FINGERPRINT

WHORLD Vol. 35 No.137 October 2009 Quaerite et Invenietis

The International Journal of The Fingerprint Society Founded 1974 © Copyright 2009 ISSN 0951-1288

The Fingerprint Society Online www.fpsociety.org.uk THE AIMS OF THE SOCIETY THE CONTENTS To advance the study and application of FINGERPRINT fingerprints and to facilitate the FINGERPRINT WHORLD co-operation among persons interested SOCIETY in this field of personal identification. QUAERITE ET INVENIETIS OCTOBER 2009 Vol. 35 No 137

FOUNDER MEMBER: D.R. Brooker, Consultants COVER Fingerprints of Flags N.J. Hall, S.E. Haylock, M.J. Leadbetter Prof. J. Verbov, MD, FRCP, FRCPCH, FIBiol

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PRESIDENT: Vivienne Galloway FFS Life Members Leicester Constabulary Fingerprint Bureau, J.E. Berry, BEM, FFS, M.J. Leadbetter, BA (Hons), FFS, ARTICLES Can production and trafficking of illicit drugs 165 St Johns Enderby, Leicester LE5 9BX N, Hall, MFS Steve Haylock (City of London Police) Robert Mackenzie, Brian Moorcroft be reduced or merely shifted Regional Vice-Presidents Peter Reuter F. Rodgers, FFS (USA), B. Dalrymple (Canada), Other Committee Member s G. Farncomb, FFS (Australian Federal Police) Ron Cook (Independent), Steve Haylock (City of R. Plummer, FFS (Southern Australia) London Police), Kevin Kershaw (Greater Manchester Dr G.S. Sodhi (India) Police), Darrien Smith (NPIA), Dr. Raul Sutton Biometric pass of the ports 191 (Academic), John Yarrow (Retired) Hertz Quartz CHAIRPERSON : Martin Leadbetter PO Box 257 , Little Wymondley, Official Publication Herts. SG4 7WW FINGERPRINT WHORLD Those Halcyon Years 194 Published quarterly: SECRETARY: Robert Doak January, April, July, October John Edward Berry.B.E.M. F.F.S Fingerprint Bureau, Humberside Police HQ, Priory Road, Hull HU5 5SF EDITOR: Fiona McBride Scientists reveal secret of girl with 202 MEMBERSHIP SECRETARY : ARCHIVIST: Mervyn Valentine FFS Allison Power Greater Manchester Police, ‘all seeing eye’ Fingerprint Department, 1 Pacific Quay, GLASGOW, Scientific Support Services, G51 1DZ. United Kingdom Fingerprint Bureau, Bradford Park, 3 Bank Street, Clayton, Manchester, M11 4AA SUBSCRIPTION SECRETARY : MISCELLANY 204 Phil Swindells EDUCATION COORDINATOR : Karen Stow Lancashire Fingerprint Bureau, PO Box 77, Hutton, Derbyshire Constabulary, Scientific Support Unit, Preston. PR4 5SB Butterley Hall, Ripley, MERCHANDISE 208 Derbyshire. DE5 3RS WEBMASTER : Richard Case Greater Manchester Police, Forensic ADVERTISING : Steve Mewett REMEMBERING Peter John Horatio Nelson 209 Identification Services, Bardford Park Sussex Fingerprint Bureau, Sussex House, Crowhurst Complex, Bank Street, Clayton, Road, Brighton. BN1 8AF Manchester. M11 4AA CONFERENCE Conference Booking Form 210 MERCHANDISE AND MARKETING : TREASURER: Cheryl McGowan Nick Mitchell Lancashire Fingerprint Bureau, Leicestershire Constabulary, PO Box 77, Hutton, Preston, PR4 5SB Scientific Support, St Johns Enderby, Leicester LE5 9BX Hon. Members and Advisors G. Lambourne, QPM, FFS (UK), M. Carrick (USA), S.G. Durrett, FFS (USA), F. Warboys, OBE, BA, FFS, T. Kent (UK), S. Hardwick (UK), K. Creer, MBE, Produced by Think Digital (Scotland) Ltd NB. With regard to the article ‘Powder Suspensions for the recovery of Fingerprints on wetted non-porous surfaces’ FBIPP, FRPS [email protected] published in vol 35, issue 136 of the Fingerprint Whorld; the Editor apologies for not crediting the Journal of Forensic Identification with first publication in 2008, vol 58, issue 5 pages 600-613. CONFERENCE CONFERENCE

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page 163 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 164 ARTICLE trafficking. The general impression is that such programs have been ineffective. Certainly it is the case that the world drug trade has continued to flourish even as the rhetoric of control has CAN PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING OF ILLICIT sharpened during the last quarter century and as the flow of funds for suppression has increased.

DRUGS BE REDUCED OR MERELY SHIFTED? This paper focuses on cocaine and heroin for two reasons. First, cocaine and heroin are Peter Reuter generally believed to account for the bulk of the income that flows to developing countries from illicit drugs, though the evidence is very soft; there are no systematic estimates of the flows from School of Public Policy and Department of Criminology, University of Maryland other drugs such as methamphetamines and marijuana. Second, compared to drugs that are Drug Policy Research Center RAND more widely used (in particular marijuana), cocaine and heroin produce particularly intense psychological and physical effects on users; cocaine use results in a form of psychological addiction by producing a high that encourages pursuit of more intense intoxication, whereas ABSTRACT heroin use produces an actual physical dependence (Kleiman, 1992). For example, opiates account for approximately 70 percent of all treatment demand in Asia, followed by 64 percent in The production of cocaine and heroin, the two most important drugs economically, has been Europe and 62 percent in Australia. They are the principal vector for the spread of HIV in a concentrated in a small number of poor nations for 25 years. A slightly larger number of developing number of countries. Cocaine is the biggest problem drug in the Americas, accounting for 58 nations have been affected by large-scale trafficking in these two drugs. This paper reviews what percent and 40 percent of total drug treatment in South America and North America, respectively. is known about drug control programs and considers non-traditional options. The usual array of programs for suppressing drug problems, enforcement, treatment, harm reduction and prevention The paper begins by providing a description of how consumption, production and have been assessed almost exclusively in wealthy nations. Although treatment has been shown trafficking are distributed among countries. The following section offers some hypotheses about to be costeffective, it is of minimal relevance for reducing the drug problems of nations such as why both production and trafficking are so concentrated in so few countries. It then describes the Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico or Tajikistan, which are primarily harmed by production and ways in which governments have attempted to reduce both production and trafficking and trafficking rather than consumption. Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking have summarizes what is known about the effectiveness of the different methods used. It concludes not been subject to systematic evaluation but the best interpretation of the available evidence is with comments about some major research questions. that they have had minimal effect on the quantities produced or trafficked. It is reasonable to conclude that international drug control efforts can do more to affect where these 1. ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES drugs are produced rather than the quantity. If that is the case, and given that spreading a This section provides background on the levels and trends in cocaine and heroin specific level of production or trafficking to more rather than fewer nations probably decreases consumption; it shows which countries are most important and summarizes indicators of drug global welfare, it may be appropriate to consider a less aggressive stance to current producers use in major developing countries. and to make strategic decisions about the location of an industry producing a global bad.

INTRODUCTION CONSUMING COUNTRIES There are no reliable data on the worldwide consumption of illicit drugs. The United Cocaine and heroin are produced in poor countries and exported, inter alia, to consumers Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports the prevalence of illicit drug use through in rich countries, where their consumption and sale cause considerable damage in the form of surveys of countries’ governments in its annual Global Illicit Drug Trends. But with exception of crime, disease, and addiction. The producing nations are then blamed for their failure to control the United States and (more recently) a few other industrialized nations, countries have not production, accusations that are sharpened by the corruption that is ubiquitous around drug developed the necessary capability to collect such information (and some have little desire to do production and by the large rewards that accrue to some developing country players in the trade. so). Thus the UNODC survey responses suffer from lack of data, varying estimation While there is increasing acceptance that the fundamental problem for rich countries is their methodologies across different countries, and biases that governments bring to the reporting of inability to control domestic demand for drugs, the search for ways of controlling production the level of consumption. According to the UNODC (2003, pp. 101-102), cannabis is the most continues, with rich countries both aiding and coercing poor producer nations in their efforts. widely abused drugworldwide (around 160 million people) followed by amphetamine-type The findings on effects of interventions are discouraging. Little of a systematic nature is stimulants (35 millionpeople). Approximately 15 million people abuse cocaine, and a similar num - known about the effects of such programs as interdiction, crop eradication, “alternative ber abuse opiates;. development,” or more general law enforcement aimed at reducing drug production and

page 165 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 166 Tables 1 and 2 report the 2002 UNODC figures on opiates and cocaine for major nations and The data presented so far report only numbers of users. What are needed to understand the regions, along with my judgment of recent trends. There is minimal use of cocaine in Asia or market are estimates of quantities. Almost no data are available on the average quantities Africa. consumed annually by addicts in each country. This reflects the fact that users can report only how much they spend on cocaine and heroin, not how much of the active drug they purchased, The use of opiates is very broadly distributed both geographically and in terms of relative since the purity is highly variable and cannot be observed. There is some evidence to suggest that wealth. The bulk of opiate users are in developing nations. Even though China has a very low U.S. heroin addicts consume less per annum than their counterparts in Europe but absent more estimated prevalence rate, which may reflect the low investment in data collection, it has more specific data, it is reasonable to assume that for the rest of the world the distribution of quantities opiate addicts than all but three or four other nations, simply because of its population. India, consumed does mirror the distribution of users. with a moderate estimated prevalence, has by far the largest number of opiate addicts, for the same reason. In most of Western Europe and the United States there has been little growth in Number of Percent of opiate addicts. Asia and Eastern Europe have seen sharp increases in recent years, with people population Trends CentralAsia being most affected (Ponce, 2002; Roston, 2002). (millions) (over 15) Americas 9.08 1.50 Mostly stable The bulk of cocaine users reside in a few rich countries. The United States dominates that - United States 5.79 2.60 Declining market but there has been substantial growth in Western Europe since about the mid-1990s. - Mexico 0.33 0.50 Stabilizing - Argentina 0.51 1.90 Increasing Retail expenditures are dominated by rich country consumers, simply because retail - Colombia 0.34 1.20 Some increase prices are so much higher in those nations. However the prices received by growers and - Peru 0.17 1.00 Some increase - Bolivia 0.05 0.90 Stable traffickers are not dependent on the final destination. A shift of consumption from Western - Other 1.89 0.79 Mixed Europe to China has no significance to Afghanistan producers in terms of revenue; the export Europe 3.71 0.57 Mostly increasing price from Afghanistan is the same, regardless of the final consumption destination. Hence it is - United Kingdom 0.95 2.00 Increasing approximately true that consumers in the developing world account for most of the earnings of - Other West Europe 2.48 0.93 Mostly increasing opium producers, as opposed to the revenues of traffickers and retailers in developed countries. - East Europe 0.29 0.09 Mostly increasing Oceania 0.23 1.03 Stable Number of Percent of Africa 0.91 0.20 Stable or increasing persons population Trends Asia 0.15 0.01 Stable or decreasing (millions) (over 15) Global 14.08 0.33 Stable to increasing Asia 7.46 0.29 Source: UNODC (2003, pp. 129-135, 337); U.N. World Population Prospects 2002 Revision - India 2.68 0.40 Slower growth TABLE 2: ANNUAL PREVALENCE ESTIMATES OF COCAINE ABUSE, 2000-2001 - China 0.96 0.10 Increasing - Pakistan 0.74 0.90 Stable to declining PRODUCING COUNTRIES - Thailand 0.27 0.60 Continued decline A small number of nations account for the bulk of the production of coca and opium. - Other 2.81 0.34 Mixed by region According to official estimates by the UNODC (2003), three countries, Bolivia, Colombia, and Europe 4.56 0.70 Peru, account for the entirety of commercial coca production. There are reports of small amounts - Western Europe 1.57 0.42 Stable to declining of coca being produced in Brazil and Venezuela, constituting a miniscule portion of world - Russian Federation 2.39 2.00 Strongly increasing production. Table 3 displays the global production of dry leaf coca for various years between - Other Eastern Europe 0.60 0.38 Mixed 1990 and 2004. As shown, most coca is currently produced in Colombia, although Peru was the Oceania 0.14 0.63 Declining primary producer a decade ago. Production in Bolivia and Peru declined sharply over the Americas 1.86 0.30 period. - United States 1.34 0.60 Declining - Other 0.52 0.13 Some increases 1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 Africa 0.92 0.20 Increasing Bolivia 77,000 85,000 13,400 19,800 25,000 Global 14.94 0.35 Increasing Colombia 45,300 80,900 266,200 222,100 148,900 Source: UNODC (2003, pp. 107-128, 336); U.N. World Population Prospects 2002 Revision Peru 196,900 183,600 46,200 52,500 70,300 TABLE 1: ANNUAL PREVALENCE ESTIMATES OF OPIATE ABUSE, 2000-2001 TOTAL 319,200 349,500 325,800 294,400 244,200 Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_web.pdf TABLE 3: COCAINE PRODUCTION, 1990-2004 (SELECTED YEARS)

page 167 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 168 Afghanistan and Myanmar accounted for over 90 percent of global production of opium constitutes one of the three largest markets for heroin and serves as a transshipment country for in 2004 (4,570 out of 4,850 metric tons). This two-country dominance in opium production has Eastern Europe; yet Russia seizes barely one ton of heroin each year. occurred in every year since 1988 (when systematic estimates began), except for 2001 when the Taliban successfully cut Afghanistan’s production by over 90 percent. Table 4 reports Table 5 lists the highest-ranking countries for seizures of cocaine and opiates (i.e., heroin,mor - estimated global production of opium for various years between 1990 and 2004. As shown by phine, and opium) in 2001 by the percent of the world total. The t able shows almost half of the the table, second-tier opium producers include Colombia, Laos, and Mexico. Pakistan, Thailand, cofor order seizurt caine seized in 2001 was seized in the United States, the largest consumer and Vietnam comprise the third tier; once substantial producers in the 1980s and early 1990s, they country, and in Colombia, the largest producer country. Spain and Mexico accounted for the next now are almost insignificant. largest amounts of seized cocaine; these countries represent gateways for cocaine traveling into Europe and the United States, respectively. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil were also It is useful to contrast this with cannabis, the other prominent psychoactive drug that has responsible smaller, though significant, amounts of seized cocaine. These countries border its source in a plant. U.S. production accounts for a substantial (though unknown) share of U.S. geographically the primary source countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. As compared to consumption, apparently much of it grown indoors. In Western Europe it is thought that the heroin, total seizures of cocaine account for a much larger share of estimated production (44% Netherlands accounts for a large share of the cannabis consumed in Europe. Morocco and vs 18%). Mexico supply substantial quantities of cannabis resin and cannabis herb to Western Europe and the United States, respectively, but they are certainly not dominant. Cannabis’ exceptional status Table 5 also shows that most of the opiates seized in 2001 came from countries that bAfghanistan; probably rests on four factors: the bulkiness per unit value, which raises smuggling costs Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan together accounted for 51 percent of global opiatees. It should be substantially; the high dollar yield per acre, which reduces risks of detection per dollar of noted that these levels occurred during a year in which the Taliban had dramatically slashed production; the existence of a boutique market of user/growers interested in developing be opium production, so they understate the amount of opiate trafficking thanormally occurs there. breeds of the plant; and the ease of entry, since the seeds are widely available and there are Other major countries with opiate seizures, China and Turkey, are alsolocated in Asia. Turkey, with probably few economies of scale in growing beyond quite a small number of plants and ther a small domestic opiate market, is a principal transshipment routefor European heroin, while no further processing. China not only has a large domestic market but also serves as a transshipment route for heroin into some Western markets.

1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2004 Afghanistan 1,570 2,335 3,276 185* 3,400 4,200

Colombia 0 71 88 58 50 73 Cocaine Opiates (Heroin, Morphine, and Opium) Laos 202 128 167 134 112 45 in heroin equivalents Mexico 62 53 21 71 47 n.a. Colombia 32% Iran 29% Myanmar 1,62111 ,664 ,087 1 ,097 828 570 United States 28% Pakistan 21% Pakistan 150 112 8 5 5 40 Spain 6% Turkey 12% Thailand 20 2 6 6 9 ** Venezuela 5% China 9% Vietnam 90 9 ** ** ** ** Mexico 5% Afghanistan 4% Other 45 78 38 40 40 40 Peru 2% Tajkistan 4% TOTAL 3,76044 ,452 ,691 1 ,596 44 ,491 ,850 Netherlands 2% Russian Federation 3% Source: UNODC (2004, p. 1 6) Netherlands Antilles 2% Other countries 18% *Reflects production crackdown by Taliban Boliva 2% **Included in other Other countries 16% TABLE 4: GLOBAL PRODUCTION OF OPIU M FOR SELECTED YEARS (IN METRIC TONS) Total (% of estimated 356 tons (61) Total 120 tons (32) consumption) TRAFFICKING COUNTRIES Source: 2006 UNODC World Drug Report, p. 70-72, 91. As with production, the trafficking of coca and opium involves a relatively small number A TABLE 5: HIGHEST RANKING COUNTRIES FOR SEIZURES OF COCAINE AND of nations. Ine indicator of which countries are involved in trafficking is drug seizures but it requires careful interpretation. Seizures can be driven by production, local consumption, and OPIATES IN 2004 (BY PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL) transshipment; nations with large seizures that are neither producers nor major consumers are likely to be nations involved in trafficking to other countries. It is a one-sided indicator; some transshipment nations either as a result of corruption or limited enforcement effort, may have few seizures. Illustrating the weakness of seizure as an indicator, are the figures for Russia. It

page 169 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 170 2. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PATTERN OF NATIONAL traffic in illicit drugs is to examine the structure of international drug industries. Table 6 provides INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE approximate figures on the cost of cocaine and heroin at different points in the distribution The concentration of coca and opium production in these few developing countries is an system to the United States and Western Europe, respectively, in the year 2000. As shown, the important fact for policymakers. It creates the sense, probably illusory, that success is just around principal costs of these drug industries are associated with distribution rather than production. the corner because only two or three countries need to exit the industry. One pure kilogram of cocaine exported from Colombia in 2000 cost traffickers $1,050; of this amount, $650 covered farmers’ cultivation costs. However, traffickers priced this same kilogram The concentration is a paradox for three reasons. First, many nations are capable of of cocaine for U.S. importers at $23,000. And, moving down to the retail level (through perhaps producing each drug. Historically, substantial opium production has been recorded in China, Iran, four transactions), the kilogram fetched $120,000 from consumers, sold in 500 milligram units at and Macedonia, for example, none of which now produces. Australia, France, and Spain have 50% purity. The story with heroin was similar: A pure kilogram of heroin produced in entered the legal opiate market in recent times, obtaining production quotas from the Afghanistan for less than $1,000, was exported from Turkey for $10,000, and by the time it International Narcotics Control Board under an international treaty agreement for that market reached consumers in Western Europe it was priced at $175,000. (INCB, 2002). Coca has been grown commercially in Java (while under Dutch rule) and Taiwan The figures in Table 6 suggest three general propositions: (while under Japanese rule) and could be grown in parts of the Andes that are not now involved • The cost of production, as opposed to distribution, is a trivial share of the final price. That (Spillane, 2000). • statement holds true even if one adds the cost of refining to that of growing coca leaf or opium • poppies. Second, technically it is possible to produce cocaine or heroin in industrialized nations. • Smuggling, which is the principal transnational activity, accounts for a modest share but much Hydroponic techniques, for example, can be used for both coca and opium poppies in regions • more than production and refining. with less than suitable climates. And with local production comes associated savings in • The vast majority of retail prices in Western markets are accounted for by domestic distribution transportation costs and the elimination of interdiction risks. However, the enforcement risks • in the consumer country. Most of the domestic distribution revenues go to the lowest levels of faced by producers in the United States or Western Europe are substantial and the • the distribution system. If the retailer and lowest level wholesaler each raise their purchase price compensation costs for these risks sufficiently high that local production has never developed. • by 75 percent, which until recently was a low estimate of the margin, they account for two thirds • of the final price. Third, many developing countries that neighbor coca and opium producers are not or have not been major producers, although they might be involved in trafficking. Consider Thailand, for Stage Cocaine Heroin example, which was a major producer of opium in the early 1970s. Thailand has had a Farm-gate $650 (Leaf in Colombia) $550 (Opium in Afghanistan) substantial heroin addict population since the 1970s. It continues to suffer from high levels of Export $1,050 (Colombia) $2,000-4,000 (Afghanistan) corruption, both in the military and the civilian government. Consequently, Thailand would seem Import $23,000 (Miami) $10,000 (Turkey export) to be a strong candidate for a large opium production sector. However, Thailand now produces Wholesale (Kilo) $33,000 (Chicago) $50,000 (London) very little opium and serves primarily as a consuming and transshipping country for Myanmar. Wholesale (Oz) $52,000 (Chicago) n.a. Similarly, Venezuela and Ecuador have many of the pre-conditions for coca production and are Retail (100 mg. pure) $120,000 (Chicago) $175,000 (London) regularly put on the list of candidate producers but have, after two decades of being at high risk, Source: Drug Enforcement Administration; EMCDDA; UNODC; n.a. is “not available” not entered the industry. Very specific factors may account for the observed differences. TABLE 6: PRICES OF COCAINE AND HEROIN THROUGH THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN 2000 (PER PURE KILOGRAM EQUIVALENT)

The concentration and precise pattern of trafficking, as opposed to production, is also not What explains these observations? A plausible, though still untested, explanation is that easy to explain. Transshipment across other countries is not a universal feature of the drug trade. they reflect the costs of the risks, both from the government and from others in the business, Substantial quantities of cocaine are shipped directly from Colombia to Western Europe, though that traffickers and dealers, rather than producers, must bear (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). First, Argentina and Brazil, with close commercial connections to the Iberian Peninsula (as indicated coca and opium are grown in countries characterized by labor and land that have low prices by Spain’s high seizures), also play a role. In the 1980s, some Pakistani-produced heroin was sent relative to those in North America and Europe (Kennedy, Reuter, and Riley, 1993). The directly to the United Kingdom. So transshipment is never simply geographic destiny, but comparative advantage of these countries is reinforced by the reluctance or inability of geography is clearly a risk factor. Consequently, it is important to understand how the various governments in Bolivia and Peru (for coca) and Afghanistan and Myanmar (for opium/heroin) to economic, sociological, and political factors in different countries can drive the production and act aggressively against growers or early stage refiners. Low opportunity costs for factors of trafficking of coca and opium. production in conjunction with low enforcement risks result in very modest prices for the refined product, and they also ensure that production does not move upstream geographically. STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG INDUSTRY One approach to exploring the question of which countries are more likely to produce and It should be noted though that cheap labor, plentiful land, conditions that support coca or

page 171 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 172 opium production, corruption, and weak governments are found in many nations. Francisco than 2 percent of the retail price. Even if the plane has to be abandoned after one flight, the Thoumi (2003) contrasts the distribution of illicit drug production across nations with that for capital cost of replacing the plane adds only another $2,000 to the kilogram price. For shipments legitimate agricultural products. Thoumi notes that coffee can be grown in many countries and, in container cargo, seizure constitutes little more than a random tax collection; replacement cost in fact, a large number of those countries do have producing and exporting industries. But very of the seized drugs is substantially less than the landed price, so high seizure rates have few potential producers are active in the coca and opium markets. With respect to government modest effect even on wholesale prices. This contrasts sharply with street level dealing, where corruption, the totality of Myanmar’s corruption and the need of the central government to allow the risks of arrest and incarceration can be spread over only the few grams that the dealer sells indigenous groups to maintain independent export industries surely plays a role in opium Caulkins and Reuter, 1998 for a discussion of these issues). production, as does the extreme weakness of the central government in Afghanistan since 1989. On the other hand, neither Bolivia nor Peru stands out as having a particularly weak government Heroin smuggling appears to be less efficient than cocaine smuggling, at least as measured among those in the region. And a history of illicit drug production is a risk factor, but it is not in dollars per kilogram. Heroin that exits Afghanistan at $1,000 per kilogram (in bundles of ten essential. Mexico had no indigenous opium production until the United States government kilograms or more) sells on arrival in the United Kingdom for $50,000 per kilogram. There started limited production there during World War II because of interruptions to traditional have been a few multi-hundred kilogram shipments of heroin but they are very rare compared to sources. Colombia also had no history of opium production before the development of poppy those for cocaine. The drug often travels in small bundles that are swallowed (typically wrapped fields in the mid-1990s. Thus we can only suggest the factors that lead to specific countries in condoms) by individual couriers. “Body-packing,” where the couriers are low wage earners, acquiring important production roles. produces per kilogram smuggling costs of less than $10,000 in the United States. A body-packer can apparently carry about 3/4 of a kilogram. A payment of $5,000 for incurring a 1 in 10 risk in One might ask whether the new republics of Central Asia are likely to become major prison (perhaps acceptable for couriers whose legitimate wages are only about $2,000 per players in the international heroin business, providing more than transshipment to the Russian and annum), along with $3,000 in travel expenses, produces a kilogram smuggling cost of just over Eastern European market. They certainly have low cost land and labor, as well as apparently $11,000 compared to a retail price of $500,000.24 The remainder of the smugglers' margin is for favorable agricultural conditions for growing opium and a traditional expertise. Some assuming other kinds of risk. governments, such as those of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are desperate for foreign currency, have few alternative sources and little concern about their standing in international organizations; Importantly, smuggling costs depend on the ability to conceal drugs in a flow of legitimate they are unlikely to aggressively enforce prohibitions against growing opium poppies or to have commerce and traffic. Colombia and Mexico serve as the principal smuggling platforms to the the capability to do so even if they desired to. They are certain to be low cost producers. United States in part because they have large immigrant populations in the United States and extensive air traffic and trade. Though Mexico is a high cost producer, farm-gate prices for But are they advantaged, compared to current low cost producers, notably Afghanistan and opium in Mexico being typically $2,000 to $5,000 per kilo, compared to less than $50 in Myanmar? Though closer to Europe and with significant populations resident in Russia and Afghanistan prior to 2001, the low smuggling costs equalize total landed price. Colombia, a new perhaps even in Western Europe, the commercial connections with Western Europe are likely to source for heroin also represents high farm-gate production with relatively low smuggling costs be weak compared to Myanmar, which has established Thai and Chinese trafficking networks. (Uribe, 2005). Though Colombia and Mexico are minor producers of opium worldwide, The Central Asian republics will probably only become major players in the European opiate accounting for perhaps three percent of the total, they are now the source of nearly two thirds of markets if there are disruptions (including rapid economic development) in the current major U.S. heroin. supplier countries. But geography also matters. Afghanistan’s neighbors are at risk, for example. Iran’s total This discussion has identified factors that might make a nation attractive for drug dominance as a transshipment country until recently was probably a function of the existence of production and trafficking but not why the numbers actively participating are so small. It may be a substantial domestic Iranian market and the relatively good connections with Turkey, itself a that drug-related corruption shows sharply declining marginal costs per transaction, or that there traditional supplier of the United States and Western Europe until 1970. As the Russian are high fixed costs to establishing international trading networks. The literature is silent on this market grew after 1995, Tajikistan became an important transshipment country. The border matter, though Thoumi (2003) offers some suggestions on those non-economic factors that are between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was particularly porous, reflecting the flow of Tajik citizens to most likely to affect national participation in the drug trade. Afghanistan during the Tajikistan Civil War of the early 1990s, the weakness and corruption of the Tajikistan coalition government, and the ease of exit from Tajikistan through Kazakhstan to The modest share of Western retail prices associated with cocaine smuggling and Russia. Uzbekistan, another Afghan neighbor with good links to Russia, has a much narrower, illustrated in Table 6 is also easily explained. Cocaine travels in large bundles at that stage; more defensible border and a stronger, richer central government; Uzbekistan, though suffering seizures suggest that shipments of 250-500 kilograms are quite common. Though large sums from a substantial drug use problem, seems to have only a modest trafficking role. may be paid to American pilots for flying small planes carrying cocaine or for Honduran colonels to ignore their landing, these costs are defrayed over a large quantity. A pilot who demands Mexico is perhaps the nation for which geographic destiny is strongest; it has been called a $500,000 for flying a plane with 250 kilograms generates costs of only $2,000 per kilogram, less “natural smuggling platform” for the United States. Mexico serves as the principal entry country

page 173 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 174 for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine imported by the United States. At various 3. SUPPLY SIDE CONTROLS TARGETED AT PRODUCING AND times Caribbean nations and some nations in Central America have also served as transshipment TRAFFICKING NATIONS countries; the latter are way stations to Mexico. Many different approaches are used to attempt to reduce illicit drug use and related problems. Few policies and programs have been subject to systematic evaluation. Particularly The drug trade readily uses indirect paths for smuggling. Seizures in Germany sometimes striking is the absence of any research on the effectiveness of the principal class of programs used turn out to have traveled through Scandinavia into Russia and then exited through Poland to their in most Western nations (particularly the U.S.), namely enforcement of prohibitions on selling final market. Ruggiero and South (1995, p. 75) describe “a joint Czech-Colombia venture to ship drugs (Manski, Pepper and Petrie, 2001). Far more is known about the effectiveness of treatment sugar rice and soya to Czechoslovakia…. This operation was used to smuggle cocaine, destined of drug abuse and addiction. for Western Europe. In 1991, police say that 440 lbs. of cocaine were seized in Bohemia and at Gdansk in Poland, which would have been smuggled onward to the Netherlands and Britain.” Since almost all the research has been conducted in the industrialized world, predominantly the Nigeria is an interesting transshipment anomaly, a nation that seems to have little potential United States, evaluations reflect Western perspectives. In particular, there are almost no role in the international drug trade. It is isolated from the any of the principal producer or consumer evaluations of interventions aimed at the demand side of poorer nations. In this section I review countries and lacks a significant base of traditional domestic production or consumption. what is known about programs relevant to developing nations involved in production and Nonetheless, Nigerian traffickers have come to play a substantial role in the shipping of heroin trafficking; Boyum and Reuter (2005; Chapters 3-4) provide a broader review. between Southeast Asia and the U.S. and also to Europe; recently these traffickers have even entered the cocaine business, though the cocaine production centers are still more remote from PRODUCTION AND REFINING CONTROLS their home country. Nigerians have been identified as pioneers in the heroin trade in Russia and Three types of programs have been used to reduce source country drug production: Central Asia as well, implausible as that may seem. eradication, alternative crop development, and in-country enforcement against refiners. Eradication, involving either aerial spraying or ground-based operations, has direct and indirect The explanation is perhaps to be found in a complex of factors. Nigerians are highly effects. It aims to both literally limit the quantity of the drug available for shipment to foreign entrepreneurial, have been misruled by corrupt governments over a long time, have large consumers (in the short-run) and to raise the cost of producing those drugs, or otherwise overseas populations, weak civil society, very low domestic wages, and moderately good discourage farmers from growing them (in the long-run). Alternative development is the soft commercial links to the rest of the world. Thus it is relatively easy to buy protection for version of production controls; it encourages farmers growing coca or poppies to switch to transactions in Nigerian airports (corruption and a weak governmental tradition), to establish legitimate crops by increasing earnings from these other products. Alternative development connections in both the source and rich consuming nations (large overseas populations) and to strategies include introducing new crops and more productive strains of traditional crops, use existing commercial transportation (note that the drugs travel with passengers rather than improving transportation for getting the crops to market, and various marketing and subsidy cargo since Nigerian exports, apart from oil, are modest); smuggling labor is cheap (low schemes. The concept can be broadened to alternative livelihoods, where the shift may be to domestic wages) and the entrepreneurial tradition produces many competent and enthusiastic nonagricultural activities (UNODC, 2005). Finally, source countries can pursue refiners more smuggling organizers. Nigeria is not unique in most of these dimensions; however its size and vigorously, perhaps using military equipment and training; much of the U.S. support for source connections with the rest of the world distinguish it from other West African nations. There is country control has taken this form. There is little discussion of aggressive use of criminal perhaps an accidental quality to its initiation into the trade, but these other factors plausibly play sanctions against the peasant farmers. a major role. Eradication Immigrants in the destination country who are from the producing and trafficking countries Few producer countries use aerial eradication, which is believed by many observers to have advantages in managing exporting, with better knowledge of potential sellers and cause environmental damage. It is also politically unattractive since the immediate targets, corruption opportunities. Few potential U.S. importers speak any of the languages of the Golden peasant farmers, are amongst the poorest citizens, even when growing coca or poppy. Colombia Triangle (Myanmar, Laos and Thailand); English has more currency in Pakistan but not much in and Mexico, neither traditional producers of drugs, have been the source countries most willing Afghanistan. Corrupt officials may be much more at ease in dealing with traffickers whose to allow spraying. In a few other nations (e.g. Bolivia) the government has allowed manual families they can hold hostage. Moreover, non-native traffickers are likely to be conspicuous in eradication, which is very labor intensive. the growing regions. Nor are the exporters merely agents for wealthy country nations, in sharp contrast to the international trade in refined agricultural products. Khun Sa, a quasi-military The term eradication has also been used for a program that mixes coercion and financial leader associated with irredentist ethnic groups on the periphery of Myanmar, was the dominant incentives: “voluntary eradication.” In Bolivia, with U.S. funding, the national government in the figure in opium exports from the Golden Triangle for many years (Booth, 1996). The Colombian 1990s offered farmers $2,000 per hectare for tearing out coca plants, and agreeing not to cocaine trade has spawned some spectacular figures, such as Pablo Escobar and Carlos Lehder, cultivate any others (Riley, 1996). Absent a good registration of pre-existing fields, this all of them of Colombian descent. If there are major U.S. or European individuals in the intervention also ran perilously close to being a price support program, since the unsuccessful exporting business in the source countries, they have managed to escape detection.

page 175 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 176 coca farmer could sell his cultivated land to the government for the nominated price. production in any region of the world, as opposed to the specific areas targeted by the interventions. There is little evidence that eradication has been effective in recent years but rigorous evaluations are not available and are difficult to carry out. The share of the crop eradicated has A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Unit of the UN ODC reached very pessimistic been quite high in some recent years; for example, Mexico reported in 2001 that it had conclusions: “There is little empirical evidence that the rural development components of AD eradicated 15,350 hectares out of the estimated 19,750 hectares that were in production [Alternative Development] on their own reduce the amount of drug crops cultivated. Agriculture, (UNODC, 2002). However, there has not been a consistent decline in Mexico’s estimated economic and social interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure exerted by potential production. That may reflect either the dubious nature of the estimates of eradication or the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where reduction in drug cropping occurs it seems that poppy prices are high enough that eradication of 80% of crops still provides farmers with an other factors, including general economic growth, policing, etc., can be identified as contributors incentive to plant poppies. Both are plausible and both may apply. to the change that takes place.” (UNODC, 2005a)

In 2003 both the U.S. State Department (2003) and UNODC reported substantial A recent study of the Chapare for the World Bank Institute (Reuter, 2006) suggests that a reductions in Colombian coca production, reasonably ascribed to increased spraying with US combination of large scale development funding and aggressive enforcement can move the locus supplied planes and helicopters. The 2004 figure showed little change. A U.S. government of production. Whereas in the early 1990s the Chapare was the principal producer of coca leaf report in late 2005 that cocaine prices had risen and purity dropped did not inspire confidence; for the illicit market in Bolivia, by 2005, before the election of Evo Morales as president, only the changes over a six month period merely returned price and purity to the levels of late 2003. 7,000 hectares were in coca cultivation (UNODC, 2005c). The Yungas had become, as the result In 2004 the U.S. government reported voluntary eradication in Bolivia may have substantially of heavy investment of aid by both the United States and European governments, a relatively reduced coca production there in the 1990s. attractive rural area, with good quality physical and social infrastructure. Production had shifted both within Bolivia (to the Yungas) and to other countries. Eradication has one major success story in modern times: Mexican opium production in the mid-1970s. An industry that had operated fairly openly in five northern states, with large, There are two distinct frames for assessing production controls; those of the targeted unprotected fields, took approximately five years to adjust to the sudden introduction of spraying. nation and of the global market. It is entirely plausible that a well-executed eradication or Production subsequently became much more widely dispersed and growing fields were smaller alternative development program could reduce production in a specific country or sub-national and more frequently hidden in remote locations; good data are lacking but farm-gate prices may region; it is less plausible that successes even in a few nations could substantially reduce global have been substantially higher as a result. By the early 1980s, Mexico was supplying as much production of either opium or coca. The reasoning is simple and rests largely on the fact that heroin as before the spraying, but for about five years there was a substantial reduction in production costs (both cultivation and refining) constitute a trivial share of the retail price of availability in the United States, particularly in Western states where Mexican supply dominated drugs in the major Western markets. As noted earlier, the costs of the coca leaf that goes into a heroin markets (Reuter, 1992). gram of cocaine is usually less than $0.50; the retail price of that same gram sold at retail in the West is more than $100. Alternative development In contrast to spraying, alternative development, a whole panoply of programs, almost Suppose that stepped-up eradication led to a doubling of the price of coca leaf, so that it always funded by Western donors, is politically attractive, since it provides resources for cost $1 for refiners to buy the leaf that goes into one gram of cocaine. Assuming that the $0.50 marginalized farmers. However, there are numerous obstacles to successful implementation. For per gram cost increase was passed along to traffickers and dealers, the resulting change in the example, it requires persuading farmers that the government will maintain its commitment over a retail price of cocaine would be negligible. Indeed, leaf prices in the Andes have increased more long period; otherwise they will not be willing to incur the costs of shifting to new crops. In since the mid-1990s, with no evident effect on the retail price of cocaine, which declined situations of political instability there will understandably be skepticism about the ability of, say, over the period. the Peruvian government to assure a dependable market, and a reliable transportation infrastructure, for tropical fruits from the Upper Huallaga Valley. Moreover, in some regions, The story for alternative development is analytically identical. If the introduction of new such as the Chapare in Bolivia, coca is grown in areas that have been cleared precisely for that infrastructure in Afghanistan increases the returns from growing wheat, so that many farmers purpose and the land is not promising for other crops; in this case finding ways of moving now switch from growing poppy, then refiners will raise their prices in order to keep sufficient land immigrant farmers back to their original communities has been an important part of the effort. and labor in poppy production. That may lead to shifts of production across provincial or There are a few instances of well-executed local crop substitution programs, in which farmers in national boundaries or simply to increased payments to the current growers. The change in a small area were persuaded to move from coca or poppy to legitimate crops. For example, in Western heroin prices from the higher farm-gate opium price is so slight that production will be Northern Thailand, replacing opium poppy with commercial flowers greatly increased annual unaffected. It should be noted, though, that the poppy farmers are now better off than they were revenues per acre. In Bolivia, rubber has turned out to be more profitable in some areas of the before the alternative development programs; alas, they are still growing poppies. Chapare (Mansfield, 1999). However, it does not appear that these programs have reduced drug

page 177 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 178 However this argument views the issue exclusively from the side of the rich consumer margin that smugglers charge, i.e. the difference between the price at which they purchase countries. A very successful program in one country, whether it be eradication or alternative (export from source/transshipment country) and the price they charge in the destination country. development, might raise poppy or coca costs sufficiently to make another nation more attractive as a production center. For the innovating country, this is still a desirable result, even if global In Table 7 (abbreviated from Reuter and Greenfield, 2001), the difference between export drug consumption is hardly changed. For the other nation or nations that see increases in and import values for world agricultural trade amounted to about 6 percent of the export value; production, or which enter the industry for the first time, the result is increased damage. We absent data for a particular product or market, the Food and Agricultural Organization typically return to this issue later. applies a standard “add factor” of 12 percent. In glaring contrast, the cross-border mark-up on, for example, Tajikistan-Russia heroin shipments is thought to be vastly larger, perhaps a ten fold In-Country Enforcement increase, even though what is crossed is just a pair of land borders. Another indication of the The United States has also invested in building institutional capacity to deal with the drug high effectiveness of interdiction is the high price per kilo of shipping drugs across international trade in major producer countries. Each year the State Department’s International Narcotics borders. It costs less than $100 to send a kilogram of coffee by express mail from Bogota to Control Strategy Report (INCSR) argues that the central problem of drug control in other London; it costs $10,000 to send a kilo of cocaine between the same two cities. countries is political will and integrity. Training investigators, strengthening the judiciary, and improving extradition procedures are the stuff of efforts to deal with this issue. Unfortunately, in Agricultural Products Exports Imports Industrial Products Exports Imports both Colombia and Mexico the corruption problems have seemed endless, imbedded in a larger Cereals & preparations 54 57 Iron & steel 126 138 system of weak integrity controls. For example, in Colombia, where the Army has taken on a Fruits & vegetables 71 79 Chemicals 526 547 major role in drug control, particularly with respect to coca growing, allegations of involvement Sugar & honey 16 17 Automotive products 549 566 in mass killings are well substantiated and have been a major source of controversy about U.S. Coffee, tea & spices 31 32 Office & telecom equipment 769 792 funding (Youngers and Rosin, 2004). Mexico has also had a succession of drug-related Beverages & tobacco 57 57 Textiles & clothing 334 352 corruption scandals at the highest levels; for example, in 1998 the Mexican drug czar, an Army Alcoholic beverages 30 30 Other manufactures 1182 1966 Tobacco 22 21 Total manufactures 4186 4361 general, was convicted of involvement with major drug traffickers. Despite the election of a Total agricultural 417 441 president (Vicente Fox) in 2000 who had no ties to the old system of corruption, the problem products continues, as illustrated by a flood of drug-related murders involving police both as victims and SOURCE: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2000), World Trade Organization (2000) assailants. The story for Pakistan and Thailand among Asian trafficking and producing nations Notes: Exports valued FOB and imports valued CIF; totals may not add due to rounding; n/a means not available differs only in that the violence is less conspicuous. TABLE 7 WORLD TRADE OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES T FOR 1999 (IN BILLIONS OF CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS) The United States has also promoted efforts to crack down on refining facilities in Unfortunately, tougher interdiction does not seem to raise prices much. Figures for the U.S. in producer countries. This may have limited potential because refineries have little fixed capital recent years suggest that seizures of cocaine have increased as a share of total shipments and can be cheaply and rapidly replaced. in recent years while import prices have fallen. Reuter, Crawford and Cave (1988) built a simulation model in which smugglers used past interception data to make decisions about which Trafficking and Smuggling Controls routes to pursue. Given the low export price of cocaine and low inputs of both equipment and Another set of control programs aims at the smuggling of drugs into the wealthy nations. personnel costs per gram, it turned out to be difficult to raise retail prices substantially with more Most large seizures are made through interdiction, i.e. as cocaine or heroin is being moved across aggressive interdiction. Crane, Rivolo and Comfort (1997) examined the effects of temporary or toward borders. Indeed, interdiction seizures may account for as much as 40 percent of total spikes in seizure rates in source zones and found that they did increase retail prices substantially; cocaine production; large seizures are made by the exporting Andean countries, some of the there has been considerable controversy about the researchers’ development of a price series transshipment nations (particularly Mexico), and by U.S. Coast Guard and Customs. Heroin and of their approach to modeling the short-run effects of interdiction events to reach this seizures appear to be a much smaller share of total production, perhaps only 18 percent, as conclusion (see Manski, Pepper and Thomas, 1999). indicated in Table 5. Most of the heroin seizures are made in Asia, close both to the production centers (Afghanistan and Myanmar) and to the largest consumer populations (India, That leaves open the question as to why cross-border prices are so high yet more China, Iran, Pakistan). enforcement does not have the desired consequence. Consider again the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, whose passage increases the price of a kilogram of opium many fold. The effect of interdiction on the availability of cocaine has been examined in only a small This border has been porous throughout the period in which the heroin trade between the two number of studies (e.g. Reuter, Crawford and Cave, 1988; Crane, Rivolo and Comfort, 1997). countries has developed. As a share of the estimated flow, seizures have been modest; Interdiction is like a stochastic tax; shipments and agents (crew members, pilots, unloaders) are Greenfield and Reuter (2004) present figures for seizures and flow that suggest the rate is less subject to a probability of interception and the smuggler incurs costs to replace the shipment and than 5 percent. Nor do smugglers face much threat of incarceration from law enforcement, to provide compensation to agents for the risk of being incarcerated. This will be reflected in the requiring high payments to smuggling labor. Perhaps the border guards seizing a small share of

page 179 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 180 the flow have the capacity to do so and are charging high prices for withholding their authority. which has de facto legalized sale of small amounts of cannabis at coffee shops, has not been able Detailed descriptions of smuggling activities are inconsistent with this. There are multiple border to subject these sales to an explicit tax (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Third, it creates an control agencies (including, until recently, a Russian military division, staffed by Russian officers ambivalence to the role of the state in enforcing generally agreed upon norms. and Tajik soldiers) thinly spread out along a border that has many difficult-to-guard mountain passes. It is striking that no nation has actually adopted such a policy. There are regions of nations in which the government takes little action against producers or traffickers, such as the Shan Perhaps the market for smuggling is characterized by cartel or monopoly control. This State in Myanmar or the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru in the 1980s. However they all seem to would account for both the high margin and the lack of sensitivity to the higher interdiction (i.e. be instances in which the state has generally weak authority; it simply could not take actions. tax rate). This is possible in some markets but the best known ones, for shipment to the United States, have been characterized, since the fall of the Cali and Medellin cartels in the early 1990s, Buying Up the Crop by large numbers of small smuggling enterprises. Perhaps they continue to co-ordinate but there The fact that global production and trafficking are so concentrated presents an opportunity is no obvious mechanism for them to accomplish the discipline that legal cartels have rarely for effective interventions, particularly if it is possible to co-ordinate across sectors within managed over sustained periods of time. countries and across nations. One policy option that is mentioned from time to time is preemptive purchase of the drugs in the dominant producing country by Western governments, I can offer no good account for the high margins charged by drug smugglers in so many perhaps acting through an international agency. The total cost of purchase of all Afghanistan’s settings. The data on risks (seizure, incarceration) and prices (the difference between import and opium production prior to 2001 might have been no more than $250 million, a small fraction of export prices) are not nearly precise enough to allow formal empirical modeling. The apparent what is spent by wealthy nations to deal with the problems of their heroin addicts. Such a lack of response to increased interdiction severity also remains a puzzle. pre-emptive purchase, if successful in making heroin much harder to obtain, might drive many addicts into treatment or otherwise lead them to desist from heroin use for a period of time. 4. NON-TRADITIONAL DRUG CONTROL METHODS In addition to the supply and demand interventions noted above, there are a variety of There are two standard objections to this, one practical and the other conceptual. The approaches – which I broadly label ‘non-traditional’ – that have not been widely discussed, but practical objection is that it would be impossible to make this pre-emptive purchase discreetly. which probably bear closer examination: de facto legalization of production or trafficking, buying Traffickers would soon become aware of the new entrants in the market and would bid against up the crop, and choosing a strategic location to allow production for the global market. Each has them. The price of opium in Afghanistan would soar and the program would end up costing substantial operational or political risk but explicating these risks helps clarify the considerations taxpayers a great deal more and still not prevent opium from continuing to flow into the illegal involved in policy toward drugs and development. market, albeit at higher prices. The conceptual objection is that the intervention would exacerbate long-term problems. In face of the increase in demand at the farm-gate level, growers would now De Facto Legalization of Production or Trafficking plant more, thus worsening the world heroin problem after the pre-emptive buying program ended. Can a nation simply ignore drug production and trafficking? Both for treaty reasons, and because legalization is so shocking to other nations, legalizing and openly taxing or regulating the Though both objections have some power, neither individually nor jointly are they production and distribution of these drugs for international markets is clearly not a possibility. decisive. The traffickers in the short run might not have access to funds to bid the prices very However it is very different if a nation simply fails, as the result of explicit policy consideration, much higher than they are now; over time they can increase their sales revenues enough to do to enforce laws against producing or trafficking in these drugs. so but perhaps not in the first year. Nor does failure to buy the whole crop mean that users would be unaffected by the program; if the governments succeed in purchasing half the product, there There are at least three reasons for considering this option. First, it might lead to minimal will still be substantial hikes in export prices. These might be large enough to raise retail prices corruption around the trade; neither producers nor traffickers would have reason to pay police or in some countries, motivating a large number of addicts to desist, with or without formal treatment. other authorities if the latter are known to lack political backing to eradicate crops or arrest producers and refiners. Second, it reduces political tension, since the government is not seen as The fact that there will be an increase in production, and presumably lower prices, in the opposed to interests of small producers. Third, it increases earnings of peasant farmers in that following years, has relatively little consequence for the global market. A decline in the price of nation, since it may induce a rise in their share of world production. opium has minimal effect on the price of heroin in the major consumer markets. The claim here is of an asymmetry. A sharp reduction in physical availability might generate a price However, there are also substantial risks in pursuing such a policy. Some important spike that would in fact affect final demand but that a glut cannot have the opposite effect nations with major drug problems would object and might retaliate through Official Development because declines in opium farm-gate prices have minimal effect on retail prices. Thus the Assistance cuts, both bilateral and multilateral. Second, the state would not be able to tax the shortterm gain from the price spike may not be offset by any harm from the increased production industry, which now takes a larger share of productive resources; to levy explicit taxes would be thatit generates, whether in Afghanistan or in some other nation that entered the market because a move so close to legalization as to raise the question of treaty compliance. The Netherlands, of the perception that returns had increased.

page 181 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 182 I offer this not as a complete analysis of the effects of a pre-emptive purchase but rather to warlords to independently maintain and equip substantial militias. Similarly, Colombia’s long indicate the kind of innovation that needs careful analysis. The sudden rise in prices might lead running civil war has been deepened and prolonged by the ability of both FARC and of the newer another nation to enter the market, thus spreading the problem and eliminating one of the paramilitary to finance their activities with funds from taxing coca production and refining. attributes that make pre-emptive purchase possible. If crops can be expanded rapidly, then the However, at the margin, shifting 25 percent of the industry to, say, Ecuador might do less to program might be so short-lived as to be not worth the effort. One would have to consider not only reduce the damage in Colombia than it does to worsen Ecuadorian integrity and stability. It may whether it is possible to obtain the desired spike but also whether it is possible to co-ordinate be that globally it is preferable to manage the problem in Colombia, rather than pressure it to act treatment efforts in consumer countries to provide resources so that the system is able to take aggressively and motivate re-emergence in Bolivia. advantage of the short-term opportunity. Move or Stabilize? The damage caused by the industry is also partly a function of Strategic Location whether it has been stably located. Systemic corruption is not irreversible but once the norms It is plausible to suggest that even programs that succeed in raising the price of coca and and networks supporting it have developed, restoring good governance is difficult. Pushing opium will fail to substantially reduce world consumption of cocaine and heroin. The reason is Myanmar’s production into Cambodia and then on into Vietnam may cause the latter two simply that the elasticity of retail price with respect to the price of opium or of coca paste is too countries great harm without much helping the fight to improve the welfare of the people of low; raising Afghan opium prices by 50 percent may generate, even in Iran (a middle income Myanmar. neighbor of Afghanistan), no more than a 5 percent increase in retail price and thus a very modest decline in consumption. That has important policy implications, as it suggests that Which Nations? If it is accepted that the global community can make a strategic choice control efforts will result in shifts in location rather than reductions in the volume of production. about where the industry locates, then one can ask whether total harm can be reduced. For Afghanistan’s decline in production will be compensated, perhaps with a lag, by increases in example, size is a consideration. A small nation such as Tajikistan may be substantially production elsewhere. corrupted by accounting for trafficking even as little as 20 percent of Afghanistan’s production, whereas Brazil is so large that a shift of trafficking networks for Colombia’s cocaine output to Drug production then becomes a global public bad, like toxic waste disposal. Some that nation will have only modest effects. Brazil may also be more capable of moderating the nations will have to bear the consequences of the global demand for drugs so long as that adverse effects of the trafficking-related corruption. However, the population potentially affected demand cannot be suppressed. In the case of waste disposal, there are compensation by government failure is very much greater in the larger nations. Should the world prefer 5 mechanisms that hopefully do not distort decisions. For other global public bads, such as the sex million Tajikistan citizens to have their government totally captured by the drug trade, rather than trade, no such compensation mechanisms have been developed, in part because what is have governance for 70 million Iranians somewhat worsened by trafficking? conspicuous is the revenue generated by the trade rather than the institutional and social problems that accompany it. Compensation mechanisms Whether it is possible to create a mechanism that is politically acceptable and that does not encourage weak nations to seek out the industry is another matter. The global policy decisions are then whether it is (a) desirable to have production Indeed, it could be argued that simply letting the producing nations keep the revenues from the dispersed across many countries or concentrated in a few; (b) desirable to have production drug trade without sanctioning them is compensation enough. stably located in specific countries or moved around; (c) possible to determine which countries are likely to suffer the least bad consequences from becoming major producers and traffickers; There is generally something disturbing about such policy realism and it is not clear that it and (d) possible to develop compensation mechanisms for those nations that end up with the is a politically stable option. What if global public opinion does not accept the premise that drug industry. Many or few? It can be argued that many countries with a small opium industry will production is demand driven? Can the government of Colombia responsibly accept that it will result in less total harm than a few countries each with a large industry. A few hundred opium continue to be a major cocaine producer without acting aggressively to suppress the trade? The farmers scattered across a broad area will generate only opportunistic corruption and the funds taint of the business may simply be too great for any nation which has prospects of attracting available from the farmers will not be sufficient to purchase central government protection. substantial legitimate foreign investment.

However, that may not be a stable equilibrium; sub-national regional concentration may develop 4. NON-TRADITIONAL DRUG CONTROL METHODS and pose a substantial threat to provincial, if not national, government integrity. In addition to the supply and demand interventions noted above, there are a variety of approaches – which I broadly label ‘non-traditional’ – that have not been widely discussed, but Allowing two or three nations to dominate production, effectively the situation that has which probably bear closer examination: de facto legalization of production or trafficking, buying characterized the last 20 years, results in fundamental undermining of governmental authority in up the crop, and choosing a strategic location to allow production for the global market. Each has those countries. The term narco-state has been thrown around loosely but it is fair to say that substantial operational or political risk but explicating these risks helps clarify the considerations the task of re-establishing the central government in Afghanistan has been made substantially involved in policy toward drugs and development. more difficult by the flow of revenues from opium and heroin, which has allowed regional

page 183 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 184 5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) very risky and expensive, Afghanistan might lose its This has been a speculative essay because there is little empirical or conceptual literature. attraction as a producing site. This is not intended as description of a policy option; closing Gross facts about global drug problems are readily available: e.g., Afghanistan produces most of trafficking is harder than eradicating production, which does require fixed sites. the world’s opium and the U.S. consumes a large share of the world’s cocaine production. However there is no precision about magnitudes; e.g. estimates of Colombian cocaine production Comparative Advantage have been revised by 50% around the year 2000 because of new information on yields of Cocaine and heroin look like “footloose” industries. The specific knowledge, personnel alkaloid and the frequency of crops, while the error bands around estimates of the number of and capital required are minimal. Small changes in the profitability of specific nations should heroin addicts in Europe are very broad indeed. lead to rapid changes in location. Yet there has been surprising stability. The same three nations have dominated cocaine and the same two have dominated heroin for the last 20 years. The only The body of research and evaluation on drug policy interventions, apart from drug new entrant has been Colombia into heroin production. treatment, is thin. There are no more than three empirical studies (using that term generously) of the effects of increased intensity of interdiction. There are literally no evaluations of the At the sub-national level there has been much more change. For example, Afghanistan’s consequences for major drug markets of crop eradication or lab seizure efforts in producer opium production long concentrated in a few southern and eastern provinces is now spread countries. throughout the country. Bolivian coca production was concentrated in the Jungas until about 1980, when unemployed tin miners moved to the Chapare and is now moving back to the Conceptual matters are no better. There are barely a handful of articles by economists on Jungas. What this suggests is that the nation is a relevant unit of analysis; there is a system of the peculiar configuration of the global drug market. Economist’s curiosity has largely been distribution and trafficking that can accommodate to changes in the site of production. confined to clever possible explanations for paradoxical effects of enforcement (e.g. Poret, 2003). I will conclude this article by identifying three questions that seem worthy of economists’ Note that in the trafficking sector, nationalities rather than nations may be involved. attention: Nigeria is not an important trafficking location, Rather it is the diaspora of Nigerians throughout 1. What factors determine a nation’s comparative advantage in the production or trafficking of the world that serves as a supply of trafficking labor, linked loosely to the mother country. The illegal drugs? decision may be which nations Nigerians find most advantageous to use for transshipment. 2. How stable is the configuration of producer and trafficker countries? However, the reverse relationship is also possible: There are nations that are advantaged for 3. Is long-reduction in global supply possible? transshipment and it is Nigerians as labor who are advantaged for certain roles in those countries.

Comparative Advantage Global Supply Reduction The factors of production for cocaine or heroin at first glance appear to be those of any This paper reflects what is now nearly a traditional pessimism about the long-run agricultural commodity; labor and land that is agronomically suitable. However under conditions prospects of supply reduction at the source country level. The elasticity of demand for cocaine of prohibition the scarce factor is some form of “domestic tranquility”, the ability to grow, and heroin with respect to source country prices appears to be almost zero; as noted above, the process, and transport the commodity at low risk. In explaining Colombia’s dominant role in the raw material costs of opium and coca are barely 1% of the retail price in rich countries and South American cocaine industry, Thoumi (2003; Chapter 3) offers a conceptual model that perhaps no more than 10 percent in the large markets in poorer nations. emphasizes the lack of social capital and weak governance as the basis for low operating costs for the industry. He also notes the difficulty of disentangling historically the relationship between However, this is a static and crude model of price formation. Is it possible to impose a weak government institutions and the presence of the drug trade, which itself weakens those series of short-run supply disruptions that might cumulatively make a difference? The market for institutions. these drugs appears to be less well integrated globally than markets for many legal commodities, perhaps reflecting the high fixed costs and risks of establishing new trafficking routes. These The configuration is state-dependent (pun intended). A principal cost is presumably that drugs are the subjects of epidemics (e.g. Caulkins, Behrens, Knoll, Tragler and Zuba, 2004). A of obtaining official co-operation. The cost of such co-operation is highest for the first supply disruption for two or three years at the right moment in an epidemic can make a transaction, since in subsequent transactions both sides know that the other can be trusted. An substantial difference for a particular country. established producer country is one in which many such corrupt relationships have been created, providing lower costs for all phases of the industry within that country. There is also an implicit model of price formation that underlies this; small dollar but large percentage increases in raw material costs do not affect final prices because they are International transportation costs take on a new meaning in this setting as well; they are passed along additively. Caulkins (1990) has argued that the relationship might be multiplicative, also determined less by the conventional factors than by the risk of seizure and the penalties at least for price increases somewhat further up the chain. The historical record is inconsistent faced by interdicted couriers; the relevant risks may those imposed by other countries. Thus, if it with the multiplicative model for coca and opium prices; these have been subject to large werepossible to make transportation through all neighboring countries (China, Iran, Pakistan, fluctuations that have not been seen in retail prices reported in the U.S., though the quality of the

page 185 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 186 price data is low. More serious testing might find that this model is not correct. Reuter, Peter, Crawford and Cave (1988) Sealing the Borders: Effects of Increased Military Efforts in Drug Interdiction, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, R-3594-USDP Cocaine and heroin appear likely to present global problems for the foreseeable future. A Reuter, Peter, and Victoria Greenfield, (2001) “Measuring Global Drug Markets: How Good are the Numbers and Why Should We Care About Them?” World Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp.155-173, 2001. better understanding of the economics of production and trafficking would help policy makers Reuter, Peter and Emil Pain with Victoria Greenfield (2004) “The Effects of Drug Trafficking on Central Asia” both assess existing options and develop new ones. unpublished project report, RAND Reuter, Peter, and Mark Kleiman, “Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement,” Crime and REFERENCES Justice: An Annual Review, Vol. 9, pp.128-179, 1986. Badillo, Celia; Bryan, Mark; Burton, John; Conti, Gabriella; Iacovou, Maria and Stephen Pudney (forthcoming) “Estimating the Size of the UK Illicit Drug Market” London, Home Office Riley, K. Jack, (1996) Snow Job: The War Against International Drug Trafficking New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers: Booth. M., Opium: A History, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996 Roston, Aram. “Central Asia’s Heroin Problem” The Nation. March 25, 2002 issue.]. Boyum, David and Peter Reuter (2005) An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy Washington, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020325/roston DC, American Enterprise Institute Ruggiero, V. and N. South, Eurodrugs: Drug Use, Markets and Trafficking in Europe, London: Byrd, William and Christopher Ward Afghanistan’s Drug Economy: A Preliminary Overview and University College London Press, 1995. Analysis World Bank, draft February 2004 Spillane, Joseph F., Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States: Caulkins, Jonathan P. 1990. The Distribution and Consumption of Illicit Drugs: Some Mathematical Models and 1884-1920, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Their Policy Implications. PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thoumi, Francis, Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes, Baltimore, MD: Caulkins, Jonathan P. and Peter Reuter (1998) “What Can we Learn from Drug Prices?” J. Drug Issues Caulkins, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Jonathan; Behrens, Doris; Knoll, Claudia; Tragler, Gernot and Doris Zuba (2004) Townsend, Jacob (2005) China and Afghan Opiates: Assessing the Risk Silk Road papers “Markov Chain Modeling of Initiation and Demand: The Case of the US Cocaine Epidemic” Health Care http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/Townsend_Total.pdf (accessed December 23, 2005) Management Science 7, 319---329 United Nations Drug Control Program (1997) World Drug Report Oxford, Oxford University Press Crane, Barry; Rivolo, Rex and Gary Comfort (1997) An Empirical Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program Effectiveness, P-3219, Institute for Defense Analyses, January 1997 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2003), Global Illicit Drug Trends, New York: United Nations, United Nations Office Dikotter, Frank; Laamann, Lars; and Zhou Xun (2004) Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China Chicago, Chicago University Press United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005) Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation New York, United Nations Drug Availability Working Group, Drug Availability Estimates in the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington D.C., 2003. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005a) Thematic Evaluation of UNODC’s Alternative Development Programs Vienna, United Nations Greenfield, Victoria and Peter Reuter (2004) “Estimated Earnings from the Heroin Trade in Central Asia” unpublished paper, RAND United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005b) 2005 World Drug Report Vienna, United Nations International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Board Control, 2002. Online at United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005c) Bolivia Coca Cultivation Survey La Paz http://www.incb.org/e/ar/2002. United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (2001) What America’s Users Spend on Illicit Drugs Kennedy, M., Peter Reuter, and K. Jack Riley, “A Simple Economic Model of Cocaine Production,” Computer 1988-2000 Washington, D.C. and Mathematical Modeling, Vol 17, No. 2, pp.19-36, 1993. United States Department of State (annual) International Narcotic Control Strategy Report Washington Kleiman, Mark (1992) Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results New York, Basic Books Uribe, Sergio (2005) “Development of the Colombian Heroin Industry, 1990-2003” unpublished project MacCoun, Robert J., and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places, memorandum Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Washington Office on Latin America (no date) Aerial Fumigation: Stop U.S. Spronsored Chemical Spraying in Manski, Charles; John Pepper and Yvette Thomas (eds.) Assessment of Two Cost-Effectiveness Studies on Colombia Cocaine Control Policy Washington, DC; National Academy Press 1999 http://www.wola.org/Colombia/citizen_action_guide_fumigation.pdf Youngers, Collete and Eileen Rosin (eds.) (2004) Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Manski, Charles; John Pepper and Carol Petrie (eds.) Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs Washington, Policy Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner DC; National Academy Press, 2001 Office of the Press Secretary. 2001. Remarks by President George W. Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico in Joint Press Conference, 16 February 2001. Copyright http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/print/20010216-3.html (accessed 17 November 2004). Ponce, Robert. “Rising Heroin Abuse in Central Asia Raises Threat of Public Health Crisis” Eurasia Insight. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank Open Society Institute: 2002 Poret S. (2003) The Illicit Drug Market: Paradoxical Effects of Law Enforcement Policies. International Review of Law and Economics 22(4): 465-493. Reuter, Peter (2006) Drug Control in Bolivia mimeo Reuter, Peter, “Can the Borders Be Sealed?” The Public Interest, pp. 51-65, Summer 1988. Reuter, Peter (1992) "After the Borders are Sealed: Can Domestic Sources Substitute for Imported Drugs?" in Peter Smith (ed.) Drug Policy in the Americas. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp.163-177. page 187 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 188 IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE MVC ™1000 New bench top cyanoacrylate fuming cabinet features fast processing cycle Developing latent fingerprints using the cyanoacrylate fuming process is now faster with the new, compact MVC™1000. 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page 189 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 190 ARTICLE difficult it had been to get the children to keep a straight face at the same time as look directly at the camera for their passport photographs. BIOMETRIC PASS OF THE PORTS BY HERTZ QUARTZ Hertz Quartz Another car forward – one to go. Window down, I ready our passports, having a last look at my own. Inside the last page is a little black square, a microchip, with a thin wire woven into a rectangle. Ah, I remember now: the new passports are biometric. What precisely does that mean? It’s been grey skies and rain for ages. We’ve been I wonder. I move the car forward and hand the Quartz passports through the little space in the asked to go on holiday, somewhere of low glass booth… precipitation and pleasant temperatures. It’s a bit of a late decision, a fortnight until we leave. Those Supposedly, the origin of the word passport is French, 1490. The verb passer – to pass, and the asking need a decision tonight. The rain is pounding word porte – gate. “Pass thru the gate” of old city walls, I suppose. down outside, while Mrs Quartz and I discuss it. We say yes. In the morning, we realise we don’t have A biometric passport might seem like a huge advance but the intention is the same. We have a passports for our two young children and that my document bearing the stamp of our sovereign that we present to officials of other “sovereigns”. passport expired six months ago. Hopefully, with the request above provided to us. Where before there was a photograph, still there is a photograph. For UK passports, the photograph supplies the primary biometric, which is Aaagghhh! facial recognition. (The International Civil Aviation Organisation, which set international standards decided on this.) That is why I had to struggle to get the young Quartz’s not to smile while looking dead ahead. One week after panicking, filling in the paperwork, getting photographs, countersignatures, and attending the Passport Service office, plus parting Put simplistically, facial biometrics take features of the face and records them in relation to other with close to three hundred pounds, three new passports arrived. features, e.g., distance between eyes, between the sides of the mouth is one, hence the no-smiling rule. In the fingerprint whorld, minutiae are taken in relation to other minutiae, then Some weeks pass, holiday over - that was quick - and we are in the car at a seaport waiting to compared to known recorded minutiae to decide on identity or not. Not surprisingly, and just like pass through UK Border Control. I have four passports for two adults and two children. I don’t know with fingerprints, it seems there are many different ways and methods in use, all with their why I do it but I check that the passports are the same four passports used for going out of the problems. Facial Recognition Algorithms are utilised for this process. I get dizzy at the thought. country. There is one for each of us. Inside the first, I read the inscription:

When I Googled on the subject of facial recognition, I found Sciencewatch.com in April 2009 “Her Brittanic Majesty’s looked into it. To quote: Secretary of State Requests and requires in the “The pros and cons of a variety of face recognition algorithms are the main focus of both paper Name of Her Majesty lists. These algorithms include both one- and two-dimensional principal component analysis all those whom it may concern (PCA), linear discriminant analysis (LDA), locality preserving projections (LPP), eigenfaces, to allow the bearer to pass freely fisherfaces, Gabor features, FERET, component analyses, and discriminant analyses. Problems without let or hindrance, associated with these methods, or problems certain methods were designed to overcome and to afford the bearer include pose and lighting variations, small sample sizes, and multiple viewpoints. Studies of how such assistance and protection these methods perform in comparison to other methods as well as to human operators are also as may be necessary.” included. “

The queue of cars moves forward one car, still plenty of time to check the passports. I look at the I’m still dizzy… cute pictures of two little Quartz’s. I smile, move forward another car. Mrs Quartz. Myself. No smiles in the passports, of course, that’s not allowed. I now wonder why, remembering how

page 191 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 192 ARTICLE The official in the booth took our four passports and, in turn, placed each upon a scanner. This scans the chip via the thin copper wire that acts as the antennae. It also reads the alphanumeric characters printed on the passport which is used to decode the chip. This means that the Border THOSE HALCYON YEARS Controller does not have to make any keystrokes to obtain the information on the chip.

She didn’t smile when she returned the passports and waved us through. You have a nice day, too, I thought.

I think the idea behind the biometric passport is that it prevents someone illegally altering a passport. The biometric must match the photograph. The biometric on the chip - which is supposed to be secure although Googling on that suggests otherwise – was entered by the Passport Service when they issued the document. They linked the biometric to the original photograph.

The Passport Service is considering fingerprints as a secondary biometric. Other countries John and Diane Berry already do this, some use two different fingerprints. Iris recognition is probably not that far away. 1975- 1991), MY TIME IN THE HERTFORDSHIRE CONSTABULARY FINGERPRINT BUREAU. After my next holiday…I wish. In the next journal, when the dizziness leaves, I’ll look at facial recognition in more detail. learned on the streets of Thailand! By JOHN EDWARD BERRY.B.E.M. F.F.S.

In April 1975 I transferred from a Regional Fingerprint Bureau to the Hertfordshire Constabulary bureau. I had been a police fingerprint expert for 20 years, and upon retirement decided to continue my fingerprint career in a civilian capacity.

The Hertfordshire fingerprint office was staffed by five men, and I name them alphabetically, not in order of talent… Dave Brooker (Supervisor); Nick Hall (fingerprint officer); Stephen Haylock (fingerprint officer); Martin Leadbetter (fingerprint expert,) and myself.

Before I arrived, the first four named , working in a small office, felt that they were isolated , knew very few other fingerprint personnel, although 20 miles to the south was the huge New Scotland Yard bureau, and surrounding them were the Bedfordshire, Cambridge and Essex bureaux.

Rumours of new techniques for developing latent finger imprints were on the horizon but how would they discover them? Even obtaining sets of finger impressions from the Yard took time, following the required protocol of written application. Wouldn’t it be really efficient, say, if they could telephone a known acquaintance in another bureau and receive finger impressions by return of post? How to penetrate this shield of possibly official insularity dominated their thoughts..

Why not, they reasoned, formulate a society of fingerprint officers countrywide? They circulated their thoughts to all bureaux in Great Britain, and, to their delight and surprise, the response was enthusiastic. Meetings were held well attended, and duly the NATIONAL SOCIETY OF FINGERPRINT OFFICERS (NSFO) was formed . I must point out that most of this frenzied activity occurred before I arrived at the bureau.

page 193 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 194 However, official response was unfavourable . Many bureaux featured police officers in their staff, Service , organised a conference in Washington DC, USA, which I attended, as did Stephen could it be Heads of Bureaux reasoned, that the N.S.F.O was but a façade to encourage civilian Haylock from Hertfordshire, with a ‘plane load of other British members; it was a total success. staff to form a pseudo Trade Union, to discuss pay, differentials and working conditions? I consider we in the little Hertfordshire Bureau ably carried out the aims exemplified by the Founders in the journal,. We certainly recorded many new innovations, techniques and skills. One These thoughts were never entertained by the Four Founders, as they were termed- Brooker, of our most notable coups concerned the Superglue technique for revealing latent finger and Hall , Haylock and Leadbetter. palm impressions on items not normally amenable to powdering.

They decided a journal was required to hold the newly- formed society together and propagate `Many years ago , an English Scenes of Crime Officer was repairing broken photographic equip - their views, and at this juncture I arrived at the bureau. ment, using Superglue as a fixative, and he was amazed to find his white finger imprints all over the equipment. He informed his Detective Inspector , who , I understand duly informed his An editor was required; I did mention that I had experience editing science fiction and judo superiors, but there were no further developments. magazines, I was asked to consider editorship. I punned the title FINGERPRINT WHORLD, which they liked, but there was a dearth of contents. Martin Leadbetter, whilst visiting bureaux in the United States in 1982, invariably noticed white-sided aquarium-type containers. “Oh, that’s Superglue,” he was told, “it reveals superb Our first issue, in July 1975 featured a scoop. I had recently read an F.B.I. Law Enforcement latents.” Martin noted that an item for examination was placed in the tank, and a small folded Bulletin, which featured an illustrated article regarding an unusual pattern. I strongly disagreed with bandage was placed in the corner of the tank, and Superglue from the tube was squirted over it, their classification, because they did not refer to a transitioned pattern which I thought was causing fuming. Martin was amazed at the results. essential. I wrote to the F.B.I. with my complaints. Upon returning to are bureau, he informed senior Hertfordshire detectives, who told him, “if it Shortly afterwards I received a reply from the F.B.I. stating ‘such patterns often produce lively works, use it”. We did so, and found the Superglue technique revealed imprints in many cases discussions,’ and ‘create a special interest in fingerprint identifications’ The letter was signed including serious crimes, and evidence was presented in Courts in Hertfordshire. ‘J.Edgar Hoover’, (I still have the letter framed in my den) thus giving our first issue undoubted At this time, Hertfordshire was the only bureau in Great Britain using Superglue and proving prestige. subsequent identifications in legal proceedings.

A senior police officer in the Essex bureau Superintendent Lewis Minshall, recognised our aims, In numerous articles in FINGERPRINT WHORLD we praised the Efficacy of Superglue, urging trying to circulate fingerprint knowledge, and told his police experts that they should join. other bureaux to use it. However Home Office scientists averred Superglue did not work, but we Consequently , over a period of a year or so, many police officers became members, and we also continued to extol its virtues in the journal. Eventually, after thorough research, having received enquiries from abroad, especially from the United States. presumably negotiated the ‘health and safety’ requirements. the Home Office did endorse its usage, eventually providing sophisticated equipment subsequently utilised by every bureaux in the To remove any remaining doubts as to our aspirations, totally removed from a ‘trade union’ bias country. which critics still moaned about , we changed the name to THE FINGERPRINT SOCIETY. The final accolade occurred in 1976, Martin Leadbetter and myself were at New Scotland Yard, During research for articles for FINGERPRINT WHORLD, I read that even as long ago as the and were stopped by Commander Gerald Lambourne, Head of the Yard bureau. To our utter turn of the 20th century, fingerprint pioneers noted that ‘primates have fingerprints;’ one or two surprise, he told us he appreciated the formation and aims of the Society and shortly afterwards learned professors even published comparison charts of the hand and feet impressions of a few many NSY staff joined the society. selected species.

Insofar as FINGERPRINT WHORLD was concerned, I edited 64 quarterly issues from 1975 to We discussed this phenomenon during coffee breaks in the office, and such was the drive and 1991, ably assisted by Assistant Editor Martin Leadbetter, my final issue being circulated to circa enthusiasm engendered by the staff in this small bureau that we decided that we would, for the 900 members in over 6o countries. first time ( as far as I am aware) attempt to examine the hand and feet surfaces of ALL primates, around 190 different species. The Fingerprint Society held successful yearly conferences in England, Scotland and Wales, always with a nucleus of attendees from around the world. Samuel Durrett, United States Secret We availed of leave days to travel far and wide, mostly visiting private zoos, where owners

page 195 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 196 permitted us to powder the hand and feet surfaces of their pets. We used black powder, lifted the Surreptitiously, Roger smeared acrylic paint along the surface, and as soon as it dried he lifted impressions with transparent tape, transferring the result to fixed white photographic paper. it, a perfect result, and superb ridge detail.

Stephen Haylock and Dave Brooker visited one small zoo, and Stephen took photographs of an I illustrated the item in FINGERPRINT WHORLD with an enlargement of a section of it. I believe inquisitive chimpanzee taking the brush from Dave Brooker and attempted to powder Dave’s it to be the first time that prehensile tail ridge detail was published. I still retain the acrylic strip. fingers. Eventually we ticked off the last primate to be examined , again , I firmly consider this was the first One national newspaper reported that ‘Steve Haylock, a Hertfordshire Constabulary fingerprint time such research had been carried out. I must report that most patterns were arches, tents expert , is fingerprinting monks.’ loops and whorls, although the occasional strange patterns occurred, usually complicated whorls. As a general rule I can state that large primates seem to feature arch and loop pattern, and Martin Leadbetter and I visited the Primate House at London Zoo, and I must report that Mr smaller primates have whorls, but this is certainly not a definitive statement. Leadbetter used the devious device of placing lifting tape around his fingers and approaching Guy the Gorilla safely behind iron bars, hoping that the gorilla would touch the tape as Martin All primates have fingerprints this caused me to ponder during sleepless nights- how old are gingerly placed his taped fingers in the vicinity of Guy’s massive hands. Guy grabbed Martin’s fingerprints? Primates occur mostly in warmer countries all over the world and they all have homo jacket sleeve through the bars of the cage and groped vigorously, ripping the sleeve to the elbow. sapiens-type hand and feet impressions. Er, yes, Martin did get a smudged arch pattern on a section of the tape… I considered Madagascar for example. Since that vast country split from the African continent, Keeper Carwen introduced us to Suka, a young female orang-utan, who sat happily between us primates have evolved into many completely new species, ring tailed lemurs for example. I sought whilst we dabbed her hands and feet with black powder and lifted them, the results were wonderful an answer to an important issue, when did Madagascar split from Africa? clear, and the primate was delighted throughout the operation. Many time scales have been quoted, the average being 170 million years ago.Ergo, I reasoned, Three months later, my wife and I spent a day at London Zoo. We crossed to the orang-utan cage, surely our sub- primate ancestors had hand and feet impressions before the separation, a retentively simple reasoning process providing the age of hand and feet impressions at over 170 suddenly a young orang-utan ran from a family group, and rushed over to look at me, million years. gesticulating excitedly, I did not recognise Suka, but obviously it was she, expressing delight at meeting an old friend. Onlookers were amazed….. As far as I am aware, no one previously had reached this conclusion, and why should they indulge in such esotericism? I published my thesis in the first edition of RIDGE DETAIL IN NATURE Martin made contact with Professor Prue Napier at the National History Museum in London, and (RDIN) in 1979, edited by myself and circulated with FINGERPRINT WHORLD. Subsequently discovered that she was in charge of a large hanger-type building at the rear of the museum I was asked to lecture on the subject at a Conference at the F.B.I. Academy at Quantico, U.S.A. which housed stuffed primates of all species in individual metal drawers. She gave permission for However, I had already fully booked a holiday in Australia with my son and his family, and two researchers to examine all the specimens. unfortunately had to forgo the F.B.I. lecture opportunity. However , my colleague Stephen Haylock was delighted to attend the Conference on my behalf and duly presented my thesis. I visited the museum with Detective Constable Roger Ball, a Hertfordshire Scenes of Crime Officer, who was interested in our research. I exhaustively researched the life and times of Scottish fingerprint pioneer Dr. Henry Faulds and subsequently published seven articles in the journal under the banner THE FAULDS LEGACY. Roger had invented the use of acrylic paint for lifting embossed latents at crime scenes- duly I consider all young fingerprint trainees should read and study the absolutely amazing article by reported in the journal. Dr. Faulds published in NATURE in 1880, wherein he described his research into fingerprints matters- yes- 1880- twenty one years before the Yard’s Henry fingerprint system commenced. I had read that a few species of South American primates have a thin sliver of skin on the inside surface of their prehensile tails roughly six inches long and half an inch wide bearing ridge Faulds also published seven issues of his fingerprint journal DACTYLOSCOPY in the early detail, obviously to assist grip and provide a sensory facility when hanging from branches or twenties, required reading. Somehow, the energetic Martin Leadbetter, who in his formative years swinging from trees. was a librarian, managed to somehow negotiate a minefield of officialdom, and eventually obtained copies of the entire DACTYLOSCOPY file, which I copied, had bound; a valuable I opened a box and saw a South American primate, lifted the tail, noting the strip of skin. addition to my fingerprint library.

page 197 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 198 In issue number 43 of FINGERPRINT WHORLD, I did a sketch showing the dilapidated state of Martin Leadbetter and myself made two visits to East Germany in 1987, and 1989 (the latter prior his grave in Staffordshire, and as a result, two Americans paid for its renovation, shown on the to the removal of the Berlin Wall) lecturing to fingerprint officers at Humbold University in East front cover of FINGERPRINT WHORL D NUMBER 49. Berlin on RDIN, which was an amazing concept to them, albeit we were not permitted to converse with individual officers. However, an observation made by Faulds inspired me to commence research into the We took our wives on the 1989 visit… our host, Professor Horworka, stopped our Trabant at a phenomenon whereby the seven basic fingerprint ridge characteristic appear in Nature. roadside café, and whilst we were supping tea and plain biscuits, a convoy of military lorries Obvious examples are zebra and the formation of wind-blown and tidal sand formations. Faulds stopped for the same reason. It was quite bizarre to be seated amongst very–looking Russian was looking out of his window one day, and noted snow flakes falling on a nearby field and a light soldiers, although they did not acknowledge our presence. breeze blew across the field forming ridge detail. As I have previously mentioned, my wife and I, together with a ‘plane load of British I was stunned by this observation, and subsequent research revealed in the previous 75 years society personnel, attended the Fingerprint Society Conference in Washington, D.C. U.S.A. We since the turn of the century, fingerprint pioneers had noted the phenomenon in around a dozen were then driven to Canada, with RDIN enthusiast Peter Banks, and stayed with him and his instances ridge detail in cloud formations, tree trunks, etc. family for several days. These visits convinced me that the FINGERPRINT SOCIETY faithfully fulfilled the Founder’s aspirations, with fingerprint and Scenes of Crime staff all over the world All the enthusiastic Hertfordshire fingerprint staff commenced to make observation regarding this benefiting from the many preferred ideas and techniques circulated via FINGERPRINT WHORLD, new ‘wrinkle’. In my RIDGE DETAIL IN NATURE (RDIN) number 1 in July 1979, circulated with to the betterment of The Discipline. FINGERPRINT WHORLD , I detailed 7o new discoveries … in my latest publication of the 100 page STRABISMUS in 2007 (renamed from RIDGE DETAIL IN NATURE in 1989) my total of During my seventeen years in the Hertfordshire Bureau, there were numerous staff changes, discoveries is 1,749. Let me just vaingloriously put this in perspective, 12 reported discoveries in including two husband and wife teams, Dave and Janet Dobie, and Cliff and Alison Gulbis. James the subsequent 4o years. Nixon left to join the Metropolitan Police. Janet Newton transferred to the Nottinghamshire Bureau where she is still working (2008). Two ex-Yard technicians, John Mansfield and Mike Butler served At one time I had thirty RDIN researchers around the world, itemised in editions of RDIN and for a short time. I must state that I have pleasant memories of these technicians. STRABISMUS,and still a dozen stalwarts bring, reports or send me discoveries, most especially Founder Nick Hall later transferred to the Hertfordshire Constabulary Photographic Martin Leadbetter and Mike Walker. Department, and is now retired and resident in Cornwall. Dave Brooker also retired some years ago. During my 17 years sojourn in the Hertfordshire bureau, my wife Diane and myself visited various countries, and I usually made a point of visiting bureaux, where, because of my Martin Leadbetter maintains a very active career in fingerprints. He worked on computer editorship of FINGERPRINT WHORLD, I was invariably well received. technology for a time at the Home Office, whilst at Hertfordshire, he resigned from the bureau and worked in France with computer giant MORPHO, visiting many countries demonstrating their On a visit to an Australian bureau I noted a fingerprint officer with a heated iron moving it to and technology; on at least two occasion’s, he made identifications, ( one being a murder), whilst fro about three inches above paper obviously treated with ninhydrin; there was absolutely no performing this function. For almost a decade he was in charge of the Cambridgeshire Bureau. effect. “Permit me,” I said, I asked for blotting paper, placed it on the ninhydrin-treated paper, and Whilst there he instituted the first ( and extremely successful) palm searching computer system ran the iron forcibly across it… there was a sort of sizzling sound, and gasps from the huddled in Great Britain, subsequently used by other bureaux overseas. He is a European Union observers, I lifted the singed blotting paper, and revealed were a number of excellent purple consultant , and also operates as an Independent Consultant . Since the formation of the NSFO imprints. The technicians were impressed, they said the instructions they had been given was to in 1975, subsequently renamed THE FINGERPRINT SOCIETY, he has had numerous use the very slow heat treatment above the paper, a flawed technique they said, which they would administrative positions, and in fact, at time of writing (2008), he is the Chairman of the Society. henceforth ignore. Diane and myself were quests of the South African Police in 1981 for three weeks visiting large parts of this wonderfully scenic country, and of course, visiting bureaux, I worked with Stephen Haylock for many years, until we were both upgraded to ‘officers and he including Soweto, where I was presented with a momento. We mingled with fingerprint staff in took charge of the team investigating crimes in West Hertfordshire.(Apropos my ‘promotion’, an numerous bureaux, exchanging ideas and techniques, and a dinner was arranged at which most Inspector interviewed Stephen and myself, stating proudly that our new promotion permitted us South African Fingerprint Society members attended. to use the Officer’s Mess. I chuckled to myself; as an army officer I was an officer’s Mess habitué in 1946). Stephen held important administrative positions in FINGERPRINT SOCIETY. He was

page 199 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 200 ARTICLE an extremely pleasant gentleman to work with, and I have many happy memories of our association. SCIENTISTS REVEAL SECRET OF GIRL WITH Upon retirement from the Hertfordshire Bureau he worked temporarily with Martin Leadbetter in ‘ALL SEEING EYE’ the Cambridgeshire Bureaux. He is now in charge of the City Of London Fingerprint Bureau (2008). Scientists have discovered how a 10-year-old girl born with half a brain is able to see normally ]Ex-NSY expert Mike Walker had two spells in the bureau, and I had the pleasure of working with through one eye. The youngster, from Germany, has both fields of vision in one eye and is the only him; a non-stop dedicated technician, unhappy unless he had just made an identification. known case of its kind in the world. I have previously reported the following incident , receiving ribald comment, but it is absolutely true; I hereby dispute the allegation that it is apocryphal. University of Glasgow researchers used Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to reveal how the girl’s brain had rewired itself in order to process information from the right and left I had completed a fingerprint search, the bundles of Two-Hand finger impressions held together visual fields in spite of her not having a whole brain. The right hemisphere in the girl’s brain failed by a strained elastic band. As I crossed the room to return the bundle to its compartment the to develop in the womb. elastic band snapped and Two-Hand forms showered to the floor. Mike Walker caught a form as he walked past, looked at it, and did a ‘double-take’ with widened optics. He rushed to the Scenes Normally, the left and right fields of vision are processed of Crime cards flipped through them, triumphantly passing me a card. It was an identification. Mike and mapped by opposite sides of the brain, but scans is still an enthusiastic RDIN researcher, making many discoveries on the German girl showed that retinal nerve fibres that should go to the right hemisphere of the brain diverted I retired from the Hertfordshire Bureau in 1991, upon reaching retirement age. I maintain my to the left. interest in fingerprints, publishing STRABISMUS (I am now working on the thirtieth annual` issue) and continue to research The Discipline via the numerous old fingerprint books I possess (some Further, the researchers found that within the visual published over a century ago), writing articles for FINGERPRINT WHORLD. I am pleased to cortex of the left hemisphere, which creates an internal report that my 40-page THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FINGERPRINTING in map of the right field of vision, ‘islands’ had been formed ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT. TECHNOLOGY, edited by Henry C Lee Gaensslen (ISB number within it to specifically deal with, and map out, the left 0-8493-0923-9) has been cited as ‘a definitive work on the subject’ and I note that I am frequently visual field in the absence of the right hemisphere. referenced in other fingerprint publications, which makes it, as the cliché states, “all worthwhile”. Dr Lars Muckli of the Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging in the Department of Psychology, who led the study, said: “This study has revealed the surprising flexibility of the brain when it comes to self-organising mechanisms for forming visual maps.

“The brain has amazing plasticity but we were quite astonished to see just how well the single hemisphere of the brain in this girl has adapted to compensate for the missing half.

"Despite lacking one hemisphere, the girl has normal psychological function and is perfectly capable of living a normal and fulfilling life. She is witty, charming and intelligent."

The girl’s underdeveloped brain was discovered when, aged three, she underwent an MRI scan after suffering seizures of brief involuntary twitching on her left side.

page 201 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 202 MISCELLANY Apart from the seizures, which were successfully treated and slight weakness on her left side (hemiparesis), the girl had a normal developmental and medical history, attending regular school and taking part in activities such as roller-skating. CROSSWHORLD PUZZLE NO. 006

In other cases, where patients have half of the brain removed (hemispherectomy), to treat severe epilepsy for example, one field of vision is lost in both eyes – i.e. they see only objects on the left or right side of their vision. In the case of the German girl, her left and right field vision is almost perfect in one eye.

Visual information is gathered by the retina at the back of the eye and images are inverted when they pass through the lens of the pupil so that images in your left field of vision are received on the right side of the retina, and images from the right are received on the left. The part of the retina closest to your nose is called the nasal retina, while the other half is called the temporal retina, as it is next to the temples of the head, and both halves have separate nerve fibres which transmit the information received.

Normally, the nerve fibres from the nasal retina cross over in a part of the brain called the optic chiasma and are processed by the hemisphere on the opposite side. The nerve fibres from the temporal retina remain in the same hemisphere, so this means that the left and right visual fields at processed by opposite sides of the brain.

However, in this case, the nasal retinal nerve had connected to the left brain hemisphere.

The scientists believe the right hemisphere of the girl’s brain stopped developing early in the womb and that when the developing optic nerves reached the optic chiasma, the chemical cues that would normally guide the left eye nasal retinal nerve to the right hemisphere were no longer present and so the nerve was drawn to the left.

This implies that there are no molecular repressors to prevent nasal retinal nerve fibres from entering the same hemisphere.

Dr Muckli added: “If we could understand the powerful algorithms the brain uses to rewire itself and extract those algorithms together with the general algorithms that the brain uses to process information, they could be applied to computers and could result in a huge advance in artificial intelligence.”

The study, which was begun by Dr Muckli at the Max Planck Institute for Brain Research in Germany and involved colleagues at the Institute of Medical Psychology at Goethe-University, Frankfurt-am-Main, is published in the ‘Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA’.

page 203 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 204 CROSSWHORLD PUZZLE NO. 005 Answer Key

ONE DAY MY ‘PRINTS MIGHT COME Martin Leadbetter

I wonder why we never get That vital elimination set? Perhaps, if there was greater understanding Far fewer marks would be outstanding. But even then, I’m not convinced We’d ever get elimination ‘prints.

page 205 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 206 COMING OF AGE MARK TO MARK Martin Leadbetter Martin Leadbetter

A heinous crime took place one night, The whole court heaved, aghast, surprised. Why is it with a mark to mark Why is it with a mark to mark The scene it was an awful sight: Fear and alarm showed in the Strattons’ eyes. The same two parts are never there? Not many hits are made? One has a delta on the left, The reasons clear are here to read Two bodies there the police did find, But then, a witness new was called, The other on the left is quite bereft: Each one will on the search impede: A bloody thumb mark left behind. By name a certain, Dr.Faulds. So nothing can be matched. But sometimes there’s a hit……..

The cash-box with the bloody ‘print The dour old Scot then had his say, Why is it with a mark to mark How is it with a mark to mark Would give the police their only hint, Stating this evidence should not the jury That one’s so good, the other bad? That sometimes there’s a hit? Of whom the murderers could have been, sway. On one the points are crystal clear, When both have points quite closely knit The other’s points have disappeared: There’s always prospects of a hit: And were witnessed running from the scene. He thought the mark was inconclusive Which makes a match so hard. But always luck is needed. And that Collins had been too obtrusive. Two brothers soon were in the frame, Why is it with a mark to mark Albert and Alfred were their names. The jury though did not agree, The digit’s rarely known? They both denied they were involved – Eleven points they could clearly see. If for sure it was a ring, Then that would be another thing: The Farrows’ murders remained unsolved. A guilty verdict they returned, And then it might be matched. The argument of Faulds was spurned. After the brothers were arrested, The fingerprint system would be tested. The men were guilty, that was clear, MERCHANDISE “It’s him!” cried Collins, “It’s his right thumb!” The court could almost smell their fear. The detectives stood there stunned, quite They knew they’d get the sentence dread, The Fingeprint Society has purchased an amount of specially produced dumb. Within three weeks they’d both be dead. merchandise that we sell at conferences and events.

The brothers then were duly charged The work of Collins in this case We hope to have an online facility available within a year, so that members can And Collins had the ‘print enlarged. Put fingerprints in its rightful place: make purchases online. He charted eleven clear characteristics, Although a hundred years have passed, Ready to challenge any likely probabalistics. The fingerprint’s still quite unsurpassed.

The trial took place in year ’05, The court-room drama electric and alive. How would this new, strange evidence Be challenged by the crooks’ defence?

The judge, the jury, court-room all Listened intent as Collins did recall: “The blood mark is a clear arch pattern And could only have been made by Alfred Stratton.”

page 207 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 208 REMEMBERING...

Peter John Horatio Nelson (9th October 1941-28 March 2009)

The 9th Earl Nelson, Peter John Horatio Nelson, the first and only Patron of the Fingerprint University College London Society died in March 2009, aged 67. 9/10/11 April 2010 ͞WĂƐƚ͕ WƌĞƐĞŶƚ͕ Θ &ƵƚƵƌĞ͟

He was born on 9th October 1941 to Captain Hon. John Marie Joseph Horatio Nelson and CONFERENCE REGISTRATION Kathleen Mary Burr, and was the oldest of 3 children. His sister Jane Priscilla Nelson was born Please complete and return to K. Bishop, 14-22 Baches St., London N1 6DL or in 1944, followed by Francis Edward Horatio Nelson in 1947. After Peter was born, his father [email protected] bought a poultry farm in Norfolk, and this was where Peter grew up. Attendee Information: Speaker? Yes No Fingerprint Society member (Please note: speakers are exempt from registration fees but Yes No The history behind the ancestry of Lord Nelson is extremely interesting. In 1805, George III named must arrange their own accommodation if needed. A list of local hotels is provided.) the Reverend William Nelson as the first Lord Nelson, following the death of his brother Horatio (Please complete as you wish for it to appear on your name badge) Nelson, at the Battle of Trafalgar. The first Lord Nelson was given £90,000 (approx £100 million Title: First Name: Surname: in today’s money) to buy an estate, and a pension of around £5,000 a year (around £3.7 million) which was to continue for as long as there were Lords Nelson. Through the years, the pension Job Title: Organisation: was subject to government attempts at a buy out. In 1946, the Treasury proposed a deal which would mean passing a Bill to end the pension, which was the only remaining one of its kind. This Address: Telephone: allowed the family to sell the estate, which had been bought with public money for Horatio E-mail: Nelson’s successors. By 1981, where Peter John Horatio Nelson succeeded to the earldom upon his Uncle’s death, there was nothing left of the family fortune. Registration Fees: (please note ʹ early bird registrationf fees apply to payment received before 15 Feb 2010) Member Member Non-member Non-member Student Peter joined the Metropolitan Police after a short period of time spent both at Agricultural College Early Bird Registration Early Bird On-site Registration Registration Registration Registration and as an RAF apprentice. After serving in the CID and flying squad, he joined Hertfordshire Full Residential £250 £275 £275 £300 Police, rising to the rank of Detective Sergeant. He became the 9th Earl Nelson in 1981, and Package* Full Non-residential £150 £175 £175 £200 retired from the force in 1983 to take his place on the Conservative benches in the House of Package** Lords. Following Labour reforms, Lord Nelson lost his seat in the House of Lords in 1999. He Day Delegate # £40 £45 £45 £50 (Friday, 9 April) then served as president of the Royal Naval Commando Association. Day Delegate # £60 £65 £65 £70 £40 (Saturday, 10 April) Day Delegate ## £40 £45 £45 £50 Lord Nelson married Maureen Quin in 1969, with whom he had 2 children, son Simon John (Sunday, 11 April) Gala Dinner Guest Horatio Nelson, a 37 year old policeman who will succeed to his father’s Earldom, and daughter £60 £75 £60 Saturday Evening £30 £35 £30 Lady Deborah Nelson. Following his divorce from Quin, Lord Nelson married Tracy Margaret Entertainment Cowie in 1992, with whom he had another son. Non-attending £120 £135 £135 £150 £100 ĞůĞŐĂƚĞΏ Ύ/ŶĐůƵĚĞƐ Ϯ ŶŝŐŚƚ͛Ɛ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ,ŽƚĞů ZƵƐƐĞůů͕ all meals, Coffee breaks, & Gala Dinner & Saturday entertainment/dinner. **Includes Lunches, coffee breaks, Gala Dinner, & Saturday entertainment. #Includes Lunch & Coffee breaks ##Includes Coffee breaks & afternoon tea ΏdžĐůƵĚĞƐ ƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͖ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ Ăůů ŵĞĂůƐ͕ 'ĂůĂ ŝŶŶĞƌ͕ Θ ^ĂƚƵƌĚĂLJ ĞǀĞŶŝŶŐ entertainment/dinner.

page 209 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 210 Attendance Information: LONDON HOTEL INFORMATION This is my first time attending the Fingerprint Society Conference. Yes No I plan to attend the Friday Gala dinner. Yes No Click here for a Google map of the local area including local hotels. I plan to attend the Saturday night social. Yes No Please indicate any special needs, dietary or otherwise. Hotels very close to University College London:

Royal National Hotel Ambassadors Bloomsbury Hotel 38-51 Bedford Way, London, WC1H 0DG 12 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0HX PAYMENT INFORMATION Call: +44 (0)20 7637 2488 Call: +44 (0)20 7693 5400 I enclose a cheque for the sum of £ made payable to the Fingerprint Society. www.imperialhotels.co.uk/royalnational1_hotel.as www.ambassadors.co.uk px I wish to pay by BACS. From £79 per night From £72 per night Please arrange payment to: The Royal Bank of Scotland Travelodge London Euston Liverpool Branches Tavistock Hotel 1-11 Grafton Place, London NW1 1DJ 1 Dale Street Tavistock Sq, London, WC1H 9EU Call: +44 (0)871 984 6332 Liverpool Call: +44 (0)20 7636 8383 www.travelodge.co.uk/search_and_book/hotel_o www.imperialhotels.co.uk/tavistock1_hotel.aspx verview.php?hotel_id=344 L2 2PP From £65 per night From £49 per night

Sort code: 16-2406 Account no: 10299165 County Hotel Premiere Inn London Euston Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0JW 1 Dukes Road, London WC1H 9PJ Call: +44 (0)20 7387 5544 Call: +44 (0)870 238 3301 www.imperialhotels.co.uk/county1_hotel.aspx www.premierinn.com/pti/hotelInformation.do?ho From £43 per night telId=23882&CMP=KNC-Google_brand_location GALA DINNER ʹ Additional attendee form From £90 per night Attendee Information: Hilton London Euston Name of Conference Registrant with whom you are attending 17-18 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0HT Radisson Edwardian Grafton Hotel Call: +44 (0)20 7943 4500 130 Tottenham Court Road, London, W1T 5AY www.hilton.co.uk/euston Call: +44 (0)20 7388 4131 (Please complete as you wish for it to appear on your name badge) From £109 per night www.radissonedwardian.com/londonuk_grafton From £125 per night Title: First Name: Surname:

Job Title: Organisation:

Address: Telephone:

E-mail:

page 211 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009 page 212 FINGERPRINT WHORLD - ISSN 0951-1288

MEMBERSHIP SUBSCRIPTIONS Application forms for membership and renewal of dues should be forwarded to the Membership Secretary. You can download an application form from our website at www.fpsociety.org.uk Changes of address or circumstances should be forwarded to The Membership Secretary, Fingerprint Department, 1 Pacific Quay, GLASGOW, G51 1DZ. United Kingdom.

SUBSCRIBERS Application forms for subscription and renewal of dues should be forwarded to the Subscription Secretary. You can download an application form from our website at www.fpsociety.org.uk Changes of address or circumstances should be forwarded to the Subscription Secretary, Lancashire Fingerprint Bureau, PO Box 77, Hutton, Preston, PR4 5SB.

ORDERS AND BACK ISSUES Request for back issues or copies of articles should be made to The Archivist. There may be a charge made for providing such material to cover postage and packing costs. There will also be a charge as per issue/volume prices for those not in membership of The Fingerprint Society.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE Except as otherwise permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Acts, 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the Publishers or in any case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency in the UK.

page 213 FINGERPRINT WHORLD Vol 35 No 137 October 2009