Third World Centre for Water Management
Environmental Sustainability of Water Projects
Cecilia Tortajada Doctoral Thesis
Division of Hydraulic Engineering Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Royal Institute of Technology
Stockholm 2001
Contents
Preface
I. Introduction 1
II. Environmental Sustainability of Water Projects 6
III. Southeastern Anatolia Project: Impacts of the 28 Ataturk dam
IV. Resettlement: An Essential Component of Water 79 Development Projects
V. Institutions for Integrated River Basin Management 120 in Latin America
VI. Conclusions 151
Annex I. Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment, 1972
Annex II. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992
Preface
This doctoral thesis represents an extension of the research work that was carried out for the licentiate thesis earlier on the issue of “Approaches to Environmental Sustainability for Water Resources Management: A Case Study of Mexico”. It is thus desirable that this doctoral thesis is read in conjunction with the licentiate thesis to ensure continuity and a better perspective on the overall analysis of the environmental sustainability of water projects.
The licentiate thesis focused on the approaches to environmental sustainability of water management in terms of a case study for Mexico. It was the first ever comprehensive analysis of the environmental policies of the water sector in Mexico, as well as an in-depth analysis of all the environmental impact assessment reports that have been conducted in the country. It is important to note that no other analysis of the environmental assessments studies of any other sector of the country is available at present. This thesis already has generated considerable interest for conducting similar comprehensive in-depth analyses for the water sector of other Latin American countries.
The doctoral thesis reviews the evolution of the concepts that are currently being used for water management. Concepts like sustainable development and environmental sustainability are analysed, as well as their status of implementation, and the reasons for their success or failures. Several case studies are presented on different important aspects of environmental sustainability. These include the role of institutions, effectiveness of legal frameworks, participation of stakeholders, contributions of water development projects to regional development, consideration of environmental and social issues, and impacts of social and environmental movements.
I am indeed most grateful to Prof. Klas Cederwall, Chairman, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology, for his unstinted support during my entire research, on which the present report is based. Without his continued support and encouragement, it simply would not have been possible to carry out this research. I would also like to express my indebtedness to Prof. Asit K. Biswas, President, Third World Centre for Water Management, Mexico, for his support, advice and encouragement to complete this research. Many friends and colleagues from different countries of the world have assisted me in numerous ways during the course of this research. I am most grateful for all their help.
Cecilia Tortajada I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the 21st century, it is being increasingly realised that water could be the dominant resource issue at least for the first part of the present century. Water is essential for human survival, not only in terms of drinking and hygiene, but also to ensure agricultural and industrial development, electricity generation, navigation and ecosystem protection. Since amount of freshwater that can be used at any time is constrained by economic, technological and environmental reasons, it is essential that existing water resources be managed efficiently and equitably in terms of both quantity and quality, at local, regional and national levels. As population and human activities continue to increase, water management is becoming more and more complex. Incremental advances in management practices and business as usual are no longer viable options for the future. Thus, sustainability of water development has become a critical issue for the future. While there is now broad agreement globally among water professionals that sustainability of water resources is an essential requirement, our current knowledge-base on how to achieve this ambitious goal of sustainability leave much to be desired.
In the area of water resources, the dominant trend of the decades of the 1970s and 1980s was on the construction of infrastructures. During the early 1990s, the focus shifted to the management of water resources, but it was still largely based on sectoral lines. By the end of the 1990s, integrated water resources management became an important trend, with a broader multisectoral approach, and consideration of social and environmental issues. Stakeholder participation is now considered to be an important component of water resources planning and management. It is being recognised that many of the activities related to integrated water resources management like demand management, efficient and equitable allocation of water among uses and between users, environmental and social impacts, stakeholders participation, etc., have little in common with a paradigm which focused mainly on the construction of hydraulic infrastructures. It is further being recognised that in order to achieve integrated water resources management, appropriate functional institutions would have to be developed, with adequate managerial and technical expertise, and financial resources.
Concepts like sustainable development and integrated river basin management have proved to be appealing, and have received widespread global acceptance from national and international institutions in recent years. However, while concepts like integrated water resources management or sustainable development have become popular, and are extensively mentioned in national and regional policies and international discussions, their effective incorporation and implementation in national policies, programmes and projects, have proved to be extremely difficult, irrespective of the country concerned. These concepts have attracted special attention following the International Conference on Water and Environment in Dublin, and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, both held in 1992.
1 There are many reasons for these shortcomings, among which are inadequate institutional and legal frameworks for integrating environment- and development-related issues, highly centralised decision-making, absence of political and administrative will to change the status quo, lack of adequate number of qualified and trained managerial and technical personnel, non-availability of financial resources on a timely basis, etc. In addition, processes like decentralisation and privatisation have yet to produce results that are expected from them in most countries: more efficient water distribution and treatment services, encouragements of local initiatives, active participation of water users, generation of new investments funds, and regular involvement of diversified actors.
The environmental sustainability of water projects is a very complex issue, and no effective ways have yet been found to operationalise it. The best that can be achieved at present is to identify certain issues which could contribute to unsustainability, and then try to ensure that these factors are taken care of. It is also agreed that economic, social and environmental benefits of any project should far outweigh the costs on both short- and long-term basis. The nature of the beneficiaries, that is who benefits and who pays the costs, has become an important consideration to decide on the implementation of the water projects. Issues like efficient management, institutional strengthening, education, training, communication and information are now receiving as much importance as the construction of the projects themselves. All these can be considered to be positive development. However, how all these complex tasks can be successfully achieved, and even if they are achieved, if they will contribute to sustainability, are still open questions, for which still no definitive answers exist.
Among many issues, there are some important aspects which should be considered simultaneously within the context of environmental sustainability of water projects.
a) Short-term versus long-term considerations, where the time-frame for sustainability should be defined, and where there should be considerable flexibility in terms of the type of projects considered. b) Externalities, which should be internalised, at least conceptually, through taxes, subsidies and regulations. So far, it has not been easy to internalise the externalities in developing countries for four important reasons: methodologically, calculations of the precise value of externalities have proved to be a difficult task; externalities may or may not receive support due to political reasons; externalities could develop steadily over time, and thus there could be a time gap before those affected realise the real costs they may have to pay, directly or indirectly; and regulations to control such externalities in nearly all developing countries have proved to be somewhat ineffective and expensive. c) Risks and uncertainties associated with managing systems to ensure they are sustainable indefinitely. It is necessary to identify which parameters define the inherent sustainability of water systems so that
2 they are monitored regularly, and also at what collective levels of these parameters, transition of any water system takes place from sustainability to unsustainability, and vice versa. This knowledge still is not available. One is often confronted with the difficult issue of even identifying the direction of any overall change in terms of sustainability, let alone the magnitude of that change (Biswas, 1996).
Thus, if environmental sustainability of water projects is to become a reality, national and international organisations will have to address many complex issues with the objective to propose feasible alternatives. Political correctness, routine policies, lack of appreciation of the realities of policymaking, and the limitations imposed by techniques and practices available, will have to be overcome. If the current development paradigms cannot be translated effectively into operational reality, environmental sustainability will remain a dream, which may gradually fade away giving way to a new paradigm, or plurality of paradigms, which can subsequently be operationalised.
FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS
For the doctoral thesis, following a discussion on the sustainability of water projects, several case studies have been presented on different important aspects of environmental sustainability. These include the role of institutions, effectiveness of legal frameworks, participation of stakeholders, contributions of water development projects to regional development, consideration of environmental and social issues, and impacts of social and environmental movements.
Following is the framework for the thesis, and the case studies that have been carried out.
I. The introductory chapter presents the evolution of the concept of sustainable development, as well as an in-depth discussion on the environmental sustainability of water projects. The concepts are analysed from the theoretical and the implementation viewpoints.
II. The impacts of the Ataturk dam, within the Southeastern Anatolia (GAP) Project, Turkey, is analysed in the second chapter in terms of planning, policy making, institutional arrangements, infrastructural development, and human resources development. Its economic, social and environmental impacts during the construction phase and the first seven years of operation are reviewed. The assessment carried out is based on extensive field work and intensive discussions, both in Ankara and the project area, with the staff members from the GAP Administration and other different planning and implementing institutions, especially the State Hydraulic Works, State Planning Organisation, General Directorate of Rural Affairs, Middle East Technical University, etc. Interviews were also carried out with senior members of national and international institutions from within and outside the region, numerous representatives of the affected population at different locations, concerned private sector institutions and NGOs. The members of the local population were selected at
3 random. After initial set of discussions, it was decided to focus on issues like new economic activities and employment generation during the construction of the Dam, the reservoir and the associated hydraulic structures; farms using pumped irrigation directly from the reservoir, and how their agricultural yields, and thus incomes, may have changed; impacts on health and education; and overall changes in the quality of life of the population living in the project area. Review of the resettlement process due to inundation caused by the reservoir are also analysed in- depth.
III. Resettlement is now considered to be one of the most important factors for the environmental sustainability of large water development projects. Accordingly, it was selected to be an important component of the thesis. This issue is analysed in the third chapter. The roles of large dams in poverty alleviation and socio-economic development of the regions are analysed, in terms of resettlement. The current global thinking on involuntary resettlement is reviewed, as are the global experiences on resettlement of the people affected by the projects due to the construction of large dams.
An important part of this chapter is an objective assessment of the participatory process that was formulated for the resettlement of the people who were affected by the construction of the Birecik dam, GAP Project, Turkey, and the results thereof. This analysis is based on extensive discussions that were carried out with the GAP Administration staff associated with the Birecik dam resettlement study, both in Ankara and in Sanliurfa. Numerous meetings were also organised with the representatives of the regional offices of the General Directorates of Agrarian Reform and Rural Affairs, and the regional branch of the Public Works, Governor of Sanliurfa, District Governor of Halfeti, and Mayors of Halfeti and Sanliurfa. In addition, several newly resettled villages were visited, where extensive discussions took place with the people who were resettled. This assessment was carried out less than six months after the people had moved to the new settlement areas. Thus, it was still very early to make a definitive statement on whether the resettlement and rehabilitation processes had been successful or not, especially on a long-term basis. Resettlement processes cannot be judged within a few months after people have been relocated, since the people are just beginning to adjust to their new lives. Accordingly, only the process through which the people were encouraged to participate, the outcomes of their participation, and the transfer of the affected population from their own land to the new resettlement zones were assessed. The advantages and disadvantages of this participatory process are analysed from the perspective of the people who have been resettled.
IV. Institutional arrangements for integrated river basin management in Latin America is analysed in the fourth chapter. It focuses on the institutional framework for sustainable water resources development planning at the river basin level in Latin America. Even though the river basin concept in the region was started mainly to deal with a single resource, water, the current approach is expected to integrate economic, social and environmental issues simultaneously within the river basin context. To what extent such an integrated management is realistically possible when the management unit is primarily chosen on the basis of water, is basically unknown at present. This is an especially pertinent issue, since at
4 the national or the regional levels, countries which have institutions that manage jointly or separately, water, environment, economic and social affairs, still have to learn how to coordinate with each other. However, in the final analysis, efficient administration of the river basins is likely to depend significantly upon the extent to which decision-making power and financial autonomy are delegated to them. It is based on an in-depth analysis of the Brazilian and the Mexican experiences of water management at the river basin level. Brazil and Mexico were chosen for this case study since they are by far the most advanced in this area, compared to all the other Latin American countries.
V. The final chapter presents the conclusions of the various issues discussed in the thesis, within the overall context of the environmental sustainability of water projects.
5 II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Even though the concept of sustainability has been used extensively since the mid-1980s, the idea is not new. For example, the term “sustainability” has been widely used in fisheries and forestry for nearly a century for defining long-term management techniques for harvesting reproducible natural resources. Thus, terminologies like maximum sustainable yield have been common for many decades in the fields of fisheries and forestry.
Even in the area of water resources development, the idea of building hydraulic structures that could last over tens of generations is not new. For example, it has been a fairly standard to design large dams with life periods of hundreds of years. While the term “sustainable” was not specifically used for such structures, the idea was the same. These major structures should survive over long period of years, spanning several generations. For example, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt was very specifically designed to have a life span of 500 years.
Contrary to the popular view, the concept of sustainable development did not start with the publication of the report of the World Commission on the Environment and Development in 1987. In fact, by the mid-1980s, well before this report was published, the concept of sustainable development had already become popular, initially through the work of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and later by the activities of the World Bank.
The earliest reference to the concept of sustainable development, as well as the use of this terminology, goes back to at least over half a century. It is possible that other authors may have used this terminology before 1948, even though no such reference was found during the course of research for the present thesis.
In 1948, Fairfield Osborne, the founder and the then President of the Conservation Foundation, wrote in his book Our plundered planet that:
“We are rushing forward unthinkingly through days of incredible accomplishment… …and we have forgotten the earth, forgotten it in the sense that we are failing to regard it as the source of our life.”
Osborne was concerned with the “accumulated velocity with which (man) is destroying his own life sources.” He insisted that the only kind of development that makes sense is “development that can be sustained.”
Intellectually, however, the concept of sustainable development was promoted by UNEP, which was established in Nairobi, Kenya, as a direct result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1972. A small group of environmental scientists, meeting in Nairobi in 1975, under the aegis of UNEP,
6 extended the concept of sustainability from fisheries and forestry to the development process itself.
Shortly after this meeting, in 1976, Mostafa Kamal Tolba, the then Executive Director of UNEP, in an address in London pointed out (Tolba, 1982):
“A new kind of development is needed because it is essential to relate development to the limitations and opportunities created by the natural resource base to all human activities. It is also required because it is now clear that past patterns of development in both developed and developing countries have been characterized by such serious environmental damage that they are simply not sustainable.”
Tolba (1982) then went on to argue:
“The most pressing objective of environmental management is to meet basic human needs within the potentials and constraints of environmental systems, including natural resources. Environmental management brings two new dimensions to the development process: it broadens the concept to include environmental quality, and it expands it in time to include development over the long-term on a sustainable basis.”
Tolba’s eloquent arguments for a new form of development process which is sustainable over the long-term, touched a chord in the environment movement. In 1981, A.W. Clausen, the then President of the World Bank, gave a major statement on “Sustainable Development: the Global Imperative” (Clausen, 1981). A year later, during the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, in Nairobi, 10-18 May 1982, the world community of states unanimously recommended “sustainable socio- economic development.” The Nairobi Declaration, that resulted from the commemorative meeting, concluded by urging (Tolba, 1988):
“… … all Governments and peoples of the world to discharge their historical responsibility, collectively and individually, to ensure that our small planet is passed over to future generations in a condition which guarantees a life in human dignity for all”.
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, or the so- called Brundtland Commission), in its report entitled Our common future, recommend the concept of sustainable development, which it loosely defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs.”
Even though the WCED report made continual references to sustainable development, it was totally silent on how the concept could be operationalised. Sustainable development was expected to be achieved in an unspecified and undetermined way, some time in the future. Nor did the definition include the realization of an equitably distributed level of economic
7 well-being, without which no development can be sustainable over the long term. The issue of equity is especially important for developing countries (Biswas, 1997).
The United Nations General Assembly considered both the WCED report and a report UNEP had prepared on Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond. In the General Assembly Resolution 42/186 of 1987, it noted that “different views exist on some aspects” between the WCED and UNEP reports. It, however, welcomed:
“… as the overall aspirational goal for the world community the achievement of sustainable development on the basis of prudent management of available global resources and environmental capacities and the rehabilitation of the environment previously subjected to degradation and misuse…”
Following the work of UNEP and the WCED, and the passing of the above- mentioned United Nations General Assembly Resolution, sustainable development became “the” paradigm for development. The various United Nations Agencies, all the Development Banks and the bilateral aid agencies, and nearly all the governments, embraced the paradigm of sustainable development, even though it was never properly defined, except in a broad and general way, and no serious discussion ever took place as to how the concept could be operationalised in the real world, so that a development process could be planned and managed from the very beginning in order that it becomes inherently sustainable.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
In response to the perceived threat of impending ecological crisis during the post-1970 period, a dominant environmental discourse constructed itself. Certain words were favoured for their ability to evoke images of consensus, unity and common purpose, like sustainability, diversity, democracy, community, globalisation, and environment. An important consideration within this overall general environmental discourse has been the concept and mechanisms to address sustainable development. So far, however, there is still no agreement even on the meaning or definition of sustainable development. Thus, it is not surprising that little consensus exists with regard to formulating and operationalising sustainable development policies, except in broad and general terms (Meppem, 2000; Meppem and Bourke, 1999; Dragun and Jacobsson, 1997; Goodland, 1997; Biswas, 1996).
In translating the principle of sustainable development into specific targets and actions, and identifying the indicators for sustainable development, the philosophical consensus shatters into a cacophony of definitional debates, interpretations, recriminations, and slogans. It is now generally accepted that what sustainable development seeks to sustain is the integrity of combined human and natural systems as they interact and condition one another over time (Raskin et al., 1998).
8 The ongoing debate about sustainable development and its various meanings is very much an ideological debate (Soderbaum, 2000). The diversity of discourses on sustainable development do not necessarily reflect conflicts over content, but also on interests and in opinions on the processes through which the different sectors of the societies want to assure that their own needs and interests are represented in the development decision-making. Thus, sustainable development may not refer to a quantifiable goal which can be achieved at any specific moment in time: it refers instead to the possibility of establishing a balance between environmental, social and economic interactions. This process, at least in theory, is expected to improve the quality of life of the human beings, and simultaneously maintain the integrity of the environment. The concept of sustainable development at the first instance may appear somewhat simple, but in reality it is very complex, since it is expected to result from a series of decisions taken by several generations of human beings in different parts of the world, at different levels of governments, with changing socio-economic conditions, differing cultural values, uncertainties, and socio-economic goals which are seldom shared by all the members of the different societies, since people tend to work at the individual level (Dourojeanni, 1999). In addition, the nation states have their own interests, which may vary with time.
It should be clarified that the ideological debate about ways of integrating environmental considerations into policy-making also did not start with the publication of the UNEP and the Brundtland Commission reports. During the 1970s and 1980s, attempts were made to articulate alternatives to an almost exclusive reliance on conventional indicators such as economic growth in terms of GNP, balance of payments, employment, index of inflation, etc. Among other catchwords, “qualitative growth” was one of the first to signal a new direction of societal interest. It was argued that growth exclusively in terms of GNP for some activities is incompatible with environmental goals, while growth in other activities (with related goods and services) is basically beneficial (Soderbaum, 1998).
Sustainable development is a complex process. Thus, there would always be a gap between the current understanding and the one necessary to address evolving economic, social and environmental planning and management issues comprehensively, as well as the institutional, legal and even participatory considerations. Working with the concept of sustainable development means embracing ambiguity, since it deals with societal values, which are diverse, and may often vary with time. If the conflicts in interpretations of sustainable development reflect the diversity of the concerns and interests of the populations in time and space, it is fundamental then to learn how to accommodate the politics of these divergent claims for attention. Additionally, if the relations between citizens, the private and the public sectors, are increasingly interdependent, necessary processes and polices should be developed in order to approach the various interests from an integral viewpoint (Meppem, 2000; Meppem and Gill, 1998).
Economic, social and environmental dimensions should be considered concurrently within the goals of development. Social considerations are essential because poverty is both a cause and an effect of environmental degradation, and societies festering with poverty and social
9 tensions will not have the means, or inclination, to make environment a priority issue. There are no blueprints for a transition to sustainable society, but there are policy reforms that could reduce environmental degradation, income disparity and persistent poverty. It is expected that development will continue to affect the environment and natural resources on which it depends, by using the natural resources faster than nature can produce them, and by releasing pollutants faster than they could be safely assimilated. Thus, if the environmental criteria are to be met, policies will be needed to introduce alternatives for the use of natural resources through management procedures and more efficient technologies (Raskin et al., 1998).
Sustainable development may be considered to be more of a desirability with regard to future human development, in which case it may represent a constraint to the present development. Sustainable development may assure certain life opportunities in the future, but at the cost of the modification or sacrifice of life opportunities in the present. The environmental sustainability of the people refers to the ability of the environment to sustain different forms of life. The environmental sustainability of economic activities refers to the continuing ability of the environment to provide the necessary inputs to the economy to enable it to maintain economic welfare. Both these sustainabilities in turn depend on the maintenance of the environment, but are determined also by culture, society, and management practices. This is the reason why environmental problems cannot be solved by technical means alone, but require interrelated changes in human ethics, perceptions and culture, as well as certain institutional arrangements (Ekins, 1997).
The reason why human ideologies and ethics have to be understood in the race to either try to reduce environmental degradation, or to improve its status, is precisely because it is the humans, with their activities and attitudes, who affect the environment. Since the societal values are expressed in terms of aggregated human preferences and activities, it is fundamental to first understand societal ideologies, and then focus on the environment. This importance given to the societal values could probably be the reason as to why social sciences, other than economics, are gaining ground in the dialogue concerning the environmental issues (Soderbaum, 2000).
The integration of the environmental concerns in development planning would require action by developing countries at the national level. Some of the major policy areas will include location (or relocation) of industries, land use policies, community development, etc. Proper planning of infrastructures is important so that individual development projects are integrated within an overall framework for regional development planning and management. The social benefits and costs of projects, including their favourable and unfavourable impacts on the environment and the populations, should be fully reflected in these policies. Too often the negative impacts of many projects have been ignored in the initial planning stage, and so the awareness of the society of many of the environmental disruptions resulting from these projects has come at a very late a stage, when the construction has already been completed, and the adverse impacts have already surfaced. Cost-effective alternatives
10 available at such late stages to take ameliorative measures are likely to be limited. Accordingly, it is important to analyse comprehensively both the favourable and the unfavourable social and environmental impacts before implementing development projects, so that the society is able to compare them against the economic and social benefits expected from the project. Feasible alternatives can then be considered (UNEP, 1981).
To design appropriate policies for sustainable development, the goals must be expressed in terms of specific indicators. However, these choices are to a certain degree subjective by nature, and are dependent to a great extent on the cultural preferences and interests of an individual, a community, or a country. This implies that different societies, with differing social, economic and cultural conditions, may choose different sustainability criteria and may even select different paths to sustainability (Raskin, 1998). Thus, one of the greatest difficulties to achieve sustainable development lies in the lack of indicators for measuring it, since none of the three objectives of sustainable development (economic, environmental and social objectives) is currently measured using compatible parameters. The indicators used to quantify the economic, social and environmental objectives do not have a common denominator, nor do universal conversion formulae exist: economic growth is measured using economic indicators, social equity is determined on the basis of social parameters, and environmental sustainability is measured in physical and biological terms. Given the absence of suitable indicators, and the fact that each of these objectives is measured according to different criteria, it does not seem that it would be possible to interlink the three objectives in a single plane. Quantification of economic, social and environmental objectives may not be possible, unless compatible quantifiable parameters are available for all the three sectors (Dourojeanni, 1997).
Sustainable development would not be achieved if emphasis is placed on either of the economic, social or environmental objectives at the expense of the others. Thus, the stakeholders must contribute simultaneously to economic growth, social equity and environmental protection, most likely through tradeoffs, negotiations and by modifying every day practices. The agreements between the various stakeholders are likely to be more productive, equitable and workable, if there is an understanding of the actual value of the specific resources and products for each one of them (Dourojeanni, 1997). However, values are often subjective, and hence intercomparison of subjective values is a most difficult task under the best of circumstances.
Another major issue confronting sustainable development is the risks and uncertainties that are inherently associated with complex systems. For example, it is now universally accepted that food production must be maximised to feed an expanding population base in developing countries. Accordingly, resources such as land and water must be used intensively to maximise food production. Accordingly, a fundamental question, for which there is no clear-cut answer at present, is up to what level can the food production system be intensified, in terms of land and water, without sacrificing sustainability? There are other difficult questions as well. For example, in the area of water, what early warnings could indicate the beginning of a transition process from sustainability to unsustainability? What
11 parameters should be monitored to indicate that such a transition is about to occur, or indeed is occurring? Existing knowledge bases and databases are inadequate even to identify all the relevant parameters that could indicate passage from one stage to another. Thus, concurrently it is not possible to accurately detect, much less predict, the transition of a sustainable system to an unsustainable one and vice versa (Biswas, 1996).
In order to formulate and implement sustainable water development policies, the developing countries require a lot more knowledge, expertise, data and information than they currently possess. Thus, one of the first priorities should be to broaden their knowledge and information bases in the technical, economic, social and environmental fields. Research, training and capacity building, both for individuals and institutions, should be developed, keeping in mind the type of environmental problems that are likely to face during the process of water development over the course of the next several decades. Developing nations should base their development agendas on their own administrative, technical, scientific and economic capacities. For water development to be more effective, those being educated must approach their disciplines from a broader perspective, and develop knowledge that will be useful to decision-makers outside the academic and research fields (Serageldin, et al., 1998).
It is important to remember that technology may have a major impact on the global development process, but may not necessarily solve demographic, social and environmental problems. The impacts of technology often depend upon its social context, in terms of how, when and whether it is used. Technological innovations may have important economic effects, lowering costs through improved efficiency, making alternatives possible which were not feasible before, and accelerating economic growth. However, the development of new technology is often less important than its appropriate use. Whether technology will solve all, or most water-related problems, remains to be seen, since social factors have the definitive say in its implementation, and it may take decades for new technology to be adopted, and for societies to benefit from it (Hammond, 1998).
The rapid growth of public environmental awareness in recent years has placed new pressures on both the public and private sectors of the world, mainly through the NGO movement and its ability to expose erroneous actions, real or perceived. At present, organized groups of citizens, environmental organizations and voluntary institutions of all kinds seem to be emerging as an important social force, with an increasingly growing influence in setting social and political agendas. Environmental groups have long had a powerful influence in the USA, Western Europe, and Japan, by lobbying for new laws, filing court actions, providing information to the media, and changing the mind-sets and perceptions of the society (Hammond, 1998). This phenomenon also exists in some developing countries, like India, where NGOs have been successful in embarrassing governments and large firms that have paid little regards to social and environmental conditions.
12 Public and private sectors are increasingly recognizing the need to improve their environmental and social performances. While improvements can be noted in some specific areas, overall on a global basis, there has not been major changes so far that could modify the present trend of continuing environmental degradation. Private sector companies are expected to take new responsibilities towards protecting the environment and provide better water services demanded by the consumers, with minimum social and environmental impacts. The reality, however, is that private sector companies in the developed and developing world seem to have improved their environmental and social performance mainly due to rigorous norms, legal enforcements, and pressure from the NGO and the international community (Welford, 2000).
The progress in terms of environmental and social performance is not similar for all countries of the world. It may vary from country to country, and region to region, and over time. In the case of Latin America, for example, while the countries of the region were parties to the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan of 1972, they still did not have the administrative or managerial capacities, and in many cases even the political will, to ensure rational management of natural resources, including water. In most of the countries, the greatest progress has been in terms of regulations, even though the implementations of these regulations have left much to be desired. Institutional and organizational restructuring has lagged far behind what is needed to improve the governmental performances. It is claimed that the main constraint to sustainable development has been primarily economic. While lack of funding has certainly been a constraint, even bigger constraints are absence of managerial and technical capacities, almost exclusive top-down centralised approach, absence of stakeholder participation, and lack of any long-term vision in any field, including water. Not surprisingly progress in improving water resources management practices has been somewhat limited since the convening of the Stockholm Conference some three decades ago (ECLAC, 1998).
It is important to note that the main reasons for the modifications of water laws in several Latin American countries have not been necessarily to promote the achievement of integrated water resources management, either nationally or at the river basin level, but to respond to changing trends both at the national and international levels. It appears that to a significant extent, the efforts to amend the legal and institutional frameworks have resulted from the desire to encourage the participation of the private sector in supplying water- related services, and enable users to administer water themselves (Marañón-Pimentel and Wester, 2000; Dourojeanni, 2000). The dominant present thinking is that extensive participation of the private sector and water users will significantly improve the performances of the existing water institutions, which have been mostly dismal in recent years. In terms of water resources, some of the priorities of the region at present focus on the expansion of coverage of potable water and environmental health services; improvement of the efficiency of irrigation systems; inclusion of the community in action and decision- making on water resources management; attempt to manage water with river basins as the units of management, and water quality monitoring and management (ECLAC, 1996).
13 The point of departure for the development process varies considerably from one country to another at the global level, for technical, economic, historical, cultural and other reasons. Each country needs to formulate its own water development strategies based on its specific conditions requirements and expectations. However, irrespective of how sustainable water development is conceptualised, achieving it in practice will requires fundamental changes in institutional structures, and management practices, as well as modifications in the human behaviour, consumption patterns and overall focus for development (UNEP, 1981).
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER PROJECTS
The interest in environmental management at the global level has resulted in both developed and developing countries establishment of legal and institutional frameworks, as well as economic, social and environmental policies and instruments, which, at least in terms of expectations, promote simultaneously economic development, social welfare and environmental protection. It was during the Stockholm Conference that issues like complementarities between development and environment, rational natural resources management, and the setting of machineries for monitoring environmental developments from the social and cultural viewpoints, were first discussed at the global level. Following the Stockholm Conference, many developing countries established their own legal and institutional frameworks at the national level, where environmental aspects were taken into consideration. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), as a tool for policy and decision- making, was promoted in several countries, both developed and developing.
In 1969, the United States became the first country in the world in formalising environmental management laws, by enacting the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA). This Act had the objective of encouraging the federal agencies to improve their internal environmental planning and decision-making processes. NEPA initiated the EIA process for the first time in history. It also enabled the people to have a voice in the planning and implementation of various development projects (Modak and Biswas, 1999). During the 1970s and the 1980s, the concept of EIA gradually broadened from project to programme level, including consideration of social impact assessment, environmental health assessment, risk assessment, etc. Later, in 1992, in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, EIA was recognised as an instrument for environmental management (Principle 17, UN, 1992).
During the past three decades, EIA has gradually been considered to be a policy and management instrument for planning and decision-making of development projects. The EIA process is expected to identify, predict and evaluate the potential impacts, both favourable and unfavourable, of development projects, from an interdisciplinary perspective. While very significant progress has been made in conducting EIA at the project level, commensurate progress has not been made for programme and policy levels, except in general terms. These analyses should be made available to the public with the objective of getting their inputs, both for the benefit of the project and the affected population. Finally,
14 the overall results are presented to the managers as a tool for decision-making, with the assurance that the EIA includes the best alternatives available for the project and the society, in terms of if, when, and how the project should be implemented (Tortajada, 2000; Modak and Biswas, 1999).
Surprisingly, however, it has not always been the developed countries who have first adopted environmental instruments like EIA practices. For example, the Philippines introduced EIA in 1977, while Germany introduced it about a decade later (Werner, 1992). Regarding international organisations, the World Bank considered EIA in the early 1970s on an ad hoc basis. It became mandatory for all their projects only in 1984. At present, it is a requisite for all the borrowing countries when the projects are sponsored by the organisation (Goodland and Edmundson, 1994). The evolution of EIA is presented in Table 1. All development projects, including those on water, followed this basic pattern of development.
Table 1. The evolution of environmental assessment
Date and phase Trends and innovations Prior to 1970, Project review based on engineering and economic study, e.g., Pre-EIA benefit-cost analysis; limited consideration of environmental impacts
1970-1975 EIA introduced in some developed countries, initially focused on Methodological development identifying, predicting and mitigating biophysical effects; opportunity for public involvement in major reviews 1975-1980 Multidimensional EIA, incorporating SIA and risk analysis; public Social dimension included consultation as integral part of development planning and assessments; increased emphasis on issues of justification and alternatives in project review 1980-1985 Efforts to integrate project EIA with policy planning and follow-up Process and procedural phases; research and development focusing on effects of monitoring, redirection on EIA audit and process evaluation, and on mediation and dispute resolution approaches; adoption of EIA by international aid and lending agencies and by some developing countries 1985-1990 Scientific and institutional framework for EIA begin to be rethought Sustainability paradigm in response to sustainability ideas and imperatives; search begins for ways to address regional and global environmental changes and cumulative impacts; growing international cooperation on EIA research and training 1990-1999 Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of policies, programmes, and plans introduced in some developed countries; international convention on transboundary EIA; UNCED places new demands on EIA for expanded concepts, methods, and procedures to promote sustainability (e.g. through sustainable development strategies) Source: Sadler, 1994 in Modak and Biswas, 1999.
15 EIA, when properly conducted, provides a whole range of alternatives for the development processes, since it can be used to review policies, programmes and project proposals. It also has the potential to integrate these proposals with other instruments available for environmental planning, such as land use planning, economic instruments, environmental regulations, environmental auditing, etc. One of the important aspects of EIA is that, at least in theory, economic, social and environmental considerations are given the same weight, within the same timeframe for decision-making purposes (Tortajada, 1999a,b). It has been claimed that EIA is “one approach to integrating environmental issues into economic decision-making and, as such, may prove to be a valuable tool for planning sustainable development.” (MacDonald, 1994), or that it “is usually applied in support of policies for the sustainable and equitable use of natural resources and the prevention of environmental degradation” (Wramner, 1992). Furthermore, assessment of the contributions of a project to sustainability would require an analysis of the role of the project within an economic, environmental and social context (Sadler, 1994).
Regarding water development projects, sustainability may depend on how economic, social and environmental issues are approached during the planning, construction and operation of the projects. In order to assure that the environment and the well-being of the populations are protected, or even enhanced, because of present and future projects, EIA studies have to be prepared for all development projects. However, it has not been easy to define how and when water projects could be considered to be sustainable or unsustainable because of many reasons, among which are the difficulty to define sustainability in operational and quantitative terms.
One hypothesis is that the projects can be identified as sustainable, or unsustainable, by identifying and estimating all their environmental and social costs, through a comprehensive assessment process. However, at present no technique is available which can reliably identify and price all the environmental and the social costs. According to Mikesell (1994), for a project to be sustainable, the following conditions should be fulfilled: depleted renewable natural resources must be restored; compensation to future generations for depleted non- renewable natural resource capital must be included in the social cost of the project; damage to life-supporting natural resources and environmental assets must be avoided, or the cost of avoidance, included in the social cost of the project. The compensation included in the social cost of the project may take the form of either contribution to the quantity and/or quality of natural resource assets equivalent to what has been depleted or damaged by the project, or the accumulation of a fund sufficient to offset the loss of income to future generations resulting from the depletion of natural resource capital associated with the project. Mikesell (1994), however, agrees that there are limits to the levels of compensation: it may not be possible to find a substitute for environmental assets damaged beyond a certain absorptive capacity of the environment, and it would not be possible at all to replace the real loss from depletion of natural resources in economic terms. It can thus be concluded that as attractive as the economic instruments can be, neither practical techniques to identify and estimate all the environmental and the social costs within the framework of EIA of a project are now available, nor have methodologies and implementation strategies for economic instruments
16 have proved to be successful in practice. Thus, at least methodologically, there are severe limitations to the degree to which compensation in the form of financial capital can substitute the loss of certain kinds of natural capital.
One important issue that requires special attention is if environmental sustainability should be approached and targeted differently in developed and developing countries. EIA studies should be properly conducted, irrespective of whether they are to be used in developed or developing countries. Otherwise, their usefulness for efficient environmental management of any project is likely to be limited.
It is true that there are differences between developed and developing countries in terms of available capacities and resources for environmentally-sound management of water project. This means that developing countries should not automatically accept and use the solutions that may have been formulated specifically for use in developed countries. These solutions should be carefully reviewed, and then, if necessary, adopted to suit the conditions prevalent in developing countries. This, however, does not mean that the quality of environmental assessments that need to be carried out in developing countries should be sacrificed.
The conditions prevalent in developing countries may be different from developed countries. For example, funds, expertise and time available may be limited. Additionally, the data necessary to identify and estimate the various environmental impacts may not be readily available, and also, if available, their quality may be uncertain. In addition, EIA is a methodology that was developed in the North, and therefore it may contain certain cultural values that may make its direct transfer to the South difficult. However, many developed and developing countries also share many of the same concerns regarding the EIA processes. These concerns include post-development auditing, process implementation costs, process development and support costs, estimation of cumulative impacts, soundness of knowledge used for EIA, availability of adequate funding and time for conducting the studies, legal standing of EIA, accessibility of information, timing of EA during project or programme development, and its implementation process (Modak and Biswas, 1999; de Boer and Saddler, 1994; MacDonald, 1994). Hence, it is clear that there is no one universal solution. Each country should develop its own approaches for environmental management, as well as the most appropriate methodology for the assessment of water projects and programmes. This should always be considered by a case-by-case basis. Developing countries should not automatically accept and use the solutions that may have been formulated specifically for use in developed countries. These alternatives should be carefully reviewed, and then, if necessary, adopted to suit the conditions prevalent in developing countries. In addition, not all the projects in developed countries are sustainable, and not all the projects in developing countries are unsustainable. Each country should develop its own priorities in accordance with their prevailing conditions, needs, national plans, policies and programmes, as well as social expectations (UN, 1992).
Institutional acceptability of the EIA procedures is an important factor. For example, in many developing countries, water ministries are still not convinced that EIA is an essential
17 procedure. Thus, even if legal requirements may mandate that such assessments are necessary, and even if external funding agencies may insist that conducting EIA is a pre- condition for receiving funds, if the water ministries are not convinced of its necessity, EIA will continue to be a mechanical process, with virtually no impact on the actual sustainability of the proposed water development projects. Exhaustive analysis of the environmental sustainability of water projects in Mexico (Tortajada, 2000; Tortajada 1999a,b) indicates that even though EIA studies are carried out because of legal requirements and donor insistence, they have had virtually no impact in terms of improving the sustainability of the water projects.
Routine policies, highly centralised decision-making, lack of appreciation of the social and environmental impacts of water projects, and the limitations imposed by near-total engineering mind-sets of the managers, all conspire to reduce the overall positive impacts of the water development projects. Thus, since the EIA studies are not appropriately conducted, and the senior managers have limited interest in such studies, there is limited recognition of the overall environmental and social consequences of the water development projects. In addition, heavy centralisation, absence of environmental expertise in the water ministries, lack of realisation of the senior management of the importance and relevance of environmental and social issues, absence of clear administrative processes, lack of modalities for social participation, etc., have all contributed to the poor implementation of the laws, even when they exist, as is the case for Mexico (Tortajada, 2001).
Additionally, many times EIA is erroneously used to decide “how” the development projects should be carried out, instead of whether, if, or where. Thus, unless the different alternatives for the projects have already been analysed in depth, the EIA will not fulfil its task (Saldler, 1994). In fact, the EIA should not only identify and estimate the potential environmental and social damages of a water project, but also its benefits, that is, how the project can enhance the quality of life of the population and how it can preserve the environment (Mikesell, 1994). Adverse impacts should be compared with the project benefits, and trade- offs should be considered which could bring the viewpoints of all stakeholders affected by the project (Thanh and Tam, 1992).
The above analysis makes it clear that, in general, environmental sustainability of a water project does not depend on the fact that management tools (EIA studies specifically) are mandated by the law and the institutions. It should be noted that unless it is incorporated early enough in the project cycle to influence planning and design, and the management believes in its necessity, its usefulness at best can be marginal. EIA as such does not solve environmental problems associated with any water development project, it just provides a framework for systematic predictions and assessments of environmental effects (Wramner, 1992). However, unless the management believe that environmental and social issues are important, EIA will not have any visible impact on any project.
In terms of expertise and knowledge, experience has shown that technical knowledge alone is not enough to make accurate predictions of the potential social and the environmental
18 impacts. Technical knowledge needs to be complemented with social and environmental expertise. Absence of multidisciplinary approach is likely to result in the identification of only certain impacts, the magnitudes and distributions of which over the project area may not be accurate. In addition, quantification of the impacts and estimates of time periods over which they surface, may prove to be erroneous. These deficiencies are generally compounded by the lack of monitoring and follow-up. As a result, an integrative approach to EIA still remains prescribed primarily in the literature, rather than applied in practice (Sadler, 1994). Problems that still have to be resolved include poor implementation of the proposed mitigation measures, environmental monitoring, compliance control, and lack of coordination among the several governmental ministries, especially to implement mitigation measures which are their responsibility (Tortajada, 2001; Tortajada, 2000).
Another constraint is due to the use of the environmental assessment study in real terms. Initially, studies were carried out after the project had been designed, and in some cases, even after the project was under construction. This was not a satisfactory process, but still better than no environmental analysis. By the early 1980s, and as EIA process picked up momentum, such studies were mostly initiated at the beginning of the project cycle, expecting that this would ensure that the environmental and the social impacts of the various alternatives would be considered before the final plan was selected. In other words, the environmental and social concerns could be internalised in the project planning process. While this was an improvement, EIAs in developing countries still continues to be inherently weak and poor in terms of quality (Goodland, 1997). The EIA studies should be rigorous and comprehensive, and it should estimate the magnitudes and extents of the impacts. Thereafter, alternatives should be proposed on how the adverse impacts could be mitigated, the costs of mitigation measures, and who should be responsible for implementing them. A monitoring process should also be suggested. Unfortunately, however, it is very rare to find an EIA report in a developing country which contains all this information. National legislations generally require that EIA studies should be undertaken, and these must be approved before the projects are cleared. The laws often do not require that the findings and recommendations in terms of mitigation measures should actually be implemented, or some institution should ensure that the mitigation measures proposed in the report, on the basis of which the project was cleared, will actually be applied (Tortajada, 2001).
Under these conditions, EIAs, as they are currently used in many developing countries, do not represent a useful tool for environmental management, as should have been the case. They often become documents that are legally necessary to clear projects, irrespective of their qualities or findings. In many countries, Mexico being one of them, once the approval process is complete, the study is promptly filed and never reviewed, or used, thereafter, (Tortajada, 2001).
There is no regular follow-up of the mitigation measures that are recommended in the EIA study, or post-evaluation of the projects or actions to determine that no other significant negative impacts have emerged, and how they are to be ameliorated. Since there is no ex- post evaluation, it is not possible to determine what were the actual environmental, social or
19 economic impacts due to any project. Without such evaluations, biases and errors containing in the assessment studies continue to be perpetuated, and no lessons can be learnt to improve the analytical aspects of improving the EIA procedures in the future. Thus, every study becomes a discrete and individual activity, which has no relevance or impact to similar studies either before or after. Following such studies, normally all projects are approved, irrespective of the qualities of the studies or nature of the findings. The reports remain with the staff who are responsible for them, which means that there is no knowledge enhancement of the institutions (Tortajada, 2000).
Public participation and involvement is an important requirement for the environmental sustainability of water development projects. Stakeholders should be aware of the social, economic and environmental impacts of the proposed projects on their lives and the surrounding environment. Public awareness of the potential impacts of a project is essential. This awareness should be based on the consensus that all people affected by a project must benefit from it, and the environment must be protected. Public participation and environmental awareness are necessary to create a constructive atmosphere, within which the pros and the cons of any water development projects could be discussed (Thanh and Tam, 1992). The public participation could be passive or active, formal or informal. It could use methods like surveys, meetings, hearings, workshops, etc. However, unless the water ministries concerned believe in the relevance and importance of public participation, the whole process is likely to be superficial. For the Latin American countries, where decision- making in all sectors have been almost exclusively top down for decades, public virtually has no role to play in water resources planning and decision-making, and project formulation.
According to MacDonald (1994), “the results of public consultation will differ very little from no public consultation at all, if information is only presented to the public for review and the suggestions or comments received during an open public meeting do not affect any change in the direction of conclusion of the EIA.” The situation in several Latin American countries is actually worse. For example, in Mexico, even though legally all EIA documents should be available to the public, they are simply not accessible not only to the public, but also to the staff members of other governmental institutions. Thus, giving lip service to the concept of public participation in the water sector project planning is not enough: the institutions must believe in it, and do whatever may be possible to encourage it. Otherwise public participation will not have any perceptible impact, which mostly is the case for developing countries.
There are some important issues that should be considered for an effective public participation, like who should be consulted, by what process or criteria should they be selected, at what stages of the process should they be consulted, and which methods will be used. Public participation, when properly conducted, should contribute to the improvements in the project planning and implementation processes, and the overall acceptability of the projects. But the process must be consultative, open and transparent: otherwise the impacts are likely to be minimal.
20
CASE STUDY OF MEXICO
Following is an analysis of the situation in Mexico in terms of environmental sustainability of water projects. In order to assure that the environment and natural resources would be protected during the construction and operation of the current and the future water projects, legislations and procedures have made EIA process mandatory in Mexico since 1988. Prior to this date, the creation of environmental units within the Federal Government Administration set the basis for the legal adoption of the procedures for EIA. One of these, the Intersectoral Commission for Environmental Sanitation (Comisión Intersectorial de Sanidad Ambiental) designed the necessary procedural framework that was adopted within the Law of Public Works (Ley de Obras Publicas) in 1980. It was after the Law of Public Works was enacted in 1980, and the Federal Law of Environmental Protection (Ley de Protección Ambiental) in 1982, that the then Ministry of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL) developed the guidelines for the preparation of environmental impact assessment studies. The General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (Ley General de Equilibrio Ecologico y Protección Ambiental, LGEEPA) was enacted in 1988, and amended in December 1996. By 1992, about 50 environmental impact assessment studies of water projects had been prepared (CNA, 1996). The detailed analyses of all the studies can be found in Tortajada (2000; 1999a,b).
The amended LGEEPA established the evaluation procedures for the environmental assessment of different projects and activities, as an instrument to ameliorate their negative impacts on the environment. An EIA report must be produced before a project, or an activity, is carried out, which should evaluate the negative impacts and the proposed alternatives, from site selection to the general approaches for their management. However, there is no requirement in the legislation which stipulates that once the assessment report is prepared, evaluated and approved, it should actually be implemented. This is a major gap in the legislation, of which the water authorities have taken full advantage in the past. The environmental assessment procedure, as it is currently practised in Mexico, is basically a paper exercise, which neither improves the environmental and social impacts of the water project, nor can it be considered to be a useful tool for environmental management. It has become simply a document that is legally necessary to clear a project, irrespective of its quality and/or findings. Once the approval process is completed, which is for all practical purposes automatic, the report is filed and never consulted or used thereafter.
The implementation of the LGEEPA has been consistently poor. In general, the EIA reports of water projects in Mexico are descriptive, superficial and mechanical, rather than analytical, predictive and comprehensive. Accordingly, they are of questionable value for rational environmental management of the projects, including follow-up studies and monitoring. Mitigation measures proposed are based on generalised principles and not
21 supported by specific facts, analyses or findings. The studies do not include any consideration of monitoring programme to test predictions and facilitate the impact management. They also lack any serious social or environmental analyses. Participation and involvement of the public, for all practical purposes, is non-existent. The unsatisfactory quality of the EIA studies of water projects in the country represent a serious limitation for developing any post-project evaluation or impacts management. The mitigation measures proposed are so vague and general that it is not possible to consider them seriously. The reports do not contribute to any in depth discussion on the mitigation of the adverse impacts even when they are identified, or enhancement of project benefits. The institutional arrangements necessary for implementing even the proposed general measures are never defined, and the costs of implementing the recommendations are never estimated. Mitigation measures are characterised by their generality, scarcity and superficiality. Predictive techniques are used whose margin of errors is not known, and numerous tables of data are presented without any reference to their usefulness or reliability. The data listed are seldom analysed properly. Evaluation methods, which assess and present information, are concerned primarily with the approval of the project. Little or no attention is paid to environmental management during the post-approval stage.
On the basis of the performance thus far, the National Water Commission of Mexico (CNA), which is in charge of overall water planning and management in the country and is a part of the Ministry of Environment, is only interested in the clearance of the projects, irrespective of their total adverse social and environmental impacts, and without doing any serious environmental analyses.
In the long run, it is in the national interest to identify the deficiencies in the EIA reports before they are submitted, rather than wait to have them exposed by others at later stages of the review process (this has not happened so far), or even after the projects are constructed. Initial reviews of the assessment reports in the country are undertaken by an internal CNA body, Department of Environmental Management and Evaluation, which deals exclusively with the environmental assessment process. After receiving the reports from the consultants, and before submitting them to the Ministry of Environment for clearence, the reports are reviewed, mainly in terms of satisfying the terms of references of the contract, and not in terms of their usefulness or relevance to the environmental management process. There is no systematic institutional process to assess the quality of any report, and adequate expertise, or even interest, to review them properly simply does not exist. Furthermore, CNA as a proponent of the projects, has a vested interest to get the projects cleared as soon as possible. Thus, the entire assessment process has basically become a paper exercise, which attempts to satisfy only the basic legal requirements. Under these conditions, not surprisingly, even a single water project has thus far ever been rejected on environmental and/or social grounds. The prevailing conditions are inappropriate and inadequate to ensure the sustainability of the water projects in Mexico. Unquestionably this sad state of affairs will have long-term negative impacts in terms of returns from these high investments.
22 The institutional arrangements for clearance of the studies are fundamentally flawed. This is because the person responsible for clearing the studies within the Ministry of the Environment is an employee of CNA. The person is seconded to that position, but his or her career path remains with CNA. Not surprisingly, the officer concerned has not opposed any project which CNA has proposed, since such a stand is highly likely to ensure his/her prompt dismissal. Under such biased institutional arrangements, not even a single project has ever been rejected on social and environmental grounds. In addition the whole philosophy of including a powerful development agency like CNA, under the umbrella of a somewhat weak environmental ministry, needs to be re-examined.
The LGEEPA established that post-project evaluations are mandatory. Legally it is possible to proceed against the developers of the projects, who do not comply with the legislation. However, since the government itself is the developer of the projects, it simply is not possible to take sanctions against the government under the present socio-political conditions. Furthermore, the legislation does not have any instrument to force the developers (in this case the government) either to improve the quality of the assessment, or use the recommendations of the studies that have been prepared, or to institute environmental monitoring, or to make post-project evaluations. The situation is unsatisfactory since the developer in these cases is a powerful government institution like CNA.
The LGEEPA promotes public participation during the conducting of EIA studies. Before the amendments to this Law, public participation meant that the general public could read the assessment studies prepared on the projects and activities, if they so wished. However, the only problem was that the public had no access to such reports, irrespective of the legal requirements. With the new modifications, there is an opportunity for the public to discuss the various projects and activities which could seriously damage the environment, or threaten public health or ecosystems. According to the law, any person, social group, NGO, or association can lodge objections to the Office of the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (Procuraduria Federal de Protección al Ambiente, Profepa) especially in terms of those activities or omissions which could result in ecological deterioration or threaten the environment or the natural resources, or which do not comply with the law. Legally, the promoters or institutions to be responsible for the project and thus damages, can be taken to the court. Irrespective of the legal requirements, the general public is still basically ignored by CNA, and they have no real role to play in the construction or operation of new projects.
Irrespective of all these legal changes and requirements, the general public, academic institutions and NGOs still do not have access to the assessment studies. For all practical purposes, CNA treats them as highly confidential documents.
The comprehensiveness, objectivity and accuracy of EIA studies as they are carried out at present for the water sector of Mexico, are matters of concern since many of them do not even meet the minimum regulatory requirements, much less provide adequate information and analysis on which to base necessary decisions. Proponents of the projects and their
23 consultants need to monitor the quality of their assessment studies, and to review them critically before submitting them for approval to the appropriate authority. Alternatively, the approving authority must start to reject all assessment reports, unless certain minimum standards are maintained. At present there is no sign that either of these two alternatives are likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
Thus, in Mexico, in spite of the legal and institutional requirements for rational environmental management of water development projects, only very limited progress has been made so far. Laws have been systematically ignored and/or circumvented. Accordingly, two important conclusions can be drawn. First, the legal and institutional processes that currently exist in the country do not contribute to the environmental sustainability of water development projects. Second, even when EIA are carried out, they have no impact on the actual sustainability of the water projects.
Not only for Mexico, but also for all developed and developing countries, EIA studies of water projects are an important requirement to ensure that the economic and social benefits accrue as planned, and environmental costs are kept to a minimum and acceptable level. While conducting good and objective environmental assessments is an important first step, such studies, by themselves, will not assure long-term sustainability of the projects. Unless the senior decision-makers in water ministries believe that environmental and social considerations are important issues, real progress is likely to be minimal and slow. In addition, regular monitoring and evaluation at appropriate intervals during the operational phase of a project, and feedback of these results to the decision-making levels are absolutely essential to ensure long-term sound management of water projects (Biswas, 1996).
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Tortajada, 1999a, Environmental Sustainability of Water Management in Mexico, Third World Centre for Water Management, Mexico.
Tortajada, 1999b, Approaches to Environmental Sustainability for Water Resources Management: The Case Study of Mexico, Licentiate thesis, Division of Hydraulic Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm.
UN, 1992, Earth Summit, Agenda 21, The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio, United Nations, New York.
UNEP, 1981, In Defence of the Earth, The Basic Texts on Environment: Founex, Stockholm, Cocoyoc, United Nations Environment Programme, Executive Series 1, Nairobi.
Welford, R., 2000, Corporate Environmental Management 3, Towards Sustainable Development, Earthscan Publications Ltd., London.
Wramner, P., 1992, Environmental Impact Assessment of Developed Projects: Experience from Nordic Aid in Environmental Impact Assessment for Developing Countries, A. K. Biswas and S.B.C. Agarwals (Eds.), Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, Oxford.
27 III. SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT: IMPACTS OF THE ATATURK DAM
INTRODUCTION
The Southeastern Anatolia Region of Turkey has been historically a low-productive plateau lying at the foot of the Taurus Mountains and drained by the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. The region is rich in water, land and human resources. In terms of water, both the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers represent more than 28% of the surface waters of the country. The region has more than 20% of all economically irrigable land at the national level. According to the 1997 census, the ratio of working age population living in the area is above 48%. However, irrespective of all these strengths, the GAP Region has lagged far behind the rest of the country in terms of development indicators such as per capita income, life expectancies, infant mortality rates, literacy rates, manufacturing activities and health and infrastructure facilities. Even though its economy is based largely on rain-fed agriculture, the productivity of the area has historically been low because of untrained labour force. This has contributed to high unemployment, with seasonal agricultural out-migration and continued rural to urban migration (Unver, 2000a). Additionally, a major inhibiting factor for the economic development of this area has historically been the non-uniform distribution of rainfall (Harmancioglu et al., 2001). The highly erratic flows of the rivers have limited their utilisation, since a low monthly flow is only one- ninth of a maximum monthly flow, and a dry yearly flow is one only-third of a wet year flow (Altinbilek, 1997).
However, it was the vast development potential of both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers which in the 1960s contributed to the idea of harnessing their waters for irrigation and hydropower generation. Towards the end of the 1970s, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) planned a series of land and water resources development projects on these two rivers under the name of Southeastern Anatolia Project. DSI, under the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, is the institution responsible for managing and developing water resources projects in Turkey. It is responsible for irrigation development, flood control, hydropower generation, provision of drinking water to the large cities of Turkey, and other associated water-related activities. It is also the executing agency for land expropriation for water development projects. Approximately, one-third of the Turkish population has directly benefited from the water from the dams, pipelines and treatment plants constructed by DSI (DSI, 2000).
In 1989, it was decided that Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), or Southeastern Anatolia Project, would not only be a land and water resources development project, but also a large- scale, multi-sectoral regional development activity. The project would focus not in the economic growth based on infrastructural development, but also on the regional development taking into consideration industry, transportation, urban and rural infrastructure, environmental protection and social sectors like employment generation, health, education, capacity building, gender equity, etc. The main objective of the GAP Project would be to strengthen social, economic, institutional and technical aspects of human development in an
28 economically disadvantaged region by significantly increasing the living standards of its people (GAP Administration, 1999a; Altinbilek, 1997).
The Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration was established as the governmental agency responsible for planning and programming the development efforts in the GAP Region, by integrating the various multi-sectoral projects. It was to coordinate the various agencies that are responsible for implementing all the developmental activities in the region. It is affiliated to the Prime Ministry, and has the authority to approve the land use planning in the area. Initially, the GAP Administration was initially established for a period of 15 years (GAP Administration, 1999a).
The Article 1 of the Decree-Law 388 of 6 November 1989, which established the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP Administration, 1998a), stated that:
“…the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, which has a judiciary personality, affiliated to the Primer Ministry and a duration of 15 years, which shall provide or cause to be provided such services as planning, infrastructural services, services related with licenses, housing, industry, mining, energy and transport, to ensure a rapid development of the regions under the Southeastern Anatolia Project, take actions or have the same taken to improve the educational level of the local population, and to ensure coordination among the relevant agencies and organizations.”
The Master Plan for the GAP Region was prepared by Nippon Koei of Japan and Yuksel Project of Turkey. The main objective of this Plan was to identify the potentials of the region, constraints for its development, targets and strategies. The aims being to raise the income levels in the GAP Region, increase the productivity and employment opportunities in rural areas, enhance the assimilative capacity of the larger cities, and contribute to the national objectives of economic growth, export promotion and social stability by efficient utilization of the regional resources (Ozbilen, 2001). The Master Plan was completed in 1989.
The Master Plan emphasized the need for an approach which could simultaneously manage the various technical, economic, social and environmental issues in an integrated manner. One primary strategy for achieving socially sustainable development was to develop a “downstream” approach, focused particularly on community-based, small- to medium-scale development programmes in the areas of education/training, health, status of rural women, housing and resettlement programmes, economic development, employment generation, environmental protection and public participation (GAP Administration, 1990).
Due to the complexities associated with such a large development project, changing conditions of the region, as well as the shift of paradigms at the global level from economic growth to sustainable human development, the GAP Administration is at present reviewing and updating the earlier Master Plan. The Master Plan is expected to be ready by the end of May 2001. The new Master Plan focuses primarily on three issues: public investment programmes, private
29 sector involvement, and sustainable human development. The updating of the Plan is being carried out in-house with local expertise. The Plan formulation process is being used as an effective tool to initiate a dialogue with the stakeholders interested in the region at the national, regional and local levels. Several meetings, with approximately 3,000 stakeholders, have already been organised at the regional, provincial and local levels in order to identify and assess the potential, constraints and alternatives to achieve economic, social and human development in the region. Through this participatory, interacting process, the Master Plan is expected to formulate and incorporate the appropriate policy instruments, promote more effectively the roles of the private sector (including the financial aspects) and the non-governmental organisations, and put more emphasis on development programmes for poverty alleviation, employment generation, gender equity and environmental conservation (Ozbilen, 2001).
GAP PROJECT
The Southeastern Anatolia Project, as it is presently conceived, is a $32 billion, multi-sectoral, integrated regional development programme, which main objective is to strengthen economic, social, institutional aspects of human development in this economically disadvantaged region by raising the existing living standards and quality of life of its people. With proper planning and management, water is expected to be the engine which would drive the sustainable development of this region in the coming decades.
The GAP Region covers the provinces of Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak which represent approximately 10% of the area of the country. The region also accounts for nearly 10% of the country’s total population (6.1 million inhabitants according to 1997 census). According to the present plan, by the year 2010, the GAP Project is expected to generate annually 27 billion kilowatt-hours of hydroelectric energy, and irrigate 1.7 million ha of land, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the irrigable land of Turkey. This would be accomplished through the construction of 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants with a total installed capacity of 7500 MW, and extensive irrigation and drainage networks. The project is expected to almost double the existing area of artificial lakes to 228,136 ha in the country. The irrigated land would increase from 2.9% to 22.8% of the total area of the region, and concurrently rainfed agriculture would decrease from 34.3% to 10.7% (Biswas and Tortajada, 1997).
30 On the basis of currently available anecdotal evidence, the disparities between the GAP Region and Turkey as a whole are slowly reducing in terms of several socio-economic indicators. Some indicators of the improvement in the life-style of the population in the area are literacy (increased from 55% in 1985, to 67% in 1997); infant mortality (decreased from 111 per 1000 in 1985, to 62 per 1000 in 1995); landless population (from 40% in 1985, to 25% in 1997); rural and urban water supply (from 57% and 15% to 67% and 57%, respectively), decrease in out- migration and very significant improvement in the regional economy (Unver, 2000a). While these are all encouraging statistics, further detailed studies have to be conducted to determine to what extent the GAP Project per se has been responsible for improving these socio- economic indicators, especially as only part of this project has been implemented.
Regarding infrastructural development, one of the seven GAP schemes on the Euphrates River is the Lower Euphrates Project. It consists of projects like the Ataturk dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant (HEPP), Birecik dam and HEPP, Sanliurfa Tunnels, Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation, Mardin-Ceylanpinar irrigation, Siverek-Hilvan pumped irrigation and Bozova pumped irrigation (DSI, 2000; Unver, 1997). In 2000, the Birecik dam and HEPP was completed through a private sector build-operate and transfer (BOT) project. The magnitude and complexity of the GAP Project can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1.
The construction of the Ataturk dam was started in 1983, and it was completed in 1992. Its height from foundation is 169 m, with a maximum water elevation of 542.0 m above m.s.l. The volume of the reservoir is 48.7 billion m3, and it has an area of 817 km2. The construction of the diversion tunnels was initiated in November 1983, and was completed in January 1986. The diversion of water through the tunnels started in June 1986. The impoundment of the reservoir was started in January 1990, and was completed in August of the same year. With the construction of the Ataturk dam, some 81,700 ha of land were inundated (GAP Administration, 1999a).
The Ataturk dam generates 8.9 billion kWh energy annually. By September 1999, the cumulative energy production in the region (Karakaya and Ataturk dams) was 155 billion kWh, representing a revenue of $9.3 billion. Expressed in terms of alternative source of commercial energy, it corresponds to the import of about 39 million tons of fuel oil or 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas (GAP Administration, 1999b).
Water reaches the Sanliurfa-Harran plains through the Sanliurfa Tunnels system, which consists of two parallel tunnels, each 26.4 km long and 7.62 m in diameter (DSI, 2000). One of these two tunnels was completed in 1995, and the other by the end of 1998. Irrigation in the Harran Plane was being practiced in 90,000 ha with economic returns of around $85 million (GAP Administration, 1999). Sanliurfa main irrigation canal is expected to irrigate 43,000 ha of land by gravity and 5,000 ha of pumping. The Harran main irrigation canal is expected to irrigate 98,500 ha by gravity (Unver, 1997).
31
Figure 1. GAP water resources projects
Nomenclature: In Operation Caspian Sea Under Construction In Planning and Final Plan Stage In Reconnaissance and Master Plan Stage TURKEY Underground Water Irrigation Irrigation Canal Irrigation Tunnel SYRIA Pumping Station IRAQ Diversion Dam Power Station
North
Source: DSI, 1999.
32
Table 1. Water and land resources development projects of GAP Project
EUPHRATES RIVER TOTAL TIGRIS RIVER
5 304 MW Installed Capacity: 7 476 MW 2 172 MW 20 098 GWh Energy Production: 27 345 GWh 7 247 Wh 1 091 203 Ha Irrigated Area: 1 693 027 Ha 601 824 Ha Number of Dams : 22 Number of HEPPs: 19
Installed Energy Irrigated Installed Energy Irrigated Capacity Production Area Status Capacity Production Area Status Project (MW) (GWh) (Ha) Project (MW) (GWh) (Ha)
I. Karakaya Project 1800 7354 VIII. Tigris-Kralkizi Project 204 444 126080 Karakaya Dam & HEPP 1800 7354 OP * Kralkizi Dam & HEPP 94 146 U/C * Tigris Dam & HEPP 110 298 U/C II. Lower Euphrates Projects 2450 9024 706281 * Tigris Rights Bank Grav.Irr. 54279 U/C * Atatürk Dam & HEPP 2400 8900 OP * Tigris Rights Bank Pum.Irr. 71801 U/C+D/D * Sanliurfa HEPP 50 124 * Sanliurfa Irr.Tunnels OP+U/C IX. Batman Project 198 483 37744 a) Sanliurfa-Harran Irr. 60000 OP * Batman Dam & HEPP 198 483 U/C 90000 U/C * Batman Left Bank Irr. 18758 U/C b) Mardin-Ceylanpinar Grav.Irr. 185639 M/P+U/C * Batman Right Bank Grav.Irr. 18758 U/C c) Mardin-Ceylanpinar Pum.Irr. 149000 M/P * Siverek-Hilvan Pum.Irr. 160105 Rec. X. Batman-Silvan Project 240 964 257000 * Bozova Pumped Irr. 69702 Rec. * Silvan Dam & HEPP 150 623 Rec. * Kayser Dam& HEPP 90 341 Rec. III. Border Euphrates Project 852 3168 * Tigris Left Bank Grav.Irr 200000 Rec. * Birecik Dam & HEPP 672 2516 U/C * Tigris Left Bank Pum.Irr. 57000 Rec. * Karkamis Dam & HEPP 180 652 U/C XI. Garzan Project 90 315 60000 IV. Suruç-Yaylak Project 146500 * Garzan Dam & HEPP 90 315 Rec. * Yaylak Plain Irr. 18322 U/C * Garzan Irrigation 60000 Rec. * Suruç Plain Irr. 128128 Rec. XII. Ilisu Project 1200 3833 V. Adiyaman-Kahta Project 195 509 77824 * Ilisu Dam & HEPP 1200 3833 Imp. * Çamgazi Dam & Irr. 6536 U/C * Gömikan Dam & Irr. 7762 M/P XIII. Cizre Project 240 1208 121000 * Koçali Dam & HEPP 40 120 21605 M/P * Cizre Dam & HEPP 240 1208 Imp.
33 * Sirimtas Dam & HEPP 28 87 M/P * Nusaybin-Cizre Irr. 89000 Rec. * Fatopasa HEPP 22 47 M/P * Silopi Plain Irr. 32000 Rec. * Büyükçay Dam,HEPP&Irr. 30 84 12322 M/P * Kahta Dam & HEPP 75 171 M/P * Pumped Irr. from Atatürk Reservoir 29599 M/P+U/C
VI. Adiyaman-Göksu 7 43 71598 * Çataltepe Dam Irr. M/P * Erkenek HEPP 7 43 M/P
VII. Gaziantep Project 89000 * Hancagiz Dam & Irr. 7330 OP * Kayacik Dam & Irr. 13680 U/C * Kemlin Dam & Irr. 1969 M/P * Pumped Irr.from Birecik Reservoir 53415 M/P * Belkis-Nizip Irr. 11925 U/C
Installed Energy Irrigated Status Installed Energy Irrigated Status Capacity Production Area Capacity Production Area Project (MW) (GWh) (Ha) Project (MW) (GWh) (Ha)
INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS IN EUPHRATES RIVER INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS IN TIGRIS RIVER
OP 14.4 42 60440 Devegeçidi Project 7500 OP M/P 6353 Silvan I & II Irrigation 790 OP Nusaybin Irrigation 7500 OP Nerdüs Irrigation 2740 OP Çag Çag HEPP 14.4 42 OP Çinar-Göksu Project 3582 OP Akçakale, groundwater 15000 OP Garzan-Kozluk Irrigation 3700 OP Ceylanpinar, groundwater 27000 OP Hacihidir Project 2080 OP Dumluca Project 1860 OP Suruç Groundwater 7000 OP Besni Dam & Irr. 2820 M/P Ardil Dam & Irr. 3535 M/P
Note: Individual projects are not included in grand total
Legends: OP, In operation U/C, Under construction D/D, Detailed design completed M/P, Master Plan
34 Rec., Reconnaissance Imp., On Implementation Programme
Source: DSI, 2000 in Unver 2000b.
The Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation project was the first project to become operational among the several irrigation projects in the GAP Region in 1995. According to GAP Administration (1999a), the 90,000 ha of land which were under irrigation at the end of 1998, produced a gross agricultural output value (GAOV) of almost $180 million, and a value added of almost $150 million/year. Prior to irrigation, GAOV in the GAP Region was $ 31.5 million and the value added was estimated at $18 million. Table 2 presents the gross agricultural output value before the introduction of irrigation and then with irrigation development up to 1998.
In addition to the benefits of such large infrastructural development projects at the national level in terms of electricity, and to the region in terms of increased agricultural production through irrigation, it is of fundamental importance to identify the benefits of the projects at the local level, and also review the nature of beneficiaries. Assessment of the social, economic and environmental impacts of different water projects, both positive and negative, should be undertaken so that specific policy decisions can be taken in a timely manner, which will maximise the positive benefits and minimise the adverse social and environmental costs. This knowledge, based on an objective assessment, is especially necessary to ensure that expected benefits from the project accrue as planned. It can also be used to improve the planning, constructing and managing of similar water development projects in the future in the regions concerned, as well as elsewhere.
Table 2. Gross Agricultural Output Value (GAOV) and value added from irrigation in the Harran Plain
Year Area (ha) GAOV Value Added (million $/year) (million $/year) Prior to Irrigation 30,000 31.50 18.0 1995 30,000 65.4 49.8 1996 40,000 87.5 67.4 1997 60,000 125.8 100.6 1998 90,000 178.8 148.8 Source: GAP Administration, 1999a.
GAP REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Since the GAP Project is a large-scale, multi-sectoral regional development project, an integrated approach is essential to achieve its targets and objectives. It is evident that the
35 irrigation and other infrastructures that have already been constructed, and would be built in the future, would contribute significantly to rapid economic growth and social changes. All these changes, in turn, would unquestionably have discernable environmental impacts, both positive and negative, which need to be carefully managed to ensure the sustainability of the Project and to improve the quality of life of the local people.
In Turkey, the legislation for Environmental Impact Assessment was enacted in 1993. Since then, EIA studies have been prepared for all water projects, including dams. However, it was in 1992, even before the legislation, that the Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Water Development Projects in Turkey were developed by DSI, with the financial support of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (Akkaya, 2001).
Due to the construction of the Ataturk dam, and the ensuing advantages in economic activities, some urban areas (e.g. Sanliurfa) face an incoming population flux, with the attendant need for more housing, water, education, health services, and employment opportunities and more efficient transportation systems. If these changes cannot be properly managed, environmental degradation in terms of water, soil and air pollution could become a serious problem. With such a multiplicity of problems, it is important to identify specific priorities, policies, and actions needed to address the most immediate issues related with sustainable urban development, including the necessary social and technological infrastructures.
A number of environmental studies have been carried out for some of the projects in the GAP Region. These include potential environmental impacts of irrigation schemes, hydrology, pollution, seismic, sedimentation, ecology, human health, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage (Harmancioglu et al., 2001; Chamber of Agricultural Engineers of Turkey, 1993; Development Foundation of Turkey, 1994; GAP Administration, 1998b, 1995; METU 1994a, b, 1993; Sociology Association, 1994). The main environmental benefits of GAP Project that have been identified are the control and use of flood waters mainly for energy and agricultural purposes, availability of a regular supply of high-quality water for human and industrial needs, preservation of the natural flora, increase in the aquatic fauna, creation of recreation areas, etc. On the other hand, some of the adverse impacts are considered to be inundation of natural and cultural areas; modification of hydrological patterns; changes in land use; contamination of soil and surface and groundwaters; salinity, waterlogging, sedimentation and erosion; increase in the use of fertilizers and pesticides; increase in the incidence of water- born diseases, etc (Harmancioglu et al., 2001).
In the specific case of the irrigation activities, some of the mitigation measures proposed include the increased efficiency of the irrigation systems, including drainage canals, improvement in the irrigation techniques and reuse of the irrigation return flow and urban water in irrigation (Harmancioglu et al., 2001).
Environmental considerations need to be integrally incorporated within the physical planning projects of the GAP Project for the protection of the natural resources of the region. Experiences from other parts of the world indicate that big rural and urban public investment projects, when not properly implemented, could adversely affect the ecosystems, and thus
36 contribute to increased environmental degradation. Accordingly, the formulation of regional strategies to manage water, land and biotic resources need the integration and implementation of land use policies and practices for both urban and rural areas that could be affected by the development projects.
The existing environmental conditions in the GAP Region, as well as the potential positive and negative impacts which could result from the different developmental activities, would have to be carefully analysed and managed within an integrated sustainable framework in order to maximize the total benefits and minimize the overall costs that could accrue to the society. A Regional Environmental Management Study is thus an essential prerequisite for sustainable development. Accordingly, adequate base-line information is necessary, with which future changes could be compared, and then appropriate steps could be taken for their management. A methodology is currently being developed for preparing reliable environmental profiles, that would be most appropriate for the region. If so, the results could be effectively used for planning, decision-making and overall management of the region.
ATATURK DAM: ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
In order to understand and appreciate the changes that the construction and operation of the Ataturk dam would bring to the people of the region through economic and social development, a study was carried out to objectively determine the extent and magnitude of the actual social, economic and environmental impacts of the Dam and the reservoir on the region some eight years after the construction was completed (Figure 2). The emphasis of the study was on economic, social and environmental issues, both direct and indirect, over the short- to medium-terms, which could be objectively estimated and evaluated with reasonable accuracy. It included the evaluation of the direct impacts (positive and negative) on the people living in the two provinces affected directly: Adiyaman and Sanliurfa, as well as on the region as a whole. The evaluation of the impacts of the Dam at the national level was not included in this analysis (Tortajada, 2000), primarily because of the absence of data.
Figure 2. Ataturk dam (DSI, 1999)
37
The assessment carried out included extensive field work and intensive discussions, both in Ankara and the project area, with the staff members from the GAP Administration and from other different planning and implementing institutions, especially DSI, State Planning Organisation, General Directorate of Rural Affairs, Middle East Technical University, etc. The interviews were carried out with senior members of national and international institutions from within and outside the region, numerous representatives of the affected population at different locations, concerned private sector institutions and NGOs. The members of the local population were selected at random.
After initial set of discussions, it was decided to focus on issues like new economic activities and employment generation during the construction of the Dam, the reservoir and the associated hydraulic structures; farms using pumped irrigation directly from the reservoir, and how their agricultural yields, and thus incomes, may have changed; review of the resettlement process due to inundation caused by the reservoir; impacts on health and education; and overall changes in the quality of life of the population living in the project area.
During the process of carrying out the studies, it was evident that the social, economic and environmental impacts of the construction of the Ataturk dam and its reservoir on the region were substantial through a variety of pathways. Both the Dam and the reservoir have acted as the engine for economic growth and integrated regional development in a historically underdeveloped area. The benefits that are now accruing to the country by the increased electricity generation alone are very substantial. Equally, for the population living in the project area, and especially for the majority of people living near and around the reservoir, the benefits
38 can be counted mainly in terms of infrastructural development (health and educational infrastructures), transportation and communication networks, capacity building, etc.
The areas around the Dam were primarily rural, with limited infrastructural facilities. Before the Dam was constructed, the transportation and communication networks between the various population centres near and around the Dam site were limited. When the Dam construction started, a good road network was constructed, which significantly improved the communication in the area. It became much easier and less time consuming for people and goods to move from one place to another. Commercial activities increased. For example, before the Dam was constructed, there was not even a drugstore in the area. People had to travel to larger urban centres to obtain drugs and receive medical attention. Shortly after the construction started, one of the engineers working in the Dam site opened a drugstore, which ensured that the local people could obtain drugs without long hours of travelling. The transportation network constructed also ensured that schools became more accessible to boys and girls. All these new facilities improved the social milleau of the local people.
On the basis of the studies carried out on the impacts of the construction of the Ataturk dam, the way of living of the local population has changed, the employment opportunities and working conditions of the communities have increased very significantly, and expanded economic activities have encouraged migration from the rural to the urban areas within the region in many cases. In other words, rural migration to major urban centres in Turkey, like Istanbul or Ankara, were reduced. People migrated from the rural areas to the centres of the region, which started to grow significantly because of the new economic activities and employment opportunities. Thus, new urban growth poles are developing, like in Sanliurfa, which helped somewhat in balancing the urbanisation process.
Following aspects were identified as the main impacts due to the construction of the Ataturk dam on the population living in the project area and beyond.
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION
I. Construction of Ataturk Dam, Hydropower Plant and Tunnels
Employment opportunities in the GAP Region have been historically limited because of the few economic opportunities. High population growth, economic stagnation, limited agricultural activities, untrained labour force, and political instability have all contributed to the underdevelopment of the region during the pre-1990 period. This situation started to change with the beginning of the construction of the Ataturk dam and the associated hydraulic infrastructures by DSI. The area became a magnet for people seeking employment in the construction activities from both within and outside the region. The private sector companies who carried out all the construction suddenly opened a new vista for employment for skilled and non-skilled personnel, the extent and magnitude of which have never been witnessed in the region in the earlier decades.
39 For the construction of the Ataturk dam and hydropower plant, the main contractor was ATA Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. In August 1983, the contract value of the Dam was 102,842,062,500 TL, which was later increased to 171,085,000,000 TL because of the additional costs. The contract was signed on October 28, 1983, and the construction of the Dam started immediately thereafter, on November 4, 1983. Although the duration of the work was initially estimated to be 108 months, the actual construction period had to be extended up to December 1997, a total period of 169 months. The payment was 214,293,000,000,000 TL at 1997 prices, including VAT equivalent of $ 1,916,437,700,000 at January 1997 (exchange rate of $ 1.00 = 111,818.40 TL).
On the basis of information collected for the present analysis from the ATA Construction Company, the construction of the Dam started in November 1983 with only 89 workers (Figure 1). The total number of workers employed during the construction of the Dam was 16,431, of which 466 were technical staff, and the rest were skilled and unskilled workers (nearly 1000 of them were sub-contracted). Between November 1983 and May 1996, there was an average of 3,100 person-months of work.
The technical and skilled staff came to the region from other parts of Turkey, since local people neither had the knowledge or the skill to construct such a large and complex structure. Most of the skilled workers who migrated to the Dam site had gained their knowledge and experience during the construction of other similar structures like the Keban and Karakaya dams earlier. Local people represented 95% of all the workers employed, but all of them were initially recruited as unskilled labourers. During the course of the construction of the Ataturk dam, many unskilled personnel were trained. They later worked as drivers, machinery operators (light, medium and heavy), carpenters, turners, metal workers, etc. Following the completion of the hands-on training period, the unskilled workers gradually became skilled.
As can be seen from Figure 3, the number of people working on the construction of the Dam steadily increased with time. As noted earlier, the number of employees in November 1983, when the construction started was 89, but a year later, by October 1984, the number had increased to more than 1,000 workers. At the peak of construction, which was reached in October 1988, the number of workers was 7,688. The number started to decline steadily thereafter, and had decreased by half in about two years. By May 1996, the number had declined to only 281 workers.
The contractor for the construction of the tunnels of the Atatürk dam was Dogus Insaat ve Ticaret A.S. The tunnel construction started in October 1981, when the cost was estimated at 9,500,000,000 TL. The original contract value was 5, 671,849,025 TL. The final payment was 10,386,000,000,000 TL ($92,882,700 at January 1997 exchange rate of $1.00 = 111,818.40 TL).
Akpinar Construction Co. was one of the sub-contractors for the construction of the diversion tunnels. According to its records, 66 skilled and unskilled workers were employed directly by the company in January 1985. Peak employment was 186, and was reached in August 1991. It then declined to 70 by September 1997. Based on interviews carried out with the Akpinar Construction Co., the payments were based on minimum wages. Unfortunately, the
40 information available at present from this company does not make any distinction between the salaries paid to skilled and unskilled workers; there is just one gross average wage per person per month for all employees. Furthermore, the records indicate that employees of the Akpinar Construction Co. were earning only about one-third of that of the ATA Construction Co. However, since detailed employment records are no longer available, it was not possible to make any comparison between the salaries paid by the two companies to their skilled and unskilled workers.
The actual salaries of the workers of the Akpinar Construction Co., for technical staff as well as skilled and unskilled workers, varied tremendously over the months, and also over the years. High rate of inflation in Turkey was an important factor for this variation. As can be seen from Figure 4, the salaries increased steadily between 1985 and 1992, when the average annual salary was $1290. However, the wages decreased dramatically from 1993. In fact, by 1997, the workers were receiving less than what they had earned in 1990, at least when converted into U.S. dollars at the then prevailing exchange rates.
Figure 5 shows the gross salaries paid by ATA Construction Co., but only to unskilled workers. The salaries have been calculated per month, based on 10.5 working hours per day and 30 working days per month. Considering the high inflation rate of the country, the monthly salaries of the unskilled workers increased from $113.79 to $138.52 in the U.S. dollar terms, between 1984 and 1987. However, between 1988 and 1989, there was an increase of almost 170% (from $163.79 to $274.69). This increase in the salary was somewhat similar to what was awarded to all the workers in Turkey. In the case of the workers of ATA Construction Co., it also resulted from the fact that the coffer Dam was completed in 1989. The workers realised that most of the work for the project was completed, and from then onwards the number of people needed would start to decline radically. In view of the fact that most of the people would lose their jobs, the workers demanded an additional increase in their salaries. In 1988, contrary to the expectations, the salaries declined by 10%, compared to the preceding year. From 1992 to 1994, the salaries increased again, but during 1995 and 1996, the salaries were similar to what were paid in 1989, at least in dollar terms.
Figure 3. Number of people employed at Ataturk dam site, 1983 - 1996
41 8,000 7,500 7,000 6,500 6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000
Number of People Employed 1,500 1,000 500 0
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992 1994 1995 1996
Years
Figure 4. Annual gross salaries for personnel working at Akpinar Construction Company, 1985-1997.
42 1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
Value in dollars 200
0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Years
It should be noted that nearly 100% of the unskilled workers employed by the different companies during the construction of the Dam and the associated hydraulic structures were recruited from the people living in the GAP Region. The estimated number of people hired during the construction of the Ataturk dam was 16,400. If this number is multiplied by a factor of 7 (average number of persons per family in southeast Turkey), some 114,800 people living in the region were sustained by the income generated due to the employment created during the construction of the Ataturk dam.
While the number of people supported is a small percentage of people of the region, the fact still remains that the construction activities supported 114,800 people, which is not a negligible figure. The incomes they obtained were unquestionably beneficial to them since their living conditions generally would have been worse without them.
Figure 5. Monthly gross salaries of unskilled workers at Ataturk dam, ATA Construction Company, 1984-1996
43 1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
Value in dollars 200
0
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Years
The benefits that accrued to the local people who worked during the construction of the Ataturk dam, at least in the case of ATA Construction Co., went far beyond the higher salaries paid to them. As noted earlier, thousands of local unskilled workers received training in different activities, thus gaining knowledge, experience and skills in different areas. As a result of this training, many workers who were unskilled and mostly unemployed and unemployable earlier received marketable skills, and thus an opportunity to get both permanent and seasonal jobs in various construction companies after the work on the Ataturk dam was completed. Furthermore, since the construction of the Dam continued over several years, many employees were entitled to retirement pensions. The workers received additional social benefits as well during the time they worked for ATA Construction Co., including social insurance for the employees and their families, as well as health services. ATA Construction Co. employed 4 doctors, and 5 nurses, and had 4 ambulances to provide medical services to the workers and their families, as well as to the local people. These were important social and medical benefits which were basically unavailable to the local people before the construction began. Clearly these development had beneficial impacts on the lifestyles of the local population.
ATA Construction Co. noted that of the hundreds of students who were trained at the Sanliurfa Vocational School of Industry, many were hired by the company after their graduation. The Manager of the ATA Construction Co. estimated during an interview that approximately 25% of the skilled people working in the Ataturk dam were hired later for construction projects in other parts of the country.
44
II. New economic activities due to the construction of the Ataturk dam and reservoir
It was natural that several new economic activities were generated during the construction and operation of the Ataturk dam and the associated hydraulic infrastructures. Among these activities were fishing and fishing-related industry (boat building, fish-net construction and repair, fish processing and marketing, etc.), agricultural production through pumped irrigation directly from the reservoir, tourism, developments in the agro-industrial and industrial sectors, etc.
1. Fishing and fishing-related industries
The southeast of Turkey is a semi-arid region. Accordingly, most of the agriculture practised was rain-fed, and fishing and fishing-related activities were basically unknown to most people before the construction of the Dam and the reservoir. It is important to note that the Ataturk dam Lake is the longest reservoir in Turkey, and is one of the largest man-made lakes of the world. Thus, properly planned and managed, it could have significant fishing potential.
The GAP Administration and DSI are aware of the economic, social and environmental impacts, both positive and negative, that may directly occur due to the construction of water projects in general. Thus, both institutions are carrying out activities whose objectives are to enhance the positive impacts and mitigate the negative ones.
One of the important tasks of DSI as a planning and implementing agency is to advise the local populations as to how best to take advantage of the newly available water resources for their own benefits as well as those of the communities concerned. DSI is also the institution responsible for carrying out activities related to water conservation and maximising the economic benefits that could accrue from the water projects. These activities include income- generating activities, improvements in water supply and sanitation facilities, crop diversification and increase in agricultural yields, promotion of fishery, use of new varieties of food that were not locally available earlier, etc. (Safak et al., 1999).
DSI and the General Directorate of Rural Affairs, have signed a protocol governing the water products-related activities in reservoirs of DSI. This protocol defines the responsibilities of each of the two parties. It also establishes that once the studies on fisheries are completed, the estimated leasing prices and fishing periods have to be determined. Afterwards, the reservoirs are to be leased to local cooperatives and to the private sector by the Ministry of Finance (Safak et al., 1999).
Fishery-related activities in reservoirs developed by DSI have been carried out since 1959. In general, these include limnological research, breeding and feeding activities in hatcheries, stocking of reservoirs, stock assessment and cage-culture activities. In reservoirs which are under operation, fish production from commercial fishing, cage-culture project application and sport fishing are encouraged by DSI. By the end of 1998, DSI has carried out limnological
45 studies in 180 reservoirs and restocking studies in 160 reservoirs and 191 ponds (Safak et al., 1999).
The financial contribution of fishery production in Turkey from reservoirs is estimated at approximately $6 million per year. Additionally, the fishing activities in the reservoirs have provided new jobs to approximately 20,000 local people. However, some of the experiences of DSI are that the reservoirs in the country generally have fishes that are either not marketable or with low economic value. Thus, DSI notes that in order to improve the economic production from the reservoirs, the existing hatcheries need to be improved significantly. Additionally, the fry production capacity for re-stocking and cage-culture projects should be increased with species with higher economic value (Safak et al., 1999).
The fisheries-activities carried out by DSI in the country up to 1998 are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Fishery activities by DSI
Years Limnological Restocked reservoirs Fish Fry Restocked Reservoirs Annual studies Dam Regulated Ponds produced fish in production lakes natural (1000 (1000 operation (tons) lakes nos.) nos.) Before 55 34 3 14 1274 1203 14 4700 1980 1980 58 40 3 18 2124 1903 19 5000 1985 78 56 3 39 8294 8253 51 5700 1990 116 98 6 48 16584 16253 73 4400 1995 153 133 8 130 59634 59067 97 4900 1996 162 145 8 145 75634 74367 103 5300 1997 169 151 8 162 93634 91556 105 5320 1998 180 160 8 191 110134 108056 108 5350 Source: Safak et al., 1999.
In the case of the Ataturk dam, the Department of Operations and Maintenance, Water Products Branch of DSI, prepared an “Assessment of Water Products and Fishing Ground in the Ataturk dam Lake” (Safak et al., 1994). Among the main objectives of this assessment were the definition of the characteristics of the lake, study of the flora as well as any structure that would be covered by the water in the reservoir, limnological studies, estimation of the fish production potential of the reservoir (including stock assessment and feeding requirements), establishment of a Water Products Station, and provision of necessary support to establish a co-operative for fishermen. The field work on which the assessment was based was carried out between May 1992 and March 1993. Laboratory work was conducted between July and November 1993, and the report was completed in 1994. a) Water Products. Limnological studies concluded that there were no variety of fishes in the reservoir that were of economic importance. The stock of the existing species was very low, and there were considerable problems in terms of hatching. Accordingly, it was decided to
46 introduce large fish populations (especially carps) in the reservoir, using 5-6 cm fingerlings from the Elazig-Keban Water Products Centre. In 1991, 200,000 carp fingerlings were released into the lake. The number of fingerlings released increased subsequently to 600,000 in 1992, and then to 2,000,000 each year in 1993 and 1994. Table 4 shows fish species that existed in the lake, as well as their percentage compositions.
Species like Carasobarbus luteus, Tor grypus, Silirus triostegus, Vimba vimba and Cyprinion tanuiradius also are present in the reservoirs of the Lower Euphrates River System, in both Syria and Iraq.
Based on the data, it appears that the density of fish in the Ataturk reservoir is less than what have been observed in Karakaya and Keban. This is to be expected and is primarily due to the fact that the Atatürk reservoir is new and thus the amount of nutrients available for fish production is low. On the basis of investigations carried out by DSI, the fish stock in the Atatürk reservoir was about 850 tons/year when the assessment referred to earlier was carried out. This stock comprised of mainly varieties like biyikli, bizir, in, sis, cultured carp, fresh water scud, and bass.
According to this reports, there are many bays in Adiyaman at present in the Ataturk reservoir. The report noted that it should be possible to establish successfully cage fishing in these bays. In fact, cage fishing is considered to be an important potential economic activity for people living near the reservoir. However, this may have some water quality implications which need to be considered carefully. b) Fishing Activities. The data included in the Assessment of the Stock of Water Products and Fishing Grounds in Ataturk dam Lake (Safak et al., 1994) is based on the discussions the DSI staff carried out with the fishermen living in the project area as well as on the basis of questionnaire surveys conducted in 1993 in the villages surrounding the Lake. According to this report, there were about 900 fishermen in the districts around the reservoir, who had 153 fishing boats. The average fish catch was 2390 kg/day in both Adiyaman and Sanliurfa (Table 5).
Based on information available (Safak et al., 1994), it is not clear whether the people referred to were already fishermen before the Dam was constructed, or if they decided to become fishermen because they realised the economic potential of fishing activities of the newly constructed reservoir. Nor is it possible to determine at present if the fish catch indicated was for a specific year, or that it was an average over several years. Information is also not available as to whether fish caught were sold, or consumed by the fishermen themselves. If they were sold, it would be desirable to know how much was sold, at which locations, and what were the market prices. Accordingly, on the basis of information available, it is not possible to estimate the economic potential of fishing-related activities for the local population living near to the Lake in any definitive manner. Nor it is possible to estimate the nutritional aspects of the fish catch on the local population.
47 Table 4. Existing fish species in the Ataturk dam lake
Fish Species Turkish Name Percentage
Barbus raganorum Bizir 27 Carasobarbus luteus Egrez baligi 26 Vimba vimba Sis baligi 21 Aspius vorax Kultur sazani 8 Cypinius carpio Tatli su kefali 8 Tor grypus Sabut 5 Silirus triostegus Mezopotamya yayini 3 Alburnus alburnus In baligi 2 Capoeta sp. Siraz * Chondrostoma regium Kababurun * Mastacembelus simack Firat Yilanbaligi * Chalcalburnus mossulensis Musul kolyozu * Cyprinion tanuiradius Biyikli balik *
*These species are present in very small percentages. Source: Safak et al., 1994.
A cooperative for the fisherman has already been established to facilitate fishing activities. The General Directorate of Organisation and Support of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for assisting the fishermen in establishing the cooperatives, and provide further assistance to its members in terms of its efficient running as and when necessary.
48
Table 5. Fishing activities in Ataturk reservoir
Province-District No. of Fishermen No. of Boats Average Fish Yield (Kg/day) Adiyaman, Kahta 165 23 500 Adiyaman, Gerger 70 13 320 Adiyaman, Centre 333 50 1100 Adiyaman, Samsat 45 6 90 Sanliurfa, Hilvan 45 14 100 Sanliurfa 244 47 280 TOTAL 902 153 2390 Source: Safak et al., 1994.
When the Ataturk dam was constructed, 146 villages (43,198 ha of land) were expropriated: 84 in Adiyaman, 49 in Sanliurfa, and 13 in Diyarbakir. Since the reservoir affected 3 different provinces, and 10 administrative districts, it was necessary to divide the reservoir into several fishing grounds so that the cooperatives could be properly established. The fishing grounds were identified by DSI, General Directorates of Agricultural Production and Development, Conservation and Control, and Organisation and Support, Ministry of Agriculture, on a combined basis. The fishing grounds were established based on a number of factors, which included their areas in hectares, geographical boundaries, state of expropriation, and studies carried out by DSI which included fish stocks and ongoing production activities in various locations. The established fishing cooperatives are likely to require some support in the near- to medium-terms, if they are to be viable commercial operations.
Nine fishing grounds were initially established:
?? Adiyaman. Four fishing grounds covering a total of 51,200 ha: Central (15,400 ha), Samsat (16,800 ha), Kahta (15,200 ha) and Gerger (3,800 ha); ?? Sanliurfa. Three fishing grounds covering a total of 29,400 ha: Bozova (15,000 ha), Hilvan (7,500 ha) and Siverek (6,900 ha); and ?? Diyarbakir. Two fishing grounds covering a total of 1,100 ha: Cermik (800 ha) and Cungus (300 ha).
The different Ministries concerned with fisheries-related activities have agreed that the Ministry of Agriculture should train its own staff working in the fishing areas and also organise the fishermen into cooperatives. The rent that the individual fishing cooperatives would pay would be determined on the basis of a variety of factors, like the nature and extent of rural settlements, poverty in the area, employment opportunities, information available on fishing activities, local consumption of fish, marketing, etc.
49 According to the information available from the GAP Administration on the project area, the nine original fishing grounds were sub-divided into 21 by 1996. There were 290 fishermen in Adiyaman (compared to 613 fishermen noted by DSI in the 1994 report, and 172 in Sanliurfa (compared to 285 reported by DSI). At this stage, it is not possible to identify the reasons for discrepancies between the DSI and GAP Administration statistics. There are two possibilities. First, DSI and/or GAP Administration did not accurately enumerated the fishermen. Second, both the statistics are correct, but during the intervening years some fishermen decided to pursue alternate employment opportunities for certain reasons. Most probably, however, the discrepancy could be accounted for because of incorrect data collection in one study or the other.
Both the DSI report (Safak et al., 1994), which was based on information collected through interviews with the Department of Fisheries, and the report by the GAP Administration, noted that fishing cooperatives were still not properly organised in the project area. The only cooperative that was active in 1994 was the one in Bozova District. The rest of the fishing districts were either in the process of being established, in the bidding process, or there were no viable activities at all. As of October 1997, all the fishermen that did not belong to any specific cooperative were still fishing, even though this was not possible under the existing legislation. In addition, and according to the Provincial Agricultural Directorate, no cooperative was being organised in Diyarbakir, and there were no data on either the number of fishermen or their catch.
The assessment of fishing activities carried out by DSI in 1992-1993 pointed out that no marketing of products could be discerned from the fishing activities. However, on the basis of data collected by GAP Administration, fish products were already being packed in Adiyaman and Sanliurfa, and sold to fish traders for consumption in Gaziantep, Adana, Izmir and Manisa. However, neither the prices of the fish products nor the amounts marketed were noted.
Data available from GAP Administration and DSI, as well as the interviews carried out as part of this study with the local population, indicated that fishing boats are not being constructed in the project area.
The Directorate of Agriculture in Sanliurfa provided information on quantities and market values of freshwater fish that were caught in Sanliurfa and Adiyaman from 1993 to 1997. These data are shown in Tables 4 and 5, and Figures 3 and 4. There are no data from 1st April to 1st July for any year, since no fishing is legally permissible during these months.
The Directorate further advised not to consider any information available for the periods January-March 1993, 1994 and 1995, because “it simply did not exist officially.” The implications of this advice were not very clear. It could mean that fishing activities existed during these periods even though these were not legally permissible, or that there were no reliable records in the Directorate.
Adiyaman. The Directorate of Agriculture in Adiyaman provided information on the quantities and market values of freshwater fish caught during January-March 1993. However,
50 since the Directorate of Agriculture from Sanliurfa had advised not to consider the statistics for these months, these were not included in the present analysis. Similarly, the information for January-March, 1993-1995, were not considered as well.
Based on statistics available, and if the production for January-March is ignored as advised by the Directorate, more than 370,000 kg of fish were sold in 1994, for a total market value of $38,742.
In 1995, the revenues decreased dramatically because only 105,000 kg of fish were sold during three months (July-September) of the year. The total market value was $10,512. This represented a decrease of more than 70% in revenue from the earlier year.
In contrast, in 1996, about 365,000 kg of fish were sold, similar to the amount sold in 1994. However, the fish sold for 1996 was over a 9-month period compared to a similar catch over only six months in 1994. The revenue in 1996 was 13% higher than that of 1994.
In 1997, the amount of fish sold until September appears to be very low compared to the previous year. Only 13,300 kg of fish sold for a total market value of $16,000 (Figure 6, Table 6).
Figure 6. Freshwater fish yields in Adiyaman, 1993-1997
60,000 450,000
400,000 50,000 350,000
40,000 300,000
250,000 30,000 200,000
20,000 150,000 Yield (kg)
Value in dollars 100,000 10,000 50,000
0 0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Years
yields dollars
51
Table 6. Freshwater fish yield in Adiyaman, 1993-1997
Date Quantity Value Date Quantity Value Sold (Kg) X1000 TL Dollars Sold (Kg) X1000 Dollars TL 1993 1996 January* 5,700 130,000 14,952 January 27,000 400,000 6,634 February* 6,400 148,000 16,387 February 274,000 430,000 6,730 March* 7,300 159,000 16,957 March 28,000 460,000 6,754 TOTAL 19,400 437,000 48,296 April ------May ------1994 June ------January* 8,500 65,000 4,286 July 5,500 262,500 3,627 February* 9,500 65,000 3,671 August 6,150 339,750 4,011 March* 10,000 65,000 3,157 September 8,000 455,000 5,134 April ------October 5,882 282,500 3,024 May ------November 4,382 324,750 3,305 June ------December 6,383 490,000 4.698 July 33,500 160,000 5,166 TOTAL 365,297 3,444,500 43,917 August 36,000 165,000 5,211 September 35,200 160,000 4,717 1997 October 80,100 215,000 6,163 January* 0 0 0 November 91,800 285,000 7,860 February* 100 40,000 336 December 97,650 360,000 9,625 March* 150 60,000 481 TOTAL 402,250 1,540,000 49,742 April ------July 1,800 360,000 2,355 1995 August 4,200 710,000 4,356 January* ------September 7,050 1,485,000 8,748 February* ------TOTAL 13,100 2,655,000 16,276 March* ------April ------May ------June ------July 33,500 160,000 3,607 August 36,000 165,000 3,458 September 35,200 160,000 3,357 October ------November ------December ------TOTAL 104,700 485,000 10,512 *Data from January, February and March 1993-1995 should not be considered, since it did not exist “officially.”
Sanliurfa. Market values of the fish sold varied significantly between 1993 and 1994. In 1993, 24,000 kg of fish sold, which had a market value of about $35,000. In 1994, 20% of this amount
52 (less than 5,000 kg) were sold for 65% more. In 1995, within 6 months’, 30,000 kg of fish were sold for almost $90,000. However, 9 months of fishing activities in 1996 resulted in 41% more of fish sold, but the market value increased by only 15% more. In January-March 1997, 5,000 kg of fish was sold for a market value of more than $30,000. Data on fish sold for January- March 1995 were not considered (Figure 7, Table 7). There were no data available from July to September 1997.
Figure 7. Freshwater fish yield in Sanliurfa, 1993-1997
120,000 45,000
40,000 100,000 35,000
80,000 30,000
25,000 60,000 20,000
40,000 15,000 Yield (kg)
Value in dollars 10,000 20,000 5,000
0 0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Years
dollars yield
If the data available are correct, it has to be concluded that fishing activities do not appear to be an attractive business proposition. Total fish catches varied widely from one year to another. Equally, the market value of fish varied tremendously over time. The general consensus appeared to be that fishing is a relatively new economic activity in the area for most of the population, and thus not surprisingly people had very limited knowledge as to how best the incomes from this activity could be maximised through an appropriate management process. If this hypothesis is correct, and if fishing is to be made an attractive income-generating activity which could also be socio-economically beneficial to the region, considerable effort has to be
53 made to develop training and educational activities in the area. Fishing could definitely be an alternative profession for some people, but the population concerned, at least during the initial years, should be supported in terms of technical knowledge, economic and marketing skills and equipment.
Table 7. Freshwater fish yield in Sanliurfa, 1993-1997
Date Quantity Value Date Quantity Value Sold (Kg) X1000 TL Dollars Sold (Kg) X1000 Dollars TL 1993 1996 July 1,710 155 13 January* 2,530 820,000 13,600 August 1,500 155 13 February* 3,180 940,000 14,712 September 1,740 155 13 March* 3,550 970,000 14,242 October 6,370 155,000 12,416 April ------November 7,200 155,000 11,610 May ------December 5,790 160,000 11,400 June ------TOTAL 24,310 470,465 35,465 July 3,230 890,000 10,788 August 1,600 890,000 10,508 1994 September 8,830 975,000 11,001 January ------October 5,950 1,150,000 12,310 February ------November 6,075 1,150,000 11,706 March ------December 7,050 1,170,000 11,217 April ------TOTAL 41,995 8,955,000 110,084 May ------June ------1997 July 495 260,000 8,395 January 1,740 1,210,000 10,821 August 490 260,000 8,211 February 1,435 1,330,000 11,185 September 520 260,000 7,665 March 2,160 1,230,000 9,874 October 1,000 415,000 11,897 April ------November 1,140 415,000 11,445 May ------December 1,225 415,000 11,095 June ------TOTAL 4,870 2,025,000 58,708 July No data No data No data August No data No data No data 1995 September No data No data No data March ------April ------May ------June ------July 3,330 550,000 12,402 August 3,400 550,000 11,827 September 8,830 645,000 13,535 October 4,040 815,000 16,341 November 4,675 840,000 16,075 December 5,370 930,000 16,434 TOTAL 29,645 4,330,000 86,614
54 *Data from January, February and March 1993-1995 should not be considered, since it did not exist “officially.”
2. Ferry boat, tourism (new hotels, restaurants, etc.)
On the basis of available evidence and site visit, no significant increase in touristic and recreational activities can be noted around the Ataturk Lake. This is to be expected since this area has not been considered in the past as a centre of touristic attraction and thus infrastructure to attract tourists like hotels, restaurants, and holiday camps have to be developed, and events which could attract tourists have to be organised. The GAP Administration is aware of this issue, and thus has been organising an annual water festival in recent years, in which the main attractions are various types of water sports in the reservoir. While this has been a good beginning, additional considerations need to be given as to how to attract more people for longer periods. Considerations could be given to organise national and international meetings in conjunction with the water festival on a regular basis each year. One possibility could be to expand the water festival to an annual occasion for discussions on various aspects related to water as a focus for regional development and integrated water and land resources management. Such a dual process of water festival and technical meetings has considerable potential to boost economic activities in the region.
3. Agricultural production through pumped irrigation directly from the reservoir
Based on information available from DSI and from personal interviews conducted with people living around the reservoir area, only a limited number of people are practicing irrigation with water pumped directly from the reservoir. These are mostly small-scale farmers. A main advantage of this type of farming has been that it could be practiced as soon as the reservoir was ready: it was not necessary to wait for irrigation to start until all canal infrastructures were constructed.
4. Irrigated Agriculture
The main objective of GAP Project is to transform the region into an export-base for its agricultural products. Irrigation is expected to increase crop yields and diversification very substantially, which in return would contribute to infrastructural development and increased economic activities. This is expected to further accelerate development of the agroindustry and other agricultural services.
A sustainable agricultural development requires not only conservation, reuse, minimization of the various environmental damages, but also suitable production practices, appropriate technology, profitability, enforcement of laws and regulations, incentives and appropriate investment plans.
Before the irrigation started, the main crops of the region were wheat and barley. In 1995, about 30,000 ha were irrigated with cotton as the main crop. By the end of 1998,
55 approximately 90,000 ha were irrigated with economic returns of around $85 million. Increase in cotton production has already spurred development in cotton-related agro-industries, like cotton ginning, manufacture of cotton-seed oil, cloth mills, etc.
Additionally, rainfed agriculture is practiced to produce crops such as wheat, barley, lentils, chickpeas and sesame as well as horticultural crops like pistachios and grapes (Altinbilek, 1997).
The production of many secondary crops has increased as well. Double and even triple cropping has been achieved due to the irrigation activities. For example, maize cultivation has increased from about 500 decares of maize in 1995, to about 4,000 decares in 1997 (10 ha = 1 decar). The private sector buys this production to feed the livestock.
5. Industrial Activities
As a direct result of developments stemming from the construction of the Ataturk dam, industrial and commercial activities are accelerating rapidly in the region. The urban centres of the region have witnessed explosive growth in immigration because of enhanced employment potential, including self-employment like traders, vendors, providers of services like child-care, transportation, etc.
Construction activities have increased substantially, as have commercial activities in both formal and informal sectors. Transportation and communication links within the region, as well as between the region and the rest of Turkey have opened up new potentials for economic and industrial activities which simply did not exist earlier. Because of increasing demands, frequency of commercial flights between the urban centres of the GAP Region and the rest of Turkey has expanded exponentially in recent years. Such increased and improved transportation and communication linkages are likely to enhance the socio-economic development of the region at an accelerated rate in the coming years.
A good example of industrial and commercial development is Sanliurfa. The city has already established an industrial zone which is now almost full, as a result of which a second zone of about 11,000 decars is now being developed. A free zone for exports and imports would be organised in this second zone. The first zone is mainly occupied by agro-industrial activities that are cotton-related, e.g., cotton ginning, textiles, cotton seed oil, etc. Prior to the construction of the Ataturk dam, these type of activities were extremely limited. These agro- industries are not only generating new employment that is improving the living conditions of many people but also are providing a major value-added service which was not available earlier. In the process, merchants or industrial concerns are buying the raw materials from the farmers, which further boosts the economy of the region. A secondary benefit of the new agro- industrial development is that the workers employed need housing, markets, and other services which are further boosting the employment conditions of the region. The Ataturk dam has thus directly contributed to a “win-win” situation, whose socio-economic benefits now encompass
56 not only the GAP Region but also the rest of the country through a variety of direct and indirect linkages and pathways.
The GAP Region is now at an early phase of industrial development. The levels of education and training that now exist in the region are still significantly below national average, though in recent years the gaps between the two have been closing. While at present very significant number of unskilled labourers can be absorbed in the labour force, the region will increasingly need more and more skilled labour, if the sustainability of the employment generation conditions are to be ensured, and new employments are to be generated. Many of the unskilled labourers are progressively learning new skills, which increases their salaries and employment opportunities. However, more needs to be done if the current expectations are to be fulfilled. The potential of higher income through better-paying jobs are of course strong incentives for the people to learn new skills.
In spite of some advances, however, it is now clear that the region is already suffering from a shortage of skilled workers. As new industries are established and existing ones are modernised, demand for skilled labour is going to accelerate. This demand can be fulfilled by increasing the training facilities available in the region, and by migration of skilled workers from other parts of Turkey to the GAP area. The latter is likely to put inflationary pressures on wages for skilled labour in the country, which could reduce one of the important economic advantages the country has at present. Equally dependence on skilled workers from outside the area will assure that the workers of the region will be increasingly restricted to low-paying and undesirable jobs. This could create social tension between the low-paid local workers and highly paid employees coming from outside the area. Thus, viewed from any direction, the best solution would be to take appropriate and timely steps which would increase the education and skills of the local workers.
While increasing industrialisation has ensured many benefits to the people of the region, it also is bringing in its wake certain social and environmental costs. The main concern at present is the negative environmental and social impacts of wastewater management practices. Proper wastewater treatment by any industry in the region is now an exception rather than the norm. The situation is serious for the industrial zone in Sanliurfa because of the high concentration of the industrial activities in the area. None of the industries treat their wastewater, and all of wastewaters are now discharged on the land adjoining the industries.
Even though the Sanliurfa industrial estate is 15 km away from the city, the discharge of wastewater could have major social and health costs in the coming years. First, even though Sanliurfa is at a reasonably distance away from the industrial estate, groundwater of the area may become contaminated with industrial wastewaters over the years. Depending on the gradient of the flow, the groundwater of the region may become contaminated industrial waste products, not only in Sanliurfa but also in the different cities where similar industrial developments are being encouraged.
Second, the industrial estate may be 15 km away from Sanliurfa, but it is located near some villages and a nearby stream, which serves as a source for water for many people. People and
57 the ecosystems of the nearby villages are likely to bear the first adverse health and environmental impacts from the existing wastewater discharges from these new industrial developments.
Near-term, monitoring of the qualities of the wastewater discharges and groundwater near the estate is necessary. Over the short- to medium-term, it is necessary to prepare a plan for wastewater treatment for the industrial zone, and then implement it. Because of lack of data on the quantities and qualities of wastewater generated, it is difficult to make specific comments on water quality issues. However, prima facie, there appears to be a good case to construct a communal wastewater plant for treating the discharges from the industrial estate as soon as possible.
A strategy for wastewater management for the industrial estate of Sanliurfa should now receive priority attention. This is because a second zone is now in the process of establishment which is likely to increase the magnitude of the overall problem.
The experience with the Sanliurfa industrial zone project indicates that any new similar project in the region must consider a wastewater and solid waste management plan from the very beginning of the planning process. Environmental management needs to receive a higher priority than at present.
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION
In Turkey, the designated executing agencies for water and land development projects are DSI. The General Directorate of Rural Affairs is responsible for resettlement and rehabilitation. Like in most other countries, expropriation of land and the subsequent resettlement and rehabilitation activities are regulated by law (Altinbilek et al., 1999a,b).
The levels of compensation for the people who have to be resettled depend on several factors like the nature and size of the properties, elements which could increase the value of the properties, taxes paid on the properties, etc. The levels of compensations for all properties are decided by an independent valuation commission composed of technical experts and representatives of the affected population. DSI transfers the amount needed to a Special Resettlement Fund that is then managed by the General Directorate of Rural Affairs. When the values of the expropriated properties exceeds the compensations offered, the differences are paid back to the owners. However, when it is the reverse, the owners are given a 5 year moratorium on the debt, followed by a 20-year interest free repayment period (Altinbilek, 1999a).
Figure 8 shows the dams and hydroelectric power plants that have been constructed up to 1999. Table 10 shows the population who has been resettled due to the construction of large dams in Turkey between 1990 and 1997.
58
Figure 8. Dams and hydroelectric power plants that have been constructed in Turkey up to 1999
Source: (DSI, 1999)
People have the option to decide whether they would like to be resettled in rural or in urban areas. For those families who opt for rural development, each household is entitled to housing, farm land, credit for animal husbandry, etc. The law further stipulates that the farmers who are to be resettled must receive from the Government training on new agricultural production methods. All rural resettlement units have to be provided with a health centre, a doctor, a nurse, and a midwife. For urban resettlement, the people receive a house and needed commercial facilities, as well as credits for commercial activities. In many cases, major land owners with large properties prefer to receive cash compensation, and then use the compensation received to establish small industries or commercial activities in the cities. It is fairly common to find that part of a family whose land was expropriated moves to the city, but the rest prefers to stay on the land. The experiences indicate that the second
59 generation of the families that decided to resettle in the cities and invested their money successfully, became entrepreneurs.
Overall, the main problem for the relocation of populations is the scarcity of land where a group of people could be resettled, and not money. Experiences from different water development projects from other parts of Turkey indicate that many people prefer to take the appropriate financial compensations and then organise their own resettlement in areas of their choice. The GAP Region was no exception to this practice.
People from the rural areas, often non-skilled and not familiar with the various investment opportunities have not managed the expropriation funds received properly. Accordingly, many of them have unwisely used the funds received and have financially ended up with no house, no land, no job, and no money. Thus, within a limited period of time, they have ended up as destitutes, with economic and living conditions significantly worse than before because of poor investment decisions and inappropriate financial management. This is an important problem for Turkey in terms of the efficiency and social acceptability of the resettlement practices. This is a national problem, not limited to the GAP Region, for which proper solutions, like intensive information and communication services, have to be provided which could enhance the social and economic conditions of the people who are to be resettled.
For the current analysis, the information on resettlement was collected from DSI and from the Directorate of Rural Affairs. The information that the XVI Regional Directorate of DSI provided included the status of urban and rural resettlement as of 1993, and also the status of expropriation as of 1996. DSI data did not include information on resettlement after 1993.
On the basis of the information collected from DSI and the Directorate of Rural Affairs, as of 15 September 1997, the expropriation of properties up to the height of 542 metres has been completed. The total cost has been 13,057 trillion TL at 1995 prices. By the end of 1995, and by decision of the courts, 2,979 trillion TL (at 1995 prices) have been paid to settle disputes with the resettled population.
The Directorate of Rural Affairs has estimated that 1129 families had to be displaced due to the Ataturk dam Project during the period 1988 to 1997. Out of this number, 44% would be resettled in rural areas, and the balance of 56% in urban areas. By 1998, only 30% of the population had been resettled (344 families), and 70% still had to be resettled (369 families in rural areas, and 416 families in urban areas) (Tables 8 and 9).
However, the records of DSI do not include the total number of families that have to be resettled. The records only note that the number of families that were involuntarily resettled from 1988 to 1997 was 344 (133 in rural areas, and 211 in urban areas).
By 1999, 375 families affected by the Dam were still living in rented houses waiting to be resettled in rural areas (Altinbilek et al., 1999a,b).
60 According to DSI (Bayram, 2000), by July, 2000, 36 families more had been resettled in Ayrancilar village and six families more had decided not to wait any longer to receive the support of the Government. The General Directorate of Rural Affairs is planning to resettle the remaining 333 families in Van province, but the necessary land still has not been allocated by the Treasury. Due to the delay, several families are considering to be resettled in urban areas. Kahta district of Adiyaman province is one possibility, according to the officers from the Rural Affairs. However, Rural Affairs still has not carried out any detailed study related to this resettlement.
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the efficacy of the resettlement process from the perspective of the people who were affected, extensive series of discussions were conducted with the project-affected people in several villages in Adiyaman and Sanliurfa provinces. Collective meetings with the people that were resettled were organised in a few selected villages. All the meetings included the Mukhtar (Head of the village) and all the heads (men) of each family living in each town. The men finally selected for detailed interviews were chosen at random. In all cases, at least 50% of the heads of the households affected were interviewed in one form or another.
The main issues that were discussed during all these interviews and meetings were the effectiveness of the resettlement process, status and levels of compensations paid, quality of housing and services provided, as well as the impacts of the construction of the Ataturk dam on their own lives, the lives of their families and their villages.
The three villages studied in detail were New Samsat, Akpinar and Kizilcapinar. An overall picture of the resettlement process from the perspective of the resettlers, by the villages, is discussed next.
1. New Samsat
Due to the construction of the Ataturk dam, one administrative district and its centre, 27 villages and 73 arable fields (sub-village) were totally inundated, and eight villages and 10 arable fields were partially inundated (Altinbilek et al., 1999a).
The district centre of Samsat was rebuilt above the reservoir level and most of the 5,000 people of the town, as well as some people living nearby had to be relocated in a new village called New Samsat. The new place was established about 8 km away from the old town. The population recognized the main differences between the old and the new towns, and between their old and new life-styles. The people that were interviewed stated that Old Samsat was a non-planned city; their houses were small, and generally made out of mud. Available transportation and communication networks were very deficient. Access to health, education services and electrical facilities were also highly unsatisfactory. The main economic activity of the old village was agriculture, and the main products were cereals and cotton. In contrast, for New Samsat village, infrastructure facilities like roads, energy, water, and communication were excellent. This unquestionably is a significant improvement compared to what the population had access to earlier. In addition, their new houses were built with cement, and people in
61 general had televisions, refrigerators, telephones, and washing machines in their houses, which earlier were considered to be luxury items. People also now have running water, electrical connections and better sanitation facilities in their houses. On the negative side, the people felt their current income was lower than before since they can grow mainly tobacco because of absence of water to irrigate.
The local population also pointed out that Old Samsat did not have medical personnel or facilities. Because of absence of health facilities and poor transportation facilities, caring of the sick, old and pregnant women was difficult. This contributed to much suffering. Situation in the new town was totally different. New Samsat currently has three doctors in the town on a permanent basis and there is also a small hospital. There are also more schools (2 primary, 1 high school) compared to only one primary school earlier. When the present study was carried out, another primary school was under construction.
When the population moved to New Samsat, DSI encouraged fishing as a new commercial activity. Fish larvae were provided. However, people did not appear to be interested in pursuing fishing as a profession. Accordingly, there were only a few fishermen. The fishes that are caught are primarily for household consumption. Some of the reasons for the unpopularity of the fishing profession could be inadequate fish catch, lack of stock and/or proper fishing gears, absence of commercialisation, or to the fact that people are not aware of the potential of the fishing profession since it is a new activity in the area.
In Old Samsat, the rate of out-migration was low, probably because people had steady activities and jobs. At the new location, however, many people are migrating to other cities to get better jobs. Some of the inhabitants appear to have migrated to Sanliurfa to work in the cotton fields. Tobacco grown in New Samsat is sold to the Government. The farmers currently receive technical advice from the Department of Agriculture on various aspects of tobacco farming.
Overall, the people interviewed agreed that their quality of life is better in New Samsat compared to what they had before. This is primarily because the conditions under which they live are better at present than before in many significant ways. However, the people insisted that from an economic viewpoint, the conditions were better earlier. It was not possible to determine if the deterioration in their economic conditions was real, or it was a complaint by the people who felt that this could bring them additional new economic benefits from the government. 2. Akpinar
Akpinar is an old village, which contributed with many people to the construction of the Ataturk dam as non-skilled workers. With the incomes obtained during this construction process, people constructed new houses with better materials (cement, brick, etc.) compared to before (primarily mud); and bought consumer goods like refrigerators, television sets, etc. Some people also bought tractors, or established small shops. Many farmers supplemented their incomes by working at the dam site as a secondary job. There were some fishermen in the town, but catch was primarily for their own consumption.
62
The economic and social conditions of the people have improved. This is because before the Ataturk reservoir, they had to grow tobacco under rainfed conditions. The new reservoir has proved to be a source of irrigation. The farmers currently grow mainly cotton, which has increased their incomes appreciably. Thus, not surprisingly, an overwhelming percentage of people feel the construction of the Dam has been beneficial to the community, although there are some unemployed people who are looking for jobs. One of the benefits of having a higher income has been that the children (including girls, according to the people interviewed) are now being sent to the schools, even though most of the population of the town attended only primary school. Absence of higher education and training has meant that most of the people from this village who worked during the construction of the Dam were non-skilled. However, since the construction of the Ataturk dam extended over a period of years, it was possible for many of the villagers to be trained as drivers, motor mechanics, etc. With new skills, some of the people are now working as skilled labourers at different infrastructure development projects all over the country, and a few even abroad.
Even though the town has access to water for agricultural activities, it did not have access to drinking water by the time of the study. Their only source of drinking water was through a constantly running pipe. Drainage at the pipe outlet was a problem, especially in terms of health. The problem was easy to resolve, either by the local technicians or by the appropriate municipal authority. The villagers had requested the Government help to resolve the situation, but no help was forthcoming when the study was undertaken. The villagers also had taken no initiative to solve this simple problem themselves.
3. Kizilcapinar Village
This is a village with about 15 families from Caili village who were still waiting to be resettled in rural areas. They are still living in rented houses paid for by the government,. They work as sharecroppers, primarily growing tobacco, which is the same activity they used to carry out before they were displaced. Even though they had limited resources, most of the villagers interviewed mentioned that their children were attending schools in Adiyaman.
On the basis of the interview and meetings, it appears that the vast majority of the people that had to be resettled due to the construction of the Ataturk dam were not aware of the overall process of resettlement. Nor did they have much knowledge of the Resettlement or Expropriation Laws or their entitlements under the laws. Some people who are yet to be resettled mentioned that they tried to obtain information several times from the Directorate of Rural Affairs, but without any success. Basically they wanted to know where they were likely to be resettled and when this might take place. They were told that they would be informed when their houses would be ready, and they could move. The government officials had informed them that they are likely to be resettled “in the future” in Hatay, which did not appear to be the situation as of October 1997. Even though six families were resettled in Hatay in 1996, the information provided by the Directorate of Rural Affairs was that the construction of these houses in Hatay had to be stopped because of social disturbances and unrest. The inhabitants of Hatay did not want people from Kizilcapinar to be resettled there. It seems that the main
63 constraint to resettle the people is the lack of appropriate land. The population in Kizilcapinar had not been informed of this situation, and accordingly, were still expecting to be relocated to Hatay.
64 Table 8. Resettlement of population due to the construction of Ataturk dam (Source: General Directorate of Rural Affairs)
Year Name of the Present Location Number of Number of Type of Resettlement Area Project Families to Families Settlement be already Resettled Resettled Province District Village Rural Urban Province District Village 1988 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 185 185 - 135 Adiyaman Y.Samsat - 1988 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 34 34 34 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 42 42 42 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Sanliurfa Various Various 20 20 20 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Diyarbakir Cermik Dilekpinar 3 3 3 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Geldibuldu 1 1 - 1 Burbur Bucak - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Centre Hacihalil 1 1 1 - Sanliurfa Ceylanpinar - 1989 Ataturk Diyarbakir Cermik Dilekpinar 1 1 1 - Diyarbakir Centre - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Samsat Various 6 6 - 6 Adiyaman Y. Samsat - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Centre Karicik 1 1 - 1 Ordu Unye - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Adali 2 2 2 - Aydin Soke Denizkoy 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 18 18 18 - Hatay Reyhanli Vazvaza 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Geldibuldu 1 1 1 - Konya Sarayumu Kayioren 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Bostanli 2 2 2 - Cankiri Cerkes Akhasan 1991 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 2 2 2 - Hatay Reyhanli Vazvaza 1993 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 18 18 - 18 Adiyaman Y. Samsat - 1993 Ataturk Sanliurfa Bozova Dikili 1 1 1 - Hatay Kirikhan Karatas 1997 Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 6 6 6 - Hatay Centre Hasanli Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 369 - 369 - Hatay Hassa Gurpinar* Ataturk Adiyaman Various Various 416 - - 416 Adiyaman Y.Samsat ** TOTAL 1129 344 502 627
* The General Directorate of Rural Affairs stopped the construction of the houses (regulations of 27.3.1997) ** The land to construct the houses was given by the government, the population did not pay for it.
65
Table 9. Resettlement of population due to the Construction of Ataturk dam (Source: General Directorate of Rural Affairs)
Name of the Location Name of the area affected What was affected To what extent Project Province District Settlement Land
Ataturk dam Sanliurfa Bozova Dutluca Village Land Partially Yaslica Village Land Partially Cinarli Village Settlement Completely Igdeli Village Settlement Land Completely Gecitbasi Village Settlement Land Completely Dikili Village Settlement Land Completely Kasimkuyu Village Settlement Land Partially Tavuk Hamlet Land Completely Baglica Village Odulalan Settlement Land Partially Completely Hamlet Yukaricatak Village Settlement Land Partially Tatar Hoyuk Village Settlement Completely Bahceli Village Settlement Land Partially Tekagac Village Settlement Land Partially Asagika Tak Village Settlement Completely Yiginak Village Land Partially Acikyel Hamlet Settlement Completely Akyatir Hamlet Settlement Completely Arikok Village Land Partially Kucuktulmen Village Land Partially Sanliurfa Hilvan Gulusagi Village Settlement Completely Kocabey Village Settlement Land Completely Gelenek Village Settlement Land Partially Kamisly Hamlet Land Completely Ambar Village Settlement Land Completely Ugra Village Settlement Land Completely Uluyazi Village Settlement Land Partially Nasrettin Village Settlement Completely Geciatagzi Village Settlement Completely Kavalik Village Land Partially Kovaci Village Settlement Completely
66
Name of the Location Name of the Area affected What was affected To what extent Project Province District Settlement Land
Oymaagac Village Land Partially Karaburc Village Land Partially Bagrac Village Settlement Land Partially Bahcelik Village Settlement Completely Faik Village Settlement Land Partially Kucak Village Land Partially Catak Village Land Partially Bugur Village Land Partially Sanliurfa Siverek Tasagil Village Land Partially Azikli Village Land Partially Kalemli Village Settlement Completely Kuslogol Village Land Partially Kayali Village Land Partially Divan Village Land Partially Narlikaya Village Land Partially Buruncek Village Land Partially Tasikara Village Land Partially Buyukoba Village Land Partially Bekceri Village Land Partially Kavalik Village Land Partially Caylarbasi-subdist Land Partially Adiyaman Centre Bebek Village Land Partially Araplar Hamlet Settlements Completely Mazilik Hamlet Settlements Completely Cobandede Village Land Partially Cat Hamlet Settlements Completely Bagpinar Sub-dist Land Partially Akdere Village Land Partially Karicik Village Settlement Completely Battalhoyuk Village Land Partially Bozhoyuk Village Land Partially Yazica Village Land Partially Yazlik Village Land Partially Kuyuck Village Land Partially Buyukkavalik Village Land Partially
67 Lokman Village Land Partially Kizilcapinar Village Land Partially Disbudak Village Land Partially
Name of the Location Name of the area affected What was affected To what extent Project Province District Settlement Land
Cayci Village Settlement Completely Aydinlar Village Settlement Completely Golpinar Village Land Partially Incebag Village Land Partially Boztepe Village Land Partially Sariharman Village Land Partially Ipekli Village Land Partially Sitilce Mah. Land Partially Adiyaman Samsat Samsat Ilcesi Settlement Land Completely Kumluca Village Settlement Land Completely Balcilar Village Settlement Land Completely Sutbulak Village Settlement Land Completely Kovanoluk Village Settlement Land Completely Tapeonu Village Settlement Completely Bayirli Village Nalgevir Land Partially Completely Hamlet Settlement Bagarasi Village Land Partially Doganca Village Land Partially Completely Kilisik Hamlet Settlement Goltarla Village Land Partially Gulpinar Village Land Partially Kirmacik Village Land Partially Bizbeya Hamlet Settlement Completely Yarimbag Village Land Partially Orentas Village Land Partially
Uzuntepe Village Land Partially Adiyaman Kahta Taskuyu Village Land Partially Cicek Village Land Partially Belenli Sub-dist Land Partially Cakiresme Sub-dist Settlement Land Completely
68 Dardagan Village Land Partially Gurni Mah. Settlement Land Completely Eskitas Village Land Partially Ulupinar Village Land Partially
Name of the Location Name of the area affected What was affected To what extent Project Province District Settlement Land
Yiginak Village Land Partially Arili Village Land Partially Caybasi Village Land Partially Beloren Village Land Partially Saridana Village Land Partially Guzelcay Village Land Partially Seyhbaba Village Land Partially Erikdere Village Land Partially Go lgeli Village Land Partially Buyukbag Village Land Partially Oluklu Village Land Partially Gudulge Village Land Partially Akincilar Sub-dist Land Partially Geldibuldu Village Settlement Completely Adali Village Settlement Completely Ikizce Village Land Partially Bostanli Village Settlement Completely Narsirti Village Settlement Completely Dut Village Land Partially Kahta Centre Land Partially Sanliurfa Gerger Kilic Village Land Partially Besgoze Village Land Partially Korulu Village Land Partially Gumuskasik Village Land Partially Kokluce Village Land Partially Beybostan Village Land Partially Yagmurlu Village Land Partially Kesertas Village Land Partially Yayladali Village Land Partially Acma Village Land Partially 69 Dagdeviren Village Land Partially Budakli Village Land Partially Uckaya Village Land Partially Gonen Village Land Partially Gozpinar Village Land Partially
Name of the Location Name of the Area affected What was affected To what extent Project
Province District Settlement Land
Gecitli Village Land Partially Konacik Village Land Partially Ortaca Village Land Partially Cevizpinar Village Land Partially Diyarbakir Germik Saltepe Village Land Partially Ceylan Village Land Partially Pamuklu Village Land Partially Karakaya Village Land Partially Cukurelma Village Land Partially Armagantasi Village Land Partially Dilekpinar Village Land Partially Konakli Village Land Partially Sayhandede Village Land Partially Adalar Village Land Partially Komurculer Village Land Partially Bayat Village Land Partially
70 Table 11. Number of families resettled due to the construction of large dams in Turkey, 1970 – 1997
YEAR NAME OF ORIGINAL LOCATION NUMBER OF TYPE OF NEW LOCATION THE DAM FAMILIES SETTLEMENT RESETTLED PROVINCE DISTRICT VILLAGE RURAL URBAN PROVINCE DISTRICT VILLAGE 1985 Altinkaya Samsun Bafra Several 25 - 25 Bursa Gemlik Centre 1986 Altinkaya Sinop Duragan Kaplangi 41 41 - Hatay Reyhanli Horlak 1986 Altinkaya Samsun Several Several 130 130 - Hatay Reyhanli Horlak 1988 Altinkaya Sinop Duragan Several 81 - 81 Sinop Duragan - 1989 Altinkaya Sinop Duragan Several 6 - 6 Sinop Duragan - 1990 Altinkaya Sinop Duragan Several 155 155 - Hatay Reyhanli Vazvaza 1990 Altinkaya Samsun Vezirkopru Several 11 11 - Reyhanli Vazvaza 1990 Altinkaya Sinop Several Several 5 - 5 Duragan TOTAL 454 337 117
1970- Hasan-Suat Ugurly 39 39 - Samsun Carsamba Demirli 1983 1985 Hasan-Suat Ugurlu Ordu Akkus Cokek 17 - 17 Ordu Unye Centre
1985 Hasan-Suat Ugurly Samsun Carsamba Several 100 - 100 Samsun Carsamba Kirazlicay 1987 Hasan-Suat Ugurly Samsun Carsamba Several 134 - 134 Samsun Carsamba Kirazlicay 1987 Hasan-Suat Ugurly Ordu Akkus Several 38 - 38 Samsun Carsamba Kirazlicay TOTAL 328 39 289
1986 Karakaya Malatya Several Several 132 132 - Konya Centre Yaglibayat 1986 Karakaya Malatya Several Several 62 62 - Aydin Soke Kirikici 1986 Karakaya Elazig Several Several 33 33 - Aydin Soke Kirikici 1987 Karakaya Malatya Several Several 20 20 - Aydin Soke Kirikici 1989 Karakaya Malatya Centre Meydanci 1 1 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1990 Karakaya Malatya Centre Tecirli 2 2 - Kanya Sarayon Kayioren TOTAL 250 250
1988 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 34 34 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1988 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 185 - 185 Adiyaman Y. Samsat - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 6 - 6 Adiyaman Y. Samsat - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 42 42 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk S. Urfa Several Several 20 20 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Diyarbaki Cermik Dilekpinar 3 3 - Aydin Soke Yalikoy 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Geldibuldu 1 - 1 Burdur Bucak - 71 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Centre Hacihalil 1 1 - S. Urfa Ceylanpinar - 1989 Ataturk Diyarbakir Cermik Dilekpinar 1 1 - Diyarbakir Centre - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Centre Karicik 1 - 1 Ordu Unye - 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Centre Ovakuyu 1 1 - Aydin Soke Denizcoy 1989 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Adali 1 1 . Aydin Soke Denizcoy 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 18 18 - Hatay Reyhanli Vazvaza 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Geldibuldu 1 1 - Konya Sarayonu Kayioren 1990 Ataturk Adiyaman Kahta Bostanli 2 2 - Cankiri Cerkes Akhasan 1991 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 2 2 - Hatay Reyhanli Vazvaza 1993 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 18 - 18 Adiyaman Y. Samsat - 1993 Ataturk S. Urfa Bozova Dikili 1 1 - Hatay Kirikhan Karatas 1997 Ataturk Adiyaman Several Several 6 6 - Hatay Centre Hasanli TOTAL 344 133 211
1993 Kayraktepec Icel Mut Evren 1 1 - Hatay Kirikhan Karatas TOTAL 1 1 -
1970- Keban 159 93 - Diyarbakir Centre Yolboyu 1983 40 - Elazig Centre Golkoy 26 - Tunceli Pertek Bicmekaya TOTAL 159 159 -
1970- Gokcekaya 43 - 43 Eskisehir Centre - 1983 TOTAL 43 - 43
TOTAL 1604 919 685 Source: DSI, 1999.
72 CONCLUSIONS
During the studies carried out, it was evident that the magnitude and extent of the social and economic impacts generated by the Ataturk dam and its reservoir have been positive not only for the region but also for the country as a whole. The benefits that are now accruing to the country by the increased electricity generation alone are substantial. Equally, for the population living in the project area, and especially for the majority of people living near and around the reservoir, their lifestyles have improved very significantly. In retrospect, based on data currently available, the construction of the main infrastructural project in the GAP area, the Ataturk dam, has acted as the engine for economic growth and integrated regional development in a historically underdeveloped area. The Dam and the reservoir system have changed the way of living of the local people, and significantly increased the employment opportunities and working conditions of the communities. Expanded economic activities have encouraged migration from the rural to the urban areas. The semi-urban and urban areas of the region are now facing an incoming population flux, with the attendant need for more and more housing, water, education, health services, and employment opportunities and efficient and reliable transportation and communication systems.
The region has flourished and employment has been generated both during the construction and the operation of the Dam. Many of the labourers who initially were unskilled and who were trained during the construction period of the Dam, became skilled, and entrepreneurs after the construction was over. Many of them are now working in the construction of dams all over the country. The resulting incomes come back to the region, since the incomes are sent back to the families.
The benefits of irrigation are visible mainly in Sanliurfa, where both formal and informal jobs have increased exponentially. However, the construction of the Dam did not result only in benefits in terms of employment. The daily exposure of the villagers to the different traditions of “outsiders” during more than a decade of construction, resulted in the population expressing their ambitions in terms of better and more housing, transportation, food and health habits, higher education, the decision of the local population to send their children (including women) to the schools, demand for information and communication, etc. The life-styles of the population have thus started to change in the region, which only can result in better quality of life for many people.
While the construction of this Dam and the associated hydraulic structures have clearly contributed significantly to improve the lifestyles of the people, they also have had some adverse direct and indirect social and environmental impacts as well, e.g. resettlement of a large number of people from the inundated area, impoverishments of those who did not manage their expropriation funds properly, loss of productive agricultural land, and increase in environmental contaminations due to higher levels of economic activities. The population affected, however, has generally been fairly compensated for their losses.
73 Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the overall benefits and costs of the Dam were viewed differently at the local level depending upon whether the people were from Adiyaman or Sanliurfa. Several towns of Adiyaman were affected by the construction of the Dam and the reservoir. In the villages visited, the people did not have access to water for irrigation purposes. Thus, they felt that their lands had been expropriated and they were not receiving benefits from the reservoir in terms of irrigation, even though they confirmed that their life-styles had improved in general compared to what it was before. They felt this was unfair. In contrast, the people living in Sanliurfa appeared to have a very positive attitude towards the Dam and the reservoir.
Since the socio-economic and educational levels of the people who had to be resettled varied widely, it is not possible to draw uniform and universally acceptable conclusions. However, among the positive impacts were improvements in the economic conditions and life-styles of the people who managed their expropriation funds properly. Education of children (including girls) received a significant boost, and fertility rates have started to decline. Fragmentation of families was the main adverse impact with the resettlement processes, when the several members of the extended families decided to settle down in different places. Impoverishment was a serious issue for those who could not manage their expropriation funds properly.
If the GAP Project succeeds to achieve its objectives, the development requirements of the region are likely to increase very significantly. However, if these significant and rapid social, economic and environmental changes cannot be properly managed, environmental degradations in terms of water, soil and air pollution could become serious problems in several urban communities, which in turn could have adverse impacts on the sustainability of the project, and on the health of the people and the ecosystems. With such a multiplicity of opportunities and problems, it is important to identify specific priorities, policies, and actions that are needed to address the most immediate and critical issues related to sustainable urban development, including the development and facilitation of appropriate social and technological infrastructures.
Although not easy, the integration of environmental considerations within the planning processes of the region would certainly result in better living conditions for the population and in the protection of its natural resources. Experiences from other parts of the world indicate that large rural and urban public investment projects, when not properly implemented and managed, could adversely affect the ecosystems and, in the long-term, the socio-economic development. Regional strategies to manage water, land, air and biotic resources need the formulation, integration and implementation of appropriate land use policies and practices for both urban and rural areas that could be affected by the development projects. While formulation of rational land use policies should be possible, global experiences indicate that generally they are very difficult to implement even under the best of circumstances. This could thus be a potential problem for the GAP Region.
74 No large-scale infrastructure development project is possible anywhere in the world which can only contribute to positive impacts. However, even though some negative impacts would be unavoidable, social and environmental impacts should be looked at in an organised way so that they can be mitigated properly. Accordingly, projects and activities must be selected where positive impacts significantly outweigh the negative costs.
Overall, the main problem for the relocation of populations is the scarcity of land where a group of people could be resettled, and not the availability of funds for compensations. Experiences from different water development projects from several parts of the world indicate that many people prefer to receive the appropriate financial compensations and then plan and organise their own resettlements in areas of their choice. People from the rural areas, mostly non-skilled and not familiar with the various investment opportunities, often do not know how to manage properly their expropriation funds. Accordingly, they have often unwisely used the funds received and have later financially ended up with no house, no land, no job, and no money. Thus, within a limited period of time, many of them have become destitutes, with economic and living conditions significantly worse than before they were resettled because of poor investment decisions and bad financial management. This is an important issue that needs further consideration in terms of the long-term economic efficiency of the process and the social acceptability of the resettlement practices. This, however, is not only a problem limited to Turkey, but also for nearly all developing countries, for which proper solutions have to be found. In the final analysis, people who are to be resettled must have better conditions than before since they are involuntarily affected by the development projects. In fact, with the increasing scarcity of land necessary for land for land resettlement processes, the governments will have to develop appropriate information and communication strategies to support the populations on how to invest their expropriation funds, and make them aware of the risks of managing them unwisely.
Properly planned and implemented, resettlement programmes can become part of an overall strategy of any country to reduce poverty. Well planned investments in new infrastructures and services (water, electricity, schools, hospitals, roads, etc.) represent an opportunity to improve the standard of life of the populations directly affected by the development projects. Since the rejection of any involuntary resettlement is unrealistic, it is essential to improve the knowledge base for the planning and the implementation phases of the projects, looking to protect the entitlements and livelihoods of those affected. Resettlement should be approached as a development process, which it is, and not as the neglected stage of an infrastructural construction project. This, although difficult, it is not impossible, especially if there are policies and resources, and also the understanding of the complexities, and the benefits and costs, of resettlement processes from the social, cultural, economic and ecological viewpoints.
In Turkey, there do not seem to be negative attitudes towards the construction of infrastructural projects because of their impacts on the people and the environment. The projects are understood and appreciated for what they are: essential part of the development of the country which will improve the lifestyles of the people. There is a
75 concern and a demand, however, that social and environmental issues should be taken into consideration in the projects to avoid increased poverty for large number of people, unwanted migratory movements, degradation of the environment, etc.
In Turkey, the institutional framework, as well as the practices, for resettlement and rehabilitation are being improved at present in order to ensure a better coordination between the concerned agencies during the planning and implementation stages of resettlement, as well as rehabilitation processes. Additionally, the sustainability of each dam that is to be constructed is being objectively assessed in order to assure that it would be a win-win solution from the social, economic, environmental and cultural view-points. Those projects which were to be implemented, but were later not considered to be optimal for the sustainable development of any region, have been postponed indefinitely.
The need for reform of development policies is becoming increasingly apparent and urgent with the passage of time. The present thinking is that development policies should be formulated within a much broader and integrative framework than has been the case in the past. It is understood that exclusive reliance on techno-economic aspects cannot provide all the necessary conditions which could ensure that the fruits of development policies are enjoyed by all the people concerned in an equitable and sustainable manner. They must go beyond techno-economic considerations and must include social and environmental factors, as well as objective review of the capacities of the institutions that are likely to implement them.
GAP Project, if properly planned and implemented, represents an opportunity for the development of one-tenth of the population of the country. In order to succeed in such a challenging task, development planning and implementation should explicitly consider improvements in the quality of life of people, fulfilment of their needs and expectations at the national, regional and local levels, and preservation of the environment.
Meeting the social goals of a country has set a challenging agenda for development at the global level. The GAP Project, by meeting the economic, social and environmental goals of Southeastern Anatolia Region, has the potential to become an excellent example of people-centred integrated regional development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The support of Dr. Olcay Unver and Mr. Kaya Yasinok, President and Vice President of GAP, and Prof. Dogan Altinbilek, Director General of DSI, are gratefully acknowledged. Ms. Berrin Basak of GAP provided much assistance in the data collection process. The
76 study was carried out for the GAP Administration and UNDP. The opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of GAP and UNDP.
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77 GAP Administration, 1999b, The Ataturk Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP), Information Series, GAP Regional Development Administration, Prime Ministry, Ankara.
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78 Safak, N., G. Berk, S. Buyukkusoglu, Z. Oztekin, 1994, Assessment of the Stock of Water Products and Fishing Grounds in the Ataturk dam Lake, DSI, Ankara.
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79 IV. RESETTLEMENT: AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, water has always been considered to be a critical natural resource on which mankind’s very survival depends. Human history, from the earliest evolution of the human beings to the development of the main civilizations on the banks of some major rivers, like the Nile, Euphrates, Tigris and Indus, can be considered to be water-centred. These early important civilizations developed and flourished because of the many advantages the rivers gave them. In fact, the history of mankind can be written in terms of human interactions and interrelations with water, so much that they can be called hydraulic civilisations (Biswas, 1970).
For some 5,000 years, water retaining structures have been built in different parts of the world to ensure water availability for domestic and agricultural purposes on a reliable basis. As science and technology have advanced, it has been possible to construct larger and more complex water storage and distribution structures. In the 19th and 20th centuries, these advances coincided with the growth of the global population, when more water became necessary to support ever-increasing human activities in the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors. The Industrial Revolution further accelerated the demands for water. With very significant advances in technology, human knowledge-base and the global economy, and plentiful availability of water, it was possible to match the accelerating water demand by increasing water availability. Furthermore, electricity requirements to support an ever- increasing global population and economic expansion increased as well. Since no large-scale generation of electricity is possible without water, water requirements increased concomitantly. Navigation became an important form of transportation to move goods produced by the Industrial Revolution. Populations steadily became more dispersed over a larger area, and the rates of urbanisation started to increase, as a result of which society had to be protected from the regular ravages of droughts and floods through better water control mechanisms and management practices. Thus, water control and assured water availability of appropriate quality became an essential requirements for continuing economic and social development of the world (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001).
One of the most efficient ways to manage water resources is with the construction of dams, which create reservoirs for the storage of water and its future distribution. Currently, there are about 45,000 large dams, as defined by the International Commission for Large Dams (ICOLD). These are dams higher than 15 meters or higher than 10 m but with more than 500 m crest length, or more than 1 million m3 storage capacity, or more than 2,000 m3/s spilling capacity (ICOLD, 1997). While some of the existing dams are more than 2,000 years old, about 73% of them have been built only during the last 50 years. The reservoirs formed by these dams store some 3,600 km3 of usable water (ICOLD, 1999). Large dams have become an integral part of our basic infrastructure by offering indispensable benefits, like
79 irrigation, hydropower, domestic and industrial water supply, flood control, navigation, fish farming and recreation (Lecornu, 1998).
Due to the limited and uneven distribution of water at the global level, many more dams are still needed if development is to be promoted and basic human needs are to be covered. This applies especially to the developing countries, which currently represent 70% of the world population and approximately 94% of the annual global population growth. In many of these countries, increased food production is only possible through improved or increased irrigation. Currently, it is estimated that 30-40% of the irrigated land worldwide relies on dams and that dams generate almost 20% of the electricity at the global level (Bird and Wallace, 2001). About 250 million hectares of land are under irrigation, growing one-third of food at the global level on less than one-fifth of the world's total cultivated area, and accounting for almost three-quarters of world water consumption. In conjunction with determined efforts to develop effective ways of saving water by avoiding losses in the distribution systems, and by applying better irrigation techniques, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates a 3% compound rate of growth in irrigated agriculture to meet the needs of an extra one billion people in the next ten years (ICOLD, 1997).
Increasingly more emphasis will have to be paid in the future on population control, as well as on improved water demand management practices, including efficient use, re-use, and reclamation of water by various technical, economic, social and legal means. However, in addition to a more efficient water management, more and more water will be needed to meet the increasing human needs for domestic, agricultural, power and industrial sectors of the world, as well as to simultaneously satisfy environmental requirements. At present, it is estimated that approximately 8,000 km3 of water available is stored behind dams, which represents one and a half times the world’s total annual water consumption. Hence, future water demands of the world cannot be met without the construction of new projects to store and distribute water (Gupta, 1998).
The primary objectives of every water development project in the developing world should include poverty alleviation, improvement in the standard of living of the populations, regional income redistribution, economic efficiency, and protection of the environment. All of these issues have to be assessed against the backdrop of considerable costs (both financial and human) that go into the planning, design and construction of any project. In addition to the classical criteria of technical, economic and financial feasibility, large development projects, like dams, have to satisfy a fourth and increasingly stringent criterion, namely social and political acceptance (Bhalla, 2001).
Because social and environmental issues were often not comprehensively addressed in the past during the planning and construction of large development projects, there is now strong opposition to such projects. Large dams, because of the size of the areas they cover, have become the lightning rods for opposition by various social and environment activist groups. One of the demands of these so-called environmental movements has been, and rightly so,
80 the improved social and environmental performances by the governments, lending institutions, and now the private sectors, involved in the planning and construction of dams. The increasing pressure exerted by these groups at the national and global levels has had many positive impacts, since the concerned institutions have been forced to improve the whole process leading to the construction of dams and their subsequent management. This awareness of social and environmental issues at the global level has resulted in changes of earlier processes and practices during the planning and construction phases of large dams. Two important benefits have been participation of the stakeholders and better treatments of project affected people (PAP).
There are many cases which indicate that governments have focused most of their attention in the past on technical and economic issues when planning and constructing dams. It is equally true that many projects have been implemented properly from the technical, economic, social and environmental perspectives, and that these projects represent not only the backbone for the socio-economic development of the countries and the regions, but they have also significantly contributed to poverty alleviation and protection of the environment.
There are new emerging social and environmental requirements which can contribute to radical changes in water and land management practices. In spite of the unquestionable social and economic benefits which could accrue from properly planned and managed irrigation projects, poorly planned and managed projects have also resulted in reduced economic benefits at significant social and environmental costs. This has turned many environmental and citizens' groups against irrigated agriculture, with the national and international media questioning the benefits of large-scale irrigation development projects in many parts of the world.
There are compelling reasons to improve the management and the efficiency of irrigation schemes, irrespective of the pressures from the environmental and social activists. Changes in land uses, as a result of irrigation, have sometimes resulted in extensive waterlogging, salinisation, deforestation and soil erosion. Rapid expansion of irrigated areas, without major changes in the present management practices, could contribute to increasingly more environmental degradation, and also could have negative impacts on the projects themselves, unless appropriate countermeasures are taken (Tortajada, 1999).
However, the discussions in the international arena have often gone out of proportion. What is demanded by the international environmental movements is that no new dams should be constructed, irrespective of their overall total benefit to the society. Numerous non- governmental organisations (NGOs) have been mostly promoting these dogmatic views. While some of these groups represent the interests of the populations affected, many others represent only their own dogmatic views. In their genuine or faked concern for the people and the environment, they are ignoring the basic needs and the rights of the low-income majority of the population of the developing world (Scudder, 2001).
81 The validity of the arguments for and against dams by governmental institutions and NGOs cannot be resolved one way or the other because of the lack of past and present post-project evaluations of the economic, social and environmental impacts (both positive and negative) of large dams from different parts of the world. Without such information, only anecdotal information can be used to justify or refute the arguments made by the proponents or the opponents of the large dams. Thus, until and unless objective and reliable environmental assessment studies and post-project evaluations are carried out, and then analysed and disseminated, no definite conclusions on the overall benefits and costs of dams can be drawn.
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
Disenchanted with the overall results of the past development policies, governments and development professionals all over the world are now searching for new and implementable paradigms which can simultaneously contribute to issues like reduction of poverty, improvements in quality of life, social cohesion, and environmental protection. Even though the population growth rates in most developing countries have steadily declined during the past 20 years, and this trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, the total number of poor people in the world in absolute terms is still increasing steadily. Furthermore, information and communication revolution has meant that the expectations of the people have increased radically in recent years. Unless these expectations in terms of poverty alleviation and improvements in the standards of living of people are met, social tensions and political instabilities are likely to increase in many developing countries in the coming years. Politicians and decision-makers are becoming increasingly aware that unless they meet the expectations of the people within a reasonable period of time, their terms in office are going to be severely restricted.
The need for reform of development policies is becoming increasingly apparent and urgent with the passage of time. The current general thinking is that exclusive reliance on techno- economic aspects of development policies cannot provide all the necessary conditions which could ensure that the fruits of development policies are enjoyed by all the people concerned in an equitable manner. Development policies thus must go beyond techno-economic considerations and must include social and environmental factors, as well as objective review of the capacities of the institutions that are likely to implement them. It is thus essential that development policies be formulated within a much broader and integrative framework than has been the case in the past. The objectives of development planning must include improvements in the quality of life of people, fulfilment of their needs and expectations, and protection of the environment.
Meeting social goals within a reasonable timeframe has set a challenging agenda for the development professionals. Processes which are open, participatory and inclusive should not only be accepted but encouraged and used extensively. However, many of the present development-oriented institutions are still too dogmatic, conservative, traditional and
82 hierarchical to take necessary steps which could effectively change past practices. If the issue of participation is considered, it unquestionably represents a fundamental requirement for public policy formulation and implementation. Populations affected by any given policy and/or project must have a say in the developments which are likely to affect their lives in the coming years. They must decide what is best for them (Sen, 1999).
Times have changed. While in early times the central governments decided on what they thought was the best for the people, nowadays, development projects have to be accepted by the local populations. Failure of the governments to take into consideration the opinions, experiences and expectations of the people would most likely result in the lack of success of the projects, and thus their overall benefits would never be achieved. In addition, effectively organised, public participation can contribute to a new way of managing natural resources in many developing countries, since this will allow local experiences, knowledge and interest to be channelled to the solution of the problems encountered by the local people themselves.
There is an increasing need for public participation in environmental protection and water resources planning and policy-making processes where the main objective is to satisfy certain social needs. However, while the participation of stakeholders is in principle accepted by nearly all water resources planners, its implementation within the natural resources planning process is far from a simple task. A major concern that arises immediately is how the planners can become aware of the actual needs of a pluralistic society, where the needs perceived vary not only from one segment of the population to another but also could change with time within heterogeneous populations. Furthermore, when social needs are conflicting, as they mostly are, on what criteria can these be aggregated and who should carry out this complex task. In addition, it has been most difficult to formulate planning and policy-making frameworks which can be flexible enough to deal with changing long-term attitudes and/or requirements. Methodologies to forecast future public attitudes still need to be substantially improved (Biswas, 1997).
However, the conflict in many cases of public participation is not always that the people can or cannot decide freely which traditions or alternatives they wish, or do not wish, to follow. In many cases, it is the insistence of outsiders on what established traditions should be followed (no matter what) and on who sets the agenda (Sen, 1999).
Major water projects are bound to have effects and implications that go far beyond irrigation-related activities, touching many facets of life and involving most social, environmental and economic sectors. In the case of water development projects, it is widely known that they lead to economic, social and environmental impacts, both positive and negative. It should be noted that the benefits of large water development projects have reached millions of people at the regional and even national levels mainly in terms of clean water supply, irrigation, hydropower generation, employment creation, and industrial and social development, all of which contribute to improvements in the life style of the people.
83 The current discussions on water projects at the national and international fora do not adequately reflect the consideration of total benefits, direct and indirect, or the nature of the beneficiaries, that stem from such projects. The arguments often exclusively centre on the problems the development projects may create because of improper planning, management and implementation, as a result of which the anticipated benefits from the projects may not be realised, and/or the nature of the beneficiaries could be different from planned. In addition, the projects could contribute to unanticipated social and environmental problems which could affect people and ecosystems adversely. Some people, especially many of those who are to be resettled, may become vulnerable, and thus may not even be able to maintain their previous life-styles. On-farm development, extension programmes, ensuring timely availability of agricultural inputs and credits, marketing arrangements, development of essential rural infrastructures, timely operation and maintenance of the extensive irrigation and drainage systems, environmental protection, preservation of historical and cultural heritage, resettlement, and social attitudes and expectations are many of the issues that need to be addressed properly during the planning, implementation and operational phases of water development projects.
In spite of the importance of considering concurrently both the positive and the negative impacts of water development projects so that the positive impacts could be maximized and the negative impacts could be minimised, such holistic approaches are mostly conspicuous by their absence at present. After nearly 20 years of fruitless debate, the fact still remains that there are very few dams anywhere in the world, whose economic, social and environmental impacts (both positive and negative) have been scientifically and objectively monitored and evaluated on a regular basis over a period of time, following their construction. Evaluation of the full extent and range of their impacts are missing at present (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001; Fisher, 2001; Scudder, 2001). Accordingly, and not surprisingly, in the absence of good and reliable studies, the proponents and opponents of dams can get away with dogmatic statements that justify their respective agendas. It is difficult to understand why the proponents of large dams have not carried out such definitive assessments which, in all probability, are likely to help their cause (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001).
In the absence of objective assessments, biases of the various groups continue to be perpetuated. For example, the post-project review of the Calaca power plant in the Philippines that was carried out by a Japanese NGO was technically inaccurate. This does not necessarily imply that the professionals working with the NGO concerned were technically incompetent, but that existing political biases in their mind-sets prevented them from analysing all the feasible alternatives of the project. It seems that this assessment was a component of an overall “anti-aid” campaign against overseas development support by the Japanese government in general, and proposed for the Philippines in particular. Some other development aid projects that were funded by Japan were also criticized on the basis of environmental and social impacts. This post-project evaluation is an example where ideological tendencies and prevailing biases interfered with the technical and the ethical performances of a Japanese NGO (Fujikura and Nakayama, 2001). Similar examples can be
84 found in many other development projects, where prevailing biases prevented the groups concerned to approach the issues objectively and honestly.
Examination of development projects worldwide indicate that social, environmental and institutional issues have often not been adequately addressed. Millions of people have been impoverished as a result of their displacement, and the environment has been degraded (Bird and Wallace, 2001; Fisher, 2001; Scudder, 2001; WCD, 2000; Nakayama et al., 1999). Regarding institutional concerns, it is generally recognised that institutional weaknesses undermine the operation and maintenance of infrastructures, that irrigation schemes perform below expectations, and in some cases may even contribute to serious adverse environmental effects. Even when institutional concerns are addressed, they are often limited to strengthening of the central agencies: regional or local ones are mostly neglected. Quite often there is a wide gap between the needs that are identified and the actual implementation of programmes that address those needs. Sometimes this could be because adequately addressing the social issues would raise political questions which may prove later to be far too large for the project to handle. In other cases, the implementing agency is not oriented to deal with such needs. Addressing social issues often involves building new capacities among the people at the community level. However, many government agencies responsible for implementing large projects, have norms, procedures, policies, and attitudes which provide little support for building such capacities (Cernea, 1991).
Development is a complex issue, and cannot be completely free of contradictions and conflicts. Involuntary displacement due to certain projects, imposed by more broadly based interests, is only one such case in point. Recognising that some degree of involuntary displacements cannot be avoided during certain development projects, does not mean that these should not be accepted. It should be realised that development projects must contribute to the local and national well-being, but these could have unavoidable negative impacts on certain population groups. What is thus necessary is some means for reconciling the conflicting interests between those who benefit and those who pay the costs. People who are negatively affected should be properly compensated (Cernea, 1991).
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
The modern environmental movement as such was born in the early 1960s. Its midwife could be considered to be Rachel Carson, whose book Silent Spring was instrumental in exposing the destructive side-effects of the DDT and to articulate the subtle cumulative perils of many persistent pesticides. Throughout the 1960s, the environmental groups made increasingly successful efforts to alert the public to various environmental threats and to mobilize support for such causes as wilderness protection, and air and water pollution control (Mitchel, 1990).
Interest in the adverse environmental impacts of economic development became an increasingly important consideration during the late 1960s, first in the USA and later in the
85 rest of the world. Public interest in the various environmental issues peaked around 1972-73, and then started to decline steadily for much of the next decade and a half. The overall interest in the various environmental issues was rekindled in the late 1980s. It became a key political issue in the early 1990s, and may have reached its peak with the convening of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 (Biswas, 1997).
In the case of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), initially they used to be performed after the project had been designed. During the late 1970s, EIA studies were carried out at the end of an already designed project. However, during the last few decades, EIA processes have improved to the extent that now they are started more or less at the same time as project design, with the expectation that by the time a project has been designed, environmental and social concerns would be internalised. While this is an improvement, in general, EIA still are often weak and low in quality (Goodland, 1997). EIA at the World Bank began in the early 1970s on an ad hoc basis, and by 1984 became a requirement for all relevant projects sponsored by the Bank (Goodland and Edmundson, 1994).
A major development of the post-1975 period was the emerging of the environmental and social movements, primarily in a few select developed countries, which gradually contributed to radical changes in the mind-sets of people. In June 1972, the United Nations convened the first of its mega-conferences of the decade of the 1970s on the Human Environment in Stockholm (UNEP, 1981). This Conference was a landmark for the environmental movement, and was followed in rapid succession by similar UN mega-conferences on population (Bucharest, 1974), food (Rome, 1974), women (Mexico City, 1975), human settlements (Vancouver, 1976) water (Mar del Plata, 1977), desertification (Nairobi, 1977), science and technology for development (Vienna, 1979), and new and renewable sources of energy (Nairobi, 1981). All these mega-conferences did have some discussions on water, and also all considered environment in one form or another. The Stockholm Conference also resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme. It was the first UN agency that was established in a developing country, and was expected to represent the environmental consciousness of the UN System (Tolba, 1988).
All these events, individually and cumulatively, had some impact on the current societal perception of large dams. Interest in the environmental aspects of water development has fluctuated with time during the past three decades. Even though policy frameworks which focused on environmental and social issues appeared in developed and developing countries during the last three decades, this does not mean that the environmental impacts of water projects were completely neglected in the past. Many specific environmental and social impacts have always been known and considered, among which are salinity and waterlogging due to inappropriate irrigation management practices, and resettlement of populations because of inundation caused by newly constructed reservoirs. However, comprehensive and integrated environmental and social impact studies were not formally carried out, nor were the study results properly implemented until recently (Biswas, 1996). This, however, was the case for all development projects: water projects were not an exception.
86 Anecdotal information available at present on the overall impacts of large dams, like the Bhakra and the Hirakud in India, the Aswan in Egypt and the Ataturk in Turkey, indicate that they have had very substantial impacts on the development processes of the regions, assisted their national economies, and have very significantly improved the quality of life of the people of the regions. Similarly, hydraulic structures like Chukha I and II projects in Bhutan have been primarily responsible to increase the per capita GDP of that country from being the lowest in South Asia in 1960 to the second highest in the region at present. This economic transformation that has occurred in Bhutan, within a short period of less than two decades, primarily through the export of the hydropower generated to India. There is no doubt that the construction of the third dam will transform Bhutan into a country having the highest GDP in the region, certainly within the present decade. Judicious balance of development and environmental requirements is enabling Bhutan to enter the 21st century as a much stronger nation, where the Bhutanese people are rapidly tasting the fruits of water development, and simultaneously ensuring that their environment and culture are maintained. The environment and development professions will do well to analyse such successful case studies objectively and comprehensively in the near future so that lessons could be learnt from these experiences which could be used elsewhere. The Bhutan-India development is also one of the best examples of inter-country collaboration to foster regional peace and stability by managing their water resources prudently and efficiently (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001).
In recent years, governments, donors, academics and NGOs have been emphasising the need for local people to have greater involvement in project planning, implementation, management and evaluation of water infrastructures. However, the extent to which local people have actually been involved in participatory water-resource development has been disappointing. Local participation, if conducted properly and in a timely manner, can improve the living standards of the PAP. It is essential that local people and planners work together to determine how best to institutionalise local participation, and also how to effectively channel local knowledge and expertise so that the existing water management practices can be improved substantially. In many cases, new institutional structures may be necessary. Alternately, existing institutions can be restructured and strengthened to meet the new requirements (Scudder, 1997). Effective participation requires forging functional partnerships among different levels of governments, private sector, donor groups, NGOs and the society. A comprehensive strategy is simply too demanding for any one level, area of government, or for a single donor to formulate and implement.
The increasing influence that societies and NGOs have had on the social and environmental performances of both the private and the public sectors throughout the world deserves special attention. The rapid growth in the environmental awareness of the public in recent years has put new pressures on the governments of the world, mainly from the NGO movement and its ability to publicise what they consider to be erroneous approaches, be they real or imaginary. Diversity of information disseminated by the governments and the NGOs through the printed and electronic media has made people more aware of the complexities of the social and environmental issues, as well as their implications over the
87 short, medium and long terms (WCD, 2000). Governments and private sector groups all over the world are increasingly recognizing the need to improve their environmental and social performances, although this has not materially changed the prevailing trend of environmental deterioration. In many cases, however, the public and the private sectors have been forced to react, not because they have realised the advantages that long-term environmental and social planning would bring to the society, but mostly due to the pressures exerted by the international community as well as the opposition of the national and international NGOs (Welford, 2000).
With the increasing information available, the societies of the world have the potential to mitigate the “excesses” of both the public and private sectors, which have to be prepared to tackle this new force. Currently, it is generally believed that all NGOs are good, and that they represent a credible alternative to public and private sectors in all cases. This is in spite of the fact that with the proliferation of NGOs, it is not possible that all of them are objective and/or good, and they represent unfettered benefits to the society. Unfortunately, no independent and objective evaluations of their performances and impacts have been systematically carried out. Such evaluations are essential if their overall performance over a reasonable period of years is to be judged. Anecdotal evidences, however, indicate that just like there are good public or private sector bodies, similarly there are good or bad NGOs. The NGOs are reflections of the current complex and diverse world we live in.
It is important to note that it has been the participation of the different sectors of the society that has contributed to better consultation, cooperation, coordination and decision-making processes. No single group, including the NGOs, can be considered to be the most appropriate group to develop unilaterally any policy, or promote any specific views or solutions. NGOs have their own agendas, which may not be the best for the society in general. Equally, NGOs are not elected by the people, though many of them claim to be speaking for the people. While NGOs have many strengths, their weaknesses have not been seriously considered so far. It is essential that a dialogue be initiated between public and private sectors, NGOs and citizens so that clear ideas of the expectations of the people can be judged, and appropriate decisions can be taken which benefit the society as a whole.
While it has been welcomed that environmental and social issues are properly considered in all development projects, it has also to be admitted that many new developments to improve the quality of life of people and the protection of the environment in the developing world are now prevented or delayed indefinitely by vocal activists. They are mainly the self-styled “environmentalists”, primarily from the developed world, or through their direct financial and intellectual support to their counterparts in the developing world (Biswas & Tortajada, 2001). Many NGOs have linked adverse health and socio-economic and environmental impacts in critiques of large infrastructural water projects at the global level, without considering their benefits. In many cases, their justifiable concern for the environment and indigenous people have made them ignore the urgent needs of a far larger number of the poor for achieving a better lifestyle. Large dams and irrigation projects are, and must be, a legitimate option in meeting the future water needs for agricultural, municipal, industrial and
88 energy development, as long as they are properly planned and managed. Unfortunately, the position of many NGOs is to reject, at the expenses of the poor, all large dams, irrespective of their benefits and costs (Scudder, 2001). It is clear that demands for better performance of the governments from the environmental and social viewpoints are valid; however, these demands have unfortunately evolved into a rejection of the goals and legitimacy of the development process itself (World Bank, 1994).
Looking to the future, resistance to water development projects can be expected to increase, unless the rights of poor minorities who are to be resettled are respected. Environmental NGOs are increasingly becoming advocates for PAP. Their arguments already have had positive impacts in improving the resettlement and rehabilitation practices of many large projects, including those on water. NGOs have also forced the planners to assess how similar or greater benefits in many cases can accrue from the implementation of alternatives that may not require major engineering works. The growing sophistication and recent international networking of indigenous people affected by major projects are expected to strengthen their resolve in opposing the projects (Scudder, 1996a) unless their interests are specifically taken into account.
The agenda of those NGOs who oppose all water-resources development projects which involve major infrastructure construction, irrespective of their overall societal benefits, seems to be mainly ideological. However, for those NGOs who have close linkages with PAP and their interests in their welfare is genuine, this should help them to familiarise themselves with the needs and wishes of the local people. It is important to note that worldwide, all people would like to raise their living standards and conditions. They want development, which, among other benefits, bring new employment opportunities, electrification, water supply, transportation and communication facilities and health and education services. Thus, if the development of an area through a project represents a good alternative to raise the living standards of the people concerned, then NGOs will have to decide whose interests come first: theirs or those of the PAP (World Bank, 1994).
Even though NGOs are effective in undertaking certain tasks which include dealing directly with the local populations, many of these groups can probably contribute far more than they have in the past. Many NGOs have proved to be very effective in organizing people and promoting self-sufficiency. They could use their experience to initiate new income- generating activities for the people who are to be resettled. Many times, the negative attitudes of the state governments towards some advocacy NGOs, and vice versa, can obscure the potential that many grassroots, field-based NGO may have for their work at the local level (Picciotto et al., 2001 ).
Among the development assistance agencies, the World Bank has led the way from the 1980s in establishing a resettlement policy to mitigate the impacts on involuntary relocation. During this period, the formation of a global network of NGOs has highlighted the general ineffectiveness of the past resettlement practices, and made resettlement an important socio- political issue for water development projects. NGO concerns on resettlement have often
89 focused on the predicament of families displaced by dams, overlapping with a broader dislike for the construction of large dams (World Bank, 1994). The construction of dams in areas that are densely populated, environmentally sensitive, and institutionally weak, can be very destructive. Just as in real estate, location of dams matter. Focusing mainly on consultations with the PAP is important and a step in the right direction, but it has not proved to be a panacea. The protection of natural habitats and the resettlement of people displaced by dams call for institutions and implementation capacities that need nurturing over many years, even decades (Picciotto et al., 2001).
So far, even when planners are promoting consultations, analyses indicate that lasting patterns of social organization which can assure effective participation are not established. In most parts of the world, specific provisions for introducing and supporting participation are still needed. There must be plans to share responsibilities in the different stages of the project cycle, since beneficiaries involved in the planning and execution of projects are better informed and more committed to make the project work than are people suddenly handed an asset to which they have contributed nothing. If “people’s participation” in financially induced, development programmes are to be more than a trendy slogan, then planners and managers must face the task of organizing participation by identifying and mobilizing the social stakeholders whose contributions are important. Practical and cost-effective ways must be found through which they could participate in project design, implementation and monitoring. (Cernea, 1991).
In order to involve the local populations, it is necessary to design and implement the development projects which could meet the needs and capabilities of people who are supposed to benefit from them. In terms of project formulation, more realistic and beneficial projects should be formulated by engaging the local inhabitants living in the project areas, in addition to more efficient coordination and timely implementation. Participatory capacity cannot be suddenly built like a road or a dam: it must be developed, and nurtured over a certain period. It cannot be achieved overnight. Involving the intended beneficiaries in project design and implementation is one way of bringing knowledge of past development experiences to bear on the new effort. The local people will know what, if anything, has been tried before, and what, if anything, has worked. When projects “reinvent the wheel,” they usually end up in square one with a plan which has already failed. Participation may sometimes slow the progress at certain stages of the projects, such as planning or implementation, but to argue that it may be time consuming or expensive, is to assign no cost to the inefficient use of resources, since it is possible that unrealistic components of a project may be approved without such consultations (Uphoff, 1991).
Unless the intended beneficiaries are already organized, and are accustomed to be involved in formal development programmes, some procedures for introducing participation should be explicitly and carefully worked out. Procedures will be needed to acquaint beneficiaries with the project from the beginning, to elicit their ideas and suggestions, to encourage and assist appropriate modes or organization for institutionalising participation, and to monitor progress so that changes in the approach can be made whenever problems arise or better
90 means can be identified. Unless there are adequate and regular consultations with the proposed beneficiaries, and sometimes even then, it is easy for planners to specify targets that may foreordain failure (Uphoff, 1991).
There are many possible kinds of participation. However, who participates and how, may be more crucial to project success than any purely quantitative expression of participation. While many projects claim to take social factors into consideration by decentralising government services, most of the projects so far depend entirely on the government personnel. It is fundamental to offer more than resources or technology to the poor majority, and offer them some voice and certain channels for improving their lives. It is clear that the government agencies, as well as the donor agencies, are likely to need some reorientation of their own personnel practices, rules, incentives and procedures if they are to be consistently supportive of participatory approaches to the planning and implementation of projects. Monitoring and evaluation are essential elements of government support. It is important that monitoring and evaluation be fully participatory, and that persons who represent many different roles and statuses be encouraged to interact. In particular, central government decision makers should go the field as members of evaluation teams, so that they can see and hear for themselves the opinions and the preferences of the resettlers (Uphoff, 1991). The results of monitoring and evaluation should be extensively available so that no single party or parties can manipulate the process to their advantage.
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION
Involuntary resettlement is often a direct consequence of a planned change generated by a major development project or programme. It has been a companion of development throughout history, and has been indelibly written into the evolution of industrial as well as developing countries. Forced relocation is widely, but mistakenly, seen as a consequence of construction of large dams only, but, in fact, it also occurs for many other sectors. Several categories of development interventions (primarily those predicated on major changes in land and water use) are likely to require mandatory population dislocation. Dam construction has been the largest single cause for involuntary resettlement, although its proportional importance currently is dropping as increasing numbers of people are moved due to the construction and renewal of transportation corridors (railways, highways, airports, transmission lines, irrigation canals, and others that require right of way); new ports and towns; urban infrastructure, such as sewerage systems, intracity roads, and subways; mining development; major industrial estates or zones that require considerable land; and protection for forest reserves or national lands (Scudder, 1996b; World Bank, 1994; Cernea, 1991).
Settlement movements sponsored by governments or other agencies can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary mobility, including rural-urban migration, stimulates economic growth, reflecting people’s willing pursuit of new opportunities, and has also resulted in the design and implementation of settlement policies. In contrast, involuntary resettlement does not include the choice to remain in place, and, if improperly carried out, the resettlers often
91 may face more risks than opportunities. Because it represents such an extreme example, settlements resulting from involuntary relocation spotlight a number of problems which, to a lesser extent, characterize all types of new land settlements. Involuntary resettlement consists of two distinct, although closely related, social processes, displacement of people and reconstruction (or rehabilitation) of their livelihood. Displacement concerns on how land and other assets are expropriated to allow a project for the overall social good to proceed. Rehabilitation is related to the fate of the displaced people. In theory, the two processes are segments of a single continuum, in practice, the first does not always bring about the second (Scudder, 1991; World Bank, 1984).
Inefficient involuntary resettlement has been presumably due to the failure during project preparation to carry out social surveys of those who are to be dislocated as well as of those in the host-area, where people are to be resettled. This, plus the weak preparation of viable re-development alternatives, may be the reasons why appraisals of resettlement plans are some times inappropriate. Costs tend to be underestimated, and even this budget is not released in a timely manner. Compensation payments may be delayed significantly. Since water ministries are generally dominated by engineers, they are often put in charge to implement the resettlement plans, even though they may have no prior knowledge and experience in this complex area. Social scientists may not have a career path in water ministries, and thus their numbers, and the roles they can play, may be seriously restricted. Inadequate concern for the severe consequences of involuntary dislocations, or the inability to prevent destitution by establishing those evicted on an alternative productive base, can be a major constraint for the success of a development project (Umaña, 1998).
Involuntary resettlement has been, and often still is, approached as a salvage and welfare operation, instead of as a multi-sided opportunity for the reconstruction of systems of production and human settlements that would represent improvements in the standards of living of those affected, as well as in the regional economy. In fact, the backbone of any proper resettlement plan is precisely the development packages, which should include a series of project funded provisions. The objective should be to reconstruct the production base of those who are to be relocated, and re-establish them as self-sustaining producers or wage earners. This way, involuntary resettlement plans would eventually improve the lifestyles of the people affected (Cernea, 1998; World Bank, 1984).
The complex social nature of involuntary resettlement practices should be appreciated by the government agencies and the project managers so that these can be directly addressed with the tools and resources available for the planned change. Rather than seeking mitigation only, as it is generally the case at present, the aim should be to restructure the socio- economic development process, within which the PAP can play effective and productive roles. Additionally, given the complexity of the resettlement practices and the unimpressive track record for both land and non-land strategies, the first principle of any development project, which displaces populations, must be to reduce the number of people affected to the minimum extent possible, until financial and economic returns argue otherwise (Picciotto et al., 2001).
92 For rural areas, there should be two basic strategies to re-establish those dislocated both economically and socially: land-based strategies and non land-based strategies. Cash compensations may not always be the proper answer because such compensation may not be adequate, paid on time, and/or not invested productively, which many times is the case. If land for land compensation is not provided, many of the displaced population may end up in squatter settlements within a relatively short period. This of course undermines the objectives of any development project. Under the pressure of immediate real or perceived needs, people frequently tend to use cash compensations for purposes other than replacing the land, after which those displaced become destitutes and are forced to start farming on canal banks, or encroach, deforest or overgraze communal lands. (Cernea, 1988). Such results are neither beneficial to the individuals nor to the society.
A review of the experiences from the various World Bank supported projects indicate that involuntary resettlement has often been under-financed. One major reason for this has been that the costs of resettlement have been systematically underestimated. Examples of cost elements frequently missed are surveys, population and property census, foregone benefits from assets being lost, land reclamation and improvements at relocation sites, construction of adequate urban and rural infrastructures, implementation of rehabilitation packages, mitigation of the impacts on host populations, temporary losses or reductions in production and income of the affected population, cost of setting up new industrial and commercial enterprises, and provision of special health, education and welfare services (Scudder, 2001). Thus, the inclusion of involuntary resettlement in a project is not by choice but by necessity, since its cost is an integral part of that of the total project. Therefore, it is neither desirable, nor appropriate, to provide a separate economic justification for resettlement, as one would do for a separate component.
Dissemination of information to the people who are to be resettled on the resettlement procedures, including relocation and compensation processes, is fundamental to promote participation and reduce stress. Lack of efficient and systematic information and communication channels between the agencies and the population can exacerbate misunderstandings and strengthen resistance to the project. It also results in situations where some individuals may try to manipulate the conditions to their own personal advantages. A programme to inform and educate the people concerned is therefore a prerequisite for obtaining the cooperation of the affected population (Umaña, 1998).
Involving local leadership and constructive NGOs is another basic requirement for successful resettlement operations. In many cases, the contributions of the NGOs can be substantial and beneficial. These could include conducting baseline socio-economic surveys, organizing resettler participation, intervening at the grassroots level, and in calling the attention of national and international agencies to problems emerging due to improper resettlement operations, especially when resettlement practices are inadequate (Umaña, 1998). In other cases, however, performances of the NGOs have been far from optimal. The evaluations of involuntary resettlement of major case studies (Bhalla and Mookerjee, 2001; Patel, 2001; Picciotto et al., 2001; Verghese, 2001) show that the involvements of the
93 NGOs are not always productive. Each case has to be analysed individually. The involvement of the NGOs could result in positive impacts on government behaviour, but the impacts may be limited because of their own lack of interest or because of the lack of interest of the governments, their individual agendas which may not be the same as those of the affected populations, adversarial relationships with authorities, single cause advocacy, and availability of limited technical knowledge and support. While there are resettlement programmes where there is not enough voluntary and constructive grassroots activities by the NGOs, some other programmes tend to fail precisely due to the NGOs, who create confrontational or abusive relationships with resettlement agencies, affecting negatively the PAP, since in many cases they even refuse to establish a dialogue (Picciotto et al., 2001).
In addition to the government agencies and the resettlers, the other major stakeholders in resettlement processes are the host populations living in the receiving areas. It is a mistake not to consider the role of the host population during the resettlement processes, only to discover during implementation that intractable problems arise. Since only rarely can implementing agencies find empty lands for all the resettlers, the risks are that population density in receiving areas will increase suddenly to levels above the carrying capacity of the land and the natural resources available to both the hosts and the newcomers. Although the relations between the resettlers and the host communities have been surprisingly good in many projects (Fisher, 2001), serious conflicts may arise as increased demands are placed on land, water, services, etc. Infrastructural and social facilities of the areas could be overwhelmed by the sudden influx of the resettlers, which could contribute to the development of tensions between the two groups.
In situations where there is not enough land available and a “fill-in” operation is planned, experience shows that hosts tend to see the newcomers as a source of cheap labour and may try to exploit them. If possible, education, water, health and other services should be made available not only for the resettlers, but for the host community as well. The social, economic and cultural integration of the resettlers with the host population is a slow, but important process, if viable communities, settlements and new social networks are to be built. Such a process can be accelerated by policy-driven planning that integrates and cements host-resettler inter-relationships, especially when the authorities can provide incentives to the host communities (Cernea, 1988).
The World Bank, the first major international agency to adopt a resettlement policy, shares the views of those critics who deplore bad resettlement operations in the past and support their concern for the welfare of the displaced populations. However, the Bank also recognises that the rejection of all involuntary resettlement is unrealistic, and in many situations, it is even unavoidable. Thus, the real issue is how to minimize the number of people who are to be resettled, and how to respond effectively to their needs. Several borrowers of the World Bank loans have enacted or improved domestic policies and legal frameworks for resettlement practices because of the pressure from the Bank (Picciotto et al., 2001; World Bank, 1994). However, to what extent the Bank itself changed its policy due to the pressures of the activist NGOs is an issue that needs to be examined.
94 While incorporation within a wider political economy and more institutional involvement have the potential for creating new opportunities for displaced communities, the general record to date has been that resettlement generally continues to be unsatisfactory. This includes lack of awareness of many of the governments and aid agencies of the complexity and dynamics of the resettlement processes, acceptance of inadequate and inappropriate goals, and an inadequate perception and understanding of the impacts of resettlement on displaced people and hosts. Other reasons include lack of empowerment, loss of resiliency, and conflicts with the populations who have been resettled. The main goal of involuntary resettlement must be that both the population to be resettled and those among whom they are to be resettled, become beneficiaries of the projects. This would mean that the income and living standards of a large majority of the people concerned must improve to the extent that it is evident to both themselves and to the external evaluators. Improper resettlement creates dependence and impoverishment, which reduces the expected benefits from the projects. However, at the same time, one of the paradoxes of resettlement is that it may subsequently foster a more dynamic process of economic development and community formation. In fact, it has been observed that aspiring entrepreneurs and leaders are apt to find themselves in a more flexible environment than before (Scudder, 1996a,b).
Two basic strategies must be pursued for re-establishing those dislocated from rural settings: employment strategies and, whenever possible, land-based strategies. Past experiences indicate that vocational training alone will not restore income, unless those displaced can actually get employment with their newly acquired skills. This is why restoration of productive systems and substitution of lost income-generating assets should go beyond simple cash payments to provide an alternative on income basis to the affected people. In the case of those displaced from urban or peri-urban areas, a combination of land-based and employment strategies may be appropriate. This is because this type of population usually derive their livelihood from jobs in the industrial, service sectors or from self-employment, but sometimes they may also own some farm land. Whichever strategy is followed, it must be flexibly translated into specific steps that should be taken and funded by the project concerned (Cernea, 1991).
Sometimes specific strategies aimed at reinforcing the faltering land for land programmes (strategies conceived and implemented long after appraisal) have been ineffective. Such projects include the resettlement and reservoir development programmes at Kedung Ombo, Indonesia, and the more recent income-generating schemes in two states in India. Pursuing land for land policies, where the circumstances are unfavourable, is expected to produce unsatisfactory results, as have been noticed in Itaparica, Brazil. Governments have had difficulty in finding ways to compensate for losses of cultivable land by providing comparable farm holdings nearby, as well as establishing other bases of productive employment. In retrospect, these two are among the most challenging tasks of water development, since large dams sites usually inundate some of the most fertile lands in the area, and the people in the flooded valleys generally have few skills and motivation to shift to other activities. However, while land for land should be given due consideration and
95 appropriate analysis, the experience has shown that it should not be adopted regardless of costs (Picciotto, 2001).
Controversy can also be expected wherever the policy of “land for nearby land” prevails. Attempts to index compensation rates to land prices will not work in many cases because not enough land is available. Increasing those rates will only provide resettlers with more money to purchase the same amount of land, leading to an inflationary spiral. Thus, the sense of having given up something better, may predetermine the attitude of the resettlers towards infrastructural development projects. In those cases where it is not possible to provide PAP with irrigated land next to the reservoir or below the dam, the “land for nearby land strategy” has little applicability to reservoir resettlement, at least in already crowded regions. Land for land, without the nearby tag, is practical where transmigration is feasible. However, in crowded regions with no transmigration alternatives, the primary objective should be to encourage diversification (Picciotto et al., 2001).
Resettlement should ideally focus on a productive base than on “passive” compensation, like in the case of Itaparica (Umaña, 1998). In fact, its main objective should be to provide adequate compensation for all lost production and household assets, and to restore the productive base and income levels of the populations affected. Resettlers are normally dissatisfied with compensation rates, improvements such as the ex gratia payments are welcomed, but do not fundamentally redress past grievances. The income generating grants are often too small for most productive investments. Nonetheless, these payments and grants are sufficiently popular to encourage resettlers to want to be included.
While the resettlers tend to generally accept that the worst is behind them, in many cases, because additional efforts are being made to fully rehabilitate them, resettlers often tend to downplay benefits and overstate sufferings in an attempt to win more benefits. Although resettlers are naturally inclined to claim that what they have received is inadequate, so that they can make the case for receiving additional benefits, evidence is overwhelming that when compensation rates for houses, land and other assets are generous, this is recognized by the resettlers, but only indirectly. When compensation is generous, it normally generates discontent among unaffected and thus non-compensated people. This is one of the best indicators that compensation was sufficient. It is confirmed by survey data showing that unaffected people would have liked to have been resettled themselves, if only they could receive similar compensations (Picciotto et al., 2001).
Normally, the new villages have better community infrastructure (piped water, health clinics, roads, electricity, etc.), schools are more accessible and educational quality is better than before, and the resettlers’ incomes and expenditures start to stabilize or recover. However, when the entire compensation process is inadequate, it causes lasting problems. People who are not compensated at proper replacement costs, are unable to replace their income- producing assets, mainly land, and have to turn to other sources of income. Delays in receiving compensations, as well as being paid in instalments, further aggravates the problem. Many problems also occur when the people are moved into the command area and
96 the construction of the new housing and services is in the early stages of development, since the command areas themselves become sources of outmigration because of land pressure (Picciotto et al., 2001).
Social infrastructure and services are the part of the resettlement programme that usually receive strong approval from the resettled populations. Several World Bank studies, as well as the personal experiences of the author, indicate that social infrastructural services (water, electricity, access roads, communication networks, health, education, etc.) are in general better in the new villages than before resettlement. Improvements in the physical infrastructures are welcomed by the resettler communities, mainly in those cases where no infrastructure existed before. However, a distinction should be drawn between the physical infrastructure and the supporting services required to use and maintain it. Social infrastructures have to be accompanied by adequate staff and supplies: schools and clinics without teachers, textbooks, nurses and medicines are of no use to the people. Resettlers tend to complain about the erratic or poor quality of human services and the material supplies provided. More often, the complains are generic, and indicate failures of the local authorities to operate the services at a level commensurate with the structures built, or to fund adequate upkeep. In many cases, failures include lack of infrastructures for water supply, sanitation or electricity for resettlers, which in some cases have contributed to serious health problems. However, the attitude of many resettlers also represent a handicap for their own improvements, since many times they expect to be supported financially by the government eternally (Picciotto et al., 2001; Umaña, 1998).
In general, in recent years, most governments have become more committed to improve their performances in terms of the resettlement processes. However, it has to be recognised that there are many levels of commitment. Sometimes there is commitment at higher, more policy-oriented levels but relatively less at the working level. Other times, dedicated individuals in the field are frustrated by the indifferent attitudes at the higher levels, who may not provide them with the resources to perform their tasks effectively. Experiences indicate that some of the errors that the governments should avoid in formulating effective resettlement programmes are the absence of participation by the affected population; failure to establish an institutional mechanism to manage effectively the entire process; compensation rates that do not take into consideration the effects of the project on land prices in the region (if land prices increase sharply, compensation received on the basis of pre-project land prices will be inadequate); and lack of monitoring and evaluation of the processes (Umaña, 1998). Additionally, the relevant planning and the executing institutions responsible for resettlement should be strengthened, especially when they lack knowledge and experience necessary to design and implement resettlement processes appropriately.
Resettlement is a very complex process which goes far beyond the formulation of laws and regulations. Even the implementation of the most appropriate laws is often inadequate because of economic, social, institutional and cultural constraints, as well as due to issues like lack of vision, corruption, inefficiency, and lack of political will. Properly implemented, resettlement programmes can be an element of a nation’s strategy to promote development
97 and reduce poverty. However, this requires not only sound policies and adequate resources, but also major changes in the mind-sets of the officers concerned, to ensure that the resettlers receive their fair shares of the benefits from the projects which are directly responsible for their displacement (Scudder, 1996a,b).
It is essential that there are both practical and moral reasons to ensure that all affected people participate in the decision-making process, and are fully compensated and properly rehabilitated. All parties lose when projects are designed without the input of local knowledge and experience, when basic civil and human rights are threatened or violated, and when the projects are delayed as a result of resistance and protests from PAP because they may have been unfairly treated. Unless the difficult issues associated with the water development projects are considered properly, opposition to them could accelerate in the future as a result of which consideration of large dams as a solution to the water problems may become more difficult. The challenges, then, are to improve the relationships among dam planners, dam-affected communities, and human rights/environmental activists, to find ways to reduce environmental and social costs, and to formulate and implement policies sensitive to economic development, social acceptability and environmental protection (Fisher, 2001).
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION PROCESSES IN TURKEY
Following the above global consideration of resettlement practices, the current efforts in Turkey (the second largest dam building country in the world at present, after China) to improve the resettlement practices are analysed next.
As the Turkish population has increased, more water has become necessary to meet the increasing needs for domestic, agricultural and industrial uses, as well as for electricity generation. A natural result of all these and other related developments has been that a large number of dams has been built, not only to satisfy the increasing demands for water for various purposes, but also to reduce recurrent flood and drought damages.
Proper water control and assured availability of water of appropriate quantity and quality are essential for the continuing economic and social development of all developing countries. Hydropower is an important source of electricity generation in the world, and Turkey is not an exception. In fact, hydropower is even more important for this country compared to most other nations, since it is heavily dependent on external sources for importing oil and gas for the operation of its thermal power plants. With increasing population, and accelerating need for electricity for continued socio-economic development of the country, its energy needs, both in aggregate and per capita terms, are increasing steadily as well. Thus, hydropower development has to be an important component of Turkey’s overall development strategy. According to Altinbilek et al. (1999), 175 dams and hydropower stations have been built in Turkey during the last 45 years, and out of 8.5 million ha of land that can be irrigated,
98 already 4.5 million ha (53% of the total potential) are under irrigation. At present, Turkey is using only about 30% of its hydropower potential, which is expected to increase to nearly 40% with the completion of the projects that are currently under construction. The Government of Turkey, through the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), plans to increase the total number of hydropower projects to 493. The DSI is the main executive agency in Turkey for the planning, execution and operation of the water projects of the country.
The land acquisition for the development of many such large water development projects is likely to result in the involuntary displacement of large number of people. Thus, the issues of involuntary resettlement of people due to the construction of a large number of dams needs special attention.
In Turkey, like in most other countries, expropriation of land and the subsequent resettlement and rehabilitation activities are regulated by law. For water and land development projects, the designated executing agencies are DSI for expropriation, and the General Directorate of Rural Affairs for resettlement and rehabilitation. An overview of the expropriation and resettlement practices in Turkey can be found in Altibilek et al., 1999.
The expropriation process includes the following four interrelated steps: (1) obtain the approval from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources; (2) define the size and boundaries of the areas subject to expropriation through cadastral surveys; (3) registration of ownerships of immovable properties and resources; and (4) assessment of the values of assets and resources through a valuation commission in each district, which includes five people: three technical experts and two settlers who are designated by the District Municipal Board (Altinbilek et al., 1999).
According to the Turkish expropriation law, if an asset or resources cannot be used anymore as a result of a project, the remaining portion of the immovable asset or resource can also be expropriated upon the request of the owner within 30 days from the original date of the expropriation announcement. Furthermore, if immovable assets outside the expropriation area cannot be utilised as a result of the project, these assets can also be expropriated if a claim is made within a year of the expropriation announcement by DSI in the village, after the reservoir expropriation has been completed. Under the law, even the population who do not have any property in the area to be expropriated can still be resettled by the government, if the people so wish. Once the valuation commission decides on the amount of the compensation to be paid to the families facing involuntary resettlement, DSI transfers the necessary total amount to the Special Resettlement Fund, which then is administered by the General Directorate of Rural Affairs (Altinbilek et al., 1999).
When the values of the expropriated properties exceed the costs of resettlement, the differences are paid back to the owners. However, when it is to the contrary, the owners are given a five year moratorium on the debt, followed by a 20-year interest free repayment period. People have also the option to decide whether they would like to be resettled in a
99 rural or in an urban area. For those families who choose rural resettlement, each household is entitled to housing, farm land, credit for animal husbandry, etc. The law further stipulates that the farmers who are to be resettled must receive from the government training on new agricultural production methods. All rural resettlements need to be provided with a health centre, a doctor, a nurse, and a midwife.
For the people wishing to be resettled in urban areas, they are entitled to a house and needed commercial facilities, as well as credits for commercial activities.
According to the Turkish State Planning Organization, many of the people who request financial assistance from the Government to be resettled, are generally landless or poor. Major land-owners, with large properties, generally prefer to receive cash compensations, and then use the compensations received to establish small industries or undertake commercial activities in the cities. It is fairly common to find in many instances that one part of a family whose land was expropriated moves to a city, but the rest prefers to stay on the land. The experiences indicate that many of the second generation of the families that decide to resettle in the cities and invest their money successfully, become entrepreneurs (Biswas and Tortajada, 1999).
Overall, the main problem for the relocation of populations is the scarcity of land so that a group of people from the same village could be resettled together, and not the availability of funds for compensations. Experiences from different water development projects from several parts of Turkey indicate that some people prefer to receive the appropriate financial compensations and then plan and organise their own resettlement in areas of their choice. People from the rural areas, mostly non-skilled and not familiar with the various investment opportunities that may be available, generally do not know how to manage properly their expropriation funds. Accordingly, they have often unwisely used the compensation funds received, and have later ended up with no house, no land, no job, and no money. Thus, within a limited period of time, many of them have become destitutes, with economic and living conditions significantly worse than before they were resettled because of their own poor investment decisions and bad financial management. This is an important issue that needs further consideration in terms of the long-term economic efficiency of the process and the social acceptability of the resettlement practices. This, however, is not only a problem limited to Turkey, but also for nearly all developing countries, for which proper solutions have to be found. In the final analysis, people who are to be resettled must have better conditions than before, since they are the negative beneficiaries of the development projects (Altinbilek et al., 1999).
In Turkey, government-assisted resettlement from DSI projects attracts relatively few of the affected families because many people prefer to resettle themselves. Experience shows that a maximum of 25% of the families in the reservoir area actually request government assisted resettlement. The rates vary widely, for example, 8% in Karakaya project, 10% in the Kayraktepe project, 15% in Tahtali project, and 20% in the Boyabat project. The most important reason for the low rate of assistance requests is that the General Directorate of
100 Rural Affairs provides the same housing to all families, irrespective of the expropriation compensations transferred by DSI. Another important reason is that the amount of compensation for expropriation is higher than market prices. In other words, it is at the level of replacement cost. This point is very important from the view point of international guidelines on land acquisition and resettlement (Altinbilek et al., 2000).
After a long series of discussions, a new approach to resettlement has been decided upon for the Seventh Five-Year Plan in Turkey by the State Planning Organization. The Plan mentions specifically that: “ Laws shall be drawn up to plan and put into effect additional projects, such as environmental impact assessment and resettlement projects, which should run alongside and simultaneously with major construction projects”. This Plan also makes clear that the organization who executes the main construction project, like DSI, will be responsible for implementing the resettlement projects. This new approach also includes some remedial solutions for site selection problems associated with resettlement. Site selection is a very difficult problem at present. Experiences indicate that most of the existing state-own land is occupied by landless people, who have been living there for years. Removing them would mean their resettlement. On the other hand, expropriation of a current settlement is not a realistic solution since it would also result in further resettlement. Thus, one alternative would be to look for new approaches, other than the consideration of land-for-land strategy only. Thus, innovative solutions would have to be developed for case- specific conditions (Altinbilek et al., 2000).
Experiences in the Gap Region
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) in Turkey is a regional development project, whose main objective is to improve the quality of life of the people of the region. The water resources development programme of the region includes 13 groups of irrigation and hydropower generation projects in both the Euphrates and the Tigris river basins. It is proposed to construct 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants and irrigate 1.7 million ha of land. The overall planned installed capacity is about 7, 500 MW, with an annual hydroelectric production of 27 billion kWh.
The main objective of the GAP Project is to improve the standard of living of the people of the GAP area. This is expected to result from the present and future massive development of water infrastructures in the region (Tortajada, 2000; Biswas and Tortajada, 1998). In order to improve the lifestyles of the local population through water acting as the engine for socio- economic development, it is necessary first to assess and understand the socio-economic and cultural conditions in which the people live at present.
During the early 1990s, the GAP Administration commissioned several social surveys from different institutions in Turkey. The surveys included a diagnosis of the problems of the people of the region: demographic and family structures, health services, level of education and educational services available, infrastructure, settlement patterns, employment and income levels, etc. It was realised that many people of the region would need assistance to
101 adapt to the new conditions resulting from the rapid economic development of the areas. This vulnerable group was identified and attempts were made to determine how best both the government and NGOs could support them to cope with these anticipated changes.
Some of the surveys that were carried out included the Assessment of the trends of the social changes in the GAP Region by the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers in 1991-1993; Population movements in the GAP region by the Sociology Department of the Middle East Technical University (METU), 1992-1994; Status of women and their integration to the processes of development in the GAP Region by the Development Foundation of Turkey in 1992-1994; Problems of employment and resettlement in areas which will be affected by reservoirs in the GAP Region by the Sociology Association, in 1992-1994; and Socio- economic studies on the management, operation and maintenance of the GAP irrigation systems, Department of Sociology of the METU, 1993.
In 1997, the GAP Administration, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), initiated a project entitled “Planning and Implementation Project for Resettlement, Employment and Economic Investments for the Population Affected by the Birecik dam” (GAP Administration, 1997). The main objectives of this project were to:
?? organise the affected populations so that they could express their own views and preferences in terms of selecting the areas where they could be resettled; ?? inform them of their entitlements in terms of the various resettlement laws; ?? advise them on how best the compensation money received can be used to generate stable and regular income on a long-term basis; and ?? support them to generate employment and/or income-generating activities in their new settlements.
During the survey undertaken for this project, the heads of more than 1,300 households were interviewed from a total of 200,000 people in 36 settlements. This population had already been affected by the construction of three dams (Karakaya, Hancagiz and Hacihidir), and would be further affected by four more dams that were under construction at the time of the study (Ataturk, Dicle, Kiralkizi and Batman), as well as by another dam, Ilisu, that is likely to be constructed in the near future. Heads of villages and people working in the local government institutions were also interviewed with the objective of finding out their views on and concerns with the entire resettlement process. The results of these interviews indicated that compensation (both level and timing of payment) was their main concern, since even though 1052 families would be affected by the dam, only 131 families had received their compensation money.
The results of this survey reflected not only the problems faced by the PAP in terms of lack of funds because of delays in receiving compensations, but also the socio-cultural difficulties
102 they had to face to adapt themselves and their families into their new living conditions. The lack of timely and proper implementation of the expropriation and the resettlement laws made the processes difficult, frustrating and time consuming. A fundamental problem that repeatedly was mentioned by the PAP was the lack of economic activities and unemployment for the displaced populations, which could result in socio-economic hardships for thousands of families. The PAP expected in general a more timely resettlement planning, better levels and timely payment of compensations, their effective participation throughout the decision-making processes, including selection of sites where they could be resettled, support for employment generation, including self-employment, training and support for farming and animal husbandry-related activities, availability of low interest credit facilities, equitable land distribution, and so on.
Based on the results of this survey, it was clear that the adverse impacts of the construction of the dams in terms of resettlement could be minimised if the PAP were included in the planning and the decision-making processes from the very beginning. In addition, compensations should be paid at appropriate levels on a timely basis and training and guidance services should be organised properly to ensure the channelling of the compensation funds to productive income-generating activities. If all these constraints could be simultaneously taken care of, the adverse socio-economic impacts of resettlement could be minimised on both short- and long-term basis.
The GAP Administration thus decided to initiate a pilot resettlement planning project in the area that would be inundated by the Birecik dam. The primary objective was to initiate a new approach to resettlement, which would be more acceptable to the people whose lives will be disrupted by the projects constructed, and to ensure that the standard of living of the PAP is better than what they enjoyed before. The approach would be participative and consultative, wherein the target population would be considered to be an integral part of the resettlement planning and implementation processes, with good communication and coordination between the governmental institutions involved and the people to be resettled. Due to the historical and the archaeological richness of the area that would be inundated by the project, the protection of the cultural assets was also considered to be a priority consideration.
Birecik Dam Resettlement Process
The Birecik dam is a multi-purpose dam, with emphasis on hydropower generation, and ensuring a reliable supply of water for domestic, industrial and agricultural purposes. Flood control would also be an important benefit of the project. The annual electricity output of the dam is expected to be 2.5 billion kWh, and an area of 700,000 decars (10 ha = 1 decar), reaching up to the Syrian border, will benefit from irrigated agriculture. The construction of the Birecik dam started in 1996, and its first power generating unit is expected to be operational in 2001. The construction is based on a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model, and the consortium for the project consists of Turkish, Belgian, German, Austrian and French firms. The dam will be transferred to the Government of Turkey after an operational period of 15 years (Yasinok, 2000).
103
The Birecik dam is a private sector initiative, whose main payback will come from the selling of hydropower generated to the State. Since the main focus of the dam was on electricity generation, the expropriation activities were not the responsibility of DSI, which normally is the case in Turkey, but of the Electric Works and Survey Administration, Ministry of Energy. This organisation is normally not responsible for resettlement activities. Thus, not surprisingly, it has had very little knowledge and experience in implementing large-scale resettlement activities.
The construction of the Birecik dam affected more than 30,000 people living in 44 villages, which included Halfeti, Birecik and Bozova districts in Sanliurfa province, Araban, Yavuzeli and Nizip districts in Gaziantep province, and the Central and Besni districts in Adiyaman province. The project inundated some 50,000 decars of agricultural land. The settlements that were affected in terms of inhabited areas and/or agricultural and grazing lands are shown in Table 1 (Yasinok, 2000; GAP Administration, 1998).
The first step of the participatory resettlement process initiated consisted of establishing communication with the populations affected and to find out their concerns so that the social, economic and spatial preferences of the people affected, could be defined. Surveys in 13 settlements were carried out over two years, which resulted in responses from 1307 families. Concurrently, open meetings were organised in the different settlements in order to establish a direct dialogue with the populations. This was also a confidence-building measure. During all these meetings, villagers were given appropriate information on both compensation and resettlement practices, their legal rights and obligations, and overview of resettlement experiences from both within and outside the region.
104 Table 1. Settlements and population affected by the Birecik dam
District Settlement Population Area Plots Level (1997) (decars) affected affected
Birecik Meteler 171 3457 190 Fully Altinova 1595 311 14 Surtepe 312 22 37 Gecittepe 173 3034 219 Fully Keskince 946 6718 555 Fully Dorucak 549 625 75 Fully Ayran 2592 821 95 Sub-Total 6228 14,988 1185 Halfeti Kavaklica 464 2510 289 Fully Sirataslar 817 568 65 Bulakli 307 2 1 Kayalar 522 423 3 Bozyazi 906 355 9 Gozeli 890 762 7 Fully Saylakkaya 843 223 2 Savasan 299 597 41 Partly Cakalli 573 690 28 Merkez 2560 2322 232 Partly Sub-Total 8181 8452 677 Bozova Kiragili 326 158 11 Killik 604 639 11 Urunlu 855 83 4 Irmakboyu 532 707 28 Partly Ozgoren 307 1161 18 Karapinar 154 131 12 Sub-Total 2778 2879 84 Nizip Kavunlu 422 4312 572 Fully Samandoken 291 1120 40 Keklik 180 1561 308 Toydemir 193 131 12 A. Cardak 813 3927 772 Y. Cardak 285 1002 221 Erenkoy 563 1916 412 Fully Gumusgun 220 1384 354 Partly Kamisli 412 929 46 K. Meydani 114 1510 159 Fully Sub-Total 3493 17792 2896 Yavuzeli Kasaba 284 605 94 Sarilar 1473 432 9 Sub-total 1757 1037 103
105 District Settlement Population Area Plots Level (1997) (decars) affected affected
Araban Elifkoy 2595 317 5 Fistiklidag 715 949 16 Hirarkoy 880 490 14 Tarlabasi 109 396 7 Ciftekoz 310 100 0 Sub-Total 4609 2252 42 Adiyaman Besni Kizilin 2140 642 28 Merkez Gumuskaya 1610 837 35 Merkez Akdere 1175 667 34 Sub-Total 4925 2146 97 Source: Yasinok, 2000, GAP Administration, 1998.
The populations were specifically informed on the criteria for evaluation of their properties, and on how the valuation committee would price their resources and assets so that the total compensation could be determined. They were advised to point out certain specific characteristics of their assets and resources to the valuation commission, which would ensure that they receive higher, but just levels of compensations. This was a totally new process, since these types of information and support were not available to PAP in any earlier project in Turkey. This campaign to inform the people of their rights and how valuations would be made, generally resulted in the families receiving higher levels of compensation than otherwise may have been the case.
The people who decided to be resettled in the project area, worked jointly with the concerned governmental institutions to identify the locations of their new villages. In addition, a Multipurpose Community Centre (CATOM) was opened by GAP Administration in Halfeti District Centre, with the objective of providing information on a regular basis and establishing regular communication with the settlers. The information provided included an overview of the impacts of the Birecik dam at the national, regional and local levels; how it would affect the local populations directly and indirectly, expropriation, compensation and resettlement-related issues; preferred locations for their new settlements; types of housing they need or could expect, etc.
In terms of compensations, the resettlers had several alternatives to choose from. They could either opt for cash payments and then be responsible for their own resettlement, or request the authorities concerned to use the cash amount to facilitate their resettlement. Generally, however, it appears that the people preferred to resettle as a group in areas near to the original settlements with which they are familiar. Settlers who requested cash compensations were paid the amounts stipulated by the law, although there were considerable delays in receiving such payments in many cases. They also received support from the government for the construction of their new villages. Some people preferred not to accept compensations in cash, but requested instead that the authorities construct their
106 houses and infrastructural facilities. Other resettlers decided to accept their compensation amounts in cash and then resettle in urban areas of their choice by themselves, while some others requested the support of the government to move into urban areas, and thus forego the cash compensation alternative.
Through the participation, information and communication strategies, the villagers were made fully aware of their rights and financial entitlements under the Turkish compensation and resettlement laws. The population was given all the relevant information on the criteria by which their land and properties would be assessed for expropriation by the government, and thus the levels of compensation they could expect. The GAP Administration staff advised them as to which aspects of their land and properties should be specifically shown to the assessors so that they received proper compensations. The villagers followed these advice, as a result of which their compensation payments were assessed at correct levels, which were higher than the initial estimates prepared by the government. The final appropriation cost was thus higher than the initial estimates, which were based on earlier resettlement experiences, when people did not have much information on how their properties would be assessed by the government. Unfortunately, it appears that this was not appreciated by some of the relevant institutional authorities who were partners of the GAP Administration in the resettlement process. Payments of higher compensations thus became an important element which directly contributed to confidence building with the local populations. Such results of the awareness-raising aspects of the participatory process can generally be considered to be positive.
In order to learn from their own approaches, the GAP Administration carried out an internal evaluation on “the planning and implementation project for resettlement, employment and economic investments of the population affected by Birecik dam” (GAP Administration, 2000). Following it, an independent study was conducted to evaluate the resettlement process due to the Birecik dam and of the salvage operations in the city of Zeugma. The analysis that follows refers to this last study, where the author participated, and will focus only on the resettlement process due to Birecik dam (Biswas and Tortajada, 2000).
An important component of the independent study was to conduct an objective assessment of the process used for resettlement of the population affected by the construction of the Birecik dam, and the results thereof. As a part of this study, extensive discussions were carried out with the GAP Administration staff associated with the Birecik dam resettlement study, both in Ankara and in Sanliurfa. Numerous meetings were also organised with the representatives of the regional offices of the General Directorates of Agrarian Reform and Rural Affairs, and regional branch of the Public Works, Governor of Sanliurfa, District Governor of Halfeti, and Mayors of Halfeti and Sanliurfa. In addition, several newly resettled villages were visited, especially those considered by the GAP Administration staff to be good examples of the participatory resettlement process.
The assessment was carried out less than six months after the people had moved into the new settlement areas. Thus, it was still very early to make a definitive statement on whether
107 the resettlement and rehabilitation processes had been successful or not. Resettlement cannot be considered to be complete within only a few months after the people moved, since during this time the people are just beginning to adjust to their new lives. In the case of the Birecik dam, it was possible to assess only the process through which the people were encouraged to participate, the outcomes of their participation, and the transfer of the affected population from their own land to the new resettlement zones.
The main lesson of this resettlement process is the fact that the populations were consulted, informed and supported before and throughout the resettlement period by the government, which contributed to the building confidence between the populations and the related agencies. There were also handicaps, which were mainly due to shortages of funds, delays in execution, and the lack of coordination between the several governmental agencies in charge of the different tasks.
As noted earlier, there are many levels of commitment, including at the higher policy-making and at the field levels, some of which varies within and among the institutions. However, the commitment and performance of the populations, and also that of the NGOs, are also decisive for the success of the resettlement and rehabilitation processes. The delay in relocating the households do not always result from the lack of political will. Many other factors, including delays in decision making from the resettlers, conflicting views of the villages, lack of responsibility and self-dependency, also affect the resettlement and rehabilitation processes negatively.
Based on the analysis carried out, the delays in the resettlement and rehabilitation processes cannot exclusively be attributed to the government agencies. PAP are also responsible for the delays in the implementation of the process. For example, in the case of the Birecik dam, some people decided that they would take the money and resettle by themselves. Hence, new villages were planned for a certain number of people in terms of housing and associated services. However, all of a sudden, most of the people who had already taken their compensations and had left, came back indicating their desire to be resettled with their previous neighbours. Not surprisingly, this situation could not be solved promptly, since new housing and infrastructure requires planning, executing and budgeting, which needed time. The population who came back received support from the government in terms of temporary housing, but will have to wait to be resettled.
In another case, the inhabitants of one of the villages to be resettled, changed their mind several times regarding the site where their new village would be relocated. It was until they realised that the construction of the other villages was going on, and that theirs would not be ready by the time they would have to leave the present ones, that they finally accepted the place that had been initially selected by them and the government staff. Obviously, the construction started much later than planned and thus will be finished much after the rest of the villages are complete.
108 The populations of the several villages were informed of the risks they could face if they opted for cash compensation, left the region and did not invest the money productively. Extensive information was provided to the resettlers of the people who had left the region with cash compensation payments. If these cash payments were not properly invested, those people ended up in the streets as financial destitutes. The objective of this exercise was to make populations aware of the importance and consequences of their own decisions. The result was that 100% of the people that were relocated, or relocated by themselves due to the Birecik dam, stayed within the region.
The payments the resettlers received for their properties were not only legal but were also just, but these payments were invariable given very late. The people who had been resettled at the time of the current assessment (July 2000), and those who still have to be resettled, are generally poor, not properly educated and have very little political power. However, this did not entitle government staff to act unfaithfully, or not to provide fair share of the compensation money, or not to make timely payments. In future resettlement cases, the GAP Administration, as well as the other governmental organisations, should make even more vigorous effort to make the people not only aware of what are their legal rights, but also assist them to ensure that their legal rights are respected, and they receive the appropriate compensation payments in a timely manner.
An interesting finding was the difference in attitude and knowledge of the people who were resettled because of the construction of the Ataturk and the Birecik dams. In the case of the Ataturk dam, the population had only a vague idea about the amount of expropriation payments they were entitled to receive, as well as to their legal rights in general. People were passive, and to a large extent, mostly grateful for whatever benefits the government had decided to give them. Even some 10 years after the completion of the Ataturk dam, as of August 2000, there were still 330 families who were waiting to be resettled. They still did not know where exactly they would be resettled, or when. Since the government has paid for the housing of the people, they have been waiting passively and patiently for almost a decade for the government to give them the necessary information, and hopefully resettle them somewhere some time in the foreseeable future.
In contrast, many of the resettlers of the Birecik dam who were interviewed were aware of most of their rights, and they were not passive or shy in asking for what they were entitled to by the law. Their expectations were much higher than the resettlers of the Ataturk dam, and they were more active and forceful in terms of demanding their rights under the Turkish laws. It was also evident that they were somewhat more aware of the power of the media to bring their plights to the attention of the nation, or even internationally, compared to their counterparts in the Ataturk dam, who were basically naïve in terms of using the media.
The process of awareness-raising and confidence-building should be emphasised further in all resettlement processes which may be undertaken by the GAP Administration or any other institutions in the coming years. This empowerment process through knowledge is an
109 important contribution to the development of the region, and it is an essential component of any democratic process.
On the other hand, even though the GAP Administration succeeded in the awareness-raising aspects with the population, it did not have the same success with the governmental institutions involved with the resettlement process. The overall intentions may have been good, but better planning and timely implementation still have to be achieved by the different institutions responsible for implementing the resettlement process. It has to be realised that the participatory process is not an end by itself, since it will only have limited impact on the lives of the population, if the process is not implemented appropriately. The end is to achieve a better life-style of the people who are resettled. Clearly, a participatory process is a fundamental requirement in terms of communication, information, and support to the population, but it should be recognised only as the beginning of the process to pay back the affected population what they are entitled to.
In order to achieve successful results, all resettlement processes should be monitored and the results evaluated by independent professionals who are not responsible for either the project development or the implementation of resettlement. The results of the monitoring process should be evaluated periodically, and remedial measures must be taken promptly to address the shortcomings. These evaluation reports should be part of a strategy to encourage all the participating institutions to the resettlement process to complete their agreed activities on time so that the expected benefits accrue to the PAP, and the promises of delivery of services are kept, and not delayed, as was the case for the Birecik dam.
Another issue to consider in the resettlement issues is timing. In general, large development projects, like dams, are constructed and put into operation over a 10-15 year period. However, the case of the Birecik dam is different, since the private consortium responsible for its construction completed it in only 5 years. It indicates that private sector groups have the potential and the interest to construct and operate large dams in far shorter time than what was the average earlier. This also means that the governments must re-think the overall resettlement strategies. The resettlement plans must be formulated and implemented in far shorter times for BOT projects, compared to government-constructed projects. Private- public partnerships have to be developed so that the planning and implementation stages of the infrastructural projects can take care properly of all relevant environmental and social issues, including resettlement. The failure to do this would make timing another important reason for a poor implementation of the social components of water development projects.
At present, resettlement practices are being closely scrutinised by social and environmental activists, as well as by the international media. If the governments and the private sector cannot assure that the environmental and the social components of development projects can be taken care of sensitively and efficiently, it would make future construction of large dams more difficult. Lack of support to water projects by the global community can make it very difficult for any new project to be implemented. Inadequate resettlement practices can result, besides from the failure of the project, in a general reluctance by the external
110 financing agencies to provide funds for the construction of large dams. It could delay, or even stop, construction of new dams, even when they are properly planned and their overall societal benefits are beyond any question.
The participation of private sector opens a new dimension in the construction and operation of large water development projects. Since private sector companies are likely to become increasingly more involved in the construction of large dams, they should recognise the need to improve their environmental and social performances. Companies will have to give further thought as to how the resettlement practices can be further improved, even when they are not directly responsible for this aspect, as was the case for the Birecik dam.
The rapid advances in the environmental awareness of the public in recent years has meant new pressures on both the public and private sectors, mainly by the NGO movement and its ability to expose wrong doings, real and imaginary, through electronic and printed media. The public has become increasingly aware of the social and environmental impacts of large development projects. Accordingly, irrespective of the past and the present situations, social and environmental impacts of future development projects must be overwhelmingly positive. This includes resettlement practices, which must show significant improvements in the coming years.
The main objective of any development project is to improve the lifestyles of as many people as possible. Such projects, however, must not have serious negative impacts on people who may have to pay very high costs. In this case, the very rational of constructing a new project can be seriously questioned. Resettlement can be a serious concern for large dams, and it will continue to remain so, until and unless the practices are improved significantly. In this connection, participatory resettlement process which was formulated for the Birecik dam is a good beginning.
However, in the final analysis, it is not the participatory resettlement process that is most important, but what actually happens to the people who are to be resettled due to the construction of the Birecik dam. Many people have already been resettled, but equally many others are waiting to be resettled. No conclusion can now be drawn as to what are likely to be the social and environmental impacts on the resettlers in the future. Would they be able to pursue appropriate income generating activities in their new environment? Or, would their future lifestyles be better than the past? It would probably take another 10 years or so, before definitive conclusions can be drawn in the effectiveness of the participatory resettlement process attempted for the Birecik dam regarding long-term socio-economic development for the resettled populations. In the intervening years, it would be desirable to monitor the lifestyles of the people who have been resettled, and those who will be resettled, on a regular basis. This will ensure that the shortcomings can be taken care of as and when they surface. Monitoring will also add to our knowledge-base, which is particularly weak because of absence of data and information on the efficacy of the resettlement process due to the construction of the large dams in the past.
111
CONCLUSIONS
Future water problems of the world can only be resolved if the existing water resources management practices become increasingly more efficient. Unless the existing large development projects are managed more efficiently in technical, economic, social and environmental terms, it would be significantly more difficult to justify the construction of new large systems, irrespective of their needs to solve the water scarcity problems of the future.
The emerging social and environmental requirements call for radical changes in water and land management practices of the past. Social, economic and environmental benefits which could accrue from properly planned and managed large water development projects are unquestionable. Equally, poorly planned and managed projects would continue to result in high social and environmental costs, and substantially reduced economic benefits.
With the increasing population of developing countries, accelerated human activities, and increases in per capita water demand, the global water problems can only be resolved by concurrent pursuit of two policies: make water management practices increasingly more efficient, and construct new dams with proper consideration of social and environmental impacts. One of this impacts, which has not been properly considered in the past, is involuntary resettlement of people due to the inundations caused by reservoirs.
The importance of water development projects for the socio-economic development of developing countries cannot be denied. However, there are several important issues which can no longer be ignored either. First, many governments have failed to identify and minimize the social and environmental negative impacts resulting from the construction and operation of large projects. Second, irrespective of the importance and the necessity of actively engaging the affected populations in the decision-making processes, these have been mostly ignored in the past. Third, it is only recently that involuntary resettlement is being recognised as a development process and not simply as a salvage operation as has often been the case in the past. Fourth, efficient information and communication strategies have neither been formulated, nor been implemented between the government agencies responsible for resettlement operations and the PAP, in spite of the substantial benefits that are likely to occur to the people that are to be resettled as well as the project itself.
Anecdotal evidence supports the fact that both the adverse and the positive social and environmental impacts of large water projects have been seriously underestimated. However, absence of objective post-project evaluations means that no conclusive and definitive statements can be made on the overall impacts of the large dams on the society and the environment.
There are many reasons as to why resettlement practices were not satisfactory earlier. Probably the most important reason was because neither the governments nor the
112 international organisations funding the development projects gave adequate attention to the resettlement aspects, including the re-integration into the economy of the affected population. Even if some funds were earmarked for resettlement, they were neither sufficient, not efficiently or timely used. Corruption and mismanagement further reduced the benefits to the people, who were to be resettled, were to receive. The fact that these people were mostly poor, uneducated and politically powerless did not help their case much.
Among the main weaknesses of the past resettlement practices are also the inordinate delays in resettling the people (it is not unusual to find that the people have not been properly resettled even a decade after the completion of projects), lack of coordination among the government institutions concerned, determining correct and just levels of compensations to all the families, disbursement of the compensation funds on time, absence of consultation and communication between the governmental institutions and the PAP, and proper participation of PAP in reaching decisions likely to affect their lives in the future.
The emergence of the social and environmental activism in the 1980s and 1990s brought many of these unsatisfactory practices to the open. The activists championed the cause of the poor and the indigenous people, who often paid the major part of the costs of the development projects in economic and human terms. They brought the plights of the resettlers, and the poor treatment they received to the fore, and put pressures on the international financing institutions and the governments concerned through demonstrations in different capitals of the world, as well as through the media. These interventions brought the resettlement issues higher up in the national and international political agendas, compared to where they used to be before. While the governments of many developing countries were forced to improve their resettlement practices due to the pressures from the NGOs and financing institutions, the World Bank was similarly forced to update its resettlement policy due to the relentless pressures and criticism from the NGOs.
Even though resettlement is one of the major issues for which large dams have been criticised in recent years, it should be noted that not all involuntary resettlement practices in the past have been left much to be desired, be they due to the construction of large dams or for other development projects. However, in the current era of social and environmental awareness, what may have been considered acceptable earlier can no longer be considered acceptable at present. It is thus essential that resettlement practices must be sensitively and efficiently carried out so that the people who are to be resettled also become real beneficiaries of the projects, instead of paying the costs, as was often the case earlier for many such people.
Offering resettlers land for land is an option for income restoration, but it is not the only alternative available. In planning for land-based, as well as non land-based compensations, it is essential to be realistic about the resource base available, the activities it can support, and the actual skills and traditions of the population affected. Pursuing land for land policies, especially where the circumstances are unfavourable, is likely to produce unsatisfactory results. Equally, in those cases where land for land resettlement cannot be achieved, it is
113 essential to inform and educate the people on the importance of investing their compensation money properly and wisely. Investment programmes which could provide reasonable returns over the long term should be supported. Land for land strategy should be considered first, but the challenges for most resettlement projects at present are mainly to develop other options because of the scarcity of land on which people can be resettled.
Government agencies often lack the experience to develop income-generating activities which are well suited to the needs and the capacities of the resettlers. Thus, cooperation with the NGOs and the private sector should be solicited from the initial stages of project planning. Properly managed, these groups can make good contributions which could benefit the affected populations. Best practices for involuntary resettlement practices should include good participatory processes, where governmental authorities and people concerned could plan and implement the resettlement requirements together.
However, in the final analysis, participation for the sake of participation is of no use to the resettlers or to the project. Although better planning practices could lead to better implementation, this assumption has not always been true in the case of involuntary resettlement. As a secondary, or even tertiary operation, resettlement continues to receive inadequate attention during implementation phases. Additionally, past experiences indicate that economic rehabilitation of the resettlers is one of the weakest aspect of resettlement planning.
Once government agencies and officers in the field understand the importance and complexity of involuntary resettlement, they are more likely to address it properly and sensitively with the resources allocated to the process. Instead of seeking mitigation measures only, they should aim to re-establish a socio-economic development process, from which the resettlers could benefit over the long term. However, it is important to remember that involuntary resettlement dismantles production systems and may affect irreversibly the lifestyles of many people. A comprehensive consultation process and the development of income restoration strategies would help, but it would be an almost impossible task to find alternatives that would satisfy all people. It is also possible that resettlers may change their minds as conditions change, or they receive new information. Furthermore, some may feel that no compensation would be enough for forcing them to change their previous lifestyles, and move from the land where their forefathers had lived.
Participatory resettlement, as initiated in the Birecik dam, is a step in the right direction. However, discussions and consultations are not enough: they must result in concrete actions on a timely basis. This will require political will, and understanding by the government institutions responsible, that resettlement is a critical issue which must be performed satisfactorily. While resettlement is receiving increasing attention, the fact still remains that more needs to be done in most development projects.
114 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The support of Dr. Olcay Unver and Mr. Kaya Yasinok, President and Vice President of the GAP Administration, is gratefully acknowledged. Ms. Berrin Basak of the GAP Administration provided much assistance in the data collection process. The study was carried out for the GAP Administration and UNDP. The opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of GAP and UNDP.
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119
V. INSTITUTIONS FOR INTEGRATED RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
The global interest in environmental and social issues has increased exponentially since the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. When the Stockholm Conference was held, 11 countries had appropriate institutional arrangements to manage environmental issues. Exactly 20 years later, when the United Nations convened its next global Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, nearly all the member countries of this august body had established institutional mechanisms to manage their environmental issues at the national level. One of the aspects that contributed to this development was the individual and collective recognition of the countries on the increasing degradation of their natural resources and its inevitable long-term adverse linkages with their future economic development, poverty alleviation and overall quality of life of their populations. This awareness prompted political attention towards social and environmental issues at the national and international levels, which resulted in several world-wide gatherings to analyse development and environment related issues. Unfortunately, however, almost 10 years after the Rio meeting, the continuation of environmental degradation suggests that many developed and developing countries have still not managed to formulate and implement proper public policies which address environmental issues within their overall economic and social frameworks.
It was during the late 1980s and the early 1990s that developing countries all over the world initiated a wide range of economic, environmental and social reforms. This was, in addition to the above mentioned reasons, as a response to international pressures from the donor governments, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and activist non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, during the early 1990s, the focus of the portfolio of the loans of the World Bank shifted to issues like poverty eradication and environment, from infrastructural development that was prevalent during the 1980s and earlier.
In the area of water resources, the dominant trend of the decades of the 1970s and 1980s was on the construction of infrastructures. During the early 1990s, the focus shifted to the management of water resources, but it was still largely on sectoral lines. By the end of the 1990s, integrated water resources management had become the main trend, with a broader multisectoral approach, and consideration of social and environmental issues. Stakeholder participation became an important aspect of water planning and management. It was recognised that many of the activities related to integrated water resources management like demand management, efficient and equitable allocation of water among uses and between users, environmental and social impacts, stakeholders participation, etc., had little to gain from a paradigm which focused mainly on the construction of hydraulic infrastructures. It was further recognised that in order to achieve integrated water resources management,
120 appropriate institutions would have to be developed, with adequate managerial and technical expertise and financial resources. Both the World Bank (1993) and the Inter-American Development Bank have changed the focus of their policies from development of water resources to their holistic management. The emphasis of these international agencies shifted from sub-sectoral and project-based development projects to issues like demand management, private sector involvement, water pricing, environmental conservation, social participation and watershed management. In other words, the new policies were expected to take into account social, environmental and economic aspects, which would result into more effective regulations, incentives, investment plans and environmental protection.
To a certain extent, the shift in the policies of the World Bank and the regional development banks have been because of the continued evolution of the concepts of sustainable development, integrated water resources management, integrated river basin development, and advances in knowledge-base and technology. Additionally, it was further recognised that investments supported by international funding agencies have historically faced shortcomings during the implementation of water-related projects mainly due to weaknesses in national policies and institutions (World Bank, 1993). It was realised that infrastructural projects do not necessarily improve social or economic conditions by themselves, but it is proper planning and investment, as well as technical, financial and social support, which are decisive for their overall success.
Concepts like sustainable development and river basin management have proved to be appealing, and have mostly received widespread global acceptance from national and international institutions in recent years. However, while concepts like integrated water resources management (GWP, 2000) or sustainable development have become popular and are extensively mentioned in national and/or regional policies, their effective incorporation and implementation have proved to be extremely difficult, irrespective of the country concerned. These concepts have attracted special attention following the international conference on water and environment held in Dublin and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, both held in 1992.
There are many reasons for these shortcomings, among which are inadequate institutional and legal frameworks for integrating environment and development-related issues, highly centralised decision-making, absence of political will to change the status quo, lack of adequate number of qualified and trained personnel, non-availability of financial resources on a timely basis, etc. In addition, processes like decentralization and privatisation have yet to produce results that are expected from them in most countries: more efficient water distribution services, encouragements of local initiatives, active participation of water users, generation of new investments funds and involvement of diversified actors (Dourojeanni, 2000).
In terms of participation, the importance of stakeholders’ involvement in the overall water resources planning and management process, as well as in planning, development and implementation of water projects has now been recognised. In many countries, a variety of
121 new social institutions, often non-governmental in nature, have already appeared, and are making their presence increasingly felt in the field of water, especially in terms of environmental and social issues. Unfortunately, however, the water managers of the developing world in general do not appear to appreciate or understand the importance, relevance and necessity of effective stakeholder participation. The central authorities often appear to consider decentralised local institutions and/or NGOs as more of an annoyance rather than an essential partnership between the different institutions concerned to manage water efficiently and equitably. Even though experiences from both urban and rural areas have demonstrated that the successes of specific water projects often depend upon their acceptance by the relevant stakeholders, the views of the local populations have mostly not been adequately considered in the past during the planning, construction and operation of the projects. In order to ensure that water resources development projects benefit the local populations, it is necessary to develop systems of decentralised governance where participation and decision-making are encouraged at the local levels, and where the needs of the societies are identified. Decision-making should not be limited exclusively to the top- most governmental levels, where the real needs of the people, and the various alternatives preferred by them, may often not be known (Garcia, 2000).
As water management problems have become more complex in recent years, and as societal needs and demands have become more diverse, institutions managing water need to reflect and adapt to the new requirements and conditions. Unless the existing water institutions are restructured and/or strengthened, they would be unable to formulate and implement water development policies necessary to improve water management processes and practices. Unfortunately, however, with a few exceptions, institutional changes are still not high on the national or the international political agendas. It is true that water resources management has become the main topic for large international gatherings. However, the aspects discussed at these meetings are not new, nor have they contributed to the improvement of water management policies in the developing countries to any perceptible degree, including those of Latin America. There is a large gap between the discussions at major water and environment conferences and the daily challenges faced by the water managers, where inappropriate management practices continue to prevail for a variety of socio-political and institutional conditions. Long-term national visions for water, formulated through a consultative and participative process by the society, are basically absent at present, not only in Latin America but also the rest of the developing world (Dourojeanni, 2000).
DECISION MAKING FOR WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Development and environment-related problems have remained largely a disciplinary-based exercise in all sectors, and the water sector is not an exception. The environmental issues are often analysed without consideration of their economic, social and cultural interlinkages. The dominance of this limited approach in the development of environmental policies has
122 contributed to the continued acceleration of environmental degradation, inspite of the widespread political and social interest in its abatement (Meppem and Bourke, 1999). So far as water resources is concerned, solutions to specific water issues cannot be found within exclusively the water sector: answers often have to be formulated within an overall inter- sectoral framework. All major water issues are interlinked with many other development- related issues, which means that both the problems and their possible solutions do not depend, and thus should not rely, exclusively on any one discipline, institution or sector. This recognition has further contributed to the widespread acceptance of the concept of integrated water resources management, which considers water management on a multi- sectoral and multidisciplinary basis.
In Latin America, it is being gradually recognised that the increasing complexities of the problems associated with efficient water resources management, and accelerated societal interest in water issues, necessitate a broader approach, which cannot be provided by engineers and/or economists alone. Irrespective of the theory, however, the reality is that the traditional organisations are still basically sectoral, where most of the sectors tend to focus in activities related to one specific use of water and not to their multiple use or management at the river basin or appropriate regional levels (Dourojeanni, 2001a). Despite the fact that the policies on water, agriculture, energy, industry and environment are interrelated to each other, and that in some Latin American countries the water authorities are located within the ministries of the environment, the water is often viewed and managed as if it was independent from all other sectoral issues. The planning and management of water resources still focuses mainly on technical and economic considerations, with limited contributions from natural and social sciences.
In terms of institutional frameworks, it is important to remember that individuals live and operate in a world of institutions, where opportunities and prospects depend on which institutions exist, how effectively they function, and how responsive they are to the changing needs and requirements of the society. These are difficult tasks to accomplish even under the best of circumstances, and thus a single institution may not be adequate or able to handle all the needs in a timely manner. Accordingly, it may be necessary to develop and support a plurality of interacting and interrelated institutions as a means to accomplish the desired objectives (Sen, 1999). Thus, it would be a mistake to look exclusively for one single institutional model expecting it to assure optimum functioning for the overall benefits of the society. Exclusive reliance on any one institution could marginalize the opinions and participation of other institutions which could play constructive roles in the solutions of the problems. Multiple participation of institutions and stakeholders may be desirable in the planning and decision-making processes so that a broader spectrum of opinions, interests and alternatives could be considered before the final decisions are taken. The institutions should evaluate the wants of the societies and have the knowledge and understanding of their needs, so that they are able to provide the necessary support to achieve their goals and objectives. However, the conditions under which specific institutions can operate optimally depend on a multiplicity of factors, which may differ from one country to another, and even
123 over time. There are thus no universal solutions that would be equally applicable for all cases.
Many planning and execution programmes developed by water institutions have not achieved the degree of integration required to take appropriate and timely actions with reference to issues like water projects, consideration of economic, social and environmental impacts, implementation of economic instruments for water management, etc. (for the specific case of Mexico, see Tortajada, 2000a). The lack of effective participatory processes which involve at least the majority of the essential stakeholders, generally results in lack of in-depth considerations of social, economic, environmental and legal issues. For example, formulation and implementation of land use policies and reorientation of economic and industrial activities, including their total costs, are seldom considered. Some regional studies for the water supply sector, like those involving two or more municipalities, may not reach an agreement among the interested parties due to lack of adequate communication and interests, as well as because of political and institutional rivalries. The fact that most of these plans and programmes, though technically acceptable, have been carried out by the governmental institutions without, or with limited, public participation, have made them difficult to implement over the long-term (Braga, 2001).
Public participation in the water sector is an issue that has been widely discussed and promoted at the various national and international levels. Irrespective of the rhetorics, however, not very much has been achieved to ensure its implementation. It seems that in many developing countries, and even in certain international institutions, the discourse of public participation has become an end by itself. Its fundamental importance, that of looking for more realistic analyses of the problems and richer sets of alternatives, as well as its direct linkages with the development process, have not yet been fully appreciated by the central institutions concerned. Institutions at the international, national, regional and local levels, have not realised that in order to achieve an effective and realistic participation by the society, many other needs like education, training, information and communication must be met concurrently. Participation for the sake of participation, may produce results, which may not necessarily be beneficial for the same individuals. The participation of an educated, informed and organised society is likely to be more constructive than that of an uninformed and indifferent population who may not be able to make significant inputs to any development plans or processes. This raises broader issues of societal development which, although of fundamental importance, will not be discussed in this chapter.
The participation of the different sectors of the societies have become so important and essential at present that the efficient water policies can no longer be developed unilaterally or exclusively by any one institution or stakeholder alone, be it the government, private sector, academia or the NGOs. Fortunately, individuals and institutions (other than the governmental ones at the central levels) are increasingly becoming interested not only in water development, but also in planning, management and operation of various water-related activities. Thus, effective ways of consultation, participation, representation, cooperation, coordination, and decision-making have to be developed by the interested parties so that
124 water development and planning and management policies and practices can become more efficient and acceptable to a vast majority of the concerned population. In the specific case of water development projects, in order to ensure that the expected benefits actually accrue to the population concerned and the environment is not degraded, an extensive stakeholders participation and consultation is necessary, which most institutions are ill-equipped to handle at present
Inspite of the importance of public participation, it should be noted, however, that decisions must not always be taken at the lowest organisational level, but at the most appropriate level, which may vary from case to case, and also over time. A single body, be it government, private sector or NGO, is unlikely to see beyond its own interests, agendas and priorities, every time over the long term. So far as NGOs are concerned, many people and institutions consider at present that they represent the voice of the poor and the under-privileged. It is a fact that many times NGOs have taken over some of the responsibilities of the governments when they have failed in the past to deliver water-related services efficiently, cost-effectively and equitably. However, this does not mean that the NGOs can replace the entire government apparatus and/or perform all the tasks the governments are entrusted with, but rather that they can perform certain tasks more efficiently over a period of time.
Properly structured and managed institutions can accommodate mixed demands and interests, incorporating not only public arrangements but also initiatives from different sectors, like the public sector institutions, private sector, academic and research institutions and NGOs. Institutional arrangements can directly contribute to the success or the failure of the formulation and implementation of water policies, as well as in the design, execution and management of specific water projects. A well-structured and properly functioning institution can further assure a more effective participation of the society, who, in turn may become more responsive and participative, thus resulting in a “win-win” situation for all concerned. Furthermore, such institutions are able to reach both the macro- and micro- levels of any society in terms of policies and services. Furthermore, they can also assist in improving human welfare through better services, employment generation, advances in knowledge, education and training, dissemination of information and better communication (Sen, 1999). The roles the water institutions can play in the future through their interactions with the societies will indicate how much these institutions, as well as the community in general, can contribute to improve the quality of life of the population, promote social cohesion and preserve the environment, through efficient water resources management.
Thus, if integrated management and development of an area is a goal, this is more likely to be achieved if management units are defined on the basis of such areas, i.e., river basins. River basins can be considered as integrating units through which it is possible to improve the quality of life of the population at the economic, social and environmental levels (Barrow, 1998), by promoting decentralised management and participation of the stakeholders. In the case of water resources, river basin organisations are potentially one of the most promising institutional alternatives for their management, if developed within a
125 framework which focuses on the integration of water resources planning and management looking for economic, social and environmental development.
Management activities at the river basin level may vary depending upon the policy objectives, which include decentralization, public participation, infrastructural development, environmental protection, rural development, land and water management, etc. The integrative natural resource management at the river basin level can be based on either natural resources in general, or as is the case for Latin America, basically on water resources (Dourojeanni, 2001b). In this case, it is desirable that the interests of the different users, whose economic and social activities depend on the hydrographic basin, are represented in the policy-making of the region so that no conflicts arise among them and that their activities are not unnecessarily affected adversely.
The river basin bodies are expected to plan and act in response to specific regional needs, promote the formulation of region-specific strategies and assist in their implementation, take actions for rational and efficient use of resources to improve the lifestyles of the local people, and simultaneously protect the environment (CEPAL, 1997). Depending upon the roles, jurisdiction and authority of the river basin organisations, they can be classified as authorities (with statutory power to promote and enforce changes), entities (intermediate and vary in power) and commissions or committees (with advisory or monitoring roles, but no decision-making power) (Barrow, 1998). The type of river basin organisations that are needed depend on the policies of the countries and the objectives that are to be achieved. Their roles, responsibilities and financial resources of the organisations, have to be defined within the existing legal and institutional frameworks of the specific countries concerned for a more efficient performance. With the recent decentralization drive in most Latin American countries, the roles of the water management institution at different levels should be clarified in order to ensure a better coordination among them. River basin organisations have to be carefully incorporated into the administrative structures of the countries to avoid rivalries among institutions at the central, state, regional and municipal levels, duplication of activities, inefficiency and lack of resources.
River basin organisations have been created all over the world. However, the focus in the subsequent discussion will be the performances of the river basin organisations in Latin America only, with special emphasis in Brazil and Mexico.
RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
Many Latin American countries became interested in river basin organisations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, mostly in an attempt to replicate the experiences of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States. The approach to use river basins as a management unit at that time in the region could be partly explained by the then prevailing national policies that favoured a regional planning approach which could create development poles to ease the pressures on the urban and industrial centres. The TVA model was
126 generally viewed as a possible way to achieve development and industrialisation. Some regional development corporations were established on the basis of river basins, like several river basin commissions in Mexico towards the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s (Barkin and King, 1986; Garcia, 1999).
The earlier approach to manage river basins as a unit of development and/or management was, however, not extensive. The general concept received wider acceptance in the 1990s, when the interest in river basin organisations became more widespread not only in Latin America but also in many other parts of the world. This interest, however, has less to do with the use of river basin units as poles of decentralised development as was the case in earlier times. Instead, it was a part of a general shift towards integrated water resources management, and the realization that in order to meet increasing water demands and to reduce water scarcity due to quality and quantity problems, a broader approach-base was necessary on efficient management and not exclusively on infrastructural development. This accelerated interest has resulted in the establishment of river basin organisations in several Latin American countries (Garcia, 1999).
The French and the British experiences on river basin management were noted with considerable interest in many Latin American countries. However, these European experiences were never critically and objectively analysed as to what extent these were the most optimal units for water management, and their relevance and potential replicability under the differing physical, environmental, social, economic, legal and institutional conditions of Latin America. This acceleration of interest in river basins resulted in the formation of several regional institutions like the Latin American Network for Watershed Management, and regional networks such as the Latin American Network of Basins Organisations (LANBO). At the regional level, many bilateral and multilateral commissions were created, like the Bermejo and Pilcomayo Commissions, Inter-Governmental Plata River Commission, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, etc. (Biswas, et al., 1999; Cordeiro 1994 in Garcia, 1999). At the national level, there was a general trend towards the establishment of river basin organisations in several Latin American countries during this period. However, even though many central institutions have started a process of decentralization, mainly directed to the agricultural sector, for all practical purposes, a centralised top-down management structure primarily along sectoral lines continues to be in place inspite of the creation of the organisations at the river basin level.
Some Latin American countries have developed, or are in the process of developing, institutional and legal frameworks to manage their water resources at the regional level by creating river basin organisations. So far, in terms of legislative framework, only Brazil and Mexico in Latin America have water laws which promote river basins as the unit for management of water resources. The Inter-American Development Bank has already financed, or is likely to finance, more than 20 projects at the basin management level in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Even though the river basin concept in the region was started mainly to deal with
127 a single resource, water, the current approach is expected to integrate economic, social and environmental issues simultaneously (Garcia, 2001; 1999). To what extent such an integrated management is realistically possible when the management unit is primarily chosen on the basis of water, is unknown at present. This is an especially pertinent issue, since at the national or regional levels, countries have institutions that manage jointly or separately, water, environmental, economic and social affairs, and which still have to learn on how to coordinate with each other.
In the final analysis, efficient administration of the river basins is likely to depend significantly upon the extent of decision-making power and financial autonomy that would be delegated to such authorities (Solanes & Getches, 1998). These institutions should have authority and resources to carry out the tasks assigned to them in terms of managing water resources optimally over the long-term. They should also be accountable for their overall performance.
It is important to note that the main reasons for the modifications of water laws in several Latin American countries have not been necessarily to promote the achievement of integrated water resources management, either nationally or at the river basin level, but to respond to changing trends both at the national and international levels. It appears that to a significant extent, the efforts to amend the legal and institutional frameworks have resulted from the desire to encourage the participation of the private sector in supplying water- related services, and enable users to administer water themselves (Marañón-Pimentel and Wester, 2000; Dourojeanni, 2000). The dominant present thinking is that extensive participation of the private sector and water users will significantly improve the performances of the existing water institutions, which have been mostly dismal in recent years.
Another reason for the legal changes could be the urgent need to improve water management practices which can match the growing competition between its multiple uses and users, especially due to the increasing demands for water in urban areas, irrigated agriculture, hydropower generation and environmental protection, and simultaneously manage its quality. Finally, the last reason could be the need to formulate a more modern legislative framework which could contribute to the control of floods and droughts, the over-exploitation of certain sources, especially aquifers, and the increasing deterioration of water quality in all Latin America.
LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES: THE CASES OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO
Geographical, economic, political, social, legal and institutional considerations have been the main drivers for the improvement of the water management practices in different countries. Furthermore, it should be noted that Latin America is neither a homogeneous region, nor are all the countries at the same level and stage of socio-economic development. Thus, any single institutional model is highly unlikely to be equally applicable for efficient river basin
128 management for all countries. Inspite of this fact, the region as a whole appears to be moving towards river basin management, although one cannot prejudge a priori the results of this shift at present. The concept of idealized situations where things were designed to be “as they should be,” is giving way to a more pragmatic approach, where river basin management activities must conform to demands and constraints imposed by real situations, where things are “as they are” (Garcia, 2001).
Historically and traditionally, the Latin American countries have been heavily centralised in terms of planning and decision-making, and the water sector has not been an exception. Hence, simple adoption of a policy advocating decentralization is unlikely to succeed: the mind-sets of the senior officers of the existing water ministries need to change to embrace the new philosophy. There are, however, no visible signs that this is happening at present. Managers at the federal, but also at the local levels, must believe that decentralization and delegation of authority are essential for improving the water management practices of the countries concerned. Without such fundamental attitudinal changes, decentralization will continue to remain mainly rhetorical for political purposes and hence unlikely to succeed, as often appears to be the case at present. In addition, irrespective of the consideration as to what may be the best unit for river basin management, human and financial resources will continue to remain important constraints for rational planning and management of water resources in Latin America, whether the process remains centralised or becomes decentralised. Institutions, whether centralised or decentralised, cannot function efficiently without management and technical expertise, as well as timely availability of necessary funds.
Experiences from integrated management of river basins in Latin America in general, and specific case studies from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, indicate that the units for optimal water management need to be further studied and objectively reviewed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn (Biswas et al., 1999; Biswas & Tortajada, 2001a). The units may not necessarily be in terms of river basin units for a variety of technical, political, institutional, legal, social and cultural reasons. In some cases, the units could perhaps be best managed by administrative regions. This is an area that needs further serious investigations. In addition, the most appropriate units for water management may even vary from one part of Latin America to other because of the wide diversity of conditions.
In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are the only two countries where river basins organisations are legally mandated. Examples of river basin management practices from Brazil and Mexico are discussed next, which illustrate the present status of the application of the concept.
Brazilian Experiences
Brazil is one of the most advanced countries of the region in terms of river basin management. Geographically, Brazil is by far the largest Latin American country. It has three large river basins (Amazon, Tocantins and São Francisco) and two other groups of river
129 basins (Plata and the remaining rivers that flow to the Atlantic). The Plata river basin includes the Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay rivers. Finally, the Atlantic river basin complex includes the following: Atlantic North, Atlantic Northeast, Atlantic East I, Atlantic East II and Atlantic Southeast (Tucci and Clark, 1998).
Historically, the regional economic development in Brazil has been heavily dependent on the hydropower sector, which has received many special privileges compared to the other water sectors like irrigation, industrial and municipal water supply, and navigation. In fact, during the late 1970s, most of the dams in the country were constructed primarily for hydropower generation. They were thus basically single purpose development, and multiple uses of water did not receive adequate attention. Accordingly, the institutions responsible for generation and management of hydropower became very powerful, both politically and financially, certainly at a level that was significantly higher than the irrigation-related institutions.
Brazil is a federal nation. In terms of legislations, many of the Brazilian states have formulated their own water laws, mainly because of the delay in developing a national water law by the federal government. Along with the legislations, most of the states also progressed towards the establishment of river basin committees. Legal and institutional frameworks are currently being developed on important issues like the establishment of water agencies, committees, norms, information systems, introduction of water tariffs, water permits, etc. The institutional framework at present includes the National Water Resources Council, with the authority to manage and plan the water resources at the national, regional and state levels. It approves the guidelines for the permits for water use and withdrawals, and it is also the final arbitration stage for inter-state conflicts. The water agencies act as executive secretariats for the river basin committees and implement their decisions. The responsibility for the management of water resources in the country is vested in the federal government. Accordingly, it has the majority voting power in the Council, 50% plus one vote, in terms of decision-making (Garrido, 2001; Porto et al., 1999).
The National Water Law in Brazil was approved in 1997 (Ministry of Environment, 1999). However, the law for the State of Sao Paulo was proposed in 1991 and was approved by the State Congress during the 1992-1996 term. In the State of Ceara, its water law was approved in 1992. During the subsequent three years, five other states followed their examples. Issues like integrated water resources management, river basins as management units, provisions for public participation and provisions for water pricing, were common in the laws of several states (Porto et al., 1999).
As noted earlier, the Water Resources Law of the State of Sao Paulo, was approved by the State Congress during the 1992-1996 period. This time period, however, did not coincide with the terms of the Governor and the State Congress persons, which began in 1995. Fortunately, however, this overlap allowed sufficient time for the newly elected representatives to get acquainted with the approved plan, and then prepare a new plan for the following 4-year period. A regular evaluation of the plan is being carried out through an annual report prepared by the executive office of the State Water Resources Council for each
130 management unit. During the development process of the plan, there were frequent interactions between the State Plan and the basin plans developed for the various management units. The State Plan provided the overall direction and technical and economic mechanisms for the orientations of the basin plans and programmes. The basin plans, on the other hand, focused on programmes for development of the specific management units. Other important points in the process were decentralization of the planning process which enabled the water management units to propose their own development programmes, ensured consolidation and integration of the basin plans at the State level and the consideration of interfaces with other states, regional, municipal and urban plans. Once the State plan is formulated, it is reviewed by the State Congress, and following its approval, it becomes a law (Braga, 2001).
Under the Brazilian law, the river basin committees are considered to be coordinating units, which bring together the different stakeholders to discuss various problems and decide on possible solutions with the objective of protecting the natural resources within the river basin, especially in terms of water resources. The committees can act within the entire river basin, including sub-basins, any tributaries to the main streams, and group of neighbouring river basins or sub-basins (Garrido, 2001).
The composition of the river basin committees varies in the different states (Porto, 1998). In the state of Sao Paulo, the committees consist of representatives of three groups: state government, municipalities, and stakeholders (professional associations, universities and organised groups interested in the region). Each group has one-third of the representatives. In the state of Santa Catarina, 20% of the representatives are from the state government, 40% from the municipalities and organised civil society, and 40% from the stakeholders. In the state of Ceara, there is no specific number for the seats for any of the sectors: the only stipulation is that the state government and the municipalities should have the same number of representatives.
In the state of Ceara, it is COGERH, a public bulk water company at the state level, which currently plays the role of water agency for all the state river basins. It was after the COGERH showed positive results in the management of bulk water (with the participation of stakeholders) and after water users were better organised at the reservoir level, that COGERH organised the river basin committees (Porto and Kelman, 2000). This is an interesting case which shows that traditional river basin organisations are not always what is needed for efficient water resources management. What is necessary instead is an efficient organisational structure which helps to solve the specific water problems of a region.
Some examples of efficiency of river basin organisations are demonstrated by experiences in the states of Sao Paulo and Ceara. The state of Sao Paulo is divided into 20 water management units according to basin boundaries and social and economic indices. For example, in the Piracicaba river basin, agreements have been reached on water allocation for minimum flows, industrial withdrawals and effluent dilution, during the monthly meeting of the commissions between water supply utilities, power sector companies and industrial
131 sector. In the state of Ceara, 80% of the conflicts have been resolved, not in the courts, but within the committees (Porto, 1998).
A preliminary assessment of the water resources of the state of Sao Paulo indicated that the management units located in the eastern part should have priority in implementing integrated water resources planning. It was decided that the management units for the Upper Tietê, Piracicaba and Baixada Santista rivers should be considered simultaneously. Thus, a plan was prepared (HIDROPLAN), which took into consideration the multidisciplinary nature of water resources planning and its interrelations with other sectors of the economy. The plan was conceived to be dynamic, and was based on different scenarios for future water demands for different uses in the river basin, including wastewater management, pollution control, electricity generation, urban water supply, etc. Seven development alternatives were generated for this plan, from which the most optimal one was finally selected (Braga, 2001).
It has been recognised in Brazil that in order to implement water management at the river basin levels, issues like decentralization, water permits and water pricing should be promoted, and appropriate legal and institutional frameworks need to be developed. Even when there is no perfect process, a more efficient water resources management can be achieved if it is realised that the institutional frameworks should respond to the specific needs of the regions, accommodating their individual hydrologic, social, political and cultural conditions.
Mexican Experiences
In Mexico, water demands have historically been met through the construction of new infrastructures, without questioning either the validity of consumption patterns or the efficiency of the existing water use practices. Therefore, adequate considerations have not been given to the dual problem of water scarcity and the increasing costs of supplying it.
Towards the end of the decade of the 1940s, the Mexican government embarked on large- scale water-based regional development programmes. The first group of river basin commissions (Papaloapan, Grijalba, Tepalcatepec and Balsas) were established to coordinate the activities of the different ministries working in the several states of the region, where the programmes were initiated. The funds for this large-scale investment programmes were allocated to the commissions, as well as a wide spectrum of responsibilities. The commissions were designed to be dependent on the federal authority responsible for water: they had no autonomy. These river commissions proved to be reasonably effective instruments for the implementation of the regional policies of the country. Their tasks included not only financial matters at the regional levels, but also planning and coordination activities which were earlier the responsibility of ministries and governments at the state level. The main investment programmes of the commissions included initiatives like water resources, construction of irrigation projects, programmes on flood control and hydropower generation. However, they were also responsible for expenditures on roads, schools, public health issues, and so on, for the regions. The power, and thus efficiency, of these commissions has depended historically on the priority the specific region has had at the
132 national level. Their main weaknesses, however, have been that they were created as coordinating and advisory units, with no power to force any public or private institutions to comply with any legislations, or to question any unwarranted environmental and social impacts (Barkin and King, 1986).
Later, during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, large-scale rehabilitation projects were undertaken to increase the productivity of the existing irrigation districts. Plans for large- scale river basin transfers (Cutzamala and Lerma-Balsas systems) were developed to expand the irrigated areas in the north-west part of the country, as well as to ensure a source for future water supply to the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (Tortajada, 2000a).
The apparent abundance of financial resources in the country during the late 1970s and early 1980s reinforced the notion that water could be supplied at any cost, even when the cost was not covered by the consumers who benefited from increasingly subsidised water services in the cities as well as in irrigated areas. However, the economic and financial crisis of the 1980s had a definite impact on water development. As the federal government faced serious budget constraints, most water investment programmes were reduced to a minimum, certainly far below of what was needed to meet increasing demands, and also in closing existing gaps in water services. Available resources for investment programmes were further reduced by increased federal subsidies for operating and maintaining water services in cities and irrigated areas. In addition, these subsidies were insufficient, which further contributed to the progressive deterioration of water infrastructures.
In 1989, the National Water Commission of Mexico (CNA) was created by a Presidential Decree as the sole Federal authority to deal with water management as an autonomous agency. Initially it was part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. However, shortly after the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, CNA was moved from the earlier Agriculture and Water Resources Ministry to the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP, 1997), which was renamed Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) in 2001. Even though institutionally CNA is part of SEMARNAT, for all practical purposes, it has continued to function as an autonomous independent agency.
The policy framework for water resources management in Mexico is defined by several laws. The main one is the Mexican Constitution (1917), which states that water resources of the country are national property. It stipulates that they are under the control of the Federal government. The Law on National Waters (1992) and the Federal Law on Water Excise Taxes set the regulatory, economic and social frameworks for water management. The Law of National Waters establishes the broad objectives for the development and implementation of the plans and the policies for water resources management. The responsibility for implementing the law has been assigned to the CNA. The Law for Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) defines the environmental regulations (SEMARNAP, 1997) and the General Health Act establishes the standards for drinking water.
133
The Regulations of the Law of National Waters was amended in December 1997 (Anon., 1997), with the objective of defining the structure of the river basin councils, as well as to enforce the participation of the appropriate authorities and the water users in the development, implementation, updating and evaluation of the river basin planning processes. According to Article 13 of the Law,
“following a decision by its Technical Council, the Commission (CNA) shall establish basin councils to coordinate and liase with the Commission, federal, state and municipal departments and agencies; and representatives of users of the hydrological basin in question, with a view to formulating and implementing programs and actions to improve water administration, development of water infrastructure and the respective services, and the preservation of basin resources. Within the scope of the basin councils, the Commission shall agree with the users on any temporary limitations to existing rights in the event of emergencies, extreme scarcity, over- exploitation or declaration of protected areas. In such circumstances, residential use shall have priority.” (Anon., 1997).
The amendments of the Law also consider concessions and water rights.
At present, the river basin councils are expected to manage water resources from integrated and regional perspectives, and involve water authorities at the federal, state and municipal levels, as well as the various users. For operational purposes, the basin councils define four territorial levels: basin, sub-basin, micro-basin and aquifers, where the bodies are respectively known as councils, commissions, committees and groundwater technical committees (COTAS) or Comites Tecnicos de Aguas Subterraneas (Dourojeanni, 2001a).
By law, the River Basin Councils have to approve the river basin plans which, once integrated within the National Water Master Plan, become mandatory for the federal government, and indicative for the local and the state governments and water users. In these plans, bottlenecks and necessary actions and resources needs are to be identified and evaluated, and unrealistic or unfeasible situations are expected to be fedback into the regional planning process (Tortajada, 2000b). However, the Councils have no legal authority as planning and managing units, but can only make recommendations. This means that their approval or rejection of the plans can be considered only as an opinion. It does not have any implication in terms of the actual planning or management of the plans.
With the objective of managing the water resources of the country in a more coordinated way, Mexico has been divided into regions and sub-regions, with 13 regions defined based on the hydrology of the country, and 102 sub-regions on the basis of political jurisdictions. Each sub-region includes a number of municipalities of the same state, so that regional programmes could be planned at the sub-regional level. At present, there are 314 hydrological basins, 37 hydrological regions and 13 administrative basins in the country.
134 About 25 river basin councils, out of the 26 that were planned, have already been established, but mostly are not functional yet.
After 70 years of continuous hierarchical water management and planning practices, Mexico still lacks knowledge, experience and expertise as to how best to structure the councils from a decision-making viewpoint, and also to ensure that the relevant interest groups can coordinate among themselves within the overall framework of the councils. Among many other constraints faced by these river basin councils are the lack of knowledge and expertise on the economic, social and environmental aspects of water; no clear understanding as to the process by which water policies could be formulated for the country and what such policies should contain; reluctance by the central authorities to disseminate reliable data and information on the status of the water quantity and quality in the country, lack of appreciation by the authorities on the importance of stakeholders’ participation, need for the use of proper economic instruments like water pricing and demand management, high levels of corruption, etc. (Castelan, 2000a).
Most of the river basin councils are at present not yet operational: they are in the process of organisation. The councils continue to be coordinating units which can only make recommendations to the authorities and the users. Even though the Law of National Water stipulates that the river basin councils can develop and implement programmes for the construction of hydraulic infrastructures which could be considered to be strategic, the fact remains that because the councils have not yet been fully functional, they do not have any say in the planning, design or operation of any major water infrastructure in the country. If and when they become fully operational, it is yet to be seen as to whether the central authorities will allow the councils to use their decision-making powers on important issues, or if they will continue with their traditional centralised decision-making.
It should be noted that in the most advanced basin council in Mexico, the Lerma-Chapala, master planning and resulting infrastructure operations have been subject to joint decision- making process in which the CNA no longer exercises the sole responsibility. The recent surface water agreement in the Lerma-Chapala basin, originally proposed by the CNA- dominated technical working group, required several modifications by the concerned states and users before it was accepted. While the CNA still plays a dominant role, this case appears to indicate that counterbalancing objectives has made limited inroads in the decision-making process (Scott, 2001).
In theory, the basin councils have representatives from the federal and the state governments from the water and other sectors like the Federal Power Commission (CFE), Mexican Oil Company, etc., academia, NGOs, other and regional committees for the users of the different sectors (industrial, agricultural, drinking water providers, services, etc.). Specific commissions and committees can be established within the councils only when there are specific problems, i.e., evaluation, regional considerations, or groundwater. However, it should be noted that the users of water are only those who have titles to withdraw and use water. Citizens and organised civil society cannot be part of the
135 discussions at the basin level, until and unless they are first acknowledged and invited by CNA. Recent experiences indicate that CNA invites only those parties that are acceptable to this institution (Castelan, 2000b). Unfortunately, stakeholders with independent, and even objective views, are not invited to participate. Another main constraint is the representativeness of the water users. Even though participants from different sectors attend the meetings, regrettably they do not necessarily represent the views of the majority of the stakeholders in their sectors.
Within the councils, not all members have the right to vote: only the representatives of the users, and the state governments and the President of the council have voting rights. The rest of the participants have only the right to express their opinions, which would not be taken into consideration, until and unless CNA considers them to be appropriate (Castelan, 2000a). The basin councils can be considered within the country as virtual bodies. In the case of the Lerma-Chapala basin, until very recently, most of the member states of the basin councils declined to participate in any meetings arguing that that the legal framework did not give them any rights or responsibilities. At present, however, and irrespective of the fact that neither the legal nor the institutional frameworks have been modified, the representatives of the different sectors have realised that their participation is essential, if changes in the regions are to be achieved. Such attitudinal changes are likely to result in more participation, and in more autonomy for the stakeholders, who are gradually becoming actors instead of being spectators as was mostly the case earlier (Guerrero, 2000).
By law, the basin councils are primarily coordinating agencies at present, whose only role is to make recommendations to the federal government and the users on specific issues. Unfortunately, however, as noted earlier, their creation respond more to broader decentralization trends at the national level which still have not been achieved, rather than the realisation of the needs to manage water resources more efficiently within a regional context. The main constraint regarding river basin management is not that the councils are not entitled to develop any regulations or execute any administrative or legal action. If the councils were operational, they would play a very important role in terms of planning as coordinating bodies. The main problem is that the overall operational framework to manage water resources at the basin level is still not functional in the country. The legislation exists, but it is still not clear what would be the operational functions of the councils, or how the councils are to be included in the administrative structure of the country at the administrative level with state and municipal governments, so that they could complement and support each other effectively. So far, only 1 out of the 25 river basin councils that have been created is operational. In most cases, the councils do not even have staff or offices, not to mention implementable plans or financial support. Even for this one operational case, no objective and independent assessment has even been made to assess its operational efficiency and impacts.
The present problem of water scarcity in many river basins arise not only because of lack of water but also due to unacceptable water quality and poor management practices. The demands from all different uses and users are increasing rapidly, but the management
136 expertise and financial resources of the concerned institutions are increasing only incrementally. Unless these trends are reversed, the water situation of the country is likely to get worse, both in terms of quantity and quality. Additionally, the main focus of water planning and management is still vested in one single institution at the central level, which has been unable thus far to respond to the increasing needs of the sector. Even though 25 river basin councils have been established thus far, the legal framework to give them autonomy, funds and responsibilities has yet to be developed. The Mexican government has still not formulated, let alone implemented, strategies to decentralise the functions, responsibilities and funds from CNA, and transfer them to the basin councils and/or to the appropriate authorities at the regional, state or municipal levels. On the basis of their performances so far, the existing basin councils neither can be considered to be viable units for water management at the regional levels, nor can become advisory institutions since they are subordinate to the interests of CNA. Fundamental legal changes will be necessary if they are to become successful institutions for regional water management in the future (Castelan, 2000a,b; Guerrero, 2000).
In the case of the Lerma-Chapala basin (specifically in the states of Guanajuato and Queretaro, two of the five states which are part of the basin), new institutional arrangements have been put in place for the management of water resources. Bodies known as COTAS (Technical Committees for Groundwater according to CNA, and Technical Water Committees, according to the State Commission of Water and Sanitation in Guanajuato, now Guanajuato State Water Commission) have been established with the objective of reducing serious over-exploitation of the aquifers. This is done through the development of new criteria for water allocation, with the participation of the several water users. Even though this is an innovative alternative, it is still not enough, since only two of the five states that are part of the basin (Guanajuato and Queretaro) have COTAS, which, in addition, are managed with quite different approaches.
According to the CNA, the COTAS should depend on the federal government, financially as well as in terms of authority. This naturally limits their actions and overall performances. However, the government of Guanajuato has supported the COTAS as a true means for decentralization, both from institutional and financial viewpoints. The main constraint is that the CNA is still not willing to give up its decision-making role and economic power. The COTAS are not empowered with any legal authority, and thus are not likely to enforce any agreements or contribute to the reduction of the over-exploitation of the aquifers in the state (Marañón-Pimentel and Wester, 2000). It is worth noting that when the state of Guanajuato developed its own master plan, which was formulated by the local experts, considering the local problems and proposing local alternatives, it faced very strong opposition from the CNA throughout the plan formulation process. On the basis of the performances thus far, it is evident that the central government is only willing to transfer programmes, but no resources or authority (Guerrero, 1999 in Marañón-Pimentel and Wester, 2000). This is unlikely to contribute to efficient water management at the river basin level.
137 In terms of infrastructural development, the water law in Mexico stipulates that the basin councils are entitled to develop and implement water projects. However, the bodies responsible for the planning and construction of dams within CNA and CFE do not work jointly with the Councils. In fact, they do not even participate at present in the meetings of the Councils except for quantity and quality issues. Large infrastructural projects, dams included, are considered as strategic for the development of the country, and thus their planning and execution are under the authority of the federal government, and not in the hands of the states or the councils. Currently, the river basin councils do not have any saying in terms of planning, construction or operation of water projects within the basins.
It is urgent to modernize the water sector of Mexico, not only in terms of laws and institutions, but also in terms of overall management practices. The problems have become more complex due to the inadequate management and technical capacity, and the slow, and often inappropriate, responses of the sole central institution responsible for water management. Fortunately, however, the country as a whole is changing. The regions are asking for a greater role in the planning, management and decision-making since water projects affect the lives of the people through various pathways. These are undoubtedly positive indications which may improve the institutional efficiencies to manage water rationally in the coming years. Additionally, a new Administration took over in Mexico in December 2000. However, it is still early for the Administration to define an institutional strategy for water management for the coming six years, which is its present life. It is now evident to any objective analyst that the “business as usual” is not a strategic option that can be adopted for the future, especially if the nation wishes to improve its present dismal water management record in terms of quantity, quality, equity, environment and socio-economic performances.
ROLE OF RIVER BASIN ORGANISATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE DAMS
In Latin America, in general, the authority to plan, construct and operate large infrastructural projects (like dams) is vested in the central governments. The importance of water infrastructures for the socio-economic development of the countries, as well as the very high investments needed, make these projects strategic at the national level, and as such, the decision-making processes are highly centralised in most countries. The involvement of the different economic sectors is determined and coordinated by the central government. The participation of the society in the planning, construction and operation of major water projects, if it takes place at all, has been mainly in terms of superficial consultations.
The river basin institutions basically represent new arrangements for the management and planning of water resources in Latin America. Their roles are limited mostly to the local and small-scale levels. The large dams have been historically considered to be one of the most important alternatives for the economic development of the countries, for the regulation of floods and management of droughts. For the most part, the central bureaucracies have
138 jealously guarded their authority to plan, construct and operate large water development projects.
Table 1 presents a succinct overview of the various types of river basin organisations in the region, as well as their roles in the construction and management of large water development projects.
The extent of the involvement of the public and private sectors, as well as the users of water and the society within the river basins, generally varies from one country to another, and some times even from one part of the country to another. Institutional and legal frameworks are being developed and updated according to the specific needs, but financial resources, technical, scientific and management expertise, and institutional capacities still continue to be serious constraints.
Dams and Development
Water control and assured water availability of appropriate quality are essential requirements for continuing economic and social development of the world. During the 1930-1980 period, numerous dams were built all over the world for water supply, hydropower generation, irrigation, navigation, flood control, or multipurpose water development. Dams are still being built, but their numbers have declined during the post-1980 period.
A major development in the world during the past two decades has been the emergence of active environmental and social movements, primarily in a few select developed countries, which have gradually contributed to radical changes in the mind-sets of people at the global level. In June 1972, the United Nations convened the first of its mega-conferences of the decade of the 1970s on the Human Environment in Stockholm. This Conference was a landmark for the environmental movement, even though it was boycotted by the then Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Europe over the political issues linked with East Germany. This Conference was followed in rapid succession by similar UN mega- conferences on population (Bucharest, 1974), food (Rome, 1974), women (Mexico City, 1975), human settlements (Vancouver, 1976), water (Mar del Plata, 1977), desertification (Nairobi, 1977), science and technology for development (Vienna, 1979), and new and renewable sources of energy (Nairobi, 1981). All these mega-conferences did have some discussions on water. They also considered environment in one form or another. The Stockholm Conference also resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme. It was the first UN agency that was to be established in a developing country, and was expected to represent the environmental consciousness of the UN System. All these events, individually and cumulatively, and in their own ways, had some impact on the current societal perception of large dams in one form or another.
139 Table 1. River basin organisations and their role in the planning, construction and operation of large water projects
Type of Main actors Origin or main Role in planning Selected RBO purpose and operation of examples dam projects
Watershed Central Rural development Negligible. If a dam Alto Lempa, El manage- government as within its boundaries, is present, it Salvador. ment executing or downstream effects preceded the Paute , Ecuador. agency for on a hydraulic watershed Yaracuy, Bocono, specific structure or management Tocuyo, Venezuela. projects. hydrological regime. activities. Trifinio, User and Guatemala, community Honduras, El organisations. Salvador. Bi- or multi- national commissions.
River basin Government, Coordinate actions of Usually small. There Tárcoles, Costa manage- municipalities, government and NGOs may not be a dam, or Rica, Amatitlán, ment user and for solving overriding it may already have Guatemala, Guaiba, community problems in the basin, been built, or the Mogi-Guaçu, organisations, usually pollution. Also government needs Apa/Miranda civil society, implement water coordination for its Brazil. Lerma- stakeholders resources and construction. Same Chapala, Mexico. Not necessarily environmental with other hydraulic the same in all management process. projects. RBOs.
Bi-national Bi-national and Usually formed for Important, since Rio Bermejo or tri- tri- national construction or some of them are Argentina, Bolivia. national entities operation of an able to promote new Salto Grande river basin supported by international project. projects. Argentina, commis- the respective Some disappear after Uruguay. sions governments. the project is Itaipú Some may be operational. Some Brazil Paraguay. entitled to draft, continue and generate Yaciretá Argentina bid, finance and other projects within Paraguay. administer their jurisdictional Pilcomayo hydraulic areas. These areas Argentina, Bolivia projects. Some usually do not cover Paraguay tend towards the whole basin. privatisation.
140 Type of Main actors Origin or main Role in planning Selected RBO purpose and operation of examples dam projects
Regional Originally Autonomous Important, since Corporación de corporat- created for a organisations. May some of them are Cundina-marca, ions decentralized include the able to plan and Colombia public participation of local build infrastructure, administration governments, civil including dams. Recently society and other adapted for stakeholders. environmental management.
Source: Garcia, L., 1999.
It is often been assumed by both the water and development professions that the water issues faced by the entire world are very similar. This however, is incorrect. There are fundamental differences between the developed and developing world in terms of water problems, one of which is availability of clean water and sanitation, and management practices, which are not recognised at present. The differences between the developed and developing world are due to climatic, economic, historical factors and status of economic development which have not received adequate attention so far.
Climatic conditions are very different in developed and developing countries. All developed countries are in temperate regions, where precipitation is more evenly distributed over the year. In contrast, developing countries are located in tropical and semi-tropical regions, where seasonal rainfalls patterns are very pronounced. For example, for monsoon Asia, most of the annual rainfall occurs is no more than 25-30 days (not consecutive) during the rainy season. The issue then becomes how to store this extremely high rainfall over a very short period of less than one month so that it could be effectively used over the rest of the eleven months. Small dams and rainwater harvesting will work in some parts of monsoon Asia, where population is dispersed and there is reasonable amount of annual rainfall. However, countries like India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan have no other choice but to consider large dams store to water to ensure that their increasing urban population have access to water for drinking, as well as for agricultural, industrial and energy development, and for ecosystem conservation. The differences in climatic conditions between the developed and developing countries mean that storage of water is an important issue for human survival in the developing world: large-scale storage is not feasible without large dams.
The economies of the developed countries are now not dependant on water. Accordingly, if there are droughts and floods, these mean only temporary inconveniences for the people, without any serious long-term economic damages. In contrast, agriculture continues to be a very important factor for the survival of the developing world. Prolonged droughts mean
141 low reservoir levels, and thus also lower hydropower generation. This often results in regular power cuts and voltage reductions, which seriously disrupts industrial production, as a result of which industrial employment suffers. Reduced agricultural production and disruptions of industrial activities due to power shortages contribute directly to serious human hardships. In contrast, developed countries are basically immune from such damages at present. These countries may have been vulnerable some 40-60 years ago, but their economies are significantly more diversified and resilient at present.
Probably the most critical issue facing large dams at present is the issue of resettlement of people due to the inundation caused by large reservoirs. There is no question that the governments all over the world have not generally handled the resettlements issues arising from large infrastructure development projects sensitively and properly in the past. Dams have been no exception. International financing institutions also did not handle these issues adequately earlier. During the past decade or so, it has been realised that the past resettlement practices for large infrastructure developments projects were inadequate and thus must be improved significantly. No sane person will argue with this suggestion. It is now universally accepted that the people who have to be resettled must have better quality of life than they had before, and also better socio-economic facilities. All the necessary expenses for such resettlement must be included in the project cost, and it is the duty of the authorities concerned that the allocated funds are properly spent in a timely manner to improve the lifestyles of the people who have to be resettled.
Irrespective of the current discourse by the supporters or opponents of the large dams on their overall social and environmental benefits and costs, the fact remains that these are not known. Much of the information available at present is anecdotal, and in many of the cases, quality of information is often dubious and the objective and comprehensive analyses, if any, on which many conclusions and recommendations are based, are very poor. Not surprisingly, in the absence of good and reliable studies on the socio-economic- environmental impacts of large dams, both positive and negative, the proponents and opponents can get away with whatever dogmatic statements they wish to make. After nearly 20 years of fruitless debate, the fact still remains that the number of large dams anywhere in the world, whose economic, social and environmental impacts (both positive and negative) have been scientifically and objectively monitored and evaluated on a regular basis, can be counted on the fingers of one’s hands, with some fingers left over! It is difficult to understand why the proponents of large dams have not carried out such definitive assessments of their impacts (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001b).
Large dams would have to be built in the developing world to satisfy basic human needs for water, food and energy, to alleviate poverty, and to improve quality of life of people. It is equally certain that their construction will be strongly opposed by a limited group of activists and interest groups, who have their own dogmatic views. The water profession must listen to all views. If the points raised are valid, the issues must be addressed to promptly and efficiently. While the Western world has basically constructed the dams considered necessary (perhaps with the exception of Japan), the situation is very different from the perspectives of
142 the developing countries, where the progress in construction has been much less. Climatic, technical, economic, social, environmental and institutional conditions are very different between the developed and the developing countries, and hence the approaches to water management cannot be identical for the whole world.
Large dams have become a subject of controversy and growing international debate, not because of the technical aspects, but due to their social and environmental impacts, as well as the overall decision-making processes that lead to their construction. In 1998, the World Commission on Dams was established to provide a forum where both proponents and opponents of large dams could present their views. It was sponsored by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and it was decided that it would have a two-year duration. The Commission was set to address the central issues of controversy with respect to large dams and provide an independent review of their effectiveness in sustainable development. Its objectives were to review the development effectiveness of large dams and assess alternatives for water resources and energy development; and to develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards, where appropriate, for the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and decommissioning of dams (Bird and Wallace, 2001).
So far, both the process to develop the report, and the report itself, have generated much controversy. Several countries have mentioned that the report (WCD, 2000) is unbalanced in the sense that there was no true public participation, that the Commission was biased in its views, approaches and process used. It is further claimed that the analysis of existing dams is unbalanced, with a strong implied conclusion that the majority of the world's 40,000 large dams are "environmentally damaging or socially destructive". The report mentions very briefly the benefits of well-planned large dams, and suggests no feasible alternatives to meet the future water needs for drinking, food, industrial and energy needs of the more than 3 billion people living in the developing countries (Thatte, 2001).
The report can be considered as a useful document to generate further discussions, but it does not seem to contain elements to find any alternative solutions for the short- and long- terms. Large dams are linked to development, and to stop their construction is not a feasible solution, neither for Latin America or the rest of the developing world. After all, it is not only large dams, but all large infrastructural development (e.g. development of new towns, accumulative effects of highway construction) results in displacement of population and environmental modifications. Accordingly, it is not the construction of the projects themselves that should be questioned, but issue as to whether social and environmental impacts have been properly considered in the planning and execution of all infrastructural development projects, including large dams.
As the populations in the developing countries continue to increase, and as per capita demand for water increases from the current low levels due to increased economic development, more and more water will be required in the coming years. In addition, agricultural, industrial, energy and environmental sectors will require their fair share of water.
143 Some of this additional water will be available because of the increasing use of more efficient management practices and conservation measures, including demand management. In most cases, however, this will not be adequate. New water developments will be necessary to meet the increasing shortages.
In addition, technological developments will undoubtedly contribute to more efficient water production, use and management. In spite of all these positive developments, developing world will require more, and not less, water than it is using at present. Construction of large dams will continue to be one of the important policy alternatives to solve the water crisis of the developing world in the coming years. These new dams must be built and managed with the best scientific and technical knowledge available so that development is not hindered, poverty is eradicated, the environment is protected and social welfare is maximized.
The main issue facing the developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa is certainly not whether large dams have an important role to play in the coming decades, but rather how best we can continue to improve their performances so that their societal and environmental benefits can be maximised, adverse impacts can be minimised, and simultaneously equity issues can be properly addressed. This will be a challenging task, but one that must be faced squarely and successfully.
CONCLUSIONS
The current global trends promoting the concept of integrated water resources management are having increasing impacts in Latin America. Among these impacts are decentralization of water resources planning and management, stakeholders’ participation, involvement of the private sector in managing and developing water supply and wastewater management, irrigation, and hydropower-related projects, water pricing and demand management. Social and environmental aspects are slowly being recognised as important issues for water management.
While decentralization is desirable and would certainly strengthen institutions in terms of improving their efficiencies, it may prove to be disastrous over the near- to medium-terms, unless the local bodies can recruit and retain qualified and experienced staff as well as have access to necessary investment funds. Development of appropriate institutions at the local and regional levels, capacity building and availability of proper and timely funding are all essential preconditions for any successful decentralization process.
If planned and implemented properly, one effective means of decentralization in terms of financial and natural resources management could be the creation of management units, in this case, river basins. Past and present experiences indicate that implementation of the projects at the regional or river basin level may be better when one competent authority is responsible and accountable for the project, and has the necessary resources and capacity to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them.
144
River basin management institutions in Latin America are predominantly based on the British and the French models. Direct technology and experience transfer from Western Europe to Latin America is replete with examples of limited successes and many failures, since Latin American conditions are very different compared to those from France or England. Thus, unless the Western European river basin models are adopted carefully to suit the conditions of the specific Latin American countries, such institutions are unlikely to succeed. Regrettably, very little serious and objective work has been done so far to determine if the European models are the best option for Latin America, and if so, how these models should be modified to suit the prevailing conditions of the appropriate Latin American countries. In fact, research on institutional aspects of water management in Latin America is still at a very early stage. This area needs priority and accelerated work.
Even though the current momentum in Latin America is moving firmly towards the concept of integrated river basin management, one cannot prejudge the results of this shift at the present stage. Integrated river basin management is a very complex subject, as well as the institutional arrangements necessary to ensure their optimal functioning. When the results from these new management units are available, they need to be objectively and seriously analysed. These results should be compared with other alternative institutional arrangements. Only after such a process can definitive conclusions be drawn as to which should be the preferred option and under which conditions.
One of the main constraints in the region is the general lack of interest of the institutions to seriously consider social and environmental implications of their actions, which often contribute to the reduction of the overall cost-effectiveness of projects, and equitable distribution of their benefits and costs. Such neglects may even contribute to the long term deterioration of the quality of life of the populations, wastage of funds invested, and may some times eventually lead to the failure of the projects. However, this lack of interest in environmental and social issues is not necessarily limited to water institutions at the basin level: it often permeates through the entire institutional system of federal and state levels of bureaucracies in all sectors, including water. In addition, irrespective of the consideration as to what may be the best unit and/or institutional arrangements for efficient water management, human and financial resources are likely to continue to be the main constraints for water resources management in Latin America for many years to come.
Only two countries in the region, Brazil and Mexico, have developed legal and institutional frameworks for river basin organisations as units for water resources management. In other cases, where river basins organisations exist, they are not necessarily within the national policy-making framework, which makes their operation more complex and their results more difficult to predict. However, while the existence of legal and institutional frameworks within the national policy-making is important and even essential, it does not assure either that the river basin organisations will be fully functional or that they would be supported by the administrative structures of the countries concerned.
145 A main failure of the governments, not only in most Latin American countries but also in many other developing countries, has been that the river basin organisations have not been considered as real instruments for water resources management. It seems that their establishment has been made a response to the current global trend, rather than the recognition of the actual benefits such institutional arrangements could bring to the management and planning of water resources at the regional and local levels. The river basin organisations are being created and they are being expected to function, but many times not even the support or the resources necessary are made available to them. Thus, their creation seems to be an end by itself, and not the means to an end, the end being a more efficient, decentralised, participative process where needs and requirements of the several stakeholders (including the environment) are identified, analysed objectively and then rational decisions are made within a social-economic-environmental framework.
On the basis of the present analysis, it can be said that most of the river basin organisations in Latin America are institutions whose significant evolution is still essential before they can become effective units for water management and planning. Further decentralization of authority, decision-making and allocation of financial and human resources, improvement of the capacities of the institutions in terms of management capabilities and technical expertise are necessary prerequisites if these institutions are to become efficient mechanisms to rational water resources management. Among the main constraints still are the lukewarm support from the central authorities, absence of a clear definition of both their objectives and activities, and identification of modalities so that the federal, state, regional and municipal authorities can work together in a co-ordinated way within an agreed framework.
Unfortunately, the concept of river basin organisations is now being increasingly considered to be as the only alternative available for decentralised water resources management, primarily because it is the prevailing global view. In the long run, this may or may not prove to be the best option for the Latin American countries. On the basis of currently available data, it is clear that the units for water management have to be objectively reviewed, especially as river basins are not the only management units available in terms of the most effective and operational institutional arrangements, even though they are the most widely promoted alternative at present. Management at the regional or state levels may also prove to be appropriate for Latin America. Conclusions should not be drawn a priori that the river basin management units are the most efficient alternative, or even the only alternative.
Regarding water projects, in spite of the unquestionable social and economic benefits which could accrue from properly planned and managed water development projects, institutions in the past have poorly planned and managed projects, which have resulted in reduced economic benefits at significant social and environmental costs. This has turned many environmental and citizens’ groups against water projects, and the media has often questioned the benefits of large-scale water development projects. There is thus an urgent need to improve the management capabilities and enhance the efficiencies of the current institutions so that the benefits expected actually accrue, and all environmental and social costs are minimised to acceptable levels. Regional development often is dependent on the
146 construction of large infrastructures, like water projects and highways. Absence of such developments could have negative cumulative impacts at the regional and national levels, especially in terms of employment generation, poverty alleviation, improvements in quality of life and socio-political stability. The benefits and costs of water development projects (economic, social and environmental) need to be analysed objectively further. Project and no-projects alternatives should be considered, and appropriate decision should be taken depending on their total benefits and costs, and socio-environmental acceptability. Institutions should also consider the nature of the beneficiaries, that is, who benefits and who pays the costs of specific projects.
Present needs and future requirements demand more flexible institutions and decision- making processes with emphasis on local and participatory structures. Operationalization of decentralization has proved to be most difficult because of its complexity. This is mainly due to the fact that administrative and institutional structures in most of the countries have historically been vertical, where the paternalistic approaches prevail and where decisions have traditionally been imposed from above, instead of being developed from below, as should be the case. Decision-making would certainly be more dynamic and rational, if it is approached and implemented on the basis of consultation, explanation and learning, and not on control and prediction.
Until and unless the Latin American water institutions are restructured and strengthened, it is somewhat unlikely that the water needs of the countries of the region will be met successfully and cost-effectively in a timely manner. In the final analysis, it is the institutions which formulate the water policies, and who are also responsible for their implementation. River basin organisations are not an exception. Without institutional reforms, it is highly unlikely that water management practices can take a new direction, irrespective of whatever units are considered for management. Institutional reforms are urgently needed to meet the evolving water needs of the society, and also to meet the complex challenges of the 21st century.
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148 Garcia, L., 2000, Institutional Framework for Integrated Water Resources Management in Latin America. Some Experiences from the Inter-American Development Bank. International Workshop on Water Policies and Institutions, Salvador.
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150 CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that the global interest in environmental and social issues has increased exponentially since the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. When the Stockholm Conference was held, only 11 countries had institutional arrangements to manage environmental issues. By the time the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro was convened in 1992, nearly all the member countries of the United Nations had established institutional mechanisms to manage their environmental issues at the national level. Viewed from any direction, it has to be considered to be a very significant development within a short period of only two decades. One of the aspects that contributed to this remarkable advance was the individual and collective recognition all over the world of the increasing degradation of the environment and natural resources, and their inevitable long-term adverse impacts on the economic prospects and efforts to poverty alleviation of the countries concerned. This increasing environmental awareness prompted political attention towards social and environmental issues at the national and international levels, which resulted in the convening of several major international fora, at high decision-making levels, to analyse issues like environment, population, food, women, human settlements, water, desertification, science and technology for development, and new and renewable sources of energy.
With few exceptions, the environmental performances of both developed and developing countries in recent years have left much to be desired. Almost 10 years after the Rio Conference, the continuation of environmental degradation at the global level suggests that many countries still have not managed to formulate and implement proper public policies which address environmental issues within their overall economic and social frameworks. Water has not been an exception to this general global trend, especially in terms of increasing contamination.
It should, however, be noted that during the last three decades, a wide range of economic, environmental and social reforms have been put in place, in both developed and developing countries. Institutions have been established and/or strengthened, legislations have been passed, and instruments have been formulated. Intersectoral approaches and water quality management are receiving increasing attention, and the general public is becoming more and more aware of the importance and the relevance of water to economic development, improvements in the lifestyles of the people, and environmental protection. While all these, and other associated advances, are a step in the right direction, these are not enough if the future water problems of the world are to be solved in a timely and cost-effective manner. To paraphrase Lewis Carrol, one will have to run faster to remain in the same place, at least so far as the water sector is concerned.
As the world has become more interested in environmental and social issues, there is an increasing acceptance of concepts and terminologies like sustainable development, integrated management, community participation, diversity, democracy, globalisation, and
151 environmental protection, all of which have the ability to evoke images of consensus, unity and a common purpose, conferring positive overtones and ideologically conferring a global stamp of approval. International organisations, nations and individuals have often taken advantage of this global consensus to include these terminologies in most programmes or projects. Commensurate thought, however, has not been given as to how these aspects, appealing as though they are, can be operationalised in the national context in terms of policies, programmes and projects.
The point of departure for the development process is different from one country to other for technical, economic, historical, cultural and other associated reasons. It is clear that each country needs to formulate its own water development strategies based on its specific conditions, requirements and expectations. However, in many parts of the world, practices, processes and legislations are being copied from other countries, without adapting them specifically to their own conditions. Institutional frameworks are being structured which often respond to the latest international thinking, without any detailed review of their applicability and usefulness in the national context. A good example is the river basin institutions in Mexico, which are being established on the basis of the French models, but with no budget, expertise or delegation of power. The sustainability of such institutions can be seriously questioned, even though such models may have worked successfully in a different country, under different context and different conditions.
On the basis of the analyses carried out for this thesis, following overall conclusions can be drawn.
i. Too much political correctness, not enough reality – All developing countries promptly subscribed to the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan of 1972. However, almost 30 years later, they still did not have the administrative or managerial capacities for efficient management of natural resources, including water. Even now, most of the countries still do not have a long-term plan for water management. In many Latin American countries, the main progress that can be noted so far has been in terms of formulation of legislations, although their implementation has not been satisfactory. During these three decades, some institutional changes have been made, especially by moving the water sector to the Environment Ministry. This was the case for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. This restructuring, by itself, does not appear to have any visible impact in terms of improving water management practices. It is likely that the water sector may be moved again to another ministry in these countries in the near future. This has already happened for Argentina. However, such restructurings, by themselves are likely to accomplish little, unless the existing management practices are changed significantly.
Many developing countries have claimed that their main constraint to fulfil their commitments made for implementing the Agenda 21 has been primarily economic. While lack of funds is certainly a constraint, even bigger constraints have been absence of leadership and managerial and technical capacities, almost exclusive top-down centralised
152 approach, absence of stakeholders’ participation, and lack of any long-term vision in any field, including water. Not surprisingly, progress in improving water management practices has been somewhat limited during the last 30 years in the developing world.
Much more could have been accomplished with the budgets that were available, if the leadership had a clear vision as to what should be accomplished and their relative priorities. Not surprisingly, water problems of developing countries have deteriorated significantly, especially in terms of water pollution. Water quality management, naturally, not only has received low priority in terms of management attention in the past, but also funding. Unless there is a significant shift in current policies, the main water crisis of the future will be in terms of water quality. Currently only about six percent of domestic and industrial wastewaters in Latin America is properly treated. The situation is likely to be similar in other developing countries of Asia and Africa. Developing countries continue to excuse themselves for the increasing deterioration of the environment blaming the lack of financial support, while issues like mismanagement, corruption or lack of expertise are simply denied at the political levels.
Irrespective of the rhetorics, and although most developing countries have tried to protect their image at the international level, poor management of water resources will continue to have serious social, economic and environmental implications at the local and national levels over in the short- and the long-terms. Many times, such mismanagement has contributed to increasing poverty, and deterioration of the quality of life of the populations, especially in terms of health.
There are many examples of political correctness which have not improved the poor management of water resources, and which have contributed to negative social, economic and environmental impacts. One concrete example is the Lake Chapala in Mexico, which is the largest natural lake of the county and third largest in Latin America. It provides about 60% of water supply to the second largest city of the country, Guadalajara, and it supports the socio-economic development of a large region mainly in terms of fishing, agriculture and tourism. It is an important refuge for migratory birds for North America. However, the demands of water for domestic, industrial and agricultural uses upstream have increased so much that during the last decade, the volume of the Lake has decreased by almost 30%. Water pollution has increased exponentially, since about 20% of all municipal, industrial and agricultural wastewater discharged in the Lerma-Chapala basin finally ends up in the Chapala Lake, with very little or no treatment. It is now estimated that more than 12 Kg of chromium and more than 4 Kg of zinc are deposited every day in the Lake as a result of the industrial wastewater discharges. The increasing water pollution has already reduced fish production to less than 70% of what used to be about one decade ago. While the importance of the Lake to the regional economy is fully recognised by all in the country, no viable actions have been taken by the several governments during the last 30 years. In May 9, 1971, the then President made a firm commitment to protect the Lake. Throughout these 30 years, there have been at least 24 Presidential statements assuring that specific actions would be
153 taken to improve the environmental conditions of the Lake. Inspite of these statements, the health of the Lake has continued to deteriorate, and the current situation is significantly worse than 30 years ago. There has been no shortage of political rhetoric from the highest level of the government to CNA. Making politically correct statements will not improve the conditions of the Lake; there has to be a viable long-term plan, which has to be implemented. There is no sign of this happening yet. Surprisingly enough, even with such records, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has given its seal of approval to Mexico for achieving the goals set by Agenda 21. OECD unquestionably took the political statement of the government at face value: it never bothered to check the reality.
One of the main constraints in most developing countries is the general lack of interest of the water institutions to seriously consider social and environmental implications of their actions, which invariably reduce their overall positive impacts. Such neglects often contribute to the long term deterioration of the quality of life of the populations, wastage of funds invested, and may even eventually lead to the failure of the projects. ii) NGOs and water management - The increasing influence that NGOs have had on the social and environmental performances of both the public and the private sector water projects throughout the world deserves special attention. The result is that awareness has stimulated a public debate on the needs for construction of new large dams, necessity for demand management policies, the role of private sector, and the social and environmental impacts of hydraulic infrastructures.
The social and environmental movements are not new. For example, when the Earth Day was first celebrated in the USA in 1970, hundreds of thousands of people participated showing their concern on and support to environmental issues. Since then, the environmental and social movements have become stronger with time, and NGOs have become a global socio-political force to rekon with in most fields, including water.
The active involvement of these activist groups has forced the policy-makers to be more innovative in their decisions and also to review their existing policies. Information disseminated by the NGOs, which often directly contradict the government positions, have made people more aware of the complexities of the associated social and environmental issues, as well as their implications over the short-, medium- and long-terms. Governments and private sector groups all over the world are increasingly under pressure from the NGOs to improve their environmental and social performances in the water sector.
In terms of construction of water development projects, public concern with their social and environmental impacts, have increased exponentially in recent years, primarily because of the social and the environmental activists. Social and environmental impacts of water development projects were often not comprehensively addressed to in the past. Involuntary resettlement practices have often been poor in the past. This is one of the main reasons as to why the NGOs have opposed water projects strongly. The increasing pressure from the NGO community has had many positive impacts, since the concerned institutions, both
154 national and international, have been forced to improve the whole process. Two important benefits of such oppositions have been increasing participation of the stakeholders in the planning and decision-making process and better treatment of the project affected people.
However, the views of some NGOs now can be seriously questioned. What they are demanding at present is that no new large dams should be constructed, anywhere in the world, irrespective of their overall benefits and needs to the society. It is important to note that while many of the NGOs represent the interests of the populations affected, many others represent only their own dogmatic views and their own agendas, sometimes even opposing the preferences and the needs of the people who are affected by the projects. Since these NGOs seldom propose feasible alternatives to the projects they oppose, and water scarcity continues to be a problem in developing countries, their local support has continued to erode. Thus, the NGOs have had both positive and negative impacts on water development and management practices in recent years. iii) Public participation – No sane person will argue with the statement that the participation of the people who were affected by water policies, programmes and projects in the past was inadequate. Conceptually, philosophically and objectively, people whose lives are going to be affected must have a say in the formulation of policies and projects. Such participation is likely to broaden the scope of discussion by raising new ideas, issues and alternatives; priorities given to various aspects; and identification of constraints which may be social, environmental, economic or cultural in nature. Broadening of the debate and considerations may increase the length of the planning process, but it has the potential to enhance the acceptability of the project by a larger group of people than otherwise may have been possible, and also to increase the benefits that may accrue from the project.
For public participation to be effective, the effort must be genuine. For example, the results of public consultation are likely to differ very little from no public consultation at all, if information is only presented to the public for review and the suggestions or comments received during an open public meeting do not affect any change in the direction of the policies, programmes or projects. Thus, unless water planners and managers are convinced that public participation is desirable, and even essential, its overall impact is likely to be marginal, either in terms of improving the quality of the project or its acceptability.
Essential though public participation is to effective democracy, it is no guarantee that the water resources project will automatically improve because of it. Under the right conditions, it could result in programmes and projects that are well adopted to the wishes of the people. However, under less favourable circumstances, it could contribute to divisive and diversive debates, and stalemate instead of action. Equally, in some cases, certain vocal and articulate groups may manipulate the process for partisan and self-seeking advantages, as has been witnessed for a few water project in certain developing countries. In other words, the very symbol of democracy may be being used for other than democratic purposes.
155 There are also other very important issues that should be considered for an effective public participation, like who will be consulted, at what stages of the process, and which methods will be used to consult them.
Increased public participation in the water resources planning process is no panacea. It could create a difficult philosophical issues. For example, it is possible that the public may be more interested in achieving short-term goals rather than long-term objectives. Hence, what should be the role of the water resources planners, when the public has a strong preference for a course of action, which they feel may be a passing fancy, and may not be beneficial on a long-term basis? Do the planners go along with the public preference, even when they disagree with it, or do they suggest what they consider to be the best for the region, which may be different to the public perception of the solution of the problem. If they follow the first alternative, and 10 years after they are proved to be right, can they escape the charge of abdicating their professional responsibilities? If they wish to follow the second alternative, do they have the moral authority to do so? The conviction and sincerity of the water planners may be unquestioned, but what if they are wrong? These are difficult questions, which the water profession still has not addressed properly.
It is true that there is an increasing need for public participation in water resources planning and policy-making processes where the main objective is to satisfy certain social needs. However, it has been most difficult to formulate planning and policy-making frameworks which can be flexible enough to deal with changing long-term attitudes and/or requirements. Methodologies to forecast future public attitudes still need to be substantially improved. This is an important issue since the gestation period of large water development projects often exceeds 10 years, during which public attitudes and opinions may change. iv) Sustainable development – Sustainable development has become a very popular concept in the world over the past 15 years, not only for the water sector but also other development sectors. The concept is attractive, but also is complex.
Sustainable development is expected to result from a series of decisions taken by several generations of human beings, in different parts of the world, with changing socio-economic conditions, differing cultural values, uncertainties, and social-economic goals, which are seldom shared by all the members of the societies, since people tend to work at the individual level, and nations states have their own interests, both of which may vary with time.
There is now considerable discussion on the operational feasibility of the sustainable development concept. In many ways, sustainable development should be considered as a journey and not a destination. The world is not homogeneous, and thus there cannot be one unique path to sustainable development that would be equally valid and applicable for all countries of the world, and for all development sectors. Each country will have to base its water development agendas on their own social, economic, cultural and environmental conditions, available managerial, technical and administrative capacities and societal
156 expectations and aspirations. For developing countries, as long as water development policies, programmes and projects can contribute to socio-economic development, reduction in poverty and income disparity, and protection of the environment, they are well on course in their long journey to sustainable development. Definitional debates as to what constitutes sustainable water development are likely to be unproductive.
157 ______Stockholm Declaration, 1972
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972,
Having considered the need for a common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the people of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment,
Proclaims that:
1. Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights –even the right to life itself. 2. The protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 3. Man has constantly sum up experience and go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing. In our time man’s capability to transfer his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to human beings and the human environment. We see around us growing evidence of man-made harm in many regions of the earth: dangerous levels of pollution in water, air, earth and living beings; major and undesirable disturbances to the ecological balance of the biosphere; destruction and depletion of irreplaceable resources; and gross deficiencies, harmful to the physical, mental and social health of man, in
i the man-made environment, particularly in the living and working environment. 4. In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by under-development. Millions continue to live far below the minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of adequate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve the environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized countries should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves and the developing countries. In the industrialized countries, environmental problems are generally related to industrialization and technological development. 5. The natural growth of population continuously presents problems for the preservation of the environment, and adequate policies and measures should be adopted, as appropriate, to face these problems. Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. It is the people that propel social progress, create social wealth, develop science and technology and, through their hard work, continuously transform the human environment. Along with social progress and the advance of production, science and technology, the capability of man to improve the environment increases with each passing day. 6. A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to earthly environment on which our life and well-being depend. Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can achieve for ourselves and our posterity a better life in an environment more in keeping with human needs and hopes. There are broad vistas for the enhancement of environmental quality and the creation of good life. What is needed is an enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but orderly work. For the purpose of attaining freedom in the world of nature, man must use knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better environment. To defend and improve the human environment for present and future generations has become and imperative goal for mankind –a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of world-wide economic and social development. 7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. Individuals in all walks of life as well as organizations in many fields by their values and the sum of their actions, will shape the world environment of the future. Local and national governments will bear the greatest burden
ii for large-scale environmental policy and action within their jurisdictions. International co-operation is also needed in order to raise resources to support the developing countries in carrying out their responsibilities in this field. A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the common international realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations and action by international organizations in the common interest. The Conference calls upon Governments and peoples to exert common efforts for the preservation and improvement of the human environment, for the benefit of all the people and their posterity.
II. PRINCIPLES
States the common conviction that:
PRINCIPLE 1
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to prot ect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.
PRINCIPLE 2 The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.
PRINCIPLE 3 The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must be maintained and, wherever practicable, restored or improved.
PRINCIPLE 4 Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat, which are now gravely imperilled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation, including wildlife, must therefore received importance in planning for economic development.
iii PRINCIPLE 5 The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure that benefits form such employment are shared by all mankind.
PRINCIPLE 6 This discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollution should be supported.
PRINCIPLE 7 States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.
PRINCIPLE 8 Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life.
PRINCIPLE 9 Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under- development and natural disasters pose grave problems and can be best remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the developing countries and such timely assistance as may be required.
PRINCIPLE 10 For the developing countries, stability of prices and adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw materials are essential to environmental management since economic factors as well as ecological processes must be taken into account.
PRINCIPLE 11 The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development potential of developing countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better living
iv conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by States and international organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meeting the possible national and international economic consequences resulting from the application of environmental measures.
PRINCIPLE 12 Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the environment, taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any costs which may emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards into their development planning and the need for making available to them, upon their request, additional international technical and financial assistance for this purpose.
PRINCIPLE 13 In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and co- ordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need and protect and improve environment for the benefit of their population.
PRINCIPLE 14 Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect and improve the environment.
PRINCIPLE 15 Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbanization with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the environment and obtaining maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for all. In this respect, projects which are designed for colonialist and racist domination must be abandoned.
PRINCIPLE 16 Demographic policies which are without prejudice to basic human rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned should be applied in those regions where the rate of population growth or excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on the environment of the human environment and impede development.
PRINCIPLE 17 Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task planning, managing or controlling the environmental resources of States with a view to enhancing environmental quality.
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PRINCIPLE 18 Science and technology, as part of their contribution to economic and social development, must be applied to the identification, avoidance and control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems and for common good mankind.
PRINCIPLE 19 Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension. It is also essential that mass media of communications avoid contributing to the deterioration of the environment, but, on the contrary, disseminate information of an educational nature of on the need to protect and improves the environment in order to enable man to develop in every respect.
PRINCIPLE 20 Scientific research and development in the context of environmental problems, both national and multi-national, must be promoted in all countries, especially the developing countries. In this connection the free flow of up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience must be supported and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environmental problems; environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries on terms which would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting and economic burden on the developing countries.
PRINCIPLE 21 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
PRINCIPLE 22 States shall co-operate to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
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PRINCIPLE 23 Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
PRINCIPLE 24 International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big and small, on equal footing. Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all States.
PRINCIPLE 25 States shall ensure that international organization play a co-ordinated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection and improvement of the environment.
PRINCIPLE 26 Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.
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Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992
Having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992,
Reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972,a and seeking to build upon it,
With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people,
Working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental and development system.
Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home,
Proclaims that:
______PRINCIPLE 1 Human beings are at the Centre of concerns for Sustainable Development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.
______PRINCIPLE 2
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
______PRINCIPLE 3 The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.
______PRINCIPLE 4 In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development processes and cannot be considered in isolation from it.
______PRINCIPLE 5 All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.
______PRINCIPLE 6
The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority. International actions in the field of environment and development should also address the interest and needs of all countries.
______PRINCIPLE 7
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States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, Stat es have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.
______PRINCIPLE 8 To achieve sustainable development and higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.
______PRINCIPLE 9 States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies.
______PRINCIPLE 10 Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
______PRINCIPLE 11 States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of
iii unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.
______PRINCIPLE 12 States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.
______PRINCIPLE 13 States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
______PRINCIPLE 14 States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.
______PRINCIPLE 15 In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
______PRINCIPLE 16
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National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.
______PRINCIPLE 17 Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.
______PRINCIP LE 18 States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States. Every effort shall be made by the international community to help States so afflicted.
______PRINCIPLE 19 States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.
______PRINCIPLE 20 Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development.
______PRINCIPLE 21 The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable development and ensure a better future for all.
______
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PRINCIPLE 22 Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.
______PRINCIPLE 23 The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be protected.
______PRINCIPLE 24 Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.
______PRINCIPLE 25 Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.
______PRINCIPLE 26 States shall resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the United States.
______PRINCIPLE 27 States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfillment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable development.
a Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum), chapter I.
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