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Echo Effects Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict

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Echo Effects Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 9 February 2008 Echo effects Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict n 2 February 2008, a force of emerged in eastern Chad: following The on-again, off-again Chadian around 4,000 fighters from the arrival of more than 200,000 Suda- rebellion has flared up since the O the three main rebel groups nese refugees, janjawid militia similar failed October 2007 peace deal in Chad—Union des forces pour la to those in Darfur contributed to the between Déby’s regime and the démo cratie et le développement displacement of a further 170,000 principle Chadian rebel groups. (UFDD), UFDD–Fondamentale Chadians in 2005 and 2006. An addi- The Sudan-supported attack on (UFDD/F), and Rassemblement des tional 30,000 Chadian refugees have N’Djamena, and the bombing cam- forces pour le changement (RFC)— fled back across the border into Darfur.1 paign waged by Chadian forces reached the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. Deepening Chadian instability is against Chadian rebel bases inside Supported by Khartoum, they had connected to complex interlocking fac- Darfur, have placed further pressure come from West Darfur less than a tors arising in both Chad and Sudan at on fragile Khartoum–N’Djamena week before, crossing the border local and national levels. These include relations. around Adé, south of El Geneina. localized ethnic conflicts exploited by the Threats by the main Chadian rebel They had then driven quickly towards Déby regime; long-standing Chadian groups against the deployment of the capital, avoiding the government opposition to Déby’s repressive admin- peacekeepers, together with confu- forces concentrated in the east and istration and the slow pace of democra- sion over the peacekeeping mandate finally coming up against them around tization; and the use of armed proxies and the roles and responsibilities of Massaguett, only 50 kilometres north- by both Khartoum and N’Djamena. contributed troops, raises the like- east of N’Djamena, on 1 February. This Issue Brief describes the evolu- lihood of violence and insecurity, After an hour of fighting, the Chadian tion of the current crisis. Recent devel- and places humanitarian operations Army, and President Idriss Déby him- opments only make sense when cast in jeopardy. self, had to retreat to N’Djamena. After against ethnic and political power Though largely ignored by the inter- 17 years in power, Déby’s regime was struggles in Chad and Sudan that date national community, bilateral diplo- thought lost by many people in the back to the 1990s. The Brief also con- macy and international pressure rebel and government forces, the siders in particular the emergence of are essential to restoring security civilian population, and the interna- rebel groups and proxy militias since the to Chad. tional community. But he and his end of 2005, and the many challenges forces held out, thanks largely to his facing the deployment of United superior arsenal, including tanks and Nations–African Union and European Gradual collapse: bilateral helicopters. Union peacekeepers. The attack represented perhaps the relations 1990–2005 The Issue Brief finds that: lowest point so far in the deepening The present instability in Chad has Chad–Darfur crisis, the root causes of Proxy forces supported by both deep roots. President Idriss Déby which persist. President Déby has faced N’Djamena and Khartoum are overthrew his former mentor Hissein insurrections almost since the day he increasingly beyond the control Habré in 1990 from a base in Darfur, came to power in 1990. But these rebel- of their masters, and pose serious where he had fled in 1989 after the lions have become more organized and risks to both. These militias are persecution of his ethnic group, the stronger in recent years, due in part to integrated into local ethnic and Beri. Habré was supported there by assistance from Khartoum. Predict- political conflicts, and limit the the Sudanese Beri, and by Omar al- ably, Chad has retaliated by becoming capacity of Chad, Sudan, or the Bashir, who had recently seized power increasingly involved in the Darfur international community to stabi- in Sudan. More widely known by their conflict. Echoes of Darfur have since lize the region. Arabic name of Zaghawa,2 the Beri www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 straddle the Chad–Darfur border. based Chadian opposition elements For its part, Khartoum received anyone Crucially, Déby and a number of the into the janjawid.8 Primary among them who might hurt the Chadian regime, main Darfur rebel leaders are Beri.3 were Arabs, themselves former sup- including the Bideyat (among them Since Déby became president, civilian, porters of the Conseil démocratique close relatives of Déby), who gradually military, and economic power in Chad révolutionnaire (CDR) (the main his- joined the rebellion. In May 2004 Déby has been consolidated within the Beri torical Chadian Arab rebel group), as escaped an attempted putsch fomented community, and particularly within well as the Tama, traditional enemies by soldiers from within his own ethnic his own sub-group, the Bideyat, and of the Beri.9 When these groups were group. Since then, and particularly his own clan, the Kolyala.4 not fighting alongside the Sudanese since the end of 2005, desertions have Throughout the 1990s Déby was a army in Darfur, they launched periodic multiplied. But, while deserters were loyal ally of the regime in Sudan. He attacks on Chadian territory. leaving to join the rebels in Darfur in consistently refused to supply aid to Whether Khartoum wished to desta- 2003, they are now choosing anti-Déby Sudanese rebels—whether from Darfur bilize the border region or install a rebel movements within Chad sup- or South Sudan—despite requests to puppet regime in Chad is not clear. ported directly by Khartoum. do so since the early 1990s.5 But from From 2004 onwards, opponents of the In 2004 Khartoum started asking 2003 he was unable to stop the two regime in Chad streamed into Sudan in the numerous rebel Chadian factions 10 rebel movements in Darfur, the Sudan the hope of winning popular support. to unite. From 2005, Déby began a rap- Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting Chad M editerra nean Sea LIBYA combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his re- gime) and garnering support among CHAD the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government. In March and April N’Djamena 2003, Déby sent Chadian troops to fight Gulf of the SLA and the JEM inside Darfur. Not Guinea surprisingly, however, Beri soldiers from Chad showed little inclination to NIGER fight against other Beri and gave the Darfurian rebels advance warning. BORKOU-ENNEDI-TIBESTI In March 2004, Déby served Khar- toum by creating a dissident group within the JEM (the National Move- ment for Reform and Development, or NMRD), which secured a short-lived Bir Kalaït NORTH ceasefire agreement with Khartoum in Kariyari DARFUR December 2004.6 He managed not only KANEM WADI FIRA CHAD Dar to weaken the JEM, but also to recast Guéréda SUDAN Tama Hadjer Morfaïn himself as a mediator for the Darfur BATHA el-Fasher conflict. On 8 April 2004, he hosted the LAC Abéché L. Chad Adré Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement El Geneina OUADDAÏ between the Government of Sudan, HADJER-LAMIS WEST Goz Beida DARFUR Nyala the SLA, and the JEM. Very quickly, NIGERIA N’Djamena Dar Sila however, the Chadian mediation lost CHARI- credibility among both the rebels and BAGUIRMI GUÉRA Am Timma Tissi SOUTH DARFUR the Sudanese government due to its MAMAYO-KEBBI SALAMAT EESST perceived partiality, and the agreement 7 was violated by both sides. MAYO-KEBBI TANDJILÉ MOYEN-CHARI OUESTST International boundary Concurrently, Déby’s inability to LOGONE prevent those close to him from sup- OCOCCIDENTALCIDENTAL Region/state boundary MANDOUL National capital porting the Darfur rebels weakened LOGONE CAMEROON ORIENTAL Regional capital his credibility among power-brokers Other town in Khartoum. In response, starting in 0km200 Military base 2003, Khartoum incorporated Darfur- 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 9 February 2008 prochement with Darfur rebel groups (SLA–Minni Minnawi and JEM), in Khartoum has consistently tried to unite the various exchange for their commitment to aid in fighting Chadian rebels on Chadian Chadian rebel factions, with only limited success. soil. The situation deteriorated rapidly. An attack on the border down of Adré on 18 December 2005 by the Rassemble- ment pour la démocratie et les libertés as a mediator. On 26 July 2006, an Meanwhile, attacks on Chadian (RDL), a Chadian rebel movement made agreement was signed in which each territory by janjawid with both Suda- up of Tama led by Captain Mahamat government agreed not to give refuge nese and Chadian elements resumed in Nour Abdelkarim, marked a turning to the others’ rebels and by 8 August the south-eastern department of Dar point. Déby now realised that Sudan the two countries had normalized Sila. Fighting also erupted between was decisively supporting Chadian their diplomatic relations. By the end these elements and the Darfur rebels. rebels against him. While the rebels of the month, they agreed to sign a The janjawid operating in Chad had did not manage to take Adré, the raid framework agreement recording the previously been seen only on horse- allowed Mahamat Nour to display his normalization of their relations ‘as back, but by October 2006 they were strength and later assume the leadership friends and good neighbours’, though also seen riding in cars, most likely of the Sudan-supported rebel coalition, many close to the process felt the tem- supplied by Sudan or by Chadian rebel the Front Uni pour le Changement porary thaw was unlikely to last.
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