Criminal Procedure Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
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College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures 2004 Section 5: Criminal Procedure Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School Repository Citation Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 5: Criminal Procedure" (2004). Supreme Court Preview. 185. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/185 Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview CRIMINAL PROCEDURE New Case: 04-104 U.S. v. Booker Synopsis and Question Presented 268 Transcript of Sentencing Hearing in U.S. v. Fanfan (04-105) 273 Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing Lyle Denniston 275 Justices, in Bitter 5-4 Split, Raise Doubts on Sentencing Guidelines Linda Greenhouse 277 High CourtRuling Sows Confusion Joan Biskupic 280 Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing Adam Liptak 283 Justice By the Numbers Joan Biskupic and Mary Pat Flaherty 286 New Case: 03-923 Illinois v. Caballes Synopsis and Question Presented 292 High Court Takes Police-Dog Case Joan Biskupic 297 Supreme Court to Hear La Salle County Drug Case Tom Collins 299 An Officer's Best Buddy Adriana Mateus 301 New Case: 03-674 Jama v. INS Synopsis and Question Presented 304 New Case: 03-583 Leocal v. Ashcroft Synopsis and Question Presented 310 Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Agree to Hear Two Deportation Cases Linda Greenhouse 312 265 Miami-Dade Case Goes to High Court Lisa Arthur 314 Immigration Case Creates Legal Stir Todd Nelson 315 U.S. Gains Strength On Deportations:Supreme Court Says Legal Aliens Who Commit Certain Crimes Can Be Held Before Hearingon Removal Tony Mauro 317 New Case: 03-931 Floridav. Nixon Synopsis and Question Presented 319 Man Gets New Trial in '84 Killing: Court Says Nixon Did Not Agree to Defense Strategy James L. Rosica 327 High Court to Review Slaying; Tallahassee case Tests Rules for Defense Lawyers Tallahassee Democrat Staff 329 The Defense Wishes to Rest: Lawyers Avoid 'Hassle' ofDeath Penalty Stephanie Saul 330 New Trial Revives Old Nightmares: Court's Decision Shocks Jurorsfrom 1985 Case James L. Rosica 332 New Case: 03-0878 Crawford v. Martinez Synopsis and Question Presented 334 New Case: 03-7434 Benitez v. Wallis Synopsis and Question Presented 335 High Court to Decide Fate of Refugee; DanielBenitez, a Mariel Refugee in Indefinite Detention, Wants the U.S. Supreme Court To Order His Release Alfonso Chardy 339 High Court to Consider Detention Case; Justices to Decide if U.S. Can Indefinitely Imprison Illegal Immigrants Charles Lane 342 Mariel Felons Remain Stuck in Legal Limbo Alfonso Chardy 344 266 New Case: 03-1039 Goughnour v. Payton Synopsis and Question Presented 347 California Death Penalty Law at Issue David G. Savage 354 Legal Pingpong and a Condemned Man Jerry Hicks 355 En Banc Ninth CircuitAgain Orders New Death Penalty Trialfor Killer MetNews Staff Writer 359 With a 6-5 Split, Ninth Circuit Treads FamiliarGround Jason Hoppin 361 267 U.S. v. Booker (04-104) Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 7th Cir. 2004) At sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant: (1) had distributed 566 grams over and above the 92.5 grams found by the jury and (2) had obstructed justice. Defendant's appeal challenged the sentence on the ground that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines) violated the Sixth Amendment insofar as they permitted the judge to find facts that determined defendant's sentencing range. The court held: (1) the application of the Guidelines in defendant's case violated the Sixth Amendment because it limited defendant's right to have a jury determine, using the reasonable-doubt standard, how much cocaine base he possessed and whether he obstructed justice; (2) in cases where there were no enhancements-that is, no factual findings by a judge increasing a sentence-there was no constitutional violation in applying the Guidelines unless the Guidelines were invalid in their entirety; and (3) if the Guidelines were severable, the judge could use a sentencing jury; if not, he could choose any sentence between 10 years and life and, in making the latter determination, he was free to draw on the Guidelines for recommendations. Questions Presented: 1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant. 2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether, in a case in which the Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for the offense of conviction. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee V. FREDDIE J. BOOKER, Appellant United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Decided July 9, 2004 [Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] POSNER, Circuit Judge: A jury found the defendant guilty of statute prescribes a minimum sentence of 10 possessing with intent to distribute at least years in prison and a maximum sentence of 50 grams of cocaine base, for which the life. At sentencing, the judge found by a 268 preponderance of the evidence that the the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant had distributed 566 grams over defendant." "In other words, the relevant and above the 92.5 grams that the jury had 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum to have found. [...J Under the federal sentence a judge may impose after finding sentencing guidelines, the additional additional facts, but the maximum he may quantity finding increased the defendant's impose without any additional findings. base offense level from 32 to 36, [with t]he When a judge inflicts punishment that the effect, together with that of the enhancement jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury that the guidelines prescribe for obstruction has not found all the facts 'which the law of justice, was to place the defendant in a makes essential to the punishment,' and the sentencing range of 360 months to life. The judge exceeds his proper authority." judge sentenced him to the bottom of the "Without" is italicized in the original; we range. The appeal challenges the sentence have italicized "relevant" to underscore the on the ground that the sentencing guidelines difference between the maximum sentence violate the Sixth Amendment insofar as they in the statute, and the maximum sentence- permit the judge to find facts (other than what the Supreme Court regards as the facts relating to a defendant's criminal "relevant statutory maximum"-that the history) that determine the defendant's judge can impose without making his own sentencing range. [...] findings, above and beyond what the jury found or the defendant admitted or, as here, We have expedited our decision in an effort did not contest. to provide some guidance to the district judges (and our own court's staff), who are The maximum sentence that the district faced with an avalanche of motions for judge could have imposed in this case resentencing in the light of Blakely v. (without an upward departure), had he not Washington, which has cast a long shadow made any findings concerning quantity of over the federal sentencing guidelines. We drugs or obstruction of justice, would have cannot of course provide definitive been 262 months, given the defendant's base guidance; only the Court and Congress can offense level of 32 (32 is the base offense do that; our hope is that an early opinion level when the defendant possessed at least will help speed the issue to a definitive 50 grams but less than 150 grams of crack), resolution. and the defendant's criminal history. True, that maximum is imposed not by the words of a federal statute, but by the sentencing guidelines. Provisions of the guidelines The Supreme Court had already held that establish a "standard range" for possessing "other than the fact of a prior conviction, with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of any fact that increases the penalty for a cocaine base, and other provisions of the crime beyond the prescribed statutory guidelines establish aggravating factors that maximum must be submitted to a jury, and if found by the judge jack up the range. The proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In pattern is the same as that in the Washington Blakely it let the other shoe drop and held statute, and it is hard to believe that the fact over pointed dissents that "the 'statutory that the guidelines are promulgated by the maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the U.S. Sentencing Commission rather than by maximum sentence a judge may impose a legislature can make a difference. The solely on the basis of the facts reflected in Commission is exercising power delegated 269 to it by Congress, and if a legislature cannot the guidelines are thus that they require the evade what the Supreme Court deems the sentencing judge to make findings of fact commands of the Constitution by a (and to do so under the wrong standard of multistage sentencing scheme neither, it proof), and that the judge's findings largely seems plain, can a regulatory agency. [ ...] determine the sentence, given the limits on upward and downward departures.