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THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD ANALYSIS PAPER Number 16, December 2013 PLAYING WITH FIRE: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria’s Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home at BROOKINGS Elizabeth Dickinson TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments . iii The Author . iv Introduction . 1 Background . 3 2011: From Protestors to Soldiers . 5 2012: Descent into Civil War . 7 2013: To Each His Own Battle . 16 Kuwaiti Government Response . 20 Conclusion . 25 THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS PLAYING WITH FIRE: WHY PRIVATE GULF FINANCING FOR SYRIA’S EXTREMIST REBELS RISKS IGNITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT AT HOME ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS am grateful to Will McCants and Marc Lynch and advice of excellent colleagues in the region, as I for commissioning this project and for offering well as the many Kuwaitis who welcomed me into me the space to follow the ripple effects of the Syr- their homes to discuss this topic and others . Thank ian conflict across the Gulf . My thanks as well to you for your trust and hospitality . two anonymous reviewers, whose feedback and comments added much to framing the research, And thank you finally to my husband, Mario and to Jomana Qaddour and Mary Casey for their Chacon, for your infinite, and insightful, support . editing . I have greatly benefited from the expertise THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS PLAYING WITH FIRE: WHY PRIVATE GULF FINANCING FOR SYRIA’S EXTREMIST REBELS RISKS IGNITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT AT HOME iii THE AUTHOR Elizabeth Dickinson is the Gulf Correspon- ern Tiger . Her work has appeared in the Wall Street dent for The National, based in Abu Dhabi . She Journal, New York Times, Washington Monthly, At- previously served as assistant managing editor at lantic, New Republic, The Mail & Guardian (South Foreign Policy magazine in Washington, D .C . and Africa), among others . She has reported from five as the Nigeria correspondent for The Economist in continents and speaks fluent French, Spanish, and Abuja . Elizabeth is author of Who Shot Ahmed, a Krio, as well as basic Yoruba and Arabic . Elizabeth Kindle Single chronicling the murder of a 22-year- graduated from Yale University with a degree in old videographer, killed in cold blood in the dead African and International Studies . Follow her on of night at the height of Bahrain’s Arab Spring . She Twitter @DickinsonBeth . also the co-editor of the recent book, The South- THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS PLAYING WITH FIRE: WHY PRIVATE GULF FINANCING FOR SYRIA’S EXTREMIST REBELS RISKS IGNITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT AT HOME iv INTRODUCTION “The whole world is grappling in Syria at the expense of the Syrian people, and it is impossible for the army to unite when every brigade follows whoever is financing it. I am not only talking about the support of governments but this presents a real problem to the supporters in Gulf, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia... I mean this huge number of supporters has resulted in a serious problem: it made every brigade think that it doesn’t need the other brigades. For example, Liwa al-Tawheed doesn’t need Ahrar al-Sham, just as Ahrar al-Sham doesn’t need al-Nusra, and this brought forth various armies inside the one army and caused a problem.”1 —Jamaan Herbash, former Kuwaiti Parliamentarian and supporter of Free Syrian Army brigades ver the last two and a half years, Kuwait has backed rebels who have committed atrocities and Oemerged as a financing and organizational hub who are either directly linked to al-Qa’ida or coop- for charities and individuals supporting Syria’s myr- erate with its affiliated brigades on the ground . iad rebel groups . These donors have taken advan- tage of Kuwait’s unique freedom of association and Conflicts and competition between donors also its relatively weak financial rules to channel money contributed to the splintering of rebel groups in to some of the estimated 1,000 rebel brigades2 now Syria . Armed groups attracted financing by desig- fighting against Syrian president Bashar al-Asad . nating personal Syrian representatives in Kuwait, who channeled donations to them from Kuwaiti This memo charts how individual donors in the benefactors . But infighting among these agents— Gulf encouraged the founding of armed groups, as well as their benefactors—quickly became com- helped to shape the ideological and at times ex- mon . At times, high profile disputes among donors tremist agendas of rebel brigades, and contributed prevented rebel factions from joining under the to the fracturing of the military opposition . From single umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) . In- the early days of the Syrian uprising, Kuwait-based stead, a host of mini-alliances in individual provinc- donors—including one group currently under U .S . es have been brokered, in some cases with the help sanction for terrorist financing—began to pressure or complicity of Kuwaiti donors . So alarming is the Syrians to take up arms . The new brigades often splintering that today some involved now express adopted the ideological outlook of their donors . As remorse at having backed disparate rebel groups . the war dragged on and the civilian death toll rose, the path toward extremism became self-reinforcing . Although it is impossible to quantify the value of Today, there is evidence that Kuwaiti donors have private Kuwaiti assistance to the rebels, it almost 1 Jamaan Herbash (member of Kuwaiti parliament), interview with author, Kuwait City, Kuwait, October 2013 . 2 Charles Lister, “Syria’s Insurgency: Beyond Good Guys and Bad Guys,” Foreign Policy, 9 September 2013, http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/ posts/2013/09/09/syrias_insurgency_beyond_good_guys_and_bad_guys . THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT BROOKINGS PLAYING WITH FIRE: WHY PRIVATE GULF FINANCING FOR SYRIA’S EXTREMIST REBELS RISKS IGNITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT AT HOME 1 certainly reaches into the hundreds of millions of dol- mer, the Emir of Kuwait signed legislation that, for lars 3. Donors based in Kuwait have also gathered con- the first time, criminalizes terrorist financing and tributions from elsewhere in the Gulf, where fund- mandates the creation of a forensic Financial In- raising is more closely regulated . Early in the conflict, vestigation Unit (FIU) to track alleged misconduct . Kuwaitis used money transfers, exchange companies, But much work is needed to fully implement the hawala agents, and direct cargo shipments to convey new law, and Kuwait’s unique freedoms of assem- their donations . Some groups may have used their bly and association make it difficult to halt religious legitimate businesses and investments in Syria to il- charities’ activities . The challenge is compounded licitly move money to allies in the country . Today, a by the very significant and legitimate charity work great deal of the money and supplies gathered passes that Kuwaiti groups are undertaking in and around directly through Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan before Syria . Kuwait is currently the fourth largest donor crossing into Syria . At least half a dozen Kuwaiti do- to UN relief operations in Syria .4 Finally, the coun- nors also continue to travel to Syria personally . try’s domestic politics also complicates the govern- ment’s response; many individuals involved in fi- Meanwhile, there is also evidence that members of nancing have large and important constituencies . Kuwait’s minority Shi’ite community may be finan- Hence, many of the individuals and groups who cially supporting the Syrian regime . This is not the have publicly raised money are still operating in the primary subject of this paper and remains a signif- open . icant area for further research, as this could violate U .S . and international sanctions on individuals and The U .S . Treasury is aware of this activity and has entities linked to the regime . expressed concern about this flow of private financ- ing . But Western diplomats’ and officials’ general Although the fighting is thousands of miles away, response has been a collective shrug . Some have Kuwaiti involvement in the Syrian conflict is risky argued that the amount of private money is not for Kuwait itself—a small country of just over three significant in the broader context of the Syrian million, a third of which are Shi’a . Many of Ku- conflict . Even if that is true, this paper questions wait’s highest-profile Sunni and tribal opposition whether a dollar value alone is the most indicative figures have been involved in fundraising; support- measure given that Gulf donors have contributed ing the mujahedeen (military fighters) has become to the ideological and strategic alignment of today’s an important political gesture . Shi’ite figures al- rebel groups, in which extremists have the military legedly involved are also high profile businessmen upper-hand . and politicians . But both Sunni and Shi’ite cam- paigns increasingly employ sectarian rhetoric, and This report captures what may be only a portion residents of all sects report feeling increased com- of the activity underway—that which is visible . It munal tensions . Dozens to hundreds of Kuwaitis is possible that other or different funds have been are also believed to have travelled to Syria to fight gathered more discreetly . But because certain do- with the rebels directly . nors and fundraisers have chosen to use social me- dia to broadcast their work, we now have a window Kuwait has taken steps to respond to concerns into networks that may have existed for many years about financing to extremist groups . Over the sum- prior to the conflict in Syria . 3 My assessment is based on interviews I conducted in Kuwait, which is corroborated by an anonymous U .S . intelligence official . See Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say,” The Washington Post, 21 September 2013, http://www .washingtonpost .com/world/ national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story .html .

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