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US V. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

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US V. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed CHARGE SHEET I. PERSONAL DATA 1. NAME OF ACCUSED: . KHAUD SHEIKH MOHAMMED Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin 'Attash Ramzi Binalshibh Ali Abdul Aziz Ali Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsa~ li1'1ol,!iliJed !ill(elitel"li ~Jc. Sit. ~ 2. ALIASES OF ACCUSED: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (aliases Mukhtar al Baluchi; Hafiz; Meer Akram; Abdul Rahman Abdullah AI Ghamdi) Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin 'Attash (aliases Khallad; Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf; Silver; Tawfiq) I Ramzl Blnalshlbh (aliases Abu Ubaydah; Ahad Abdollahi Sabet; Abu Ubaydah al Hadraml) AI'I Abd UI Az'IZ AI'I (aI'lases Ammar a I B a Iuc h'I; Isam Mansur; Isam Mansar; Isam \VI ansour; AI'I; Hani.) Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (aliases Zahir; Hashem Abdollahi; Muhammad Ahanad; Abderahman Mustaf ) Mel'leffleaell(ei=lteFli (aliases ,'I,i=lfflea el GaRtaFli; Mei=lefflea al Gel'lteFli; Aeell:,1 RSAfflSA al JaAeebi)~/C. SJfJ ~ 3. ISN NUMBER OF ACCUSED (LAST FOUR): Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (10024) Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin 'Attash (10014) Ramzi Binalshibh (10013) Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (10018) Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (10011) li1'1ohaliied all(alltalii (0063)c:fJ~ ~!,!t'l II. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS 4. CHARGE: VIOLATION OF SECTION AND TITLE OF CRIME IN PART IV OF M.M.C. SPECIFICATION: See Attached Charges and Specifications. III. SWEARING OF CHARGES ORGANIZ~TION 5a. NAME OF ACCUSER (LAST, FIRST, MI) 5b.GRADE 5c. OF ACCUSER Dejong, Laura, S 0-3 Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) 5e. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 5d. SIZ'rURE OF ACCUSERl}P:Jr0-.ff 20080415 ttU1j}( S. 'P' (J AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, auth<{plzed by law to administer oath in cases of this character, personally appeared the above named accuser.the 15th day of ~~, 2008, and signed the foregoing charges and specifications under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that helshe has personal knowledge of or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of his/her knowledge and belief. > Kevin M. Chenail Office of Militarx Commissions Typed Name of Offioer OrganizatIon of Offioer Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Judge Advocate Grade Offioial Capaoity to Administer Oath (See R.M. C. 307(b) must be commissioned officer) g ~~ 7 Signature MC FORM 458 JAN 2007 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk IV. NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED 6.0n 30 April 2008 the accused was notified of the charges against himlher (See R.M.C. 308). Clayton G. Trivett, Jr., G8-14 Office of Military Commissions Typed Name and Grade ofPerson Who Caused Organizafion ofthe Person Who Caused Accused to Be Notified of Charges Accused to Be Notified of Charges 7~~#C~ V. RECEIPT OF CHARGES BY CONVENING AUTHORITY 7. The sworn charges were received at 1751 hours, on 15 April 2008,at Arlington, Virginia Location For the Convening Authority: Donna· L. Wilkins Typed Name of Officer GS-15 ~u.;.;;,gn.",.~... VI. REFERRAL 8a. DESIGNATION OF CONVENING AUTHORITY 8b. PLACE Be. DATE (YYVYMMDD) Convening Authority 10 USC § 948 h .2Cog~Soq Appointed on 6 Feb 2007 . Arlington, VA Referred for trial to the ~capital military commission convened by military commission convening order 08-01 Dated 10 April 2008 1 subject to the following instructions : See Continuation Sheet. ~ ~ Command, Order, or Direction Susan J. Crawford Conveninq Authority 10 USC § 948h Typed Name and Grade of deer Official Capacity ofOfficer Signing ~J~wtT~ Signature(/ VII. SERVICE OF CHARGES 9. On , I (caused to be) served a copy these charges on the above named accused. Typed Name of Trial Counsel Grade of Trial Counsel Signature of Trial Counsel FOOTNOTES See R.M.C. 601 concerning instructions. If none, so state. Me FORM 458 JAN 2007 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk CONTINUATION SHEET - MC FORM 458 JAN 2007, Block VI Referral In the case of United States of America v. KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (aliases: Mukhtar al Baluchi; Hafiz; Meer Akram; Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al Ghamdi) The charges against the above named accused will be tried at a joint or common trial with the trials of: 0 Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin 'Attash; Ramzi Binalshibh; Ali Abdul Aziz Ali; and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi. The charges against Mohammed al Kahtani will not be tried at this joint trial. This case is referred capital. See R.M.C. 103(a)(3) and (4). Susan J. Crawford Convening Authority 10 USC § 948h Date: /l..(Jf76~S-(J9 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. §950v(b)(28), CONSPIRACY Specification: In that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 'Y~Yd Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin'Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali;}Justafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi aBd Mallamed a. KalltaBi, persons subject to trial by military commission as alien unlawful enemy combatants, did, at various locations, from in or about 1996 to in or about May 2003, conspire and agree with Usama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, Mo~a.rned al Kahtan; Mohammed Atef(a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri), 19 individuals who hijacked four commercial airliners on September 11,2001: (American Airlines Flight 11, hereinafter AA #11) Mohamed Atta, Satarn al Suqami, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri, Abdul Aziz al Omari; (United Airlines Flight 175, hereinafter UA #175) Marwan al Shehhi, Harnza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan Al Qadi Banihammad (hereinafter Fayez Banihammad); (United Airlines Flight 93, hereinafter UA #93) Ziad Samir Jarrah, Ahmad Ibrahim A. al Haznawi, Ahmed al Nami, Saeed al Ghamdi; (American Airlines Flight 77, hereinafter AA #77) Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Majed Moqed, Salem al Hazmi; and various other members and associates ofthe al Qaeda organization, known and unknown, and willfully join an enterprise ofpersons with the intent to further the unlawful purpose ofthe enterprise; to commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, murder in violation of the law ofwar, destruction ofproperty in violation ofthe law ofwar, and t:twrism, said agreement and enterpnse. sh' armg a common cnmma. 1 purpose, known to t h e ~ve.accuse, d to attack the United States, its people, and their property, said conspiracy resulting in the deaths of2,973 persons. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for a list ofvictims killed in the attacks). In furtherance ofthis agreement and enterprise, and in o~~er to accomplish some objective or purpose ofthe agreement and enterprise, the above sWfaccused and their co~ conspirators knowingly committed an overt act or acts, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. In August 1996, Usarna bin Laden issued a public "Declaration ofJihad Against the Americans," in which he called for the murder ofU.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian Peninsula. 2. In 1996, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met with Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan and discussed the operational concept ofhijacking commercial airliners and crashing them into buildings in the United States and elsewhere. This plan was ultimately approved by Usama bin Laden. 3. Between 1996 and 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Usama bin Laden, and Mohammed Atef(a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri, the military commander ofal Qaeda), proposed and discussed potential targets for attackby hijacked commercial airliners and decided to target economic, political, and military buildings in the United States and Western Pacific. Page 1 of90 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk 4. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and others, under the banner of "International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," issued a fatwa (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans - whether civilian or military - anywhere they can be found and to "plunder their money." 5. On or about May 29, 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a statement entitled ''The Nuclear Bomb ofIslam," under the banner ofthe "International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," in which he stated that "it is the duty ofthe Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God." 6. In early 1999, Usama bin Laden directed Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin'Attash(a/k/a Khallad, hereinafter Khallad Bin'Attash) to obtain a United States . visa so that he could travel to the United States and obtain pilot training in order to participate in what Bin' Attash·termed the "Planes Operation." 7. On or about April 3, 1999, Khallad Bin 'Attash traveled to San'a, Yemen and applied for a visa to travel to the United States using the alias "Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousa£" This application was denied. 8. On or about April 3, 1999, and April 7, 1999, respectively, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) received visas in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia, in order to travel to the United States. 9. In or about September 1999, Khallad Bin 'Attash administered a forty-five day special course in hand-to-hand combat training at an al Qaeda camp in Logar, Afghanistan, in order to help select trainees for the "Planes Operation." Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) attended this course. Following their participation in the course, al Mihdhar (AA #77) and al Hazmi (AA #77) were selected to be part of the "Planes Operation." 10. In or about November 1999, Khallad Bin'Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77)­ traveled froin Qandahar, Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, where they moved in with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. With the assistance of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Khallad Bin'Attash and Nawafal Hazmi (AA #77) began using CDs, books, and other materials to learn about flying airplanes.
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