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The Likely Scenario Artical Name : Possible Trajectories After Tunisia's Artical Name : The Likely Scenario Artical Subject : Possible trajectories after Tunisia¶s President exceptional decisions Publish Date: 28/07/2021 Auther Name: Ahmed Nazif Subject : On the 64th anniversary of the Republic, President Kais Saied chose to declare µstate of imminent danger¶invoking the constitution shaped by the Islamist Ennahda movement. On July 25, Saied took exceptional decisions ousting the government led by Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freezing the activities of parliament, and stripping parliament members of legal immunity. He considers the measures necessary for saving the state. The political forces took different stands depending on their position in the political hierarchy as well as their closeness to President Saeid.Context and motivesPresident Saeid¶s exceptional measures came within a difficult dynamic that has been going through for a year in Tunisia. The economic and social crisis became even deeper in an unprecedented way due to political instability and the aggravated relations between the presidency, head of government and speaker of the parliament. Growing illegal immigration, poverty, unemployment and economic stagnation exacerbated amid a catastrophic outbreak of Covid-19 resulting in growing deaths as the health system collapsed.To justify his declaration of a µstate of imminent danger¶and the subsequent measures, President Saeid announced the reasons behind the exceptional decisions:1- The underperformance of Mechichi¶s Government: President Saeid reiterated that weakness of the state and failure of the institutions to provide services to citizens were among the top reasons why he took the decisions. He said that there are plans to blow up the state from within, and noted that underway to turn the state into plunder and achieve power-sharing by µrobbing the will of¶people and making appointments in government jobs based on loyalty to parties and lobbies.2- Rampant corruption across vital sectors: reports released by the Audit Court, the highest judicial authority in Tunisia, exposed widespread corruption across major sectors, among the political elite and even across the electoral process. President Saeid also noted that corruption spread to the judiciary system and that court cases have been left unresolved for years because of nepotism and influence of the elite in power. Hinting at acts passed by the parliament, he described the influential figures as thieves who seek protection in the texts that they designed to suit them. 3- Growing popular anger.: protests spreading across Tunisia were triggered by the collapsing living conditions of the majority of the population, and especially the poor, amid a disastrous Covid-19 pandemic sweeping the country. Covid-19-related deaths reached a record for the country over the past weeks due to slow vaccination and decaying health facilities. On June 25, hours before Saeid declared a µstate of imminent danger¶and the offices of ruling parties, including those of Ennahda, were attacked. These protests seem to have encouraged Saeid to announce the exceptional measures.4- Severe polarization within the parliament: the legislature was overwhelmed by a state of turmoil when representatives of the opposition and those of the tripartite alliance of the President, premier and parliament, had violent verbal and physical exchanges turning the parliament from a seat for legislation into an arena for settling scores.Implications of the President¶s decisionsPresident Saied said his exceptional decisions were based on Article 80 of the country¶s constitution, which states thatin the event of imminent danger threatening the nation¶s institutions or the security or independence of the country, and hampering the normal functioning of the state, the President of the Republic may take any measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances, after consultation with the Head of Government and the Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and informing the President of the Constitutional Court. The President shall announce the measures in a statement to the people.[1] The controversial article also states thatthe measures shall guarantee, as soon as possible, a return to the normal functioning of state institutions and services. The Assembly of the Representatives of the People shall be deemed to be in a state of continuous session throughout such a period. In this situation, the President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and a motion of censure against the government cannot be presented.[2] The constitutional article also states that thirty days after the entry into force of these measures, and at any time thereafter, the Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People or thirty of the members thereof shall be entitled to apply to the Constitutional Court with a view to verifying whether or not the circumstances remain exceptional. The Court shall rule upon and publicly issue its decision within a period not exceeding fifteen days.According to a statement from the Presidency, Saied held consultations with Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and Speaker of the Parliament Rached Ghannouchi, about invoking this article. The latter confirmed the consultations in statements to the media, but later on, in an official statement, denied having been consulted by the Head of State.Based on this article set by Ennahda in 2014, Saeid decided to:1- sack prime minister Hichem Mechichi,2- suspend the parliament for 30 days,3- suspend the immunity of all members of the parliament,4- remove the justice and defense ministers,5- assume full powers under the executive branch, aided by a new cabinet named by the president,6- order suspension of work at state administrations,7- declare overnight curfew across the country for one month.These decisions suggest that President Saied trampled on Article 80, which stipulates that the parliament remain in session, and that he took over the three authorities, especially amid an ongoing disagreement on the creation of the constitutional court. Saeid justified his actions by saying that they were based on a state of imminent economic, political and health danger, and that the duration of these measures will not exceed thirty days. He also pledged to protect the democratic course, freedoms and rights.Due to the absence of the constitutional court, only President Saeid is authorized to interpret the constitution, a gap which was left in place by the ruling majority led by Ennahda between 2011-2014 and in which they themselves fell.Efforts to 9/25/2021 11:07:37 PM 1 / 2 form the constitutional court were blocked by hurdles due to Ennahda¶s desire to take full control of the judicial institution that is based on quotas for the presidency, the Supreme Judicial Council and the Parliament.Implications and responsesThe scale of support for the President¶s measures were evidenced in popular celebrations, statements from nationalist and left-wing opposition parties, as well as the Tunisian General Labour Union¶s voicing of conditional support based on constitutional guarantees.On the other side, leaders of Ennahda and its allies, Heart of Tunisia and the Dignity Coalition, took to verbal opposition to the measures. They described the measures as a coup against legitimacy. But except for a rally in front of the parliament that was quickly dispersed, their statements did not materialize on the ground into considerable demonstrations or rallies. This exposes a decaying popular incubator for Ennahda, a faulty ability to mobilize supporters as well as fear among large segments of the populations that the situation would spiral into clashes similar to those that occurred in other regional countries.Islamist forces in regional countries such as Libya, Morocco and Algeria, as well as the Turkish government, Ennahda¶s major ally, denounced the development and described the Tunisian president¶s actions as a µcoup.¶On the other hand, most of the international reactions appeared to be diplomatic and unbiased with a majority of countries calling for dialogue, such as the United States and the European Union, the two major powers on which Ennahda was betting to embarrass and pressure President Saeid.Potential trajectoriesIt is hard to predict what President Saeid next steps are, since he could be characterized as an µoutsider¶within the common Tunisian political scence . This means that the picture remains unclear and uncertainty shrouds what would happen in the coming days. In light of this, scenarios of the developing situation in Tunisia can be outlined as follows:1- First Scenario: President Saeid pushes forward: the Tunisian President can, within the 30-day hiatus, reshape the domestic landscape the way he sees fit, utilizing the concentration of powers in his hand. He can do that by re-opening judicial cases that have been ignored for year, suspending members of the parliament who are accused of corruption, appointing new cabinet and ministers as well as officials in senior government positions. In doing this, he would make amends and get the situation back on track, allowing the parliament to resume its functions. This course of events is possible and can be followed by radical changes to the structure of Tunisia¶s political system. 2- Second Scenario: returning to a national dialogue: the country can move towards a national dialogue involving all political powers nationwide to change the hybrid political system, adopt a presidential or parliamentary system, change the electoral
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