The Authoritarian Gambit by Daniel H

The Authoritarian Gambit by Daniel H. Levine, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Michigan; Profesor Honorario de Ciencias Sociales, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú [email protected]

Venezuela is in the midst of a protracted, gained an absolute majority in December With electoral means put off the table bitter, often violent, and sometimes deadly 2015. and the very existence of the national struggle to determine what kind of society assembly threatened, ordinary political and government it will have and what kind What to do when electoral success becomes means lack validity, and the opposition of future Venezuelans can hope for. At the questionable and elections are no longer a turned to massive and continuous public time of writing (mid-August 2017) it is too reliable source of power or legitimation? demonstrations and civic strikes which early to know how this struggle will turn The first step is to disqualify opposing have become a constant presence in out, or what the process will be like until candidates on charges of corruption, or national life. Faced with such sustained some more or less settled pattern emerges. “incitation to violence,” or “failure to carry opposition, what tools remain to the But it is not too early to know what the out their duties.” If opposition candidates regime? The first choice has been repression regime and opposition want, to identify win anyway, a second step is to disqualify and intimidation—mass arrests of activists the tools with which they work, and to be elected officials. This has been the case of (tried in military courts), arrests of political clear about what they hope for and what numerous mayors and of three deputies prisoners in the middle of the night, and they fear. from Amazonas whose disqualification active, violent harassment of demonstrators kept the opposition from acquiring a and opposition figures by police and This regime wants above all to stay in supermajority (required to pass “organic proregime paramilitaries. power. Its principal leaders and enablers laws”) after gaining control in the electoral (army, national guard, police and political landslide of 2015. When the Assembly Let us be clear. The overwhelming weight police, and paramilitaries) fear a loss of passes laws, a further step has been to have of violence, the overwhelming control power which would limit their access the courts disqualify them (numerous laws and use of the means of violence, lies to goods and funds, and make them were declared unconstitutional on issues in the hands of the regime. Aided by vulnerable to legal and political processes, from amnesty to land title). If the problem paramilitary groups, official forces (like the for example for violations of human rights, persists, a next to final resort is to have the army, police, national guard, and political corruption, or drug trafficking. courts declare the Assembly in rebellion police) deploy considerable force every day and try to shut it down. This is what against manifestations and members of the As to tools, this has been an evolving sparked the round of protests that began in opposition. process. President Maduro clearly has early 2017 and continue to the present. exercised control of the executive branch If violence is not sufficient to quell protests, of government, including institutions that The Bolivarian constitution of 1999 the next step, given the opposition’s use of monitor and control elections, he has relied provides an elaborate mechanism for the constitution to legitimate its actions, on a compliant judiciary, and counted on a removing the president from office has been to scrap the constitution and start range of security (better called “insecurity”) through a recall election. What can be over. Hence the process of “electing” and forces that have played an active role done if the opposition gathers the required installing a National Constituent Assembly in harassment and repression of the signatures and looks likely to force a recall (vote July 30, installation immediately opposition. election? The first response, used ably after). This was no ordinary election: by Chávez himself when facing a recall candidates were preselected by the regime; What the regime no longer enjoys is the vote in 2004, is to engage in a series of no opposing views were represented. popular support that carried Hugo Chávez delays and sequential changes of rules Moreover, in contrast to the Constituent to a succession of electoral victories, the while strengthening the regime’s position Assembly that launched the Chávez period, last when he was clearly dying of cancer. with economic benefits. But the current there was no referendum to decide whether After Chávez’s death in early 2013, economic situation is so bad, and the or not such an assembly should be elected Maduro (his designated successor) was government’s popularity so low, that these in the first place. This is an assembly elected president by a tiny (and contested) do not appear sufficient. So what to do? imposed from above and designed to margin. Since that time the regime has The answer has been that if all else fails, create a fortified, armored authoritarian lost successive elections at the local and simply cancel elections indefinitely. At this system. It is important to realize that a regional level and lost control of the point the regime abandoned democracy. constituent assembly is a unique kind National Assembly, where the opposition of legislature, with no preset limits or

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controls, empowered to abolish all existing participation, venues, and candidates. There to suffer further, damaging the capacity of institutions, remove all existing officials, will be tightened controls over media, the regime to provide for basic needs. The and start from scratch. The Constituent information, and freedom of movement end result will be further damage to the Assembly began in this way, asserting its and association. The regime will crack well-being of Venezuelans. This is going to general authority and disqualifying or down on independent social movements, be a rough, costly, and likely violent ride, ousting opponents. particularly those that monitor events; so buckle up. shut down external funding; accelerate The preceding comments show the regime repression and imprisonment of activists, Supporters of the regime argue that the working to hold on to power through protesters, and opposition officials; troubles of Venezuela all stem from an an escalating series of measures, always accentuate all economic controls; and economic war against the country being accompanied by violence. If these are the increase the already significant role of the waged by imperialism. This story rings goals and tools of the regime, what of military in all production and distribution hollow to anyone who looks at the facts, the opposition? The short-term goals of of essentials like food and medicine. including the government’s own statistics. the opposition remain clear: to remove The only indices that have consistently the president by legal and constitutional Will the authoritarian gambit work? For gone up over the last five years are inflation means, hold new elections, free political how long? Similar efforts to stabilize (the highest in the world), poverty, deaths prisoners, and restart the economy authoritarian rule have worked, sometimes by violence, scarcity, out-migration (two by loosening controls and reopening lasting for a very long time. Regimes of this million Venezuelans already in self- international ties. All these have been laid kind face a few great perils. Free elections imposed exile3), and infectious disease, out in legislation regularly swatted away of any kind, including referenda, are with the return of once eliminated diseases by the Supreme Court. As the electoral dangerous (viz Nicaragua in 1990, Chile like malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and ground has gradually been constricted or in 1988, Uruguay in 1980).1 So we can chikungunya. Essential services from eliminated, and in the face of attacks on expect elections to be controlled. Sustained transport to electricity, potable water to the National Assembly and harassment internal opposition threatens to raise the public health, not to mention availability of deputies and other elected officials, cost of control to an excessive level. So we of food and medicines, have all collapsed. the opposition has turned to massive, can expect more repression. Continued, The regular repetition of the claim that it continuous public protests in an effort accelerated economic decay will further is all somebody else’s fault reminds one of to rally and consolidate support and fuel opposition and out-migration. We can Groucho Marx’s famous line in the movie keep the issues on the public (national also expect escalating violence and serial Duck Soup. When faced with someone he and transnational) agenda. In these the defections from the ruling coalition (e.g., is unable to convince of something clearly opposition has been successful, but the miltiary officers, public officials), which can absurd, who will not swallow a half-baked regime hangs on, entrenched behind its probably be contained, at least for a while. story, Groucho’s character, Rufus T. Firefly, security forces and now with a Constituent asks: “You gonna believe me or you gonna Assembly to provide a legal foundation The options for the opposition are above believe your lying eyes?” more to its liking. all to maintain unity, sustain a public presence, avoid provocations, and mobilize I prefer to believe my eyes. I believe in How this contest will work out is difficult and coordinate support within the country facts—what we can see with our eyes to predict in detail. For the regime and from international sources. Venezuela and with the tools of political and social the choice is clear: double down on is already very isolated internationally analysis. The facts are as outlined above: authoritarian rule or risk losing everything. in both political and economic terms. a struggle between a regime desperate The Constituent Assembly is the vehicle Numerous governments and transnational to hold on to power by any means and for that doubling down. It is impossible groups (Mercosur, the European Union, working to consolidate a more secure and to know precisely what the Assembly the UN, and the Vatican) have condemned lasting authoritarianism, and an opposition will come up with, but some informed the destruction of democracy and declined hoping to restore political democracy and speculation is in order: assert control of to recognize the Constituent Assembly.2 civil and social liberties. These are the all institutions; continue to provide for International carriers have cut service, and facts. Hopefully LASA as an institution elections but with severe controls on access, trade including petroleum exports is likely committed to democracy and human

2 DEBATES: ON VENEZUELA

Medium- and Short-Term Historical Causes of Venezuela’s Crisis

by Reuben Zahler | Associate Professor of History, University of Oregon | [email protected]

rights will take a principled stand and I have conducted research in Venezuela accelerated these trends, and in so doing unequivocally condemn the destruction since the early days of Hugo Chávez’s has caused far greater damage than the of democracy in Venezuela, a process presidency, when his movement was previous administrations. unfolding before our horrified eyes. idealistic and optimistic. At the time, as a burgeoning scholar of nineteenth-century To understand present-day Venezuela we Latin American history, I wanted to work should return to 1958, when a coalition Notes in a country that would be a safe location of civilians and military personnel ousted 1 The Sandinistas lost power in 1990 when to conduct my research. I had traveled Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the country’s last Daniel Ortega was defeated in presidential throughout Central America and the Andes military dictator. Then the country’s three elections by Violeta Chamorro. Military in the 1980s and had seen the travesties of main political parties met and signed plans for indefinite rule were defeated in civil war and drug violence. In contrast, the Pact of Punto Fijo, which laid the plebiscites in Chile (1988) and Uruguay since the 1970s scholars had written about groundwork for democratic governments (1980). Democratic government was restored “Venezuelan exceptionalism” in reference for decades to come. Under this pact, following free elections in both countries (elections in Chile in December 1989, elections to the country’s use of oil revenues to elected governments would include in Uruguay in November 1984). foster stable democracy and socioeconomic members from different parties sitting in development, successfully avoiding the president’s cabinet and the legislature, 2 Cf. the Declaration of Lima (August 8, 2017), the military dictatorships and extreme and they would exclude parties from the signed by foreign ministers and representives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, violence that plagued Latin America in far right and far left. Labor leaders also Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, the 1970s–1990s. On my first trip to signed the pact, agreeing to work with and Paraguay. On the same day, the UN High Venezuela, as a graduate student in the state and industrial leaders to negotiate Commissioner for Human Rights denounced year 2000, I saw a stable democracy with agreement without resorting to violence widespread torture and abuse of human rights a comparatively high standard of living, or strikes. Puntofijismo sought to create by the Maduro regime. which I assumed would remain a safe stable, moderate governments that could 3 A. Torres, P. De Lllano, A. Marcos, and G. location for me to conduct my research. defend themselves against radicals from Ballesteros, “El Chavismo lleva al exilio a más This turned out to be a poor prediction. the right or the left. In many ways, it de dos miliones de Venezolanos,” El País, August The country now is either a failed state or worked for almost four decades. Aside 13, 2017. close to it and has among the highest rates from a comparatively small leftist-guerrilla of homicide and kidnapping in the world. movement in the 1960s, this country The last five years mark the country’s weathered the remainder of the Cold War harshest descent in terms of political, as a peaceful constitutional democracy. economic, and living standards since its war of independence (1810–1823), when it Nonetheless, serious social, economic, lost one-third of the population. and political problems emerged under puntofijismo, which persist to this day. So how did we get here? A full answer is Here I will address two of these problems. beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, The first was a lack of government an exploration of weaknesses in Venezuelan accountability to its citizens. In theory, a democracy since its inception in 1958, democratic citizenry can affect state policy along with recent governmental policies, through voting or refusing to pay taxes. point toward some key observations. In Venezuela, however, the ruling parties Since well before chavismo, Venezuelan did not need citizen support as much as governments have lacked accountability access to petrodollars that could be used to their citizens and have been highly to continue ineffective policies, curry corrupt. Also, rather than foster sustainable favors, and buy votes. Politicians thus economic policies, these governments were often immune to the pressures from a have focused on consolidating power discontented citizenry. This disconnect from unto themselves. The current regime has popular opinion became even stronger