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From Honneth to Fromm

Seiki Okazaki

I Introduction

As is well known, Jiirgen Habermas opens up the frontiers of "radical democracy" in the history of by overcoming the so-called pessimism of The Dialecticof Enlightenment. It is Axel Honneth who takes over the political orientation from Habermas, who nevertheless criticizes Habermas's language-theoretic version of communication paradigm and advocates his own recognition-theoretic version of communication paradigm. In The Fragmented World of the Social (1995), Honneth refers to

"four thematic domains" of his post-Habermasian critical theory (Honneth 1995, pp. xiii-xxv): (A)

"everydaymoral experience" connected with a "struggle for recognition"; (B) relation between "work" and

"recognition"; (C) "pathologies of modern society" having nothing to do with the problem of

"rationality"; and (D) "psychoanalytic concept of the subject." I find potentialities in Honneth's critical theory in that it will contribute to elucidatemany problems on which Habermas fails to shed light.

However, in spite of its attractiveness, there exists a crucial difficulty in Honneth's critical theory. In this article I would like to attempt to overcome the difficulty of Honneth's critical theory through the dialogue with one of the most important critical theorists, Erich Fromm (1900-1980). While he had been "a member of staff who had for a considerable time been the most significant one for its theoretical work"

(1), Fromm was excluded from the Institute for Social Research, partly because of the opposition to

Adorno. And Fromm was labeled as a "neo-Freudian revisionist" in the so-called Fromm-Marcuse Debate in the 1950s (2). In this article I would like to show that Fromm's " 'another' critical theory" (3) has the potential to overcome the difficulty of Honneth's critical theory, and to advocate a theoretical shift toward an active communication theory.

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II Critical Theory of Honneth

1 Honneth's Criticism of Habermas

Let's start with a brief sketch of Honneth's critical theory. Honneth looks back on his intellectual history in the interview held on the journal Radical (Honneth 1993). According to it, he started to study philosophy and literature at the University of in 1969. At that time he was influenced by

Adorno and was not active politically. However, after moving to the University of in 1971, he became a member of the USOS, the youth organization of SPD. There Honneth began to read Habermas and wrote his Magisterarbeit concerning Habermas's interpretation of psychoanalysis. Then Honneth moved to the Free University in and studied sociology. Although he was a "totally convinced

Habermasian," Honneth had already some objections to Habermas. Honneth objected that Habermas reducedthe concept of "work" into "instrumental action." Besides, contrary to Habermas, Honneth came to be closer to "philosophical anthropology."

In The Critique ofPower (1986), which is the enlarged version of his dissertation submitted to the Free

University in Berlin, Honneth thinks highly of Habermas (and Foucault) for his "rediscovery of the social," which overcomes the "incapacity for social analysis" from Horkheimer to Adorno. Furthermore,

Honneth thinks highly of Habermas's "communication-theoretic transformation" of The of

Enlightenment, in comparison with Foucault's "systems-theoretic dissolution" of it. This does not mean, however,that Honneth agrees with Habermas entirely: Honneth criticizes Habermas for failing to grasp the role of "struggle" in the history of species. According to Honneth, among the two competing models,

Habermas develops the "model of a two-tiered reproduction of society within instrumental-rational and communicative spheres of action," not the "model of a maintenance of the social order through institutionally mediated communicative relations between morally integrated groups" (Honneth 1986, S.

307, p. 278). This leads Habermas to "twocomplementary fictions": "theexistence of power-free spheres of communication" as well as "the existence of norm-free organizations of action" (Honneth 1986, S.

328, p. 298). According to Honneth, Habermas

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"not only gives up the possibility of a justified critique of concrete forms of organization

of economic production and political administration. Habermas loses above all — and this

again makes him heir to the tradition of critical social theory we have investigated here —

the communication-theoretic approach he had initially opened up: the potential for an

understanding of the social order as an institutionally mediated communicative relation

between culturally integrated groups that, so long as the exercise of power is

asymmetrically distributed, takes place through the medium of social struggle." (Honneth

1986, S. 334, p. 303)

In the introduction of The Struggle for Recognition (1992), Honneth states that The Struggle for

Recognition arose in connection with the conclusion of The Critique ofPower. That is, "any attempt to integrate the social-theoretical insights of Foucault's historical work within the framework of a theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of morally motivated struggle" (Honneth 1992, S. 7, p.

1). What should be pointed out here is that The Critique of Power does not contain the concept of

"recognition" (Anerkcnnung) as such, which constitutes an important element of his criticism of

Habermas. To be sure, we can find the concept in the "Afterword to the Second German Edition (1988)" of

The Critique of Power (Honneth 1986, S. 385-386, pp. xvii-xviii). However, it is in The Strugglefor

Recognition that the concept of "recognition" is discussed systematically for the first time.

In his inaugural lecture entitled "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect" (1994), Honneth criticizes

Habermas's language-theoretic version of communication paradigm from the standpoint of his recognition-theoretic version of communication paradigm (Honneth 1994). To be sure, Honneth acknowledges that Habermas opens up the possibility of an "intramundane transcendence," in contrast to

Adorno's "negativist social critique." However, Honneth criticizes Habermas for being incapable of finding

"pretheoretical resource" (vorwissenschaftliche Instanz) within social reality. According to Honneth,

"moral experiences are not aroused by restricting linguistic competences, rather, they are generated by violating identity claims acquired in socialization" (Honneth 1994, S. 86, p. 262). Therefore, critical theory cannot grasp "normative presuppositions of social interaction" fully, as far as it remains within the communication theory of Habermas.

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2 Struggle for Recognition

In The Struggle for Recognition Honneth presents his own recognition theory after tackling the recognition theory of the early Hegel and that of G. H. Mead. Honneth argues that "practical identity-formation" presupposes "recognition" and distinguishes three forms of recognition.

The first form is "love" (Liebe), which is prior to the other forms of recognition (Honneth 1992, S.

153-172, pp. 95-107; S. 214-215, pp. 132-133). Honneth defines"love" broadlyas "primary relationships insofar as they — on the model of friendships, parent-child relationships, as well as erotic relationships between lovers — are constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people"

(Honneth 1992, S. 153, p. 95). When discussing "love," Honneth is based on the psychoanalytic object-relations theory, especially on that of Donald W. Winnicott. According to it, "mother" and child dependon each other in the first months after birth. After that phase, the child become aggressive to the

"mother." If the mother reacts to the child without revenge, the child develops a sense of "basic self-confidence." However, "abuse" and "rape" damage the sense of "basic self-confidence."

The second form of recognition is "rights" (Recht) (Honneth 1992, S. 173-195, pp. 107-121; S. 215-216, pp. 133-134). Legal recognition is the recognition of universal features of human subjects. In modern societies, legal recognition is detached from "social esteem." With the help of Marshall's study, Honneth distinguishes two "developmental possibilities" of legal recognition: one is the development of

"substantive content" — civil rights, political rights and social rights. The other is the development of

"social scope," in which the excluded or disadvantaged groups acquire existing rights. One can acquire a sense of "self-respect" by legal recognition. According to Honneth, "in the experience of legal recognition, one is able to view oneself as a person who shares with all other members of one's community the qualities that make participation in discursive will-formation possible" (Honneth 1992, S. 194-195, p.

120). However, "denial of rights" and "exclusion" deprive people of the sense of "self-respect."

Finally, the third form of recognition is "solidarity" (Solidaritat) which refers to "social esteem" (Honneth

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1992, S. 196-210, pp. 121-130; S. 216-218, p. 134). In contrast to legal recognition, social esteem is the recognition of "concrete traits and abilities." It presupposes the existence of a "community of value," which is an evaluative system of social esteem. In traditional societies, where the conceptions of ethical, goals were substantive and hierarchical, social esteem took the form of "honour" of "status groups." It was symmetrical within a status group, yet asymmetrical between status groups. In modern societies, however, social esteem lakes the form of "standing" or "prestige" of individuals, not of status groups.

Relations of social esteem become "symmetrical," though they are subject to permanent conflict. The denial of this form of recognition is "denigration" and "insult."

The denial of these three forms of recognition causes the "negative emotional reactions," which constitute the "motivational basis" of a "struggle for recognition" (Honneth 1992, Kap. 8, Chap. 8). This does not mean, however, that Honneth regards every experience of "disrespect" constituting the basis of "social" struggle: he sees the basis of "social" struggle in the denial of "rights" and "solidarity," not in the denial of "love." It is true that Honneth realizes cases where "pursuit of interests" constitutes the motivational basis of struggle. "It will always be an empirical question as to the extent to which a social conflict follows the logic of the pursuit of interests or the logic of the formation of moral reactions." (Honneth

1992, S. 265, p. 165). However, accordingto Honneth, "interest" does not have to be seen as "something ultimate or original," but may be seen as something "constituted within a horizon of moral experience"

(4).

It should be noted here that Honneth regards "struggle for recognition" not only as an "instrument" for the expansion of recognition, but also as a field of recognition. In other words, "struggle for recognition" is

"ends" as well as "means." Honneth states that:

"[t]he collective resistance stemming from the socially critical interpretation of commonly

shared feelings of being disrespected is not solely a practical instrument with which to

assert a claim to the future expansion of patterns of recognition. For the victims of

disrespected— as has been shown in philosophical discussions, in literature, and in social

history — engaging in political action also has the direct function of tearing them out of

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the crippling situation of passively enduredhumiliation and helping them, in turn, on their

way to a new, positive relation-to-self. The basis for this secondarymotivation for struggle

is connected to the structure of the experience of disrespect itself." (Honneth 1992, S.

262-263, p. 164)

III Intermediate Reflections

Here I would like to "educe" a constitutive element latent in Honneth's recognition theory: an element of

"passivity" of his communication theory. It is true that Honneth does not construct his communication theory as "passive" intentionally. Rather, he is not conscious of the active-passiveproblem. In this sense,

Hiroshi Fujino is right to translate the term "MiBachtung" into "(being) disrespected" in Japanese

(Honneth 1994). However, we cannot overlook the fact that Honneth concentrates his attention exclusively on the experience of "being disrespected." In orderto demonstrate this interpretation, I would like to take Chapter 6 of The Struggle for Recognition, where Honneth explains his concept of

"disrespect," for example. The following two sentences, which are all the sentences found in Chapter 6 that specify the subject of disrespect (or of recognition), reveal that Honneth concentrates his attention exclusively on the experience of "being disrespected" (or of "being recognized"), not on the experienceof

"to disrespect" (or of "to recognize"). I shall quote them in German (italicized by OKAZAKT).

Sentence A

"denn in dcr Selbstbeschreibung derer, die sich durch anderefalsch behandelt sehen, spielen

bis heute moral ische Kategorien einedominante Rolle, die wiedie der >Beleidigung< oder>

Erniedrigung< auf Formen der MiBachtung, der verweigerten Anerkennung also, Bezug

nehmen." (Honneth 1992, S. 212)

Sentence B

"das, was es in einer derartigen Empfindung iiber sich selber erfahrt, ist die konstitutive

Abhangigkeit seiner eigenen Person von der Anerkennung durch Andere." (Honneth 1992,

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S. 223-224)

In addition, there are two interesting sentences in Chapter 6, which reinforce my interpretation.

Respectively, after quoting the original sentence in German, I shall quote the English sentence translated by Joel Anderson (italicized by OKAZAKI).

Sentence C

"weil das normative Selbstbild eines jeden Menschen, seines >Me<, wie Mead gesagt

hatte, auf die Moglichkeit der steten Ruckversicherung im Anderen angewiesen ist, geht

mit der Erfahrung von Mifiachtung die Gefahr einer Verletzung einher, die die Identitat der

ganzen Person zum Einsturz bringen kann." (Honneth 1992, S. 212-213)

Sentence C

"Because the normative self-image of each and every individual human being — his or her

'me', as Mead put it — is dependenton the possibility of being continually backedup by

others, the experience of being disrespected carries with it the danger of an injury that can

bring the identity of the person as a whole to the point of collapse." (Honneth 1992, pp.

131-132)

Sentence D

"In solchen Gefuhlsreaktionen der Scham kann die Erfahrung von Mifiachtung zum

motivationalen AnstoB eines Kampfes um Anerkennung werden." (Honneth 1992, S. 224)

Sentence D'

"In the context of the emotional responses associated with shame, the experience of being

disrespected can become the motivational impetus for a struggle for recognition." (Honneth

1992, p. 138)

In these two sentences, Anderson translates the noun "MiBachtung" into the passive form "being

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disrespected." There exists, no doubt, an interpretation of the translator. However, this does not mean that it is an arbitrary interpretation that violates the intention of the author. Honneth thinks highly of

Anderson's ability to translate in the preface of TheStruggle for Recognition. "He has the rare ability of understanding the intentions of the author sometimes better than the author himself (Honneth 1992, p. xxii). It is true that this statement is not directed to specific terms. However, in the light of the importance of the term "MiBachtung" in that book, Honneth is likely to be satisfied with the translation from "MiBachtung" into "being disrespected." With the interpretation of the translator, the English version of The Struggle for Recognition shows the "passivity" of Honneth's recognition theory more clearly than the German original version.

Here the objection may be raised that Honneth articulates "mutual" or "reciprocal" recognition and that he regards recognition as a "moral obligation" (cf. Honneth 1997, S. 38-39, p. 32). However, since "being disrespected" (and "being recognized") presupposes "to disrespect" (and"to recognize"), the existence of the concept "to disrespect" (and "to recognize") does not contradictmy interpretation. The decisivequestion is the quality of its "mutuality" or "reciprocity." Are there any insights that "to disrespect" weakens the person who disrespects, andinsights that "to recognize" strengthens theperson who recognizes? I can find no evidence in The Strugglefor Recognition. The concept "to disrespect" (and "to recognize") is assigned only a secondary position in his theoretical system.

Honneth's recognition theory may reflect our "fear of not being recognized." More than that, it may reflect our "fear to recognize." Fromm says, "while one is consciously afraid ofnot being loved, the real, though usually unconsciousfear is that ofloving" (Fromm 1956, p. 115).

IV Critical Theory of Fromm

1 Honneth's Interpretation of Fromm

Before contrasting Fromm's communication theory with Honneth's, I would like to glance at Honneth's

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interpretation of Fromm, in order to show the relevance of taking up Fromm in the context of contemporary critical theory. While critical theorists of the "inner circle" labeled Fromm as a

"neo-Freudian revisionist," Honneth interprets Fromm as a pioneer of communication theory in the tradition of critical theory.

In The Critique of Power Honneth argues negatively that Fromm falls into the "closed functionalism" by crushing the dimension of "social action" (Honneth 1986, S. 32-34, pp. 23-24). Honneth does not revise the negative estimation in the article "Critical Theory" (1987) as well. However, what should be noted here is that Honneth comes to think highly of the later Fromm, contrary to the early Fromm (Honneth

1995, pp. 83-84). In this articleHonneth thinks highly of the "outercircle"of the FrankfurtSchool, that is, Neumann, Kirchhcimer, Benjamin, and the later Fromm, as pioneers of communication theory.

Whereas I acknowledge the importance of Honneth's interpretation, it is far from being satisfactory.

Honneth regards Fromm merely as a pioneer of communication theory. However, Fromm constructs a communication theory decisively different from Honneth's, which I would like to call active communication theory. Honneth fails to grasp the uniqueness of Fromm's communication theory. In what follows, I would like to sketch Fromm's active communication theory. Needless to say, it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with Fromm's critical theory as a whole.

2 Fromm's Concept of "Activity"

Burkhard Bierhoff points out that Escapefrom Freedom "occupies a special place in Fromm's works": it is not only the work "in which the previous works culminate and, as it were, bear fruit," but also the work

"which produces the new basis for the later works of Fromm" (5). In his chief work Escapefrom

Freedom, Fromm rejects Freud's instincts theory and adopts a new theory of Man which emphasizes the need for relatedness to the world. According to Fromm, contrary to the Freud's understanding of human relations merely as "means," Man has a need to relate oneself to the world as "ends." Here are crucial sentences, though somewhat longer, from Escapefrom Freedom.

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"Freud always considers the individual in his relations to others. These relations as Freud

sees them, however, are similar to the economic relations to others which are characteristic

of the individual in capitalist society. Each person works for himself, individualistically, at

his own risk, and not primarily in co-operation with others. But he is not a Robinson

Crusoe; he needs others, as customers, as employees, or as employers. He must buy and

sell, give and take. The market, whether it is the commodity or the labor market, regulates

these relations. Thus the individual, primarily alone and self-sufficient, enters into

economic relations with others as means to one end: to sell and to buy. Freud's concept of

human relations is essentially the same: the individual appears fully equipped with

biologically given drives, which need to be satisfied. In order to satisfy them, the

individual enters into relations with other "objects." Other individuals thus are always a

means to one's end, the satisfaction of strivings which in themselves originate in the

individual before he enters into contact with others. The field of human relations in Freud's

sense is similar to the market — it is an exchange of satisfaction of biologically given

needs, in which the relationship to the other individual is always a means to an end but

never an end in itself." (Fromm 1941, pp. 9-10)

With regard to his criticism of Freud, I would like to emphasize that the concept of "activity" plays an important role in his conception of "relatednessto the world." The concept of "activity" comes to the fore in his later writings. In To Have or to Be? (1976), for example, Fromm characterizes the mode of "being" as its "activity." "Its fundamental characteristic is that of being active, not in the sense of outward activity, of busyness, but of inner activity, the productive use of our human powers" (Fromm 1976, p.

88). It should be noted here that Fromm does not replace the concept of "relatedness to the world" with the concept of "activity." When he refers to Albert Schweitzer in that book, Fromm states that "[t]he only meaningful way of life is activity in the world; not activity in general" (Fromm 1976, p. 163).

Admittedly, the role that the concept of "activity" plays in Escapefrom Freedom is less central than in his later writings. In Escapefrom Freedom, however, Fromm refers to "spontaneous activity" as what enables both "individuality" and "relatedness." "Spontaneous activity is the one way in which man can overcome

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the terror of aloneness without sacrificing the integrity of his self; for in the spontaneous realization of the self man unites himself anew with the world — with man, nature, and himself (Fromm 1941, p.

259). The concept of "activity" does not mean "doing something." It means "the quality of creative activity that can operate in one's emotional, intellectual, and sensuous experiences and in one's will as well" (Fromm 1941, p. 257). In order to express this idea, Fromm creates the concept of "activeness" in

The Revolution ofHope (Fromm 1968, p. 12).

It is not easy for us to understand the concept of "activity" fully: for there exists a premise which is alien to us. It is the premise that "the self is as strong as it is active" (Fromm 1941, p. 260). We have a tendency to think that to be active is to consume energy, hence, to weaken the self. However, Fromm does not think so.

In order to understand what Fromm means, I would like to consider Fromm's discussion in The Art of

Loving (1956). As is well known, Fromm emphasizes that the problem of love is not the problem of

"being loved," but the problem of "loving." Fromm does not regard passive love as "mature love": passive love, both "motherly love" and "fatherly love," has its own weakness (cf. Fromm 1956, pp.

35-41). According to Fromm, "motherly love" is unconditioned: we need not do something in order to be loved. However, if we lose it, we cannot acquire it by ourselves. On the other hand, "fatherly love" is conditioned: we can acquire it by meeting the expectations of "father." However, "fatherly love" causes the suspicion that "I am not really loved."

On the contrary, strength is inherent in the activity of "loving" (cf. Fromm 1956, pp. 20-24). One of the most important elements of "love" is "giving." For the "receptive character," "exploitative character" and

"hoarding character", "giving" means " 'giving up' something, being deprived of, sacrificing." The

"marketing character" is "willing to give, but only in exchange for receiving." In sum, for the

"non-productive characters," "giving" means "impoverishment." Contrary to these, "giving" assumes quite different meaning for the "productive character."

"For the productive character, giving has an entirely different meaning. Giving is the

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highest expression of potency. In the very act of giving, I experience my strength, my

wealth, my power. This experience of heightened vitality and potency fills me with joy. I

experience myself as overflowing, spending, alive, hence as joyous. Giving is more joyous

than receiving, not because it is a deprivation, but because in the act of giving lies the

expression of my aliveness." (Fromm 1956, p. 21)

Here the concept of "potency"is quite significant. Already in Escapefrom Freedom, Fromm distinguished two kinds of "power" (Fromm 1941, pp. 160-161). One means "domination," the other "potency."

According to Fromm, the two concepts are mutually exclusive: "domination" is the "perversion of potency."" But in a psychological sense, the lustfor poweris not rooted in strength butin weakness. ...

It is the desperate attempt to gain secondary strength wheregenuinestrength is lacking" (Fromm 1941, p.

160).

As we have seen, Fromm advocates "loving," not "being loved." However, this simple formula requires some qualification. For Fromm, love is paradoxical: by being loved, the loved person becomes a loving person. In turn, the loving person comes to be loved.

"He does not give in order to receive; giving is in itself exquisite joy. But in giving he

cannot help bringing something to life in the other person, and this which is brought to

life reflects back to him; in truly giving, he cannot help receiving that which is given back

to him. Giving implies to make the other person a giver also and they both share in the

joy of what they have brought to life. In the act of giving something is born, and both

persons involved are grateful for the life that is born for both of them. Specifically with

regard to love this means: love is a power which produces love; impotence is the inability

to produce love." (Fromm 1956, p. 23)

I would like to pay attention to the fact that Fromm does not value "being loved" as such. Fromm values the experience of "being loved," as far as it constitutes the driving force from "being loved" to "loving."

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V Toward an Active Communication Theory

So far I have contrasted Fromm's active communication theory with Honneth's passive communication theory. This is not only an attempt to compare them, but also an attempt to show Fromm's Aktualitat in the contemporary critical theory. In this final section, I would like to show that Fromm's active communication theory has the potential to overcome the difficulty of Honneth's critical theory. What is the difficulty of Honneth'scritical theory? As Honneth himself acknowledges, "struggle for recognition" is not necessarily democratic. Honneth states that:

"social esteem can be sought in small militaristic groups, whose code of honor is

dominated by the practice of violence, as well as in the public arenas of a democratic

society. The sense of no longer being within the network of social recognition is in itself

an extremely ambivalent source of motivation for social protest and resistance." (Honneth

1994, S. 93, p. 268)

While Honneth criticizes the early critical theory for its "sociological deficit," Fromm would criticize

Honneth for his "democratic deficit." It is true that, as Takashi Kibe points out, Honneth's recognition theory "offers important suggestions to radical democracy" (6). However, his recognition theory is incapable of laying the foundation of democracy, to say nothing of "radical democracy." As Honneth himself acknowledges, "being recognized" can be sought not only in democratic groups, but also in neo-Nazi groups. The cult group AUM in Japan gives us a concrete image of the distorted form of recognition.

It should be addedthat "being recognized" can be sought by sadistic domination as well as by masochistic submission. Sadistic domination may appear to be "active." Although it is "active" in the sense of "doing something," sadistic domination is not "active" in the sense of expressing one's potency. As Fromm points out exactly, the sadist owes his/her sense of "strength" to the "object" of sadism (cf. Fromm 1941, p. 144; Fromm 1956, pp. 18-19). As the masochist depends on "being recognized" by the sadist, the

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Okazaki, S., 1999a: Fromm Honeth to Fromm, Typescript available at the Fromm Archive, 17 pp.

Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of material prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder.

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sadist depends on "being recognized" by the masochist.

After acknowledging that the sense of being disrespected lacks "normative direction," Honneth concludes his article "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect" by addressing "the question of how a moral culture could be so constituted as to give those affected, disrespected and ostracized, the individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere, rather than living them out in the countercultures of violence" (Honneth 1994, S. 93, p. 269). Faced with this question, we have two theoretical alternatives: one is to restrict Honneth's recognition theory with a theory of democracy.It will give us the recognition theory compatible with a kind of democracy. The other is to criticize the "passivity" of Honneth's recognition theory and to perform a theoretical shift toward an active communication theory.

Obviously, in , active communication theory is the anthropological basis of his criticism of Fascism and of "our own democracy" (7). Fromm, who advocates to realize both

"individuality" and "relatedness" through being "active," cannot but be critical of Fascism which is characterized by sadistic domination and masochistic submission. More than Fascism, he cannot but be critical of "our own democracy" constituted by "automatons," which is in danger of Fascism. His despair of "our own democracy," however, leads Fromm to radical democracy. Paradoxically, Fromm attempts to overcome the pathology of "our own democracy" through the development of democracy itself. This paradoxical faith in democracy differentiates Fromm from Schumpter {, Socialism and

Democracy, 1942).

"The only criterion for the realization of freedom is whether or not the individual

actively participates in determining his life and that of society, and this not only by the

formal act of voting but in his daily activity, in his work, and in his relations to others.

Modern political democracy, if it restricts itself to the purely political sphere, cannot

sufficiently counteract the results of the economic insignificance of the average

individual." (Fromm 1941, pp. 271-272)

To repeat, we can select the way of restricting Honneth's recognition theory with a theory of democracy.

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Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of material prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder.

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However, I insist that we should select the way of performing a theoretical shift toward the active communication theory. What I would like to emphasize is that to strengthen the self through being recognized means to dependon the external sources of "strength," and this must inevitably weaken the inner strength of one's self. This is the reason why I am critical of the "passivity" of Honneth's recognition theory. It is in this sense that I formulate "from Honneth to Fromm" provocatively. I do not intend to reject Honneth totally. I intend, speaking more pragmatically, to invite Honneth to revisit

Fromm, and speaking more theoretically, to appeal to Honneth to perform a theoretical shift toward the active communication theory.

What I have argued in this article is so limited that it requiresdetaileddiscussions (8). However, I believe that the perspective of active communication theory will contribute to the development of "politics of recognition." What I sharewith Honneth andwith many other political theorists like Charles Taylor (9) is the view that the problem of "recognition" is of great significance in our contemporary society. However,

I do not agree with Honneth's interpretation based on passive communication theory. What I advocate is to create the conditionsin which eachperson is capable ofstrengthening his/herselfby expressing his/her own potency in the world. I would like to develop this formula of active communication theory in my subsequent studies.

Notes

(1) Rolf Wiggershaus, The School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance,

trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 271.

(2) In the epoch-making article "The Fromm-Marcuse Debate Revisited" (1986), John Rickert

objects against Marcuse's misreading of Fromm. John Rickert, "The Fromm-Marcuse Debate

Revisited," in The : CriticalAssessments, Vol. IV, ed. Jay Bernstein (London

and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 278-319.

(3) Burkhard Bierhoff, Erich Fromm: Analytische Sozialpsychologie und vision a re

Gesellschaftskritik (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), S. 45.

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(4) points out the "redistribution-recognition dilemma." Nancy Fraser, "From

Redistribution to Recognition?: Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age,"

Review, No. 212 (July/August 1995), pp. 68-93.

(5) BurkhardBierhoff, ErichFromm, S. 50.

(6)Takashi Kibe, "Radical Democracy in contemporary : Habermas, Maus, Honneth," (in

Japanese), Thought, Vol. 867 (September 1996), p. 218.

(7) I interpret Escapefrom Freedom asa self-criticism ofdemocracy faced with Fascism, rather than

a simple criticism of Fascism. In this respect, I disagree with Neil McLaughlin ("Nazism,

Nationalism, and the Sociology of Emotions: Escape from Freedom Revisited," Sociological

Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3, November 1996, pp. 241-261). The final chapter (except Appendix) of Escape from Freedom is devoted to the self-criticism of democracy, not to the criticism of

Fascism.

(8)To take an example, I find it dubious that Honneth's recognition theory is capable of dealing

with the problem of "nature" adequately (cf. Rin-itsu Kawakami, ed., "Honneth Symposium:

Power and Critical Theory," [in Japanese], History and Society, No. 8, September 1988, pp.

175-216;Masao Higurashi, "Die EntwicklungderTheorie derAnerkennung bei Axel Honneth,"

[in Japanese], Annals of the Society for the History of Social Thought, No. 22, 1998, pp.

93-100). I would like to suggest that Fromm's active communication theory is capable of

dealing with the problem of "nature"adequately.

(9) Charles Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturism: Examining the Politics of

Recognition, ed. andintro. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Works Cited

Fromm 1941: Escapefrom Freedom (New York: Henry Holt andCompany, 1994).

Fromm 1956: The Art ofLoving (New York: HarperandRow, Publishers, 1989).

Fromm 1968: TheRevolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (New York: Harperand Row,

Publishers, 1968).

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Okazaki, S., 1999a: Fromm Honeth to Fromm, Typescript available at the Fromm Archive, 17 pp.

Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of material prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder.

Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

Fromm 1976: To Have or to Be? (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1997).

Honneth 1986: Kritik der Macht: Reflexionsstufen einer kritischen Geselhchaftstheorie, 2 Aufl.

(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994); The Critique ofPower: Reflective Stages

in a Critical Social Theory, trans. Kenneth Baynes (Cambridge, Mass. and London,

England: The MIT Press, 1991).

Honneth 1992: Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 1 Aufl.

(Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994); The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral

Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,

1996).

Honneth 1993: "Critical Theory in Germany Today: An Interview with Axel Honneth," interviewed by

Peter Osborne and Stale Finke, Radical Philosophy, 65 (Autumn 1993), pp. 33-41;

reprinted in A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals, ed. Peter Osborne (London

and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 89-106.

Honneth 1994: "Die soziale Dynamik von MiBachtung: Zur Ortsbestimmung einer kritischen

Gesellschaftstheorie," Leviathan, Heft 1, Jg. 1994 (Marz 1994), S. 78-93; "The Social

Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today," trans. John Farrell,

Constellations, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 255-269.

Honneth 1995: The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social andPolitical Philosophy, ed.

Charles W. Wright (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

Honneth 1997: "Anerkennung und moralische Verpflichtung," Zeitschrift furphilosophische Forschung,

Bd. 51, Heft. 1 (Januar-Marz 1997), S. 25-41; "Recognition and Moral Obligation,"

trans. John Farrell, Social Research, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 16-35.

* This article is a summary of my doctoral dissertation, Political Fromm: Paradigm Shift toward the

Active Communication Theory, written in Japanese and submitted to the Graduate School of Public

Administration, International Christian University, Tokyo, on December 14, 1998. I wish to thank Mr.

Norris Falguera and Ms Mari Tomita for checking the manuscript of "From Honneth to Fromm."

Copyright September 1999, by Seiki Okazaki. e-mail address: [email protected]

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