Re-Authoring Narrative Therapy: Improving Our Self- Management Tools Daniel D

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University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts 2017 Re-authoring narrative therapy: improving our self- management tools Daniel D. Hutto University of Wollongong, [email protected] Shaun Gallagher University of Memphis, [email protected] Publication Details Hutto, D. D. & Gallagher, S. (2017). Re-authoring narrative therapy: improving our self-management tools. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 24 (2), 157-167. Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Re-authoring narrative therapy: improving our self-management tools Abstract Narrative practices have the potential to play a robust part in strategies for self-managing psychosocial well- being. Narrative therapy in particular seeks to empower groups and individuals, providing them with the resources and skills needed for positively improving their own well-being and coping with a wide range of life challenges. However, narrative therapy is in need of a philosophical update and some theoretical finetuning. Re-authoring some key elements of narrative therapy's official narrative will not only improve our understanding of it but increase the chances of a wider uptake of self-management strategies. Some features of narrative therapy's self-understanding invite and require clarification or adjustment in order to benefit from new thinking in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Disciplines Arts and Humanities | Law Publication Details Hutto, D. D. & Gallagher, S. (2017). Re-authoring narrative therapy: improving our self-management tools. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 24 (2), 157-167. This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3043 Re-Authoring narrative therapy: Improving our self- management tools Daniel D. Hutto & Shaun Gallagher Abstract: Narrative practices have the potential to play als to frame, or reframe, and to manage their life a robust part in strategies for self-managing psychoso- circumstances in richer or new ways (Lock & cial well-being. Narrative therapy in particular seeks to Strong, 2012). empower groups and individuals, providing them with Narrative Therapy (hereafter NT), an impor- the resources and skills needed for positively improving their own well-being and coping with a wide range of tant sub-class of talking therapies, breaks faith life challenges. However, narrative therapy is in need with more traditional psychodynamic approaches of a philosophical update and some theoretical fine- in adopting a not-knowing interactive stance. NT, tuning. Re-authoring some key elements of narrative developed by White and Epston in the early 1990s, therapy’s official narrative will not only improve our stands out in seeking to empower individuals and understanding of it but increase the chances of a wider groups by getting them to look again at their habits uptake of self-management strategies. Some features of of self-narration and to explore the possibility of narrative therapy’s self-understanding invite and require clarification or adjustment in order to benefit from new telling new stories about their individual or col- thinking in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. lective lives: “As people become more narratively resourced . they find that they have available Keywords: narrative therapy, folk psychology, self, to them options for action that would not have self-management, cognitive science otherwise been imaginable” (White, 2011, p. 5, emphasis added). The aim of NT is to expand the individual’s or group’s “options in self-formation” ow we narrate our lives can affect us, (White, 2004, p. 43). for good or ill. Our narrative practices NT practitioners pursue this aim by helping Hmake an undeniable difference to our individuals or groups to re-author or re-story psychosocial well-being. All so-called “talking conversations, enabling them to see new avenues cures” – including traditional psychoanalytic and for action and by improving their capacities to psychodynamic approaches to therapy and newer respond to such affordances. In terms of its ambi- techniques – are motivated by this insight about tions and style, NT “seeks to be a respectful, non- the power of personal narratives. All therapies of blaming approach to counseling and community the discursive ilk make use of narratives, in one work, which centers people as the experts in their way or another, as a means of enabling individu- own lives” (Morgan, 2000, p. 4). In short, NT uses © 2017 by Johns Hopkins University Press 158 ■ PPP / Vol. 24, No. 2 / June 2017 special techniques in order to provide the tools or adjustment if it is to benefit from new thinking that enable people take responsibility for their in and a wider engagement with philosophy and own mental to health and exercise their agency the cognitive sciences. in maintaining it in positive ways. NT equips Section 1 reviews NT’s official story about its individuals with powerful tools that can enhance working methods and theoretical assumptions. the self-management of mental healthcare. Section 2 shows that certain of NT’s central as- Although NT is very much in the mold of “talk- sumptions – about science, folk psychology and ing cures”, it does not seek to understand past the self – are in need of revision so as to enable causes of current trauma through such means. NT’s further theoretical and practical develop- NT’s working assumption is: “Change the over- ment. Section 3 supplies first pass answers about arching narrative representation and deeper and how NT might revise its narrative concerning these more extensive opportunities for engaging in novel assumptions in order to become more internally behaviors can be achieved” (Russell et al., 2004, coherent and to enter into a more positive and p. 215). Consequently, its main aim is to use nar- cooperative relationship with sciences of the mind. rative techniques to get people to construct a more The concluding Section 5 briefly summarizes how positive “future trajectory rather than achieving the future development of NT along the theoretical past accuracy” (Graham, 2010, p. 14). lines we propose opens up promising new pos- Decades after its inception, NT is now well sibilities for NT to feature in self-management established in practice. NT is widely used as a mental healthcare strategies. basis for personal, family and community inter- vention and treatment around the world. It is Narrative therapy: The especially popular in Australia and New Zealand, official story where it originated, having its main base in the Dulwich Centre, Adelaide which was founded in One of NT’s central tenets is that deficiency- 1984. Other Centers and Institutes of NT have centered stories limit options for action (White, been established in parts of the English-speaking 2004, p. 34). Such stories pathologize and dis- world, Canada, the UK and USA. Although there empower people by making it seem as if their is limited scientific evidence of the efficacy of NT, problems are an essential part of who they are. In it enjoys a reputation as providing an attractive general, prêt-à-porter narratives – those inherited means of supporting people from diverse back- uncritically from the surrounding culture – tend grounds. For example, NT has been used to help to foster such negative and limited ways of think- people deal with a wide range of problems, from ing. Such narratives restrict a person’s vision and asthma, anorexia, bulimia, depression and other capacities for self-understanding by presenting psychiatric illnesses to trauma (Murdoch, 2009, only a limited array of options. Those who operate p. 494). As such, it has the potential to inform with such “thin” narratives perceive fewer of the approaches to self-management in mental health genuine possibilities for action, fewer affordances. care. This is especially so on the assumption that The danger, as NT practitioners point out, is the sorts of narrative skills, once acquired, can be that “All too often, the stories we believe about deployed independently, without continued reli- ourselves have been written by others” (Denbor- ance on therapists. ough, 2014, p. 8). In passively buying into and Despite its successes, NT is in need of a philo- repeating narrow and negative narratives we sophical update and some theoretical fine-tuning. unnecessarily restrict our life possibilities. NT By re-authoring some key elements of narrative guards against this by questioning such narratives, therapy’s official narrative, the therapy itself will insisting on the need for people to reclaim and be afforded new possibilities for development and take back their “storytelling rights” (Denborough, wider uptake. This paper provides an initial analy- 2014, p. 8, 10, 22). The practices of NT help sis of some features of narrative therapy’s self- people to reclaim these rights, by enabling them understanding that invite and require clarification “to break from thin conclusions about their lives, Hutto and Gallagher / Re-Authoring Narrative Therapy ■ 159 about their identities, and about their relation- are necessarily selective. Whichever story we tell ships” (White, 2000, p. 4). This way of seeing the about our lives there are always other options landscape of therapy is connected to one of NT’s – possibilities that were not foregrounded, not grounding post-structuralist assumptions that “it mentioned, not attended
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