62 Christian Ruck / Bernd Rill (Hrsg.)

Der Weg Pakistans – Rückblick und Ausblick ISBN 978-3-88795-335-5

© 2008 Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.V., München Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen Verantwortlich: Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser (Chefredakteur)

Redaktion: Barbara Fürbeth M.A. (Redaktionsleiterin) Susanne Berke, Dipl. Bibl. (Redakteurin) Claudia Magg-Frank, Dipl. sc. pol. (Redakteurin) Anna Pomian M.A. (Redakteurin) Friederike Pfaffinger (Redaktionsassistentin)

Kein Teil des Werkes darf in irgendeiner Form (durch Fotokopie, Mikrofilm oder ein anderes Verfahren) ohne schriftliche Genehmigung der Redaktion reproduziert oder unter Verwendung elektronischer Systeme verarbeitet, vervielfältigt oder verbreitet werden. Inhaltsverzeichnis

Christian Ruck / Bernd Rill Vorwort ...... 5

Paul Lehrieder Einführung...... 7

M. Aslam Syed Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan ...... 11

Jochen Hippler Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans ...... 27

Tanvir Ahmad Khan Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations...... 37

Mohammed Saeed Chaudhry The European Union and Kashmir...... 51

Asad Durrani Pakistan-Afganisthan Relations ...... 73

Hein G. Kiessling Pakistan und die USA ...... 81

Autorenverzeichnis...... 91 Vorwort

Christian Ruck / Bernd Rill

Mit der Gründung Pakistans vor mehr als onsbehaftete Politiker wie Benazir Bhutto 60 Jahren und der Ausrufung der ersten und Nawaz Sharif in einer Sackgasse be- islamischen Republik 1956 entstand ein fand. Er wurde als damaliger neuer Regie- wichtiger Ankerstaat in der islamischen rungschef Pakistans in dem Antrag auch Welt. Bedingt durch ethnische Vielfalt, die dazu aufgefordert, dass er die Unterstüt- umsiedlungsbedingten Wirren und die zung der Taliban einstellt, dass er sich mit fehlende historische Tradition, stand Pa- Indien aussöhnt und dass er eine entwick- kistan von Anfang an vor gewaltigen Her- lungsorientierte Politik betreibt, die der ausforderungen – insbesondere bei der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung dient und ihr Herausbildung einer eigenen Identität. Der Perspektiven verschafft. Antagonismus zu Indien, besonders ausge- prägt im Kaschmirkonflikt, und die kultu- Wenn wir die heutige Situation mit der relle Verschiedenheit zu dem bengalisch damaligen vergleichen, sind viele Paralle- geprägten Ostpakistan waren von Anfang len erkennbar. Die Bilanz von Musharraf an eine erhebliche Belastung. Auch die ist sehr durchwachsen. Ich möchte daran stärkere Betonung des Islam – als bestim- erinnern, dass er am Ende seiner Amtszeit menden Gründungsfaktor für Pakistan – in der Aussöhnungspolitik mit Indien gro- konnte die Abspaltung Ostpakistans 1971 ße Fortschritte erzielt hatte. Es gab auch nicht verhindern. Diese Elemente waren in demokratische Reformen und wirtschaftli- Verbindung mit Strukturdefiziten und fort- chen Erfolg, aber vieles ist nur halbherzig bestehenden traditionellen Strukturen mit umgesetzt worden, und – das ist vor allem ursächlich dafür, dass Pakistan bis heute zu nennen – der wirtschaftliche Erfolg kam keine gefestigten demokratischen Struktu- nicht bei der breiten Bevölkerung an. ren etablieren konnte. Die daraus resultie- rende Abfolge von demokratisch geprägten Man muss jedoch klar sehen, dass der Regierungen mit Militärdiktaturen konnte Krieg gegen die Terroristen in Afghanistan leider auch wenig beim zukunftsgerichte- und der Kampf um die Wiederherstellung ten Umbau der Gesellschaft und beim Ab- von Demokratie und Frieden in Afghanis- bau der Strukturdefizite bewirken. tan infolge des 11. September 2001 nicht nur die Bedeutung Pakistans regional und Dieser kurze Rückblick gibt uns Hinweise international ernorm erhöht haben, sondern darauf, welche Ansatzpunkte von großer auch seine Probleme. Es muss sich zeigen, Relevanz für den Ausblick sein könnten. ob die Regierung den Spagat zwischen Is- lamisten und Feudalisten sowie zwischen Am 17. Mai 2001 wurde ein Antrag in den echten und falschen Demokraten schaffen Deutschen Bundestag eingebracht und mit kann. den Stimmen aller Parteien verabschiedet. Darin wurde Präsident Musharraf aufge- Das Land ist in der Vergangenheit nicht fordert, so schnell wie möglich zur Demo- zusammengewachsen. Es sieht leider sogar kratie zurückzukehren. Ihm wurde aber so aus, dass die zentrifugalen Kräfte stär- auch der Rücken gestärkt für die überfälli- ker denn je offen zu Tage treten. Das hat gen, notwendigen Reformen in einem zer- viele Gründe; es hat hier und da etwas mit rütteten Land, das damals am Rand des halbherzigen Politiken zu tun. Aber wir Zerfalls stand, dessen Demokratie desa- glauben, dass die tieferen Ursachen dafür vouiert war und das sich durch korrupti- in fehlender Entwicklung und fehlender 6 Christian Ruck

Perspektive für die breite Bevölkerung zu und Hilfsangebote verbessern können. Es suchen sind. Denken wir an Stammesge- ist wichtig und richtig, dass die Demokra- biete, wo noch archaische Zustände herr- tie insgesamt, die unabhängige Justiz und schen, an Großstadtslums und an feudalis- die Medienfreiheit wiederhergestellt und tische Zustände in weiten Teilen des Lan- gestärkt werden müssen. des wie zum Beispiel im Pandschab. Es sind jedoch auch die Grunderkenntnisse Die Stabilität Pakistans und eine positive richtig und wichtig, dass Pakistan viel stär- Entwicklung Pakistans sind für die friedli- ker als bisher eine Bildungsoffensive che Entwicklung in der Region, aber auch braucht – gegebenenfalls gegen den Wi- insbesondere für die Konsolidierung in Af- derstand der Koranschulen. Diesen ghanistan entscheidend. Es ist für den Wunsch müssen wir mit unseren Appellen Ausblick wichtig und richtig, den Grund- verbinden, dass Pakistan ein besser funkti- gedanken des damaligen Antrags im Deut- onierendes Gesundheitssystem inklusive schen Bundestag noch einmal in Erinne- Familienplanung benötigt, dass in Pakistan rung zu rufen. Wir sind der Überzeugung, eine Landreform unabdingbar notwendig dass es ohne grundlegende Reformen und ist, dass Pakistan mit Hilfe von Mikrofi- ohne ein Wirtschaftswachstum, das auch nanzierungsinstrumenten viel mehr Wachs- den breiten Schichten der Bevölkerung zu- tum von unten generieren muss und dass gute kommt und bis nach Waziristan und Pakistan Hilfe bei seiner Energieversor- die Grenzgebiete dringt, keine Stabilität gung nötig hat. und keine positive Entwicklung in Pakistan geben kann. Wenn wir berechtigte Forderungen an Pa- kistan stellen, dann müssen wir, ungeachtet Die Entwicklungspolitik, die für Pakistan der Tatsache, dass die Aussetzung von als einen der Hauptempfänger unserer Hil- Neuzusagen zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt fe in all den Jahren immer eine sehr be- das richtige Signal ist, gleichzeitig den deutende Rolle spielte, muss sich bilateral, Umfang unserer Reform- und Hilfsange- aber auch auf internationaler Ebene noch bote an Pakistan vergrößern. Das müssen stärker und konzentrierter darüber Gedan- zwei Seiten ein und derselben Medaille ken machen, wie wir die Entwicklungs- sein. Einführung

Paul Lehrieder

Aus Anlass der Gründung des Staates Pa- dem Gebiet Indiens beschlossen. kistan fand im November 2007 eine Ex- pertentagung der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Am 14. August 1947 bildete sich aus den Kooperation mit dem Deutsch-Pakistani- überwiegend muslimischen Gebieten Bri- schen Forum statt: "60 Jahre Pakistan – tisch-Indiens der Staat Pakistan. Über vier Rückblick und Ausblick". Die Vorträge Millionen Muslime verließen in dieser Zeit der einzelnen Experten sind die Grundlage das heutige Indien, während etwa sieben für die vorliegende Publikation. Millionen Hindus und Sikhs nach Indien gingen, ein Flüchtlingsstrom, der durch Ziel des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forums Gewaltakte und Strapazen über 700.000 ist es, die vielfältigen Beziehungen zwi- Menschen das Leben nahm. schen Pakistan und Deutschland zu stär- ken. Es ist im beiderseitigen Interesse, die Nach der Teilung bestand Pakistan aus den guten Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen beiden etwa 1.500 Kilometer auseinander- und Pakistanern zu vertiefen und weiter liegenden Landesteilen West- und Ostpa- auszubauen. Das Forum versteht sich als kistan, wobei sich Ostpakistan 1971 unab- Sammelbecken aller Aktivitäten der hängig machte und heute Bangladesh deutsch-pakistanischen Zusammenarbeit heißt. auf unterschiedlichsten Ebenen. Als Präsi- dent ist es mein Wunsch, das Deutsch- Die Zugehörigkeit des Fürstenstaates Pakistanische Forum mit Leben zu füllen, Kaschmir zu Indien oder Pakistan war da- sei es durch Diavorträge, kulturelle oder gegen umstritten. Von wenigen überwie- auch gesellschaftspolitische Veranstaltun- gend hinduistischen und buddhistischen gen. Gegenden abgesehen, war die Bevölkerung des Staates überwiegend muslimischen Um die aktuelle Situation einschätzen zu Glaubens. Die herrschende Dynastie war können, möchte ich im Folgenden einen jedoch hinduistisch, weshalb sich der da- kleinen Rückblick auf die historische Ent- malige Fürst Indien anschloss. Pakistan wicklung Pakistans geben. erlangte jedoch die Herrschaft über den westlichen und nördlichen Teil dieser Re- Mit der Gründung des Nationalkongresses gion. 1885 nahm die indische Unabhängigkeits- bewegung von der britischen Kolonial- Beide Staaten beanspruchen ganz Kasch- macht Gestalt an. Als Gegenstück zum mir als ihr Territorium, eine von den Ver- hinduistisch dominierten Kongress ent- einten Nationen vorgeschlagene Volksab- stand 1906 die Muslimliga, deren Führer stimmung wurde nie durchgeführt. Der Muhammad Ali Jinnah die Mehrheit der Kaschmir-Konflikt prägt seither die Bezie- indischen Muslime für einen eigenen Staat hung zwischen Pakistan und Indien und ist mobilisierte. in drei Kriegen – in den Jahren 1947, 1965 und 1971 – eskaliert. In der im Jahre 1940 verabschiedeten so- genannten Lahore-Resolution wurde dann Bereits 1948 verstarb Ali Jinnah, der so jedoch endgültig die Gründung eines etwas wie eine Vaterfigur des gerade erst eigenständigen muslimischen Staates auf gegründeten Staates Pakistan darstellte. 8 Paul Lehrieder

Unbeständige politische Zustände führten 1958 zum ersten Militärputsch unter Gene- Ende Mai 1998 reagierte Pakistan mit ral Muhammad Ayub Khan und damit zu sechs unterirdischen Kernwaffentests auf einem Wendepunkt in der Geschichte des fünf vorangegangene Atomversuche des Landes. Seitdem bestimmten immer wieder Nachbarlandes Indien und bestätigte damit Militärdiktaturen die Geschicke Pakistans. endgültig den erfolgreichen Abschluss sei- Auf das Regime Ayub Khan folgte 1969 nes 1972 begonnenen Atomprogramms. die Regierung des Generals Muhammad 1999 setzte General Pervez Musharraf die Yahya Khan. Zudem sah sich der junge gewählte Regierung Sharifs in einem Mi- Staat von Anfang an vor eine innere Zer- litärputsch ab und errichtete die vierte Mi- reißprobe gestellt. Die große Entfernung litärdiktatur Pakistans. zwischen den beiden Landesteilen West- und Ostpakistan erschwerte nicht nur die Seit den Anschlägen vom 11. September staatliche und wirtschaftliche Organisati- 2001 stand Pakistan in verstärktem Maße on, sondern auch die Entstehung einer ge- im Spannungsfeld religiös motivierter meinsamen nationalen Identität. Auseinandersetzungen, insbesondere da Musharraf eine enge politische und militä- Der Verlust des östlichen Landesteiles ver- rische Allianz mit den USA eingegangen anlasste Präsident Yahya Khan 1971 zum war, welche im Land sehr umstritten war. Rücktritt, was eine vorsichtige Demokrati- Unabhängig davon beteiligte sich Pakistan sierung Pakistans einleitete. Sein Nachfol- weiter am Kampf gegen den internationa- ger Zulfikar Ali Bhutto erließ 1973 eine len Terrorismus. Obwohl anfangs im Volk neue Verfassung, in der er dem Premier- sehr beliebt, unterliefen dem damaligen minister die wichtigsten Vollmachten zu- Präsidenten Musharraf nach Meinung ver- erkannte und die Rolle des Präsidenten auf schiedener Beobachter viele innen- und rein repräsentative Aufgaben beschränkte. außenpolitische Fehler in der Amtsfüh- 1977 scheiterte jedoch die Errichtung einer rung. So wurden ihm Unregelmäßigkeiten demokratischen Regierung. Der damali- und Manipulationen bei der Parlaments- ge Armeechef, General Mohammed Zia wahl im Jahr 2002 vorgeworfen sowie eine ul-Haq, rief das Kriegsrecht aus und be- Missachtung der Gewaltenteilung. Seine gründete so die dritte Militärdiktatur. Zia Entscheidung, den politisch unbequemen ul-Haq leitete anschließend eine Islamisie- Obersten Richter Iftikhar Muhammad rung Pakistans ein, unter anderem, indem Chaudhry von seinem Amt zu suspendie- er die Scharia als Rechtsgrundlage ein- ren, hatte eine Massenbewegung für die führte. Unabhängigkeit der Justiz in Pakistan pro- voziert. Auch wurde die Ausrufung des Belastend auf die politische und wirt- "State of Emergency" als Vorwand für die schaftliche Stabilität wirkten sich zudem präventive Verhinderung eines Richter- der Bürgerkrieg und die sowjetische Inva- spruchs angesehen, welche die Wahl Mus- sion des Nachbarlandes Afghanistan zwi- harrafs zum Präsidenten für ungültig er- schen 1979 und 1989 aus. Nach dem Tod klärt hätte. Verschiedene Stimmen nicht Zia-ul-Haqs 1988 fanden wieder freie nur in Pakistan sahen darin lediglich den Wahlen statt, aus denen mit Benazir Versuch, sich lästiger Kritiker zu entledi- Bhutto zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte gen. Die Verhaftungen, der Hausarrest von eines islamischen Staates eine Frau als Führern politischer Parteien, von Juristen, Siegerin hervorging. Auf sie folgte 1990 von Vertretern des öffentlichen Lebens die Regierung Nawaz Sharifs. 1993 gelang waren fragwürdige Mittel, um die Ordnung Benazir Bhutto die Rückkehr an die in Macht, bis sie 1997 abermals von Nawaz Pakistan zu erhalten, denn die Notstands- Sharif abgelöst wurde. maßnahmen richteten sich offensichtlich Einführung 9 gerade gegen die Kräfte, die Pakistan ge- tionalen Welt, welches sehr gelitten hat, braucht hätte, um eine demokratische, könnte jetzt wieder eine Verbesserung er- rechtsstaatliche und stabile Gesellschaft fahren. Das Land gilt im Allgemeinen si- aufzubauen. cherlich zu Unrecht als Unruheherd in Südasien, als Brutstätte des Terrorismus, Im Lichte der aktuellen Ereignisse in Pa- des islamischen Fundamentalismus, der kistan ist der Weltpolitik einmal mehr sehr Talibanisierung und der nuklearen Prolife- deutlich geworden, welche extrem wichti- ration. Gerne wird dieses Bild in westli- ge Position Pakistan für die westlichen Si- chen Medien von Pakistan gezeichnet; dass cherheitsinteressen einnimmt. Wenn Pa- dies aber nur zehn Prozent des eigentlichen kistan mit seinen über 160 Millionen Ein- Pakistans ausmacht, wird leider medial wohnern in Chaos und Gewalt versinkt, kaum erfasst. dann bedroht dies auch deutsche Sicher- heitsinteressen, insbesondere im Nachbar- Das Land ist überwiegend säkular ausge- land Afghanistan. Atomwaffen und Rake- richtet mit einer vorrangig aufgeklärten tensysteme in den Händen von islamisti- Bevölkerung, einer sehr vibrierenden und schen Terroristen sind nur eine der Gefah- vitalen Kunst- und Kulturszene in Karachi, ren, die oft genannt werden. Lahore und Islamabad sowie einem starken Wirtschaftswachstum von über acht Pro- Zu konstatieren ist, dass Pakistans bisheri- zent. Dies macht das andere Pakistan aus, ger Präsident Musharraf sich im Kampf in dem junge pakistanische Ärzte, Ingeni- gegen den Terror durchaus als wichtiger eure und IT-Experten in exzellenten Insti- Verbündeter des gesamten Westens gezeigt tutionen ausgebildet werden und das große hatte. Er hat bis an den Rand seiner innen- Potenzial dieses Landes darstellen. politischen Kräfte nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 den Kampf gegen Geostrategisch könnte Pakistan in den al-Qaida und fanatische Taliban unter- nächsten 25 Jahren zu einem der wichtigs- stützt. Musharraf hat innenpolitisch nach ten Länder Asiens werden. Zu nennen sind kemalistisch-laizistischem Vorbild die so- die Erdöl- und Gaspipeline, welche von genannte "Enlightened Moderation" pro- Turkmenistan über Afghanistan und Pa- pagiert und zu Beginn seiner Herrschaft für kistan in das Arabische Meer münden soll, eine durchaus freie, kritische und pluralis- sowie die Gaspipeline von Iran über Pa- tische Medienvielfalt gesorgt. kistan nach Indien. Folgerichtig gibt es auch zwischen Deutschland und Pakistan Eine zivile Regierung, das Prinzip der Ge- eine lange Tradition von sehr positiven waltenteilung, die Unabhängigkeit der Ansätzen der Zusammenarbeit. Zu nennen Justiz, die Freiheit der Medien, das sind sind die Hochschulkooperationen der Uni- die tragenden Säulen jeder Demokratie, versität Tübingen mit der Universität Ka- und es sind auch die Dämme, die Pakistan rachi im Bereich der Chemie, aber auch vor dem Chaos bewahren. Ein Zeichen für viele andere wie etwa die Kooperation der die Rückkehr zur Demokratie waren die Humboldt Universität mit der Universität bereits am 18. Februar 2008 durchgeführ- Faisalabad im Bereich Landwirtschaft und ten Wahlen, die die bisherige Oppositions- die der Universität Bonn im Fachgebiet partei PPP als Sieger hervorbrachten. Kon- Geographie. Ein Megaprojekt ist die deut- sequenterweise leitete die PPP ein Amts- sche Technische Universität in Lahore, enthebungsverfahren gegen Musharraf ein, welche von pakistanischer Seite mit über worauf dieser zurücktrat und von Asif Ali 500 Millionen Euro finanziert wird. Auch Zardari als Präsident ersetzt wurde. unsere Entwicklungshilfe ist über die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zu- Gerade das Image Pakistans in der interna- sammenarbeit (GTZ), die Kreditanstalt für 10 Paul Lehrieder

Wiederaufbau (KfW) und die Senior Ex- aufgenommen und die Handelskette Metro perten Service (SES) vertreten und leistet eröffnete Ende des letzen Jahres in ver- wertvolle Arbeit. Auch wirtschaftlich ist schiedenen Städten erste Filialen. Deutschland in Pakistan präsent. Viele deutsche Firmen haben Niederlassungen in Trotz der aktuellen Probleme habe ich als Pakistan, wo Produkte vor allem für den Präsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Fo- einheimischen Markt hergestellt werden. rums das Ziel, die vielfältigen Beziehun- Zu nennen sind Siemens, BASF, Bayer, gen zwischen Pakistan und Deutschland Hoechst und die Firma Merk. Lufthansa weiter zu stärken. Ich bin sicher, die vor- hat nach einer Pause von zehn Jahren wie- liegende Publikation wird dazu einen kon- der Direktflüge nach Karachi und Lahore struktiven und fruchtbaren Beitrag leisten. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan

M. Aslam Syed

One year ago, an article appeared in an "If my brother visits England, the King Urdu newspaper with the startling title should also receive him." During his last "We want the Pakistan of 1948". Since days of terminal illness, his physician 1948, Pakistan has made tremendous presented him a new pair of socks. He progress in industry, technology, health, liked them but when he came to know the education, agriculture, and other social and price (two rupees), he returned them with economic fields. What was missing in the the remark that a poor country’s head of Pakistan of 2007 that it had in 1948? The the state could not afford such luxurious article did indeed show what was missing items. from the Pakistan of today. The writer had shown a few glimpses from the public and While these and many more events in his private life of the founder of Pakistan pubic and private life act as reminders to during his brief tenure as the first those political leaders of Pakistan who Governor-General and compared it with have not been able to hold such standards the profiles of the present leaders of the of honesty, integrity, and respect for public country. Jinnah’s legacy was missing from funds, there are more important aspects of the Pakistan of 2007. In view of their Jinnah’s legacy that have been relevance to today’s topic, the following compromised. Before discussing those, it anecdotes will serve to illustrate some of would be appropriate to have a brief survey these insights. of his life because his legacy and life reflect each other. The first part will look "Sir, should we serve coffee or tea during at the Jinnah who strove for the freedom of the cabinet meeting?" Jinnah’s aide-de- India and Hindu-Muslim unity, earning camp asked. "Plain water should be served. him the title of the ‘Ambassador of Hindu- Those ministers who want to have coffee Muslim unity’. The second part will be or tea may take whatever they like when devoted to his disappointment and they return to their homes. We should be frustration in the wake of the changing careful about spending public money." contours of Indian politics, his brief self- exile to England, and his return to lead the Some items were purchased for the movement for Pakistan. And finally, the Governor-General’s House. After going manifestation of his vision and legacy after through the bill which amounted to only 38 he had achieved the creation of Pakistan. rupees, Jinnah asked his secretary to take the money from his sister’s account for the things that she had ordered; he would pay 1. The campaign for Hindu-Muslim for those items that were bought for his unity personal use, and only those goods that were to remain in the Governor-General’s Jinnah was born on 25 December 1876 in House would be charged to the State Karachi to a middle-class merchant family. Exchequer. His father was not rich but had a comfortable life and valued education. The British High Commissioner asked Jinnah received his early education at the Jinnah to receive the British King’s brother Sind Madrasatul Islam and the Christian at the airport upon his arrival in Pakistan. Missionary Society High School. After his "It should be reciprocal," Jinnah told him. entrance examination, his father decided to 12 M. Aslam Syed send him to London in 1893 to study and approach towards such complex business and accounting at Graham's issues. He had to work within the British Shipping and Trading Company, his senior constitutional and legal system. business partners. Within a few months of his arrival, Jinnah left the business firm The Imperial Legislative Council of India and joined Lincoln’s Inn to pursue a career was not an active body but just an advisory in law. In order to finance his education, he adjunct to the British colonial rule. worked at different places including a brief Nonetheless, within its framework Jinnah but important job as an actor in a theatre. effectively spoke for the rights of his He was inclined to pursue this career but countrymen. Conscious of social evils like his father, however, disapproved. In 1896, child marriage, he was instrumental in the he was called to the bar. During his passage of the Child Marriages Restraint studies, while assisting Dadabhai Nauroji, Act. The British had appropriated Muslim the first Indian Member of the Parliament, endowments and trusts. He sponsored the he developed a passion for politics. This Waqf Validating Bill which freed many passion was guided by two factors: one Muslim charities from the British clutches was the British racist attitude of contempt and endeared him to the Muslims of India. and humiliation and the other was the Perhaps more important was his slavish and apologetic behaviour of his contribution in exposing British policies countrymen towards their masters. Jinnah towards the Indians in South Africa. While detested both. describing the British treatment as "harsh and cruel", he earned the wrath of the On his return to India, Jinnah started his viceroy, Lord Minto. The viceroy legal practice and soon emerged as one of reprimanded him for using the words harsh the leading barristers of his country. and cruel. Jinnah replied: "My Lord! I Impressed with his performance Sir should feel much inclined to use much Charles Ollivant, judicial member of the stronger language. But I am fully aware of Bombay provincial government, offered the constitution of this Council, and I do him a position with an inflated salary of not wish to trespass for one single moment. 1,500 rupees a month. This was indeed a But I do say that the treatment meted out to handsome amount in 1901 but Jinnah Indians is the harshest and the feeling in refused, saying that soon he would earn this country is unanimous".1 that much in a day. And indeed he did. By this time he had joined the Indian National Jinnah joined the All India Muslim League Congress and attended its 1906 Calcutta in 1913 while retaining his membership of session as private secretary to the President the Congress. During the First World War, of the Congress. His services to the party he actively supported the British in their and his fame as a leading lawyer earned war hoping that such efforts would be him public fame and he was elected to the rewarded after the war. In order to give Imperial Legislative Council in 1910. them a clear message that the two main religious communities of India, Hindus and During this period, Jinnah’s political Muslims, were unanimous in their struggle activities were reflective of his motives to against British colonialism, he convened a persuade the British to show some respect joint session of the Indian National to the Indians and to give them Home Congress and the All India Muslim League Rule, and to unite the different religious in Lucknow in 1916. It was indeed a and ethnic communities of India on one landmark in the political history of South platform. While his zeal to achieve these Asia, being the first such occasion when two goals knew no bounds, he was the two communities agreed on some nevertheless constrained by his training principles of co-existence. The same year, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 13 with the help of Annie Besant and others, who know him, a naive and eager he founded the All India Home Rule humanity, an intuition quick and tender as League. He was at the peak of his a woman's, a humour gay and winning as a popularity as a staunch Indian nationalist child's. Pre-eminently rational and with no love for sectarian cries. Some practical, discreet and dispassionate in his highly placed British had to admit his estimate and acceptance of life, the enormous contribution and capabilities. obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for wisdom effectually disguise a shy and India, wrote of him in 1917: "Jinnah is a splendid idealism which is of the very very clever man, and it is, of course, an essence of the man."5 outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own The British rewarded India with the country".2 Rowlatt Act, which authorized provincial governments to issue warrants and detain After the end of the war, the British did not anyone without going through the honour India with either Home Rule or necessary judicial procedure. Jinnah even with gratitude for their contribution strongly opposed it on the ground that it during the war. On the contrary, oppressive was against the law of justice that any man and draconian laws were passed to quell should be denied his rights without a the movement for freedom. Jinnah and his judicial trial. As a protest, he resigned from wife led a mass demonstration against the the Imperial Legislative Council. In his idea of giving a farewell reception to the letter of resignation, he echoed the oppressive and arrogant outgoing governor sentiments of Indians: "The passing of the of Bombay, Lord Willingdon. The citizens Rowlatt Bill … has severely shaken the of Bombay were so overwhelmed with trust reposed by them in British justice". Jinnah’s bold move that they built the Jinnah Memorial Hall to commemorate Gandhi’s return to India and his style of this event in 1918. It still exists inside the politics brought religion into the picture. compound of old Congress House as P.J. At about the same time, the British started Hall. The abbreviation P.J. stands for occupying parts of the defeated Ottoman People’s Jinnah, perhaps to cover the Empire. They had assured the Muslims that identity of the man who inspired this the territorial integrity of the Ottoman monument.3 Empire would be maintained. This betrayal of pledge became the starting point of the Many of his contemporaries have praised Khilafat Movement. Paradoxically, it was his outlook and vision for India. Stanley not Jinnah who would lead this movement, Wolpert writes that he was adored by most but Gandhi. Jinnah did declare that women at first sight and admired or envied whereas the Rowlatt Act was an attack on by most men.4 Perhaps Mrs. Sarojini Naidu India’s liberty, appropriation of the paid the best tribute to him in her book Muslim territories amounted to an attack "Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Ambassador of on their religion. But he was opposed to Hindu-Muslim Unity". She wrote:"Tall and Gandhi’s mass movement in the name of stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, religion. He warned Gandhi that this kind languid and luxurious of habit, Mohammad of movement would appeal only to the Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is a deceptive illiterate and the inexperienced youth of sheath of a spirit of exceptional vitality and the country, and would have horrible endurance. Somewhat formal and consequences. Jinnah felt that even this fastidious, and a little aloof and imperious issue should be fought constitutionally. In of manner, the calm hauteur of his the Congress session of 1920, his was the accustomed reserve but masks, for those only voice that opposed the resolution for a 14 M. Aslam Syed mass movement. He said: "... the weapon (1927) visited India, in their demand that will not destroy the British empire … it is some Indian members should be included neither logical nor is it politically sound or in the Commission. This co-operation led wise, nor practically capable of being put to a split in the All India Muslim League in execution." but Jinnah remained steadfast in his resolve and declared the composition of Colonel Wedgwood, who heard Jinnah’s the Commission a "butchery of our souls". speech, was very impressed and As president of the Muslim League he commented: "I do not know enough about said: "A constitutional war has been Mr. Jinnah’s politics to say whether I agree declared on Great Britain. Negotiations for with him or not, but I do know that a man a settlement are not to come from our side who has the courage to come to this ... We are denied equal partnership. We audience and tell what he has told you is a will resist the new doctrine to the best of man of my money. The first thing in every our powers … I welcome Pandit Malaviya, political leader is not brains, but courage."6 and I welcome the hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu 2. From disillusionment and self- Mahasabha ... this offer is more valuable exile to the creation of Pakistan than any concession which the British Government can make".7 This was the beginning of Jinnah’s disillusionment with the Congress. The Even this co-operation between the period following the Khilafat Movement Congress and the Muslim League was witnessed many instances of Hindu- short-lived. In 1928, Motilal Nehru Muslim riots. His legacy of Hindu-Muslim presented a constitutional formula which is unity had become a victim of the politics known as the Nehru Report. These of religion. But he still remained active, proposals totally ignored Muslim demands and in February 1924 introduced an and the Congress leadership acted as the important resolution in the Legislative only supreme body authorized to shape the Council (he was re-elected by the citizens future of India. Still, it did not result in a of Bombay) that aimed at the Indianization "parting of the ways". Jinnah said: "We are of the army and including Indian all sons of the soil. We have to live businessmen and manufacturers by inviting together ... If we cannot agree, let us at any tenders in the Indian currency. rate agree to differ, but let us part as friends".8 He tried once again to act as Jinnah continued to look for formulas that mediator to bring some rapprochement could bring these two communities between the two parties but he was not together in their struggle against the British successful. In March 1929, he voiced the imperialism. The Congress was unwilling concerns of the Muslim League in his to accept the separate electorates for the Fourteen Points but they also met the same Muslims that it had approved in the fate as his previous interventions. Motilal Lucknow Pact. Jinnah persuaded the Nehru’s letter to Gandhi explains the Muslim delegates to give up this demand. thinking of Congress at this stage: "We Instead, they asked for some guarantees in agreed that the Hindu opposition to the the so-called Delhi-Muslim Proposals of Muslim demands was to continue and even 1927. The Congress accepted the be stiffened up by the time the Convention withdrawal of separate electorates but was held." He concluded: "You will see denied the other demands. Jinnah again that the stumbling block in our way is this extended his co-operation to the Hindu question of one-third Muslim rep- leaders, when the Simon Commission resentatives and on this point even the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 15 most advanced Musalmans like Dr. M. A. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, convinced him Ansari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. through his letters. In fact, some of these T.A.K. Sherwani and others are all very letters do indeed show that Iqbal was sure strongly in favour of the concession. I that no other leader except Jinnah was would therefore ask you to direct your capable of leading the Muslims at that attention now to the Mahasabha, leaving juncture. In an interview, Iqbal’s son, Dr. Ali Brothers and Mr. Jinnah to stew in Javed Iqbal, was asked: "There were many their own juice." 9 other Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Khan Abdul Gaffar Jinnah decided to leave India and settle in Khan, Maulana Hussain Madani who were England. In January 1931 he asked his certainly more devout than Jinnah. Why daughter Dina and sister Fatima to join him did Iqbal choose Jinnah, who even didn’t in London. During his stay in London he know Urdu, to plead for Pakistan?" Dr. kept in touch with the political Javed Iqbal’s answer was: "Because Iqbal developments in India and attended two felt that Jinnah was more sincere to the sessions of the Round Table Conferences. cause of Muslims than any other Muslim Explaining his decision to stay in England leader of the sub-continent."11 to the students of the Muslim University Union, he said: "I received the shock of my In anticipation of his return, various life at the Round Table Conference ... I factions of the Muslim League met in began to feel that neither could I help Delhi on 4 March 1934, decided to merge India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor into one party, and elected Jinnah as the make the Musalmans realize their President of this united League. Jinnah precarious position. I felt so disappointed arrived in Delhi the next month and and so depressed that I decided to settle received an enthusiastic welcome. He down in London. Not that I did not love reorganized the party and infused it with a India; but I felt utterly helpless. I kept in new spirit. After three years he returned to touch with India."10 Lucknow, the city where he had laid the foundation of Hindu-Muslim unity about The Indian delegates at the Round Table twenty years ago, to address nearly five Conference could not come up with an thousand delegates from all over India. His agreed formula. The British Prime Minister address reflected the enormous changes announced the Communal Award on 16 that had taken place on the political April 1932 promising reforms on the horizon of the sub-continent. The Muslim pattern of the Lucknow Pact, which was League did not do well in the elections of the only moment in history when the 1936. The Congress ministries were Muslims and the Hindus had agreed upon viewed as favouring Hindus and ignoring any issue. However, this Award deprived Muslims. Jinnah declared: the Muslims of their majority in important provinces like Bengal and Punjab. Many "This Session of the All India Muslim Muslim leaders visited Jinnah in London League is one of the most critical that has and tried to persuade him to return to India. ever taken place during its existence. The He was reluctant because the Muslims present leadership of the Congress, were not only divided in many political especially during the last ten years, has factions, but also feudal lords and those been responsible for alienating the who had little understanding of the Muslims of India more and more, by political developments dominated the pursuing a policy which is exclusively Muslim League. It is not known what Hindu; they are in a majority, they have by prompted him to return to India but many their words, deeds and programme shown, historians believe that the celebrated poet, more and more, the Muslims cannot expect 16 M. Aslam Syed any justice or fair play at their hands. one is foe of the other, and likewise, their Wherever they were in a majority and victories and defeats overlap. To yoke wherever it suited them, they refused to co- together two such nations under a single operate with the Muslim League parties state, one as a numerical minority and the and demanded unconditional surrender."12 other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any It was not just the speech that was different fabric that may be so built for the from his earlier address in Lucknow, the government of such a state."13 speaker was no longer in his Savile Row suit or wearing a European head cover; he The passing of the Lahore Resolution in wore a black long coat (sherwani), March 1940 indicated the road that Jinnah traditional white trousers, and a karakul was going to follow. A year later in April cap. The cap would soon acquire a new 1941 in Madras, he elaborated his vision name, the "Jinnah cap". One poet for the new state: "Our goal is Pakistan. addressed him as Quaid-i-Azam (the great Now what next? No people can ever leader). This title became so popular that it succeed in anything unless they work for it almost replaced Jinnah. He had indeed and work hard." He asked the Muslims to emerged as the leader of Muslim India. devise a definite and well-considered After this session, the Muslim League also educational plan. "It is knowledge, reached unprecedented heights of popu- information and enlightenment that make a larity. Within a few months, more than 170 people great", he declared. Secondly, since new branches of the League were the Muslims were much further behind established. It is estimated that more than than the other communities of India in 100,000 Muslims joined the League from economic and social fields, great efforts the United Provinces (today: Uttar were required to improve their status in Pradesh) alone. Finally, the Congress these areas. Thirdly, Muslims needed Ministries resigned and Jinnah’s call to political training that was based on the celebrate that moment as the "Day of principles of security, justice and fair play. Deliverance" met with response not only And finally, he emphasized the promotion from the Muslims but also the scheduled of goodwill and harmony with the other casts. peoples on the basis of equality, fair play and reciprocity, with the objective of Now Jinnah was ready to explain to the collective security and orderly develop- world what sort of constitution would suit ment among free states as members of a India. He wrote an article for Time and community pledged to respect each other's Tide of London. It was published on 19 rights.14 January 1940 under the caption "The Constitutional Future of India". Jinnah While Jinnah was preparing these formulas argued: "The Hindus and the Muslims for the envisaged state of Pakistan, the belong to two different religions, British were passing through a difficult philosophies, social customs, and lit- phase of the war. France fell in June 1940. erature. They neither inter-marry, nor inter- By the end of 1941, the United States had dine together, and indeed they belong to joined the war after the Japanese attack on two different civilizations which are based Pearl Harbour. The Allies desperately mainly on conflicting ideas and needed the goodwill of the Indian leaders. conceptions. They … derive their Churchill’s arrogance did not allow him to inspirations from different sources of make any commitments regarding the history. They have different epics, their freedom of India. Under the pressure of heroes are different, and they have President Roosevelt, however, he sent Sir different episodes. Very often the hero of Stafford Cripps to India in March 1942. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 17

His arrival coincided with the second was the third party equally concerned with anniversary of the Lahore Resolution. the future of India. Furthermore, the After meeting with the Congress leaders, Congress claimed that it represented all he met Jinnah and told him that he had Indians including Muslims. Jinnah had to changed his view about the Muslim prove that the League was the sole League and Pakistan because of the representative of the Muslims. The "change in the communal feeling in India elections of 1946 proved beyond any doubt and the growth of the Pakistan movement". that the Muslim League indeed represented His declaration that after the war, India the Indian Muslims. In many ways, these would be given a Dominion Status and a elections also demonstrated that the newly elected Constituent Assembly would Congress did not represent the Muslims, at frame the constitution, however, did not least in the manner in which it had please anybody. The Congress was claimed. unhappy because he gave an indication that those provinces that did not approve the The war ended in 1945 and with that the new constitution could retain the present British also forgot their pledges made to framework and would be treated at par India, especially to the Muslim League. It with the Indian Union. The Congress smelt was indeed a very difficult period for Pakistan in this proposal while the Muslim Jinnah. His health had deteriorated to the League felt that the idea of Pakistan was extent that his sister Fatima would often treated only as a remote possibility. ask him to take some time off from his busy schedule and rest. Whenever she At this stage of the analysis of Jinnah’s expressed her concern for his health he legacy, it is crucial to point out that his would reply that one man's health was understanding of the duration and the insignificant when the very existence of a outcome of the Second World War were hundred million Muslims was threatened. largely responsible for his success in the "Do you know how much is at stake?" he following years. The Congress leaders would ask her.15 thought that the war would be short and would result in the British defeat. Their Some historians and political analysts have policies towards the British were, thus, argued that Jinnah never wanted Pakistan reflective of this idea. They wanted the and that he used the demand for a separate British to leave. In 1939, shortly after homeland for Muslims as a bargaining viceroy Linlithgow proclaimed British ploy. This argument is based on his India at war with Germany, Nehru called acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan upon the viceroy to issue an immediate that called for a loose federation of Indian promise of "absolute freedom to India after provinces and princely states. This neither the war and the right of India to draft her represents a true understanding of the man own constitution," as the price for nor the odds against which he had to work. Congress's support. Jinnah, on the other Jinnah was a constitutionalist and he had hand, called upon all Muslims to help the always worked within the system. On more British by "honourable co-operation" at than one occasion he had very skilfully this critical and difficult juncture. used that system to his advantage. He knew the Congress leadership too well to The Congress leadership was bitterly expect that they would agree to a loose engaged with the British over the future of federation as stipulated by the Cabinet India. They were trying to convince them Mission. Subsequent events proved that he that there were only two parties to this was right. Secondly, it is amazing that issue: the British rulers and the Congress. none of the stalwarts in the Congress Jinnah insisted that the Muslim League realized that his Pakistan was just a 18 M. Aslam Syed

"bargain ploy". They could have easily citizens. From then on the road led only to used it to their advantage. Just as staunch Pakistan. 'Think 100 times before you take as he was for a Hindu-Muslim unity that a decision', Jinnah said at the Muslim brooked no compromises, he remained League's historic 1940 Lahore Conference, steadfast in his struggle for Pakistan, after which came down in favor of partition. realizing that an independent Muslim state 'But once that decision is taken, stand by it was the only solution to the complexities as one man.' He obeyed his own diktat and of Indian polity, and he never wavered for refused to be deflected by political a moment from that goal. It was not plain expediency. There was no force to back sailing and he had to tackle many him. He created Pakistan out of sheer will unexpected and often violent currents, but and against enormous odds."17 the fact remains that he successfully completed his voyage. 3. Jinnah’s vision and legacy for the Even after accepting that the Muslim new state of Pakistan majority provinces would go to Pakistan, the British partitioned Punjab and Bengal, Pakistan came into existence on 14 August they held referendums in some Muslim 1947. Mountbatten, the last viceroy of majority provinces to assess whether the British India, arrived in Karachi to population of those provinces would opt inaugurate the Constituent Assembly of for Pakistan or not. Jinnah accepted all Pakistan. On that occasion, he asked the these challenges. The demarcation of the Government of Pakistan to follow the boundary between India and Pakistan was example of the great Mughal ruler, Akbar, so unjust and bereft of all known principles in its treatment of the minorities. Jinnah’s of fairness and justice that even a thousand response is notable: "It will be our constant pledges and oaths would have defied it. endeavour to work for the welfare and Jinnah’s reaction, however, is noteworthy: well-being of all the communities in "We have been squeezed in as much as Pakistan, and I hope that everyone would was possible and the latest blow that we be inspired by the idea of public service, have received is the Award of the and they will be imbued with the spirit of Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, co-operation and will excel in their incomprehensible and even perverse political and civic virtues which go to Award. It may be wrong, unjust and make a great nation and help to advance its perverse; and it may not be a judicial but a greatness. The tolerance and goodwill that political Award, but we have agreed to great Emperor Akbar showed to all the abide by it and it is binding upon us. As non-Muslim is not of recent origin. It dates honourable people we must abide by it. It back thirteen centuries ago when our may be our misfortune but we must bear Prophet not only by words but by deeds up this one more blow with fortitude, treated the Jews and Christians, after he courage and hope."16 had conquered them, with the utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their Time magazine published a survey of the faith and beliefs. The whole history of most influential Asian leaders of the last Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete century. In this galaxy, Jinnah occupied the with those humane and great principles most envious position. The magazine which should be followed and practised."18 wrote: "After the 1937 elections, when the majority Congress party refused to share Three days earlier, in his address to the power with the Muslim League, Jinnah Constituent Assembly, he had given a concluded that under its leadership manifesto to the legislators of the new Muslims would become second-class state. Because of its guidelines for the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 19 rulers and the legislators, it deserves to be anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not quoted at length. After thanking the countenance it." members for electing him President of the Constituent Assembly, he said: Reflecting on the division of India into two states, he said that he knew that in India "The Constituent Assembly has got two and Pakistan many people did not agree main functions to perform. The first is the that India should have been partitioned. very onerous and responsible task of "Much has been said against it, but now framing the future constitution of Pakistan that it has been accepted, it is the duty of and the second of functioning as a full and everyone of us to loyally abide by it and complete sovereign body as the Federal honourably act according to the agreement Legislature of Pakistan ... Dealing with our which is now final and binding on all. But first function in this Assembly, I cannot you must remember, as I have said, that make any well-considered pronouncement this mighty revolution that has taken place at this moment, but I shall say a few things is unprecedented. One can quite as they occur to me. The first and the understand the feeling that exists between foremost thing that I would like to the two communities wherever one emphasize is this: remember that you are community is in majority and the other is now a sovereign legislative body and you in minority. But the question is, whether it have got all the powers. It, therefore, was possible or practicable to act otherwise places on you the gravest responsibility as than what has been done, a division had to to how you should take your decisions. take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and The first observation that I would like to Pakistan, there are sections of people who make is this: You will no doubt agree with may not agree with it, who may not like it, me that the first duty of a government is to but in my judgement there was no other maintain law and order, so that the life, solution and I am sure future history will property and religious beliefs of its record its verdict in favour of it. And what subjects are fully protected by the State. is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the The second thing that occurs to me is this: only solution of India's constitutional One of the biggest curses from which India problem. Any idea of a united India could is suffering – I do not say that other never have worked and in my judgement it countries are free from it, but, I think our would have led us to terrific disaster. condition is much worse – is bribery and Maybe that view is correct; maybe it is not; corruption. That really is a poison. We that remains to be seen." must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures Jinnah’s next point was about the future. as soon as it is possible for this Assembly He asked: "Now what shall we do?" His to do so. answer was that if we want to make this great state of Pakistan happy and The next thing that strikes me is this: here prosperous, "we should wholly and solely again it is a legacy which has been passed concentrate on the well-being of the on to us. Along with many other things, people, and especially of the masses and good and bad, has arrived this great evil, the poor. If you will work in co-operation, the evil of nepotism and jobbery. I want to forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, make it quite clear that I shall never you are bound to succeed. If you change tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or your past and work together in a spirit that any influence directly or indirectly brought everyone of you, no matter to what to bear upon me. Whenever I will find that community he belongs, no matter what such a practice is in vogue or is continuing relations he had with you in the past, no 20 M. Aslam Syed matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is This, indeed, was the legacy that Jinnah first, second and last a citizen of this State bequeathed to his people. While his speech with equal rights, privileges, and on 14 August manifests his pride in the obligations, there will be no end to the Islamic legacy of the Prophet, his address progress you will make." on 11 August lays down the principles of statehood. Some scholars see this as a Citing religious and ethnic discriminations contradiction in that he literally repudiates as the greatest curses that enslave nations, the idea of "Two Nations". But this he declared: "I cannot emphasize it too amounts to a superficial reading of his much. We should begin to work in that thoughts. The "Two Nations" theory and spirit and in course of time all these the separate electorates acted as vehicles in angularities of the majority and minority the movement for Pakistan. They were communities, the Hindu community and necessary tools for the onerous journey but the Muslim community, because even as once one reached the destination, one regards Muslims you have Pathans, required implementation of those ideas that Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and are essential for integration and welfare of among the Hindus you have Brahmins, the different segments of the society. In Vaishnavas, Kshatriyas, also Bengalis, fact, Jinnah here once again emerges as the Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. Now you ask me, this has been the biggest that the sub-continent had two states, one hindrance in the way of India to attain the with a Hindu majority and the other with a freedom and independence and but for this Muslim majority, the minorities on both we would have been free people long, long sides would feel safer. He perceived ago. No power can hold another nation, religion as a private affair of the respective and specially a nation of 400 million souls believers or, for that matter, non-believers. in subjection; nobody could have As a Muslim, he showed tremendous pride conquered you, and even if it had in the intellectual legacy of Islam. But then happened, nobody could have continued its as a lawyer, he knew the diversities in hold on you for any length of time, but for Islamic legal schools, therefore on many this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson occasions he declared that Pakistan’s legal from this. You are free; you are free to go system would be based on the Common to your temples, you are free to go to your Law. mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong Certain analysts have pointed out that on to any religion or caste or creed that has some occasions he used the term "Islamic nothing to do with the business of the State" and that he also referred to Islam as State. We are all citizens and equal citizens his guiding force in his quest for of one state, all members of the Nation, democracy and modernism. Indeed he did. and you will find that in course of time But those statements have not only been Hindus would cease to be Hindus and taken out of context but also superimposed Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not on his speech to the lawmakers. Moreover, in the religious sense, because that is the it should not be forgotten that many personal faith of each individual, but in the political leaders in Pakistan have distorted political sense as citizens of the state. My his words to seek legitimacy and to impose guiding principle will be justice and their respective brands of democracy. In complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can his speech to the Aligarh Muslim Students look forward to Pakistan becoming one of Association, he took pride in freeing the the greatest Nations of the world."19 Muslims from the reactionary elements: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 21

"What the League has done is to set you at the centre of his speech to the free from the reactionary elements of Constituent Assembly. He strongly Muslims and to create the opinion that believed in that liberal tradition that had those who play their selfish game are nurtured him. Paradoxically, he was also traitors. It has certainly freed you from that aware of the socio-cultural milieu of the undesirable element of Maulvis and sub-continent where such liberal traditions Maulanas. I am not speaking of Maulvis as were conveniently swept under the rug of a whole class. There are some of them who parochialism, nepotism, and fanaticism. are as patriotic and sincere as any other but This awareness, nonetheless, did not there is a section of them which is diminish his confidence in the people, undesirable. Having freed ourselves from especially when they had rejected the call the clutches of the British government, the of traditional religious leaders and other Congress, the reactionaries and so-called obscurantist elements and had voted for Maulvis, may I appeal to the youth to Jinnah’s party. In numerous statements, he emancipate our women."20 In his address to had assured curious journalists that he had the American people, he declared: done his part, and now it would be up to "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic the people of Pakistan to choose whatever state to be ruled by priests with a divine style of democracy they wanted; he also mission. We have many non-Muslims, stressed that the people would opt for a Hindus, Christians and Parsis – but they liberal democracy. are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens Jinnah’s political legacy dwelt on an and will play their rightful part in the undiluted democracy, constitutionalism, affairs of Pakistan."21 autonomy of the executive, judiciary, and legislature, a free press, civil liberties, rule Jinnah was a constitutionalist and remained of law and accountability. He envisioned so even in the face of those moments when Pakistan as a welfare state where feudal rationality and legal norms are invariably lords and capitalists would submit to the sacrificed at the altar of political demands of peasants and workers. On expediencies. As stated earlier, he had more than one occasion, he had warned the asked the Muslim youths to emancipate feudal lords to heed to the call of the poor. women. The sensitivity of this issue can be Jinnah stood for enforcing law and order, gauged from a recent event in Baluchistan for the elimination of nepotism, bribery, where five women were buried alive corruption and black-marketeering, for simply because they wanted to marry the wiping out distinctions of race, religion men of their own choice, and regrettably and colour, for providing equal rights and this horrible crime was justified by an opportunities to one and all, and for the educated member of the Senate claiming to economic betterment of the masses. "Why represent "the norms and values of the would I turn my blood into water, run Baluch culture". Sixty-one years ago, about and take so much trouble? Not for Jinnah took his sister to the same province the capitalists surely, but for you, the poor and made her sit next to him on the stage at people", he told his audience at Calcutta on the Sibi Darbar, the grand annual assembly 1 March 1946.22 of the tribal chiefs. We need to keep in mind that in this part of Pakistan, even the It would be relevant here to see the British shied away from assigning any impressions of an American journalist who public role to their women. visited Pakistan in December 1947. He wrote: "The story is told that when Sovereignty of Parliament and rule by the Mumtaz Daultana, the brains of the West elected representatives of the people were Punjab ministry, went to his huge Multan 22 M. Aslam Syed estate in August, his Moslem tenants, all claimed that they were accomplishing what staunch League members, congratulated the founder of Pakistan had wished. Why him on the achievement of Pakistan, and did this happen? landlord and tenants feasted together. But a pall was thrown over the festivities when a Roses do blossom in deserts but they need peasant asked: 'When will the land be constant care and protection from the given to us?' This question is being asked ferocity of shifting sand dunes as well as repeatedly, for agrarian reforms have been nourishment. The areas that constituted promised by the League. Similar Pakistan were the least developed in resentment against the rich is voiced in the British India. In order to protect their towns. A Moslem clerk who is the local northern and western frontiers against the secretary of the League in his ward is made imagined or real threat from the Soviet conscious of social differences when he Union, the British patronized feudal lords, goes from his filthy, overcrowded tribal chiefs, and big landholders. The tenement home to the palatial residence of federating units of Pakistan had not gone the provincial leader. At a recent meeting through those educational, economic, and in Lahore a fervent young Leaguer social reforms that were implemented in exclaimed: 'The rich are finished! Let us the other parts of India. With the passage shoot them!' Since Pakistan's establish- of time, Pakistan’s leaders got used to the ment, League officers have been cautious status quo. They also followed the British about declaring where they stand with policies of control and patronage, and respect to the conflict between Russia and sidelined the masses. Unlike India, the West. Pakistan is nearer to the Soviet Pakistan never initiated the process of border than to either Britain or the United decolonizing its economic and social States, and substantial segments of public structure. Land reforms were promised and opinion show an interest in the U.S.S.R. "officially" carried out but did not have Even orthodox Moslems are watching much impact on the power of landowners developments in the Soviet Moslem areas, and feudal lords. This trend gradually such as Bokhara, which are close to became so pervasive that even those Pakistan culturally as well as leaders who did not hail from this class geographically. Not all the League adopted feudal tendencies. Commenting on progressives are pro-Communist, but many this phenomenon, a leading political seem to feel that some sort of socialism, analyst says: usually referred to as 'Islamic socialism', is necessary to make Pakistan a strong "It is amazing, but a fact nevertheless, that modern state. There would certainly be higher education and exposure to the overwhelming opposition to allowing values and ways of modernity do little to Britain and the United States to use overcome the deeply ingrained influences Pakistan's military strength or strategic of a feudal upbringing. Daultana, Mamdot, position to further their own designs."23 Firoz Khan Noon, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Dr Khan Sahib, Zulfikar Ali That was Jinnah’s Pakistan. But as we Bhutto and his latter day associates, all know, none of this happened. In fact, it partook of the same frame of mind. seems that the leaders who followed Jinnah Another deplorable fact about the feudal did not care much either for his legacy or ethos is that it does not remain confined to for that matter, public opinion. No political the great landlords. It travels to other leader had the audacity to publicly sections and ranks in society. Thus, pronounce that Jinnah was wrong. On the personalism became a dominant factor in contrary, all of them, even the most the outlook of those in positions of power corrupt, authoritarian, and fundamentalists, even if they had never been large Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 23 landowners. Witness the disposition and Great Leader), Jinnah never courted titles. style of Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander He had refused a knighthood and even a Mirza, Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq, and doctorate in law from the Aligarh Muslim currently Pervez Musharraf (among many University in 1942. With a polite smile, he others)."24 said: "I have lived as plain Mr. Jinnah and I hope to die as plain Mr. Jinnah. I am very Consequently, nothing mattered to these much averse to any title or honours and I leaders. They violated the Constitution, will be more happy if there was no prefix physically attacked the Supreme Court of to my name."26 Pakistan, converted political parties into family clubs, looted public money, sought Jinnah’s legacy fell on narrow shoulders, foreign protection for their political distorted visions, and those forces that survival, misused State institutions for were antithetical to everything that he their personal aggrandizement through stood for. Recently, a columnist protested unholy alliances with dubious religious against these leaders by showing them the groups, sold and bought loyalties, resorted mirror of Jinnah’s leadership: "We started to nepotism, and the list goes on and on. our journey under the leadership of that Muhammad Ali Jinnah whose honesty, One could argue that politics normally devotion, intellectual calibre, trust- elevates those people who by no means worthiness, demeanour, fair play and represent the social and cultural values of justice had earned the respect of not only their people, especially when such leaders his friends but also his foes. That pure soul are not sure about the fate of their political who never indulged in lies, hypocrisy, status. Nor is it necessary for politicians to greed, double standards, pretensions … always follow the road that their great and irrespective of the considerations of leaders once trod. In Pakistan, however, remaining popular or otherwise, always their performance and integrity is judged said boldly and with clarity, what was by the standards set by Jinnah. It is seldom right: We were strong and majestic like the that pages of history record such glorious rivers; Oh, mother, what happened, we are tributes to a leader from those who, rightly swimming in the gutters!"27 or wrongly, felt that they did not receive fair treatment from him, as Jinnah did. His 11 August speech continues to haunt Dewan Chaman Lall, a close friend for 30 politicians. For understandable reasons, it years and a noted Congress MP, recalled is more popular with the minorities. While Jinnah's efforts for settlement before and celebrating the 60th anniversary of this after 1940 and said in 1950: "He was a speech, Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs held lovable, unsophisticated man, whatever a rally at the site of the passage of the may be said to the contrary. And he was Lahore Resolution, Minar-i-Pakistan, unpurchasable." calling for the implementation of Jinnah’s vision in letter and spirit. A member of Sarojini Naidu did not change her opinion Parliament, Minocher Bhandara, moved a of the man even after he began to advocate bill in the National Assembly of Pakistan partition. She described him at a press in February 2007 seeking to enshrine conference in Madras on 18 January 1945 Jinnah’s speech in the Constitution. On this as the one incorruptible man in the whole occasion, he said: "The speech has been of India. "I may not agree with him, but if constantly downplayed by the government there is one who cannot be bought by title, of Pakistan since 1949. Parts of the speech honour or position, it is Mr. Mohammed have been materially altered, or omitted Ali Jinnah."25 It is true that although he is altogether, in the past." He remarked: "On remembered as the Quaid-i-Azam (the the one hand tremendous respect is shown 24 M. Aslam Syed for the memory of the Quaid-i-Azam, but important thing is to set the priorities right. on the other hand, his political thoughts are The people of Pakistan come first and if desecrated to appease religious groups." decisions are made to appease any group or any foreign power at the expanse of the There is not much that one can say about masses, then it would be a different story. the present leadership that has succeeded Jinnah’s warning to the British rulers of General Musharraf in terms of reviving the India stands good for Pakistani rulers also: Jinnah legacy but if democratic institutions "One degrading measure upon another, are allowed to flourish with an independent disappointment upon disappointment, and judiciary and a free press, one can injury upon injury, can lead a people only anticipate that liberalism and moderation to one end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It will prevail in Pakistan. The most has led Ireland to Sinn Feinism."28

Notes

1 Wolpert, Stanley: Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford 11 Khan, Danish: An interview with poet Iqbal’s 1984, p.33. son, http:/www.paklinks.com/gs/allviews/ 167004.allama-iqbal.html 2 Sayeed, Khalid bin: Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, Karachi 1960, p.86. 12 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/ speech03.htm 3 The citizens of Bombay also presented him 30.000 rupees which he returned. The people 13 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/leader5/htm started a trust, the Jinnah Hall Trust, which is 14 still operational. "Though the trust calls it the Ibid. People’s Jinnah Hall, political parties [holding 15 Jinnah, Fatimah: My Brother, Karachi 1987, sessions there] refer to it as just The People’s p.2. Hall … Attempts were made by the Sena and 16 BJP to pressure trustees to rename the trust. http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/ Yagnik, a Gujarati, and other trustees, none of leader18.htm them a Muslim, refused." Singh, Vijay: "Look, 17 Time Magazine, 8/1999. What is Jinnah doing in Mumbai", 18 http://www.rediff.co.in/news/2005/Jun/13spec http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/ 1.htm speech05.htm 19 4 Wolpert: Jinnah of Pakistan, p.40. Jinnah, Quaid-iAzam Muhammad Ali: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 5 Quoted in Bolitho, Hector: Jinnah. Creator of 1947-1948, Karachi, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan, London 1954, pp.21-22. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 6 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/politician6- 1962, pp.6-10. 2.htm 20 Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din: Some Recent Speeches 7 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/ and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 vols., Lahore, politician9.htm Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1952,Vol. I, pp.39-43. 8 Noorani, A.G.: Assessing Jinnah, in: Frontline, 21 17/2005. Jinnah’s broadcast address to the people of the United States of America, February 1948. 9 Letter to Gandhi, August 14, 1929, B.N. 22 Pandey ed. The Indian Nationalist Movement: Ahmad: Some Recent Speeches. 1885-1947: Select Documents, London 1979, 23 Roth, Andrew: Jinnah’s New Republic, The pp.63-64. Nation, 13.12.1947. 10 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/ 24 Syed, Anwar: Feudalism bane of the Punjab, politician14.htm Dawn, 30.12.2006. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan 25

25 Noorani: Assessing Jinnah. 27 Nisar, Hassan: Daily Jang, 31.8.2008. 26 Zaidi, Z.H.: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali 28 Noorani: Assessing Jinnah. Jinnah Papers, Oxford 1993, Vol. I, xlv. Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans

Jochen Hippler

Die pakistanische Gesellschaft steht ge- konflikt, sondern aus unterschiedlichen genwärtig zumindest drei zentralen Her- Konflikten, die nicht immer etwas mitein- ausforderungen gegenüber: einer bedrohli- ander zu tun haben. Wenn wir hier von der chen Wirtschaftskrise, dem schwierigen staatlichen Gewalt in der Form von Men- Übergang zur Demokratie nach den Wah- schenrechtsverletzungen (Folter, "Ver- len vom Februar 2008 und einer Welle schwindenlassen" oder Misshandlung von massiver Gewalt, die 2002/2003 begann, Oppositionellen, etc.) und der Verwicklung inzwischen aber stark eskalierte. Vor allem Pakistans in Gewaltkonflikte jenseits sei- die blutige Erstürmung der "Roten Mo- ner Grenzen (Afghanistan, Kaschmir) ein- schee" in Islamabad, eine Reihe darauffol- mal absehen, lassen sich in den letzten bei- gender Bombenanschläge, der Mordan- den Jahrzehnten die folgenden, sehr unter- schlag auf die ehemalige Ministerpräsi- schiedlichen Konfliktlinien identifizieren: dentin Benazir Bhutto und die Kämpfe an der afghanischen Grenze ließen dies 2007 – überregionale, interkonfessionelle Ge- verstärkt ins Bewusstsein der europäischen walt zwischen sunnitischen und schiiti- Öffentlichkeit dringen. Tatsächlich werfen schen Extremisten und in geringerem die in den letzten Monaten noch massiv Maße auch Gewalt gegen religiöse angewachsene Welle der Gewalt, die Ver- Minderheiten (Ahmadis, Christen, hängung des Ausnahmezustandes Ende Hindus); 2007 und der politische Neubeginn nach – eine latente Bürgerkriegssituation in den Wahlen vom Februar 2008 Fragen Karachi, die sich im letzten Jahrzehnt nach der Stabilität Pakistans auf. Diese ist entspannt hat, allerdings gelegentlich umso bedeutsamer, als das Land seit 1998 immer wieder bei Attentaten, Massa- über Atomwaffen verfügt und ein Schlüs- kern oder anderen Gewaltakten auf- selverbündeter der USA im "Krieg gegen flammt; 1 den Terrorismus" ist. – Aufstände und Aufstandsbekämpfung in Belutschistan sowie Das Ausmaß politischer Gewalt in Pakistan – eine mit Afghanistan und dem "Krieg stellt einen wichtigen Indikator seiner in- gegen den Terror" verknüpfte Situation nenpolitischen Stabilität dar. Die Gewalt des Terrorismus und Bürgerkrieges in hat in den letzten fünf Jahren dramatisch der Nordwestprovinz, die sich auf an- zugenommen: Waren im Jahr 2003 weni- dere Regionen auszudehnen droht und ger als 200 Menschen ein Opfer politischer heute mit Abstand die meisten Opfer Gewalt geworden, lag die Opferzahl 2007 fordert. bei rund 3.600.2 In der ersten Jahreshälfte 2008 lagen die Opferzahlen etwa so hoch wie im Vorjahr, um im August und Sep- 1. Konflikte zwischen Sunniten tember dramatisch anzusteigen: Allein in und Schiiten diesen beiden Monaten kamen in Pakistan mehr als 2.500 Menschen durch politische Seit Mitte der 1980er- und verstärkt in den Gewalt ums Leben, mehr als 3.700 wurden 1990er-Jahren kam es in verschiedenen verletzt.3 Landesteilen (schwerpunktmäßig im Pun- jab) zu inter-konfessioneller Gewalt, vor Die Gewalt besteht in Pakistan nicht aus allem zu Attentaten und Massakern sunni- einem einzigen, alles prägenden Grund- tischer und schiitischer Extremistengrup- 28 Jochen Hippler pen. Ihre Wurzeln reichen in die Zeit der chi verknüpft. Der Anteil der sindhi- Diktatur General Zia ul-Haqs (1977-1988) sprachigen Bevölkerung in Karachi sank zurück, als dessen Regime aufgrund der auf vermutlich unter 10 Prozent, während Islamischen Revolution im Iran befürchte- die Muhajir (urdu-sprachige Einwanderer te, der schiitische Radikalismus könnte auf und Flüchtlinge aus der Zeit der Teilung Pakistan übergreifen. Die Diktatur förderte von Britisch-Indien) bereits seit der Staats- sunnitische Extremisten, die zum Teil ge- gründung die Mehrheit stellen. Die wirt- waltsam gegen Schiiten vorgingen, was zu schaftlich bedingte Zuwanderung einer Gegengewalt schiitischer Extremisten ge- großen Zahl von Paschtunen aus der gen Sunniten führte. Der Ausgangspunkt Nordwestprovinz (und von Punjabis, Be- dieses Konflikts lag im zentralen Punjab lutschen sowie von Afghanen und Iranern) (vor allem dem Bezirk Jhang), wo die trug zur Verschiebung der demographi- "feudalen" Großgrundbesitzer4 meist schii- schen Struktur der Stadt bei. Damit ergab tisch, die abhängige Landbevölkerung da- sich im Sindh eine Situation, in der die gegen sunnitisch war, weshalb auch soziale Sindhi (vorwiegend ländlich geprägt, oft Konflikte die Form konfessioneller Ausei- unter noch "feudalen" Bedingungen und nandersetzungen annahmen. Von dort mit geringem Bildungsgrad) zwar die weitete sich die Gewalt auf andere Regio- Mehrheit in der Provinz stellen, aber in der nen aus. ökonomisch dominierenden Riesenstadt Karachi nur noch eine kleine Minderheit Der sunnitisch-schiitische Grundkonflikt ausmachen. Die Muhajir sind rein städtisch bleibt auch heute latent vorhanden. Zwar geprägt und werden politisch von einer er- führt er nur in Ausnahmefällen zu Gewalt, starkenden – und überwiegend säkularen – er kann allerdings aufgrund lokaler Kon- Mittelschicht mit relativ hohem Bildungs- flikte immer wieder instrumentalisiert grad geführt. Sie blieben in der Provinz in werden, um Eskalationen herbeizuführen, der Minderheit, während sie in Karachi die wie etwa 2005 in Gilgit oder bei Anschlä- große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung darstel- gen im Punjab, in Karachi oder der Nord- len. westprovinz. Ein erster Höhepunkt der Welle dieser konfessionellen Gewalt zwi- Die Muhajir hatten sich nach der Staats- schen sunnitischen und schiitischen Ex- gründung vor allem als "Pakistaner" be- tremisten wurde Mitte der 1990er-Jahre er- trachtet, also als außerhalb der ethnischen reicht, danach flaute sie für fast ein Jahr- und konfessionellen Strukturen des Landes zehnt ab, ohne allerdings zu verschwinden. stehend. Seit Ende der 1970er-Jahre bildete In den letzten Jahren hat sie wieder massiv sich bei ihnen zunehmend eine eigene zugenommen: Fielen ihr 2003 noch 102 "ethnische" Identität heraus, die aus dem Menschen zum Opfer, so waren es 2007 wachsenden Gefühl einer Benachteiligung bereits 441.5 Die Zahlen für 2008 dürften entsprang, insbesondere im Bildungswesen noch höher liegen. und öffentlichen Dienst des Sindh. 1984 wurde die säkulare Partei MQM gegründet (Muhajir Qaumi Movement, später umbe- 2. Bürgerkrieg in Karachi nannt in Muttahida Qaumi Movement). Bis Anfang der 1990er-Jahre errang sie eine Auch in der Wirtschaftsmetropole Karachi dominierende Position in den Großstädten (ca. 14 Mill. Einwohner) reichen die Ur- des Sindh, insbesondere in Karachi und sprünge der Gewalt in die Zeit der Militär- Hyderabad. Dieser Aufstieg richtete sich diktatur Zia ul-Haqs zurück. Der Hinter- auch gegen die starke Stellung der – eben- grund dieser Auseinandersetzung ist mit falls säkularen – Pakistan People’s Party der demographischen Entwicklung in der (PPP), die im ländlichen Sindh sehr stark Provinz Sindh und ihrer Hauptstadt Kara- bleibt. Da das Regime Zia ul-Haqs die PPP Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans 29 als die größte Bedrohung ihrer Macht schläge, Attentate) kommen immer wieder wahrnahm, unterstützte es trotz aller ideo- vor, auch im Rahmen konfessioneller Zu- logischen Unterschiede den Aufstieg der sammenstöße. Besonders blutig war etwa MQM durch den Militärgeheimdienst ISI. der Mai 2004, als in Karachi 62 Menschen Ohne Wohlwollen der Regierung wäre es durch politische Gewalt starben und über unter dem damals geltenden Kriegsrecht 200 verletzt wurden. Die MQM bemüht nicht möglich gewesen, eine solche Partei sich seit 1997 um ein gemäßigteres Image zu gründen und in wenigen Jahren zur und zugleich um die Ausweitung ihrer so- stärksten in Karachi und Hyderabad wer- zialen/ethnischen Basis über die Mujahir den zu lassen. hinaus. Inzwischen sind "Pragmatismus" und "Realismus" Schlüsselbegriffe des Die MQM bemühte sich mit allen Mitteln, MQM-Programms. Nach den Wahlen von auch durch politische Morde, Massaker 2002 trat die Partei als Juniorpartner in die und Folter politischer Gegner, ihre Kon- Regierung ein und wurde damit zu einer trolle Karachis zu festigen, was die Wirt- wichtigen Stütze des 1999 an die Macht schaftsmetropole in eine Phase der Unsi- geputschten Präsidenten und Generals cherheit und Instabilität stürzte. Viele Kri- Musharraf. Die Wende der MQM zur Mä- tiker werfen der MQM bis heute einen "fa- ßigung ist nicht bruchlos: So spricht vieles schistischen" Charakter vor.6 Mitte der dafür, dass die Gewaltexzesse in Karachi 1990er-Jahre kam es in der Stadt zu einem im Mai 2007 (über 40 Tote) anlässlich ei- faktischen Bürgerkrieg, in dem bis zu nes Besuchs des abgesetzten Verfassungs- 2.000 Menschen pro Jahr aus politischen richters Iftikhar Chaudhry von der MQM Gründen getötet wurden. Als Teil dieser organisiert waren. Auseinandersetzungen unterstützten staat- liche Stellen auch die Spaltung der MQM, was zu massiver Gewalt beider Fraktionen 3. Aufstand in Belutschistan gegeneinander führte. Eine Politik der harten Repression, die auch vor Morden Die Provinz Belutschistan hatte bereits in durch die Polizei nicht zurückschreckte, den 1970er-Jahren (in der Regierungszeit vermochte das Gewaltniveau in Karachi Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos) einen Aufstand ge- zwar deutlich zu senken, die politische gen die Zentralregierung erlebt, den diese Dominanz der MQM in den Großstädten aber mit großer Härte durch die Armee des Sindh blieb allerdings erhalten. niederschlagen ließ. Zu Beginn der 2000er- Jahre begann ein neuer Aufstand. Nach Die Lage in Karachi bleibt angespannt: Zahlen der Polizei7 kam es seitdem zu- Einzelne Gewaltausbrüche (Bombenan- nehmend zu terroristischen Anschlägen:

Jahr Zahl der Anschläge Zahl der Todesopfer

2002 5 3

2003 35 61

2004 127 98

2005 225 106

2006 415 158

In diesen Zahlen sind die Opfer militärischer Operationen nicht enthalten. 30 Jochen Hippler

Wie in den 1970er-Jahren spielt Religion afghanischen Grenzen bilden Paschtunen bei dieser Gewalt keine Rolle. Vielmehr bereits die Mehrheit, und nun befürchtet stehen die Missachtung und Benachteili- man, dass durch Riesenprojekte wie den gung der Provinz durch die Zentralregie- Hafen von Gwadar eine ganz neue Migra- rung im Mittelpunkt, was sich insbesonde- tionsdynamik in Gang gesetzt wird. Belut- re an verschiedenen Großprojekten ent- schische Politiker weisen auf das Beispiel zündet. Im Zentrum des Konflikts steht vor Karachis hin, wo durch dessen wirtschaft- allem der Bau des Tiefseehafens in Gwa- liche Dynamik – und den bis vor kurzem dar. Obwohl der Ort in Belutschistan liegt, einzigen Hochseehafen des Landes – die haben weder die Provinzregierung noch die ursprünglichen Einwohner des Sindh zu lokale Bevölkerung irgendwelche Mitspra- einer kleinen Minderheit in der Stadt wur- chemöglichkeiten. Die Menschen von den. In Belutschistan mit seinen nur fünf Gwadar und Umgebung wurden gegen ih- bis sieben Millionen Einwohnern sei die ren Willen umgesiedelt, können wegen des Gefahr noch größer. Sollte Gwadar einmal Hafens und des damit verbundenen Sperr- die Größe Karachis annehmen, wäre die gebietes nicht mehr fischen (ihr Haupter- einheimische Bevölkerung nicht nur dort werbszweig) und verloren ihr Land. marginalisiert, sondern in der gesamten Provinz hoffnungslos in der Minderheit. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit den Gasvor- kommen Belutschistans. Die Provinz soll Die Regierung hätte den gegenwärtigen über 500 Milliarden Kubikmeter an Erd- Aufstand sicher vermeiden können, wenn gasvorkommen und 6 Billionen Barrel sie die Provinz an der Nutzung der Gas- Erdöl verfügen.8 vorkommen beteiligt und einen angemes- senen Preis – vergleichbar dem für den Das Gas trägt seit den 1950er-Jahren zur Punjab – gezahlt, die Provinz und ihre Be- Energieversorgung Pakistans bei, wobei es völkerung am Hafenprojekt von Gwadar der Provinz selbst kaum zugutekommt. beteiligt hätte und vor allem Belutschistan Auch die Verkaufspreise für Erdgas betra- insgesamt politisch ernst nehmen würde. gen für Belutschistan nur einen Bruchteil Der Mangel an föderaler und demokrati- dessen, was der Sindh und vor allem der scher Mitsprache sowie der Streit um Res- Punjab für ihr Gas erhalten. Das wird ver- sourcen sind die Ursachen der Gewalt. Re- ständlicherweise als schwere Benachteili- ligiöser Extremismus spielt hier kaum eine gung empfunden. Die Situation wurde zu- Rolle, und wenn, dann höchstens provinz- sätzlich dadurch angeheizt, dass die Armee intern durch sunnitische Extremisten gegen in Belutschistan begann, ohne Rücksprache Schiiten (oft durch Paschtunen verursacht). mit der Provinzregierung oder der Bevöl- Der Aufstand gegen die Regierung erfolgt kerung neue Kasernen anzulegen, die er- vor dem ideologischen Hintergrund ethni- kennbar auf die Kontrolle der Bevölkerung scher und nationaler Identität und Selbst- in sensiblen Regionen zielen, etwa in behauptung, nicht eines islamischen Radi- Gwadar und Dera Bugti oder Kohlu, wo kalismus, der in der Provinz relativ gering traditionell regierungskritische Stämme ist und nur einen Teil der paschtunischen siedeln, die bereits früher für die Autono- Bevölkerung erfasst hat. mie und Rechte ihrer Provinz gekämpft hatten. Aber anstatt die säkulare belutschische Po- litik zum Partner des Kampfes gegen den Im Hintergrund des Konflikts steht auch religiösen Extremismus im benachbarten die Befürchtung vieler Belutschen, in der Afghanistan und der Nordwestprovinz zu eigenen Provinz zur Minderheit zu werden. machen, brachte Präsident Musharraf In der Hauptstadt Quetta und entlang der durch einen rücksichtslosen Zentralismus Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans 31 und quasi-koloniale Politik die gesamte sich zuerst Mujahedin (religiöse Krieger), Provinz gegen die Zentralregierung auf. bald aber Taliban nannten. Diese Gruppen bildeten einerseits eine Brücke der lokalen Gesellschaft zu den ausländischen Jiha- 4. Bürgerkrieg in den Stammes- disten, zugleich aber untergruben sie die gebieten der Nordwestprovinz Macht der bereits in den letzten Jahrzehn- ten geschwächten Stammestradition in ei- Zum mit Abstand blutigsten Konfliktherd nigen Regionen, da sie die Stammesführer Pakistans hat sich allerdings die Nordwest- nur noch akzeptierten, wenn diese ihren provinz entwickelt, die im Wesentlichen religiösen Vorstellungen entsprachen. Sie von Paschtunen besiedelt ist und an Af- begannen bald, in bestimmten Gebieten ghanistan grenzt. Nach dem Sturz der Tali- selbst quasi-staatliche Strukturen aufzu- ban durch US-Truppen und ihre afghani- bauen, was die Macht der maliks ideolo- schen Verbündeten im Herbst 2001 flohen gisch, aber auch durch Einschüchterung viele der – paschtunischen – Taliban und und Gewalt einschränkte. Auch der ohne- 600 bis 700 internationale Kämpfer von al- hin geringe Einfluss der pakistanischen Qaida (nach anderen Angaben bis zu Behörden in der Region wurde so noch 2.000)9 in die Stammesgebiete der pakista- weiter zurückgedrängt. nischen Nordwestprovinz. Dort wurden sie meist freundlich aufgenommen, da man Die lokalen Jihadisten begannen in einigen sich ihnen seit der gemeinsamen Kampf- Regionen mit der Verfolgung und Hin- zeit des anti-sowjetischen Jihad verbunden richtung Krimineller (Räuber, Vergewalti- fühlte. Damals waren auch durch Ehe- ger, etc.), was ein erneutes Indiz für die schließungen familiäre Bindungen entstan- Untergrabung der Stämme darstellt, die ja den, die eine positive Wahrnehmung be- eigentlich für Sicherheit zuständig waren. günstigten. Schließlich bestanden auch Ihre shuras (Ratsversammlungen der Füh- ideologische Sympathien, da die jihadisti- rer) setzten Männer unter Druck, sich Bärte sche Umformung des deobandischen Islam wachsen zu lassen, und bedrohten Ge- in den Grenzgebieten seit dem Krieg gegen schäftsleute, die CDs, DVDs oder Videos die Sowjetunion eine positive Bewertung verkauften, da Musik und Filme die Moral religiöser Kämpfer bewirkt hatte. Deshalb untergrüben und durch den Islam verboten – und aufgrund finanzieller Zahlungen der seien. Wurde diesen Anweisungen nicht ausländischen Jihadisten an die Stämme gefolgt, sprengten sie entsprechende Ge- oder ihre maliks (Stammesführer) – wur- schäfte (selbst Friseurläden, die Männern den die Jihadisten nicht nur in den Stam- die Bärte rasierten) nicht selten in die Luft. mesgebieten akzeptiert, sondern konnten Nichtregierungsorganisationen – insbeson- die Region auch zur Vorbereitung von dere solche mit ausländischer Unterstüt- Überfällen und Anschlägen in Afghanistan zung oder zur Förderung von Frauen – nutzen. wurden bedroht und zum Teil angegriffen und vertrieben, da ihre Arbeit subversiv Daraus ergab sich eine Situation, bei der sei, westliche Werte propagiere und letzt- neben den Stämmen und den bedeutsamer lich im Auftrag Washingtons erfolge. gewordenen religiösen Führern nun auch Hunderte usbekischer, tschetschenischer Zugleich standen die Bewohner der FATA und arabischer Kämpfer zu politischen (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) Machtfaktoren in den Stammesgebieten nicht allein unter dem Druck jihadistischer wurden. Zwischen diesen Ausländern und Gruppen, sondern auch der Behörden und den traditionellen Stammesstrukturen bil- des Militärs. Diese nahmen oft ganze Dör- deten sich auch einheimische, paschtuni- fer oder Stämme in Haftung, um einzelner sche Gruppen jihadistischer Kämpfer, die Verdächtiger oder extremistischer Gruppen 32 Jochen Hippler habhaft zu werden. Wenn ein Stamm nicht bekannte Zahl an jihadistischen Kämpfern bereit oder in der Lage war, Verdächtige und Zivilisten. Die militärischen Rück- oder Gewalttäter an die Regierung auszu- schläge, das Unbehagen, gegen Teile der liefern, wurden sein Siedlungsgebiet abge- eigenen Bevölkerung und "gläubige Mus- riegelt oder Kollektivstrafen verhängt. lime" vorgehen zu müssen, das Gefühl, ei- gentlich im Auftrag der USA Gewalt an- Die skizzierten Entwicklungen beschränk- zuwenden, und die Opfer unter der Zivil- ten sich nicht allein auf die Stammesge- bevölkerung beeinträchtigen außerdem die biete, auch wenn sie dort ihren Ursprung Kampfmoral vieler Soldaten. Ein Beispiel hatten und besonders intensiv auftraten. dafür stellte ein Zwischenfall im August Die politische Gewalt dehnte sich selbst in 2007 dar, bei dem eine kleine Gruppe von größere Städte aus, wie nach D.I. Khan örtlichen Taliban rund 250 Soldaten gefan- und Peshawar. Allerdings erreichte sie dort gen nahm, die sich nicht einmal verteidig- nicht das Niveau eines offenen Krieges, ten.10 sondern nahm die Form von Attentaten und einzelnen Terrorakten an. Zugleich kam es immer wieder zu Versu- chen, die Konflikte in den Stammesgebie- Die pakistanische Armee unternimmt seit ten durch Gespräche, Verhandlungen und 2002 – und verstärkt ab 2004, als etwa Vereinbarungen beizulegen, wobei häufig 80.000 Soldaten eingesetzt wurden, eine Politiker der – mit den Taliban sympathi- Zahl, die später noch deutlich anstieg – sierenden – JUI (Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam) militärische Operationen gegen die Jiha- und Stammesversammlungen (Jirgas) zur disten in den Stammesgebieten. Diese Ein- Vermittlung genutzt wurden. Meist bestand sätze waren nur mäßig erfolgreich, auch der Ansatz darin, die Stämme zu ver- weil die lokale Bevölkerung die Präsenz pflichten, lokale und internationale Kämp- und die Gewaltanwendung von Soldaten in fer selbst zu disziplinieren oder terroristi- ihrer autonomen Region überwiegend ab- sche Täter der Regierung auszuliefern oder lehnte. Die pakistanische Armee erlitt teil- an Angriffen zu hindern – im Gegenzug weise schwere Verluste und reagierte mit sollten das Militär sich zurückziehen und einer Eskalation der Operationen, die nun die zivilen Behörden finanzielle Zuwen- auch massive Luftangriffe beinhalteten. dungen leisten oder Entwicklungsprojekte Die resultierenden zivilen Opfer führten zu durchführen. Da allerdings in einigen Re- verstärktem Widerstand der betroffenen gionen die lokalen Machtverhältnisse dies Stämme, was die ausländischen und insbe- nicht mehr zuließen – die militanten Grup- sondere lokalen extremistischen Kämpfer pen waren bereits so stark, dass sie durch politisch stärkte und ihre Zusammenarbeit die Stämme nicht mehr kontrolliert werden förderte. Dazu kamen vereinzelte, aber po- konnten –, in anderen der politische Wille litisch oft verheerende Angriffe durch US- fehlte, kam es auch zu direkten Verhand- Kräfte. Das wichtigste Beispiel war 2006 lungen und Vereinbarungen der Behörden ein Raketenangriff auf eine Medresse im mit lokalen Taliban. In diesen Fällen legi- Dorf Chingai (Bajaur Agency, Tribal timierte und stärkte sie dies offensichtlich Areas) durch – sehr wahrscheinlich – US- gegenüber den nichtextremistischen Kräf- Truppen aus Afghanistan, bei dem 82 ten. Lokale Abkommen brachen auch zu- Menschen starben, darunter viele Frauen sammen, weil häufig weder das Militär und Kinder. Einige Tage später kam es zu noch die Aufständischen sich daran hiel- einem Vergeltungsangriff durch einen ten. Verhandlungsprozesse mit den lokalen Selbstmordattentäter, bei dem 40 pakista- Akteuren waren prinzipiell sinnvoll, er- nische Soldaten getötet wurden. Insgesamt folgten allerdings unter Umständen, die sie starben bei den Kämpfen bis 2007 vermut- immer wieder zum Scheitern brachten. lich mehr als 1.000 Soldaten und eine un- Teilweise wurden während laufender Ver- Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans 33 handlungen größere Militäroperationen Integration gegenüber – insbesondere einer durchgeführt – so erfolgte auch das Rake- außenpolitischen Bedrohungssituation. De- tenmassaker von Bajaur genau an dem ren Ausdruck waren drei Kriege gegen In- Tag, als in der Region ein Friedensab- dien bis 1971, seitdem mehrere Beinahe- kommen unterschrieben werden sollte. In Kriege, die Nichtanerkennung der gemein- solchen Fällen ist offensichtlich, dass die samen Grenze durch Afghanistan und die militärische Aufstandsbekämpfung Ansät- später destabile Situation dort, die nach ze friedlicher Konfliktregelung zum Pakistan ausstrahlt. Dazu kam im Inneren Scheitern brachte. die beträchtliche ethnische Heterogenität der Bevölkerung, die 1971 bereits mit zur Abspaltung der früheren Ostprovinz (heute 5. Gewalt und instabiler Bangladesh) geführt hatte. Die staatlichen Autoritarismus in Pakistan Eliten reagierten auf diese Kombination struktureller Schwäche und komplexer Die oben skizzierten Gewaltkonflikte sind Herausforderungen, indem sie die auf alle, wenn auch auf unterschiedliche Art, Kontrolle zielenden Teile der Staatlichkeit mit der spezifischen Form von Staatlich- überentwickelten, was sich in einer zentra- keit in Pakistan verknüpft. Zwar ist nicht listischen und autoritären Kontrolle der diese allein für die Konflikte verantwort- Gesellschaft und der dominierenden Rolle lich (zum Beispiel ist der Krieg in Afgha- des Militärs niederschlug. So wurden in nistan von entscheidender Bedeutung für den ersten zwölf Jahren seiner Existenz in die Gewalteskalation im Nordwesten Pa- Pakistan durchschnittlich rund 60 Prozent kistans), aber sie hat oft einen auslösenden des Staatshaushalts für das Militär ausge- oder verschärfenden Einfluss. Dabei lässt geben – und Pakistan mehr als die Hälfte sich das Paradoxon feststellen, dass in der seiner Geschichte vom Militär regiert. Der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskus- Staat geriet so in eine Schieflage, bei der sion Pakistan häufig als failing state disku- manche seiner Teile leistungsschwach tiert wird, während bezüglich der oben be- blieben (Sozialpolitik und soziale Dienste, handelten Konflikte eine "starke" oder ro- Infrastruktur, politische Integration), wäh- buste Politik staatlicher Stellen für die rend andere durch ihre Stärke die Gesell- Gewalt zumindest mitverantwortlich ist. Es schaft in ein stählernes Korsett zwängen fällt auf, dass Elemente defizitärer Staat- wollten, um so Stabilität zu gewährleisten lichkeit unvermittelt mit solchen einer (Streitkräfte, repressiver Zentralismus, Be- "überentwickelten" verknüpft sind. Hin- schränkung politischer Partizipation). weise auf geschwächte staatliche Hand- lungsfähigkeit finden sich im partiellen Der pakistanische Staat insgesamt ist dem- Verlust der Kontrolle über – wenn auch zufolge weder stark noch schwach, son- marginale – Teile des Territoriums (Wazi- dern asymmetrisch beides zugleich, was ristan, z.T. auch Swat, Dir, etc.) und in den sich immer wieder als krisenauslösend Defiziten bei der sozio-politischen Inte- oder krisenverschärfend erweist. So führte gration der unterschiedlichen Provinzen die autoritäre Überzentralisierung – also und ethnischen und religiösen Gruppen. der Versuch, einen starken und stabilen Dazu kommen die für unsere Beispiele Zentralstaat auf Kosten der Provinzen und weniger bedeutsame allgemeine Funkti- Minderheiten durchzusetzen – zu einer onsschwäche vieler staatlicher Behörden, teilweisen Delegitimierung des Staates und die Schwäche des Parteiensystems und die zu Widerstand vor allem in Belutschistan, Korruption. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser zum Teil auch im Sindh und Karachi sowie Probleme sah sich Pakistan seit der Staats- der Nordwestprovinz. Manche Ethnonatio- gründung schwierigen Aufgaben bezüglich nalisten sprechen dort von einem durch seiner Sicherheit und gesellschaftlichen den Punjab kontrollierten Staat, der eine 34 Jochen Hippler

"Versklavung" der kleineren Provinzen auch ihre Konzentration in den Händen ei- bedeute. ner schmalen gesellschaftlichen und politi- schen Elite. Eine Kultur des Autoritaris- Ein zweiter Faktor besteht in der weitge- mus dieser Eliten opferte immer wieder die henden Verhinderung politischer Partizi- Ansätze gesellschaftlicher und politischer pationsmöglichkeiten der Bevölkerung, die Integration dem Interesse persönlichen angesichts der neuen, aufstrebenden Mit- Durchregierens bis auf die Provinz- und telschichten und gestärkten Bourgeoisie Kommunalebene. Auf diese Weise wurde auf Dauer nicht durchzuhalten ist. Politi- einer hochgradig pluralistischen und hete- sche Partizipation und Aktivismus suchen rogenen Gesellschaft ein zentralistischer sich wegen der staatlichen Blockade zu- Staat übergestülpt, der sich föderal mas- nehmend außerhalb der etablierten politi- kiert. Zugleich allerdings erwies sich gera- schen Strukturen andere, auch militante de dieser die Gesellschaft dominierende Ausdrucksformen – was sich nicht allein in Staat als schwach, soweit es nicht um seine Karachi und der krisengeschüttelten bloße Kontrollfunktion ging, sondern um Nordwestprovinz zeigt. Der Autoritarismus die Bereitstellung sozialer Dienstleistungen des politischen Systems unter Präsident und politischer Integration. Musharraf brachte in den letzten Jahren fast die gesamte Bevölkerung gegen das Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen die Ent- Regime auf und wirkte so massiv auf die wicklungen seit den Wahlen vom Februar ohnehin bestehenden Konflikte in den Pro- 2008 betrachtet werden. Der Übergang zur vinzen und die religiös geprägten Formen Demokratie allein wird die Instabilität und von Politik zurück. die strukturellen Defizite des politischen Systems ebenso wenig überwinden wie die Drittens schließlich erweisen sich die häu- politische Gewalt. Aber es gibt doch einige figen Versuche staatlicher, insbesondere Bereiche, die zur Hoffnung Anlass bieten, militärischer Stellen zur Manipulation ge- mittel- und längerfristig eine politische Re- sellschaftlicher und politischer Konflikte form zustandezubringen: Insbesondere die als mittel- und langfristig zentraler Faktor breite Mobilisierung der Juristen und ande- der Destabilisierung. Diese haben in Kara- rer Sektoren der Gesellschaft, die in den chi (Aufstieg und Spaltung der MQM), in letzten Jahren die Frage der Rechtsstaat- der Nordwestprovinz und vor allem bei der lichkeit mit Nachdruck auf die Tagesord- taktischen Förderung religiöser und sogar nung setzte, demonstriert, dass die pakista- jihadistischer Gruppen durch das im Kern nische Gesellschaft sich nicht länger ohne säkulare Militär (auch durch säkulare zivile Widerspruch staatlicher Willkür zu unter- Parteien wie die PPP) eine entscheidende werfen gedenkt. Hier deutet sich ein größe- Rolle bei der Auslösung und Eskalation res Selbstbewusstsein der wichtiger ge- gewaltsamer Konflikte gespielt, die der wordenen Mittelschichten an, was eine Staat dann nicht mehr kontrollieren konnte. entscheidende Voraussetzung der Durch- setzung demokratischer, partizipativer und Diese drei konfliktfördernden Faktoren des rechtsstaatlicher Staatlichkeit darstellt. Autoritarismus sind eng miteinander ver- Solange allerdings der Demokratisierungs- knüpft. Das zeigt sich unter anderem darin, prozess unter Kontrolle der alten politi- dass der Kampf für Partizipation, Rechts- schen Eliten und im Rahmen eines weitge- staatlichkeit und Demokratie in Pakistan hend korrupten und undemokratischen fast immer mit dem für die Rechte der Parteiensystems erfolgt, dürften sich die Provinzen und Minderheiten verknüpft Chancen auf eine grundlegende Korrektur war. Umgekehrt bedeutete die Zentralisie- der strukturellen Defizite des Staatsappa- rung staatlicher Macht immer zugleich rates in Grenzen halten. Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans 35

In einem solchen Fall allerdings wären die überwinden. Dann stünde dem Land eine Aussichten gering, die innenpolitische In- längere Phase des Durchlavierens in einer stabilität Pakistans in absehbarer Zeit zu schwierigen Situation bevor.

Anmerkungen

1 Dazu Hippler, Jochen: Das gefährlichste Land 5 Institute for Conflict Management, South der Welt? Pakistan zwischen Militärherrschaft, Asia Terrorism Portal, Sectarian Violence in Extremismus und Demokratie, Köln 2008. Pakistan, http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ 2 Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment 2008, 6 Z.B. der ehemalige Cricket-Spieler und heuti- www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/ind ge säkulare Politiker Imran Khan, siehe: Imran ex.htm. Es handelt sich um Mindestzahlen, da seeks UK justice for Karachi killings, in: Daily nicht alle Todesopfer von der Regierung veröf- fentlicht wurden oder auf andere Art bekannt Times, June 3, 2007, www.dailytimes.com. wurden. Das dürfte insbesondere für die Pro- pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C06%5C03%5C vinz Belutschistan und die Stammesgebiete der story_3-6-2007_pg7_1 Nordwestprovinz gelten. 7 Interne Zahlen der Polizei, persönliche Infor- 3 Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Azam, mation für den Autor, September 2007. Muhammad: South Asia Conflict Report, aug- 8 Grare, Frédéric: Pakistan: The Resurgence of sep 2008, http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN- Files/SAN-SouthAsia/SAN-SouthAsia-Article Baluch Nationalism, in: Carnegie Papers, No. 47 /San-SA-A47-D.asp 65, Washington, January 2006, S.5. 9 4 "Feudal" ist hier nicht im Sinne des europäi- Hussain, Zahid: Frontline Pakistan – The schen Feudalismus des Mittelalters gemeint, Struggle with Militant Islam, New York 2007, sondern bezeichnet landestypische Formen S.120, 143. ländlicher Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse und die 10 Khan, Ghafar Ali: High Cost of Low Morale, damit verbundene Mentalität. in: The Herald, October 2007, S.64f. Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations

Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Ever since their independence, India and effort, described as a comprehensive com- Pakistan, the two successor states of the posite dialogue, to resolve outstanding is- British Indian Empire, have remained sues by holding multifaceted structured locked in a conflictual relationship. His- talks in joint standing committees. Nearly torical factors that culminated in the parti- four years later, assessments of progress tion of 1947 and a host of problems left made in this peace process vary but both behind by a hasty and untidy transfer of sides claim that the process is irreversible. power by Great Britain combined to frus- trate the hope that partition would usher in a period of cooperation between two es- 1. Historical background sentially satisfied nation states that had to make up for more than a century of alien Politeness, prudence and political restraint rule. There were formidable challenges of ensure that interlocutors make only a nation building and economic develop- minimal reference in the present dialogue ment. India and Pakistan would have found to the roots of estrangement between the it easier to meet them by working together. two successor states of the British Raj. But Instead, their first military conflict in the factors that created a bitter legacy of Jammu and Kashmir took place in less than distrust and conflict in the past have not three months after independence. It was to disappeared completely. What has doubt- be the prelude of future wars that led to less happened is a remarkable transforma- momentous consequences for them and for tion of attitudes. Instead of a passive resig- the region. Mutual hostility contributed to nation to endless antagonism, the two sides both of them becoming national security are finally fighting the historical determin- states committed to large defence outlays. ism of their past relations to a proactive It delayed India's emergence as an impor- quest for a better future of choice and tant actor on the global stage. For Pakistan, hope. The political imagination of the two the consequences were even more serious. nations is preoccupied less with regression It was a major factor in the secession of into the era of military confrontations and East Pakistan. It skewed the international more how and when they can put on the balance of political forces and made its ground an architecture of enduring peace democratic polity vulnerable to military and cooperation. It is a long and hazardous interventions. By the mid-1980s, this an- journey but India and Pakistan have com- tagonism had raised the spectre of a mush- menced it. room cloud over more than a billion peo- ple. The anti-colonial struggle in the British In- dian Empire was far more complex than in The present time is a time of hope that many other more homogeneous colonies. costly but inconclusive wars and military The divide-and-rule stratagems of an alien stand-offs have eventually led to a realiza- power had sharpened the communal cleav- tion that their problems cannot be resolved age in the Indian society and weakened the by the use of force. In January 2004, the consensus noticeable in the early years of leaders of India and Pakistan made a joint the Indian National Congress. But it would declaration to resolve their differences and be wrong to attribute the great split that lay disputes by peaceful negotiations. It was ahead only to British machinations; there the beginning of by far the most sustained was a more potent intrinsic reason for it. 38 Tanvir Ahmad Khan

The upsurge for freedom in India was ac- "there are two antagonistic nations living companied by strong revivalist religious side by side in India". While sections of movements amongst the Muslims and the Indian Muslim dreamt of the lost glory of more numerous Hindus. There was a con- their empires, Savarkar maintained that tinuous semantic overlap between the po- "Hindus, Hindusthan and India mean one litical and religious discourses of each and and the same thing". The idea of two na- every community living in India under the tions leading parallel lives in the subconti- British Crown. As the political and relig- nent was not particular to a single commu- ious mingled, each community became nity. More significantly Savarkar's think- more differentiated from the other, and ing had permeated into the Congress where self-determination for which they were Patel used it continuously to counter- battling the British acquired a different balance Nehru's secularism. meaning for growing majorities in their re- spective rank. Mohammad Ali Jinnah The western principle of majority rule was parted from Mahatma Gandhi because he probably the only organizing concept that concluded that Gandhi was moving away the paramount power could use for a grad- from political syncretism to defining a fu- ual introduction of constitutionalism and ture Indian nation in terms emanating from self-rule in a continental land mass of great Hindu revivalist movements. Much of human diversity. And yet, the same idea Muslim insecurity in the days ahead sprang fanned the fear of Indian Muslims that from this fear and in turn fuelled their their post-independence fate would be of a separatist politics. hapless minority. In the run-up to freedom, the liberal moderates from both sides lost control, and the communalists vented their 2. Diverging aspirations ancient hatreds and atavistic urges in mas- sive ethnic cleansing. The eventual parti- The first four decades of the twentieth tion was deeper than the great leaders of century inexorably established different the mainstream political parties had ever trajectories of aspirations that widened dis- envisaged. It was traumatic enough to sun- agreements and led to the partition of der a thousand-year-old interaction insofar 1947. Gradually, a more equitable and as the citizens of the two post-colonial credible historiography is discarding the states were concerned. Interstate relations propagandist over-simplifications domi- became increasingly susceptible to misper- nating the two national narratives crafted ceptions as the international border became in the terminal years of the Raj. The his- an epistemological barrier. India and Paki- torical process which led Mohammad Ali stan exacerbated their differences by at- Jinnah to ground his demand for Pakistan tributing the worst possible motives to in a two-nation theory is better understood each other. Pakistan's early history is as more and more Indian researchers af- haunted by the fear that India aimed at an- firm that right up to the end Jinnah was nulling partition. On its part, India was open to a compromise confederal solution determined to limit Pakistan by ensuring with a viable Centre. Even as Gandhi and that under no circumstances would the Nehru defined independence in quasi- Muslim majority state of Jammu and secular terms, Savarkar, the most effective Kashmir accede to it. Part of Nehru's ra- exponent of what in current Indian politics tionalization of this decision came from his is called Hindutva, declared in 1937 that allegation that by signing military pacts Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 39 with the United States, Pakistan was re- ered by them within the parameters of opening the gateway of the subcontinent to principles on which India had been di- foreign influence. vided. Nehru's intense preoccupation with Kashmir, a large sprawling state that should have joined Pakistan under the 3. Legacy of a discriminatory guiding principles for the accession of partition states to India and Pakistan was a case in point. Apart from frequently cited senti- Pakistan's sense of victimhood began when mental reasons, Nehru wanted Kashmir to the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten establish the Indian outreach in what had abandoned imperial impartiality and pre- been a sensitive strategic region for almost vailed upon Lord Radcliffe, the final arbi- a century. He had approached the British ter in the Joint Boundary Commission, to government in London at least two years award to India some territories that the before independence to persuade it to en- eminent jurist bad earlier marked out as trust the defence of that strategic border, Pakistan territory. Stanley Wolpert's hook where India, China, Russia and North West "Shameful Flight" reveals the degree of in- Asia formed a fateful junction, to New difference to Pakistan's needs that had de- Delhi in whatever political dispensation veloped in implementing the partition plan. was eventually worked out for transfer of Generations of Pakistanis have attributed power. Pakistan interpreted his push into this bias to Jinnah's refusal to accept Lord Kashmir as a flanking movement aimed at Mountbatten as the Governor General of isolating and strangulating it in its infancy. both the dominions. Mountbatten's influ- Jinnah's readiness to countenance an inde- ence strengthened Nehru's resolve to inter- pendent Hyderabad, a princely state with a vene militarily in the growing disorder in decisive Hindu majority in the heart of Jammu and Kashmir. A similar counter- southern India, and his acceptance of the move by Jinnah was blocked when the instrument of accession from the Muslim British commander-in-chief of the Paki- ruler of predominantly Hindu Junagadh stani army, General Gracey, reported it to well inside the Indian border were pro- Mountbatten and threatened Jinnah with vocative to lndia which used force in both mass withdrawal of all the British officers the cases to merge them into the Indian in his armed forces. If the intention was to Union. prevent a war between the emerging states, it was only partly successful as Gracey The new rulers of India tried to overcome later led the Pakistani military contingent their trauma of partition by expressing the in Jammu and Kashmir to stop the Indian hope that it would only be a short interlude army from overrunning the entire state in before full reunification. In his private the spring of 1948. The fatally delayed in- musings recorded on loose sheaves of pa- duction of regular Pakistani troops into the per, the father of the Pakistani nation did battle for Kashmir meant disproportionate not countenance an iron curtain between sacrifices by them to stem that Indian of- two sovereign states and pondered over ar- fensive, sacrifices that were to sow the eas of continuing cooperation such as seeds of militarism in Pakistani politics. common customs. The Kashmir war and the perceived threat of forcible absorption Indian independence was an epoch-making into India, however, intensified Pakistan's event but it is still being debated if in that desire to escape the gravitational pull of sublime hour, leaders of both sides rose to the bigger neighbour from which it had the high level of statesmanship warranted separated. This feeling of insecurity cre- by history. The accession of princely states ated antagonistic dynamics. Nehru thought to either dominion was not always consid- of South Asia – a vast bureaucratic conti- 40 Tanvir Ahmad Khan nental construct engineered by an imperial pletely resile from its commitment to a power – to be self-enclosed, with India its plebiscite under UN-auspices. pre-eminent nation. Pakistan saw him pre- scribing limited sovereignties for India's Sino-Indian differences on their long bor- neighbours and embarked upon a long and der erupted into a short war in 1962 in arduous quest for sovereign equality. The which India lost territory. President Ayub almost spontaneous acceptance by Pakistan desisted from taking advantage of Indian of the invitation to join CENTO in the difficulties, settling instead for the western Middle East and SEATO in South East offer of diplomatic support for a resolution Asia came less from an ideological fear of of India-Pakistan disputes. The Chinese communism and more from the opportu- disengaged and withdrew quickly but not nity to attain strategic equivalence with In- before alarm bells rang all over the western dia. world. Major western powers probably saw in the encounter an opportunity to dilute Nehru had made Indian military interven- Nehru's non-alignment and rushed in with tion in Kashmir categorically conditional large consignments of sophisticated mili- upon ascertaining the wishes of the people. tary hardware. When Pakistan complained India took the dispute to the United Na- that western assistance was disturbing the tions. The first ceasefire in that embattled fragile balance of power between the two state came in the context of U.N resolu- countries, the U.K. and U.S mediated to tions under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter bring about several rounds of Indo- requiring a plebiscite under the U.N. aus- Pakistan negotiations focused on Kashmir. pices after the Security Council's directive Two astute negotiators, Pakistan's future for demilitarization and other administra- prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the tive measures had been fulfilled. India had future foreign minister of India, Swarn installed a government headed by pro-India Singh explored solutions other than the one Sheikh Abdullah, an icon of the Kashmiri envisaged in the stalemated plebiscite plan struggle against the Dogra rulers of the but eventually lost a real opportunity to state, in the territories under its control, in- make a new beginning in India-Pakistan cluding the populous Kashmir Valley. Ab- relations. The negotiations were notable dullah had agreed only to a limited acces- for a detailed exchange of views on parti- sion with a large measure of autonomy tioning Jammu and Kashmir but failed be- guaranteed by the famous article 370 of the cause India was not willing to cede much Indian Constitution. The 1952 agreement of the Kashmir Valley which had the bulk between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru of the Muslim population. Inasmuch as which had set out in considerable detail the their failure became a contributory factor special position of Jammu and Kashmir in in the war of 1965, the parleys were coun- the Indian state broke down soon and Ab- ter-productive; Pakistan concluded that In- dullah was incarcerated for many long dian occupation could not be loosened or years. Article 370 got seriously eroded by reversed through talks. a whole series of amendments curtailing state autonomy. The recourse to the United Nations became a victim of the unfolding 4. Drums of war Cold War being waged across the globe. As the Soviet Union paralysed the Security Pakistan's determination to challenge the Council with vetoes cast on behalf of India resultant status quo led to a protracted cri- and the U.N. Commission on Jammu and sis in relations with India and led straight Kashmir failed to make any headway, it to the first major subcontinental war in became evident that India would com- 1965. Henceforth India could hold Kash- Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 41 mir only by the force of superior arms, a force or an actual resort to it. India stepped compulsion that eventually radicalized the up encouragement for separatist politics in people of the hapless state. Ironically for East Bengal that gathered momentum as Pakistan, the 1965 war also fanned separa- Pakistan's military regime continued to tist sentiments in East Pakistan creating an curb Bengali sub-nationalism with repres- unprecedented opportunity for protracted sive measures. In the western half, India interference and eventual military inter- and Pakistani fought a brief localized battle vention to help establish the independent over the demarcation of frontier in the state of Bangladesh. Rann of Kutch. The Pakistani province of Sindh is separated from the Indian territory Consolidation of Indian military power in by marshland which becomes flooded for Kashmir brought geography back to the several months every year. The British era centre stage of Pakistani concerns. All the agreement on the border which located the major rivers of Pakistan flow into it from separation line on the eastern rim of the Kashmir and as the lower riparian, it marshland was no longer acceptable to In- viewed the situation with alarm. The Rad- dia. The conflict led to international arbi- cliffe partition line running through a natu- tration which has not resolved all the allied rally integrated river system of the Indus issues including the maritime boundary to Basin made the Indian East Punjab a this day. In 1965, Pakistan sponsored a re- stakeholder in the system. Pakistan faced volt in Indian-held Kashmir by infiltrating considerable problems when India with- guerrillas. India broadened the conflict and held water from some of its canals from attacked Pakistan across the international head works awarded to India. In 1950, it frontier. It took the United Nations almost proposed arbitration and on Indian refusal, three weeks to bring about a ceasefire. It drew international attention to the brewing was, however, Russian mediation that re- crisis. The World Bank offered its good stored peace. The leaders of India and offices two years later and initiated nego- Pakistan agreed upon a number of meas- tiations lasting eight years. The landmark ures to normalize disrupted relations and Indus Basin Treaty, one of the few signifi- reaffirmed in the Tashkent Declaration is- cant agreements in the region, gave India sued at the end of the conference spon- the eastern rivers but compensated Paki- sored by the Soviet Union that they would stan by financing link canals in its own ter- not have recourse to force and would settle ritory to sustain its vast irrigation system. their disputes through peaceful means. Perhaps it is in the nature of the partition of Having alternately proposed and turned 1947 that most agreements between India down proposals for a non-aggression pact and Pakistan turn out to be imperfect but since the 1950s, the two countries now this treaty has the distinction of surviving seemed to renounce the use of force. No two major wars and many military con- more than five years later, they reverted to frontations. In more recent years, India has a posture of belligerence over a fateful in- started some upstream projects in Kashmir ternecine conflict over internal autonomy leading to Pakistani allegations of treaty in East Pakistan. violations. India denies that its projects entail consumptive use of water. The issue The Bangladesh crisis bedevilled relations is high on the agenda of bilateral negotia- as much as the Kashmir dispute had done tions but friction over water may cast a in the wake of independence. The 1965 dark shadow on cordial relations in the war had given a sharper edge to the years ahead. perception in East Pakistan that it was not an equal partner in the federation and that For the better part of a decade, the two it was discriminated against both in politics countries relied on the threat of use of and economics. The Bengali intellectual 42 Tanvir Ahmad Khan class played an important part in propa- solved to settle their differences through gating the demand for maximum provincial bilateral negotiations or by any other autonomy. In the course of time, the ob- peaceful means mutually agreed upon be- jective plan for realizing it, now the matrix tween them'. This echo of the old idea of a of the politics of the Awami League, non-aggression pact was fortified by a pointed to a restructuring of the state of further undertaking that 'pending the final Pakistan as a virtual confederation. settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilat- For much of their history, India and Paki- erally alter the situation and both shall pre- stan have been prone to exacerbating each vent the organisation, assistance or encour- other's political problems. India saw in the agement of any acts detrimental to the widespread alienation of the Bengali- maintenance of peaceful and harmonious speaking population of its neighbour 'an relations'. When the Indian army moved opportunity of a century' to fan separatism into the Siachin Glacier in mid-1980s, in it. The emergence of a group of hardlin- Pakistan considered it a grave violation of ers in the Awami League that was destined the Simla Agreement and carried out a to lead an armed struggle for liberation counter-deployment in the icy wastes of made accommodation with the military the Karakorum range of mountains. More government in the federal capital difficult. recently, the two sides have observed a Confident of Indian support, this group ceasefire there but are yet to agree upon a demanded a solution too radical for the plan of demilitarization in this highest Pakistani army. When negotiations turned theatre of war in the world. into an outright confrontation and the province of East Pakistan was plunged into mass agitation, the Pakistan army took the 5. Composite Dialogue fateful decision to use military force. India helped the forces of resistance generously Against this unfolding regional backdrop, and contemplated military intervention al- India and Pakistan have made efforts to most immediately. By November 1971, the open a new chapter in their unhappy rela- armies of two countries were battling each tions. A joint Statement made at the end of other in the border area. Bangladesh emer- a summit in February 1999 held out the ged as a sovereign state when India deliv- promise of a sustained and structured dia- ered a coup de grace in December 1971. logue to resolve differences. The initiative was derailed by the fighting in the Kargil The loss of a whole province which had mountains in Kashmir and the military more than half of Pakistan's total popula- coup d'etat in Pakistan that followed it. By tion and the humiliating circumstances in the end of 2003, however, General Pervez which the Pakistani forces there had to sur- Musharraf, who had emerged as Pakistan's render were seminal events that vitiated strongman, sought restoration of that relations for the next two decades. In a aborted dialogue with signals of accom- landmark summit called the Simla Confer- modation on the core dispute of Jammu ence, the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had and Kashmir that were unprecedented in picked up the pieces in Pakistan after a Pakistan's history. He has offered to give shattering military defeat, argued hard for up the demand for a plebiscite if India an equitable framework of relations for were to agree to a package of proposals in- future and the victorious prime minister of cluding self-rule for the disputed territory India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi reciprocated and its demilitarization. He envisages a with enough magnanimity to arrive at a soft line of control and some mechanism workable agreement. The Simla Pact of 2 for a joint control of the erstwhile state of July 1972 stated that 'the two countries are Jammu and Kashmir. Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 43

Meanwhile, India and Pakistan have com- Basin Treaty, the one international agree- pleted three rounds of meetings with com- ment that has otherwise withstood periodic mittees constituted to address a compre- conflict, by creating new facts in the rivers hensive agenda. The process has produced flowing into Pakistan from the Indian-held new confidence-building measures, con- Kashmir. Reluctance to make substantive siderable reduction in tension, modest in- progress on Kashmir and the aforemen- crease in trade and ritual reaffirmation of tioned less intractable problems had al- resolve to remain engaged in negotiations ready slowed down the peace process overtly and in the secret channel estab- when Pakistan started sliding into a period lished in 2004. However, a real break- of political turbulence several months through on Jammu and Kashmir awaits ahead of the expected uncertainty in the progress where India continues to ponder winter of 2007, the point of time for fresh the risks of demilitarization and the degree presidential and parliamentary elections. of autonomy required to bring to an end an Since March 2007 India has not pursued a 18-year-old insurgency. There are fears much awaited summit between Prime that without the coercive power of the two Minister Manmohan Singh and President subcontinental states, the people of Jammu Pervez Musharraf on the grounds that it is and Kashmir may make a bid for inde- waiting to see the outcome of the political pendence on lines similar to what was wit- tussle in Pakistan. India itself is not free of nessed in Eastern and Central Europe. political uncertainty as its polity stands di- What seems to be more credible is that the vided by serious issues including, rather people of Kashmir are aware of the strate- prominently, considerable internal dis- gic implications of being at the junction of agreements on the deal with the United India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Af- States that would open the doors for un- ghanistan and that they would prefer to an- precedented cooperation in nuclear tech- chor their long-term security in honourable nology and supply of nuclear fuel to India. arrangements with India and Pakistan. Fears that these disagreements may pre- Kashmir, in the final analysis, is a chal- cipitate a premature General Election have lenge to the creativity and ingenuity of made the dialogue with Pakistan a secon- these two states; they need to evolve a dary concern in New Delhi. framework of relations compatible with Kashmiri aspirations and conducive to their own reconciliation. 6. Nuclearization

It is not a good time to speculate on The military conflicts of 1965 and 1971 whether the two countries possess the were to accelerate the quest for nuclear quality of statesmanship to rise to this weapons in South Asia. Arguably, India challenge. There are significant imponder- has regarded nuclear capability as an es- ables that can influence the ongoing dia- sential attribute of a major state with valid logue either way. There were apprehen- global ambitions. It also needed nuclear sions in Pakistan all along that India might equivalence with China. Pakistan on the just aim at conflict management and not its other hand has avowedly sought this capa- resolution unless Pakistan would settle on bility to attain nuclear deterrence entirely Indian terms. India is also being seen to be in the context of India-Pakistan hostility. holding out even on easier issues like the After the Bangladesh debacle, Pakistan in- long overdue demilitarization of the creasingly anchored its ultimate security in Siachin region and the delimitation of the it and has to this day retained the first use boundary in Sir Creek which would have a option. Both the countries have pursued bearing on the maritime boundary. It is weaponization and sophisticated missile also seen as gradually eroding the Indus development programmes while supporting 44 Tanvir Ahmad Khan universal disarmament. Pakistan has also the winter of 1989 to its belief that nuclear frequently claimed moral high ground by weapons rule out a total war. A mirror im- proposing a South Asian nuclear free zone age is found in the Pakistani assessment and an outright abandonment of ballistic that India has contemplated sub-strategic missiles. limited wars against Pakistan under a nu- clear umbrella. India and Pakistan massed The overt nuclearization marked by multi- large forces along the international frontier ple nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in and the Kashmir line of control in 1986, 1998 ended the ambiguity maintained till 1990 and 2001. Each of them could have then. Paradoxically, the tests dramatized led to a catastrophic conflict. That it did the need to work out nuclear risk reduction not take place is probably equally attribut- measures in an environment where early able to the maturity of leadership in both warning has no meaning. Adoption of a the countries that is mindful of nuclear strategic restraint regime is now on the bi- risks and a more proactive role played by lateral agenda though agreements reached the international community in defusing so far are of the order of preliminary con- tensions in a dangerous nuclear environ- fidence-building measures. The present ment. strategic stability is vulnerable to several national and international factors. Fore- Nuclear ambiguity in the subcontinent most amongst them is the attitude of the ended with nuclear tests carried out by In- international community. In particular, the dia and Pakistan, in that order, in 1998. United States differentiates between the This demonstration of nuclear weapons ca- nuclear programmes of the two countries pability sent a shock wave around the because of what it describes as their 'dif- world. It also added urgency to their quest ferent histories'. It has made the United for stability in nuclear deterrence, the States offer sophisticated technology and stated principle of nuclearization. Apart services for the Indian civil nuclear pro- from a mutual understanding on nuclear gramme while denying the same to Paki- threshold in situations of tension and con- stan. The Indo-U.S. agreement that regu- flict, there is a whole host of issues related lates this cooperation would free consider- to miscalculation, misperception, acciden- able quantities of indigenous fissionable tal crises and deployment and targeting material in India for possible diversion to a policies. Pakistan has a long history of de- much larger nuclear arsenal capable of de- scribing its weapons programme as purely ployment on land, sea and in the air. Paki- reactive and therefore of launching propos- stan aims at a minimum credible deterrent als such as a nuclear free and zero missile but its size may get expanded if India opts zone in South Asia. Since 1998, it has re- for a large stockpile of warheads and de- formulated them as a consolidated proposal livery vehicles. for 'strategic restraint' tabled under the ru- bric of 'peace and security' item in the The impact of nuclear capability on con- composite dialogue. The two sides have ventional confrontations has been ambigu- made limited progress in negotiating nu- ous. It is widely believed to have been a clear confidence measures such as prior restraining factor in recent crises between notification of tests, including missile tests the two countries. On the other hand, India and non-attack on nuclear installations. has occasionally alleged that it has enabled Pakistan's hope of holding nuclear arsenals Pakistan to act provocatively as in the Kar- at agreed levels is not likely to be accepted gil sector of the line of control in Kashmir by India as the nuclear triad – land, air and in 1999. India also ascribes Pakistan's sup- sea – inevitably demands freedom to port for a separatist insurgency in Indian- manufacture and deploy warheads deter- administered Jammu and Kashmir since mined unilaterally by India. There is, how- Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 45 ever, a good prospect of arriving at mutu- power. Both want to build more nuclear ally acceptable confidence measures that reactors. If it finally goes through, the enhance trust and reduce risks. Indo-U.S. agreement on civilian nuclear uses will bring about a notable rise of nu- clear energy in the Indian energy profile. 7. Energy as a factor of rapproche- But even in the best case scenarios, the im- ment port of energy from outside sources will have to be a significant component of na- India embarked upon highly rewarding tional strategies for meeting the shortage. economic reforms in the 1990s. It has Current plans include an Iran-Pakistan- maintained a high rate of economic growth India gas pipeline which is eminently fea- which gives substance to its desire to sible but is opposed by the United States. emerge as a major global power. There is a This pipeline has strong support in Paki- fresh realization that conflict with Pakistan stan as it will create strategic inter- delays important milestones in this historic dependence between major regional coun- journey. Pakistan, on its part, has become tries. India and Pakistan will, in particular all too aware of the social and economic become stakeholders in an important ex- cost of strained relations with India. The ternal source of energy. Washington, how- information age has also made people con- ever, prefers projects such as gas from scious that misperceptions of the past were Turkmenistan and electricity from Tajiki- often misplaced or exaggerated and that stan and Kyrgyzstan. With a new deep sea their interests could actually converge in port at Gwadar not far from the Strait of the years ahead. India wants a land bridge Hormuz, which it has developed with Chi- to Afghanistan and Central Asia which be- nese assistance, Pakistan is positioning it- comes feasible only if relations with Paki- self to become an energy corridor between stan are friendly. West and East Asia. It is not clear as yet if India looks favourably at Pakistani aspira- India and Pakistan are developing at a rate tions though it is keen to have overland ac- that in the years to come will require an cess through Pakistan to Afghanistan and almost exponential increase in their con- Central Asia. sumption of energy. The gap between available energy and energy needed in milestones 2015 and 2025 is large enough 8. Implications of India's rise as a to threaten sustained growth. At present, major power natural gas and oil meet 80% of Pakistan's energy needs. It has sizeable gas reserves The nuclear deal is per se of great impor- for the immediate future but its domestic tance but in the region it is also being oil accounts for only 18% of oil consump- viewed as part of larger developments by tion. Currently only 40% of Pakistani which India is being enabled by the United homes are connected to the electricity grid. States to assume the mantle of a global In less than twenty years Pakistan's overall power partly to act as a counter-balance to energy needs will increase by 350% and China. There is little doubt about India's the country would meet no more than 38% rise but it is not clear as to how its eco- of this need from indigenous sources. nomic and military power will locate itself in the international system. The nuclear Corresponding figures for India are not deal will earn billions of dollars for the US much better. Both countries have a portfo- energy companies and the larger strategic lio of mixed strategies for increasing en- partnership of which it is but one facet will ergy security by tapping indigenous re- make it possible for Martin Lockheed and sources such as coal and hydroelectric the Boeing Company to break into the In- 46 Tanvir Ahmad Khan dian market with a supply of 126 state-of- multireligious democracy with a strong the-art fighter planes. Opinions on how In- military; great diplomatic influence, par- dia will project its power vary considerably ticularly within the developing world; and partly because of differences in reading In- rising soft power. Its interests are not dis- dian intentions. similar to those of the United States. Its principal foreign policy concerns include The complexity of Indian intentions lies terrorism, energy, nonproliferation, nar- partly in the debate in the Indian strategic cotics, and managing China as well as community. Not very long ago a vocal part Pakistan." of it lobbied hard for a doctrine of limited war with Pakistan waged below an imagi- But the question if the United States can nary nuclear threshold. This was dangerous look to India as a burden-sharing partner thinking as Pakistan's red lines are deliber- on the international stage and a responsible ately ambiguous. On a bigger canvas, international stakeholder is not simple and many Indian strategic thinkers argue pas- may even be problematic. This article sug- sionately that India must back the soft gests that "India's recent emergence as a power of its high economic growth with norm-setting partner of the United States hard military power. They maintain that should not be taken for granted" and that other economically successful countries, in "historically, India has not been a strong particular Germany and Japan did not pos- supporter of U.S. interests". In Pakistan's sess "national attributes" to become global perception, India has positioned itself well powers in as much abundance as India to retain its autonomy of action. India may does. India, according to them, should be reluctant to concede the American view project hard power that is not only re- that having signed the U.S.-Indian Peaceful spected but feared. This argument revives Atomic Energy Cooperation Act on 18 De- fears of Indian hegemonic ambitions in an cember 2006, India is no longer entirely area larger than the traditional swathe of outside the international nonproliferation territory known as South Asia particularly architecture. The non-proliferation lobby in because it wilfully ignores the fact that the United States wants to establish clear Germany and Japan have consciously benchmarks such as joining the Prolifera- avoided paths to hard power, especially the tion Security Initiative (PSI) as an earnest one provided by nuclear weapons. In Paki- indication of India's good intentions but the stan, it creates the apprehension that India's Indian nuclear establishment, backed by quest for glory may make it downgrade the considerable political forces, is fighting a need for a grand compact in South Asia dour rearguard action to ensure that the and that India may instead opt for domi- agreement does not put any constraints on nance and coercive diplomacy in the re- the country's civil or military nuclear pro- gion while staking a claim to strategic gramme. partnership with the United States. India has made some symbolic gestures to An article which appeared in The Wash- Washington's preferences on policy to- ington Quarterly in summer 2007 main- wards the Shanghai Cooperation Organi- tained that it is a valid question whether zation and relations with Iran. It has India qualifies as a global stakeholder, ei- slightly distanced itself from Iran on the ther as a partner to help set international nuclear issue and from both Iran and Paki- norms or to bear resource burdens: stan on the strategic Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. It has not gone down well "As a norm-setting partner, New Delhi is with important segments of India's political already valuable. India is a multiethnic and class. Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 47

India's relations with China have gained a this indirect trade gets diverted to cheaper fresh impetus since President Hu Jintao's subcontinental land routes and short haul visit to India in November 2006. The ex- sea lanes connecting Karachi and Gwadar ponential rise in bilateral trade has become in Pakistan to the major Indian ports on In- a factor of the Indian economy which India dia's western sea board, the gains for both will not throw away easily. In fact, devel- the economies would be of a substantial opment of stronger linkages is also taken nature. by the people of India as a marker of their sovereignty. It is likely that India will not act as a counterweight to China in a sim- 9. Conclusion plistic sense of the word and that its policy will continuously explore the space be- There is little doubt that a paradigm shift is tween cooperation and competition. When underway in India-Pakistan relations. It is it comes to "burden-sharing" with the West not likely to bring about a dramatic rap- on Pakistan policy, the issue may turn out prochement but there are fair chances of it to be more complex than a mere declara- being manifested in slow incremental tion by the United States that its relations gains. Again, progress may not be a linear with India and Pakistan stand 'de- process. In a deteriorating international se- hyphenated'. For one thing, Pakistan has a curity environment, both countries will strategic location vis-à-vis Afghanistan, continue to invest in sophisticated weapons Iran and Central Asia and is already paying systems. Unless they can together devise a a disproportionate price in the lives of its security architecture that de-links their soldiers and its internal political stability; it military acquisitions from bilateral threat is already in a "burden-sharing" arrange- perceptions, as for instance by procure- ment while India as yet only holds a ment and deployment of arms specific to promise of entering it. India's best option aggressive action against each other, the would be to successfully persuade Paki- peace process will remain vulnerable to stan, with help from the United States, to apprehensions about the intent behind the open the overland route for it to Afghani- constant upgrading of their offensive capa- stan and Central Asia. This may need a bilities. Recent Indian efforts to create a certain accommodation on Kashmir's self- new infra-structure of forward military fa- rule that President Musharraf defines as cilities closer to Pakistan's border has something more than autonomy and less caused much concern in Pakistan as the than outright independence. It has probably task is located in Pakistan-specific "Cold not been lost on Washington that pressure Start". It is, however, not an insurmount- on the Musharraf government to play a able problem; the two countries can nego- more proactive role in assisting counter- tiate CBMs focusing on variables of time insurgency operations in Afghanistan has and space in their deployment and adopt actually weakened the Islamabad regime. transparent targeting policies to create Washington will have to calibrate its pres- mutual trust. Such measures will lengthen sure on Pakistan to make unilateral conces- the fuse and thus provide more time for sions such as overland transit rights to In- conflict prevention diplomacy. dia. Opposition to such transit facilities for India will diminish if India and Pakistan Despite a historic concession made on can first do better than at present in build- Jammu and Kashmir by President Pervez ing up their formal bilateral trade. A sub- Musharraf by virtually giving up a U.N.- stantial part of it still gets conducted sponsored plebiscite stipulated in Security through third country ports such as Dubai Council resolutions, the composite dia- while negotiations on direct trade remain logue has not so far produced a road map subject to bureaucratic caution and fears. If for the final settlement. Secret negotiations 48 Tanvir Ahmad Khan are said to have brought the two sides to India is opened too wide. After two dec- closer to a package that includes autonomy ades of SAARC, the intra-regional trade is for parts of Kashmir respectively held by still no more than five percent. Pakistan them, a soft line of control across which has repeatedly pointed out that the aims of the people could move freely and trade and the projected free trade area (FTA) are de- a possible programme of gradual demilita- feated by the complicated multi-layered rization. There is some opposition to the Indian tariffs. The bilateral composite dia- unilateral concessions made by the Paki- logue has not come to grips with matters of stani president but the Indian government detail. India and Pakistan need a radically faces greater difficulties in implementing different approach to economic coopera- the solution being discussed in the secret tion that ensures that its rich harvest is eq- negotiations. First and foremost, India is uitably shared and promotes the economic unable to come up with a measure of capacity of both the nations. autonomy that will make the people espe- cially in the Kashmir Valley accept a per- Terrorism is another area that will have to manent association with the Indian Union. be freed from its present ambivalence. The autonomy considered adequate by Ever since 1989 when the Kashmiris took Sheikh Abdullah in the period 1947-52 has up arms, India has sought to attribute the been so drastically eroded by numerous conflict entirely to cross-border infiltration amendments of Article 370 that any gov- sustained by Pakistan. It has exploited the ernment in New Delhi would counter worldwide abhorrence of terrorism to de- strong domestic opposition to putting the pict this phase of Kashmiri struggle as clock back. A communal divide between Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. A terrorist the valley and the Hindu-majority districts act within the parliament complex in New of Jammu and Ladakh complicates this Delhi led to one of the most protracted question further. Secondly, even on de- military confrontations between the two militarization, India is clearly apprehensive countries in 2001-2002. The current dia- that loosening of the iron grip of the Indian logue became possible only when during a military may create a popular upsurge 2004 visit to Pakistan, the then prime min- analogous to the movements that brought ister of India, Vajpayee and President down pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Musharraf undertook to fight terrorism to- and Central Europe. Third, the dynamics of gether. Since then India has often ac- Indian politics in the next few years make knowledged that Pakistan has stopped it highly improbable that the Congress, the cross-border movement of militants though BJP and the parties of the left would arrive occasionally reviving old allegations. On at a consensus on a final compact with its part, Pakistan has accused India of fo- Pakistan. menting an insurgency in the Baluchistan province. President Musharraf and the In- India and Pakistan stand to gain a huge dian Prime Minister resolved to improve peace dividend if they reduce defence ex- their cooperation through an institutional- penditures entailed in antagonistic rela- ized joint mechanism to combat terrorism tions. A liberal climate for trade and in- when they met on the sidelines of the Non- vestment can bring about a radical re- aligned Summit in Havana. Since both the structuring of inter-state relations in South countries face considerable challenges of Asia. But so far India has not allayed ap- militancy and insurgency, suspicions arise prehensions of neighbouring countries that and vitiate the atmosphere from time to its much larger economy would not seek to time. The fact of the matter is that mutual overwhelm their smaller economies. The mistrust inhibits whole-hearted collabora- smaller manufacturing sectors are particu- tion between their intelligence agencies larly fearful of being wiped out if the door and law enforcement authorities. Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations 49

As they readjust the historically skewed chance that bilateral initiatives and re- balance between state-centric military se- gional cooperation envisaged in SAARC curity and what has come to be known as combine to offer a much better prospect for human security, they would discover the the future. In developing such cooperation, benefits of cooperation in combating new India and Pakistan would be returning to threats of alienation, violence and cross- the dream of the founding fathers who did border crime emerging from their internal not envisage a relationship of enduring ungovernable spaces. There is an even hostility. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Asad Durrani

1. Introduction them intent on discovering, plundering or conquering India. Relations between neighbouring states must not be judged by the same criteria At the turn of the twentieth century, the that we use for other countries. Such rela- Russian and British Empires were poised tions are burdened by history, constrained for an epic battle for influence in this re- by geography, and are a reflection of the gion, an endeavour famously called the perceptions that have taken root in the re- "Great Game". To prevent the clash that gion. The national interests of these states would have been disastrous for both, they are not only intertwined but also interde- agreed that Afghanistan could serve as a pendent. Politics that benefit one country at buffer between them. This may have saved the cost of another cannot be considered Afghanistan from becoming the battle realpolitik. In due course the benefits will ground of two great powers, but in due prove to be temporary. Very often these course it extracted a price. The Russian policies will cause more harm than good. consolidated their power in the North along the Oxus river so as to be able to re- Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can there- sume their southwards thrust – presumably fore best be understood by studying the re- towards warm waters – if they ever found a gional environment and the evolution of power vacuum. Eventually they did. And this relationship over the last six decades – the British annexed some areas on the that is, from the time Pakistan was created Indo-Afghan frontier "to ensure the secu- through a bifurcation of the subcontinent rity of their Indian empire". The new following the departure of the British im- boundary, the Durand Line (named after perial power. In this paper, an attempt has Sir Henry Mortimer Durand who led the been made to briefly define the geostrate- British Indian Boundary commission), be- gic context of the two countries and the came perhaps the most contentious issue history of their bilateral relations. The last between Afghanistan and Pakistan, when part contains a few salient conclusions. the latter inherited the North-Western Frontiers of British India in August 1947.

2. The region Notwithstanding the burden of inheritance, both Pakistan and Afghanistan had a sound The region which constitutes Afghanistan basis upon which their relationship could and Pakistan was described by the distin- be built. The predominantly Pashtun guished historian Toynbee as the "eastern populations straddling the Durand Line are crossroads of history". It lies at the junc- of the same ethnic stock and have no re- tion of three important geopolitical re- ligious or sectarian divisions. Often they gions: South, Central and West Asia (the are from the same tribe, and not infre- latter sometimes called "the Middle East"). quently from the same community. The Its territory borders Iran, three of the new Durand Line therefore exists only on maps. central Asia states (once part of the Soviet Until recently, Afghanistan's land access to Union), China, India and the Indian Ocean. the outside world was almost exclusively Throughout its history, it has been trav- through Pakistan. It therefore depended on ersed and trampled on by migrating com- Pakistan for its foreign trade and for most munities and invading armies, most of of its essential needs for sustenance and 74 Asad Durrani survival since it is an arid country with few SEATO and CENTO, the Soviet Union natural resources. Pakistan depends on Af- had started wooing Afghanistan. On a visit ghanistan for peace on its borders and to- to Kabul, Khrushchev, the then Soviet day for access to the emerging markets of premier, supported the Afghan demand for Central Asia. an independent Pashtunistan. Diplomatic relations were suspended once again. What The list could be extended but the fact is made this nexus between the Soviet Union that bilateral relations between the two and Afghanistan especially troubling for countries in the last sixty years could at Pakistan was that both countries had spe- best be described as a motley mixture. cial ties with India – and Pakistan had had an adversarial relationship with India right from its inception. 3. The history of Pakistan- Afghanistan relations In 1963 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations took a positive turn with the departure 3.1 The earlier decades (1947-79) from office of Sardar Daud who up till had been Afghan Prime Minister and had made As soon as it emerged that Pakistan would the Pashtunistan issue the main focus of his become the successor state of British India policy towards Pakistan. During the two in the North-West, Afghanistan denounced Indo-Pakistan wars that followed in 1965 the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 and and 1971, Afghanistan did not create any claimed the tribal areas it had ceded under problems for Pakistan on its western bor- this treaty. Afghanistan was the only ders. Acting possibly on assurances by the country to oppose Pakistan's membership Afghan king Zahir Shah, Pakistan moved of the United Nations, making its recogni- its forces from the Durand Line and de- tion conditional on the right of self- ployed them against India. determination for the Pashtuns of Pakistan to create an "independent Pashtunistan". Daud's departure was not the only reason Diplomatic relations were eventually es- for the magnanimity of King Zahir Shah. tablished in 1948 but the ill will thus cre- Regardless of any historical, political or ated led to many unsavoury incidents in personal factors, the ground realities com- bilateral relations. pel all Afghan rulers to find an adequate if not friendly modus vivendi with Pakistan. Relations remained strained throughout the Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for its 1950s. In 1955, when Pakistan integrated economic well-being. More importantly, all its provinces in the western wing into the Afghans are pragmatic enough not to "one unit", large-scale demonstrations push their conflicts over the limit even were organized in Afghanistan against the though they may not always agree with merger of the Pashtun majority province. Pakistan's actual or perceived policies. Pakistan's embassy in Kabul was ran- Sardar Daud, who deposed King Zahir sacked and its consulates at Kandahar and Shah in a Soviet-backed putsch in 1973, Jalalabad were also attacked. In response, came to terms with this reality when back the crowd in Peshawar attacked the Afghan in power and started mending fences with consulate. Diplomatic relations were sev- Pakistan. He paid with his life. The Soviets ered and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were angered by his overtures towards remained closed for almost five months. Pakistan and sponsored another coup, this Iran mediated to restore normality. time led by Noor Mohammad Tarakai, who as well as his successor Hafizullah Amin In the meantime, displeased with Pakistan met the same fate when they too were seen joining the U.S.-sponsored defence pacts as reluctant to follow the Soviet diktat to Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 75 maintain, among other things, a hostile "war of liberation" in which a million and posture towards Pakistan. Frustrated with a half Afghans lost their lives, and not indirect measures, the Soviets moved in without the even more significant factor of with their military might in December external help from the U.S. and Saudi Ara- 1979, and installed Babrak Karmal to head bia. a puppet government in Kabul. Pakistan played a key role in the organiza- tion and direction of the war. It also paid a 3.2 The Soviet occupation (1980-89) price by having to host millions of Afghan refugees, and by suffering the conse- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan quences of the backflow of weapons pro- brought about a qualitative change not only vided by generous foreign help that had in global and regional politics but also in become surplus in Afghanistan. The Du- Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Contrary to rand Line which had never been much of the largely prevalent view, Pakistan did not an obstacle to the movement of men and join a U.S.-sponsored war against the So- material was now more violable than ever. viet occupation. The reverse may be a The major basis of the Afghan economy, more accurate description. Traditionally opium poppy cultivation, was now also resistant to foreign forces, the Afghans needed to finance the resistance, some of were indeed the first to take up arms which found its way into Pakistan. In re- against the Soviet troops and their Afghan turn, the country gained considerable collaborators. Pakistan's decision to lend goodwill amongst the Afghans and created covert support to the Afghan resistance important assets to help its long-term inter- followed soon, while the remaining coun- ests. However, it was not able to retain all tries of the "free world" had not yet recov- the goodwill or exploit all its assets after ered from the shock and were still unde- the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. cided how to respond. Most countries eventually settled for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. 3.3 Post-Soviet Afghanistan (1989-95)

Pakistan's logic in helping the Afghan re- After the Soviet withdrawal Pakistan had sistance was simple. If the Soviets consoli- three broad policy options: first, to follow dated their hold over Afghanistan, Pakistan a hands-off policy and let the resistance would be squeezed between two hostile groups that were supported by Pakistan powers: the Soviet Union, which was one (and had now formed an Afghan Interim of the only two superpowers of that time, Government or the AIG) battle it out with and India, which was by all accounts a the PDPA regime installed by the USSR power to be reckoned with. All the same it before their departure; second, to mediate was a risky decision, perhaps even a des- between the two Afghan factions, the AIG perate one. The questions rightly asked and the PDPA, to form a government of were: what were Pakistan's chances against national consensus; or third, to help the the Soviets, even if they were not yet in AIG remove the PDPA regime. control of Afghanistan? And more impor- tantly, what chance did the resistance have The history of Pakistan's support of the re- to force the Soviets to give up their aggres- sistance made the first option – which vir- sion? There was just a remote possibility tually meant abandoning old allies to take that with Pakistan's help the Afghan resis- on a regime still backed by the USSR – not tance would survive long enough to give only difficult but also a dishonourable one: some miracle a chance to happen. Which it honour still remains important for the Af- finally did, but not before a decade-long ghans. Moreover, it would have meant 76 Asad Durrani losing much of the goodwill that Pakistan behind the Taliban, almost entirely a had created amongst the Afghans. And of Pashtun entity, when in the mid-1990s it course there was always the refugee factor took control of most of the Afghan terri- to consider. Millions of Afghans who had tory. taken refuge in Pakistan resented the USSR's Afghan legacy (the PDPA regime) more than they hated the Soviets. Essen- 3.4 The Taliban era (1995-2001) tially, Pakistan took the third option but also tried some back-channel contacts with Credit for the emergence and rise of the Kabul to assess the prospects for a medi- Taliban goes in first place to the infighting ated settlement. amongst former resistance groups. It is true that the Taliban's support base was primar- Removing the PDPA by military means ily in the Pashtun areas, but the real reason also seemed a more feasible option. As the for their appeal was their ability to disarm resistance had succeeded against the Sovi- armed factions and restore peace and order. ets, defeating its puppet regime should Pakistan decided to throw its weight be- have been an easy victory. In practice it hind this movement not so much due to its turned out to be much tougher. It took ethnic character but because of its potential three years before the AIG could form a to reunite Afghanistan. And that was pre- government in Kabul, and that only when cisely Pakistan's post-Soviet Afghan pol- the regime collapsed from within in March icy: to support any group or groups that 1992. But with that, some of the worst had the best chance to restore Afghani- fears of Afghanistan's observers started to stan's integrity. Pakistan may have made come true. errors of judgment in its assessment or in the execution of its policy, but the fact is Now that the common enemy – the Soviets that it had even supported a Tajik-led gov- and their puppets – were out of the way, it ernment (Rabbani) when it had the major- was time for the various Afghan factions to ity of the Afghan groups on board. start the final battle for their share of power in Kabul. Pakistan tried twice to The Taliban were also supported by two broker an agreement: in April 1992 (Pe- other external powers, the U.S. and Saudi shawar Accord), and then again six months Arabia, though not for the same reasons as later (Islamabad Accord). These efforts Pakistan. The Taliban controlled the west- failed to prevent a destructive civil war that ern regions of Afghanistan and this terri- raged for over three years between the two tory was vital for a pipeline project to largest former resistance groups: one pre- transport gas from Turkmenistan to Paki- dominantly non-Pashtun led by Rabbani stan and beyond. Both the U.S. and Saudi with Ahmad Shah Masood as his main Arabia had stakes in this venture. military commander, which was en- trenched in Kabul; and the other, a Pashtun The Taliban did succeed in enforcing group led by Hikmatyar. Because of its peace in the areas that they brought under large Pashtun population, Pakistan was control: nearly eighty percent of the coun- seen rightly or wrongly by the non- try before they were overthrown. However, Pashtuns as the force behind Hikmatyar. they did not belong to the acceptable ruling Non-Pashtuns constitute almost fifty per- classes in Afghanistan: the tribal chiefs, or cent of the Afghan population and are con- exceptionally successful military com- centrated mostly in the North. Pakistan manders. Their centralized system of gov- thus lost its goodwill and influence in half ernance too did not suit Afghan tribal soci- of the country. This perception was further ety, and their harsh attitude on issues such reinforced when Pakistan threw its weight as women's rights did not sit well with Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 77 their traditions. Most of the Afghans in- support" (as stated by Musharraf). That cluding the Pashtuns tolerated the Taliban dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's creden- since the alternative would have been tials as a 'reliable ally', an important factor chaos, a far worse option. Typically of the in a society as traditional as the Afghan. Afghans, they were waiting for an oppor- And indeed, it made Pakistanis generally tunity to get rid of them, probably until the and Pashtuns especially very unhappy. The Taliban defeated the non-Pashtun alliance accord with the U.S.-led coalition in Af- in the North and reunited the country. ghanistan and also with the new Karzai-led government did not last very long. Pakistan's support to the Taliban was not only in line with its longstanding Afghan Afghanistan was attacked with the aim of policy but was also pragmatic. No other capturing the Al-Qaeda leadership. Re- option looked better. However, Pakistan moving the Taliban from power was its was not assertive enough on matters where implied objective. Since air power was the as patron it could have legitimately insisted main instrument employed, the operation on a consensus. It was not likely to make resulted in heavy civilian casualties, almost much impression on the Taliban on human exclusively amongst the Pashtun popula- rights, but Pakistan could have played a tion. As traditional resistance fighters, they more active and constructive role in medi- responded by starting an insurgency that ating peace between the Taliban and the soon became a war of liberation engulfing Northern Alliance. Even if such efforts Pakistan's tribal areas where the people were not to succeed, it would have made have close ties with the Afghans across the post-Taliban Pakistan-Afghanistan rela- Durand Line. Pakistan, already under sus- tions less unfriendly. The destruction of the picion of providing support and succour to Bamiyan Buddha statues provided a good the Pashtun insurgency (erroneously called opportunity for Pakistan to express its dis- the "Taliban" insurgency), was now under pleasure, but its leadership of that time did pressure to crack down on the militants on not understand the use of pressure in inter- its territory and prevent their movement national relations: how to apply pressure across the Durand Line. and how to respond to it. This inadequacy took a heavy toll not only on Pakistan- Pakistan once again gave in under pressure Afghanistan relations but also when Paki- and used military action against its tribes- stan was pressurized by the U.S. to become men. This gave rise to an uprising that a reluctant partner in its war on Afghani- soon spread to most of the frontier regions. stan. Indeed, there was no way Pakistan could have sealed the Pakistan-Afghanistan bor- ders because of the difficult and in places 3.5 Post 9/11 (2001-to date) inaccessible terrain, and also because nearly two hundred thousand people cross Pakistan's basic decision to cooperate with it every day, most of them as part of their the U.S.-led coalition was understandable. daily routine. The Pakistani response there- The UNSC had authorized the mission, the fore only aggravated matters without exon- atmosphere in America was not conducive erating it from the charges that it was not to rational discourse, and Pakistan was doing enough to help fight the insurgents. ruled by a military junta that was inher- ently in no position to take institutional Some other developments too did not help decisions. All the same, the regime did not rapidly deteriorating relations. The Paki- even attempt to negotiate the terms of en- stani province of Balochistan has often gagement that were its right as an impor- been restless, its population never quite tant ally, and agreed to provide "unstinted satisfied that it was getting due benefits 78 Asad Durrani from its rich mineral resources. As a result After 9/11, many Pakistanis, especially in of the war in Afghanistan, the area has re- decision-making circles, naively believed ceived more than its usual share of atten- that with the Afghans in such a dire state tion. A combination of external and inter- and "our friends" the Americans exercising nal factors resulted in some of the Baloch plenty of influence in Kabul, it was the tribes – especially the Bugtis, the largest right time to coerce the Afghans into rec- amongst them – starting a movement ognizing the Durand Line as an interna- against the development policies of the tional border. They were obviously un- government. Pakistan blamed foreign in- aware of the thinking behind the Afghans' volvement, mostly Afghan and Indian. Af- acceptance of the Durand Line: they had ghanistan was also accused of permitting ceded only the administrative control of India to open too many consulates which some areas to the British, not the affinity of were involved in anti-Pakistan activities. the tribesmen. Pakistan did well to win over their loyalties and therefore the Af- In the last few years though, some damage ghans know that they have no realistic control seems to be taking place. There is a chance of regaining this territory. They are marked decline in mutual incrimination. also aware of the economic and other bene- More substantially, a bi-national mecha- fits (taking refuge when necessary, for ex- nism to control militancy along the Paki- ample) of the status quo. But since they do stani-Afghan borders has been instituted. believe that the areas were taken away un- Most crucially perhaps, the realization has justly, they will not give this arrangement sunk in that because of the American pres- any legitimacy. sure the two countries do not have to per- sist with the use of force against their own When Pakistan came under pressure to people. In both countries, the concept of curb the movement of the militants across reaching out to the "Taliban" has gained its borders with Afghanistan, it offered to primacy. As a result, the U.S. opposition to "fence and mine" the Durand Line. That this approach has been considerably the terrain would have made such meas- muted. ures futile, if not impractical, was not that important. More damaging for bilateral relations was the concern it caused on the 4. Some concluding thoughts Afghan side: "it was a Pakistani ploy to change the status of the Durand Line". A wise Afghan who had spent many years in Pakistan as an Afghan refugee described The Afghans are usually generous in ex- the worsening (at that time) state of bilat- pressing their gratitude for Pakistan's sup- eral relations a result of "misunderstand- port during their resistance against the So- ing". He was being polite. The fact is that viets and for hosting millions of Afghans despite being neighbours and having lived who sought refuge there. However, when with each other for centuries as communi- Pakistanis recall all these favours, the Af- ties, there are considerable numbers of de- ghans retort by reminding them that but for cision- and opinion-makers, even scholars, the Afghan resistance, the Soviets might at who have a problem "understanding the the very least have swallowed up Balo- other". As the larger and in many respects chistan. What is certainly unhelpful for bi- the more fortunate of the two, Pakistan lateral relations are repeated Pakistani should take more of the blame for not threats that the refugees would be sent showing more sympathy for the difficulties back. Afghanistan is obviously not in a po- in Afghanistan. To illustrate: sition to bear their burden. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 79

People in Pakistan are understandably up- people if they had jointly opposed these set when the country is blamed in certain strikes. Afghan quarters. Some of the criticism may be politically inspired, or stem from a Under the circumstances, forming a bi- misplaced belief that Pakistan wanted a national jirga to mend relations was the pliant regime in its backyard (and therefore right idea; not only due to its traditional inflames the unrest in Afghanistan). If the sanctity, but also because it created a Pakistanis were to regard that as signs of mechanism to resolve issues at the local Afghan distress in these difficult times, level. In tribal societies, involving the they might be pleasantly surprised at the tribes is the only way forward. Pakistan Afghan expression of regret. After all, initially suspected that the Afghans would there are almost a hundred thousand Paki- use this forum for some "Pakistan-bashing" stanis gainfully employed on various de- in the full glare of the media and the world velopment projects in Afghanistan, and the community. That did not happen. But the Afghan markets are awash with Pakistani logical follow-up and the crux of the con- products. cept – tasking the tribes to become respon- sible for their areas – has not yet happened. The Indian factor in Afghanistan has been Even the meeting of the mini-jirga (50 highly exaggerated in Pakistan. India does members from each side) has not taken indeed have consulates (only four, and they place, probably because of the instability in already existed in earlier times) and no Pakistan. Now that the new government is doubt indulges in espionage as is the norm. in place in Islamabad, there are good But the Pakistani assets and influence in chances for some substantial progress. areas which are its concern outweigh In- dia's capabilities by a wide margin. The silver lining and the saving grace is It was indeed unwise for Afghan official that the people on both sides of the Durand circles to blame Pakistan for all their trou- Line have long-standing and abiding ties. bles, even for the Pashtun uprising. The Even with inept handling by the two gov- actual reason for the "re-emergence of the ernments, relations do not collapse; even Taliban" was the military strikes in the when things go wrong, it takes very little to Pashtun areas, supposedly against the rem- bring the relationship back on track. The nants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Since problem is that at times, nowadays for ex- they affected both countries, instead of a ample, the bilateral relations are in the mutual blame game the two governments hands of those who have very little knowl- would have found more support from the edge and understanding of the other side. Pakistan und die USA

Hein G. Kiessling

Phase 1: Die 50er-Jahre nisation) und im Baghdad Pakt, der später in CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) Das im August 1947 geborene Pakistan umbenannt wurde. 1959 kam ein US- suchte schon früh eine politische Annähe- Pakistan Cooperation Agreement hinzu. rung an die USA. Es erlebte dabei, um dies Die amerikanische Gegenleistung für diese vorweg zu nehmen, im Verlauf der Jahr- Abkommen und Mitgliedschaften war eine zehnte Höhen und Tiefen. Nur wenige massive wirtschaftliche und militärische Wochen nach der Staatsgründung Pakis- Hilfe an Pakistan. Das Land erhielt von tans sandte Mohammad Ali Jinnah im 1955-1965 eine Militärhilfe von 5,7 Mrd. September 1947 einen persönlichen Emis- US$, d.h. durchschnittlich 500 Mio. US$ sär nach Washington. Jinnah ersuchte um pro Jahr. die Lieferung von Waffen und Munition. Die USA lehnten dies ab, man war sich der Diese US-Militärhilfe erlaubte es Pakistan, aufkommenden Kaschmir-Problematik be- mit wenigen eigenen Mitteln seine Streit- wusst. Immerhin, Präsident Truman war kräfte aufzubauen. Es bekam in dieser Zeit klug genug, am ersten pakistanischen Un- state of the art equipment, u.a. F-86 und F- abhängigkeitstag 1948 eine besonders 104 Flugzeuge, M-47 und M-48 Panzer, freundliche Grußbotschaft zu senden, in Artillerie, Hubschrauber und Radaranla- der er sagte: "I wish to assure you that the gen. Eine große Anzahl pakistanischer Of- Dominium embarks on its course with the fiziere wurde an amerikanischen Militär- firm friendship and the goodwill of the akademien ausgebildet. Aus dieser Zeit United States of America." stammt denn auch das Wort des damaligen US-Defence Secretary Robert McNamara: Pakistan vertraute diesen Worten, und die "It is beyond price to make friends of such Beziehungen zu den USA entwickelten men." sich erstaunlich gut. Die Grundlagen hier- für waren Pakistans Bedürfnis nach Siche- Darüber hinaus assistierten die USA beim rung seiner Existenz und die Suche Wa- Aufbau von intelligence and special opera- shingtons nach Alliierten im Kalten Krieg. tions facilities. Der pakistanische Geheim- Auf dieser Basis kam es in den 50er-Jahren dienst ISI hatte somit bereits in seinen An- zu einer ein Jahrzehnt dauernden ersten fangsjahren neben britischen auch ameri- Phase enger Kooperation zwischen beiden kanische Helfer. Diese Kooperation zwi- Staaten. So erklärte Vize-Präsident Richard schen CIA und ISI ist allen nachfolgenden Nixon während seines Besuches in Pakis- Krisen im bilateralen Verhältnis zum Trotz tan im Dezember 1952: "A strong inde- über Jahrzehnte und bis heute intakt pendent Pakistan is an asset to the free geblieben. Insgesamt ist festzustellen, dass world." Auf diesen Satz verweisen die Pa- das gute Verhältnis Pakistans zu den USA kistaner bis heute gerne, wenn sie sich von in den 50er-Jahren und der ersten Hälfte den USA im Stich gelassen fühlen. der 60er-Jahre die Grundlagen für das pa- kistanische Militär schuf. Es gab ihm seine Im Jahre 1954 kam es zwischen beiden professionelle Ausrichtung und wirkte als Ländern zu einem ersten Mutual Defence qualitativer wie quantitativer Verstärker Agreement und Ende 1955 stand Pakistan schlechthin. Der Fall des am 1. Mai 1960 fest an der Seite der USA. Es war Mitglied über der Sowjetunion abgeschossenen in SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Orga- U-2 Piloten Francis Gary Powers steht als 82 Hein G. Kiessling

Beweis für die damalige Kooperation Pa- Limitierte Militärhilfe an Pakistan wurde kistans mit den USA. Powers startete zu von der Ford-Administration und dann seiner geheimen Mission vom pakistani- auch von Carter wieder ab 1975 gewährt, schen Peshawar aus. die jedoch 1979 gemäß Section 669 des Foreign Assistance Act erneut eingestellt Während des Krieges von 1965 zwischen wurde. Der Grund waren Pakistans gehei- Indien und Pakistan stoppte Washington me Bemühungen um den Aufbau einer seine Militärhilfe für beide Seiten, was zu Uran-Anreicherungsanlage und den Bau einer ersten Abkühlung der Beziehungen der Bombe. US-Präsident Jimmy Carter zu Pakistan führte. Nach 1965 kam für In- begann zudem, die Stärkung und Einhal- dien die Phase eines verstärkten militäri- tung von Human Rights und Democratic schen Aufbaus mit Hilfe Moskaus. Pakis- Rights als wesentlichen Bestandteil der tan dagegen sah sich in der Folge einer Politik von den Ländern einzufordern, die Neuorientierung der Politik Washingtons US-Hilfe erhielten. An der Spitze Pakis- in Südasien mit nachlassendem amerikani- tans aber stand mit Zia ul-Haq seit 1977 schem Interesse konfrontiert. Es kam zu wieder ein Militärdiktator. Mit dem Hin- Kürzungen der amerikanischen Wirt- weis auf die nuklearen Ambitionen Pakis- schafts- und einem Wegfall der Militärhil- tans wurde daher 1979 von der Carter- fen. Als Reaktion begann Pakistan, sich Administration de facto alle Hilfe an sei- verstärkt um Hilfen aus der VR China zu nen einstigen "most allied ally" eingestellt, bemühen.1 Pakistan wurde, wie die Pakistaner noch heute verbittert sagen, zum "pariah state". Zu dieser Entwicklung trug auch Pakistan Das Land erhielt fast keine Hilfe mehr und selbst bei. Von 1971 bis 1977 stand Zulfi- musste beim IMF anklopfen. Seine kar Ali Bhutto an der Spitze Pakistans, der Fremdwährungsreserven waren im April sich politischen Führern wie Sukarno, 1979 auf 100 Mio. US$ gesunken. Mao, Castro und Ghadaffi nahe fühlte und den Platz seines Landes eher unter den Blockfreien und nicht an der Seite des Phase 2 Westens sah. Er führte eine Mini- Landreform durch und verstaatlichte Be- Bevor ein ausgehandeltes IMF- triebe von Industrie, Handel, Versicherun- Hilfsprogramm gestartet werden konnte, gen, Transport und Banken. Wirtschaftlich leitete Washington eine Kehrtwende in führte diese Politik bergab. Pakistan sah seiner Pakistanpolitik ein. Militärjunta und sich genötigt, vermehrt finanzielle Anlei- Nuklearproblematik, vom Mob angezün- hen im Ausland aufzunehmen, womit seine dete amerikanische Kulturzentren in Kara- ökonomische Talfahrt aber nur verzögert chi und Rawalpindi und eine abgebrannte wurde. Im Mai 1971 kam es für Pakistan Botschaft in Islamabad wurden vergessen zu einer ersten Situation der faktischen und Pakistan wieder zum Alliierten ge- Zahlungsunfähigkeit, ähnlich der in den macht. Ab 1980 begann so eine 10-jährige Jahren 1998-1999. Das Land sah sich ge- zweite Phase enger bilateraler Beziehun- zwungen, um ein Schulden-Moratorium zu gen. Ursache für den Sinneswandel Wa- bitten. Ein internationales Hilfskonsortium shingtons war die 1978/79er-Revolution stimmte einer Umschuldung zu, der Zins- im Iran. Amerika war dort zum "Großen satz war mit 2,5% angesetzt, die Rück- Satan" geworden. Die Carter-Administra- zahlung auf 30 Jahre festgelegt und eine tion wünschte nun eine Wiederbelebung grace period von 10 Jahren eingeräumt. der Allianz mit Pakistan. Washington be- Dies waren Bedingungen, die sich gegen sann sich, wie ein Regierungssprecher Ende der 90er-Jahre ähnlich wiederholen sagte, auf Pakistans "potential role as an sollten. important element in the defence of the Pakistan und die USA 83

Persian Gulf region". Admiral Robert Cyclone genehmigt. Cyclone war der Ver- Long, Kommandeur der US-Pacific-Flotte, such, die Sowjetunion durch die Förderung sagte bei einer Kongressanhörung: "Paki- des Islam in ihren zentralasiatischen Repu- stan´s strategic location requires us to bliken zu destabilisieren. Am Tag des strengthen our security relationship." Und Einmarsches der Roten Armee in Afgha- Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley nistan schrieb Brzezinski an Carter: "Wir berichtete im September 1981 vor dem haben nun die Gelegenheit, der UdSSR ih- Foreign Relation Committee: "Once again ren Vietnamkrieg zu bescheren." Gegen- Pakistan became an essential anchor of the über einem Journalisten sagte er 1998: entire South West Asia region." "Wir haben die Russen nicht zur Interven- tion gezwungen, aber wir haben bewusst Entscheidend war aber auch die Haltung die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür erhöht … der Staatsführung in Islamabad. Zia ver- diese Geheimoperation war eine hervorra- hielt sich pragmatischer als Zulfikar Ali gende Idee. Ihr Ziel war, die Russen in die Bhutto. Noch vor der Flucht des Schahs im afghanische Falle zu locken." Nur vier Ta- Januar 1979 konnte die operative Leitstelle ge nach dem Einmarsch der Roten Armee der CIA für Nah- und Mittelost nach Pa- weitete Präsident Carter das amerikanische kistan verlegt werden. Für die zuvor im Programm für den afghanischen Wider- Iran installierten elektronischen Horch- stand aus. Nun wurden auch Waffen und posten war somit Ersatz gefunden. Zia Munition finanziert und geliefert. hatte die sich bietenden Möglichkeiten der Informationsgewinnung erkannt und sofort In den 80er-Jahren kam es so zwischen zugestimmt. In der Folge lieferte die CIA CIA und ISI zu einer Kooperation von zu- elektronische Ausrüstung und bildete ISI- vor ungekanntem Ausmaß. Für Zia ul-Haq Spezialisten aus. Gemeinsam horchte man war dabei entscheidend, dass eine solche in Richtung der Sowjetunion. Zusammenarbeit der Stabilisierung seiner Herrschaft diente. Auch waren ihm als Weihnachten 1979 erfolgte der Einmarsch gläubigem Moslem die gottlosen Kommu- sowjetischer Truppen in Afghanistan. Be- nisten suspekt. Und er hatte den Stellen- reits Monate zuvor (Juli 1979) hatte Präsi- wert seiner Position erkannt. Als Jimmy dent Carter einer verdeckten Unterstützung Carter ihm 1979 eine erste Militärhilfe von des afghanischen Widerstandes gegen das 400 Millionen US Dollar anbot, wies Zia- kommunistische Regime in Kabul zuge- ul-Haq diese noch als "Peanuts" zurück. Er stimmt. Sicherheitsberater Brzezinski war wusste, dass nun mehr möglich war. hierbei die treibende Kraft gewesen. An- fänglich wurden Propaganda-Materialien Tatsächlich kam Brzezinski im Februar und übersetzte Fassungen des Koran gelie- 1980 nach Pakistan, um mit Zia "larger co- fert. In Pakistan war die Frontier Consta- vert efforts" in Afghanistan zu erörtern. bulary in NWFP (North West Frontier Man wurde sich schnell einig. Pakistan Province) anfänglich für die Verteilung an wurde für die USA nun der Verteiler für den afghanischen Untergrund zuständig. die Lieferung von Waffen und Geld an den Ab Ende 1980 übernahm dann der ISI die- afghanischen Widerstand. Der US-Sicher- se Aufgabe. Brzezinski behauptete später, heitsberater flog von Islamabad aus nach er habe darauf spekuliert, durch diese Riad. Die Saudis willigten ein, das ameri- schon vor Dezember 1979 eingeleiteten kanische Engagement in Afghanistan ih- Hilfen eine sowjetische Militärintervention rerseits Dollar für Dollar zu unterstützen. herbeiführen und Afghanistan so zum sowjetischen Vietnam machen zu können. Im bilateralen Verhältnis zwischen den Auf seinen Vorschlag hin wurden der CIA USA und Pakistan kam es unter der Rea- 500 Millionen US$ für die Operation gan-Administration im Juni 1981 zu einem 84 Hein G. Kiessling

5-Jahres-Paket von 3,2 Mrd. US$. Es war dass auf der Sargodha Air Base nordwest- fast gleichmäßig aufgeteilt auf wirtschaft- lich von Lahore Raketen-Silos (storage liche und militärische Hilfe. Mit dem neu- crates) für 30 chinesische M-11 Raketen en frontline-Staat Pakistan wurde vertrag- angelegt waren. Die Lieferung der bereits lich der Verkauf von 71 F-16 Flugzeugen bezahlten F-16 Flugzeuge wurde nun ver- vereinbart, von denen Pakistan die ersten weigert und die Rückzahlung des Kauf- 27 mit 658 Millionen US$ gleich bar be- preises über Jahre blockiert. Es kam zu der zahlte. Der US-Kongress gewährte für grotesken Situation, dass Pakistan jahre- sechs Jahre eine Freistellung von den US- lang an den Hersteller hohe Wartungskos- Non-Proliferation Gesetzen, bekannt als ten für die geparkten Flugzeuge zahlen Symington Amendment. Letzteres hatte musste. Erst gegen Ende der Clinton- noch 1979 zur Suspendierung der US-Hil- Regierung fand man eine Lösung, es kam fen an Pakistan geführt. zur Aufrechnung mit anderen amerikani- schen Lieferungen. Ein zweites 6-Jahres-Hilfspaket im Wert von 4,02 Mrd. US$ wurde von der Reagan- Während der gesamten 90er-Jahre kam ein Administration für Pakistan im März 1986 Großteil der "concessional assistance" der geschnürt. Kurz darauf aber kam ein Spe- USA an Pakistan zum Stillstand. Einzig bei cial National Intelligence Estimate zu der der emergency assistance von Weltbank Schlussfolgerung: "Pakistan had crossed und IMF legte sich Washington nicht quer. the Nuclear threshold." Trotzdem beschei- Islamabad sah sich so gezwungen, zu ho- nigte Reagan im Oktober 1986, so wie es hen Zinsen auf dem Weltmarkt Kredite das inzwischen existierende Pressler aufzunehmen. 1998-1999 kam es trotzdem Amendment verlangte, dass Pakistan "did zu einer de facto Zahlungsunfähigkeit, wie not possess a nuclear explosive device". Im in den 70er-Jahren musste Pakistan um Jahre 1988 wiederholte Reagan dieses Umschuldungen nachsuchen. Der Paris- Zertifikat, obwohl inzwischen als allge- Club gewährte diese dreimal, zuletzt zu meine Feststellung galt, dass Pakistan de fast identischen Konditionen wie 1974. facto eine Nuklearmacht war. Im Oktober Insgesamt zeigten die 90er-Jahre einen 1989 erneuerte dann Präsident George starken politischen Druck Washingtons auf Bush das Zertifikat seines Vorgängers. Pakistan, der bis an die Grenze des finan- ziellen Zusammenbruchs ging, zu dem 1990, die Rote Armee war inzwischen aus man es letztlich dann doch nicht kommen Afghanistan abgezogen, kam die amerika- ließ. nische Kehrtwende. George Bush weigerte sich, das Zertifikat zu wiederholen, eine Als nächstes wurden dann die Beziehungen 10-jährige zweite Phase enger Beziehun- Pakistans zu den USA und dem übrigen gen zwischen den USA und Pakistan hatte Westen durch die politische Machtüber- ihr Ende gefunden. nahme Musharrafs am 12. Oktober 1999 erschüttert. Nach nur wenigen Stunden In der Folge sank die internationale Hilfe meldete sich James Rubin von State De- für Pakistan drastisch. Amerikanische Lie- partment mit den Worten: "If there is a ferungen kamen fast völlig zum Erliegen, coup in Pakistan, we would seek the earli- es gab nur noch vereinzelt "concessional est possible restoration of democracy." assistance". Als die Sowjetunion endgültig Zwei Tage später folgte Präsident Clinton kollabierte, fanden die USA dann schnelle mit der Feststellung: "We don’t like it Gründe, das Pressler Amendment strikt an- when military leaders displace elected zuwenden. Nach einem Report der Wa- governments." Der IMF kündigte am 13. shington Post vom Juli 1995 glaubte man Oktober an, Pakistan "would receive no nun unwiderlegbare Beweise zu haben, further aid from the IMF until democracy Pakistan und die USA 85 was restored" und Weltbank-Präsident Kurzbesuch hatte er sich auch erst spät be- Wolfenson zeigte sich "alarmed by the reit erklärt, zu groß war in Washington overthrow of the civilian rule". Die EU noch die Verärgerung über: verkündete die Zurückstellung der Signatur eines ausgehandelten Abkommens über – die pakistanischen Nukleartests von Handel und Kooperation an, die Handels- 1998, beziehungen zu Pakistan wurden eingefro- – das Kargil-Abenteuer der pakistani- ren. Aus London kam am 15. Oktober die schen Militärs vom Frühjahr 1999 und Ankündigung, Entwicklungshilfe von 20 – Musharrafs Staatsstreich vom Oktober Millionen Pfund einzufrieren. Kanada 1999. kündigte eine Initiative an, nach der Pa- kistans Mitgliedschaft im Commonwealth Zudem stand bei Clintons Besuch ein poli- bis zur Rückkehr zur Demokratie suspen- tisches Gespenst im Raum. Osama bin La- diert werde. Die Initiative wurde am 18. den war im Sommer 1996 vom Sudan über Oktober von einer 8-köpfigen Aktions- Pakistan nach Afghanistan zurückgekehrt. gruppe der EU denn auch vollzogen. Pa- Am 7. August 1998 erfolgten zeitgleich die kistan war danach gehindert, am Com- Anschläge auf die amerikanischen Bot- monwealth-Treffen im November 1999 in schaften in Tansania und Kenia. Bin Laden Südafrika teilzunehmen. wurde nun zum erklärten Staatsfeind der USA. Der Versuch Washingtons, ihn am In Pakistan wurden von Beobachtern und 20. August 1998 mittels Raketen unschäd- Kolumnisten die Reaktionen des Westens lich zu machen, schlug fehl. Die CIA war als "cacophony" empfunden, das politische naiv genug gewesen, den ISI über den be- Monatsmagazin Pakistan Perspective vorstehenden Schlag zu informieren. Das führte aus: "The Nawaz government that Nest war folglich leer, als die Cruise Mis- masqueraded as a democracy had shown siles einschlugen. Die Sache belastete die all the signs of a personalised rule where Beziehungen über die nächsten Jahre, zu- one person wanted to emerge on the ruins mal vorher während der Regierungszeit of all the institutions as absolute ruler of von Nawaz Sharif der ISI einen von der the state. This is a sad saga of our political CIA ausgearbeiteten Plan zur Gefangen- history that historians would analyse at a nahme von bin Laden abgelehnt hatte. later stage."2

Präsident Clinton, der am 26. März 2000 Phase 3 für einige Stunden nach Pakistan kam, sprach mit General Musharraf, Präsident Die dritte, bis heute andauernde Rückkehr Tarar und über Radio und TV für 15 Mi- der USA nach Pakistan fand in der Folge nuten auch zum pakistanischen Volk. Sei- der Attentate des 11. September 2001 statt. ne Forderungen an Pakistan waren: Rück- Präsident Musharraf vollzog den Schritt an kehr zur Demokratie, Fortschritte bei der die Seite der USA im Krieg gegen den Ter- Lösung der Kashmirfrage und die Unter- rorismus überraschend schnell. Bis heute zeichnung des CTBT (Comprehensive Test wird hinterfragt, ob US-Vize-Außen- Ban Treaty). Im Gegenzug stellte er die minister Richard Armitage tatsächlich mit Wiederherstellung voller US-Entwick- einer Bombardierung Pakistans zurück in lungshilfe und eine politische Partnerschaft die Steinzeit gedroht hat, falls es im "War in Aussicht. Clinton war zuvor für einige on Terror" nicht mitzöge. Sicher ist, dass Tage zu einem offiziellen Besuch in Indien Musharraf und seine Generäle 2001 insbe- gewesen, sein touch down in Pakistan für sondere eine Zerstörung ihrer Nuklearwaf- nur wenige Stunden wurde von vielen als fen durch die USA fürchteten. Deren Er- Diskriminierung empfunden. Zu seinem haltung hatte für die pakistanischen Mili- 86 Hein G. Kiessling tärs höchste Priorität. Heute sind Pakistans Musharrafs. Insbesondere wurde be- Atomwaffen abgesichert und können we- fürchtet, die pakistanischen Nuklear- der von den USA noch von Indien in ei- waffen könnten in die Hände der Ji- nem Erstschlag voll außer Gefecht gesetzt had-Terroristen fallen, und werden. – die Einschätzung Musharrafs als sta- bilisierende Kraft und als moderner Zum anderen aber gab es für Musharraf Moslem, der den fundamentalistischen weitere gute Gründe, unverzüglich an die Kräften Paroli bieten könnte. Seite von George W. Bush zu treten. Ge- heimdienstberichte, die aufgrund des Free- Musharraf hatte wenig Schwierigkeit, seine dom of Information Act von Washington Kursänderung in Afghanistan, bei der er inzwischen freigegeben wurden, hatten die die Taliban zuerst einmal fallen ließ, bei Bush-Regierung nach dem 11. September seinen Kommandeuren durchzusetzen. Bei 2001 sehr schnell und genau über Pakis- der entscheidenden Sitzung im Großen tans Verhältnis zu den Taliban und zu Hauptquartier erhoben nur drei General- Osama bin Laden und al Qaeda informiert. leutnants Einwände, die Musharraf schnell Die Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) überwinden konnte. Es zeigte sich, dass die des Pentagon hatte am 23. September, d.h. Freundschaft gegenüber den USA, zumin- nur 12 Tage nach den Attentaten, wie folgt dest aber eine realistische Einschätzung berichtet: "Bin Laden’s al Qaida network von deren Stärke, bei der pakistanischen was able to expand under the safe sanctu- Generalität noch vorhanden war. Die pa- ary extended by Taliban following Paki- kistanische Führung traf so zum dritten stan directives. If there is any doubt on that Mal in der Geschichte des Landes eine pro- issue, consider the location of bin Laden’s westliche Entscheidung, die weiten Teilen camp targeted by US Cruise missiles in der Bevölkerung nur schwer zu vermitteln August 1998. Positioned on the border war. between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by 1956, anlässlich der Suez-Krise, war Pa- Pakistan’s ISI Directorate and protected kistan an der Seite des Westens, obwohl under the patronage of a local and influen- große Teile der Bevölkerung protestiert tial Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin hatten. Während der Golfkrise im Jahre Haqqani. However, the real host in that fa- 1991 unterstützte das Land die von den cility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later USA geführte internationale Koalition ge- to become Bin Laden’s base, then serious gen den Irak. Diesmal war die Opposition questions are raised by the early relation- der Massen noch größer, die Regierung in ship between bin Laden and Pakistan’s Islamabad aber blieb fest. Die Geschichte ISI."3 wiederholte sich nun zum dritten Mal 2001. Die Militärregierung in Islamabad Die Gründe für die Entscheidung der stellte sich an die Seite einer von den USA Bush-Regierung, Musharraf trotzdem zum geführten Koalition, diesmal gegen Al- wichtigen Alliierten zu erklären, waren: Qaeda und die Taliban.

– der Bedarf an Militärbasen in Pakistan Kabul ist näher an Islamabad als Suez oder als Ausgangspunkt für Operationen in Baghdad. Paschtunen leben auf beiden Afghanistan, Seiten der Durand-Linie, enge linguistische – der Bedarf an Hilfe durch den ISI auf- und ethnische Affinitäten sind gegeben. grund eigener Mängel im Bereich von Die Musharraf-Regierung hat sich trotz- human intelligence, dem an die Seite des Westens gestellt und – die Befürchtung einer Talibanisierung ihre Zusagen dann zu einem Großteil auch Pakistans im Falle der Entmachtung eingehalten. Präsident George W. Bush Pakistan und die USA 87 seinerseits hob noch 2001 die Sanktionen Rezensent den ISI denn auch als "purely auf, die gegenüber Indien wie Pakistan mercenary agency chasing up bounty nach deren Nukleartests 1998 in Kraft ge- money by handing over Al Qaeda suspects treten waren. Mit einem executive waiver to the CIA circumventing all legal chan- wurden auch die Sanktionen, die nach dem nels. Significantly, how many innocents 12. Oktober 1999 gegen Pakistan erfolgt are still being handed over to the CIA for waren, außer Kraft gesetzt. Eine Hilfe von money reasons outside the due process of 50 Millionen US$ gab Washington sofort law?" In der Urdu-Fassung des Buches frei. Das amerikanische Verhalten hatte wurden diese Ausführungen denn auch Vorbildfunktion für den Paris-Club. Er weggelassen, Musharraf selbst gab später räumte Pakistan Ende 2001 Konditionen zu, hier einen Fehler gemacht zu haben. ein, wie sie zuvor nur Ägypten, Polen und Jugoslawien gewährt worden waren. Zwei Die Unternehmungen der pakistanischen Drittel aller bilateralen Darlehen in Höhe Truppen in den FATA (Federally Admi- von 12 Mrd. US$ wurden auf die nächsten nistered Tribal Areas) ab 2002 erfolgten 38 Jahre umgeschuldet. Dabei wurde eine auf Drängen der USA. Washington zeigte grace period von 15 Jahren eingeräumt. sich über das Erstarken der Taliban und Die Asian Development Bank, Weltbank von Restteilen von Al-Qaeda besorgt und und IMF zeigten sich offen und generös für drohte mit eigenen Maßnahmen. Die in den neue Hilfspakete, die dann auch zustande FATA noch verbliebenen Reste von Al- kamen. Die Asian Development Bank gab Qaeda, insbesondere ca. 1000 Usbeken, z.B. noch 2001 für den Agrarsektor 350 wurden vom pakistanischen Militär ver- Millionen US$ und sagte eine Milliarde für nichtet oder vertrieben. Was nicht gelang, das Folgejahr zu. war eine allgemeine Befriedung der FATA. Die Taliban, die in Pakistan als Von den USA erhielt Pakistan seit dem Gotteskämpfer und nicht als Terroristen 11. September 2001 bis Ende 2007 rund gelten und deren Vernichtung ohnehin 10 Mrd. US$ an Wirtschafts- und Militär- nicht geplant war, ließen sich nicht mehr hilfen. Es bekam die dringend benötigten ruhig stellen. Sie verfolgen heute das Ziel, F-16-Jets für seine Luftwaffe, und sein über die FATA hinaus auch die NWFP zu Nachrichtendienst ISI bekam "highly so- kontrollieren. Für die Regierung in Islama- phisticated equipment for information bad und insbesondere für Musharraf rächte through the air". sich nun, dass man sie über die letzten Jah- re zumindest toleriert hat und erstarken Musharraf entsprach denn auch in den ließ. ersten Jahren einem Großteil der US-Er- wartungen, insbesondere in Sachen Al- Qaeda. Spitzen-Kader wie Abu Zubaidah, Nachtrag Ramzi Binalshibh, Khalid Sheik Moham- mad und Waleed bin Attash fanden sich Bei den innenpolitischen Entwicklungen in ergriffen und an die Amerikaner ausgelie- Pakistan ab Frühjahr 2007 spielten die fert. Nach offiziellen pakistanischen Anga- USA zunehmend die Rolle eines ratlosen ben sind 689 Al-Qaeda Leute vom ISI ge- Zuschauers. Washington war angesichts fasst worden, 237 von ihnen der CIA über- der ausbrechenden Protestbewegung der geben. Musharrafs Bekenntnis, der ISI ha- Juristen des Landes genauso überrascht be Hunderte Millionen US$ als Kopfgelder und hilflos wie Musharraf selbst. Als Ret- kassiert, waren unklug und wirkten kontra- tungsweg sah es eine Allianz zwischen produktiv. In einer Besprechung der jüngst dem Präsidenten und Benazir Bhutto. Un- erschienenen Memoiren Musharrafs "In the ter amerikanischem Druck traf sich Mus- line of fire" beschreibt ein pakistanischer harraf im Jahre 2007 zweimal mit der seit 88 Hein G. Kiessling neun Jahren im Exil lebenden PPP- harraf zu kooperieren. Dabei ging er davon Führerin. Ein power sharing agreement aus, dass Pakistan auch künftig auf ameri- wurde ausgehandelt, nach dem nach ge- kanische Wirtschafts- und Finanzhilfen wonnenen Wahlen im Januar 2008 Benazir angewiesen ist. Bhutto die Regierung führen und Mushar- raf als ziviler Präsident amtieren sollte. Mit Am 6. September 2008 ist Zardari nach der Ermordung der im Oktober 2007 zu- dem Rücktritt von Musharraf zum Staats- rückgekehrten Politikerin in Rawalpindi präsidenten gewählt worden. Die USA ha- am 27. Dezember 2007 stand Washington ben Musharraf zum Rücktritt gedrängt, nun dann vor einem Scherbenhaufen seiner muss Zardari mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, Politik. nicht nur aus Dankbarkeit, sondern weil er sie als Stütze im Kampf gegen den Terro- Letzteres umso mehr, als der mit Unter- rismus braucht, auf die er nicht verzichten stützung Saudi-Arabiens ebenfalls nach kann: Der äußerst blutige Anschlag auf das Pakistan zurückgekehrte, von Musharraf Marriott-Hotel in Islamabad am 20. Sep- im Jahre 1999 gestürzte Ex-Regierungs- tember 2008 hat gezeigt, dass Zardari auch chef Nawaz Sharif sofort in scharfe Oppo- persönlich vom Terrorismus bedroht ist. sition zum Präsidenten ging und dessen Entfernung aus dem Amt forderte. Aus den Auf der anderen Seite haben die USA Wahlen vom 18. Februar 2008 ging die in- durch Angriffe auf Al-Qaida-Kämpfer, die zwischen von Asif Zardari geführte PPP sie auf pakistanischem Territorium lokali- als stärkste Kraft hervor, verfehlte aber die siert hatten, die Souveränität ihres wich- absolute Mehrheit. Die PML des Nawaz tigsten Verbündeten im Anti-Terror-Kampf Sharif wurde zweitstärkste Partei, weit vor verletzt. Das erzürnte die Bevölkerung vor der bisher Musharraf unterstützenden Ort und kann auch dem Präsidenten als PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid-e- dem bevorzugten Ansprechpartner der Azam). USA schaden. Hier tut sich vor Zardari der Seit Ende März 2008 gibt es in Islamabad Zwang zur politischen Gratwanderung auf, eine neue, vornehmlich von PPP und PML- von deren Bewältigung sein Verbleiben im N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Amt und vielleicht sogar sein Leben ab- Group) getragene Regierung. Premiermi- hängt. nister ist Yousaf Raza Gillani von der PPP. Die beiden derzeit stärksten politischen Nawaz Sharif hingegen hält für Pakistan Führer des Landes, Asif Zardari und Na- Prosperität auch ohne amerikanische Hilfe waz Sharif, hatten nicht kandidiert und ge- für möglich und baut auf wirtschaftliche hören der National Assembly (noch) nicht Beziehungen zu China und dem übrigen an. Sie treffen ihre Entscheidungen im asiatischen Raum. Da er zudem die bisher Hintergrund. Zardari traf über die der Re- betriebene Anti-Terror-Politik ändern will, gierungsbildung vorangegangenen Wochen wird Washington sich auch in dieser Hin- verschiedene Repräsentanten Washingtons. sicht auf weitere Probleme in seiner Pa- Er bekundete zunächst seine Bereitschaft, kistan- und Afghanistanpolitik einstellen unter bestimmten Bedingungen mit Mus- müssen. Pakistan und die USA 89

Anmerkungen

1 Der vormalige pakistanische Armeechef, Ge- to China for military equipment and assis- neral Jehangir Karamat, stellt die Entwicklung tance.", in: The Military Dimension in PAK – wie folgt dar: "After the 1965 War, India went US Strategic Dialogue, IPRI Paper 3/02, Is- through a very deliberate phase of building up lamabad 2002, S.8. and upgrading its military capabilities with 2 Pakistan Perspective, Volume VIII, November Russian assistence and aid. The US response 1999, S.12. was to curtail and even stop military assistance to Pakistan and it re-evaluated its policies and 3 http://ww.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ level of interest in South Asia. Pakistan turned NSAEBB97/index.htm Autorenverzeichnis

Chaudhry, Mohammed Saeed, Dr. Lehrieder, Paul, MdB Vizepräsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Präsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Fo- Forums, Berlin rums, Berlin

Durrani, Asad, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Rill, Βernd ehemaliger Botschafter in Bonn Referent für Recht, Staat, Europäische Inte- gration der Akademie für Politik und Zeitge- Hippler, Jochen, Dr. schehen, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld Ruck, Christan, Dr., MdB Vorsitzender der Arbeitsgruppe für wirt- Khan, Tanvir Ahmad schaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwick- ehem. Staatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt, lung der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Islamabad Bundestag, Berlin

Kiessling, Hein G., Dr. Syed, M. Aslam, Prof. Dr. Pakistanexperte, Politologe und Historiker zur Zeit Gastprofessor am Institut für Asien- an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, und Afrikawissenschaften der Humboldt München Universität zu Berlin Verantwortlich: Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser Leiter der Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München

Herausgeber: Bernd Rill Referent für Recht, Staat, Europäische Integration, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen in der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München

Dr. Christian Ruck, MdB Vorsitzender der Arbeitsgruppe für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin "Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen"

Die "Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen" werden parallel zur Druckfassung auch zum Herunterladen auf der Homepage der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung www.hss.de angeboten (ab Nr. 14). Ausgaben, die noch nicht vergriffen sind (Nr. 8, 9, 11, 23-29, 45-47, 49, 51-57, ab 60), können per Klick auf "Publikationen" oder telefonisch unter 089/1258-263 kostenfrei bestellt werden.

Nr. 1 Berufsvorbereitende Programme für Studierende an deutschen Universitäten

Nr. 2 Zukunft sichern: Teilhabegesellschaft durch Vermögensbildung

Nr. 3 Start in die Zukunft – Das Future-Board

Nr. 4 Die Bundeswehr – Grundlagen, Rollen, Aufgaben

Nr. 5 "Stille Allianz"? Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im neuen Europa

Nr. 6 Neue Herausforderungen für die Sicherheit Europas

Nr. 7 Aspekte der Erweiterung und Vertiefung der Europäischen Union

Nr. 8 Möglichkeiten und Wege der Zusammenarbeit der Museen in Mittel- und Osteuropa

Nr. 9 Sicherheit in Zentral- und Südasien – Determinanten eines Krisenherdes

Nr. 10 Die gestaltende Rolle der Frau im 21. Jahrhundert

Nr. 11 Griechenland: Politik und Perspektiven

Nr. 12 Russland und der Westen

Nr. 13 Die neue Familie: Familienleitbilder – Familienrealitäten

Nr. 14 Kommunistische und postkommunistische Parteien in Osteuropa – Ausgewählte Fallstudien

Nr. 15 Doppelqualifikation: Berufsausbildung und Studienberechtigung – Leistungsfähige in der beruflichen Erstausbildung

Nr. 16 Qualitätssteigerung im Bildungswesen: Innere Schulreform – Auftrag für Schulleitungen und Kollegien

Nr. 17 Die Beziehungen der Volksrepublik China zu Westeuropa – Bilanz und Ausblick am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

Nr. 18 Auf der ewigen Suche nach dem Frieden – Neue und alte Bedingungen für die Frie- denssicherung

Nr. 19 Die islamischen Staaten und ihr Verhältnis zur westlichen Welt – Ausgewählte Aspekte

Nr. 20 Die PDS: Zustand und Entwicklungsperspektiven Nr. 21 Deutschland und Frankreich: Gemeinsame Zukunftsfragen

Nr. 22 Bessere Justiz durch dreigliedrigen Justizaufbau?

Nr. 23 Konservative Parteien in der Opposition – Ausgewählte Fallbeispiele

Nr. 24 Gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen aus westlicher und östlicher Perspektive – Ein deutsch-koreanischer Dialog

Nr. 25 Chinas Rolle in der Weltpolitik

Nr. 26 Lernmodelle der Zukunft am Beispiel der Medizin

Nr. 27 Grundrechte – Grundpflichten: eine untrennbare Verbindung

Nr. 28 Gegen Völkermord und Vertreibung – Die Überwindung des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts

Nr. 29 Spanien und Europa

Nr. 30 Elternverantwortung und Generationenethik in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft

Nr. 31 Die Clinton-Präsidentschaft – ein Rückblick

Nr. 32 Alte und neue Deutsche? Staatsangehörigkeits- und Integrationspolitik auf dem Prüfstand

Nr. 33 Perspektiven zur Regelung des Internetversandhandels von Arzneimitteln

Nr. 34 Die Zukunft der NATO

Nr. 35 Frankophonie – nationale und internationale Dimensionen

Nr. 36 Neue Wege in der Prävention

Nr. 37 Italien im Aufbruch – eine Zwischenbilanz

Nr. 38 Qualifizierung und Beschäftigung

Nr. 39 Moral im Kontext unternehmerischen Denkens und Handelns

Nr. 40 Terrorismus und Recht – Der wehrhafte Rechtsstaat

Nr. 41 Indien heute – Brennpunkte seiner Innenpolitik

Nr. 42 Deutschland und seine Partner im Osten – Gemeinsame Kulturarbeit im erweiterten Europa

Nr. 43 Herausforderung Europa – Die Christen im Spannungsfeld von nationaler Identität, demokratischer Gesellschaft und politischer Kultur

Nr. 44 Die Universalität der Menschenrechte

Nr. 45 Reformfähigkeit und Reformstau – ein europäischer Vergleich Nr. 46 Aktive Bürgergesellschaft durch bundesweite Volksentscheide? Direkte Demokratie in der Diskussion

Nr. 47 Die Zukunft der Demokratie – Politische Herausforderungen zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

Nr. 48 Nachhaltige Zukunftsstrategien für Bayern – Zum Stellenwert von Ökonomie, Ethik und Bürgerengagement

Nr. 49 Globalisierung und demografischer Wandel – Fakten und Konsequenzen zweier Megatrends

Nr. 50 Islamistischer Terrorismus und Massenvernichtungsmittel

Nr. 51 Rumänien und Bulgarien vor den Toren der EU

Nr. 52 Bürgerschaftliches Engagement im Sozialstaat

Nr. 53 Kinder philosophieren

Nr. 54 Perspektiven für die Agrarwirtschaft im Alpenraum

Nr. 55 Brasilien – Großmacht in Lateinamerika

Nr. 56 Rauschgift, Organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus

Nr. 57 Fröhlicher Patriotismus? Eine WM-Nachlese

Nr. 58 Bildung in Bestform – Welche Schule braucht Bayern?

Nr. 59 "Sie werden Euch hassen ..." – Christenverfolgung weltweit

Nr. 60 Vergangenheitsbewältigung im Osten – Russland, Polen, Rumänien

Nr. 61 Die Ukraine – Partner der EU

Nr. 62 Der Weg Pakistans – Rückblick und Ausblick