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MEXICAN PETROLEUM AND UNITED STATES - MEXICAN RELATIONS, 1919-1923 Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Baldridge, Donald C. (Donald Carl) Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 01/10/2021 11:12:02 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/287689 :l§ 71-24,365 1 i BALDRIDGE, Donald Carl, 1932- MEXICAN PETROLEUM AND UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS, 1919-1923. VS' The University of Arizona, Ph.D., 1971 i History, modern University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan \ r — - • ' ' — • • •» ——V. THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED MEXICAN PETROLEUM AND UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS, 1919-1923 by Donald Carl Baldridge A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 19 7 1 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by Donald flarl Ba Id-rid entitled MEXICAN PETROLEUM AND UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS, 1919-192 3 , be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ssertation Director Date 6 After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the follov/ing members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:"" ?/'/ ?' ~Sm This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that . accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Reauests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major depart ment or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED : C. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In carrying out this study, I have depended on many people. The Arizona Wilson Foundation provided the funds which enabled me to do research in Mexico. The staffs of the United States National Archives and the Library of Con gress, and Mexico's Archivo General de la Nacion went out of their way to assist me in my research. Competent and willing help in obtaining needed materials came from Library staffs at The University of Arizona, the University of New Mexico, and the University of Texas, especially Nettie Lee Benson, Director of the Latin American Collection. I acknowledge with pleasure the inspiration and guidance I received from former and present members of the history faculty at The University of Arizona. These include Herman E. Bateman, James A. Beatson, George A. Brubaker, John A. Carroll, Russell C. Ewing, Donald Lammers, and Mario Rodriguez. I am especially grateful to Professors Bateman and Brubaker for their numerous and well taken suggestions for improving the manuscript in both form and content. There is really no way by which I can adequately express the extent of the debt I owe to my major professor, Dr. Russell C. Ewing. In his classes and from conversa tions with Dr. Ewing I obtained the idea which ultimately iii iv developed into this work. Throughout the inception, research, and writing of this dissertation, Dr. Ewing will ingly acceded to the excessive demands I made on his time and attention. I very much appreciate the diplomatic manner with which he restrained my intemperate judgments and assessments, as well as his counsel, patience, and encour agement. For these and other contributions, I offer a simple, sincere thank you to Dr. Ewing. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the considerable efforts of my wife, Jo Ann. In addition to typing, retyp ing, and proofreading the manuscript, she also contributed some valuable criticism. Equally important, her long hours of employment provided most of the financial resources which made the research and completion of this work possible. TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT vi 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. GENESIS OP THE PETROLEUM QUESTION 7 Madero and Carranza 15 The Constitution of 1917 20 Wilson and the Constitutionalists ... 2k The Mexican Oil Industry 26 The Carranza Decrees, 191*1-1918 .... 33 3. THE PETROLEUM LOBBY 57 The Propaganda War 71 4. WATCHFUL WAITING REAFFIRMED 96 The End of the Fall Committee 122 The End of the Carranza Regime .... 132 5. THE PROPOSED TREATY 137 Colby and the Treaty 140 Hughes and the Treaty 163 6. THE ROAD TO BUCARELI . l8l The Tax Decrees of 1921 196 Huerta-Lamont Agreement 206 The Amparo Cases 211 7. BUCARELI AND AFTER 219 Conclusion 226 LIST OF REFERENCES 2^2 v ABSTRACT The Mexican Revolution of 1910 posed a particular threat to the American dominated petroleum industry in Mexico. The spectacular expansion of this enterprise after 1910 attracted the attention of revolutionary leaders who believed that Mexico's economic regeneration depended on expropriation of foreign controlled resources. When Mex ican nationalists wrote Article 27, which reserved subsoil deposits to the nation., into the Constitution of 1917, Woodrow Wilson's administration invoked diplomatic inter position in an effort to protect American property rights. Wilson, however, refused to heed demands from oil interests that he use force to install a Mexican Government that would secure American property. In 1919 the petroleum lobby promoted an intense propaganda campaign to convince the American public and Con gress that the nationalistic policies of Mexico's President, Venustiano Carranza, constituted an intolerable threat to American security. The oil lobby enlisted the support of powerful Cabinet members and Senators, and by December, while Wilson was incapacitated, appeared to have brought the United States to the brink of war with Mexico. At the peak vi vii of the crisis, Wilson temporarily reasserted control over Mexican-American relations and averted the possibility of intervention. The petroleum lobby tried another tactic. Early in 1920 a revolt led by Alvaro Obregon overturned Carranza. Spokesmen for the oil industry persuaded the Wilson admin istration to withhold diplomatic recognition from Obregon's government until he accepted a treaty guaranteeing American property rights. If Obregon refused to accept the treaty, oil operators argued, the lack of recognition would encour age his domestic opposition and permit Mexicans favorable to American interests to use the United States as a base for organizing anti-Obregon uprisings. Informed of the conditions, Obregon pledged nonretroactive application of Article 27 but he refused to consider conditional recogni tion. At this point the Harding administration took office. In May 1921, Secretary of State Charles Hughes, ignoring Obregon's earlier response, drafted a treaty secur ing privileges and guarantees for American property holders in Mexico. Presented to Obregon as a prerequisite for restoring relations, he rejected the treaty; despite this, it remained the basis of the United States' Mexican policy until 1923. Petroleum operators, meanwhile, attempted to foment counterrevolution in Mexico. Obregon coped with the viii insurrections so readily that he conclusively demonstrated his strength and discredited the premises upon which the non-recognition policy was based. Domestic critics embar rassed the Harding administration with charges that American diplomacy was designed to assist the troublemakers in depos ing Obregon. Commercial interests in the United States, eager to profit from the stability and reconstruction in Mexico, also pressured Hughes to discard the treaty and end the dispute. In March 1923> Hughes dropped his demand for a treaty prior to recognition. With that obstacle removed, unofficial negotiations produced an understanding on the petroleum question which led to the restoration of diplo matic relations between the United States and Mexico in September 1923. Although the petroleum question troubled Mexican-American relations for . another twenty years, the problem never again attained the crisis level of 1919-1923. American diplomats needlessly prolonged the con troversy with Mexico by acceding to the pleas of private interests to make their self-serving terms the basis for a diplomatic settlement with Mexico. The arrangement accepted by the United States in 1923 was essentially that proposed by Obregon in 1920. The combined efforts of the petroleum lobby and American diplomats to force Mexico's Government to concede unprecedented advantages for American citizens ix engendered a reservoir of ill will and suspicion which complicated future relations between the two countries. Consequently, non-recognition as a means to protect American