C e n T e r f o r S T r a T e G i C a n d B u d G e T a r y a S S e ssm e n ts AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas AirSeA BAttle: A Point-of-Departure OperAtionAl ConCePt Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas 2010 © 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision mak- ers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the de- velopment of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. ABout the AuthorS Jan M. van Tol, Senior Fellow, is an expert on long-range strategic plan- ning, military innovation, and wargaming. Prior to his retirement from the Navy in 2007, Captain van Tol served as special adviser in the Office of the Vice-President. He was a military assistant to Andrew W. Marshall at the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment from 1993–96 and again from 2001–2003. He commanded three warships, the last of which, USS Essex (LHD-2), was a major participant in post-tsunami relief efforts off Sumatra, Indonesia. He holds degrees in philosophy and logic from the University of Massachusetts and in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and graduated with distinction from the Naval War College. Mark Gunzinger joined CSBA as a Senior Fellow in February 2010 after a distinguished career in public service. He is the principal author or co- author of five Defense Planning Guidance/Guidance for the Development of Forces directives, the key strategic planning guidance documents that shape DoD force planning. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004, serving in sev- eral key positions until his appointment in 2006 to Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council. He most recently served as senior advisor to the Air Force for the 2010 QDR. Mr. Gunzinger holds a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College (1996), Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (1992), and Bachelor’s of Science in Chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy (1977). Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President, is an expert on US military strat- egy, policy and operations, military revolutions, and counterinsurgency. He gained extensive strategic planning experience on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and as a member of the Defense Policy Board, National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board. He is the au- thor of numerous CSBA reports on such topics as the Quadrennial Defense Review, alliances, the war in Iraq, and transformation of the US military. He received the 1987 Furniss Award for his book, The Army and Vietnam, and is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios. A graduate of West Point, he retired from the US Army in 1993. Dr. Krepinevich holds a Master of Public Affairs and Ph.D. from Harvard University. Jim Thomas, Vice President for Studies, joined CSBA in April 2009. He pre- viously served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appoint- ment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development of the defense strategy, convention- al force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. Mr. Thomas spearheaded the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of the QDR Report to Congress. Prior to joining CSBA, he held the position of Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. A former Reserve Naval officer, Mr. Thomas attained the rank of lieutenant commander. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree with high honors from the College of William and Mary, a Masters degree from the University of Virginia, and a Masters degree from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Acknowledgments The authors give special thanks to Chris Dougherty and Eric Lindsey for their research support, to Charlotte Brock and Eric Lindsey for their editorial and production support, and to Cutting Edge for their design. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the authors. conTenTs ix executive summary 1 Introduction 9 chapter 1. What should an Airsea Battle concept Do? 17 chapter 2. operational Problems Posed by Robust A2/AD systems 49 chapter 3. The substance of an Airsea Battle concept 81 chapter 4. candidate Airsea Battle “Piece-Parts” 95 chapter 5. A Point-of-Departure concept 99 Glossary 103 Tab A. Memorandum of Agreement on U.s. Army-U.s. Air Force Joint Development Process 111 Tab B. Implementing an Airsea Battle concept Figures 12 Figure 1. Illustrative Distances in the Pacific Theater 13 Figure 2. The Two Island chains and Major Us Bases in the Western Pacific 18 Figure 3. Range of PLA Missiles and strike Aircraft 22 Figure 4. notional “Keep-out” Zone 24 Figure 5. contrasting Us and PLA Approaches 37 Figure 6. estimated PLA Ballistic Missile Totals (2010) 59 Figure 7. chinese Long-Range Radar and space Facilities and Air Defenses (2010) 65 Figure 8. PLA Ballistic Missile Brigades and Air Defenses (2010) 72 Figure 9. Primary Areas of Us submarine and Anti-submarine operations 77 Figure 10. shipping Routes to china 84 Figure 11. current (and Prospective) Us Long-Range strike systems exeCutive SummAry The US military today faces an emerging major operational challenge, particu- larly in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO). The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ongoing efforts to field robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are threatening to make US power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts, prohibitively costly. If this occurs, the United States will find itself effectively locked out of a region that has been de- clared a vital security interest by every administration in the last sixty years. It will also leave longstanding US allies and partners vulnerable to aggression or, more likely, subtle forms of coercion. Consequently, the United States confronts a strategic choice: either accept this ongoing negative shift in the military bal- ance, or explore options for offsetting it. This paper does just that. It offers a point-of-departure concept designed to maintain a stable military balance in the WPTO, one that offsets the PLA’s rapidly improving A2/AD capabilities. We have titled this concept “AirSea Battle,” in recognition that this theater of operations is dominated by naval and air forces, and the domains of space and cyberspace. the unprovoked ChAllenge For well over half a century, the United States has been a global power with global interests. These interests include (but are not limited to) extending and defend- ing democratic rule, maintaining access to key trading partners and resources, and reassuring those allies and partners who cooperate with the United States in defending common interests. The United States’ ability to project and sustain military power on a large scale has been, and remains, essential to this endeavor. During much of the Cold War the Soviet Union posed a serious military challenge to US power-projection capabilities. Fortunately, the two superpow- ers managed to avoid a major war. Nonetheless, the US military’s unsurpassed x center for strategic and Budgetary Assessments ability to project and sustain large forces overseas was demonstrated in limited wars in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, as well as in numerous other, small- er contingencies. In the decade or so following the Soviet Union’s collapse the US military’s power-projection capabilities in defense of the nation’s interests were effectively unchallenged. This state of affairs is almost certainly ending, with significant consequences for US security. With the spread of advanced military technologies and their exploitation by other militaries, especially China’s PLA, the US military’s abil- ity to operate in an area of vital interest, the Western Pacific, is being increas- ingly challenged. While Beijing professes benign intentions, it is an old military maxim that since intentions can change overnight — especially in authoritarian regimes — one must focus on the military capabilities of other states. Currently there is little indication that China intends to alter its efforts to cre- ate “no-go zones” out to the second island chain, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup, the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the Western Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect.