Describe Spartan Government and Its Militaristic Society. Sparta Conquered Neighboring Lands and Forced Them to Become Helots

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Describe Spartan Government and Its Militaristic Society. Sparta Conquered Neighboring Lands and Forced Them to Become Helots

Objective (Students will…) Describe Spartan government and its militaristic society. Sparta conquered neighboring lands and forced them to become helots. Worked on farms and gave Sparta ½ of its crops. Rebelled many times. Outnumbered the Spartans. Athens City-state of ancient Greece, Fought hard. noted for its democratic form of Sparta put down each government. revolt. Sparta Revolts cause Sparta to City-state of ancient Greece, focus on military (army). known for its militarism. Helots Enslaved people of Sparta GOVERNMENT Spartan government is part monarchy, oligarchy & democracy. Kings (2) rule Spartan army. Elected supervisors (5) ran the government. Ephors Council of Elders (30) proposed laws. Older citizens (Age 60+) Assembly (all citizens) elected officials and voted on laws. SOCIETY Three social groups. Citizens, free noncitizens and helots. Citizens descendants of original inhabitants of Sparta. Aristocrats Age 20+ Supervisor Free noncitiznes = Perioeci People who are in charge of a unit Merchants and artisans Citizens spent their lives in the city or group. training to be soldiers. Noncitizens lived in nearby villages. Proposed Helots allowed Sparta to focus on Suggested, or put forward for military ? consideration. Spartan goal = strong military. Babies were examined and “defective” babies were cast away Age 7 boys moved to military barracks. Education stresses discipline, duty, strength and military skill. Read, write & use weapons Small amounts of food, barefoot, only wear cloak, walk in silence (eyes to the ground), spoke only with permission, slept outdoors, examined to see if they were becoming too fat Citizens enter military at age 20. Expected to marry. Served until age 60. Barracks Married men spent most of their time in the barracks. Military houses. Spartan women had to be tough emotionally and physically. Tough love. “Bring back this shield yourself or on it” Education focused on physical strength. Athletic and defense training. Family life less important (focus on military) Husbands and wives spent much of their lives apart. Women had more freedom. Own property Could interact with men and people on the street Women were expected to fill the shoes of their husbands while at war..

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