the Rouen merchants were visibly no longer willing to endure the detrimental impact of the imperial wars on French maritime commerce. Following Napoleon's abdication in 1814, the Rouen merchants were overjoyed with the return of peace and the reopening of the international sea lanes. With the return of war during the Hundred Days, the merchants turned their backs on the Emperor for a second and final time.

100 For public opinion- J P. Challne, Napoleon et Rouen (1984); Jean Vldalenc, 'L'oplnlon pubHque dans le departement dc la Seine-Inferieure a la fin du Premier Empire', Rev Soc Haute- Normandie, 15 (1959), 69-82, Daly, 'Napoleonic Rouen", pp. 286-305. 101 For Napoleon's visit to Rouen in 1802: ADSM 1M 325, Online, Napol&m en Rouen, pp 5-6. For the plebiscites of the Years X and XII. E. Dejean, Unprifet du Consular Jean-Claude Beugnot (1907)