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Arendt's and Adorno's Philosophy of Difference As a Case Against Normative Theories

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Arendt's and Adorno's Philosophy of Difference As a Case Against Normative Theories View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Revistes Catalanes amb Accés Obert Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía Año 2013 Núm. 15. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 149-158 Arendt’s and Adorno’s philosophy of difference as a case against normative theories Manja Kisner1 Abstract: The philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Theodor W. Adorno can be classified as critical theories that were developed out of confrontation with the totalitarian regimes. Today we can still question their actuality for the present time. To answer this, we, firstly, try to understand how their philosophies were developed. We are convinced that one of the essential aspects was Arendt’s and Adorno’s confrontation with older normative theories in the field of moral philosophy and political theory, especially with Kant’s. Secondly, the shortcomings of normativisms for understanding the catastrophes of the totalitarian era lead us to their new ways of thinking, which were pluralistically oriented and interested in difference rather than identity. By the end, in order to discuss their actuality, we confront their philosophies with new theories arising out of the normative turn. Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Theodor W. Adorno, critical philosophy, plurality, non- identity. Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) are two authors we would like to place into the field of critical philosophy and to assert their similarities despite all of the differences in their original philosophical convictions and their notorious mutual disapproval. Firstly, we would like to argue that their resemblance is due to the critical stance that they both represent, which has a common root in factual confrontation with the political rise of totalitarianisms. In this way, critical philosophy is concerned with «forms of social pathology»2 and is therefore closely linked with the critique of the worldly conditions. Thus, it is closely connected with the phenomenal reality and is not parted from the world of appearances, as old normative theories often were. But, certainly, critical theory should not be interpreted as a justification of everything existent. Secondly, we are convinced that after the event of Auschwitz Adorno’s and Arendt’s philosophies testify to an inherent necessity for the use of a new philosophical thinking and changed views on moral theories, which have to depart from the traditional normative patterns of ethics. For this reason, Adorno and Arendt develop philosophies that can be named philosophies of difference. Adorno’s turn towards nonidentity thinking is marked by the dangers of the enlightened thought (he stresses «the indefatigable self-destructiveness of enlightenment»3), whereas 1 University of Ljubljana. 2 Axel Honneth: Disrespect. The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Polity, Cambridge 2007, p. 30. 3 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer: Dialectic of Enlightenment. Verso, New York 1997, p. xi. 149 Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía Año 2013 Núm. 15. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 149-158 Arendt’s thoroughly negative evaluation of contemplative philosophies leads to the love of judging. Since we would like to rethink and defend the relevance of critical theories, in our case especially those of Arendt and Adorno, for the present, we must begin with the reconsideration of the presuppositions on which their critical philosophies stand. If the dangers of totalitarian politics –and by this, we mean all systems, which are exterminating human spontaneity and individuality in favour of repressive totality and unification of all humans– still exist, be it in the old or new forms, then their critical theories are certainly worth reconsidering. The aim of our discussion is to show Adorno’s and Arendt’s conviction that normative theories are not able to grasp the whole scope of so radically evil and perverted regimes as appearing in the twentieth century. In the first part, we will hence concentrate on their critique of normativism, especially concerning Kant’s philosophy. It is through their relentless confrontation with Kant’s normative practical reason and his moral philosophy as a whole that Arendt’s and Adorno’s critical thinking gains its shape. Further, in the second step, we will present their philosophies of plurality and difference and, in the last step, finally, look for the prospects of critical theories and its legitimation. I. Through Arendt’s and Adorno’s departure from Kant’s practical reason it is possible to demonstrate why their philosophies diverge from normativism and why after the era of grand atrocities it seems to be necessary to depart from traditional firm suppositions of what the moral principles are and what a good life is. Both philosophers agree that especially in the times of totalitarianisms the shortcomings of Kant’s individualistic ethical approach become evident and that his normativism cannot sufficiently protect against terror of unification. Arendt’s critique of Kant is closely linked with his notion of evil, especially radical evil as defined in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Already in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) she objects to how Kant introduced the notion of radical evil, which he was not properly able to reflect and accordingly «rationalized it in the concept of a “perverted ill will” that could be explained by comprehensible motives».4 At the time when The Origins of Totalitarianism were taking shape, she already doubts that Kant’s notion of radical evil could be sufficient for unders- tanding the unsteady era of totalitarian regimes. However, her real shift away from the prevailing philosophies of evil, including Kant’s, begins when she coins a new phrase –the banality of evil– during the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (book Eichmann in Jerusalem originally published in 1963). The banality of evil, still topical also in her last book The Life of the Mind (posthumous edition in 1978), should be understood as her way of breaking with the traditional conceptions of evil: «Behind that phrase [banality of evil], I held no thesis or doctrine, although I was dimly aware of the fact that it went counter to our tradition of thought –literary, 4 Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism. A Harvest Book, San Diego 1979, p. 459. 150 Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía Año 2013 Núm. 15. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 149-158 theological, or philosophic– about the phenomenon of evil».5 The main difference between the banality of evil and past conceptions is a newly accomplished separation between evil deeds and evil motives.6 As a result, it is not possible in the case of totalitarian evil to speak of de- monic, monstrous doers, but of their shallowness and especially their thoughtlessness. The connection between the notion of the will and that of the evil thus falls apart in Arendt’s conception, which leads her away from Kant’s definition of evil as of evil maxims or motives. In his theory, good and evil are always defined in relation to the will and the sole measure of the goodness or badness of a deed is its will. Conversely, Arendt’s banality of evil ascertains an entirely dissimilar notion: not the motives of the doer are essential, but only the deeds themselves in their entire monstrosity. Therefore, the banality of evil cannot be characterized with egoism or greed, whereas for Kant, on the other hand, evil still meant an egoistic act that has not undergone universalization. Kant’s entire moral theory is centred on the self and its connection to the moral law. Arendt’s critique stresses Kant’s orientation towards the life of the inner human being, which is in many aspects solipsistic, not directed to the world and without real interest for the plurality of humans. It is the isolation of human beings, their entire atomization and superfluousness and not the egoistic propositions that are the greatest danger of totalitarianisms and, hence, Kant’s practical reason is helpless in preventing them. In addition, it is this fact that makes Arendt sceptic about the use of Kant’s moral theory for the political sphere; moreover, she cannot agree that the distinction between good and evil in politics could be based on practical reason. In her Thinking Diary (Denktagebuch, 1950-1973) she articulates her doubts about Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: «It is impossible not to notice that in the Critique of Practical Reason and in other Kant’s moral essays there is no mentioning of so-called fellow men. It is really just about the Self and the solitary functioning reason. […] This is named as dispositional ethics [Gesinnungsethik] and dispositional ethics can be justified only in “border-situations”, when one can no longer assume the responsibility for the world».7 Because Kant’s moral philosophy emphasizes human dignity, self-respect, and pride, it prioritizes the care for oneself and not for others, thus we can speak of his ethics as individualistic, not concentrated on interactions and relations between people and the world, but only interested in individuals and their dispositions. Individualistic ethics cannot properly value the fact of plurality, which is central for Arendt’s political theory, and they are not able to grasp the full scope of extreme danger that emerges from this banal shallowness of the mob. In modern mass societies, the phenomenon of the banality of evil indicates why Kant’s normativism is not appropriate for, firstly, understanding and, secondly, preventing this modern terror of shallowness. 5 Hannah Arendt: The Life of the Mind. A Harvest Book, San Diego 1978, p. 3. 6 Ibídem, pp. 4-5. 7 Hannah Arendt: Denktagebuch, Bd 1. Piper, München 2003, p. 125. 151 Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía Año 2013 Núm. 15. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 149-158 Arendt criticizes self-centred ethics and favours the world of appearances and perspectivity. Therefore, her philosophy is also a critique of modern subjectivisms, which in their strivings for autonomy forget the external, natural, social, and political conditionings of humans.
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