DOCSLIB.ORG

The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution- Making Process As an Instrument for Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution- Making Process As an Instrument for Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime 19 The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution- Making Process as an Instrument for Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime Allan R. Brewer-Carías n December 1999, a new constitution state power, state centralization, extreme was approved in Venezuela as a result of presidentialism, extensive state participation a constitution-making process developed in the economy, general marginalization of Iduring that year. A national constituent as- civil society in public activities, exaggerated sembly elected that same year sanctioned the state social obligations reflecting state oil- new constitution, which was submitted to a income populism, and extreme militarism.4 referendum held on December 15, 1999, and Unfortunately, the warning signs of 1999– approved.1 20005 have become reality. The political sys- © CopyrightThis author was an elected by member the of the Endowmenttem that arose from the 1999 constitution- of national constituent assembly, participating making process has turned out to be the thein all Unitedits sessions and constitutional States discus- Institutecurrent authoritarian of regime, Peace led by former sions. Nonetheless, eventually he opposed lieutenant-general Hugo Chavez Frías, one the sanctioning of the constitution and was of the leaders of the failed 1992 coup d’état.6 one of the leaders of the political campaign Chavez was elected president of the republic against approving the constitution in the in the general elections of December 19987 referendum. This position was based on his and was reelected in December 2006.8 Af- multiple dissenting and negative votes in the ter nine years of consolidating the existing constituent assembly and on his publicly ex- authoritarian regime, in August 2007 he pressed fear that the new constitution,2 de- proposed to the national assembly a radical spite its advanced civil and political rights reform to the constitution to formally con- regulations,3 was an instrument framed to solidate a socialist, centralized, and militaris- develop an authoritarian regime. This fear tic police state.9 The assembly sanctioned the was based on the constitution’s provisions reforms on November 2, 2007; the people, allowing the possibility of concentration of however, rejected them in a referendum held 505 506 Allan R. Brewer-Carías on December 2, 2007. In any event, these constitution, through a coup d’état, a revolu- sorts of fundamental transformations of the tion, or a civil war.14 state can only be sanctioned by a national The constitution-making process of 1999, constituent assembly,10 and cannot be ap- in contrast, had a peculiarity that made it proved by a “constitutional reform” proce- different from all the previous processes in dure under Article 342 of the constitution, Venezuelan history, and even from many as the president proposed in contravention similar processes that have occurred in other of the constitution. In 2009, one of the re- countries in the last decades: It was not the jected “constitutional” reforms proposals of result of a de facto rejection of the previous 2007, seeking to establish the possibility for constitution, through a revolution, a war, or a the continuous reelection of the president of coup d’état. Rather, similar to the 1991 Co- the republic, was again submitted to refer- lombian, 2006 Bolivian, and 2007 Ecuador- endum held on February 15, 2009, this time ian15 constitutional processes, the Venezu- by means of a “constitutional amendment,” elan constitutional process of 1999 began as which was finally approved.11 a democratic process that in its origins did The 1999 constitution replaced the pre- not involve a rupture of the previous political vious 1961 constitution,12 becoming the regime.16 twenty-sixth such document in the history That said, the process did take place in the of the country.13 The 1999 constitution- context of a severe political crisis17 that was making process was not the first of its kind affecting the functioning of the democratic in Venezuelan constitutional history. Origi- regime established in 1958.18 The crisis had nally, the independent and autonomous state arisen from the lack of evolution from a sys- of Venezuela was created through two initial tem of overly centralized political parties,19 constitution-making processes. The first one which existed then and still exists to this took place in 1811, after the declaration of day. The call for the referendum consult- independence ( July 5, 1811) of the Spanish ing the people on the establishment of the colonies that were integrated in 1777 into constituent national assembly, made by the the General Captaincy of Venezuela, creat- then–newly elected Chavez through a decree ing the Confederation of States of Venezu- issued on February 2, 1999, intended to ask ©ela (1811Copyright constitution). The second by process the the peopleEndowment their opinion on a constituent of na- occurred in 1830, after the separation of the tional assembly “aimed at transforming the provinces of Venezuela from the Republic of State and creating a new legal order that al- Colombiathe Unitedthat had been created States nine years lows Institute the effective functioning of of Peacea social and earlier, in 1821, by Simon Bolivar, when he participative democracy.”20 This formal raison managed to integrate the ancient Spanish d’etre of the constitutional process of 1999 is colonies established in what is today the ter- why, with few exceptions, it would have been ritories of Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezu- difficult to find anyone in the country who ela (1830 constitution). opposed it. Few would argue against trans- Seven later constitution-making processes forming the state and putting into practice a were carried out in 1858, 1863, 1893, 1901, social, participative, and effective form of de- 1914, 1946, and 1953 through constit- mocracy. To accomplish this goal, undoubt- uent assemblies or congresses, with as many edly, a political conciliation and participative resulting constitutions. In each case, the process were necessary. constitution-making process was the conse- But unfortunately, Chavez did not for- quence of a de facto rejection of the existing mally conceive the constitutional process as Framing the State in Times of Transition 507 an instrument of conciliation aimed at recon- cial and participative democracy, unless one structing the democratic system and assuring can consider as democratic the election of a good governance. That would have required populist government that has concentrated the political commitment of all components all branches of government and crushed po- of society and the participation of all sectors litical pluralism. If political changes of great of society in the design of a new functioning importance have been made, some of them democracy, which did not occur.21 Instead, have contributed to aggravating the factors the constitutional process of 1999 facilitated that provoked the crisis in the first place. the total takeover of state power by a new New political actors have assumed power, but political group that crushed all the others, far from implementing a democratic concili- including the then-existing political parties. ation policy, they have accentuated the dif- Almost all opportunities for inclusion and ferences among Venezuelans, worsening po- public participation were squandered. More- litical polarization and making conciliation over, the constitution-making process be- increasingly difficult. The seizure of power came an endless coup d’etat22 when the con- that characterized the process has opened stituent assembly, elected in July 1999, began new wounds, making social and political ri- to violate the existing 1961 constitution by valries worse than they have been for more assuming powers it lacked under that text than a century. Despite Venezuela’s extraor- and under the terms of the April referendum dinary oil wealth during the first years of the that created it. As an independent nonparti- twenty-first century, the social problems of san candidate, this author was elected to the the country have increased. 1999 constituent assembly and participated in all its discussions; he dissented orally and in writing on all these unconstitutional and The Political System, the Crisis undemocratic decisions.23 of 1999, and the Need for Democratic The following sections trace the regime’s Reconstruction seizure of power, beginning with the con- To understand the failure of Venezuela’s sultative referendum on the calling of a con- 1999 constitution-making process as an in- stituent assembly in April 1999, continu- strument aimed at reinforcing democracy, © Copyrighting through the election of bythe constituent the Endowmentit is essential to analyze its political of back - assembly in July 1999 and the period from ground. As previously mentioned, the pro- August 1999 to January 2000, during which cess began in the midst of a crisis facing the thethe assemblyUnited exercised supraconstitutionalStates Institutepolitical system established of Peacein Venezuela at power, and finally through the drafting, dis- the end of the 1950s. That system was es- cussion, and approval of a new constitution tablished as a consequence of the democratic by referendum in December 1999. The re- (civil-military) revolution of 1958, during view shows that the 1999 constitution- which then-president of the republic Gen- making process failed as an instrument for po- eral Marcos Perez Jimenez, who had led a litical reconciliation and democratization.24 military government for almost a decade, With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear fled the country. that the stated democratic purposes of the The democratic revolution was led mainly process have not been accomplished. There by three political parties, the consolida- also has not been an effective reform of the tion of which began in the 1940s: the social state, except for the purpose of authoritarian democratic Acción Democrática (AD), the institution building, or the creation of a so- Christian democratic Partido Social Cris- 508 Allan R. Brewer-Carías tiano (COPEI), and the liberal Unión Re- ment by statute of a different system at the publicana Democrática (URD) parties.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • No Room for Debate the National Constituent Assembly and the Crumbling of the Rule of Law in Venezuela
    No Room for Debate The National Constituent Assembly and the Crumbling of the Rule of Law in Venezuela July 2019 Composed of 60 eminent judges and lawyers from all regions of the world, the International Commission of Jurists promotes and protects human rights through the Rule of Law, by using its unique legal expertise to develop and strengthen national and international justice systems. Established in 1952 and active on the five continents, the ICJ aims to ensure the progressive development and effective implementation of international human rights and international humanitarian law; secure the realization of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights; safeguard the separation of powers; and guarantee the independence of the judiciary and legal profession. ® No Room for Debate - The National Constituent Assembly and the Crumbling of the Rule of Law in Venezuela © Copyright International Commission of Jurists Published in July 2019 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) permits free reproduction of extracts from any of its publications provided that due acknowledgment is given and a copy of the publication carrying the extract is sent to its headquarters at the following address: International Commission of Jurists P.O. Box 91 Rue des Bains 33 Geneva Switzerland No Room for Debate The National Constituent Assembly and the Crumbling of the Rule of Law in Venezuela This report was written by Santiago Martínez Neira, consultant to the International Commission of Jurists. Carlos Ayala, Sam Zarifi and Ian Seiderman provided legal and policy review. This report was written in Spanish and translated to English by Leslie Carmichael. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ...............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Judgment of 18 December 2020
    18 DECEMBER 2020 JUDGMENT ARBITRAL AWARD OF 3 OCTOBER 1899 (GUYANA v. VENEZUELA) ___________ SENTENCE ARBITRALE DU 3 OCTOBRE 1899 (GUYANA c. VENEZUELA) 18 DÉCEMBRE 2020 ARRÊT TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraphs CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROCEDURE 1-22 I. INTRODUCTION 23-28 II. HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 29-60 A. The Washington Treaty and the 1899 Award 31-34 B. Venezuela’s repudiation of the 1899 Award and the search for a settlement of the dispute 35-39 C. The signing of the 1966 Geneva Agreement 40-44 D. The implementation of the Geneva Agreement 45-60 1. The Mixed Commission (1966-1970) 45-47 2. The 1970 Protocol of Port of Spain and the moratorium put in place 48-53 3. From the good offices process (1990-2014 and 2017) to the seisin of the Court 54-60 III. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT 61-101 A. The “controversy” under the Geneva Agreement 64-66 B. Whether the Parties gave their consent to the judicial settlement of the controversy under Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement 67-88 1. Whether the decision of the Secretary-General has a binding character 68-78 2. Whether the Parties consented to the choice by the Secretary-General of judicial settlement 79-88 C. Whether the consent given by the Parties to the judicial settlement of their controversy under Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement is subject to any conditions 89-100 IV. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 102-115 A. The conformity of the decision of the Secretary-General of 30 January 2018 with Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement 103-109 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume Xi
    CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) - VOLUME XI Thursday, the 24th November, 1949 -------------- The Constituent Assembly of India met in the Constitution Hall, New Delhi, at Ten of the Clock, Mr. President (The Honourable Dr. Rajendra Prasad) in the Chair ------------- TAKING THE PLEDGE AND SIGNING THE REGISTER Mr. President : I understand some new Members have come--Members from Vindhya Pradesh. They have to take the pledge now and sign the register. The following Members took the Pledge and Signed the Register:- 1. Captain Awadesh Pratap Singh 2. Shri Shambu Nath shukla United State of 3. Pandit Ram Sahai Tewari Vindhya Pradesh 4. Shri Mannulalji Dwivedi -------------- DRAFT CONSTITUTION-(Contd.) Mr. President: We are now to resume discussion of the Draft Constitution. I desire to point out to honourable Members that although 77 Members have so far spoken on the motion of Dr. Ambedkar, I have got 54 names still on the list and we have only this day and perhaps one hour tomorrow for this purpose. So all these Members cannot possibly be accommodated within these six hours or 6 ½ hours if they speak at the rate other Members have spoken and I leave it to them either to take as much time as they like and deprive others of the opportunity of speaking or simply to come forward, speak a few words so that their names may also go down on record and let as many of others as possible get an opportunity of joining in this. Shri Guptanath Singh (Bihar: General): Sir, I want to make a suggestion. It seems a large number of Members are eager to speak.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Instant Universal Suffrage
    July 2017, Volume 28, Number 3 $14.00 India’s Democracy at 70 Ashutosh Varshney Christophe Jaffrelot Louise Tillin Eswaran Sridharan Swati Ramanathan and Ramesh Ramanathan Ronojoy Sen Subrata Mitra Sumit Ganguly The Rise of Referendums Liubomir Topaloff Matt Qvortrup China’s Disaffected Insiders Kevin J. O’Brien Dan Paget on Tanzania Sergey Radchenko on Turkmenistan Marlene Laruelle on Central Asia’s Kleptocrats What Europe’s History Teaches Sheri Berman Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning Ramanathan.PRE created by BK on 4/17/17. PGS created by BK on 5/25/17. India’s Democracy at 70 THE IMPACT OF INSTANT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE Swati Ramanathan and Ramesh Ramanathan Swati Ramanathan and Ramesh Ramanathan are cofounders of the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy in Bangalore, Kar- nataka. This essay was written when the authors were visiting fellows at the Center for Contemporary South Asia, Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs, Brown University. On 15 August 2017, India will celebrate the seventieth anniversary of its independence. Acting just a few years after independence in 1947, the authors of the Constitution of 1950 took the extraordinarily bold step of establishing universal suffrage.1 All adult citizens—at that time they numbered 173 million—received the right to vote. With this singular act, India became the world’s first large democracy to adopt universal adult suffrage from its very inception as an independent nation.2 We call India’s move “instant universal suffrage,” to distinguish it from “in- cremental suffrage,” which is the more common historical experience by which the vote is extended more gradually.3 In nearly all Western democracies, suffrage rights broadened only over an extended period of time.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CHAVEZ Pages
    Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 1, pp 63–76, 2003 The Chávez phenomenon: political change in Venezuela RONALD D SYLVIA & CONSTANTINE P DANOPOULOS ABSTRACT This article focuses on the advent and governing style of, and issues facing colonel-turned politician Hugo Chávez since he became president of Venezuela in 1998 with 58% of the vote. The article begins with a brief account of the nature of the country’s political environment that emerged in 1958, following the demise of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship. Aided by phenomenal increases in oil prices, Venezuela’s political elites reached a pact that governed the country for nearly four decades. Huge increases in education, health and other social services constituted the hallmark of Venezuela’s ‘subsidised democracy’. Pervasive corruption, a decrease in oil revenues and two abortive coups in 1992 challenged the foundations of subsidised democracy. The election of Chávez in 1998 sealed the fate of the 1958 pact. Chávez’s charisma, anti- colonial/Bolivarist rhetoric, and increasing levels of poverty form the basis of his support among the poor and dissatisfied middle classes. The articles then turns its attention to Chávez’s governing style and the problems he faces as he labours to turn around the country’s stagnant economy. Populist initiatives aimed at wealth redistribution, land reform and a more multidimensional and Third World-orientated foreign policy form the main tenets of the Chávez regime. These, coupled with anti-business rhetoric, over-dependence on oil revenues and opposition from Venezuela’s political and economic elites, have polarised the country and threaten its political stability.
    [Show full text]
  • Venezuela: Background and U.S
    Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Updated June 4, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44841 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Venezuela remains in a deep political and economic crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Chávez (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans and much of the international community consider illegitimate. Since January, Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s democratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has sought to form an interim government to serve until internationally observed elections can be held. Although the United States and 53 other countries recognize Guaidó as interim president, the military high command, supported by Russia and Cuba, has remained loyal to Maduro. Venezuela is in a political stalemate as conditions in the country deteriorate. Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. It is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages of food and medicine, and electricity blackouts that have worsened an already dire humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, United Nations officials estimated that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty and 7 million need humanitarian assistance. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, but most observers cite economic mismanagement and corruption under Chávez and Maduro for the current crisis. U.N. agencies estimate that 3.7 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of March 2019, primarily to other Latin American and Caribbean countries. U.S. Policy The United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Constituent Assembly Debates Official Report
    Monday, 15th November, 1948 Volume VII 4-11-1948 to 8-1-1949 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OFFICIAL REPORT REPRINTED BY LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT, NEW DELHI SIXTH REPRINT 2014 Printed by JAINCO ART INDIA, New Delhi CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA President : THE HONOURABLE DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD Vice-President : DR. H.C. MOOKHERJEE Constitutional Adviser : SIR B.N. RAU, C.I.E. Secretary : SHRI H.V. IENGAR, C.I.E., I.C.S. Joint Secretary : SHRI S.N. MUKERJEE Deputy Secretary : SHRI JUGAL KISHORE KHANNA Under Secretary : SHRI K.V. PADMANABHAN Marshal : SUBEDAR MAJOR HARBANS RAI JAIDKA CONTENTS ————— Volume VII—4th November 1948 to 8th January 1949 Pages Pages Thursday, 4th November 1948 Thursday, 18th November, 1948— Presentation of Credentials and Taking the Pledge and Signing signing the Register .................. 1 the Register ............................... 453 Taking of the Pledge ...................... 1 Draft Constitution—(contd.) ........... 453—472 Homage to the Father of the Nation ........................................ 1 [Articles 3 and 4 considered] Condolence on the deaths of Friday, 19th November 1948— Quaid-E-Azam Mohammad Ali Draft Constitution—(contd.) ........... 473—500 Jinnah, Shri D.P. Khaitan and [Articles 28 to 30-A considered] Shri D.S. Gurung ...................... 1 Amendments to Constituent Monday, 22nd November 1948— Assembly Rules 5-A and 5-B .. 2—12 Draft Constitution—(contd.) ........... 501—527 Amendment to the Annexure to the [Articles 30-A, 31 and 31-A Schedule .................................... 12—15 considered] Addition of New Rule 38V ........... 15—17 Tuesday, 23rd November 1948— Programme of Business .................. 17—31 Draft Constitution—(contd.) ........... 529—554 Motion re Draft Constitution ......... 31—47 Appendices— [Articles 32, 33, 34, 34-A, 35, 36, 37 Appendix “A” .............................
    [Show full text]
  • Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016
    Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016 Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs January 23, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43239 Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016 Summary Although historically the United States had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier, friction in bilateral relations increased under the leftist, populist government of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), who died in 2013 after battling cancer. After Chávez’s death, Venezuela held presidential elections in which acting President Nicolás Maduro narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), with the opposition alleging significant irregularities. In 2014, the Maduro government violently suppressed protests and imprisoned a major opposition figure, Leopoldo López, along with others. In December 2015, the MUD initially won a two-thirds supermajority in National Assembly elections, a major defeat for the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The Maduro government subsequently thwarted the legislature’s power by preventing three MUD representatives from taking office (denying the opposition a supermajority) and using the Supreme Court to block bills approved by the legislature. For much of 2016, opposition efforts were focused on recalling President Maduro through a national referendum, but the government slowed down the referendum process and suspended it indefinitely in October. After an appeal by Pope Francis, the government and most of the opposition (with the exception of Leopoldo López’s Popular Will party) agreed to talks mediated by the Vatican along with the former presidents of the Dominican Republic, Spain, and Panama and the head of the Union of South American Nations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Constituent Assemblies in Constitution Making
    The Role of Constituent Assemblies in Constitution Making Yash Ghai1 Introduction With the increase in constitution making around the world, there is a growing interest in the role of a constituent assembly. The distinguishing characteristic of a constituent assembly is that it is established to make a constitution, or at least that this is its primary role. The constituent assembly is still the most common mode of making a constitution. Unlike past times, a constitution is no longer accepted as an imposition by a victor or dominant group over others (or a grant by a monarch or a president), or even that the military would promulgate the constitution (though both these situations happened in the last few decades—Nigeria’s democratic constitutions of 1979 and 1989 were promulgated by the military, although based to some extent on the work of constitution commissions and constituent assemblies). Distinguishing a constituent assembly from other constitution making mechanisms might suggest that it is a distinct species (with its generally accepted characteristics). But the fact is that between constituent assemblies there can be (and have been) enormous differences in the composition, functions and modes of operation. These differences have a major impact on the manner in which the process of making a constitution is conducted as well as its orientation and outcome. The paper reviews these various possibilities, drawing on the experiences of many countries’ constitution making processes, from the American Convention and the French Assembly of the 1790s to the Kenyan National Constitutional Conference 2001-4 and the Transitional National Assembly of Iraq 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections in Venezuela: Changes in the Rules of the Game
    Public Issues Nº 985 October 1st, 2010 www.lyd.org ISSN 0717-1528 Elections in Venezuela: Changes in the Rules of the Game Following the results of the legislative elections The extent of Chávez’s victory is of last Sunday in Venezuela there were no currently conditioned with regard to the celebrations in the Miraflores palace. The electorate’s majority denied Hugo Chávez the application of radical changes in the consent, thus clearly limiting his power following years, since now it has a yearnings. counterweight in the Assembly. According to the last balance, of 165 seats, Nevertheless, the country’s complex President Hugo Chávez did not reach his goal economical and political situation of two thirds (110 seats) which is essential to progress in his project of socialism for the 21st foretells difficult times for Venezuela. If Century and to be strengthened for the there is no open, democratic and free presidential poll of 2012. The opposition, congregated in the Democratic Unity coalition society, it is hard to believe that this (MUD) attained 65 representatives in the country will be able to progress National Assembly, putting an end to the towards true development. officialist supremacy. It is meaningful that, while Chávez obtained a tie in popular voting, the manipulated Venezuelan election system gave him a large victory in the number of seats. What do we understand by democracy? After eleven years of Chávez’s presidency, Venezuela found itself immersed in a series of electoral consultations which started with the call for a Constituent Assembly, that was not stipulated in the current Constitution, and which culminated with his presidential reelection on December 3rd 2006, thus continuing his mandate until December 2012 and being able to reelect himself indefinitely thanks to an amendment in January 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • THE Bolsheviks' Destruction of the Russian Constituent Assembly and the Making of the FIRST COMMUNI
    57 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/SPS.2019-2.4 Pieter C. van DUin - ZUZana POLÁČKOvÁ1 Pieter C. van Duin, University of Leiden, Leiden, Holandské kráľovstvo Zuzana Poláčková, Historický ústav SAV, Bratislava THE BIG BANG OF COMMUNISM: THE BOLsheviKs’ DestrUCtiOn Of the rUssian COnstitUent assemBLy anD the maKing OF THE FIRST COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP (NOVEMBER 1917-JANUARY 1918) This essay examines the suppression by the Bolsheviks in January 1918 of Russia’s first democrati- cally elected parliament, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and the various steps taken and argu- ments used by them during the preceding weeks to achieve this goal. Although Lenin and his Bolshevik party had never intended to tolerate the emergence of the Constituent Assembly as a competing political institution to their so-called Soviet democracy, they had to take care to present their repressive interven- tion as a rational and inevitable act from a revolutionary point of view. This crucial historical episode reveals the true character of the communist movement and communist ideology, which developed into one of the most dangerous threats to European democracy. There were several socialist parties in Rus- sia who tried to fight the Bolsheviks and to present a democratic-socialist alternative, in particular the moderate (‘Right’) wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The last section of this essay pays some additional attention to Viktor Chernov, a leader of the democratic group of Socialist-Revolutionaries and the President of the Constituent Assembly. In 1921 he fled to Czechoslovakia, where he lived until 1929. Key words. Communism; Bolshevism; democracy; Russia; Socialist-Revolutionaries; Viktor Chernov The Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd on 7 November 1917 (25 October on the Old Russian calendar), known among faithful communists as the ‘Great October Revolution’, was shocking to most non-Bolsheviks and even to some Bolshevik party members themselves.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Populism, Constitutional Courts and Civil Society1 Andrew Arato
    Populism, Constitutional Courts and Civil Society1 Andrew Arato, November- December 2018 Introduction The antagonism of populist governments to apex courts is, as I will show, a matter of historical record. It started with Peronism, the first time that an openly populist movement established its own government.2 In section 1 below I will summarize current efforts by dominant executives to pack and disempower supreme and constitutional courts in Peru, Russia, Venezuela, Israel, Hungary, Turkey and Poland. After a preliminary definition of populism in section 2, I will consider, in the next section, the reasons why populist movements once in government attack the independence of apex courts. I will argue that such an effort is a key indication of populism in government moving toward establishing itself as a regime. I will next try to summarize the harm involved in these cases to constitutional democracy. In the final fourth section, using the examples of Poland and the United States, I will maintain that the way to oppose populist authoritarianism and its attack on courts requires a strategy that is both legal and political, based on the mutual support of associations and initiatives of civil society and courts. I will argue that such an effort requires facing the democratic deficit of liberal representative democracy, and reliance on an alternative conception, namely the “plurality of democracies.” I. Admittedly, no current populist government has gone as far Peron’s in 1947 when he has initiated the impeachment and trial of 4 out of 5 Supreme Court justices, with one of them resigning before impeachment succeeded.3 As indicated by the table below, removal and/or packing are only two of the possible forms of bringing a court under government control.
    [Show full text]