PROJECT FORECAST...THE YF-12A INTERCEPTOR WEAPON S Y S T E M . J O I N T EXERCISE GOLD FIRE I

M A RC H -A PR IL 1965 STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AIR UNIVERSITY R eview THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

F orecast...... 2 Gen. Bemard A. Sehriever, usaf T he YF-12A Interceptor Wea po n Syst em...... 13 Col. Allen K. McDonald, usaf Do W e Waxt a Super sonic Transport or an $89 Trip to Eur ope? ...... 18 Lt. Gen. William H. Tnnner, usaf (Ret) E xer cise Gold Fir e I ...... 22 Maj. Robert G. Sparkman, usaf Amer ic a n Spa c e Policy: C iv il ia n /M il it a r y Dic h o t o my...... 45 Dr. Robert H. Puckett Viet Nam: T he Diffic u l t Yea r s...... 51 Lt. Col. Donald F. Martin, usaf The Co mma xder and His Information Officer ...... 59 Maj. William Bender, Jr., usafr The Bio l o c ic a l Basis of Arms Control...... 64 Capt. Frank H. Dowell. usaf Militarv Affairs Abroad The Deba t e Bet ween Khrushchev and His M arshals...... 68 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting Air Force Review A B R E S ...... 80 Brig. Gen. Harry J. Sands, Jr., usaf Air Operations in Viet Nam Ammunit io n Drop...... 84 In Mv Opinion Are We Liv in g a Fic t io n ? ...... 87 Col. J. Tod Meserow. usaf E ffic ien c y or Effec t iveness—L et ’s Have B oth...... 89 Lt. Col. James T. Hargrove, usaf Books and Ideas Japanese War His t o r y...... 90 Susumu Nishiura The Contributors...... 94

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor. Air Uni- Known during its developmental phase cenity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, as the A -ll, the YF-12A , shown here Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the in majestic ascent. has become widely Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- renowned for its unique performance. versity Book Department. Maxwell Air Force Colonel Allen K. McDonald is con- Base, Ala.: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 cerned with both its development cents. USAF nECORiu.se pu bl ic a t io s 50-2. and capabilities in his artiele, "The YF-12A Interceptor Weapon System." Vol. XV I No. 3 March-Apr il 1965

FORECAST

Gener a l Ber na r d A. Sc hr iever

Science and technology are having increasing infhiencc on the defense pusture of tuitions. The pace of technological change affects in a major way the near and long term complexion and strategic planning activities of the Air Force. It is quite evident that there is an urgent need for a comprehensive study and analysis of the Air Force structure projected into the 1965-1975 time period.

HIS STATEMENT by the Chief of of technological possibilities. Periodically since Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, in then the Air Force has called on scientists and T Nlarch 1963, set in motion an Air Force engineers for concentrated studies of the State tudy of major proportions which carne to be of the art and the exploration of what lay ahead :no\vn as Project fo r ec ast . Even before the through technological progress. iur Force became a separate Service almost 20 Project fo r ec ast is the latest in this series ears ago, it had established a tradition of tak- of long-range technical planning studies, which ng stock of its current capabilities and looking began with the monumental work of a group o its future potential through the forecasting headed by the late Dr. Theodore von Kármán, , . '? d t l . I Chart 1. Project FORECAST approach to long-range technical planning

published in 1945 under the title, Toward New Marine Corps, and ten other Federal agencies, Horizons. Since then there have been other participated in fo r ec a st . Likewise twenty-six studies. In the early 1950’s there vvere the universities and colleges furnished members studies of nuclear weapon capabilities and bal- from their faculties and research staffs. Seventy listic missiles led by the late Dr. John von U.S. corporations and ten nonprofit organiza­ Neumann and in 1957-58 the Woods Hole tions also provided panei memberships and studies jointly sponsored by the Air Research consultant Services. and Development Command and the National Synthesizing the collected knowledge o Academy of Sciences. the several hundred military specialists, their civilian associates in the Government, and thei the nature of the project counterparts from the national scientific ant technical community was in itself a task a; In spite of the magnitude of these past enormous proportions. The systematic àp- efforts, Project fo r ec a st was the most compre- proach that was used is shown in Chart 1. hensive exploration of our national position in Science and technology yet conducted by the the important inputs military Services. Top technical people in many fields explored the thinking and vvork of liter- There were three primary inputs to the ally thousands of U.S. scientists and engineers project, shown on the chart as Technological as well as the work of foreign specialists. Forty Possibilities, Policy and Military Considera- Government activities, including twenty-seven tions, and the Threat. Air Force organizations, the Army, Navy, A prime determinant of the role the Air FORECAST 5

Force will play in national security a decade logical competition, and a comprehensive or more into the future is the offering of tech­ definition of those specific policy goals of the nology. Thus a chief aim of the study was to Federal Government which should govern assess the impact of technological advances on long-term Air Force planning. Air Force capabilities. The first step in this as- The definition of a threat as an essential sessment was the work of twelve Technology input to a military planning study is fairly Paneis, which consisted of the following: straightfonvard. In for ecast , however, the activity of the Threat Panei went far beyond Flight Dynamics the traditional projection of numbers and types Propulsion of forces deployed. This panei also concerned Power Generation itself with the efforts of foreign countries in Sci­ Materials ence and education, the development of labora- Bioastronautics tories, research institutes, major testing faeili- Geophysics ties, production facilities, etc., particularly in Weapons major Communist countries. The objective was Detection & Surveillance to see where our opponents might be going Communications in the decade ahead and where they might be Data Processing & Display in relation to their present state of the art at Xavigation & Guidance any particular time in the future. Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic Counter-countermeasures starting the flow process These paneis examined all fields of Science These inputs were used by another group and technology that were considered to be of of paneis concerned primarily with the appliea- aotential interest to the Air Force. Their initial tion of the projected technical advances. These mtputs were projections of the State of the art were designated as Capability Paneis in the n terms of weapon/support Systems applica- areas of: ions in the post-1970 time period. In addition, :heir job was to identify those technical possi- General War nlities which might yield high achievement in Limited War nilitary technology. These were called the Continental Defense ‘high payoff” areas. Intelligence Òc Reconnaissance Compared with previous long-range, tech- Support (including subpanels for Com- aical planning studies, Project for ecast was mand and Control, Logistics, and Space) inique in having a special panei to conduct an íxtensive study of defense policy as expressed They dealt with long-range capability require- oy the decisions and actions of our national ments and with the translation of the technical .ivilian leadership. In Project for ecast a major possibilities into primary offensive and defen- íffort was undertaken to go far beyond the sive weapon systems and supporting systems for xaditional expression of general objectives of Intelligence and Reconnaissance, Communica­ )ur democratic form of govemment. for ecast tions, Command and Control, and Logistics. vas very specific in identifying those factors Their range of interest encompassed the full )f national policy which should influence de- spectrum of conflict from general war to coun- rêlopment decisions required now to ensure terinsurgency. :he long-term defense posture of the United Thus far we have been discussing four States. Exhaustive studies were made of the basic for ecast groups: one group which de- actors involved in the military response to veloped the policy environment in which the xditical decisions, the influences which deter- future Air Force will play a role; a second nine how foreign policy is made, our policy group which studied the threat against which x>sition vis-à-vis the rapidly changing techno­ the Air Force will operate; a third which 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW projected the important technological advances paneis and to identify the technical facilities of the next decade; and a fourth group which implications which have a bearing on the pro­ examined these and other factors in terms of jected technological advances or become a the projeetion of military capabilities required. pacing factor in achieving new military capa­ The next step in the process was to synthe- bilities. size from the developed material the kinds of Another very essential group was the Cost military weapon Systems and support systems Panei. It operated continuously to provide cost which could provide the military capability to estimate data to all paneis needing this informa- fight in the future environment. The goal here tion and participated heavily in the evaluation was to postulate every conceivable type of process leading to the identification of preferred system which could be made to do the jobs system eoncepts or approaches. specified. It was not expected that all of the An Analysis, Evaluation and Synthesis systems initially identified would ever reach Panei selected preferred systems through eon- final consideration. The idea was not to over- sideration of the relative costs and relative ef- look any possibilities in our initial considera- fectiveness of alternative systems and eoncepts. tions and to develop as many options as pos- It developed a cost/effectiveness basis for eon- sible. sideration in arriving at system choices. When- After all the candidates were identified, ever a proposed system, concept, or technical the selection process began. Since the funds approach was found deficient from either a likely to be allocated for defense have a limit, budgetary or policy point of view or was other- the “shopping list” had to be reduced to those wise assessed as a high-risk item, it was fed back expected to provide significant enhancement of through the system, where it was re-examined military capabilities, At the same time it was and then either retained or dropped finally. desired to identify those approaches which ap- peared to have the maximum payoff in terms of policy goals improved military technology. The objective was to point out those areas of advanced tech­ fo r ec ast established conclusively the ab- nology which could be considered especially solute necessity that technical planning for mili­ important, even though not necessarily tied to tary programs take place in the context of na- any specific- military system. These were pos- tional policy clearly developed and explicitly sible “cornerstone areas” which might serve as interpreted for studv purposes. As a result of foundations for a much broader and more the Policy Panei studies, the members of the rapid technological advancement. They could fo r ec ast group produced a tentative synthesis be classed as key elements in the achievement of the politico-military situation as they saw it. of a new levei of system capabilities in the The function of the panei was not to make 1970’s irrespective of specific design considera- policy, but they tried to define and interpret tions now. higher-level policy. In addition to the Technology and Capa­ They believe that the recognized first ob­ bility Paneis, recognition was given to several jective or goal is deterrence through the mainte- specialized areas. A special Personnel Re­ nance of superior strategic forces. This concept; sources Panei was established because of the has been successful in preventing a general criticai nature of the human resources in the nuclear war. However, in the leveis of conflict Air Force. This panei considered more than below nuclear holocaust — limited wars, so- quantity; it examined the human skill require- called “wars of national liberation, ’ insurrec- ments and what the Air Force might do now tion, and civil unrest—other objectives also be­ to acquire them. come important in shaping the kinds of forces The question of technical facilities was required. As derived by the Project fo rec a st examined throughout the entire process of Proj- members, these objectives are providing mui ti- ect forecast by a technical facilities represent- ple options and flexibility of forces for crists ative. His function was to work with all active management uncler varying conditions of in- FORECAST 7 volvement: maintaining the survivability of in achieving the flexibility of forces required. orces against uncertainties; realistic arms con- —Theater operations could, if necessary, be rol measures vvhich do. not leave us vulner- made Iess dependent on forward airfields. able; controUcd response and damage limita- —With the improvement of local defenses, r/on such tliat there can be no mistaking the particularly short-range, surface-to-air missiles intent of prescribed military action; and the employed by potential enemy forces, our deliv­ ;stablishment of negotiating thresholds and ery systems will require standoff strike capabil­ Tiethods of usar termination which will ensure ity to survive in both the general-war and protection of U.S. interests when our forces limited-war applications. jrevaiL —Low-yield clean nuclear weapons and im- Defining these policy goals provided the proved nonnuclear weapons with very accurate mderlying principies for the assessment of all-weather and night-delivery capability are Dresently planned forces. They also became essential to a concept of controlled response. Titeria against which various for ecast pro- —A most important element of our defense Dosals could be tested and evaluated. The work potential is the defense of the United States ){ the Capabilities Paneis established that our power base. In view of our total exposure to ?xisting force and the currently planned forces ic bm attack, the members of fo r ec ast stated viU require numerous improvements to make that an anti-iCBM capability is essential to en­ hem capable of responding properly to all the sure strategic deterrenee. jolicy goals. —In recognition that general war below the The stated policy goals are translated into threshold of nuclear holocaust could be the nilitary systems capabilities in many ways: product of the standoff in nuclear missile ex- —To provide the President with as many dif- change, vital importance was placed on a long- erent options as he would desire in a multi- range, high-performance system with extreme >licity of conflict situations requires alternate versatility and multiple usage throughout a veapon and delivery systems, versatility for re- wide scale of conflict intensity vvhere ballistic argeting, and combinations of forces for vary- missiles would perforce not be used. It would ng tactics and strategy. give credibility to forces in support of a policy —Our eurrent intercontinental ballistic mis- of controlled escalation and controlled response iles are not well enough suited to surgically in the spectrum of conflict where the existence xtracting military targets, with limited collat- of negotiation thresholds implies that meam »ral damage to the surrounding area. New svs- do exist to prevent all-out nuclear exchange. ems must stress very precise target location and —The submarine-launched ballistic missile >n-target controlled delivery. threat was identified as an area where increased —At the lower leveis of limited war, partieu- deterrent capability will be needed. A number urly in underdeveloped areas, the Air Force is of new systems were found to offer significant lot as well prepared as technology will permit potential against a projected increase in this 0 support crisis management which directly in­ threat. volves military forces in remote areas. —M e m b e r s o f for ecast stated their belief , —The worldwide pattern of potential con- that the ability to cope with the problem of üct zones dictates a degree of global air mobil- potentially hostile space satellites was a force ty which does not now exist. New capabilities requirement. pust avoid the inherent lack of flexibility in ntermediate bases and prepositioning policy. Hie quick response possible through global air Outstanciing Tecbnological nobility can reduce reaction time in bringing Possibilities Jnited States forces to bear during the brief, tu ciai, decisive period for managing crises. While we do not now possess the military 1 —The capability for very close air support in technology to fulfill all the defense policy goals he combined air/ground operations is essential identified in all situations, it is the for ecast jlress thoosondi of povnd* per iquore inch) estimate that the technological potential exists potential technological the that estimate capabilities in goals. supportpolicy of defense capabilities Especially difficiilt problems exist with present present exist with problems difficiilt Especially ber of areas. Advances in these fields dnring fieldsdnring inthese Advances areas. of ber have notatechnological reached plateau. materiais inturbine applications where high temperatore ranges from close to absolute zero tofromclose ranges absolute temperatore made are problems Materials systems. military thosehave in occurred the which past decade. vve Rather, unprece- of arethe on threshold vast technologystudy of to solve these kinds of problems and thereby and problems of kinds these to solve inma developments Three limitations. design severe to impose environment an oxidizing and withtemperatures combine rotationalforces to glowing the red of phenomena.re-entry improved of development inthe factor ing the next ten years can be the more significant tennextbe years can than dented technological achievements in a num- in some cases for immediate application. If If application. in immediate for cases some teriais have the potential of combining benefits of combining the potential teriais have materiais breakthroughs technological possibilities to enhance Air Force Force Air to enhance possibilities technological Paneis found many newAll twelve Technology there isthere a emerges from single theme which the increasingly difficnlt the extension by of the Materials have abvaysa major limit- been ore ast ec r fo , it is that \veit is that ­ all whichis temperature operating equivalent to rise since the earliest jet engines rise the for aircraft earliest jet since 2 ). This improvement can be classed as a break as a break classed through. be For example, can in turbojet engineimprovement appliThis ). 2 offer the possibility of of a possibility offer the cations thisadvance and otherimprovemeiits hs e xd-teghndmtras (Chart materiais newoxide-strengthenedthese theto next is respect laver with one of or shear sible assible we tolearn usinjdesign and fabricate pòs-willbe temperatures inoperating degrees Increases ofnow several available. hundre< application formateriais arehigh-temperature baseinthe them dispersing uniformly and ticles metal have been solved. This means that new that means This solved. been have metal parfinely divided sufficiently making of lems prob the years recent In difficnlt. more made inparticles foreign of introduction the by that isstrengthening of dispersion theory The tures. support many technical advances: support many technical cant strength increases at elevated tempera at elevated increases strength cant couldgive dispersionthat signifi techniques the layers of atoms of a base metal, the slippage the metal, a of base atoms of layers the prior hard-won increments of temperature temperature of increments hard-won prior Materials scientists have knownhave scientists for yearsMaterials • • • new new families of organic and inorganic oxide-dispersion-strengthened metais metal and metalloid fiber techniques and metalloid metal polymers. i—tes eprtr comparisons temperature ais—stress/ Chart 2. New high-temperature met- high-temperature New 2. Chart single increase in increase ­ ­ ­ ­ FORECAST 9

The result will, of course, eontribute greatly to of over 400,000 psi and a modulus of elasticity operating efficiencies and improved thrust/ in excess of 60 miliion. weight ratios of turbo engines. In the composite the binder or matrix ma­ In todays technology the use of fibers in terial is very important. Without it, the desir- structural applications is confined largely to able properties of the fiber cannot be utilized. glass fibers used in composite structures. The New families of polymers are becoming avail- most widely used structural composites today able, with characteristics which far surpass are glass-fiber-reinforced laminates of epoxy materiais now in wide use. One of these is resins used in molded plastics of many forms. polybenzimidazole ( pbi). Chart 3 illustrates They have only limited use in aerospace struc- some typical characteristics of these materiais. rural applications because of low modulus They offer properties which potentially double (stiffness) of the fibers and low strength char- the strength of glass laminates at elevated icteristics of the resins, which degrade rapidly temperatures, give a fourfold increase in shear vith elevated temperature. Tomorrows tech- strength when used as an adhesive, and when íology offers a host of new materiais for com- made into fiber form have no competition at aosite structural applications with vastly temperatures of 700°F and beyond. mproved characteristics over an increased When used as a matrix with metal and emperature range. metalloid fibers in composite structural mate­ Recent successes in making metallic and riais, these new polymers offer advances which netalloid fibers have led to materiais with ten­ exceed all mans prior accomplishment in the de strengths exceeding those of glass fibers improvement of structural materiais. Since the md of all bulk metais commonly used in flight Bronze Age, the strength/weight ratio of struc­ rehicle structures. They also possess extremely tural materiais has little more than doubled ligh modulus, and some of them are very light from .5 miliion to 1.2 miliion. With the new n weight. Currentlv, continuous fibers are be- composites it will be possible to triple the ng made in diameters suitable for use in present State of the art and attain strength/ aminates, with consistent strength properties weight ratios of about 4 miliion. In previous

1 15,000

adhesives lam inates organic fibers

best commercial grode j/iarf 3. Stress resistance of new polymers PBI (potybenzimidorole) 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW materiais development, increases in strength or allow us to surpass greatly the theoretical limits .stiffness have always brought a weight penalty. of hydrocarbon fuels. High-chamber-pressure We are now released from this straight-line rocket-engine advances could provide majoi relationship (Chart 4 ). In specific stiffness we improvements in rocket-engine technology. can project a fivefold increase, which over- shadows the improvements of centnries. These flight dtjnamics—flight vehicle design are projections with fibers and polymers now becoming available. Laboratory experiments Examination of individual advances in have shown the possibility of even greater in- separate technical fields does not reveal the ereases in the characteristics of fibers and performance which can be attained by the polymers. If these can be successfully achieved, integration of many technologies. fo r ec ast the properties of composites become trnly studies of flight dynamics and flight vehicle phenomenal. Many structures can then be made design showed clearly the “cascading” effect— at a fraction of their current weight. With the the extra performance gain which is achieved new materiais, entirely new design concepts when the many individual gains are examined all together. emerge, offering tremendous advances in pro- In fíguring range and payload possibilities pulsion and flight vehicle performance. Project for large, long-range cargo aircraft, three fac- for ecast made a comprehensive examination tors work together to produce the performance of these possibilities. attainable. These are the specific fuel consump­ tion ( sfc), aerodynamic efficiency as expressed propulsion in lift over drag ( l / d ), and the fuel or pay­ load weight fraction. Range is increased pro- The application of these new materiais, portionately as the specific fuel consumption combined with advanced design concepts, can is reduced, as the aerodvnamic efficiencv is lead to a whole new era of air-breathing pro- increased, and as a function of the fuel or pay­ pulsion technology, including turbofans, lift load weight fraction. These factors are multi- engines, lift/cruise engines, and multiple de- plicative rather than cumulative. Thus when sign point turbo operation. The use of lighter, the gains already discussed in propulsion effi- stronger materiais in the fan and compressor ciencies are reinforced by major improvements section can increase bypass ratios from todays in l / d through such means as laminar flow cor- values of about 1.4 to 1, to those exceeding 6 trol, variable geometrv, or higher aspect ratio: to 1. High-temperature materiais and greater and by reduction in structural weight, range: rotational speeds will allow us to reduce specific several hundred per cent greater than those c fuel consumption by more than 30 per cent. present-day logistic aircraft can be realized The total effect will be to increase thrust/ Not all this gain need be taken in range in weight ratio from 5 to 1 today to something in crease; new range/payload trade-offs are pos excess of 10 to 1 in future generations of turbo- sible, and todays large loads, dense loads, anc fan engines. outsized loads will all be less criticai problem In lift engines and lift/cruise engines, the to the designer. picture is much the same. There are possibili­ The combined possibilities can provid* ties for increasing thrust/weight ratios to values new generations of flight vehicles which cai exceeding 20 to 1 or even 40 to 1 in the case be designed for near-global range or vastly of pure lifting engines. These can be made short improved payloads, for vertical take-off an* for vertical mounting, with few stages at low landing, for economic operation over a w iJJ compression ratios, and can be designed for span of mach numbers, or for combinations o short periods of operation at relatively low alti­ these capabilities. tudes. Beyond these improvements in hydro- carbon-burning engine technology, new ave- other technologies nues are opened up for high-energy fuels such as hydrogen. The use of liquid hydrogen would Many of the significant technological ac FORECAST 11

vances found bv the twelve foreca st Tech­ and the Air Defense sa c e System are built on nology Paneis cannot be discussed because large digital Computer systems. In the future, their specific applications are classiiíed. They Air Force demands for computational power are not limited to aircraft or air vehicle opera- will increase exponentially. Paradoxically, how- tions. They may be applied to ballistic missiles, ever, computers create new problems almost as space vehicles, and command and control Sys­ rapidly as they solve old ones. tems, to cite a few. One unclassified example is The most serious problem is in programing the fíeld of Computer technology. and in the growing army of programmers need- Computers are revolutionizing almost ed. Today the Air Force requires over 5000 every aspect of military operations: the Com­ man-years of direct in-house support of com­ puter has become an indispensable tool of de- puters, excluding those for scientifíc and engi- fense management. The twelve years from 1952 neering use. A typical program of the central to 1964 saw the number of Air Force computers sac 465L system has over 600,000 instructions. grow from a single general-purpose digital This requires thousands of man-months of Computer—used in Headquarters usaf for programing time. There is an increasing num­ mobilization planning—to a total of nearly 500. ber of programs of this size. Moreover, as pro­ Such systems as the sac Control System 465L gram size increases, the productivity of the

Chart 4. Structural metal trends. Historically, metais increased ijfrom 0.5 in 400 B.C. to 1.2 in current production methods. 12 A/fí UNIVERSITY REVIEW programmer drops off, making the cost rise specific result of this effort has been the identi- approximately as the square of the ratio of the fication of five areas of technology with poten- program sizes. tially enormous payoff. fo r ec ast found it The Air Force cannot continue to sustain urgent that we expand and accelerate our the exponential increases in prograining costs current programs in these high-payoff areas to and Iead times, which may even tend to out- ensure that the technology will mature in time weigh the cost and efficiency of the computers for effective use. Toward this end, specific high- themselves. The solution lies in a reorientation priority, advanced development programs are of the Computer hardware development to being proposed in the technical fields of mate­ evolve a new class of data processors with gen­ riais, propulsion, flight dynamics, navigation eral program structures, user-oriented lan- and guidance, and Computer technology. guages, and tailored hardware. The objective The Capability Paneis identified many must be to reduce dependency on programmers weapon and support systems which can signifi- in the loop between the user and the machine. cantly enhance the abilitv of the Air Force to It is the fo r ec a st estimate that advances in respond to national security policy. As these Computer technology, if given the proper orien- systems capability projections span a decade tation, can permit users with little knowledge or more, they are objectives for sequential of the Computer technology to make effective, rather than simultaneous development. In some direct use of the machine, thus bypassing the cases immediate procurement can begin for programmer. The most promising technological systems entirely within the current state of the possibility is the “preprogramed” or “implicitly art. In other cases further study and further programed" Computer. Its advantages are that technological advances will be necessary before the user has command of his machine; he com- the ultimate military worth of the system will municates with it directly to make changes or be determined with the certainty which justifies get answers; and he Controls the growth of his the major expenditures involved. hardware to meet the needs of problems as fo r ec a st findings have national signifi- they occur. cance. Beyond the broad implications for future Among the advances which will make im- Air Force eapabilities involved, there are plicit programs possible are the enlargement broader political and economic implications. of memory storage capacities by 2 orders of For example, the technological opportunities magnitude and reduction of the cost of memory identified in the materiais, propulsion, and elements by 2 to 3 orders of magnitude. New Hight dynamics areas make practical the devel­ concepts of machine organizations have been opment of large, long-range aircraft with a explored and experimented with, giving posi­ global-range performance heretofore thought tive indications of the value of the implicit pro- impossible. This, in turn, can affect our current graming approach. Means will be found to worldwide deployment of forces and therefore permit simultaneous users, and machine power have political implications in crisis management limitations will be overcome. as well as international economic impact on U.S. gold flow problems. I n the fo r ec ast study, technical experts have Project fo r ec a st envisions a new era of made specific projections of the state of the art military technology. It identifies the advances and have identified technical advances which which can give the Air Force superior capabili- will have a major influence on the characteris- ties. The task now is to take the actions neces­ tics of military forces beyond 1970. While major sary to transform these projections into realities. advances are seen in all technology areas, a Hq Air Force Systems Command THE YF-12A INTERCEPTOR WEAPON SYSTEM

C olonel Alle.n K. Mc D onald0

NTERCEPTOR development in the past ceptor continued to depend heavily upon the has been characterized by a series of small, close control provided by the ground radar en- I incrementai improvements. The perform- vironment. By comparison, the YF-12A and its nce of each new interceptor exceeded that of armament system represent a giant step for- s predecessors by tenths of a mach number, ward in capability and independence of oper- few thousand feet of altitude, and a small in- ation. rease in combat radius. Radar detection ranges The stringent security precautions which nd air-to-air missile launch ranges likewise surroiinded the YF-12A until it was well into dvanced in small steps, and each new inter- flight test understandably generated some mis-

*Colo»irl McDonald, as Deput\ Director of Aerospace conceptions as to its mission and how it would irtponv DCS.'Plans, Air Drfense Comm md, was ADC’s proj- be employed. This weapon system was de- ^ for the YF-12A interceptor. He wa s t h e pnncipal nefinic o Acer for the fint pnhlic showing of the Y'F-12A at signed to accomplish the continental air defense dward% Air Force Ba*«\ Califórnia, on 30 September 196-4. This ticle is basotl on that briefing. mission using a completely different concept of 14 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW operations from current interceptors. The pur- application to the engine of several new high- pose of this article is to dispel any doubts as to temperature alloys. the YF-12A’s air defense mission and to de- Hughes Aircraft Company produced the seribe the new tactics made possible by the advanced fire-control and air-to-air missile Sys­ performance of this weapon system. tems for the YF-12A. Actual development of the The advanced aircraft development proj- ASG-18 pulsed Doppler fire-control system and ect that produced the YF-12A was a product the AIM-47A air-to-air guided missile was ini- of Kelly Johnsons famous “Skonk Works” at tiated as a part of the F-108 interceptor pro- Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The aircraft gram. They were continued as a separate devel­ originally carried the company designation opment effort after the F-108 was canceled. A -ll; however, the Department of Defense re- Flight-testing of the fire-control system cently assigned it the military designation YF- and armament was begun at Edwards Air Force 12A, the “Y” standing for prototype. As the Base in early 1960, using a modified B-58 as a President stated in February 1964, it has been test-bed. Many flight-test hours were accumu- tested in sustained flight at more than 2000 lated over a four-year period, and a number of miles per hour at altitudes in excess of 70,000 guided air-to-air missile fírings were accom- feet, and its range is measured in “thousands of plished. Flight-testing of the armament system miles.” in the B-58 has now been terminated but con­ The YF-12A is powered by two Pratt and tinues in YF-12A test aircraft. The armament Whitney J-58 engines. The J-58’s successful system is an integral part of the YF-12A and development and its qualification for sustained incorporates improvements which accrued from afterbuming at high operating temperatures the B-58 test-bed program. were made possible by the development and The YF-12A was designed to provide an

Sparsely settled areas of Mojave Desert afforded security for the YF-12A “mystery plane” while it tvas being flight-tested prior to the President’s announcement of its existence. 0 effective defense against the manned bomber threat throughout the North American Air De­ fense ( norad) area of responsibility. This vast area covers the whole North American Conti- nent. There are two approaches to this air de­ fense problem. If the defensive weapons lack long-range and/or high-speed performance, a large number of them must be deployed geo- graphically to cover all possible enemy attack routes. If, on the other hand, the weapons conventional possess a high cruise speed combined vvith long interceptor range, as does the YF-12A, a smaller number is V range y required, since they can be rapidly deployed to iny area where they are needed. YF- I2A In defending the North American Conti- range lent against air attack, future air defense sys- :ems must be able to operate effectively in an ?nvironment that may be degraded by ballistic nissile attack. They aiso must be caiiable of iestroying low-altitude penetrators, because as ligh-altitude defensive weapons have become Figure 1. Operational range of the YF-12A nore effective, offensive forces have turned to low-altitude tactics for survival. The addition of air-to-surface missiles able time. When required to go out fast at asm) to older bombers in effect gives these supersonic dash speeds, with a subsonic return, jombers a supersonic dash capability equal to the current fighters radius is drastically re- he range of the asm. The small radar cross sec- duced. If supersonic speed is used for return to ion of an asm makes interception extremely base also, its radius is even further reduced. lifficult once it is launched. It is highlv desir- In contrast, the YF-12A Hies at a sustained ible for future air defense weapons to be able speed of mach 3.0 and has the capability to per- o destroy the bomber before it is close enough form more than three long-range sorties while o its target to launch its asm. It should also be conventional interceptors perform one. apable of destroying asm’s in fiight in the event The operational advantage provided by he bomber is not destroyed prior to launching the combination of high-speed cruise and long hem. range is shown in a tactical example ( Figure 1). The following characteristics determine A raid cell penetrating the norad area could be he ability of any interceptor to meet these air attacked by conventional-type interceptors lefense needs: from bases within the small semicircle prior to • Speed, with the emphasis on sustained Crossing the U.S. border. Under identical condi- ruise speed, and combat radius at sustained tions, YF-12A’s from any base within thè large ãgh speed are the two criticai factors. These semicircle could be employed against this raid. wo characteristics determine the ability of an To summarize the speed/radius factors, iterceptor to arrive at the desired location at the combination of a high cruise speed and long le proper time. range permits intercepts to be made much All current fighters are designed to cruise farther out from the target area and requires iost economically at subsonic speeds and util- fewer weapons. se externai drop tanks for extending their • The fire-control system is the heart of adius. A maximum-radius mission requires any interceptor weapon system. Detection ubsonic cruise speed and consumes consider- range of the fire-control system and its low- Figure 2. ASG-18 rear cockpit display

1 manual Computer 2 radar display 3 infrared display keyboard

♦arget interceptor X intercept point- altitude capability relate directly to effective- directly to aircraft maneuverability require^ ness against low-altitude targets and operation ments. The air intercept missile AIM-47A car- in a degraded environment. The ASG-18 fire- ried by the YF-12A has a very long range and control system features a long-range search is highly maneuverable. It can engage high- capability and detection of low-flying targets altitude or low-altitude targets down to grounc down to ground levei. With this capability, the levei while the YF-12A remains at its optimuno speed and combat radius of the YF-12A enable cruise altitude. It can also be fired at targets on it to cover a much greater area in its normal either side of the interceptors flight path search pattem than current interceptors, such Whereas current interceptors must maneuvel as the F-106. very precisely to get the target within theii • Armament system performance relates relatively small missile launch zone before thev THE YF-12A INTERCEPTOR WEAPON SYSTEM 17 can fire, the YF-12A takes advantage of the Computer, and long-range maneuvering missile range and maneuverability of the AIM-47 and will allow the YF-12A to operate effectively in requires only gross steering. a degraded environment. While interceptor maneuverability is not Because of their relatively short-range fire- as important during the attack phase with the control and armament systems, current inter- YF-12A as it is with current interceptors, it be- ceptors require accurate control from ground comes important for reattack. The speed of the radars. They are directed to the proper altitude, YF-12A, coupled with its radar detection range speed, and heading for intercept. At relatively and missile launch range, actually allows it to close range, the interceptor acquires the target >n its own radar and makes the attack. The reattack sooner than current interceptors de- jilot must accurately steer the interceptor to spite its larger turning radius. Against a sub- sonic bomber raid, the YF-12A would be in lim at the precise point in space computed by :he fire-control svstem where the missile will position to fire a/ second missile in one half the time required by the F-106. Against a super- Jestroy the target. In contrast, the ASG-18/ sonic dash bomber, it could reattack in some- \IM-47 subsystems were designed to operate thing like one fourth the time of the F-106. vith a minimum of ground control. The YF- L2A’s position is automatically displayed by its ;elf-contained navigation svstem, as indicated T he YF-12A indeed represents a tremendous in- n Figure 2. Target information from any source crease in capability for continental air defense. laving raid intelligence can be inserted into the With only very rough raid intelligence, it can \SG-18 Computer automatically or manually, intercept and destroy hostile airborne forces md the position of the target relative to the farther out from their targets, in less time, and 'F-12A will be displayed for the crew on a with more deadly accuracy than any weapon actical map display. When the target is de- system heretofore envisioned. Its high speed ected by the interceptor’s long-range radar and and long range coupled with its advanced he fire-control officer obtains a loc-k-on, steer- ng information is displayed. Because of the armament system give the defense force com- mander great operational flexibility in the em- lerformance designed into the missile, the YF- ployment of his weapons. Let there be no 2A is required to make only gross azimuth teering corrections during attack and need not doubt that the YF-12A is an air defense inter­ hange altitude at all. The combination of long- ceptor of the first order. ange search radar, inertial navigation, onboard Hq Air Defense Command DO WE WANT A SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

OR AN $89 TRIP TO EUROPE?

L ieu t en a n t Gen er a l Wil l ia m H. T unner, USAF (R et )

O W E WANT the supersonic trans- sound barrier, with its attendant major engi- port, known as the sst ? Eventually. neering problems. But just about everyone who D But presently there is another trans- flies today or ships his cargo by air wants port plane that vve would like to have and really speed. Thats why he uses air in the first place need a great deal more. In getting into the —to get there faster. The public, i.e., the cus- problem the first question is, W ho are “vve”? tomers, airlines, and manufacturers, still seem We are many different people and organiza- somevvhat awed with existing speed and have tions—the riding public, the large part of the diffieultv adjusting to it. At present, there are public that hasnt flovvn but might like to, the just a fevv complaints about lack of speed. The aircraft manufacturers, the airlines, the Depart­ complaints one hears are lack of Service, lack ment of Defense, and the shippers of our Amer­ of comfort, lack of reliability, and high costs. ican industry. All agree that more safety and its close Well, vvhat do all these many groups vvant associate, reliability, would be desirable to in an airplane? W hich ones vvant an sst and have. W e merely need to recall the disastrou which ones would prefer at this time some- aircraft accidents of the past year to remind u thing else? that flying presents a risk. More constant re What are the different characteristics of an minders are the prominently placed and wcl airplane that are really desirable to the public? used accident insurance concessions and acci- Speed, safety, reliability, economy or lovv cost, dent policy vending machines found in air and comfort seem to be the principal ones to terminais, which will insure your flight for a consider. sum. Much of the air riding public is somewhat The speed which vve have today in our new fearful and has generally accepted the fact that jets, the Boeing 707, Douglas DC-8, and Con- there is a greater risk in air travei than in other vair 880 or 900, is just belovv the speed of sound. modes of travei. Anything more in speed means penetrating the As for reliability, who hasn’t been delaved.

General Tunner wrote this article some months prior to Sec- retary of Defense McNamaras announcement of plans to proceed with the development of the C-5A, the huge Air Force cargi experimental—heavy logistics system (CX-H LS). 1 DO WE WANT A SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT? 19

if he traveis often, because of weather or main- gers and cargo? Labor and salaries can’t be re- tenance problems or has not had to ‘ hold over duced. Costs of gasoline and facilities probably destinations for one reason or another? Who won’t change much. But there is a place where hasnt missed connections because of delavs? Of we might make the breakthrough: we can re­ course the airlines hate delays as much as the duce the overall cost by reducing the cost of the eustomer because it throws their operations airplane itself and also by reducing the costs scheduling and maintenance scheduling out of necessary to maintain it and to keep it flying kilter, and, worse, it costs them money—it hits safely. We can build a plane which will take them in the pocketbook. Reliability materially less money per ticket or pound of cargo to fly affects economy. Poor Service or lack of it is each mile if we make it very large, three times usuallv an internai airline problem—but all the the size of todays big jets, and if we design de- Service you get costs an airline money and sub- liberately with the thought of economy in mind. sequentlv costs you the user money. Lack of But this nation needs to keep its world eomfort is also built in—seats jammed together, prestige among its neighbors, and that is where no room to stretch, boredom are problems un- the sst comes in. The distant future no doubt popular but accepted which come about gen- will have mach 3 or 2000 miles per hour as the prally from economy reasons. routine standard speed for air travei. Interna- Passengers want safety, reliability, reason- tionally it is sound thinking to keep up with ible speed, and eomfort. Cargo by air doesn’t one’s neighbors. If we are to stay ahead of or aeed eomfort, but it does want the others. But keep up with other countries in the airline busi- Doth passengers and cargo want economy. ness, we should at least keep our fingers in the Passengers want a cheaper ticket. To prove this, sst pie. However, we are well ahead, as we nave you noted the number of people who ride should be, with our military combat planes, in ‘economy class” or “tourist class” compared to the supersonic field. I believe our military will he so-called “first class”? Because of demand keep us ahead. But I believe that neither the he lower-dass seats frequently take up nine public nor American industry wants the very :enths of the total space in a plane. People don’t high speeds of the sst in preference to safety, ike the crowding and lack of Service in the reliability, economy, and eomfort. And the sst ower class but they put up with it for economy will, at least in the early stages, probably give easons. So, the public likes economy in air us less of these merits than we have today in the ravel, but so do the cargo shippers, so does the jet airliners. Department of Defense, but most important of A recent study revealed that the sst will dl so would the 75 per cent of the people who leave in its wake along the ground a most lon’t fly at all and the shippers who don’t ship devastating (to the public eardrums) sonic ly air. In the cargo area it shoidd be noted that boom. The effects of this wide-area, continually hippers still send 99.9 per cent of their cargoes physically damaging sonic boom will surely icross the Atlantic by boat; only 1/10 of 1 per bring the wrath of the people against the Gov­ rent goes by air. ernment. As in the case of the military sonic Today about the cheapest air ticket one booms, the excuse can no longer be, “But it is n buy from New York to Paris which would in the best interests of the national defense.” ■ in the economy class, unless he goes on an Instead, lets slow up the promotion of the Ècursion with all sorts of gimmicks or trick sst . Let’s give the public what it wants. Let us imitations as to time of travei and retum, is use the state of the art as we know it today, in bout $200 one way. First-class passage to Paris manufacturing and operating airplanes, and in­ > $450. Why are fares so high? The airlines are stead of penetrating into the unknown world of [uite well run, and they are not making exorbi- 2000 mph let us use our scientists and engineers ant profits. The problem is that operating costs to refine our techniques, build a new plane, yes, re high. What can be done, then, to reduce but instead of one with extremely high speeds, losts and thus reduce the price of the ticket and use our great technology to provide greater rçpen up the great untapped markets for passen­ safety, greater reliability, and greater economy. 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

It can be done. Douglas, General Dynamics, or Lockheed as Let’s call this airplane that the public the prime source, with assists from the ones not vvants, that “we” want, the CX-X. This happens selected. The plane should carry 250,000 to be the naine the military are using to indicate pounds, 3500 miles. (Thus it would be three a new but still nebulous and undeveloped trans- times the size of any previous jet transport port plane. Now the question is, W hat should built, so that one crew can take the place of this CX-X do and vvhat should it look like? three, and three maintenance and support men What would be different about it? W hat should can take the place of six.) It should have an all- be its new, outstanding, and principal charac- out range of 5000 to 6000 miles, far enough to teristics? fly nonstop from Honolulu to New York City. Certainly it should be a plane acceptable It should be double-decked, with a removable to the Department of Defense and the com- and adjustable mid-Hoor. Although it would be mercial world alike. It is important to get quan- large enough to have a separate section for tity purchasing of the plane, if it is to be eco- movies to be shown as a standard item, the nomical. The number made could make the dif- CX-X would not be large enough to have a ference between 14 to 20 million dollars for swimming pool. each (versus 40 to 60 million for the sst ). The In its military version it should be able to military has a requirement to carry very large carry the many vital pieces of a regular Army pieces of equipment and to transport thousands divisions ordnance that can t now be airlifted— of our men with all their military paraphernalia heavy tanks, large guns, and specialized vehi- overseas, both in peace and in times of crisis. cles, while for the Air Force it should be able A very large airplane is essential to carry this to carry large missiles and even our fighter big and heavy equipment. The commercial planes. Its usable cabin space could really be a world and the military as well have a dominat- novel feature, for in this plane the cabin would ing requirement, and obligation too, for econ- be 18 feet high (enough to carry our large mis­ omv in shipping. So, large, heavy, and “out- siles ) and 18 feet wide ( enough for two large sized" cargoes may be transported, and lessened Army trucks side by side), perhaps 150 feet overall unit shipping cost should become the long with openings to the cabin at both ends. order of the day. Its lower deck should be at truck-bed height. Some, no doubt, will scoff at the idea of The CX-X should be capable of landing in designing for greater safety, economy, and re- 6000 feet and taking off with a full load in 8000; liability alone, saying that we are doing every- feet. Neither our commercial nor military air- thing in this area today that is possible. I don t ports should be required to undergo again an- think so. Consider just a few points: The nu- other expensive and protracted airfield length- merous accessories found in any airplane—are ening program as was the case with the modern they as simplified as our best engineers can jet transports and bombers. make them? And then, are they located in read- The commercial version of this plane could ily accessible places in the plane so that mainte- be quite revolutionary and very interesting. Foij nance or replacement of worn units is easy?— example, the bottom deck could be used to and also so that unloading of the plane is not carry 300 tourist passengers or cargo or a com- essential if the plane goes out of commission? bination of both passengers and freight. The Have we solved the problem of lightning top deck with 75 super first-class passengers strikes? Are flight instruments positively guar- could well resemble a large Pullman with clubj anteed to operate in all weather conditions and car or a first-class passenger steamship, \x i t hj temperature ranges? Are the newly planned jet several Pullman-type bunks available (as we engines the most efficient and as breakdown- once had in our pre-VVorld War II DC-3s), fl proof as we can make them? dining room and cocktail bar along with com- As I see it, the plane should be made by fortable lounging seats. Room and space could one of our most experienced and major trans­ be provided for passengers to get up and wall port manufacturers, that is, either Boeing, around, sleep on a bed, dine, sip eocktails, pia) DO \VE WANT A SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT? 21 cards, or see movies—real comfort and a doing up new markets for passengers and cargoes for away with the crowded, claustrophobic atmos- the airlines, and thus speed up the flow of Inter­ phere of today s air transport—and all at a price national commerce, develop new industries, below the first-class fare of today. and bring our little world even closer together. This plane, which could appear in our skies To build this CX-X we must decide that in 1970, the same time as the projected sst , we, the public, want it in preference to the ssr could well cause a revolution both in military at this time and that we are willing that our best and civilian transportation, a transportation aeronautical brains and scientists get onto this revolution so long sought after but never job. Will the public desires get ample consider- achieved. The dream of C. R. Smith, head of ation from the airlines—as well as the Govern­ American Airlines, when many years ago he ment? Will the military make the small com- uTOte in the Saturday Eoening Post, “What this promises in design that it must in order to get ;ountry needs is a good 3-cent airline,” may a plane which is coinmercially adaptable? If inally be realized—an S89 Hight from New York the answers to these questions are yes, and I :o Paris. The price of a tourist ticket might be believe they are, then I believe that the manu- is little as $89 from New York to Europe, or a facturers can use their great experience to pro- hipper could move a ton of cargo at no more duce a larger, safer, more dependable plane, and han 7<- per ton-mile, stepping down into the one considerably cheaper to operate. Certainly irea of surface prices. It could reduce military a new look at this problem by all the “we’s” rosts by hundreds of millions of dollars, open should be made. Ware Neck, Virgínia EXERCISE GOLD FIRE I

M ajor Robert G. S pa r k ma n

HE A IR/GRO UN D maneuvers in the st r ic o m to conduct field exercises and collateral fali of 1964, designated Exercise Gold studies for the purpose of (1 ) testing and eval- T Fire I, were expected to go a long way uating for suitability in joint operations the toward writing a final chapter in the disposition units and procedures by which the Air Force of the controversial recommendations of the would use aviation to enhance the mobility of Howze Board. Army units, and (2 ) obtaining maximum infor- These recommendations, generated from a mation and data applicable to the following six body of Army opinion that the organic tactical jcs requirements: air capabilities of the Army should be substan- • To eliminate areas of unnecessaryj tially enlarged, took fonnal shape in 1961 when overlap or undesirable duplication of capabili­ the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to ties make a complete re-evaluation of its require- • To determine the best methods of ex- ments from 1963 to 1975 for land war mobility ploiting the mutually supporting capabilities of with particular emphasis on the greater utiliza- the Services involved tion of air vehicles and related systems. General Hamilton H. Howze, selected by the Army to • To determine the best methods for co^ conduct the study, recommended Army air ordinating and controlling the operations of assault divisions and strong implements of or­ air/ground forces involved ganic aircraft. At the direction of the Secretary • To determine the survivability and of the Air Force, General Gabriel P. Disoswav suitability for various combat environments was chosen to head a board to review the • To determine the advantages and/( Howze Board recommendations. The Air Force limitations inherent in the Army mobility coi board concluded that the Howze Board provi- cept, including deplovment, employment, anc sions, if adopted, would lead to duplication of logistical support of the proposed units (nc equipment and capabilities already possessed applicable to Gold Fire I ) by the Air Force for joint action with ground • To provide data for use in determin- forces, in which it had long and successful ex- ing total force structure, logistical requirel perience. ments, and supporting requirements. For the third round the Secretary of De­ fense called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara author- plan tests and demonstrations relative to the ized almost 16,000 extra personnel for the Army aerial movement and supply of troops in the to establish the experimental llth Air Assault battle area. The jc s in tum directed cincus- Division at Fort Benning, Geórgia, to test the EXERCISE GOLD FIRE 1 23 air assault division theory. The division was work had to be done. The Air Force late in 1963 organized somewhat although not exactly in organized, under the Taetical Air Command, line with the ideas of the Howze Board recom- with personnel principally from tac, the Tacti- mendations and concepts of how aviation can cal Air Warfare Center ( taw c) at Eglin afb, best be used in support of and to improve the Florida. Commanded by Major General Gilbert mobility of ground forces. This organization is L. Meyers, tawc was to practice and test Air continuing training in employment of these Force concepts and doctrine in the employment Armv concepts.0 of all forms of aviation in support of ground The Air Force was directed to prepare for warfare. The overall objective of tawc is to im­ Exercise Gold Fire, a maneuver in which Air prove all phases of taetical air warfare, from Force concepts would be put into practice. Be- strategic deployment on through logistics, Com­ 'ore these methods and techniques could be munications, reconnaissance, mobility, and iemonstrated, however, much planning and close air support. This objective was to be ac- complished through field exercises, engineering •Earlv in Januarv 1965 it was announced that the 11 th Air tests of new equipment on a continuing basis, Lssault Division would not be budgeted beyond the present iscai year. analytical tests, and war gaming. Rehearsal of

General Curtis E. LeMay, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, and General Walter C. Sweency, ]r.} Commander, Taetical Air Command, are briefed by a forward air controller during Exercise Gold Fire I. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW methods and techniques for improving the Air involved completion of forms designed so that Force concepts was conducted from June the data are easily transferrable to cards for through September 1964 in a series of three Processing by a Computer. The second pro- field exercises called Indian River. The objec- cedure called for selected personnel to complete tive of these exercises was to plan, practice, and questionnaires on tactics, techniques, proce- perfect methods and techniques of implement- dures, equipment, and problem areas encoun- ing Air Force concepts in providing better and tered or observed throughout the maneuver closer integration of Air Force capabilities vvith area. Air Force and Army photographers aug- those of ground units of the United States Army mented the data with still and motion pictures and to determine the extent to which tactical in both black and white and in color. The film aviation techniques and methods of employ- coverage was then catalogued on Computer ment can enhance the mobility and combat ef- cards for easy reference and study. Over S50 fectiveness of joint combat forces. Elements of personnel, including photographers, were used the Armys lst Infantry Division, a standard in this task of gathering data. ( Controllers were road ( Reorganization Objective Army Divi­ not a part of jt e t f . ) sion ) with its normal complement of organiza- The comprehensive and intricate nature of tional aviation vehicles, were used in these exer­ the data-collection system required a thorough cises. The number of Army troops participating and complete training program for data-collec­ was increased in each successive exercise, the- tion personnel. The course was of sufficient oretically going from the simple to the complex, length to permit testing and corrective action. as the air and ground units were molded into a The proper collection of essential data and then team for use in Gold Fire I. The basic reason proper evaluation of the data collected were for the Indian River series, then, was to design such a vital part of this immense undertaking and develop, in coordination with Army com- that the training program had to be designed manders, a joint training program that would so as to ensure that data-collection personnel be responsive to Air Force concepts and doc- could attain a state of understanding and pro- trine. ficiency which permitted and made mandatory In carrying out his responsibility for gath- the successful completion of the data-collection ering data and evaluating these concepts, mission. The classroom instruction and exer­ cincstrjke in the summer of 1963 had organ- cises thoroughly familiarized all personnel with ized the Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force the proper method of observing events as well ( jt e t f ), which was employed for the first time as the procedure for accomplishing the data- in Exercise Gold Fire I. Under the command of collection forms. It was emphasized and re- M ajor General YVilliam B. Rosson, usa, the emphasized that the validity of the overall eval­ jt et f in this exercise assisted in the test and uation depended to a large extent upon the evaluation of concepts for using aviation to en­ completeness and accuracy of the data col­ hance the mobility and combat effectiveness of lected. all participating forces in a joint operation. The All data and photo documentation pro- objectives of jt et f paralleled those require- duced during the exercise provide a factual ments handed down by the jcs. The data col- basis for close examination and study by Gen­ lectors used specially designed forms to record eral Paul D. Adams, Commander in Chiefj the facts which they obtained. Data were col- usst r icom, and Director, Exercise Gold Fire Ij lected in the key areas of fire support, tactical Following this study, the data collected and air reconnaissance, strategic and tactical mobil­ usst r icom s evaluation and recommendations ity, logistical support, and command and con- will be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Stafi in trol. Other factors considered in the evaluation Washington, D.C. related to flexibility, supportability, and vulner- To stress the importance of Gold Fire I to ability of tactical air units in combat actions. the Army and the Air Force and how it bearj Two methods of data collecting were used by on methods of waging ground warfare, it mighl the Army and Air Force fact gatherers. The first be well to eraphasize that the exercise '' as a EXERCISE GOLD EIRE I 25

test of a concept or idea of moving a portion of idly and with in-flight medicai attention—di- ta standard road division a distance of some rectly to rear-area hospitais without intermedi- Í2200 nautieal miles and Ianding it on nniin- ate stops. It also carries prisoners and transports proved airfields in sufBeient strength — some materiel to the rear for maintenance and repair. 10,000 men and their equipment—to fight a sus- Thus the C-130 gives a tremendous poten- tained war and then to provide complete logis- tial to our tactical ground and air forces of tic support of tliis force bv air delivery. In no Strike Command to make swift reactions to any previous exercise has this capability been dem- part of the world. The moving of large forces, onstrated by air movement of units in the type such as an entire battalion, .over enemy lines of exercise where the men had to be fully and the exploiting of air mobility in supply and equipped for a tactical situation upon Ianding. evacuation are the delight of any ground c-om- ín Exercise Big Lift, for example, which took mander. m armored division to Germany, only person- The heart of the Armys air mobility con­ iel were airlifted into the area. This present cept is helicopter movement of eombat forces ype of accomplishment has not been possible in the general battle area to achieve increased :>efore because we did not have the right kind tactical mobility for a portion of the force at any )f aircraft. Now we do—we have the C-130. It one time by overcoming the obstaeles of terrain, •an transport a payload of 16 tons 3000 nautieal mud, dense foliage, and slow surface transpor- niles at a speed of over 300 miles per hour and tation. The Air Force has always considered and on a 2000-foot dirt strip, which ean be con- that this approach to increasing mobility has tnicted by personnel and equipment air- merit when properly used and controlled and Iropped by C-130’s after flying the same dis- worked with the lst Infantry Division to im­ ance. prove and test joint techniques, procedures, Today the Air Force has an additional ca- and equipment. During this exercise tac CH- •ability, which has undergone testing and re- 3C helicopters were employed for the first time nement by tawc, of delivering supplies by in an auxiliary role to extend the air line of xtraction methods into small areas where it is communication right up to the front lines. ot practical or possible for various reasons to Standard Army divisions are authorized 97 uild assault Ianding strips. In addition to de- helicopters in an aviation battalion. Fifty of very of supplies and equipment by the time- the craft are troop and cargo carriers. This inte­ ;sted conventional parachute method, in Gold gral helicopter-borne assault force provides a ire I tons of fuel, rations, and other supplies significant improvement in mobility. It was with 'ere delivered into small delivery zones from this equipment of the lst Infantry Division, M30’s using the low-altitude parachute ex- integrated with Air Force helicopters, that the action system ( lapes), ground proximity test was conducted utilizing the support of heli­ xtraction system ( cpes), and parachute low- copter-borne assault forces. A search is being Ititude delivery system ( pl a d s ). With both made to find a system for increasing Army mo­ xpes and cpes, the C-130 passes over the e.\- bility in the battle area through use of Air Force action zone at an altitude of about 5 feet and capabilities and resources. The Air Force wants speed of 120 miles per hour. With lapes, a to test the C-130 thoroughly, not only in getting arachute deploys, extracting the load and supplies to the battlefield but also in actually owing it to a stop. With cpes, the load is ex- depositing the supplies and equipment on the acted by a hook engaging a cable stretched battlefield. tac believes that it can put the -ross the extraction zone. In the plads tech- armies and their full equipment, ineluding vehi- que, the load is pulled by parachute from the cles, tanks, trueks, and other heavy equipment, irgo compartment of a C-130 Hving at 200 into the battlefield and provide mobility on the et. By use of any of these three methods the battlefield as far forward as any aircraft can ilivery can be pinpointed into a very small possibly go. ea. Retuming from the forward battlefield The Air Force is fully aware that the test eas, the C-130 carries battle casualties—rap- program may bring to light some gaps in the On Time and in Place Delivery of Cargo

A load of four fuel cells is extracted from the cargo compartment of a TAC C-130 Hercules assault airlift aircraft over a drop zone in Joint Task Force Ozark territory. The 500- gallon fuel bladders, weighing a total of 14,000 pounds, are dropped on a pallet from 1500 feet using three hcavy cargo parachutes. .. . An assault airlift aircraft (right approaches a cargo extraction zone in an air line of Communications resupply mission Trailing behind the aircraft is the hook which engages a cahle on the ground to extract the cargo from the aircraft on a pallet. In the foreground is a mobile control towei which was airlifted into the assault zone earlier for this combat-simulated operation ... A cargo pallet is “yanked” from the rear compartment of C-130 (lower right using the low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES). With this cargo delivery method, the aircraft flies five feet over the extraction zone at 120 milcs per hour The parachute deploys, pulls the load from the open cargo hold, and slows it to a stop

28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

total capability to fulfill responsibilities within b. Intra-combat-zone movements of units. the joint command and is ready to fill the gaps c. Aeromedical evaeuation operations. with additional or totally new equipment and d. Emergency supply and resupply. improved techniques. These tests are looked e. Movement of special forces. upon as an opportunity to work toward an even When a request is received from the Army more successful air/ground team. for air support, an evaluation is made by ex- perienced personnel and the decision is made as to the type of air vehiele most suitable for F uxdamental to and underlying the job, whether it be a helicopter or C-130 air­ the Air Force concepts is the belief that the cur- craft. Tactical Air Force units, personnel, and rent Army divisions such as the lst Infantry equipment must be responsive to experienced Division, with their full complement of combat Air Force eommanders if these tasks are to he equipment ( including 97 helicopters), teamed fulfilled. with Air Force units with fírst-line aircraft, pro- The Air Force has the role and mission of vide the optimum in combat strength and stay- providing air support of all types to the Army, ing power, significant increases in mobility, and it has the capability to fulfill this responsi- and the ability to engage the most capable of bility when put into action through Air Force potential enemies. W ith tailored weapons, concepts of how air pow er should be used in equipment, and forces, this flexible team can air mobility requirements and close air support handle threats from any enemy. The Army of ground forces. In modem warfare highly should be provided all possible support that trained and skilled technicians are needed to vvill increase com bat effectiveness, and this man intricate and expensive machines. and ndj means increased mobility on the battlefield. single Service can be self-supporting in combat There are indications that helicopters will prove situations. Instead, the requirement calls for effective for fonvard and lateral movements the best efforts of each Service woven into fight- within the area controlled by friendly forces, ing team work through joint command arrange- wlien properlv planned and controlled. The ments, thus integrating all capabilities and1 helicopter has never before been used in this avoiding costly duplication of capabilities. manner in a tactical situation, and therefore These, then, wrere the Air Force concepts techniques and methods must be tried and of supporting ground forces that constituted thej tested. framework for much testing of new techniques The usaf concept of assault airlift uses the and methods of providing this support in the helicopter to the fullest extent possible to de- Indian River exercises preparatory to Gold Firé liver and recover personnel, equipment, and I, which was conducted between 29 October supplies to, within, and from an area of opera- and 11 November under the scrutinous eye of tion, utilizing all available aircraft (including trained testers and evaluators. The followinl Air Force organic helicopters when available) coverage of the actual play in Gold Fire I does and supporting elements. In providing the opti­ not indicate in any way the extent to which the mum in logistic support, the Air Force main- Air Force concepts were successful. It is inj tains control of all its units and equipment, a tended as an indication of the tremendous effoj point at issue between the Army and Air Force by both Air Force and Army and a glimpse of for many years. Effective air logistical support the many, many intricate details that must be of combat forces by tactical air forces consists worked out step by step in improving Air Force of the following tasks: support of ground forces and making Air Forcfl a. Establishment and maintenance of an air concepts into proved doctrine. line of Communications to effect the delivery of For a mythical political and military situa- personnel, supplies, and equipment on a sus- tion as the background for Gold Fire I. thl tained basis to Army depots, division supply south central part of Missouri was divided in» points, and combat units, regardless of their the fictitious countries of Argentia, north and size or location. west of U.S. Highway 66, and Oroland, soulj EXERCISE GOLD FIRE 1 29 tand east of Highway 66. extending southward u sst r ic o m . Marine Corps Brigadier General to U.S. Highway 60 and encompassing Fort Lowell English, Deputy for Plans, u sst iuc o m , Leonard Wood. Argentias military force was was commander of Argentia s Joint Task Force Joint Task Force Sioux. Oroland had Joint Task Sioux. jt f Sioux used standard organizational Force Ozark for allied U.S. military support. equipment and normal methods of waging The ground maneuvers were conducted within ground warfare. :he country of Oroland. The Trigonist political A neutral force, under the command of uartv in Oroland had been gaining strength for Major General Lyle E. Seemands, usa, com­ a nnniber of years, and recently Oroland had mand ing general of Fort Leonard Wood, pro- tccnsed Argentia of aiding militant Trigonists vided administrative Services to the combatant n attempts to overthrow the Oroland govern- players in the ground maneuver area. This ar- nent. Trigonist party members then rioted and rangement relieved the task force eommanders vere said to be aided by Argentian provoca- and staffs of many administrative details, leav- eurs. In addition to the rioting. other internai ing them free to concentrate on exereise prob­ •vents caused further upheaval in the Oroland lems and actions. Government, causing it to apply to the United In testing the deployinent and redeploy- itates for military aid. The U.S. Government ment phase of movement to and from the exer­ ipproved the request and indicated that aid eise area, the Military Air Transport Service vas forthcoming. ( ma t s) provided all strategic airlift of person- Argentia. faced with inereasing agrieul- nel and logistic support of Task Force Ozark. nral problems, blamed its plight on economic This strategic airlift eonsisted of moving all anctions by Oroland. Tliis brought the people personnel and equipment into intermediate >f Argentia to the support of the Trigonist party staging bases near the maneuver area. Oroland, a Oroland. After the rioting in Oroland, Argen- for exereise and testing purposes, was consid- ian citizens attacked both the U.S. and Oro- ered a country separated from the United States md embassies, causing extensive damage. by water, necessitating movement of all man- 'hey also presented the Argentian government power and materiais into the country by ma t s ecommendations for a declaration of war, tell- airlift. All Hights were loaded as if for long- ig the U.S. to keep hands off. By a prearranged range airlift into exereise areas, simulating over- nd secret plan, at 1530 on 27 October U.S. seas deployment of combat-ready forces capa- oops secured Orolands Houston Airport at ble of immediate engagement with the enemy. louston, Missouri, southeast of Fort Leonard As ma t s aircraft landed at intermediate staging l'ood. At 1600 the commander of Joint Task bases, troops, equipment, and supplies were orce Ozark arrived by helicopter at the air- offloaded and immediately loaded onto jt f ort. There he consulted with Orolands Prime Ozark (or Tactical Air Command) C-130s for linister E. Romines and the American Ambas- the final leg of the airlift into hastily prepared idor. They discussed the terins of the 1948 assault strips in the combat zone. There they fívil Affairs Agreement between the United moved initially into a marshaling area and sub- Itates of America and Oroland. This agreement sequently into an assembly area. as designed to govern the relationship be- Free play in the exereise was encouraged veen U.S. troops and the civil authorities and to the utmost and was allowed to the maximum le people in Oroland, but it had been inopera- extent consistent with test objeetives. When ve since 1955. All parties present at the airport it was necessary to apply control, it was applied gned a Memorandum of Understanding which first to the aggressor Sioux forces. In this wav the raffirmed and allowed either party to imple- test force, Ozark, had the freedom of response ient the terms of the 1948 Civil Affairs Agree- to the tactical situation created. Controllers and ent. umpires had to simulate combat conditions and The commander of the test force, Oroland’s actualities by marking artillery fires, fighter Í•int Task Force Ozark, was Air Force Major strikes, and ground actions and assess the re- eneral Jamie Gough, who is Director of Plans, sulting easualties and damage to equipment. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Casualties and equipment assessed as damaged ings are not possible or practical, other delivery or destroyed were withdrawn from player con- systems as discussed earlier will be used. trol and held by neutral forces for a realistic Assault airlift officers are located in the field at recycle time as determined by the controllers. battalion and division levei to assist and advise If the free play of total integrated combat in a ground commanders in planning and coordi- fast-moving situation did not induce the de- nating requirements and determining the best sired test, then measures had to be taken to mode of delivery for any given mission or items cause a demonstration of the proeedure and of equipment. Aeromedical evaeuation of cas­ technique being tested. ualties is also an important part of aloc. The strategic deployment phase of jt f In the support area, the Air Force em- Ozark forces in Gold Fire I began on 25 Octo- ployed a system of linking all Air Force assault ber 1964 as some 4000 military personnel and strip headquarters, forward fighter operating 7000 tons of cargo were airlifted into Walnut bases, rear bases, and various exercise head­ Ridge Municipal Airport, Arkansas. Landing quarters together by a Tactical Air Support and taking off in a steady stream every ten Force ( tasf). The tasf carried out the logistic minutes, ma t s aircraft delivered Communica­ and housekeeping functions necessary for the tions vans, trucks, tents, food, and even heli- success of assault-airlift, fighter, and reconnais­ copters into the intermediate staging base. This sance operations. part of the deployment was completed in a 63- The Tactical Air Support Force for jt f hour period as the personnel and equipment Ozark was locatcd at Houston, Missouri, in the were flown in from eight different Army and midst of rural communities on the edge of the Air Force installations in C-130 Hercules, C-124 Ozark Mountains. The tasf, an important link Globemasters, and C-133 Cargomasters, all in the aloc, was in contact by telephone with assigned to ma t s. The airlift was carried out its combat support groups located in Illinois, under “bare strip” operation, terminating at a Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas. simulated overseas deployment area for U.S. This new organization of some 323 personnel Strike Command personnel and equipment. On had been further developed during the Indian the initial deployment into the overseas area, River series of tests. The tasf was in telephone tac C-130’s loaded with personnel and cargo contact with all combat support groups, a9 were used under control of ma t s. They were assault landing strips, forward fighter operat­ flown from stateside bases directly into the ing bases, rear bases, and other headquarters. assault landing strips near the battle area, after Courier Service between the headquarters and which they began operations from intermedi­ the support centers was maintained by use of ate staging bases under the control of the jt f U-3 and C-47 aircraft. Ozark commander. The heart of tasf was the Logistic Readi- The proposed Air Force concepts under ness Center ( lrc), which provided the AS consideration during Exercise Gold Fire I were Force forces commander with a control poinl command and control, reconnaissance, close air for all aircraft, equipment. personnel, and fundí support, and assault airlift. All these proposed available to his command. The lrc support; concepts and systems were used by the forces command and control of all Air Force units and assigned to Joint Task Force Ozark, the tested serves as a focal point of coordination for acfc force. tions necessary to accomplish planning anc Centralized command and control with re- logistieal support for the operational comrniM sulting fast responsiveness is the key factor for ments. It is made up of a Communications net operations of the air line of Communications work and a materiel section, which is itsélf sub h‘ ( aloc), which means delivery of supplies, divided into additional sections for supply an( troops, and equipment by assault airlift aircraft Services, maintenance, petroleum, oil and lubri (C-130’s) from the immediate staging bases cants, transportation, and munitions. The lrcí j into battle zones as far forward as assaidt land­ in operation around the clock, manned by shift ing strips can be constructed. If assault land- of 4 officers and 12 airmen equipped with fiel< j! EXERCISE GOLD FIRE I 31

:elephones and status boards. During a head- in support of airbome operations is rigged by quarters relocation. the center stays behind un- organic units of the road airborne division.) :il the Air Force cominander sets up a new com- Second, the Combat Control Tearns ( cct) are mand post, tinis providing contínuous control jump-qualified and precede any paradrop or >ver logistical operations. The tasf includes assault landing of troops and supplies, to mark idministration, comptroller, judge advocate, sites for airdrops and provide direction for jersonnel, chaplain, and security and law en- assault airlift aircraft. This team reports directly orcement to carry out logistical and housekeep- to and is controlled by the mc c but is admin- pg functions necessary for the support of air istered by the Aerial Port Squadron. operations. Thousands of tons of blank ammu- Air activity of both Oroland and Argentia lition, equipment. food, and petroleum were Air Forces increased on 1 November as aerial !jkirlifted into the assault landing zones. border reconnaissance missions continued, Perfomiing a major role and somewhat of while fighter aircraft flew air-alert missions counterpart to tasf was the Airlift Task Force throughout the area. altf). It was responsible for carrying out all The political situation continued very irlift in support of Joint Task Force Ozark. The tense, and troop buildup continued at a rapid I altf ey agencv of was the Movement Control pace; however, there were no open infractions fcenter ( mcc), through which the commander of the Oroland-Argentia border agreements re- lontrolled the movement of troops, supplies, ported by either side. The only hostile acts re- nd equipment throughout the battle area. by ported were continued harassments by guerrilla Issault airlift operations of transports and heli- elements in Oroland, mostly during the hours ' pters. Through the centralized direction and of darkness. Announcement was made by the Mining of the mc c , the Air Force forces main- Prime Minister of Oroland that he had “every Ined an air-line-of-communications How of confidence in the loyalty of the people and in pstical requirements. Two important agen- the ability of his government with the aid of s of the Airlift Task Force were Combat Air- incoming U.S. forces to maintain order.” The t Support Units ( calsu) and Aerial Port Prime Minister also announced at this time the uadrons. details of a speechmaking tour to demonstrate his confidence and to show his interest in the welfare of the populace. The first air action of the exercise took The calsu is a functional troop carrier or- plac-e on 3 November as a number of jt f Sioux nization, established to provide support to reconnaissance aircraft were observed over elements at an air facility. Normally it in- Oroland, and one of them, an RB-66, was de- udes an operations function such as move- stroyed by an Ozark F-100 fighter. lent control and Communications, a support As the tension continued to mount betvveen J nction which relates to the air facility itself, Oroland and Argentia, jt f Sioux was reported S to be taking hurried action to strengthen the ií.id a liaison function with appropriate air- iome and other air or support units. countrv’s air forces by adding a number of F-84 The Aerial Port Squadron functions to Thunderstreak and F-100 Super Sabre tactical Éorten the ground tumaround time for the fighter aircraft and RF-101 Voodoo and RB-66 ikeraft through rapid processing and handling Destroyer reconnaissance aircraft along with 1 cargo, equipment, and troops to be airlifted. support personnel and equipment. /ie development of new procedures to meet The political situation became even more «e requirements of new modes of delivery tense on 3 November as guerrillas made re- laces further demands on the Aerial Port peated attacks on a motorcade of the Oroland l(uadron’s functions. Units of this squadron Prime Minister as he and his official party de- Ép manned and equipped to ensure accom- parted on an automobile tour of guerrilla- fjishment of their functional responsibilities, infested areas. At several points on the tour, Éiich lie in two areas: First, the Combat Air from Marshfield to Houston, the Oroland leader ifelivery Section loads and unloads cargo. The #rvice shipping the cargo is responsible for ijcking and crating. ( Equipment for paradrop 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW was heckled by guerrilla sympathizers during cility. In addition supply paracluite drops of his speeches, and the motorcade was fired upon heavy equipment were made at this location. several times. Scores of Ozark Army and Air Ozark C-130’s delivering supplies into this area Force helicopters, along with Ozark jet fighter were unloaded by special Air Force trailers and reconnaissance aircraft, flew escort over- equipped for rough-terrain offloading by use of head continuously along the entire route. the 463L Materials Handling System. This Sys­ Strategic deployment of jt f Ozark ground tem forms part of the forward aerial resupply forces from Fort Riley, Kansas, into intermedi- operations for front-line troops and can handle ate staging bases in Kentucky and Arkansas was considerable quantities of cargo with maximum also completed on 3 November. During the efficiency and in minimum time at unimproved deployment ma t s flew 1300 missions over an operating locations. Designed to optimize the eight-day period, airlifting approximately 8300 C-130 assault airlift aircraft in loading and un- soldiers of the lst Infantry Division, supporting loading cargo, the system includes the rough- troops, and approximately 17,000 tons of cargo. terrain loader, which is a tracked vehicle re- From the intermediate staging bases jt f Ozark sembling a half-completed tank; four-wheelec C-130 assault airlift aircraft took the U.S. mili- dollies to carry 10,000-pound loads; a 25,000, tary aid forces into the objective area immedi- pound-capacity loader; a 40-foot-long flatbet ately after they were offloaded from ma t s trailer; and a 10,000-pound-capacity forklift, aircraft. In this phase of the exercise the C-130’s The supplies were then delivered to their fina moved some 5300 inen and about 7000 tons destination by Ozark CII-3C helicopters witl of equipment into the Fort Leonard Wood cargo slung underneath and in Army vehicles vicinity. These methods of aerial delivery of cargo an< Army engineers completed another assault personnel to forward combat areas formed wha landing zone which served as the primary was known as the Ozark Air Line of Communi Ozark assault landing and cargo extraction fa- cations.

An advance squad of Joint Task Force Sit crosses the Osagc Fork Rivcr after the bria had been destroycd bij retreating Ozark forc Cround personnel unload a pallet of supplies from a C-130 at an Ozark assault landing zone. The supplies are unloaded onto specialhj designed 463L Air Force cargo handling equipment of the 463L rough-terrain loading and materiais handling system.. .. Drums of “C o h e r n e a chemical used Materials for dust suppression, are loaded aboard a 463L rough-terrain materiais Handling handler from a forklift, also part of the 463L system. The drums had been paradropped moments before from a C-130. The rough-terrain System loading system was developed by the Air Force for handling cargo on rough dirt assault strips where normal vehicles cannot operate. The system is a combination of trucks, tractors, forklifts, and cargo pallets. 34 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

In performing the mission of tactical air The vertical cameras on the RF-101 can photo- reconnaissance, tac has available a wide range graph from 45,000 feet a strip 217 miles long of facilities, equipment, and aerial reconnais­ and 8 miles wide, and the oblique cameras can sance aircraft capable of performing any re- produce an area mosaic covering 20,000 square quirements from the prehostilities phase, when miles. The F-100 aircraft were capable of de- information is gathered to form intelligence for livering aerial surveillance data to ground force potential combat operations, to the hostilities commanders. This method involves the use of phase, which is concerned with continuous a canister equipped with a small parachute and Identification and location of known and sus- mounted beneath the wing of the aircraft. It is pected military objectives. The general cate- released by the pilot over a marked area in the gories of reconnaissance are visual, photo- field and paradropped to the field commander. graphic, electronic, and weather. Another reconnaissance technique executed To perform the reconnaissance mission in during the exercise was called “See Fast.” Two Gold Fire I both jt f ’s had RF-101 and RB-66 such missions were flown. Two highly modified aircraft, which may have as many as four cam- RB-66 jet aircraft used combinations of side- eras working at one time—some forward-look- looking radar ( sla r ), infrared ( ir ), photo- ing, some to the side, and others straight down. transmission equipment, and a television sur-

Map 1. Invasion. The situation as of 1600 hours 4 November. oint Task Force Ozark forces crouch in oncealed positions forming a perimeter efense against JTF Sioux night attacks. . . A Joint Task Force Sioux %-ton •uck fords the Osage Fork River after \itial contact with Joint Task Force >zark forces during the early morning ours of Wednesday, 4 November. 36 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW veillance camera. This system is designed to than 24 miles into the heart of the country bv relay both visual and printed photo intelligence 1900 hours. The invasion was spearheaded by to ground commanders instantaneously. A units of motorized infantrv, Crossing the border “read-out” van on the ground receives the infor- near Lebanon and moving across the country mation directly from the aircraft and permits virtually unehallenged during the first few commanders to observe, in their command post, hours of the two-pronged attack. Shortly after just what the reconnaissance crewmen see from the ground attack began. Sioux tactical fighter the aircraft. aircraft in multiple attacks hit jt f Ozark air bases at several locations. Strildng at dawn, the Sioux aircraft destroved six Ozark aircraft on J oint task Force Sioux of Argentia the ground while losing one in air-to-air com- invaded the country of Oroland on 4 Novem- bat. Other Sioux fighters made repeated strikes ber, meeting little resistance and slashing more against the Ozark ground troops in support oí

Three loads of cargo, dropped by assault airlift aircraft in support of JTF Ozark forces, descend to the ground in the vicinity of Fort Leoiuird Wood, Missouri. EXERCISE GOLD FIRE I 37

tf Sioux advances. As the battle progressed, brought the front-line units to the outskirts of )zark fighters responded rapidly, Corning to the Houston, 46 miles from the Argentian border. upport of Ozark ground torces. Üzark aircraft As the action drew closer to the capital, jt f osses were assessed at six, all from air combat. Ozark forces’ resistance stiffened as they went Behind the fonvard battle area, Ozark forces into defensive positions along the Big Piney ontinued to receive supplies in the aloc. In an River. Coutributing to the defensive strength ffort to keep the fonvard air terminais opera- were the additional troops and supplies con- ional. Ozark forces began to relocate. afstrike tinuing to be flown into the exercise assault M 30’s flew supplies and cargo from the “Nor- landing zones by afstrike C-130 assault airlift íandy” assault landing zone to other locations. aircraft and helicopters. Ground forces of jt f Sioux repeatedly met An added feature of the close air support «th success on 5 November as thev drove by the Sioux Air Force was the latest in smoke- eeper into Oroland. The swiít advances screening devices, termed a cluster bomb unit

roops of JTF Ozark race toward waiting C.-130 aircraft at an isault landing strip in Southern issouri. C-130's moved troops to criticai arcas to help Iwlstcr zark positions. . . . C-130 as- lult airlift aircraft curnj out terations on a foncard dirt as- ult landing zone, bringing in tpplies and e

i 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

( cbu ). It is a series of small smoke-prodneing in the quantity and quality desired and rendei “bomblets” airdropped from an aircraft, creat- immediate airlift snpport even though not fore- ing a smoke screen to reduce the ability of seen or planned. The mc c answered requests opposing forces to observe a specific action. for delivery of emergencv supplies of blank The air activity intensified, many missions ammunition and for evacuation of casualties being flown by both jt f s and aircraft of both and prisoners of war to the rear. In these sides engaging in air-to-air conílict in an effort emergencv situations, a specified Army/Aii to control the skies. Ozark aircraft losses to 5 Force channel of Communications led to the November were placed at 15, while Sionx had mc c . The Army field commander radioed his lost nine. request to the Army assault airlift coordinatint In other phases of the air action, reconnais- officer in the mc c . If it had been determineC sance aircraft of both forces were called on that the Air Force could best answer this need, continnously to provide vital intelligence data. the Army told the mc c what was needed in the RF-101’s and RB-66's crisscrossed the area of way of equipment and transportation and combat operations photographing vehicle where in the battlefield area the delivery was movements, troop concentrations, and installa- to be made. mc c planners and controllers thed tions. determined what aircraft would be used anc The jt f Ozark cominander started flying the types of delivery systems needed- The as reinforcements into the battle area by Air Force sault airlift crews used anv of the four teclv CH-3C and UH-1F helicopters. Helicopters niques of aerial delivery. were also used to ferry supplies and ammuni- The mc c followed the missions throughout tion in snpport of the Ozark defenders as the from the initial request to the detailed planning, final link in the aloc. to the scrambling of the crews at their bases, The entire airlift effort of jt f Ozark was to the final accomplishment of the mission. planned, coordinated, and closely followed by On 6 November in a fast air mobile coun- the Movement Control Center. This large-scale terattack using CII-3C helicopters, Ozark Armjj operation involved afstrike C-130 assault air­ forces aided in halting the invading Sioux foree$- lift aircraft flying continnously in and out of after they had made a quick thrust across the the objective area and helicopters inoving back Big Piney River. Four of the jet assault choppers and forth within the battle zone. landed near the river and unloaded 88 troops The mc c was the key agency of the Airlift to reinforce the Ozark position. This mobilí Task Force for command and control of the reinforcement helped to stop the enemy adj Air Force operation which deployed troops, vance toward Houston, the capital of Oroland supplies, and equipment throughout the Mis- The big helicopters took off from the Hous j souri battleground. When an Army field unit ton Airport moments before two Sioux F-84Ff needed aerial resupply or transportation from of the 480th Tactical Fighter Wing operatinj the Air Force, it went to the mc c . When a turbo- from McConnell afb, Kansas, carne over thi prop transport or helicopter flew these missions, field in an attack on the forward command postlj it operated on orders of or by specific direction As the jet fighters approached, an F-105 Thun 1 from the mc c . This was the heart of the entire derchief of the 333d Tactical Fighter Squadroir airlift effort in this important phase of the exer- operating out of Little Rock afb, Arkansas, wa cise. Through the centralized direction and flying in close pursuit and destroyed one of th- planning of the mc c , the Air Force sustained F-84’s. The other broke from the air action an»1 Army field elements and its own units with an knocked out the forward air eontroller opera' aloc flow of logistical requirements. tions. Shortly after this encounter. C-130 aii A certain number of assault transport and craft were rapidly unloading supplies af a helicopter missions were given each day to assault landing zone, using the various lov both the Air Force forces and Army forces by altitude delivery systems, when four Sioux I f the jt f Ozark. It was the job of the mcc to 105’s roared over the assault strips, destroyin ensure that the ground unit received snpport one of the Hercules assault airlift aircraft du# Richland ar gent ia J tf sioux Fort LeOhard Wood

Marshf ield

Housbon

Spring Hdvtville

Cdbool

|ap 2. Turning point. The situation as of 1600 hours 8 November.

5 an extraction rim and a UH-1F helicopter flown fighter support missions late the night the ground. The F-105’s retumed seconds before, using the “Night Owl” technique. In this er. knocking out the strips control tower, tactic fiares make the area to be attacked as dar compiex, and medicai staging facilitv. bright as day for the fighter strike. Ozark F-100 Super Sabres penetrated The ground war also saw the use of sev- ep into enemy territory to seek out and eral armed helicopters for the first time on strov Sioux Hawk missile sites. One Super both sides. One such attack against the Ozark bre destroyed six missile launchers and sev- forces found two HB-1B helicopters pouring d missiles, as the battery shot down one of rockets and machine-gun fire into the defend- ? attacking fighters. Some of the Ozark F- ing troop positions. The attack netted the Sioux 0’s were able to stay in the air for as long as warriors several pieces of Ozark equipment ir hours with the aid of aerial refueling by destroyed or damaged. •ategic Air Command KC-135 Stratotankers. Although the adverse weather conditions le aerial tankers orbited near F-100 tactical limited the use of C-130’s during the day, ex- hters, which destroyed 21 Sioux aircraft on cept for some vital resupply missions, the aloc ? ground. The F-100's were of the 308th Tac- was continued as afstrike CH-3C helicopters al Fighter Squadron. operating from Blythe- ferried supplies and equipment to Ozark forces le afb, Arkansas. These same aircraft had from intermediate supply bases. The In-Flight 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Station Keeping System vvas used aboard C-130 and other air liaison officers, who advise and Hercules aircraft. This radar aircraft position- assist ground commanders in the use of elose ing system provided a capability of maintaining air support and provide elose control of the air elose spacing during formation flving under strike. Sorties are allocated through the Direct adverse weather conditions. Tlie scope of the Air Support Center, whieh is a highly mobilei radar indicates the location of all other aircraft air transportable facility to provide fast reac- in the formation and their distance from each tion to surface force requirements for immediJ other, thus enabling more mass over drop areas ate elose air support and tactical air reeonnais] because of the safetv of very elose aircraft in- sanee. This vital part of elose air support in tervals. (This equipment was on board the afstrike lias a eounterpart in arstrike, and tha aircraft used in this exercise and vvas tested and combined personnel plan and eommit ciosa checked. Hovvever, no actual weather missions air support missions required by the grounq relying only on this system were Hovvn.) commander. The action in Gold Fire I took a diíferent The ground action in Gold Fire I was turn on 9 November as the superior air power limited to local skirmishes, resulting in the res- of the Ozark side began to take a heavy toll of toration of Ozark battle positions around Hous-j Sioux troop units and equipment. High on the ton. All Sioux units were forced to pull back Ozark prioritv target list for their aircraft were to the west side of the Big Pinev River. Ozark Sioux Hawk missile batteries. In several attacks forces assumed strong blocking positions all F-100 aircraft struck with napalm and eluster along the battle line, with action being limited bomb units, inflicting casualties and damage on to holding current positions while trying to the Hawk batteries. Destruction was so heavy inflict casualties on the enemy. The grounq that the missile units were declared completelv troops suffered heavily on both sides as they inefFective. The use of the cbu aecounted for a were hit time and again by jet fighters. F-100’s heavy proportion of the casualties. and F-105's on the Ozark and Sioux sides rej In similar action on the Ozark side of the spectively poured simidated napalm, cbu, and lines, one of the Hawk missile units was heavily 20-millimeter cannon fire into the ground force damaged by two Sioux F-I05 aircraft of the positions. 561st Tactical Fighter Squadron. The air action reflected the pounding In elose air support ( cas), all tactical air­ whieh the Sioux forces had received in the: craft, as well as all other military resources preceding two days. Flving a greatly reducedl within the combat area, are under the manage- number of missions and continuing to lose ment and responsibility of the joint forces com- planes on these, the Sioux Air Force found it> mander and respond to his direction. The broad self hard pressed to meet the ever increasinfl; plan of action by the joint forces commander, attacks of the Ozark units. Ozark fighters flev» j based upon the enemy threat, establishes mis- elose air support, interdiction of the battlefield sion priorities vvhich determine where and how and counter-air missions to bring the war hom< the weight of effort of the Air Force forces will to the Sioux forces. Repeated air attacks againsl be applied. The Air Force forces commander the Sioux Hawk missile units by the Ozan? then must perform specifíc tasks whieh will aid pilots netted them two of the ground-to-ai: in completion of the joint forces commander’s defense systems. plan. As the fighters inflicted blovv after blov H The actual assignment of tactical fighter both in the air and on the ground, C-130 air sorties is made through coordination between craft of the 516th Troop Carrier Wing continua 1 the air component commander and the ground to Hy supplies to the Ozark ground units fron component commander. Tactical pilots are in the staging base at YValnut Ridge, Arkansas the field attached to the Army from battalion The assault airlift aircraft used two assaull levei on up as tactical air control parties. The landing zones to deliver the valuable supplie.' tacps are composed of forward air controllers Ozark CH-3C helicopters also provided assist1 EXERCISE GOLD EIRE 1 41 mee to the logistic supply line as they brought tack nine CII-3C helicopters teamed with 13 rital cargo into the forward area. U II-lB s in the afternoon to helilift more than In a predawn attack on 10 November, 400 troops and 23 vehicles into the objective Dzark ground forces slashed across the Big area. The initial successes were supported by 5iney River to begin an all-out counteroffensive F-105, F-100, and F-4C jets, which provided o drive the Sioux invading forces from Oro- column cover and suppressive fire for the at­ and. At several locations along the river, tacking helicopters. Ozark airmen also struck Dzark units penetrated Sicux lines. As dawn beyond the border to hit Sioux ground and air broke, other Ozark troops took to the air in UH- units deep in their homeland. Many Sioux IB helicopters for objectives behind the Sioux planes, caught on the ground, were heavily ines in a vertical envelopment. The helicopter- darnaged. jome troops soon seized their assigned objec- Close air support missions by the Ozark ives and linked up with the attacking Ozark tactical fighters kept the Sioux forces pinned orces that had breached the river in the early down, allowing the attacking Ozark forces free norning actions. movement in the battle area. The Ozark attack­ Another helicopter-borne action took place ing forces hit with such speed and force that n the vicinity of Fuson, Missouri. In this at­ they were able to drive a wedge 28 miles deep

3. Invaders driven out. The situation as of 1600 hours 10 November.

Richland APGENTIA J tf sioux Foet LCOMacd' Wood

CA/nchi>u.rg

M arsh field

Housbon

Hartville

cabool 4 Helicopter Operations

A U.S. Air Force UH-1F helicopter sets down su plies in support of Joint Task Force Ozark. Heli- copter delivery to front-line troops is the final link in the aerial resupply system (ALOC) being einí ployed. . . . In a night operation. a U.S. Air Force CH-3C helicopter hovers tcith a cargo load pru to airlifting it to a forward location in support oj JTF Ozark. The downdraft from the whirling rot< blades had raised a cloud of dust and chaff arou the aircraft. This action was carricd out duri an ALOC mission in the Southern Missouri arei ito Sioux positions. In support of this counter- ffensive C-130 aircraft poured vital supplies íto assault landing zones. During this period íe planes were programed to bring in over OOC ons of supplies to maintain the all- nportant aloc. In the first air action involving the new iach 2 F-4C jet fighter, a kill was recorded by ne operating out of Scott afb. Illinois; how- ver, Sioux F-105s downed four F-4C s in air ction. Sioux forces were hit hard not only on le ground but also in the air as the fighters nd Hawk missile batteries of the Ozark air and round forces continued to take their toll. A number of reconnaissanee missions were own by Ozark RF-101’s and RB-66’s. All Sioux jconnaissance planes were inactive until late i the dav because of earlier enemy action. The C-130 Airbome Command and Con- 01 Center flew a mission for the Ozark forces, he aircraft contains a capsule accommodating A platoon of paratroopers armed with a 106-milli- 2 people and all necessary equipment for con- meter recoilless rifle mounted on a jeep moves into ucting combat operations and allows the com- position. Airhorne troops of the lOlst Airbome Division responded to a call for reinforcement of íander to observe the action at first hand from ]TF Ozark forces and arrived in time to help íe air. The Communications package is de- repulse a determined enenuj attack. A battalion gned to receive radar, television, and elec- ' was flown to an assault landing zone at night and onic reconnaissanee intelligence information. deployed for the following days engagement. Exercise Gold Fire I carne to an end at TOO hours on 11 November as jt f Ozark forced rF Sioux to withdraw into its homeland. A There was virtually no Sioux air activity on jordinated air and ground attack by Ozark the final day, since most of its fighters and all íus brought to a dose the war fought during its reconnaissanee aircraft had been destroyed. íe previous 14 days throughout the area of As the maneuver ended, civil aftairs action >uth central Missouri. carne to a clímax when the Prime Minister of The final action took place four miles Oroland, E. Romines, returned triumphantly >utheast of Lebanon, Missouri, in the moming, to the capital city of Houston. hen Ozark's 2d Battalion. 2Sth Infantry, made Ozarks offensive action on the ground, jntact with Sioux front-line units, the 2d Bat- backed by almost complete air supremacy dur­ lion, 16th Infantry. Both battalions are part ing the final offensive phase of the exercise, the lst Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. brought the maneuver to a conclusion some- he Sioux forces withdrew across the U.S. what earlier than originally anticipated. Data ighway 66 “border” in a maneuver to preserve collectors assigned to gather extensive informa­ íe integrity of the forces. tion throughout the exercise gamered the de- afstrike fighter aircraft were in the air sired data in all key areas under consideration. jnstantly in close air support of the Ozark round elements, and Ozark reconnaissanee xcraft flew a number of missions. C-130 as- T he o fficers and men who makc up the Joint mlt airlift aircraft carried out several aerial Staff of U.S. Strike Command at Mac-Dill Air elivery sorties. in a final aloc resupply opera- Force Base, Florida, observed Exercise Gold on. Fire I with great interest. They are approaching 44 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW the business of building joint task forces with best methods will be selected. The people who the combined best efforts of all personnel and make up Strike Command and Tactical Air Services. They look npon exercises such as Gold Warfare Center know that improvements and Fire realistically and think of them not as tests advancements are being made in methods and of Service roles and missions nor as competition techniques of waging ground warfare and that, between Army and Air Force aviation but as regardless of which Service wins points, in- an excellent chance to discover how air power creases will be made in the deterrent structures can best support ground forces. Various pro- of our fighting forces. W ith this spirit of team- posed methods and techniques will be tried work, there are greater chances of survival and tested with objective analysis and evalua- for all. tion of all data possible to obtain, and then the Air University Review AMERICAN SPACE POLICY Civilian/M ilitary D ichotom y

D r . R obert H. Pucket t

HE civilian/military dichotomy in the both the Congress and the executive branch American national space program has preferred, and even took for granted, the con- T created a serious policy confusion which cept of civilian control. There was a general ias kindled recent political charges that the political consensus that space should be re- United States might face a “military space served for peaceful purposes. For example, ;ap.” This confusion has also encouraged a one Congressional resolution maintained that íertain degree of general political opposition it was . . the devout wish of all peoples :o the entire svstem of priorities in the Nation s everywhere, in everv nation, in every environ- space policy. The purpose of this article is to ment, that the exploration of ou ter space shall Tace the development of our present space be by peaceful means and shall be dedicated íolicy by analvzing the political implications to peaceful purposes.”1 )f the dominant stress on “peaceful” space ac- In addition, President Dwight D. Eisen- ivities, the political implications of military hower stated on 2 April 1958: pace policy, and the attempt by the Kennedy I recommend that aeronautical and space \dministration to forge a “national” space Science activities sponsored by the United >olicy. States be conducted under the direction of a civilian agency, except for those projects pri- marily associated with military requirements. tress on “peacefuF space activities j I have reached this conclusion because space In the months immediately after the exploration holds promise of adding impor- àunching of the Soviet Sputnik on 4 October tantly to our knowledge of the earth, the solar system, and the universe, and because it is of 957, political discussion concerning the or- great importance to have the fullest coopera- [anization of the American space program tion of the scientific community at home and woceeded on the assumption that this pro­ abroad in moving forward in the fields of space sam would be developed under civilian con- Science and technology. Moreover, a civilian rol. There was no significant political debate setting for the administration of space function onceming civilian versus military control; will emphasize the concern of our Nation that 46 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEXV

outer space be devoted to peaceful and scien- ergy; thus they believed that the foreign pol­ tific purposes.- icy aspects, rather than the defense aspects, The National Aeronautics and Space Act would be dominant in future space policy. itself affirms this attitude in Section 102 (a): Administration officials also maintained that civilian control would be conducive to the The Congress hereby declares that it is the fullest realization of the scientific and eco- policy of the United States that activities in nomic potentialities of space as well as to the space should be devoted to peaceful purposes highest degree of international cooperation in for the benefit of all mankind.3 peaceful space activities. The act did, hovvever, make provision for mili- Another assumption was that there are tary space activities: many potential applications of space which are simply not military in nature and that . . . activities peculiar to or primarily associated these long-term applications should not have to with the development of weapons systems, mili- compete for funds with military programs. A tary operations, or the defense of the United final assumption was that the American space States (including the research and development program could develop its own system of pri- necessary to make effective provision for the orities only if it were a completely separate defense of the United States) shall be the re- sponsibility of, and shall be directed by, the entitv. Department of Defense. . . .4 Administration spokesmen advanced sev­ eral reasons for downgrading the military role Since the potential of space activities was in space. The desire of President Eisenhower almost entirely speculative in 1958, the fact to conduct the Presidency as a “man of peace” that both the National Aeronautics and Space rather than as a “man of war” certainly influ- Administration ( nasa) and the Department of enced his conviction as to the proper setting Defense carried on space programs created no for the space program. Throughout his Admin­ serious political dilemmas. Hovvever, as the istration he often expressed his desire that the uses of space became clearer, conflicts arose United States should do evervthing possible to between the civilian and military branches of prevent an arms race in space. Also he stressed the space program concerning the assignment the need to demonstrate to the world that of space projects and the allocation of funds. America was principally interested in the In the Kennedy Administration significant peaceful and scientific uses of space. He be­ political opposition emerged, primarily from lieved that excessive military activity in space segments of the Air Force, the Republican would be inimical to that interest. Party, and certain Democratic Congressmen Another important reason advanced for who were interested in military space activi­ downgrading the military role in space was ties. As vvill be noted later, this opposition that if the space program were under military attacked the dominant stress on “peaceful’' as- control it would be necessary to “prove” the pects of space and urged that more attention military requirement for each space project. be given to military space activities. This would presumably stifle long-term scien- Several basic assumptions entered into the tific investigation as well as commercial and political consensus favoring civilian control of cultural space programs. A final contention the American space program. These assump­ was that the military demands for secrecy tions seemed to fit the political and budgetary would hamper potential international coopera­ purposes of the Eisenhovver Administration. tion in space activities; such demands would The principal assumption was that civilian exclude many foreign scientists and might irri- control of our space program would demon- tate those American scientists who tended to strate to the world America’s concem for distrust the military. peace. Eisenhower Administration advisers Before the launching of the Soviet Sput- conceived of the space program as analogous nik, the American satellite program—one of to our attempts to intemationalize atomic en- the activities of the International Geophvsical AMERICAN SPACE POLICY 47

Sfear—was viewed bv the Administration as of space for “peaceful” purposes, but they purelv scientific. Virtuallv no attention was have often emphasized the military aspects of íiven to the propaganda and military implica- space for political purposes. The Soviet gov- íons of satellites. Administration ofíicials were emment has on many occasions pointed out in xmcemed lest the satellite project interfere threatening terms the military potential of its kvith the ballistic missile program.5 The Soviet space activities. The United States has often Sputnik, of course, forced the Administration used the expectation of military applications :o increase efforts to launch an American sat- from civilian space exploration to gain politi­ dlite and give consideration to the propa­ cal support for increased expenditures on Proj­ ganda and military implications of satellites. ect Apollo and other space programs. ?rom the beginning of the American space Such policy confusion has resulted in am- ?ffort the scientific space programs were de- biguities in American proposals for interna- pendent upon military missiles and facilities. tional control of outer space and in difficulties From a technical standpoint, there is verv in the coordination of the military and civilian ittle difference between civilian and military space programs. To a great extent this con­ ;pace programs. Virtuallv all the major space fusion is based on a misinterpretation of the ictivities have at least potential military value. word “peaceful.”7 In the sense of the United However, in terms of budgets and organ- Nations Charter and in international law, the zation, it is possible to distinguish broadly term “peaceful” is used in contradistinction to imong primarilv civilian, exclusively military, "aggressive.” In this sense, defensive military find identical civilian military uses of space. space systems would be “peaceful.” However, The political implications of the stress on the average public attitude often regards the he “peaceful” aspects of space have been sig- concept “peaceful” in the sense of “nonmili- íifícant, since these aspects have fashioned the tary.” Indeed this meaning was accepted in vhole tenor of American national space policy. the agreement establishing the International rhe dominant pohtical conception of outer Atomic Energy Agency. As will be pointed out ;pace has been that it is a new frontier, a later, the Kennedy Administration attempted blank page” totally free from the influence of to ease the confusion created by the terms ntemational “power” politics. Therefore the “military” and “peaceful” by proclaiming a Government has seemed to believe that in “national” space policy. mter space the world has a last chance to each toward the goal of peace. In accordance militarij space policy vith this view, the United States has continu- illy attempted to prevent an arms race in In the early and mid-Fifties the military pace by seeking to bar the use of weapons of Services were interested primarilv in missile nass destruction there and to reach various development, but they carried on research ntemational agreements regulating the use of conceming potential space projects. The ini- pace. tial space capabilities of the United States These U.S. efforts have given rise to a seri- were based upon the technologies produced >us policy confusion which has undercut the by ballistic missile research and development. Dr em is es of our national space policy. The There are several well-recognized military re- Government has assumed that if the “peace- quirements in space, and projects to meet these ul” aspects of space are emphasized and the requirements are in various stages of develop­ nilitarv role in space is downgraded, the ment. These requirements include surveillance íoviet government will not feel impelled to or reconnaissance, Communications, weather, roncentrate on military space systems. Such navigation, geodetic mapping, monitoring of m assumption seems highly questionable. In space phenomena such as radiation and solar ictual practice both the United States and the fiares, manned orbiting laboratory, a military íoviet Union have adhered to a dual code in patrol System for detecting, tracking, and in- pace policy.® Both nations accept the notion specting unidentified space vehicles, and 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW means for disabling hostile satellites. Experts what its military potential really is. It has fur- disagree about the potential value of bom- ther emphasized the criticai importance of bardment satellites. Some observers maintain “aerospace” (atmosphere and space) to Ameri­ that intercontinental ballistic missiles are less can security. In response to these contentions, expensive and more accurate tlian orbital the Department of Defense has formulated the bombs. Others contend that the Soviet Union “building blocks” theory of space research, de- mav be developing such weapons, that these fined as follows: satellites could have significant political and At this stage of development, it is difficult to psvchological values for the Soviet govern- define accurately the specific characteristics ment, and that such weapons could conceiv- that future military operationàl svstems of ablv incinerate large portions of the earths many kinds ought to have. We must, therefore, surface. engage in a broad program covering basic Militarv experts have stressed that there building blocks which will develop technologi- are certain peculiar military needs in space cal capabilities to meet many possible contin- svstems. These needs include all-weather capa- gencies. In this way, we will provide necessary bility, reduced launching costs, controlled re- insurance against military surprise in space by entry, rendezvous with hostile space vehicles, advancing our knowledge on a systematic ability to operate in a combat environinent, basis so as to permit the shortest possible time antijamming capabilities, ability to support lag in undertaking full-scale development pro­ grams as specific needs are identified.10 sustained manned space flight, ability to trans- fer men and material between space vehicles This “building blocks’ theory of space research in orbit, and ability to operate in deep space. could be considered a political compromise In the process of developing a military between two extreme alternatives: ( 1 ) ignor- space policy, the Department of Defense ing certain potential military space svstems in solved the problems of initial interservice ri- the hope that the Soviet Union would not feel valry concerning space projects by establishing it necessary to develop similar svstems and (2 ) Air Force dominance over defense space pro- deliberately igniting a military arms race with grams.s The primary interest of the Depart­ the Soviet Union in space. ment of Defense has been in the overall The political implications of military space military programs of the United States, dod policy involve such factors as (1) Congres- has considered space as a place, not a project, sional concern with the strategic importance and has maintained that a military space pro- of space and the political value of military gram as such does not exist as a separate space capabilities and (2 ) th e lim ite d scope entity.3 It has supported the development of of political debate which has affected military those space capabilities which will cornple- space policy. Many Congressmen have re- ment or supplement other military activities. garded space as essential to national security dods principal concern with military space since space could conceivably become a fu­ projects has been budgetary. It has generally ture arena of war in which the nation that insisted that specific military space programs exercised control of space could control the must be “proved” as military requirements, earth.11 They have maintained that space weap­ should offer the only means or the best means ons as a second-strike capability could pro- of performing specific military missions, and tect America against present and unforeseen should compete on a cost-effectiveness basis types of military threats. These proponents of with other military Systems that could meet increased military space activities have as- the same requirements. sumed that Soviet military space capabilities The Air Force has objected to what it have significant political and psychologiea considers to be the overemphasis on the ne- values and that the Soviet Union mav possiblv cessity of proving a military requirement for hope to gain strategic ascendancy in space. each space project. It has maintained that the In addition, Congressional proponents have United States must explore space to discover contended that there are several important po- AMERICAN SPACE POLICY 49 tential political values of our military space bate over American military space policy. capabilities. The primarv value would be that of inducing the Soviet Union to agree, either “national’’ space policy implicitly or explicitly, to ensure that space is used for peaceful purposes. Further, the The ambiguities inherent in the civilian/ United States could emplov military space Sys- military dichotomy in American space policy tems both to protect American satellites from engaged the attention of both the Eisenhower being destroyed by the Soviet Union by threat- and Kennedy Administrations. Assessing the ening to intercept Soviet satellites and also formative period in the development of Ameri­ perhaps to bargain for “space disarmament" can space policy, President Eisenhower com- in case the Soviet government relied heavily mented on 14 January 1960: an space weapons. ... In actual practice, a single civil-military A political debate of limited scope, which [space] program does not exist and is, in fact, ias direct relevance to military space policy, unattainable; and the statutory concept of such ias arisen over American national space policy. a program has caused confusion. The military This debate involves three factors: (1) charges utilization of space, and the research and de­ >f a “military space gap,” (2) Congressional velopment directed towards that end, are inte­ ;oncern with the efficiencv of liaison between gral parts of the total defense program of the í asa and the Department of Defense, and (3) United States.13 'eneralized opposition to Project Apollo. For This approach conceived of the American he reasons mentioned above, the Air Force, space program as almost totally civilian in he Republican Party,1- and some Democratic nature; any military space projects were re- ^ongressmen have criticized the dominant em- garded as part of the defense program rather )hasis on civilian space projects and have con- than the space 'program. ended that the United States might face a The Kennedy Administration maintained nilitary space gap unless more attention and that the Space Act of 1958, which set forth the Jovernment funds are given to military space basic tenets of our space policy, ereated a wojects. In addition, some Congressmen have “national” space program composed of two riticized the alleged duplication and rivalrv mutually supporting and separately directed >etween nasa and the Department of Defense efforts—one civilian, the other military—not a nd have insisted on more efficient liaison, separate program for nasa and another for the xchange of information, and exchange of per- Department of Defense.’4 Decisions with re- Dnnel. Opponents of Project Apollo have em- spect to the manner of implementing the na­ loyed most of the arguments for increased tional space program have been political—that rilitary space activities to attack the justifica- is, the Administration must continually assess ons set forth by the Administration for the the civilian, military, and overall national inter- »anned lunar landing program. The Adminis- ests in the light of expanding knowledge of ation has replied that Apollo and other ci- space science and technology. Furthermore the ilian programs will provide basic technology Administration stressed that there was no divi- ) meet future military requirements in space. sion between peaceful and nonpeaceful space The bulk of the political debate concern- objectives in American policy, since American »g military space policy is speculative, and military space programs were nonaggressive >r this reason the debate is complex and has and were just as peaceful as civilian programs; .'cked a dramatic focus. In addition, the de- thus, the United States supported “space mis- ate has been involved to a great extent in sions to help keep the peace and space mis- udgetarv politics; it has been muted by the sions to improve our ability to live well in aminant American stress on the “peaceful” peace.”15 In terminology, at least, the Kennedy ipects of space. Of course, any future Soviet Administration attempted to ease the policy ilitarv space spectacular would radically confusion ereated by use of the terms “military” íange the context of the current political de­ and “peaceful” to describe space activities. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

As noted above, however, the dominant trations maintained an inadequate conception stress on the “peaceful” aspects of space in- of the political and military potential of outer vited charges that the United States might space. This experience has illustrated the ne- face a military space gap and encouraged a cessity for coordinating American space policy general political opposition to American pri- with military, economic, foreign, and techno- orities in space policy. To a certain extent, logical policies. both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Adminis- Charlottesville, Virgínia

Notes 1. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics. International Control of Outer Space, 86th and Astronautics, Posture of the National Space Program, Cong., lst Sess., Í959, p. 95. Report, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1963, p. 28. 2. Message from the President of the United States Rela- 10. Dr. Harold Brovvn, Director, Defense Research and tive to Space Science and Exploration, 2 April 1958, in U.S. Engineering, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and House of Representatives, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscai Year 1963, Space Exploration, Astronautics and Space Exploration, Hearings Hearings on H.R. 11737, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 335. on H.R. 11881, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 3-4. l í . This argument was also expressed by John F. Kennedy 3. National Aeroruiutics and Space Act of 1958, as in the 1960 campaign for the Presidency, as quoted in Los amended through the end of the 87th Congress, October 13, Angeles Times, 27 August 1962. 1962, Staff Report, U.S. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and 12. See Rep. Charles S. Gubser (Chairman), Report of Space Sciences, 20 November 1962, p. 1. the House Republican Task Force on Space and Aeronautics, 21 4. lbid. November 1963, (mimeograph), p. 3. 5. Eilene Galloway, “Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and 13. President Eisenhower, quoted by Dr. T. Keith Glen- the Military Role,” in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee nan, Administrator, NASA, in U.S. House of Representatives, on Science and Astronautics, 1963 NASA Authorization, Hear­ Committee on Science and Astronautics, To Amend the National ings on H.R. 10100 (superseded by H.R. 11737), Part 2, 87th Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Hearings on H.R. 9675, Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 1051. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 30. 6. See John Immanuel Klette, Some Implications of Na- 14. Report of the Vice President, in U.S. Aeronautics and tional and International Aspects of Outer Space, Ph.D. disserta- Space Activities, 1962, Report to the Congress from the President tion, Georgetown University, May 1963, pp. 214-15. of the United States, 28 January 1963, p. 7. U.S. House oi 7. See "Report to NASA on the Law of Outer Space,” Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, United October 1960, in the White House, U.S. Aeronautics and Space States Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1961, Message from the Acticities, January 1 to December 31, 1960, Report to Congress President of the United States Transmitting a Report on United from the President of the United States, 18 January 1961, p. States Aeronautics and Space Activities for the Calendar 1 eaj 108. 1961, Pursuant to Section 206 (b) of the National Aeronautic! - 8. See Robert H. Puckett, “The Military Role in Space— and Space Act of 1958, as amended, House Document No. 324 A Summary of Official, Public Justifications,” The RAND Cor­ 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 31 January 1962, p. 6. poration, P-2681, August 1962. 15. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Sciencí 9. Dr. Lawrence L. Kavanau, Special Assistant (Space), and Astronautics, United States Aeronautics and Space Activi Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, ties, 1961, p. 6. VIET NAM: THE DIFFICULT YEARS

Lieu t ex a n t Colonel Donald F. Martin

S 1964 was drawing to a close. the efforts of In addition, President Eisenhower stated that the Al. the Republic of Viet Nam (R.V.N.) to pre- U.S. expected Diem to make needed reforms. ;erve its freedom from the Communist insurgency November 1954 saw the resettlement in South í^d not proved completelv effective. Despite three Viet Nam of the largest part of almost one million rears of major economic and military aid from refugees who fled the Communists in North Viet nany Free World nations, the United States being Nam. On 7 July of the following year Communist he largest contributor, Communist Viet Cong (vc) China announeed an aid agreement with the Viet trength had apparently inereased apace. Defeat Minh. This was quicklv followed by a Soviet agree­ if the insurgency was not foreeast for the near ment to aid North Viet Nam, called the Democratie erm. Moreover, at this juncture the ultimate out- Republic of Viet Nam (D.R.V.). ome of the eonflict seemed—at best—equivocai. On 23 October 1955 a national referendum in South Viet Nam deposed Bao Dai, who since March eciew of events, 1954-1961 1949 had been the emperor and head of State. Three davs later Diem proclaimed South Viet Nam Over the past decade the United States has a republic, and the first general elections for the *een actívely engaged in efforts to stabilize the first National Assembly took place on 4 March olitieal situation in Southeast Asia vis-à-vis Com- 1956. at which time Diem became president of the lunist expansion by force. During the first six Republic of Viet Nam. lonths of 1954 the United States Air Force eon- By 26 October 1956 a constitution for the ributed 1800 airlift sorties, comprising 13.000 Republic of Viet Nam had been adopted, and a ying hours, in what proved to be a futile attempt presidential decree was issued aimed at breaking > reverse the course of events engulfing the French up the large land holdings created during the i Indochina. On 7 May 1954 Dien Bien Phu fell French colonial period. By 9 May 1958 it was esti- ) the Communist Viet Minh, follovved on 20 July mated that roughly 35 per cent of the tenant farm- y the Ceneva agreement vvhich partitioned Viet ers had become landowners. iam along the 17th parallel. In the general elections of 30 August 1959 . On 7 July 1954 Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Diem was retained as president of the R.V.N. Two remier of South Viet Nam. The French tumed months later, in October, Viet Cong guerrilla ac- ver control of the police, justice, security, and tivitv was noted to be on the rise. The Communist ivil aviation agencies and the public Utilities to battle to subjugate the Republic of Viet Nam was hem on 16 September 1954. on in earnest. The U.S. decision to pledge inereased aid to By the spring of 1960 the insurgency situation le new govemment of South Viet Nam was made in the R.V.N. had obviously deteriorated. The y Presidential announcement on 24 October 1954. plans, materiel, and numbers of R.V.N. forces were •52 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

inadequate to the task. Thus on 5 May the U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara. Diem proclaimed announeed that miütary assistance to the R.V.N. a State of national emergency. The government of vvould be increased at that government’s request. the R.V.N. leveled formal charges of aggression And on 30 May the first of U.S. Special Forces against the D.R.V. and demanded that the Inter­ teams arrived in the R.V.N. to commence training national Central Commission (ícc) carry out an the Army of Viet Nam (arvn). investigation of the leading role of the D.R.V. As R.V.N. resistance to the aggression stiff- authorities in direct aggression against the R.V.N. ened, the Coramunist vc announeed, on 10 March The flow of U.S. miütary aid appreciably quiek- 1961. a new guerrilla offensive with the purpose of ened with the arrival of usaf instruetors for the preventing the April 1961 general elections. More vnaf. Bv the end of October the U.S. was further importantly, on that same day the Conununists eommitted to the preservation of the R.V.N. as a announeed formation of the National Front for democratic nation. the Liberation of R.V.N. (nfl). Prior to 1 January 1962 the U.S. on four sepa-; Despite increased vc efforts to prevent it, on rate occasions had made major pledges of in­ 9 April 1961 Diem was re-elected president of the creased assistance to the new and beleaguered R.V.N. On 10 May Ambassador Nolting arrived Republic of Viet Nam. The first commitment oc- and presented his credentials to President Diem. curred on 24 October 1954, less than 90 days after Two days later then Vice President Johnson the Geneva accords. Similar pledges followed in arrived to corifer with the newly re-elected presi­ May 1960 and in May and November of 196L. dent. The war with the insurgents was not going Thus for the nine years preceding 1962 the well for Diem, and he had expressed a desire for U.S. had given increasing miütary aid to the South- more U.S. aid through the Miütary Assistance east Asia war against Communist insurgency—firsl Advisory Group, Vietnam (maac-v ). Diem did not to the French, then to the R.V.N. As the assistance ask for the aid of U.S. combat troops but only increased, so too did U.S. prestige and principie; for the necessary assistance to enable him to cope inevitably become more deeply involved. successfully with the Communist-backed insur- The deteriorating situation in 1961 presentee gency. The next day a joint communiqué was is- the U.S. Government with two alternatives: (1) sued announcing a further increase in U.S. miütary to reduce assistance or withhold it completely and economic assistance. resiüting in a vc victory and the loss to Commu : Also in May 1961 the first fidl squadron of nism of another free nation, or (2) to step up 25 A-1H aircraft was deüvered to the R.V.N., and assistance of all kinds and plunge deeper into thi the strength ceiling for maag-v was increased. frav with the minimum goal of denving the Com Augmentation of the existing in-country air/ground munists their objectives. VVhat might have beeii Communications was begun on 1 October when considered a third alternative, neutraüsm such a Pacific .Air Forces (pa c a f ) deployed a Control and had been supported in Laos, was unacceptable Reporting Post (crp) to Tan Son Nhut Air Base the R.V.N. and U.S. aÜke. The alternative of fui i near Saigon. Its purpose was to provide radar eov- ther commitment became the declared U.S. polic\ erage for the Southern area of the R.V.N. and to and on 16 November 1961 President Kennedy ar train the Vietnamese Air Force (vnaf) in eontrol- nounced a massive increase in assistance. ling aircraft, both miütary and civil. Within four months 63 vnaf personnel had been trained, the the difficult years, 1962-1964 crp had been expanded into a Combat Reporting Center (crc), and the crc became part of a Tacti- In this guerrilla conflict one of the more rt cal Air Control System (tacs) established in mid- üable indicators of victory, defeat, or stalemat^ January 1962. for the Republic of Viet Nam was the numeriOfrj October 1961 was a particularly signifícant strength of the enemy—the Viet Cong. Eneml | month for United States efforts to aid the R.V.N. casualty statisties were impressive, particularl General Maxwell D. Taylor arrived in Saigon to when viewed collectively. 5 et they could also «l survey the situation for President Kennedy and disastrously misleading unless very carefully fí! j T J \ wr r' ^

■■ 1 !v, j r f r < 'M li ^ T ' ’'' 'iffi.iV*Aí! \ W \ > “Operation Lifelinc” distrib- uted U.S. food, clothing, and I >/ &k. medicines to the Vietnamese. > !MÍ i

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ated with the number of vc replaeements froin division averaged ten per cent battle casualties iltration and recruitment. per month. With a strength of 20-30,000, it ap- During the summer of 1961 the “hard-core” peared that the vc could sustam indefinitely their strength had been estimated at 12.000. In casuaitv rate of 2000 per month. icember, after the Presidential decision to in- Influencing the effective prosecution of the ;ase significantly U.S. assistance to the R.V.N., conflict was R.V. N./U.S. adherence to the Geneva ; estimate of vc strength jumped to 17,000, and accords. Although the U.S. was not a signatory to January 1962 it had soared to 20-25,000. By the accords, the Under Secretary of State spoke f elose of 1964, hard-core vc strength was esti- for the U.S. at the final session on 21 Julv 1954 ted to be in the neighborhood of 30.000. The when he stated that the U.S. would respect the ;Son given for the inereases was the acquisition agreement. Therefore the U.S. would view any more accurate information on the vc rather than violation of the agreement with grave concem as ‘actual increase in numerícal strength. threatening peace and security. The vc had snffered an estimated 50,000 Moreover Cambodia, Laos, and the Demo- ualties (killed or wounded in action) in 1962 cratic Republic of Viet Nain all served as sanctu- 1‘ 1963, an average of 68 casualties per day. aries for the vc, thus further complicating the task ompilations for 1964 were not available at this of suceessfully terminating the insurgency. The ting.) By vvav of comparison, during the Korean land boundary between the R.V.N. and these r one American infantry division (of about countries stretched for almost 1000 miles, much 000 troops) suffered battle casualties at the of it through dense jungle. - of 6i per day. In World War II an infantry From late 1961 until the end of 1964 there was little apparent deviation from the classic ten- ets of guerrilla warfare by the Viet Cong. The Phase I groundwork of cellular subversion and indoctrination had been firmly established. The hard-core insurgents and the considerably larger paramilitary forces had launched Phase II in al- most every area of R.V.N. The vc dominated large sections of South Viet Nam. More importantlv, there vvere smaller strongholds under virtually complete vc control. The French in the futile Indochina war were frustrated by manv of the same Viet Minh strong­ holds which the vc now occupy. These strongholds were not pacified by the French, nor have thev been pacified by R.V.N. troops during more than three years of substantial U.S. aid and training. Various events within the R.V.N. and the at- titudes of its government and its people influenced the prosecution of the war against the vc insur­ gents. Among them were the bombing of the Presii dential Palace by two vnaf aircraft in February 1962, the Buddhist unrest in the summer of 1963 the coup of 1 November 1963 which depose< Diem, the bloodless coup of 30 January 1964 in which General Nguyen Khanh replaced General Duong Van (Big) Minh as the chief of State, and the abortive coup of September 1964 in which Generais Duc and Phat sought to replace Khanh. Of these factors the ones that perhaps most influenced the course of war against the vc were the Buddhist situation which paved the way foi the overthrow of the Diem regime in 1963, witfl its debilitating effect upon the governmental struq ture within the provinces, and the factionalism ol the civil populace directed at the military govern» ment of Khanh in the late summer and early fali ol 1964, which further weakened the national govj ernmental mechanism. Dissension among the Buddhists reached sig nificant proportions when about 3000 of them, o all ages and classes, gathered in Hue on 8 Ma’1 1963. Thev gathered to demonstrate against al leged religious restrictions. The banning of pro' cessions and of the displaying of pictures o Buddha on his birthday were compared with th lack of government interference with Catholh observances. The crowd was peaceful at first bv eventually became unruly. Troops and police use fire hoses to disperse the crowds. In the resultin melee five civilians were killed and seven injurecjj VIET NAM: THE DIFFICULT YEARS 55

The issue simmered during the rest of May plex, and vexing. A composite of diverse influences but became intenselv active in June and again in existed—political, psychological, sociological, and August. resulting in self-immolation of Buddhists military. The interaction of these variables had in various parts of the nation and finaliy the impo- worked to determine the relative effectiveness or sition of martial law. Worldwide attention was ineffectiveness of R.V.N. efforts. Not all the policy focused on the Diem regime and generated pres- determinations influencing the conflict in the sure for finding a solution to the Buddhist problem, R.V.N. had enhanced the attainment of purely creating a more representative govemment in the military objectives. In fact some political/policy R.YT.N., broadening the Diem regime, and limit- influences had acted as constraints on the military ing Diems exercise of arbitrarv power. prosecution of the war, e.g., R.V.N. and U.S. ad- The war against the Communist insurgents herence to the provisions of the Geneva aecords. had been temporarilv eclipsed by the political con- This is not meant to deprecate the validity of Bict within the R.V.N. The discord and accom- such constraints. On the contrary, their existence janying allegations became the central political points up the trade-ofts implicit in the diversity of ssue in R.V.N. and the focus of attention in the efforts expended to achieve a single national objec­ Jnited Nations and throughout the capitais of the tive. Efforts to achieve one apparently simple and vorld. forthright national objective are, only too often in Thus the R.V.N. faced conflict on a “second the real world, encumbered by many diverse and ront”—an internai sociopolitical conflict as vvell as sometimes conflicting considerations. he externai militarv conflict with the vc. Unfor- unately, the addition of internai political pres- ures to the military objective—progress tovvard significant factors /hich was, at best, not going well—increased the bearing on the problem cope and complexitv of the “R.V.N. problem.” Apparently there are no pat answers to a well- The internai strife was thought by many to planned and supported insurgency mounted in a ave been eliminated with the successful coup favorable sociopolitical, economic, and geographi- gainst the Diem govemment. However, when a cal environment. Most of the glibly advanced Solu­ »cond coup occurred—and then a third attempted tions either unwittingly address but one facet of oup—a crucial question arose. Would such a radi­ the total problem or erroneously purport to elimi- al procedure for effecting govemmental changes nate the many parts of the problem by addressing iminate the debilitating disease afflicting R.V.N.’s only one. rosecution of the war—or would it merely ex- Yet there are some rather startling factors íange one syndrome for another, leaving the dis- bearing on the Viet Nam problem, and isolating ise unchecked? them might provide some insight for suceessfully To make matters worse, externai pressures dealing with the insurgency. ere also abuilding. By the end of 1963 Cambodia ad used a series of border incidents to break off • Only one South Vietnamese in 500 is a plomatic relations with the R.V.N., to terminate hard-core vc. The latest estimate of 30,000 vc in -S. militarv' assistance, and to issue a call for neu- a national population of approximately 15,000,000 alization of the R.V.N. constitutes an overall .2% vc-to-population ratio. In 1964 the Khanh govemment made conces- • Only one South Vietnamese in 100 is ans to students, Buddhists. military leaders, and either a hard-core vc or an active supporter. It b«r. Each concession gave rise to questions con- has been estimated that more than 100,000 Viet­ iming the strength and stability of the interim namese are what might be called vc paramilitary wemment, the existence of a common national or active supporters of the vc. They are porters, irpose to heal factionalism and provide the vital farmers, runners, informers, and others who ac- hesive force thus far lacking, and the crushing tively assist the vc while not themselves bearing >ssibility of a political vaeuum developing. arms. Thus the entire vc strength in South Viet Countering the Communist insurgency in the Nam represents less than one per cent of the na­ V.N. had proved to be extremely difficult, com- tional population. 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

• Targets for the vc are large, fixed, and bom and reared in South Viet Nam but had elected vulnerable. The task of the national government, to move to the Communist north when the country while obvious, is often overlooked. It must protect was partitioned in 1954. More recently authorita- the population, the means of production (industrial tive sources report infiltration of personnel born and agricultural), and lines of eommunication and in North Viet Nam. commerce—all of which represent essentially fixed • This is a war on two fronts. There is con- targets. The job of providing protection is over- flict between the vc and the R.V.N. as a national whelming. For example, cities, hamlets, roads, entitv, and there is conflict between the national railroads, canais, povver plants, storage areas, and government and various competing factions with- the peasant at work in the field are all part of the in the nation. The existence of both externai and security task. internai conflicts saps the strength of the govem- • By contrast, the vc at the present phase ment in dealing effectivelv with either. of the insurgency are mobile, fleeting targets. Some • The ratio of money spent by the Com- of the guerrillas are part-time vc and blend in with munists to that spent by the R.V.N. is unknown, the populaee during the day. Most, however, oper- but it might well be in excess of SI to $10 or per- ate from the jungle fastness or vc redoubts such haps even of $1 to $100. The United States has as Zone “D,” a virtually inaccessible area north- reportedlv spent in the neighborhood of $3 billion svest of Saigon. When the vc have completed an in the R.V.N. over a period of three vears for vari­ attack or elect to break oíf an engagement, thev ous tvpes of aid and expansion of the R.V.N. armed frequentlv melt away in small groups to facilitate forces. By contrast, the cost in resources to the withdrawal and then regroup at predesignated Communists has been associated with the mainte- points. nance and replenishment of some fraction of the • The existente of sanctuaries along an 20-30,000 hard-core vc. Much, but not all, of the ill-defined border stretching over hundreds of miles logistics necessary to support the vc has been taken of dense jungle is an asset of inestimable value to from within the R.V.N.—captured from the armed the insurgents. Not only does it provide a safe forces and trains, taxes in the form of foodstuffs haven for rest, refitting, and remanning battle-tom from farmers, taxes in money from plantation own- vc units, it virtually precludes isolation of the ers, extortions from businessmen in the form of battlefield, so necessary to forcing attrition of “protection,” and the like. Many weapons and enemy supplies and troops, collapse of his infra- much ammunition are captured in-country, and structure, reduction of his combat capabüity, and even some medicine finds its way into the hands his eventual liquidation. of the vc. In addition to small arms, many of the larger weapons (such as recoilless rifles and ainm J • Externai support vvas (and may still be) nition), medicine, and raw materiais for the pro-, the absolute essential to successfully mounting the duction of explosives are also brought into tht insurgency in the R.V.N. It may never be known country by the Communists. Moreover, higher spe to vvhat exact extent externai Communist support eialized training and the general training of cadrei, from China, North Viet Nam, and other Commu­ are accomplished almost entirely out-of-country^ nist bloc nations, fimneled through Laos and Cam- These costs must be borne by the Communists. Al < bodia and by sea, has contributed to the sustenance in all, it would seem that such a one-sided resourc** of the insurgency. Yet some specifics are known. expenditure ratio, which distinctly favors the Com Weapons and materiel captured from the vc by munists, would motivate them to continue, perhap arvn forces have, in many documented instantes, expand, their backing of the insurgency. been manufactured in Communist China, the East European bloc, Rússia, or the D.R.V. The vc cadres come largely from North Viet Nam and are portents for future insurgencies fleshed out, by persuasion or coercion, with South Viet Nam recruits. Earlier in the insurgency the Obviously it is far easier to deal successfull j Vietnamese infiltrators from North Viet Nam were with an insurgency when it is in its infancv. Uov ' made up of those Viet Minh troops who had been ever, various political/policy realities may w o rk * VIET NAM: THE DIFFICULT YEARS 57

make a quick ending virtually impossible of attain- essential if there is to be any chance of reversing ment. In that case the remedies for the disease the trend and defeating the insurgents. If the become—inevitably it would seem—more extreme situation deteriorates, responsibility and authority and less attractive to modern Free World societies would seem to gravitate to a certain few, with ulti- as the insurgency progresses. For example, when mate decision authority resting on one man despite an insurgency is launched such as bv the dropping overtones of dictatorial power. In the U.S. this of Indonesian paratroop guerrillas into Malaysia— power resides in the President, who is commander an action freely admitted in the United Nations in chief of the armed forces. by the Indonesian representative—the task of hunt- Yet strong central authority is not enough. In ing them out and eliminating the threat can be the early stages the vc were dependent upon the done without interfering with the routine life of a sanctuary and externai support provided by those democracv or suspension of basic freedoms. motivating, disruptive powers (D.R.V. and Com­ On the other hand a strong central govern- munist China) externai to the area being fought tnent is essential to contend successfully vvith a over (R.V.N.). There are at least three means by nll-blown insurgency. When an insurgency be- which the externai nation exporting the insurgency ?omes as well established as that in the R.V.N., may be influenced to terminate the insurgency be- he total resources of the nation must be brought fore it reaches the stage where it is self-sustaining o bear just as completelv as they are in a Western within the geographical limits of the contested lemocracy in time of war when the nation is faced nation. However, there can be great disparity be- vi th a threat to its continued existente as a political tween the alternatives in regard to eífectiveness, mtity. In the United States during World War II, cost, and susceptibility to uncontrolled escalation. )rice, wage, and rent Controls vvere put into effect, (1) Dcmjing the enemy his objective is a term ationing of food and other products was imple- used by some strategists to connote actions, nented, conscription was imposed—in short, cer- restricted to the objective country (in this case ain individual “freedoms,” if you will, were volun- R.V.N.), which will, by costly attrition of forces arily surrendered by the populace through their committed by the aggressor, cause that sustainiug lected officials, or govemment. in the all-out effort externai power to relinquish his objective. Sinee this o protect the Nation and aid our allies. concept limits military action to attacking those Imposition of martial law necessarily goes forces committed by the aggressor within the tar- irther. The civil judicial system may be sus- get nation, the risk of escalation is minimal. ended, to be replaced with military tribunais, as Thus far, this concept has not yet suceeeded ccurred in the R.V.N. Requisitioning of private in the R.V.N. Over the past three years vc strength roperty is permitted, while the right of assemblv, has, if not actually increased, at least not decreased emonstration, petition, and strike may be sus- even in the face of greatly expanded U.S. aid. ended. In democratic societies the imposition of While opinion is divided as to the part which iartial law is usuallv reserved for exceedingly externai Communist support and availability of rave crises. Not so in many Communist countries, tremendous sanctuaries have played in the stronger rhere the ostensible existente of human rights and vc force posture, there is no informed disagree- icercise of the franchise are merely a faça de cover- ment with the view that the net effect of sanctu­ ig conditions approaching those of martial law. aries and externai support has been deleterious in * In the early stages of an insurgency in a new some significant degree to the R.V.N. effort. emocracy, it may be possible to make democratic Attrition of committed aggressor forces within ivances while putting down the insurgency. In the borders of the R.V.N. under the “denial of :her cases this may not be possible. Many new objective" concept has not proved effective in cut- smocracies, and some older ones, are relatively ting off the source of externai support (personnel eak, politically, and lack stability because of di- and materiel) or in eliminating sanctuaries. More- irse competing factions. over, while countering the threat solely within the From the record thus far in the R.V.N., it area in dispute bears a low risk of unintended esca­ ould appear that in the later stages of a growing lation, it is exceedingly expensive in terms of mili­ ! surgency strong central direction of the war is tary man power as well as material resources. 58 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

(2) Covert reprimi in the form of eontrolled political, social, and religious organizations. insurgency operations vvithin the aggressor tuition The harsh realities of the R.V.N. conflict may presents an opportunitv to capitalize on tlie advan- yet produce an eífective means of throttling future tages inherent in guerrilla warfare. The tables are insurgency in its infancy. It would seem more tumed: the existente of sanctuary, externai sup- likely, however, that guerrilla warfare will be rec- port, and reversed cost ratio favoring the new ognized as a concept for conflict whieh is not to be insnrgent vvorks as a powerful incentive to get the exploited solely, and safely, by the Communists aggressor nation to cease his insurgent activity. to ac-hieve their ends. It might well be that the Thns for a fraction of the cost of mounting an more effeetive deterrent to externally supported extensive counterinsnrgency operation, insurgency insurgency will be the capability and determina* might be made a two-way Street, with the attacker tion to mount a larger, more successful reprisal being as vulnerable as the attacked. Moreover, the insurgency within the aggressor eountry. extent of the reprisal insurgency is subject to con- As in any military conflict, a nation does no! trol, and termination as appropriate, at any levei of rationally or intentionaliv start a war whieh it be- intensity short of the point at whieh it beeomes, in lieves it will lose. The low-cost, low-risk, high-gair effect, self-sustaining. aspects of guerrilla warfare for the initiator must Insurgency as an instrument of reprisal runs a be reversed. higher risk of escalating the conflict to overt war­ Failure to deal successfully with Communisi fare, since it enlarges the area being fought over exportation of insurgency in the R.V.N. may in to encompass the aggressor nation. Much of the fluence the incidence and decisiveness of insur stigma attached to insurgency by the Free World gency elsewhere in Asia, the Western Hemisphere might be removed by eschewing wanton atrocities África, and the Middle East—with disastrous re as praeticed by the vc. Obviously elimination of sults for the Free World. such atrocities vvould limit the use of terror as a Hq Pacific Air Force guerrilla tactic, but their absenee should work to reduce alienation of the population. (3) Overt reprisal (similar to that in the Gulf of Tonkin episode) represents a somewhat more pre- cipitate means of more rapidly influencing, hope- fullv curbing, the actions of a nation exporting insurgency. The extent to whieh this option for reprisal increases the possibilitv, even probabilitv, of unwanted escalation is influenced by the relative military power of the opponents whieh can be brought to bear, as well as the respective evalua- tions of importance of the national objectives of the participants and the impact of the overt re­ prisal on the aggressor. In sum, the alternative of ceasing the insurgency must be made more attrac- tive to the aggressor nation than the alternatives of continuing or escalating the conflict.

At this point in time and under the conditions obtaining in the R.V.N. at this writing, one per cent of the population operating with access to safe havens and backed by an externai power is threat- ening the existence of a new democracy. This small segment of the populace lias gained strength be- yond its numbers by exploiting factionalism and THE COMMANDER AND HIS INFORMATION OFFICER

Major YVil l ia m Bender , J r ., USAFR

HE QUALITY of leadership a com- they do for everything else that occurs within mander fumishes his information officer his command. But whereas his troops will be is so crucial and bears such direct rela- adequatelv fed and housed, the aircraft will ion to the results obtained that it seems every be maintained, and the runways cleared of reatise on managerial functions vvould give it snow, all without his personal intervention, yet nore than passing attention. This is an area if he neglects to give adequate guidance to his n which the consequences of good, poor, or information program, the result can be imme- nediocre leadership can occur with astonish- diate malfunction or utter paralvsis. ng speed and massive visibility. While the commander bears the responsi- But the sênior officer who seeks guidance bility, the lions share of day-to-day relations or directing and supporting the work of his with the press and public falis directly upon *0 will usually seek in vain. At best he fínds the io. By any orderlv form of logic, this officer í.cademic discussions on democracy, freedom should be just as responsive to commands, di- f the press, the publics right to know, and the rectives, and regulations as any other member 'irst Amendment. None of this is calculated of the staff. 0 do him much harm. Yet it fails to explain Somehow it doesn t always work out that i0\v he can direct the information program wav. ato building a strong bridge of understanding There are probably a number of reasons etween the Service and the American public. for this, but one of them, at least, is psychologi- At the opposite pole, his search may also cal: it seems impossible to “order” a man to ftncover some of the vast folklore of misinfor- be Creative. And a good 10 must exercise con- lation that is always available to fog the siderable Creative talent to be a good io. icture: carefully embroidered case histories, Another reason is that the io labors under útdated fears and views of the news-gathering some peculiar handicaps unknown to most atemity, and colorful novels by disgruntled other career fields. Few novices, for example, 1 íumalists who served in one or another of the would think of becoming bomb disposal ex- icent wars—usually in pio . perts overnight. But by the odds of human The commanders involvement in public nature, fully half the personnel on a normal iformation work is inescapable. The regula- military installation consider themselves natu- ons hold him fully accountable for this, as ral-bom information specialists. As a result, the 60 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW io is frequently pressured to follow certain Nevertheless, even after the io knows the methods in the conduct of his duties. By con- unit mission and any additional short-term trast, the supplv officer, weather officer, and goals the commander wishes to support, he bomb disposal expert are simply exhorted to will still walk a tightrope with certain stories produce results. and events. There may be only a hairline difFer- There is a whale of a difference. ence between a news release that supports the mission and one that merely flatters some- unit mission bodvs ego. Consider, for example, the typical release Undoubtedly the single most important when Good Old Joe is being transferred out step a commander can take to launch his in- of the command. With ponderous platitudes, it formation program in the desired direction merely recites his biography all the way back is to explain the organizations mission, as he to grade school. There is an odd chance that sees it, to the io. This needs to be done in per- this fascinates Joe and his wife. It is a gesture, son, and in detail. It should be done soon after somewhat like placing a bronze plaque on the assuming command. It needs retelling imme- spot Joe’s desk once occupied. diatelv when a new io joins the organization, With imagination and effort and a greater and recurrently thereafter. It needs to be done concern for the unit mission, that story could whenever the mission ehanges. focus on what Joe did to support that mission. The concept of unit mission is crucial. It Thus it would be one more step in advancing can and should govern every official move the public understanding of the command. io vvill make. It determines the particular pub- lic, or publics, he will attempt to reach. It Con­ trols the content, methods of presentation, and public interest forms of information he vvill offer. It provides him vvith an essential method of screening the Tangential to the matter of unit missiorj inevitable distractions that tend to diffuse io is the potential degree of public interest in thal vvork. And it gives the io his major effective mission. The commander, no matter how de i defense against those officers sênior to himself voted he may be to his unit and no matter how who tempt him to divert his efforts on their significant he considers its mission, must havi behalf. the knack of seeing it in news perspective. Onh 1 While explaining the unit mission, the then can he understand one of the major con commander should also state with absolute cerns of his io. eandor how he plans to judge the io’s per­ The io knows that the mission of the com, formance: Will it be by column-inehes in the mand imposes certain finite limits on th» Air Force Times? By the dollar volume of base degree of public interest he can expect to en fund drives for the Red Cross and Community counter or create. Measuring "degrees o Chest? By the expressed opinions of other public interest is an elusive and rather subjec staff officers? By the amount of personal atten- tive task at best, but it may be illustrated with tion the commander himself receives in the a case history. local, regional, or professional press? Or by In 1950 I was recalled to active duty fror some desired attitude change in the local popu- a Michigan Volunteer Air Reserve Trainin I lation? Any of these yardsticks—and hundreds Unit ( va rtu). I was first assigned to Hq Ai, i more—may be completely justified in the light Materiel Command, then to Hq Far East Ai of the units mission, but they need stating. Forces, then to the United Nations Advanc This has to be a cards-on-the-table session, Camp at Munsan-ni, Korea. without cautious modesty or equivocation. For Let us postulate an arbitrary scale of puH the commander henceforth will get exactly lic interest ranging from 0 to 10 and ascribe t what he asks for; sometimes he will get onhj each of these four units a span of estimatei i what he asks for. public concern. The va rtu was occupied wit THE COM MAN DER AND HIS IO 61

; somevvhat perfunctorv training program for had news eservists. Public interest: 0 to 1. The big payoff for an information program t Hq amc was busilv purchasing the tools often comes in moments of crisis. The complex :or the war that had broken out in Korea. tasks of running the Air Force can produce nterest: 1—4. Hq feaf was fighting that war, anything from an embarrassing goof to a ca- :o almost anything in the way of news from lamitv. In such crises prompt and clear com- :hat source had a high rate of interest; call it munication with the public through the mass j—10. And in July of 1951 when the U.N. Ad- media becomes essential. fance Camp became the focal spot of cease- Much has been said about releasing bad ire negotiations, even the daily weather report news along with the good, about the slim vas a matter of worldwide concern. Interest: chance of concealing bad news under any 1- 10. cireumstances, and about accepting the conse- The point here is that the vartu com- quences of one bad event without compound- nander and his io can expend any amount of ing the problem by alienating the press. nergv and eífort in publicizing their unit and Yet there is an additional factor that is iever have more than trifling success, com- seldom mentioned except in whispers between iared to the U.N. Advance Camp. The differ- experienced io’s. It involves one of the oddities nce is the degree of public interest. of modem news reporting. Editors develop Another aspect of public interest which certain ingrained habits, even before they get xerts a potent influence on a commands in- to be editors. High on the list is an automatic )rmation program is the dramatic distinction reflex that discounts at least 50 per cent of all etween what the public wants to know and elaims made by public relations people. This •hat some individuais within the command habit becomes so fixed that when an io volun- link the public ought to be told. Much too teers a report on some matter of “bad news” ften a person who insists that the public the editor will discount half of that, too. He mght to know” certain information is more reasons, logically enough, that the news can t incemed with his own individual sphere of really be so bad or the Air Force wouldn’t be :tivitv than with the desires and needs of the calling him up trving to rush it into print. ublic. Once alert to this symptom, the com- Good editors and good reporters all have lander and his io can steer a course for their mental radar sets keenly attuned to detect any formation program more closelv in keeping sign of reluctance to divulge information. Ex- ith their best estimate of true public interest. perience has shown them that the most dra­ evertheless there will be continuai attractions matic stories are the ones that have to be dug ad distractions to tempt them away from that out by tooth and claw. They re not brought in mrse. grátis and dropped on the editorial desk. The io usually is a competent judge of Thus, by helping to ensure that bad news ese matters. Whether he can exercise his will get the same quick and accurate treatment dgment depends, in large measure, upon the as good news, the eommander gives his io a nd of support he receives from his com- tool of incalculable worth in carrying out his jander. This support can be provided simply duties. By making proper use of that tool, the i >d effectively by a clear understanding that io will lessen the impact of all pernicious i e io’s duties are to be geared to public inter- rt and to the support of the command mission. events that may occur and will be able to sal- vage some positive goodwill from almost any As taxpayers, the public has a keen interest imaginable situation. the versatility, modernity, and efficiency of e armed forces. Their interest in Good Old es biography is pretty casual. And the mere avoid “new rules” et that they “ought to be told” about some otic problem generally implies that they have My civilian information activities gravi- f interest whatsoever. tate around some 600 medicai doctors. When 62 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW a news correspondent arrived for an interview Ideallv, every commander should keep one day recently, the doctor involved abruptly himself posted on what the public is reading, demanded a written contract to give himself hearing, and leaming about his organization. complete editorial control over the wav the But in a practical sense, this is rarely possible. story would appear in the paper. This trig- There are simplv too many channels of public gered a rhubarb of damaging proportions, even communication. though offícial policy had also been violated But the commander can guard against a bv the doctors demand. mental ambush: belief that what he is reading The povver structure of the military estab- is also being read by the target public. It is lishment creates even greater dangers of hav- quite possible for the io to do a competent job ing sudden “new rules” introduced to affect of reaching the target public without his com- the command s press relationships. The situa- manders knowing it, unless the commander is tion is especially delicate when the military part of the target public. Converselv, the com­ news source outranks the io. What the source mander may see a good deal about his organ­ intends as a mere suggestion easilv mav be ization in his normal sources of information, misconstrued to be an order. It may be acted onlv to discover that this outpouring from the upon accordingly, even though the io considers io has missed the target public altogether. it risky—if not totally improper—under the circumstances. symptoms of trouble Such an event can corrode the prestige, credibilitv, and effectiveness of the entire pub- Editors seldom agree on what makes a lic information program. Yet preventive meas- good story, and the decision is no easier for ures are possible, and comparativelv simple, commanders. Nevertheless, when something when the commander recognizes the hazard goes awrv in the information office, it shows. and delegates to his io sufficient authority to There are at least three fairlv reliable and cope with it. reasonably objective symptoms that the infor­ mation program is getting bogged down. When any one of thern appears over a period of time judging the lO's performance the personal aid and intervention of the com­ Assume for the moment that elsewhere in mander may be needed to get the io back on th< this issue of the Revietc there appears a lauda- proper course. The three are a marked paucit) torv article about vour command, placed here of news, stories that are much too long, anc by vour io. Knowing this issue is being read by something that might be called the “chain-of influential officers throughout the service, vou command syndrome. might experience a proper glow of pride. This last is a curious obsession of the io t< Assume, further, that some six months ago recite the tables of organization at the slightes vou charged vour io to tell the unit s story to provocation. His stories read like this: the general public. Now what? A1C Able B. Charlie, of 111 MainstreÉ Well, it’s an accurate and most favorable Hometown, U.S.A., who is a member of th story—this hvpothetical article—and it’s some- Electronics Repair Seetion, of the lst Squadroí thing youVe thought the rest of the Air Force of the 2d Fighter Group, of the 3d Fighte ought to know about. You’11 congratulate vour Interceptor Wing, of the 4th Air Force £ io for his efforts. Fine. Hoosatonic Air Force Base of the Continenb, Once the io learns you actually measure Air Command, participated in a recent trainin exercise at Sauk Air Force Base of the Strategi his performance by the stories he gets in Air Air Command, according to Colonel D. E. Fo: Force publications, your entire information commander. program will gently “adjust” itself. You will get stories in the trade papers and other media. Having produced this monstrosity, the i The general public may sometimes won- is comforted by the knowledge that neithi der if you are alive. Colonel Fox nor any of his subordinate con

i THE COMMANDER AND HIS IO 63

manders will register a complaint about being of longer stories suggests that the 10 is padding slighted in Airman Charlies publicity. his reports for some reason. Or that he is a vic- The fact that no editor will print such tim of the chain-of-command syndrome. Or cumbersome prose bothers this io not at all. that he doesn’t know how to write. Any of these Editors, he has learned, do not sit on his pro- reasons cries for early correction. motion board. Nor sign effectiveness reports. Except for the commander and his io, NTor do they complain about the laek of proper there is no one who has any reason for reduc- recognition. ing the length of an official news release. The Thus the chain-of-command syndrome is editor who receives it may find it much easier i signal that considerations other than public to throw it in the wastebasket. nterest and proper communication techniques VVhen that happens often, a large slice of eign supreme in the information office. The your public information program dissolves into rure. if there is to be one, can come only írom a useless ritual. he commander. On the other hand, when the commander The commander also should be eternallv fumishes knowledgeable aid and guidance to uspicious of any purported nevvs release, his io, the information program will remain a imed for the general news media, that is positive force for winning the understanding, jnger than a single typewritten page (double- esteem, and support of the American public. jaced, of course). The consistent appearance Ann Arbor, Michigan THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ARMS CONTROL

C aptain Frank H. D owell

UCH HAS appeared in the popular shown that fighting behavior can be altered pres.s in the last few years concern- chemicallv and is thus biochemicallv and genet- M ing what has eome to be called ically controlled. Maus lnmting traits must “arms control.” As I understand the arguments, also have a genetic basis and have been estah- they propose that by adopting a series of lished through natural selection, in which botli progressively less provocative military postures environment and hereditv play a part. Once the nations of the world may eventually reach established, these geneticallv controlled traits a situation in vvhieli there is little or no danger tend to remain established, beeause of the of war. Hardv-Weinberg equilibrium. Whether we progress toward that state— In short, certain qualities of human person- and if so our rate of progress—depends upon ality are of positive evolutionarv significance. man himself. Some of the arguers believe that Once established, they tend to remain estab­ the scientist can best solve the problems of war lished. W hether and how we use these qualities and peace and thus lead us toward the warless is a matter of choice, but survival and reproduc- state. Others think the man of affairs, using tion of the individual in a societv is dependent management teehniques, can best accomplish upon their varied and effective use. These uses the tasks involved in controlling the present may, however, be different from the way of arms race. Is it possible that the question of nature. arms control cannot be answered within the As is apparent, this is a restatement in framework of existing knowledge?—that per- terms of the “new systematics" of the dual na­ haps knowledge must be extended by new ture of man recognized by many theologians facts ascertained or new awareness of old facts, and philosophers. For example, reason and the especiallv coneerning man himself? appetite for danger are both qualities of evolu- Since human events are determined by tionary significance. Both exist as part of the human nature, to understand them it is well to nature of man (as observation tells us), and look at certain aspects of human nature. Man s both will probably continue to exist. This rela- evolution has been a history of the survival of tionship between appetite and reason can be those most highly endowecí with the qualities illustrated by a simple analogv, the relationship of the hunter. Experiments with mice have between reason and the appetite for food. It a THE BIOLOGICAL BAS1S OF ARMS CONTROL 65

lan pays for a meai, \ve regard him as ment. For example, if we consider a hypotheti- ungry. If he pays $25 for a meai, we regard cal simple dual game in which there is complete im as hungry but also probablv as a person of antagonism and in which both opponents are ultivation, taste, discemment, and wealth. If completely rational, what would be the result e pays $250 for a meai, we regard him as a fool. if incorrect weights were assigned to different In the appetite for food as in the other strategies by both players? Both players, acting ppetites, there is a threshold, of course varying rationally, might well favor different falsely om person to person, at which reason takes weighted strategies in the same real situation. ver from other drives. That such thresholds In this case what they would do would not be risted in relationship to reason and the appe- clever but merely irrelevant, since there would tes and drives involved in war was recognized be no real difference between their strategies. y Lee at Fredericksburg vvhen he said that If biological threshold is a factor that is was well that war was so terrible, for other- not weighted sufficiently in the assignment of ise we would love it too well. More recently weights to strategies, then either side or both arbara Tuchman in The Guns of August has sides may think they are acting in a credible íovm the results of activity, before the thresh- fashion when actually they are not. As correct Id has been reached, when war is still all glory, weighting is essential for rational playing, the ícitement, and the chase. Those who have concept of biological threshold should then be atrolled or flown at low levei also understand. tested as a component of the correct weight. D the concept of a biological threshold at Since conventional war probably has a hich reason takes over from appetite appears deterrent value too low to cause any rational » be a general one. A specific instance is the hesitation about its use, all of the following ireshold at which reason takes over from the comments will concern nuclear war. Suppose )mplex of appetites that constitute the enjoy- that in a nuclear situation we let four be the lent of both hunting and war. value assigned to the absolute economic capac- Most thinking about arms control has been ity of two countries for maintaining a deter­ ancemed with morality, estimates of capabil- rent posture. (See Table I.) Also suppose that y, and the mechanics of weaponry. It is pos- we let three be the value, though less than ble that in considering these obviously im- capacity, at which reason, or the calculated un- írtant factors the theorists have not made suffi- willingness to accept a given amount of dam- ent use of the biological threshold of reason age, takes over from the thrill of war and the )r “eredibility”) in assigning weights to dif- advantages to be gained from it. This value at írent strategies, with resultant errors in assess- which reason takes over is the biological thresh-

terrent posture protection game 1 game 2 game 3 a b ’ b a b a b Igh high 4* 4* 3* 3* 4 or 3* 4 or 3 fsh low 4 0 3 0 4 or 3 0 jw high 0 4 0 3 0 4 or 3 !

Loble equilibrium 4 = «opacity Instoble equilibrium 3 = biological threshold 2 —- o t h e r

1°hle I. Equilibrium points between less than capacity and less than threshold 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW old of reason. From these suppositions a num- ber of interesting conclusions can be drawn. In game one, the two levei (less than both the capacity levei and the biological threshold levei) is an equilibrium. However, it is an un- stable equilibrium, since it can be changed unilaterally. Four is the equilibrium of capacity and cannot be changed by either side without causing defeat or an unstable equilibrium. In game two, the two levei is again unstable. The Figure 1. Biological thresholds three levei allovvs equilibrium at the biological of different groups of men threshold, but not at capacity. Either side can raise to capacity if it is willing to pay the price, and the other side must follow. Equilibrium can multiparty situation when all thresholds are then be more than three but not less than three, the same. In a multiparty situation (Figure 2)i as was shown above. Now, since three cannot with different thresholds, even though A and B go to four instantly (investment is required) could equilibrate at a levei less than capacity, and if both sides do not wlsh to invest total both must equilibrate at capacity in order to capacity in a given posture, then both sides can deal with C, with its higher threshold. From equilibrate at the three levei as shown in game this it can be seen that, under certain condi- three. This is less than capacity but high enough tions, applying the concept of biological thresh­ to require the exercise of reason. Therefore, it old cannot eliminate war but can allow us to would seem to be possible to arrive at a stable, act as if war did not exist, and at a levei that credible equilibrium at less than capacity. It is is not exhausting. Under other conditions, an possible to use the biological threshold of rea­ exhausting military posture will accomplish son as the equilibrium point. It would seem, nothing if it does not exceed the biological then, because of the obvious advantage of a threshold of those whom it is intended to deter. credible, nonexhausting posture, to be desirable to use biological threshold as the equilibrium. Therefore, it is an important factor in weighting a strategy. As the biological threshold is important Figure 2. Multiparty equilib- rium with different thresholds and differs for different men and groups of men (Figure 1), the problem is to determine this threshold for applicable groups of men and for all men and to see the relationships between a o equilibrium these thresholds and the capacities of the coun- j ->*. tries involved. For instance (Figure 2), if capac- / \ itv is four, if all men are to be deterred, and if the “all men” threshold is over four, then it is i 4 i r- necessary to operate at capacity and pray. If \ capacity is four and the thresholds of the groups \ of men to be deterred are all three, then equilib­ equilibrium \ equilibrium / equ ibri rium can come at less than capacity. If equi­ \ / \ X" N librium is attempted at a levei lower than the \ ' V 4 fí thresholds involved, reason vvill not allow the / equilibrium to remain constant, for it will not be credible. Thus, equilibrium at the under- c capacity threshold is possible in a two-party or THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ARMS CONTROL 67

Even though the biological thresholds of been attained previously), so that either ex- 1 men and even particular groups of men have haustion may be avoided or new alignments of )t been determined, it should be possible to power arranged, or both. It appears that, pos- st the concept, nonquantitatively, by examin- sibly, the elements for a new “acting as if war g some events of the last two decades. First, did not exist” situation are present, but that relations between the United States and rearrangement is necessary. Determination of jussia, the deterrent posture of the United the “all men” biological threshold or even the ates during the 1940’s vvas not such as to China biological threshold would simplify and low reason to take over. Not enough damage accelerate a necessary accommodation—some- •uld be done for it to be credible. At present thing that was stumbled upon previously. Lack- »th the United States and Rússia have sufB- ing this, the only alternative is an exhaustive, ent force to allow destruction beyond the levei capacity-level deterrent posture. at can be rationally accepted by either, even In summary, we have seen that: ough neither is at capacity. Thus, they have (1) There is a biological basis for human uilibrated at the biological threshold levei actions. en though this has not been recognized. They (2 ) The basis for these actions is genetically e acting as if war did not exist, and at a non- determined, is of evolutionary significance, and haustive levei. Second, in the multiparty once established tends to remain established. uation of Rússia versus China versus the (3) Both reason and the complex of drives lited States, the threshold leveis again are not and appetites called “love of war” are so de­ own. Hovvever, there mav be reason to be- termined, established, and retained. ve that the biological threshold of China is (4) There is a biological threshold, different jnificantly higher than that of either the in different men, at which reason takes over lited States or Rússia. If the United States from appetite. d Rússia are at nonexhaustive equilibrium (5) This threshold is a part of the weight d if the biological threshold of China is assigned to strategies. ^her than that of either Rússia or the United ( 6 ) It is possible to equilibrate at a military ates, then both the United States and Rússia posture determined by this threshold rather ist equilibrate at the higher levei. If the bio- than at one determined by capacity. jical threshold of China is higher than the (7) United States—Soviet relationships tend pacitv of either the United States or Rússia, to confirm the hvpothesis that they have equi- en even equilibrium at capacity will be of no librated at a nonexhaustive biological threshold flue. less than capacity, even though this threshold The altematives are for both the U.S. and has not been known. i U.S.S.R. to strive for a posture of capacity ( 8 ) Uncertainty exists in the multiparty to combine their capabilities, with the rea- United States—China—U.S.S.R. situation be- íable certainty that they will exceed the cause of the lack of determination of the “all linese biological threshold, unknown though men” biological threshold. is. It would seem that even though the bio- (9) The determination of the “all men” or çical thresholds have been unknown, they even “China” biological threshold is necessary ve been the actual basis on which nonexhaus- in order either to establish a new nonexhaustive e equilibrium has been reached. They will equilibrium or, this determination not being o probably be the basis for any new equilib­ possible, to create new arrangements of force ro. The introduction of a new and perhaps rapidly and simply. In this case, knowledge can Ikher biological threshold by China points out substitute for previous accident. lí necessity for determining this new biologi- (10) In the absence of the threshold levei or ft threshold (even though threshold equilib- new arrangements, exhaustive, capacity-level |m without knowledge of the threshold has activity—with hope—is the only alternative. 5th Epidemiological Fliglit (PACAF) Military Affairs Abroad

THE DEBATE BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND HIS MAHSHALS

D r . Kennet h R. W hiting

R. KHRUSHCHEV had seemed to be drain on scarce Soviet resources in trained persoí facing an unusually large number of eco- nel and materiais. In short, Khrushchev was facin nomic headaches of late. For example, the endem- a perennial problem that comes to all leaderi | ically poor State of Soviet agrieultnre was brought be they capitalist or communist—the necessity < out into the open by the disastrous harvests of living within the nations available resource 1963, and Khrushchev had to go shopping abroad Unfortunately for Mr. Khrushchev the nato allie'j for grain. Even the Soviets admitted that their especiallv the U.S.. have far more of the necessaii agriculture needed some drastic and expensive resources than the U.S.S.R.' medication. The rising demand for more and bet- VVell aware of the enormous costs entailed i í ter consumer goods, plus the public’s impatience solving these domestic dilemmas, Khrushchev w; with the deplorable housing situation, had Nikita challenging some of the traditionallv favori* mumbling about “the material and spiritual needs claimants to the budget. In October 1964 he suJ j of the people.” Such basic weaknesses in the gested that “the development of heavy industrv i ( second-largest economic power on earth, in a na- the foundation for the rise of the whole counti tion that clairns to be ready to lay the foundations and the strengthening of its defenses was over.’ for the communist stage of plenty, seem incongru- To both the more orthodox Party leaders and tl ous to say the least. In addition, Soviet forays into Soviet marshals, this must have sounded iike she the field of foreign aid, restrieted though they be, heresy. They must have wondered what ever ha; are still expensive and demand the very types of pened to the Khrushchev who bludgeoned Male j goods needed at home to bolster a sagging eco­ kov out of power in 1954—55 for taking just such | nomic growth rate. Just to make the headache stand. complete, Mr. Khrushchev was more or less com- The political struggle in 1954 between Klirus mitted to matching the U.S. in space, a tremendous chev and Malenkov for the fallen Stalins manti This article was completed before Nikila Scrgcyevich Khrushchev wa* toppled from power, bul his stubborn debate with bis top military leaders seenis to be one more reason for his downfall. The thesis o f this article is that Khrushchev, Itaving risen to power ut least partly with the support of the niilitary leaders. begun to have second thoughts al lhe end of lhe 1950’s about the enormous share of Russia's relatively scarce resources being allotted to them. He apparently feh that the defense of the Soviet Union could be guaranteed by the pvo, nuclear weapons, and a relatively large num ber of missiles. He, therefore, saw an opportunity to get large am ounts o f capital and nianpower by cutting deeply inlo conven- lional arm am ent and m ilitary personnel. His m arshals, on lhe other hand, were arrayed in the nol unusual army stance bidding for enlarged convenlional ground forces and supporl- ing weapons in the fam iliar Soviet eniphasis on balanced forces, the concept of victory through “combined arnis.” It is not hard to believe that they could maintain such charac- teristic views to the extent of withholding support for Khrushchev in a criticai issue.

oincided with a new look in Soviet military doc- agreeable to the military leaders and to a majority rine. After a decade of slavishly chanting the in the Presidium. Voroshilov, Bulganin, Molotov, italinist credo of the five operating factors for the Kaganovich, and Khrushchev all expressed their íchievement of victory, Soviet theorists were fí- disapproval publicly and were undoubtedlv even lally freed. They were allowed to discuss the proba- more vociferous in Presidium meeting. They fol- )le effects of nuclear weapons and especiallv the lowed the traditional line: VVars are inevitable as iwesome effects to be attained through a surprise long as eapitalism exists; the U.S. is preparing to ir attack involving long-range aircraft and nuclear attack the U.S.S.R.; therefore, onlv a continued •ornbs. The Soviet Union now had such weapons, emphasis on heavy industry and an even stronger t least enough to pose a retaliatory threat, so it military force will enable the Soviet Union to sur- i/as at long last safe to discuss them. vive the attack and eventually win the war. Malenkov, to the horror of the military, drew Malenkovs position was that heavy industry te wrong conclusion from all this, and on 12 and military strength were satisfactory. The real fieurch 1954 he publicly stated that another world need was a sharp increase in consumer goods, so feir was unthinkable as such a holocaust would long relegated to a secondary place in the scheme iean “the destruction of world civilization.” 3 of things. Malenkov was apparently readv to settle fíikoyan, in a speech in Erevan, said substantially for a retaliatory capability, and he regarded the íe same thing. Apparently the majority in the Soviet armed forces as capable of deterring the 'residium ganged up on Malenkov, and in a speech U.S. ix weeks later he abandoned the “destruction of Khrushchev, thumping the drum vigorously ivilization” thesis and opted for the “end of the for the traditional emphasis on heavy industry as apitalistic system” theme.4 VVhat was behind the onlv way to further economic development and lalenkov’s position in early March and his retrac- expressing horror at the thought of weakening the on in April is a confused storv, but the main out- Soviet military posture in the face of imperialist ne is fairly elear. piaus for a new world war, was able to gain the Malenkov. who had based his power play on backing of the military leaders and the orthodox íe managerial elite or “business” group in the Party leaders. On 8 February 1955 Malenkov oviet Union (the economic planners, factory man- admitted his lack of qualifications to head the gov- gers, and professionals in the economic world), ernment and resigned to become the Minister of fanted to put more emphasis on the production Electric Power. consumer goods. This meant a curtailment of Ousting Malenkov as premier was only one ivestment in heavy industry and a cut in military step in Khrushchev s rise to power; he still faced aending. Both of these cuts were extremely dis- a formidable opposition in what later carne to be 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW called the “anti-Party group” headed by Molotov, having to rely on massive armies where morale Malenkov, and Kaganovich. His strongest cards would be weak. Beneath all this smoke, however, in this deadly game were his control of the Party the Soviet strategists were faced with the insoluble apparatus as Secretary-General of the Party and problem of how to cope with an American strategic his elose relationship with Marshal Zhukov and the superioritv. The truth seems to be that they did not military based on his approval of their demands for have the wherewithal to do so. heavy spending in weapons and in the industries Between 1950 and 1955 the Soviets had de- elosely associated with military needs. For all in- veloped an extensive system of advanced air bases tents and purposes Khrushchev was the favored in the arctic, had probably worked out refueling one as far as the brass was coneemed. techniques, and by 1955 had demonstrated the The real crisis carne in the early summer of twin-jet Badger, the four-jet Bison, and the four- 1957 when the “anti-Party group” gained a major- engine turboprop Bear. The Badger lacked the ity in the Presidium and tried to oust Khrushchev. range for deep penetration of the U.S., the Bear He appealed to the Central Committee, and Zhu­ had the range but was very slow, and the Bison kov and the military leaders stood solidly behind was not being produced in large enough numbers him. Khrushchev emerged the victor but beholden to present a real threat. In the missile field, only to Marshal Zhukov, who was now playing a politi- tactical and intennediate-range weapons were avail- cal role as a member of the Presidium in addition able. All in all, to speak of a “balance of terror I to being Minister of Defense. Zhukov, however, was fallacious, unless one had in mind only Rússia received his reward in October when he was re- and Europe. moved from all authority, military and political, Until the middle of 1957 the Soviets were sim- thus leaving Khrushchev the new vozhd, or plv responding to an American lead in strategic dictator. weapons. Even geographv was against them. Their In order to understand Khrushchev’s economic- advanced bases in the northern rim of Sibéria and military dilemma in the late 1950’s and early on the arctic islands were more than offset by the 1960’s, it is necessary to describe his estimate of U.S. bases ringing the Soviet Union. Their inven- the military capability of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis tory of bombers, although somewhat similar to that the United States. It would seem in retrospect that of the U.S. in types, was very inferior in numbers during the 1955-57 period Mr. Khrushchev was and actual performance. A doctrine of pre-emption bluffing about an effective strategic capability. may have been a measure of desperation, but it Soviet military literature seemed to*imply a capa­ was the only doctrine at all feasible. If they had bility to pre-empt an American attack but was too little to pre-empt with, they certainly had fai vague about how this was to be done. In the fali too little to retaliate with after an American strike. F of 1956 Khrushchev, caught in the middle of both The advent of the ic bm and the successfuí the Hungarian revolt and the Suez crisis, resorted launching of the Sputnik in 1957 had a miraculoui to vague hints about rockets with nuclear war- eífect on the Soviet attitude in the strategic debatí heads. He probably did have enough short-range with the U.S. Khrushchev now began to makí missiles to plaster France and Britain, but it is ex- noises about Soviet superioritv in strategic weap-, tremely unlikely that he could have inflicted un- ons. At the height of his new euphoria he rele- acceptable damage on the U.S. gated bombers and surface vessels to the museum.' The reason the Soviets put the accent on pre- and seemed determined to make long-range mis emptive attack was their evaluation of American siles the be-all and end-all of military strategy strategy. They saw an ever-increasing American Looking back at this display of cockiness, one find| emphasis on air power, in avowed military policy, it hard to discem anything except a bold gam ai in official writings, and especially in budget allo- on a psychological advantage. lh e West was in i cations. They tried to talk down such a policy, mild State of shock, and Khrushchev was capitaliz continually referring lo it as reliance on the falla- ing on it. Of course, there is the fact that this wa cious doctrine of a single weapon system, and the Soviets’ initial military “first, a weapon tha monotonously chanted the old Soviet slogan that was not merely a duplication of something already | the small, elite air force saved the imperialists from in the U.S. arsenal. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 71

Khrushchev brandished his new ic b m as an like “sausages,” as he once put it. The liquid-fuel implicit backup to his Berlin ultimatum in No- ic bm of that period was extremely expensive and vember 1958. On the other hand, he showed a complicated. Furthermore, it was not adaptable reluctance at allowing Mao Tse-tung to draw him to hardened sites and was therefore vulnerable to into an actual confrontation with the U.S. in the American attack. Whatever the reasons, the Soviets Taiwan Strait conflict of 1958. The wind might did not produce their new ic bm ’s as fast as Western be blowing from the East in \lao’s opinion, but intelligence sources estimated them capable of. Khrushchev was better aware of how little force By the end of the 1950’s Khrushchev was was behind that wind. facing another problem, a drastic shortage of This brings up the question of why the Soviets young people coming into industry and the armed did not maintain their lead in ic bm s . On the sur- forces. The catastrophic losses in manpower during iace it looks much like their failure to produce World War II plus an abnormally low birthrate [Bison airplanes at the rate American intelligence during those years resulted in a dearth of young judged them capable of: in short, the reluctance people in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Thus a to commit such a large portion of the economy to reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces would both pne weapon. In other words. it would seem that save money for other purposes and allow a diver- Khrushchev was running a little short on resources, sion of young men into industry. jargely because he had overextended his commit- These seem to have been the reasons for ments. As early as the Malenkov-Khrushchev duel Khrushchevs “new strategy” speech to the Su- or power, it is evident in retrospect that Malenkov preme Soviet on 14 January 1960.A That speech •ealized that something had to give if the Soviet also set the tone for what apparently has been a íconomy was not to be seriously overstrained. The behind-the-scenes controversy between him and Malenkov policv of easing up on militarv spending his military leaders right down to the date of his tnd on investments in heavy industry would have ouster. Khrushchev justified his manpower cut by dlowed the allocation of more funds in the eon- shouting shrilly that the Soviet deterrent force was ;umer goods industries and in agriculture, the two capable of keeping the West at bay. Almost at the veakest segments in the overall economic picture. beginning of his long harangue he stated his main Chmshchev, seeking the support of the militarv premise: “We are several years ahead of other eaders and the conservative majority in the Partv countries in the development and mass production eadership, gambled on the traditional Systems of intercontinental ballistic missiles of various asting long enough to enable him to get a vastly types.” As a result, he said, even “the statesmen mproved militarv stance before he turned his at- of the Western nations, including the U.S.A. itself,” ention to the obsolete economic machinery. Thus agree that the launching of the Soviet satellites he period after 1955 saw an unusually heavy com- and space rockets has made the American people nitment in military hardware, research and devel- aware that the U.S.A. is militarily no less vulner­ jprnent, and skilled personnel. able than any other country. Khrushchev then went By 1958, however, Khrushchev saw how on to use this shaky premise as a justification for §>verextended he was in his “races” with the U.S. his proposed drastic cut in military personnel. 'He was rac-ing the U.S. in space, in armaments, In the course of his speech he produced a p economic aid to underdeveloped countries, and number of interesting figures on the size of the én economic growth in general. AU this was being Red Army between 1945 and 1960. Between 1945 mttempted with a gross national product (gnp) only and 1955 the armed forces had been reduced from jpalf that of the United States. At this point Khrush- 11,365,000 to 5,763,000 men, and between 1955 jthev tried to back off a bit. He began to seek a and 1958 another 2,140,000 men had been de- métente with the West, which led eventually to mobilized. Thus the total was 3,623,000 in January jjpamp David in late 1959. He also began to try 1960. Khrushchev now proposed a further reduc­ ) renege on his military expenditures. tion of 1,200,000, which would bring the total In this tight situation, Khrushchev seems to down to 2,423,000. ave been unwilling to put up the wherewithal The irrepressible Khrushchev then asked: !ecessary to push ic bm s off the production line Why not?—the Soviet Union had an adequate 72 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW stockpile of atomic weapons and a “powerful in the U.S. defense budget, the acceleration of the rocket technology” in a period when the “armed Minuteman and Polaris programs, and the calling forces have been largely converted to rocket and up of the reserves could hardly help Khrushchevs nuclear weapons.” As for the conventional types of case. Even the much-vaunted “consolidation and weapons, his own words best express his thoughts: growth of the mighty socialist camp” sounded a bit silly with Mao and even Enver Hoxha of tiny Al- Given the present development of military technology, military aviation and the navy bania tweaking Khrushchevs nose with impunity. have lost their former importance. This type of Finally, by the autumn of 1961, the Department armament is not being reduced but replaced. of Defense was beginning to reverse the Demo- Military aviation is being almost entirely re­ eratic campaign estimates of Soviet superiority in placed by rockets. We have now sharply re­ ic bm’s —U.S. strategic superiority was now being duced and probably will further reduce and proclaimed, loud and clear. No longer could even halt production of bombers and other Khrushchev claim, as he had in his 1960 speech obsolete equipment. In the navy the submarine to the Supreme Soviet, that even the Western fleet is assuming great importance, and surface statesmen acknowledged Soviet missile superiority. ships can no longer play the role they have Given this set of circumstances, one is not sur- played in the past. prised that the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal In his opinion the new weapons, the phenomenal of the Soviet Union Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, in his growth rate of the Soviet economy, and the “con- speech to the 22nd Party Congress on 23 October solidation and growth of the mighty socialist camp” 1961, presented some views that were at variance all added up to an unassailable Soviet Union. Fur- with Khrushchev’s strategy of 1960.6 Malinovsky thermore, a country’s defense capability was no began his speech by pointing an accusatory finger longer determined by masses of soldiers under arms at the Kennedy administration’s warmongering ác- but by its total firepo\£er and means of delivery, tivities in general and in particular at its military both of which the Soviets had in abundance. The buildup with “the ‘Berlin crisis’ as a pretext.” What proposed manpower cut, he went on to maintain, else could the Soviet Union do except respond to would “help to build our economic might and to such a challenge? Thus in 1961 the defense capa­ create additional possibilities for raising the stand­ bility of the U.S.S.R. had been strengthened in the ard of living, further increasing material goods, following manner: developing housing construetion and shortening The reduction of the armed forces that had the working day.” In fact, the cut would yield an been planned and was in process was tem- annual saving of approximately 16 to 17 billion porarily halted; defense expenditures were in- rubles. creased somewhat; the regular demobilization Khrushchev, as future events were to demon- from the army and navy to the reserve of non- strate, had picked a poor time to try prodding his commissioned officers and men who had com- marshals into cutting back on manpower. The pleted their tour of active Service was tempo- “Camp David spirit” so evident in his 14 January rarily put off; nuclear tests are being conducted. speech soon soured into his more usual snarling attitude as a result of the U-2 incident and the Lest any of the audience think that all this Khrushchev-Eisenhower confrontation at the abor- was in contradiction to what Khrushchev had ad- tive Paris summit meeting, both events taking place vocated in 1960, Malinovsky went on to praise in May 1960. As a result the military leaders were the report of “our Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Nikita Sergeyevieh Khrushchev” as a “penetrating less liable to censure if they hinted, as some did, that this was not the time to attempt drastic sur- analysis of the nature of modern war” and "thí gery on the armed forces. basis of Soviet military doetrine.” Malinovsky ther If the events of 1960 were not conducive to a picked out a part of Khrushchevs speech that al general reduction in Soviet military expenditures, the Soviet military leaders could agree upon: those of 1961 were even less so. The American . . . a world war, should it be loosed by the iin reaction to the 1961 Berlin crisis was, from a Soviet perialist aggressors, would inevitably take th* point of view, sobering. Such steps as the increase form of a nuclear-missile war, that is, a wai MILITARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 73

in which the chief means of destruction would tank division is far higher than in World War II. be nuclear weapons and the principal means There has also been great progress in the training of delivering them to the targets would be of the parachute troops as well as in the air trans- rockets. In view of this fact, war would start port available to them. During recent Soviet ma- differently than in the past and be waged in a neuvers “military air transport alone dropped more different way. than 100,000 parachutists, to say nothing of the Malinovsky, however, went far beyond personnel and cargo it transported.” Khrushchev in giving an apocalyptic flavor to the In direct contrast to Khrushchev’s contemptu- all-out nuclear holocaust and predicted its “unprec- ous reference to “bombers and other obsolete edentedly destructive character” which would equipment,” Malinovsky put in quite a plug for “result in the deaths of hundreds of millions of the value of the air force, even in the long-range people, and whole countries will be turned into delivery of nuclear weapons. Obsolete piston- lifeless, ash-covered deserts.” engine military aircraft had been completely re- Having paid his respects to Khrushchevs placed in the air force by up-to-date jet planes, “military doctrine” and even embellished it some- “including supersonic long-range bombers. . . . what, Malinovsky then contradicted the very basis Missile-carrying aircraft able to deliver long-range upon which the manpower cuts proposed by nuclear-missile strikes at an aggressor without en- Khrushchev in 1960 were predicated—the obsolete tering his antiaircraft defense zone are being intro- character of conventional armaments and the use- duced in ever greater numbers. This has greatly lessness of large numbers of soldiers in an era of increased the military capabilities of our aviation.” tremendously increased firepower. The Western In describing the navy, Malinovsky was in leaders, said Malinovsky, are well aware of the complete agreement with Khrushchev that its main íorrors of a thermonuclear exchange, and they are arm was the submarine fleet and that the basis of jnow trying to achieve their aggressive aims by wag- the submarine fleet was “atomic submarines armed íng “local ‘small wars’ using conventional weapons with powerful nuclear missiles.” But he did not and tactical atomic weapons.” Such being the case, condemn surfaee ships to the immediate Limbo |arge numbers of men are still vital. Malinovsky’s that Khrushchev had allotted them, and he even pwn statement of this doctrinal point is hard to advoeated a major role for “naval missile-carrying pnprove upon: aircraft” acting in coordination with submarines in Although nuclear weapons will hold the combat operations. decisive place in a future war, we are never- Malinovsky undermined Khrushchev’s pro­ theless Corning to the conclusion that final vic- posed defense cuts largely based on the “obsoles- tory over an aggressor can be achieved only cence” of conventional arms, which Malinovsky through combined operations by all branches refused to admit. He then conceded that the heart of the armed forces. We are therefore devoting of the Soviet military stance is the strategic rocket due attention to the perfection of weapons of all types, teaching our forces to use them skill- troops recently created by none other than Com- fully and to achieve a decisive victory over the rade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev himself. Fur- aggressor. ther, this branch of the Services is to be in a We also believe that under modem condi- constant State of combat readiness to inflict a dev- tions any future war would be waged, despite astating defeat on the aggressor and the aggressor’s the enormous losses, by mass, many-million- country. But, Malinovsky went on to point out, the strong armed forces. “main common task we have set for all our armed Malinovsky then pointed out that although forces . . . is to study and master ways of effec- i£he ground forces had been reduced numerieally, tively repulsing an aggressors surprise nuclear Íítheir new rocket units armed with nuclear and attack and frustrating his aggressive designs by IjPther missiles with varying ranges had tremen- promptly dealing him a crushing blow.” The words jpously improved their combat capabilities. There “all our armed forces” left the ic bm forces as only Sias been no relaxation in the attention paid to con- one of the Services to perform the “common task.” íventional arms, in particular the artillery, and the In May 1962 the Ministry of Defense pub- mumber of tanks per motorized infantry division or lished a book entitled Military Strategy, a collec- 74 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW tive effort of 16 Soviet experts under the editor- (5) The war wül be between two coalitions, the ship of Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolov- socialist and the imperialist. It will mean the all- sky, the recently retired Chief of Staff.7 As the book out mobilization and utilization of the economic, states, this is the first comprehensive survey of moral, scientific-technological, and military poten- Soviet strategy since 1926. The book reflects the tial of both coalitions. But the socialist coalition is dialogue which has been going on since Khrush- superior in its ability to mobilize. The Communist. chev’s 1960 speech. It also reflects a more or less Party of the Soviet Union, taking this into account, balanced view between Khrushchev’s position in has assigned the task of guaranteeing completely 1960 and the views of the more tradition-minded the defense needs of the country to heavy industry. military leaders. The book further indicates a defi- A new edition of Military Strategy carne out nite shift from the concept of land warfare largely in 1963, but the changes were minor. The doc­ on the theater levei to one of global strategy and trine, at least the public one, was still pretty much emphasizes a pre-emptive doctrine, the necessity the one summarized in Red Star: a compromise of keeping the missile forces postured to pre-empt. between Khrushchev’s “new strategy” of 1960 and Although the work is not as clear as one might wish Malinovsky’s reinterpretation of that strategy in as to just how the conventional forces fit into global late 1961. warfare, nevertheless it does indicate that the econ- Khrushchev, however, continued to announce omy is geared not so much for a protracted conflict reductions in military expenditures and cuts in as for the maintenance of the pre-emptive forces military personnel. At the Plenum of the Central in readiness. Committee of the Party in December 1963, de- About the same time, May 1962, Colonel voted primarily to planning a tremendous, 42- Sidel’nikov in an article in Krasnatja Zvezda (Red billion-ruble expansion of the Chemical industry in Star)8 reduced Soviet military doctrine to a five- the next seven years, he stated that he planned point summary: to introduce at the forthcoming session of the (1) A world war wül inevitably become a mis- U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet a reduction in military sile-nuclear war. This is why the Communist Party expenditures in the 1964 budget. He justified this of the Soviet Union created the Strategic Missile step on the usual ground that new weapons made Force. large forces unnecessary, as can be seen in the fol- (2) Missiles with nuclear warheads can reach lowing statement: any target in minutes and gain decisive results over enormous areas. The targets will be troop concen- It is possible to argue about who now has trations, missile and air bases, industrial and popu- more battalions, regiments, and divisions. . . i lation centers. The large area of the U.S.S.R. makes But we are not living in the Napoleonic age when the strength of the armed forces of states it less vulnerable than other nations. was measured in thousands of bavonets and (3) The important role of missiles has not di- sabres. It is now another age—an age of nuclear minished the importance of other types of weapons. weapons which possess fantastic destructive The final and decisive victory over the imperialists force.9 wül be the result of the combined action of all arms and Services. The next world war will be waged by On 14 February 1964 at another Plenum of the massive, multimillion-man armies. Central Committee, this one devoted to the im- (4) “The very first massive nuclear strikes are provement of agriculture, Khrushchev again re* capable to a large extent of determining the entire ferred to a reduction in defense expenditures and consequent course of the war and of inflicting in thè size of the armed forces.10 He went into some great losses on the rear and on the troops. There- detail to prove that these cuts were not due to an fore, the first period of the war is exceptionally economic squeeze as was being claimed by the important. Soviet military doctrine holds that the “ideologists of imperialism, ’ but surely he pro- chief, most important, and very first priority task tested too much. is to be in constant readiness for a reliable repulse Many Soviet military theorists, however, have of a surprise attack by the enemy and the frustra- seemed more dubious than Khrushchev about con­ tion of his aggressive plans.” ventional armaments and large armies being madf MIL1TARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 75

obsolete by the advent of the missile and nuclear Soviet Union make it possible to inflict a crushing warhead. Colonel I. Korotkov, vvriting in early defeat on any aggressive coalition, and in a short 1964, pointed out that some military theorists, time at that. Planning for such a repulse is an ex- although admitting the tremendous role of missile- tremely complex task, and the “planning of nuclear nuclear weapons, nevertheless continued to view strikes must be aceomplished with such precision future war as probablv protracted and thus requir- that it will be possible with the least quantity of ing the use of ground forces, the navy, and the nuclear warheads to guarantee in the shortest time air force.11 In other words, some of the military the complete disruption of the economic and mili­ theorists werestill notconvinced that Khrushchevs tary might of the aggressor.” This sounds like "new strategy" was necessarily valid under all Khrushchevian strategy, but in the next sentence Iconditions. Sokolovsky goes on to say: “It is also necessary to One .American authority, Thomas W. Wolfe, determine the methods of operation of the con- has described in some detail the difficulties that the ventional forces and means under conditions of authors of Military Strategy faced in steering their great destruction and high leveis of radioaetive course between the Scylla of Khrushchev’s “new contamina tion.” strategy” and the Charybdis of Malinovsky’s Under contemporary conditions the fate of “rebuttal” at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.12 the war will be decided by nuclear strikes of strate­ VVolfe divides the participants in the struggle into gic weapons. The strategic strikes will determine the “radicais” who, like Khrushchev, see the ic bm the outcome of battles and operations. Battles in and the supermegaton warheads as the main in- the land and sea theaters of operations will be gredient in the Soviet strategic posture, and the waged to capitalize on the results of the nuclear “traditionalists” who see the new weapon systems strikes by completing the destruction of the ene- as only another ingredient in the combined forces my forces, if there are any left. Even these tasks concept. Both views were advanced in the book, will be decided by operational-tactical nuclear thus awkwardly arriving at a compromise that is weapons. This sounds like a point for the “radicais.” really an agreement to continue to disagree. But Sokolovsky balances this in the next paragraph: One of the “traditionalists,” it would seem, is :he editor of Military Strategy, Marshal V. D. However, in the course of military opera­ tions there will not infrequently be occasions Sokolovsky. In August 1964 Marshal Sokolovsky, when combat situations will have to be decided nided by a Major-General M. Cherednichenko, by conventional weapons without the use of ivrote two articles for Red Star in which he visual- nuclear weapons. Therefore the army must zed a future world war as either a short-lived also be able to conduct such operations. nissile-nuclear exchange or a protracted conflict nvolving the combined forces on an enormous Sokolovsky then goes on to State that the cale.13 Inasmuch as Marshal Sokolovsky seems to initial period of the war in which the opponents jccupy a key position in the present “radical- use up all their accumulated stock of nuclear weap­ iraditionalist” controversy, a short description of ons will be of decisive importance in the outcome ais latest effort would seem in order. (In summariz- of the war, or even see the end of the war. Never­ ng these articles I shall refer to Sokolovsky as the theless, he adds: luthor, although I have no idea of just how much . . . theoretically, it may be assumed that after General Cherednichenko contributed to the effort.) the exchange of nuclear strikes, the war will The article begins by stating that there is now go on. One side may preserve the capability of aking place the greatest revolution in the history waging offensive operations. The war may enter )f armed combat and that the authors would like a new period. The armed conflict in each period o share their views on this subject, although they will be the combined operations of all types of may, or may not, coincide with the opinions and Services according to a unified design and views expressed by other comrades.” This being under a unified strategic leadership directed the case, they expect the comrades to “examine our toward the resolution of the immediate mili- views critically.” tary-political and strategic tasks. The missile-nuclear weapons available in the In Sokolovsky’s scenario for the next world 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW war, the imperialists intend to deliver a mass of tics of long-range aviation. There is no longer any ] nuclear weapons in the very first three days of the need of large formations of aircraft to carry out a war and then, radiation leveis permitting, go over combat mission. Small groups of missile-carrying to an ofiFensive in which the ground forces exploit aircraft with escorts, or even single aircraft, will the results of the nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union, carry out the attacks. The aircraft will launch their however, has everything necessary to thwart such missiles from outside the air defense zone of the a surprise attack. Modem methods of detection and enemy. After this, long-range bombers with nu-! warning will ensure that the Soviets have the clear bombs can penetrate the enemy country. ability to mount a timely and crushing retaliatory Sokolovsky finishes up with a vivid descrip- response. The basic means of delivering the re­ tion of how the next world war will be fought, and taliatory blow, apparently, will be the strategic it would be best to leave it in his own words: missile force, atomic missile submarines, and stra­ tegic aviation. “Tactical missile forces, tactical and The aggressive bloc of the imperialists,. naval aviation, missile-carrying surface ships, and nato, maintains in constant readiness strong formations of ground troops and tactical avia­ shore missile installations of the navy will also be tion. It is equipping them with nuclear weap­ involved in the retaliatory nuclear response.” ons and is preparing to conduct combat opera­ After the retaliatory nuclear response it may tions using nuclear weapons. In the event of be possible to use airbome forces to exploit im- the unleashing of an aggressive war by the mediately the results of the nuclear strikes and, imperialists, nuclear weapons will be used on radiation leveis permitting, to carry out an ofiFen­ these formations. Then decisive ofiFensive op­ sive with ground forces to complete the defeat of erations of the ground forces and frontal avia­ the remaining enemy forces in the theaters of mili- tion will be unleashed for the final defeat of the tary operations. At the same time the enemys navy enemy troops in the theater, enemy territory must be destroyed in the sea and ocean theaters seized, and the invasion of the aggressive armies into the territory of the socialist coun- of operations. tries prevented. In the land theaters there will Sokolovsky continues to balance out the de- be unleashed offensive operations of a stra­ cisive effect of strategic nuclear attacks with a tegic magnitude (strategic ofiFensive operations cautious “on the other hand” they may not be involving several formations of ground troops decisive. This balancing act is well illustrated in the and units of the other Services of the armed following passage: forces). It is not to be ruled out that in some directions the defensive will be used as an From this there arises, in our view, an emergency and temporary form of military indisputable conclusion: a thermonuclear war action. cannot be lengthy. Therefore, it is necessary, The main means of conflict in the land in our opinion, to be prepared in the first place theaters will be nuclear weapons delivered with for a short war. the aid of missiles and long-range aviation, and It is impossible, however, to exclude the also with the help of operational-tactical mis­ possibility of a relatively extended war. This siles and frontal aviation. Tank and motorized- may have to do with a war in which nuclear infantry formations, plus airborne units, will weapons will not be used (for example, a local exploit the results of the nuclear strikes in war capable of growing into a world conflict). order to complete the destruction of the enemy Therefore, it is impossible to neglect the prep- troops and to advance deep into his territory. aration for a relatively extended war. The objectives of the armed conflict in the Unlike Khrushchev, who relegated bombers theater will be the nuclear facilities of the to the museum several years ago, Sokolovsky sees enemy, his tank, airbome and motorized forces, or infantry formations and units. a vital role for the bomber in the next world war. It will be characterized by an absence of After the salvo of missiles will come the strikes of firm fronts. The military operations will take long-range bombers, but they will use techniques place simultaneously over great distances on quite different from those in the last war. The the front and in the rear, will be distinguished availability of air-to-ground and air-to-ship mis­ by furious tempo and maneuvering of forces, siles with nuclear warheads has changed the tac- by great bitterness. The forces will have to MILITARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 77

operate under conditíons of great destruction, course of the combat operations these troops fires, floods, and high leveis of radioactíve con- will complete the destruction of the enemy tamination. fonnations which have been staggered by the It is especially necessary to speak of the nuclear strikes. At the same time they must be operational-tactical missile forces. You cannot ready to smash up separate garrisons of the look upon them as a means of firepower to enemy with conventional firepower. cover the troops as in the case of artilíery. This Airdrops carried out in the rear of the is a fundamental tool in the hands of the com- enemy from helicopters will find wide applica- manders with which they will resolve the main tion. Motorized rifle units can be used in such tasks of the battles and operations: the destruc­ attacks. This will be a distinctive offensive by tion of those who survived the strikes of the air—a new phenoinenon in the modem military strategic missiles, of the nuclear means, forma- art. tions and units in regions of concentration, on The role of airbome troops in carrying out the lines of deployment and in combat forma- tasks in the armed conflict in the theater is tions on the offensive or defensive, control sharply increasing. These troops have the capa- points, rear bases, etc. The basic method used bility of rapidly exploiting the results of the bv the operational-tactical missile forces will be nuclear strikes. Opportunities are developing missile-nuclear strikes: massed, grouped, or for carrying out deep penetrations by airbome single. The methods used by the artilíery are operations because of the inevitable destruction not suitable for the new role of these forces, of the enemy’s pv o (antiaircraft defense) as a methods such as the artilíery preparation for result of massive nuclear strikes. an attack and the artilíery support of the of­ The operations of the navy will have a fensive (the creeping barrage, the consequent significant importance in the achievement of concentration of firepower). the aims of the missile-nuclear war. The equip­ Frontal aviation will play an important ment of our fleet wàth nuclear submarines role in the armed conflict in the theater. It can armed with missiles and an air force equipped destroy the enemy’s aviation, his missiles, ar- with long-range missiles and nuclear weapons tillery, antitank materiel, and manpower by has sharply increased its striking power. This using nuclear weapons and conventional means allows it to move from fulfilling combat assign- of firepower: it can fulfill the tasks of anti- ments along the coast in cooperation with aircraft defense, reconnaissance, and the trans- ground troops to independent and decisive port of troops by air. The equipment of frontal operations over the broad expanses of the aviation with supersonic aircraft, “air-to- oceans. ground” and “air-to-air” missiles has radically The character and methods of armed con­ changed its operational tactics. The flights of flict in the maritime theaters have changed. large masses of aircraft, aircraft “hanging” Squadron battles, artilíery duels, battleships, over the field of battle for protracted periods, cruisers, and other surface ships have passed have passed into history. They have been re- into history. The new class of large surface placed by the maneuvers of small groups, pairs, ships, pushed forward by the American-British and single aircraft, operating at low altitudes school—aircraft carriers which fire not artilíery and using complex methods to deliver strikes. shells but aircraft—has also outlived its useful- The tactics of tank and motorized troops ness. It has become vulnerable. It is already are changing. The offensive will be waged pre- unable to play a decisive role in the armed dominantly in tanks, armored transports, and conflict at sea in a nuclear war. Armed conflict even in helicopters; it will develop along basic on the seas will be first of all the operations of directions. Attacks on foot will be a rare phe- submarines, their missile and torpedo nuclear nomenon. In view of the fact that the threat of strikes against naval ships, convoys, and trans­ a hostile nuclear attack will constantly hang ports, against naval bases and important con­ over the advancing troops, they must operate tinental targets. In addition there will be the without concentration, must maneuver, in es- operations of missile-carrying aircraft with sence be in movement at all times and also have their missile strikes on the same types of tar­ in readiness at all times the means of defense gets. This comprises the essence of armed against flash radiation, against radiation; they conflict on the seas in the thermonuclear war. must use machines and opportunities afforded This also is a new phenomenon in naval military by the terrain, against the shock waves. In the art. 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The most important job of naval opera- created some doubt that the icbm and supermega- tions in the ocean and sea theaters will be the ton nuclear warheads are the entire answer. destruction of the nuclear submarines. The Khrushchev, however, in a speeeh to the American press extols its missile-submarine, the World Youth Forum on 19 September 1964, an- “Polaris,” in every way possible. It speaks of swered his marshals, albeit somewhat indirectly.14 their invulnerability. In reality, these ballistic After a rambling discourse about the main struggle missiles have essential drawbacks: warheads of low magnitude, low reliabilíty and accuracy of between communism and capitalism being in the the guidance Systems, and, therefore, a low field of economic development, he finally hit out firing accuracy. The “Polaris” is sufficiently at the military, or at least at the “traditionalistsj vulnerable that it can be suecessfully com- and their advocacy of ground forces and conven- bated, which the Americans themselves are tional weapons. He told his audience that he had forced to admit. Missile submarines can be been misquoted by the bourgeois press about his destroyed, in the regions where they are based, statement to the members of the Japanese Diet by strikes from the missile forces, submarines, concerning a “new terrible weapon.” What had and aircraft. Also nuclear antisubmarine sub­ aetually taken place was as follows, in Khrush- marines, aircraft, and even helicopters and chev’s own words: antisubmarine surface craft are able to destroy enemy submarines cjuickly after spotting them. I said that my friends and I had spent the In the American press it is mentioned that sub­ whole preceding day with the military: with marines are very sensitive to underwater nu­ marshals, generais, and admirais, with scien- clear explosions. tists working in the field of armaments, with A very important task of the armed con- engineers. This took place liere, near Moscow. flict in the ocean and sea theaters is the de­ \Ye looked not at atomic and hydrogen weap­ struction of the aircraft carrier strike units of ons but at rifles, infantry and tank weapons the enemy. They can be destroyed at their and rocket equipment for dose combat. And bases by nuclear strikes of the missile forces, after this inspection I told the Japanese Diel submarines, and aircraft. Effective means of members approximately this: “What hasiil combating aircraft carriers and other surface man thought up to destroy people! These are ships at sea are nuclear submarines with tar- terrible weapons.” And 1 repeat again that the\ get-seeking missiles and torpedoes as well as are truly terrible weapons. When the bourgeoif aircraft with nuclear-warhead “air-to-ship” correspondents learned of this, they began tc missiles. The diesel-electric submarine with write as though I had spoken about some new modern armament has also not lost its weapon that could destroy everything, ab | usefulness. solutely everything! I didn t say that. But arenl There have also been essential changes in the weapons that have already been created the methods of doing such naval jobs as dis- the atomic and hydrogen weapons—aren t the' ! rupting the ocean and sea Communications of terrible enough? the enemy, assistance of our own land forces, Let me say this. 1 have lived through twt ' the landing of troops, defense against enemy wars, even three: The first world imperialis ! landings, and defense of Communications. war, the Civil War and the second world war Thus radical revolutionary changes have In these wars the tank was the terror ot th«- occurred in all the important areas of military fields. And now I shall tell vou a secret: Whá art. I went out onto the training field and saw th» So long as the possibility of a nuclear- tanks attacking and how the antitank artiller missile war arising under modern conditions is hit these tanks, I became ill. After all, we ar» not excluded, it will be necessary to work out spending a lot of monev to build tanks. And i** and master further the new military art, the art —God forbid. as they say—a war breaks out of waging nuclear-missile war. these tanks will burn even before they readj the Iine indicated by the command. Right to the final showdown, the dialogue be- tween Khrushchev and at least one group of his If Sokolovsky was the spokesman for an marshals was apparently in full swing. It would large segment of the military high command, I seem that Sokolovsky had delivered a solid blow would seem that Khrushchev's rejoinder pushe I in favor of the “combined forces” concept and had the debate toward the sliowdown. Nikita was def J MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 79

íitelv unimpressed bv his marshals’ display of eon- Soviet Armed Forces. Both sides had spoken out yentional weapons. The tenor of his speeeh was as openly as is Ükely in the Soviet Union, and the n the direetion of more accent on consumer goods debate seems to have reached the point where ind a curtaiiment of sueh things as obsolescent something had to give. anks and other out-of-date components in the Aerospace Studies Institute

íotes 1. We shall assume that the Soviet gross national product XIII, 4 (Summer 1962), 142-50. s a little less than balí that of the U.S. More exact es ti mates are 9. Pracda, 15 December 1963, p. 3. vailable, but thev differ rather wideiy. 10. Pracda, 15 February 1964, p. 6. 2. Article in the Christian Science Monitor (3 October 964, p. 4) based on a report in Izcestiya. 11. Coloneí I. Korotkov. "O razvitii sovetskoy voennoy teorii v poslevoennye gody” (Conceming the Development of 3. Pracda. 13 March 1954. 4. Izcestiya, 27 April 1954. Soviet Military Theory in the Postwar Years), Voenno-lstori- 5. Pracda, 15 January 1960, pp. 1-5; a complete transla- cheskiy Zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), No. 4 (April ion is in The Current Digest of the Societ Press, XII, 2 (10 1964), p. 46. rebniary 1960), 3-16. 12. Thomas W. Wolfe, “A First Reaction to the New 6. Pracda, 25 October 1961, pp. 4-5; a condensed trans- Soviet Book ‘Military Strategy,' ” RAND Memorandum, RM- ition is in Current Societ Policies, IV (New York: Columbia 3495-PR, February 1963. Jniversity Press, 1962), 156-59. 13. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovsky and Major- 7. V. D. Sokolovsky (editor), Voennaya Strategiya (Voennoe General M. Cherednichenko, “Voennoe iskusstvo na novom EdatePstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, Moskva, 1962); Soviet etape” (Military Art in a New State), Krasnaya Zvezda (Red dilitary Strotegy. translated by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Goure, and Star), 25 August 1964, pp. 2-3, and 28 August 1964, pp. 2-3. r. W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). 14. Pracda, 22 September 1964; translated in the Current 8. Col. I. Sidel’nikov, “O Sovetskoy Voennoy Doktrine,” Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVI, No. 38 (14 October 1964), Conceming Soviet Military Doctrine), Krasnaya Zcezda, 11 May pp. 8-10. This speeeh was not printed until three days after its 962, pp. 2-3; translation in Air Unicersity Quarterly Review, delivery. ABRES

B rigadier Gen er a l Harry J. S ands, J r .

MONG THE objectives of the Ballistic Sys- entry system must endure while still protèctin| l. tems Division of the Air Force Systems the warhead, maintaining system accuracy, anc Command is that of developing advanced ballisattempting­ to penetrate a defense radar net, pro- ticA re-entry Systems ( abres). This development vide the basis from which the various requirec program is conducted by the Ballistic Missile Re- entry Systems Office of the division. expansion viscous To appreeiate the technical problems asso- ciated with the task of placing a warhead in a re-entry vehicle, then adding devices that will ensure that the re-entry vehicle successfully pene- trates enemy defenses and accurately impacts on the target, one must first consider vvhat is termed “re-entry environment.” When an object such as a re-entry vehicle elimbs out of the earths atmos- phere, moves in semiorbit through a near vacuum, then dips down and re-enters the atmosphere at speeds in excess of 20,000 miles per honr, environ- mental conditions are created that aetually tax Figure 1. Re-entry phenomena include the variou the imagination. Figure 1 illustrates qualitatively interactions between fiow fields, shock waves, ani the re-entry physics phenomena generated by mixing areas. The resulting radar or optieal sig such a re-entry vehicle. These tremendous tem- nature represents the sum of the contribution ' peratures and pressure conditions, which the re- made by the bare body and the trailing tvake |i AIR FORCE REV1EW 81 technical disciplines are exercised in the Advanced neutralizes the defense radar. This systems analy- Ballistic Re-entry Systems Program. sis function, therefore, serves as the motivating By “re-entry system” we mean the total pay- element in the initiation of the development cycle load package, that is, the warhead, the re-entry of a new re-entry system concept. vehicle carrying the warhead, and any auxiliary Proceeding on the assumption that certain devices and/or techniques incorporated or accom- defense system characteristics can be defined, panving, vvhich tend to improve defense penetra- one of four general functional offense system ap­ tion. All of the many aspects of a re-entry system proaches can be pursued. The first involves the fali under abres purview. Functionally the abres degree of invisibility one can attain with an unac- Program concems itself with the application to companied re-entry vehicle. In other words, can re-entry systems of many technologies—thermo- a re-entry vehicle containing a warhead, without dvnamics, astrodynamics, materiais, arming and the addition of auxiliary penetration aids, assume fuzing, re-entry physics, and others. a sufficiently small radar and optical signature so The various technical approaches taken in that it will not be detected, tracked, and inter- the .abres Program are carefully formulated feasi- cepted by a defense system? Recent flight tests bility eflForts stemming from detailed offense versus conducted under abres have revealed the bene­ idefense gaming analyses. These gaming exercises ficiai effects of variation of vehicle configuration, are performed on a continuing basis and are con- choice of heat shield material, and ability to con- stantly being updated to include current postida- trol re-entry at a specified angle of attack. Closely tions of enemy defenses. Evolving from these associated with these design parameters is a rela- system analyses are those offense-oriented tech­ tively new but effective technique that involves niques or design characteristics which, following the addition of radar absorption material ( ram) feasibility demonstration, can be efficiently incor­ to the basic heat shield to reduce the radar cross porated into current re-entry system design. For section. There is much more to leam, not only of example, an engagement doctrine (Figure 2 ) may the individual parameters as they affect the result- postulate that a certain defense radar exhibits a ing signature but of their interplay and the design particular power curve. By superimposing a line trade-offs to be considered. It must be kept in representing the output of an offensive jammer, mind that the only truly significant conclusions ane can hypothesize how effectively the jammer stemming from experimental test results are those that provide a basis for a realistic and practical operational system design. The total signature of a re-entry vehicle (r /v ), igure 2. Engagement doctrine. The power vs. alti- that of the vehicle, its surrounding flow field, and de curve is plotted for a given radar. The broken the trailing wake, has been consistently difficult mzontal line represents power output of an of- nsive jammer. The unshaded area, compared to the to simulate with a small, passive decoy. This fact tal area under the radar power curve, represents is graphically described by Figure 3. It shows the e remaining degree of effectiveness for that radar. difference between the displayed radar signatures of an r /v with its wake and of a decoy. From this comparison, the difficulty of simulating an r /v with a decoy becomes obvious. The use of decoys typifies the second functional approach for im- proved penetration but constitutes only one of several different types of auxiliary devices. The abres Program is investigating both passive and active countermeasures. Active coun- termeasure techniques can either deceive or over- power a defense radar. The former approach may provide false and misleading electronic signals altitude in ft intended to trick the defense system into commit- ting an interceptor to an electronically simulated, R V ra d a r Figure 3. Ttjpicai radar returns. The top display TA «

decoy radar cantly reduced R/V returns and considerably en- echo ^ hanced decoy signals, both in amplitude and pulse where A >> a length. These converging values will ultimately enable the accurate simulation of R/V’s by decoys. rather than real, re-entry veliide. Many variations racy. Even broader in concept, however, is the and sophisticated advancements in masking, sim- possibility of hardening re-entry vehicles and all ulation, and deception are currently being ex- their subsystems without compromising a low sig- ploited under abres. nature design approach. This is an ultimate goal A third general means of achieving, or at in abres and, if achieved, will come truly close to least approaching, the optimized penetrator in­ the realization of a universal, all-purpose re-entry volves the use of maneuvering. The maneuvering vehicle. ballistic re-entry vehicle ( mbrv) vvidens the so- As pointed out earlier, the re-entry environ- called ballistic defense “threat tube” by being able ment for which a re-entry vehicle must be de- to traverse laterally or deviate vertieally a finite dis­ signed, if it is to survive and operate efficientlv tante. A maneuvering capability also gives a re- within that environment, cannot be directly con- entry system tremendous Hexibility by permitting a trolled, but the resulting interactions with an r /v mix of maneuvering and standard ballistic missile can be strongly influenced. One of these “regu- re-entry vehicles. This mix forces upon a defense lating” parameters is the time required for traversal system a very difficult problem in discrimination. of the sensible atmosphere, approximatelv 300,000 In acklition, once terminal position location sensing feet down to impact. This time is a direct function can be perfected as an operating system, it can be of the r /v velocity, which in turn depends on installed in a maneuvering vehicle, therebv creat- aerodynamic drag. A rather gross design param- ing an ability to terminally fix the target and cor- eter called ballistic coefficient (j3 ) relates an r /v ’s rect the trajectory accordingly. The resulting weight (W), cross-sectional area (A), and drag improvement in system accuracy on target is tre- coefficient (C„) in the following manner: mendously significant. W In the same functional category, but vvith a /? = cda widely divergent application, is the abres devel- opment of a boost glide re-entry vehicle ( bg r v). It logicallv follows that the shorter the time Whereas the mbr v maneuvers at the terminus of the r /v spends in the atmosphere, the smaller the a ballistic trajectory, the bg r v re-enters the atmos- depreciating effects of re-entry, since less time will phere after an extremely short ballistic trajectory be available for the various re-entry system errors and performs a long, in-the-atmosphere glide to to accumulate. The resulting benefits are primarily the target. By designing a high lift-to-drag vehicle twofold: less time for a defense system to aequire, to accomplish this, we increase the overall range track, and destroy; and overall improved system significantly. Our systems analysis also tells us accuracy. The primary means for achieving these that to defend against this type of threat a nation results is to increase the value of the ballistic co- must greatly increase the scope and dispersion of efficient. Within the abres Program considerable its radar/interceptor net, thereby multiplying its effort is being expended to accomplish this obj defense burden. jective by reducing vehicle drag effects through Finally, the fourth approach concems the optimized shaping. building of a re-entry vehicle sufficiently “hard” To realize the concept completely, other ele- to withstand nuclear effects. This concept implies ments are necessary to the abres Program. Ex- that a re-entry vehicle which has been acquired, perimental payloads require launch support, and. tracked, and intercepted can still survive a prox- once Iaunched, they require adequate downrange imity burst without significantly degraded accu- instrumentation. If it is lacking, the highest degree 4

Figure 4. This typical mission profile on the White Sands Missile Range suggests the com- plexity of instrumentation support required to gather adequate test data. After launch by the four-stage Athena booster, the re-entry payload enters the experiment interval. of excellence in payload design will still yield no missile re-entry Systems. It also is responsible for data, and thus the r /v will fail in its objective. the general advancement of technology required Supporting launch aetivities for our abres Pro- for re-entry systems in space applications. gram are on the Western Test Range. The r / v ’s are launched from Vandenberg afb. to impact into an instrumentation net in the Kwajalein Atoll area, T he A dvanced Ballistic Re-entry Systems Program and on the inland range from Green River, Utah, typifies, then, a unique segment of our total de­ to impact on White Sands, New México (Figure fense effort. The re-entry system, including the 4 ). The program places strong emphasis on both vehicle, the warhead, and the penetration aids, airbome and ground instrumentation to realize the has attained importance as an entity. It is now a maximum benefit from each test. discrete and completely recognizable missile sub- Late in 1962 Headquarters Air Force Sys­ svstem, a major element determining the total tem s Command designated the abres Program effectiveness of our defense arsenal. Progressive director as responsible for the proper integration improvement of this element is undeniably the of all re-entry System technology within the com- primary function of abres. Our balhstic missile mand. This integration has resulted in the coordi- force can be only as effective as the re-entry Sys­ nation of the various efforts of all divisions within tems that place a payload on a designated target. the Systems Command, the Ballistic Systems Divi- Of course the abres Program also has the purpose sion being designated as the lead agency. The of general advancement of re-entry technology as íirecto r for Research and Engineering, Depart- it can be applied to the overall space effort. •ment of Defense, has also recognized abres as These vital mission objectives give the abres jth e p rim e dod instrument for re-entry technology. Program and its roughly 150 engineer-scientist- irh e abres Program thu s has the key role of ini- manager Air Force offieers an increasingly impor- ítiator. coordinator, and implementer for efforts tant role in the buildup of our strategic missile aassociated with improving efFectiveness of ballistic power. Ballistic Systems Division, AFSC Air Operations in Viet Nam

AMMUNITION DROP

Preflight briefing for airdrop of 105-mm ammunition t troops of the Republic of Vict Nam Armtj (ARVN) in th Mekong Delta arca, bij 315th Troop Carrier Group aircra]

ARVN truck with 105-mm shells backs up to C-123B. Rollcrs are lockcd to the aircraft ramp. first pallet of shells rolls into aircraft, md too d is ticd down icith chains. C-123B's taxi out to runway.

n route to d r o p z o n e Awaiting sigtwl to ptisli out pallet he first load hits its drop zone . .. the second load hits its drop zone ... and the third hits its drop zone.

On the third pass over the drop zone, ground fire strikes the aircraft from which the pho- tos were taken. Crew member holds control cable cut by a 30-caliber bullet and points to hole in fuselage where projectile entered. Another 30-caliber left a small hole in the floor.

Mission completed, members of 33d Consolidated Arma- ment Maintenance Squadron look for other bullet holes. J' V* v - / v ' \

• Jy I” \ %'.V yiV " .i^l.v >

%/r V‘ " A<

ARE WE LIVING A FICTION? fcoLONEL J. TOD MESEROW

J iHE COMMANDER must have command or that systems for control of resources—men, inoney, I_ l_ operational control over support organizations and material—are rendering the principie of con­ ecessary to accomplish his mission, so States para- trol by the immediate commander a fiction. In feraph 3a, Air Force ReguJation 20-1, April 1953. the early 1950’s when the principie was first an- In todays environment this is a principie that is nounced it made good sense. In those days Com­ fto longer practiced in its entirety. Base commaiul- munications were nowhere near as sophisticated Irs now have very little to say about a number of and responsive as they are today. The eoncept Ictivities. For example, base commanders have of rotation was limited in its applieation, and l ery little command or control over: Air Force taetical units were pretty well anchored I —their inspection. Thats done largely by major to the strip from which they had to operate. More- ir command, the Auditor Ceneral, osi, tic, and over, manpower Controls were in no way as severe Irequently by the cao. and restrictive as they are now. In recent vears I —their manpower authorizations. Thats increas- it has been demonstrated that the Air Force can lig ly done by Congress, osd, the Air Staff, and the be highly mobile, flexible, and responsive in a d iajor air command. crisis, anywhere in the world. Yet our regulatory —their data Systems and reports. This is being system persists in giving lip Service to the pen- sgimented by machine standardization and dic- chant for absolute resource control bv every com­ >âim of higher headquarters. mander. I —their equipment. Many equipment review pan- Much as one hears discontent over centrali- B s and central purchasing bodies in effect dictate zation, the fact remains that the trend is pointing j y their allocation decisions the capability of com- rapidly in that direction. Its adherents claim more fcanders to accomplish their missions. efficient operations, procedural standardization, The list could go on. The issue to be faced is reduced costs, rapid response, and a host of other 88 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW values. Certainly no professional airman would Recent Air Force experience in providing quarrel with the overall objective of providing the tdy personnel to Southeast Asia in support of ac- nation with the best fighting and supporting force celerated activities there demonstrated the prob­ at the least possible cost.° This objective has fa- lem of sourcing many Air Force commands in an thered the Systems for administration and logistic emergency situation. Had the Air Force estab- activities which have become so complex that lished a worldwide base command organization, much attention of commanders is diverted from the problem of moving support people quickly primary air power matters to less important but to a trouble spot would have been redueed. A time-consuming support considerations. single commander responsible for housekeeping This leads to the purpose of this article, the throughout the Air Force would have been able proposed establishment of a worldvvide Air Force to respond more rapidly. More importantly, he Base Command. Why not? There is nothing in- would be in a better position to know which bases herently vvrong in bigness. In fact in the private could best afford to lend the needed assistance sector the giant grocery chains, department store with least disruption to the activities at those bases. organizations, and restaurant/hotel combines are It is not proposed that the tactical commander proving with remarkable success that centraliza- should be denied the resources he needs to fight. tion, procedural standardization, and equity in He must have command and control of his opera- the distribution and control of resources are more tions people and his crews, and he shoidd have efficient. Why shouldnt the Air Force take a leaf command and control of his organizational main- from the book of private enterprise and apply the tenance people and weapons loaders. These are lessons to its own management? A worldwide base the people he must use on deployment anywhere command structure would have many advantages: in the world. Everything and everybody else that • The freeing of tactical commanders from he needs to fight from any base available and direct concem and involvement in logistic and ad- feasible for his use should be provided by a host ministrative problems. This advantage alone holds base commander. If the people and the resources considerable merit for the idea. are not immediately available, they should be provided by the worldwide Air Force Base Com­ • A reduction in the size of tactical head- mand. Such a command could be as responsive quarters, a continuing anathema in the eyes of as the tactical commands in support of general the Congress and the Department of Defense. war or contingency plans. How? By proper mobil- • A more equitable distribution of base itv planning, organization of variable combat sup­ support resources throughout the Air Force. port teams, and exercise of these organizational • The development of an expertise and entities for rapid deployment anywhere, anytime, body of knowledge which would accrue to the either to bare-strip bases or as augmentation to ai benefit of all in terms of uniform procedures, faster going base that needs more help. reaction time, and flexibility in the concentration It is high time that serious thought be giver of support where and when required. to ways and means of accelerating an inevitable • Elimination of expensive and time-con­ development, which is bound to be the child oi' suming cross-servicing agreements (afr 11-4). centralization within the concept of unified com • Improved uniformity in contract Serv­ mand of combat forces. For the benefit of the Ai: ices management and control. Force, now and especially in the next decade, i is proposed that all real estate, and its manage, • More effective response to statutory ment, be assigned to a single Air Force command civilian superiors in justification of the support organized as the Air Force Base Command (afbc) requirements of the Air Force. to do the job. Why wait? Why not do it for our • Improved application of resources in selves and design the organization we need? Be for support of primary tactical and strategic missions. it’s done to us! °Honorable Eugene M. Zuekert, "Defense Resource Alloca- tion Is a Central Problem,” Supplement to the Air Force Policy Hq Pacific Air Force Letter for Commanders, No. 11, 1964, p. 2. EFFICIENCY OR EFFECTIVENESS— LET’S HAVE BOTH

L ie u t e n a x t Colonel James T. Harcrove

ANAGEMENT improvement programs mum efficiency and simultaneously lose maximum M dictated by a varietv of circumstances effectiveness. jriginating at the highest leveis of command die- Consider an example: A Forest Ranger is :ate efficient use of every dollar spent. These faced with the problem of evacuating a family of jrograms bring sharply into foeus a necessity to five, trapped in a forest fire, across a raging river. issess and reassess requirements thoroughly. He has time for only one Crossing, and though his We have been, and will continue to be, called boat will carry six persons effectively it is designed ípon to forego some of the “nice-to-have” goods to carry four efficiently. Should he be efficient or md Services which may have been routine in less effective? The answer is obvious. ean years. The forecast is that future dollar re- Likewise, our answer is obvious. Effective ources will continue to be extremely limited. utilization of resources, now as never before, is a íusiness as usual is not the order of the day. must. VVhere national security is at stake, there Absolute appreciation of the management can be no acceptable alternative to success. >roblem is vital, and Air Force mission elements Forthright acceptance of the challenge to be nust continue to evaluate requirements conscien- both efficient and effective by performing our iously. Conversely, we cannot use “limited fund duties in a professional manner, be the task large .vailability” as an excuse for failure to meet our or small, affords military and civilian personnel of esponsibihties effectively. the United States Air Force a rare opportunity to In a prevailing climate of efficiency, we must contribute to the future of the Air Force and the lso maintain effectiveness. Much has been said of security of the Nation. fficiency, and there is an abundante of guidance Do not let this opportunity pass you by. n how to achieve it. However, we should be ver aware that it is entirely possible to gain maxi- United States Air Force Academy 9 Books and Ideas

JAPANESE WAR HISTORY

Susumu Nish iur a

T THE TIM E of the cessation of hostilities tory of the Second World War on the Japanese J. \_ in August 1945, the Japanese Imperial side. Headquarters of the day instructed the Japanese With the outbreak of the Korean War in forces to destroy all their important documents 1950, the Police Reserve Force was organized in by fire. aceordance with the instructions of General Doug­ The American, British, Soviet, and other las MacArthur, commander of the occupation forces stationed in Japan and abroad made every force. It has since grown into the Japan Self De- effort to seize all the official and private military fense Force of today. In October 1955 a joint Wai documents possessed by Japanese officers and History Office of the three Services, land, sea, and men. Among the important historical papers we air, was established in the Self Defense Force foi are now keeping in the War History Office are the first time after the end of the war as an officia.' not a few which we owe to efforts of the men research institution of history. The present writei who continued to hide them at the risk of their was appointed to the post of its chief. li ves. Thus the investigation, research, and com The destruc-tion of the historical materiais pilation of works on war history began, with tht or their seizure by the occupation force and inde- main emphasis on the Japanese side of the histor} pendent suppression of war-history research activ- of World War II in the Pacific. Under the con- ities by the Japanese government under the rule ditions mentioned, the acquirement of histórica of the occupation authorities, coupled with the materiais was verv hard, and the staff was short prohibition of Japans rearmament, caused a vac- handed, so that it was at first very difficult t( uum in the investigation and research of the his­ advance the work. But the staff was graduall} BOOKSAND IDEAS 91 filled until now it amounts to about 90 persons leased historical materiais of the Ministry of For- in all, including about 40 historians. Nloreover a eign Affairs, the former Japanese Army and Navy, large number of the seized historical papers were etc., including a good many materiais possessed retumed through the good auspices of the United by the War History Office. In comparison with the States Government. Furthermore many other pa­ books published hitherto, it is recognized as exeel- pers hidden hitherto were gathered at home. lent in the richness of the materiais used. It is Thus we ha ve come to possess about a hun- expected that an English version of this book will dred thousand historical items at the present time, be published soon in the United States. and we have had a chance to hear from about a C. Kazuo Horiba. Shinajihen Senso Shido- thousand living experienced warriors on the aver- shi (The History of the Conduct of War in the ige every year. Under these conditions we are con- China Incident). Tokyo: Jijitsushin Sha, 1962. dnuing investigation and research activities. Al- 365 pp., with data book, 780 pp. hough our work is not vet complete enough to D. Maj. Gen. Takeo Imai. Shinajihen no make it open to the public, we hope, in view of Kaiso (Reminiscences of the China Affair). :he demand from all quarters, that a partial ac- Tokyo: Mimizu Shobo, 1964. 385 pp. xumt may be published little by little after a few E. Katsumi Usui and Masao Inaba. Gendai- fears. This matter has not vet been officially deter- shi Shiryo (Japanese Documents for Modem nined. History). 8 vols. Tokyo: Mimizu Shobo, 1964. Although we have not yet published an offi- As the authors present many original mate­ ãal war history in Japan, a good many works of riais, this book is valuable for fundamental study mofficial war history have been published. I will of the Second World War. It should be used to- ntroduce some of them. gether with the separate data books listed under A. Takushiro Hattori. Daitoa Senso Zenshi B and C above. (The Complete History of the Greater East Asia W ar). 8 vols. Tokyo: Masu Shobo, 1956. F. A number of the works belonging in the categorv of private memoirs of experienced mili­ The author, Colonel Hattori, served twice tary persons or those who held important posts luring the war as chief of the operation section. during the war are as follows: Jeneral Staff Office of the Armv. In cooperation «th about ten of his comrades during the war, he (1) Mamoru Shigemitsu (Foreign Minister Showa no Doran iscusses the whole range of political and military during the war). (The Tur- bulent Era of Showa). 2 vols. Tokyo: Chuoko- trategy before and after the opening of hostilities ronsha, 1952. nd the principal battles in the light of previously (2) Shigenori Togo (Foreign Minister at mreleased original materiais. This book is recog- the time of the outbreak and end of the war). lized as one having high accuracv and covering Jidai no Ichimen (A Sign of the Time). Tokyo: broader field than any similar work published Kaizosha, 1952. 360 pp. English version: The itherto. Cause of Japan. New York: Simon and Schu- An English version of the book has not been ster, 1956. ublished, but it seems that a translation of the (3) Masanobu Tsuji (Colonel, Staff Offi- ook is being used by the Historical Section of cer, Imperial Headquarters). Gadarukanaru le U.S. Army. (Guadalcanal). Tokyo: Ato Shobo, 1951. 294 pp. B. The International Politics Society of Ja­ pan. Taiheiyo Senso Eno Michi (The Way to (4) Masanobu Tsuji (Colonel, Staff Officer, the Pacific War). 7 vols., with a separate data Field Army). Jugo Tai Ichi, Biruma no Shito book. Tokyo: The Asahi Newspaper Office, (15 Versus 1: The Struggle for Burma). 1962. Tokyo: Kantosha, 1950. 350 pp. Some dozen scholars, specialists in the mod- (5) Saburo Sakai (Lieutenant, Navy, Com- mander of Fighter Squadron). Sakai Saburo i history of Japan, give an account of all that Kusen Kiroku (Records of Air-Battle by Sa­ ppened from the Manchurian Incident to the buro Sakai). Tokyo: Shuppan Kyodosha, 1956. Etbreak of the Pacific war, based on many unre- 329 pp. English version: Sarnurai by Saburo 92 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Sakai with Martin Caidin and Fred Saito. New allowance must be ma de for their special charac- York: E. P. Dutton & Sons, 1957. 382 pp. ter as private memoirs. ( 6 ) Matoi Ugaki (Vice-Admiral, Chief of G. Others: Staff, Combined Fleet). Sensoroku (Memoirs of the W ar). 2 vols. Tokyo: Nippon Shuppan (1 ) The works of Masanori Ito Kyodosha, 1953. Mr. Ito was one of the excellent journalists in (7) Ryunosuke Kusaka (Vice-Admiral, Chief Japan. His works have persuasive power and are of Staff, The lst Air-Fleet and Combined popular books having many readers. Fleet). Rcngo Kantai (The Combined Fleet). (a) Masanori Ito. Tcikoku Rikugun no Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspaper Office, 1956. Saigo (The End of the Imperial Japanese 228 pp. Army). 4 vols. Tokvo: Bungeishunju Shinsha, (8 ) Atsushi Oi (Captain, Navy, Staff Offi- 1956. cer, Sea Escort). Kaijct Goeisen (The Japanese (b) Masanori Ito. Rengo Kantainno Anti-Submarine). Tokyo: Nippon Shuppan Saigo. Tokyo: Bungeishunju Miinstia, jlooòí Kyodosha, 1953. 301 pp. 330 pp. English version: The End of the Im- (9) Minoru Genda (Captain, Navy). Kai- perial Japanese Navtj. New York: W. W. Nor­ gunkokutai Shimatsuki (Storv of the Naval ton & Companv, 1956. A Japanese account of Air Force). 2 vols. Tokyo: Bungeishunju the rise and fali of sea power, with emphasis Shinsha, 1961. on World War II. (10) Shigeru Fukutome (Vice-Admiral, (c) Masanori Ito. Rengo Kantai no Eiko Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet). Kaigun no (The Glorv of the Combined Fleet). Tokyo: Hansei (Reflections on the Navy). Tokyo: Bungeishunju Shinsha, 1962. 274 pp. Shuppan Kyodosha, 1951. 246 pp. (2) Ikuhiko Hata. Nichusensoshi (The His- torv of the China Ineident). Tokyo: Kawade (11) Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Oku- Shobo, 1961. 369 pp. miya. Middowei. Tokyo: Nippon Shuppan Kyo­ Mr. Hata is one of the writers of Taiheiyol dosha, 1951. 294 pp. English version: Midway, Senso eno Michi. He describes the course and The Battle that Doomed Japan: The Japanese complicated circumstances of the China AffairJ Navy s Story. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, especially the state of affairs on the spot and 1955. 266 pp. in Tokyo. (12) Tameichi Hara (Vice-Admiral). Tei- (3) The Institute of Diplomatic Affairs in koku Kaigun no Saigo. Tokyo: Kavvade Shobo, Japan. Taiheiyosenso Geninron (The Origins 1955. 219 pp. English version: Japanese De- of the Pacific War). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku stroyer Captain by Tameichi Hara, Fred Saito, Shuppan Kai, 1957. 800 pp. and Roger Pineau. New York: Ballantine Books, 1961. (4) The Institute of Diplomatic Affairs in Japan. Taiheiyosenso Shuketsuhen (The Ter- (13) Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Oku- mination of Hostilities in the Pacific). Tokyoá miya. Kidobutai (Task Force). Tokyo: Nippon Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1958. 861 pp. Shuppan Kyodosha, 1951. 345 pp. (5) Saburo Hayashi. Taiheiyosenso Riku- (14) Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Naka- sengaishi. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951. 30a jima. Kamikaze Tokuhctsu Kogekitai. Tokyo: pp. English version: Kogun, The Japanese Nippon Shuppan Kyodosha, 1951. 428 pp. Army in the Pacific War by Saburo Havashí English version: The Divine Wind. Japan’s and Alvin D. Coox. Quantico, Va.: Marinp Kamikaze Force in World War II. Annapolis: Corps Association, 1955. U.S. Naval Institute, 1958. 240 pp. (6 ) Soki c hi Ta k a g i. Taiheiyo Kaiscnshi (15) Nariyoshi Furukawa. Shisei no Mon (Story of the Japanese Naval Operations in the (Gate to the Other World). Tokyo: Chuosha, Pacific W ar). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 194(1 1949. 286 pp. 238 pp. The author gives a story of the Japanese side The two books (5) and (6 ) present respefl| in the battle of Okinawa. tivelv a summary of land and naval warfaif I withhold comment on each of the above- in the Pacific war. mentioned books; however, as a matter of course (7) Fumio Iwava. Chtiko (Battles of Naval BOOKSAND IDEAS 93

Attack Plane). 2 vols. Tokyo: Shuppan Kyo- New York: E. P. Dutton & Sons, 1956. 424 pp. dosha, 1958. (6) Haruji Kan. Rikusen Heiki no Zenbo H. Some books pertaining to weapons, ships, (The Whole Aspect of the Japanese Army jairplanes, etc., used by the Japanese forces: Weapons). Tokyo: Koyosha, 1953. 483 pp, (1) Kitaro Matsuki. Senkan Yamato, Musa- I. Pictorial Records: shi no Sekkei to Kenzo (The Design and Con- (1) Minoru Akimoto. Nippon Rikugun Ko- struction of the Battleships Yamato and Musa- kutai Shashinshu (Pictorial Record of the Jap­ shi). Tokyo: Haga Shoten, 1961. 422 pp. anese Army Aviation Corps). Tokyo: Shuppan (2) Shizuo Fukui. Zosen Gijitsu no Zenbo Kyodosha, 1961. 126 pp. (The Whole Aspect of the Japanese Naval (2) Minoru Akimoto. Nippon Kaigun Ko- Shipbuilding). Tokyo: Koyosha, 1953. 293 pp. kutai Shashinshu (Pictorial Record of the Japa­ (3) Shizuo Fukui. Nippon no Gunkan (Jap­ nese Navy Aviation Corps). Tokyo: Shuppan anese Warships). Tokyo: Shuppan Kyodosha, Kyodosha, 1960. 114 pp. 1956. 292 pp. (3) Shigeo Moritaka. Daitoa Senso Shashin- (4) Kumao Mizuno. Nippon Gunyoki no shu (Pictorial History of the Greater East Asia Zenbo (The Whole Aspect of Japanese Army War). 8 vols. Tokyo: Fuji Shoen, 1954. and Navy Aircraft). Tokyo: Kantosha, 1960. (4) Akira Takeuchi and Tomio Hara. Nip- 324 pp. pon no Sensha (Japanese Tanks). 2 vols. Tokyo: (5) Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya. Shuppan Kyodosha, 1961. Zerosen. 2 vols. Tokyo: Shuppan Kyodosha, (5) Yutaka Asanaga and Tadatoshi Yokoi. 1954. English version: Zero. The Inside Story Shashinshu Teikoku Kaigun (Pictorial Record of Japans .Air War in the Pacific by Jiro Hori­ of the Imperial Japanese Navy). 2 vols. Tokyo: koshi, Masatake Okumiya, and Martin Caidin. Shuppan Kyodosha, 1960. Tokyo, Japan The Contributors

G en er a l Ber n a r d A. S chriever (M .S., Stanford University) is Commander, Air Force Systems Command. After completing flying training in 1933, he served as a homber pilot at March and Alhrook Fields, reverted to inactive reserve status in 1937, and flew for Northwest Airlines until he re-entered the Service as a 2d lieutenant. Army Air Corps, in 1938. He served a year with the 7th Bombardment Group, then was assigned as a test pilot at VVright Field, where he attended the Air Corps Engineering School. After studying aeronautical engineering at Stanford in 1941-42, he joined the 19th Bombardment Group, Southwest Pacific Theater and in 1944 assumed command of the Advance Headquarters, Far East Service Command. Postwar assignments have been as Chief, Scientific Liaison Section, DCS/Materiel, Hq USAF; student, National War College, 1950; Assistant for Development Planning, Hq USAF, to 1954; Assistant to the Commander, Air Kesearch and Development Command, and Commander, Air Force Ballistic Missiie Division, ARDC, 1954-59; and as Commander, ARDC, until the Air Force Systems Command was created in 1961.

C olonel Ai . len K. M c D onald is D eputy D irector of Aerospace Weapons, DCS/Plans, Headquarters Air Defense Command. Com- missioned on completion of flying training in 1943, he served in the European Theater of Operations as a B-26 pilot. Following various postwar assignments in the United States, he was sent to Korea in 1954, where he served as Commander, 40th Fighter Inter- ceptor Squadron, and Commander, 35th Fighter Interceptor Group. After a tour of duty in Japan, he attended Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, then was assigned to Headquarters USAF as Interceptor Systems Operations Officer, Air Defense Division, DCS/Operations. Upon graduation from the Air W ar College in 1960 he assumed his present position.

L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l W il l ia m H. T unner, USAF Retired (USMA) was Coi mander, Military Air Transport Service, at the time of his retirement. After flyia training in 1929, he served with various tactical and training units until 1939, wh he was assigned to the Military Personnel Division, Olfice of the Chief of the Air Cor] When the Air Transport Command was organized in 1942, he was named command of the Ferrying Division. During World War II he commanded the India-China Div sion, ATC, with responsibility for the "Hump” airlift. In 1948 he assumed commat of the Atlantic Division of the new Military’ Air Transport Service. Shortlv aftervard he was ordered to Germany to command the USAF-RAF airlift into hlockaded Berlir After a tour at Hq MATS as Deputy Commander for Operations, 1949-50, he cí manded the Comhat Cargo Command of the Far East Air Forces during the Kor W ar. He then served as Deputy Commander, Air Materiel Command, until 1953, wh*l> he retum ed to Germany as Com mander in C hief, United States Air Forces in FnropJ ( USA FE ). He was Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters USAF. from 195* until his assignment as Commander, MATS, in 1958. During his years of actise dtr General Tunner was awarded the DSC and four times was awarded the DSM. well as many foreign decorations. Since retirement on 31 May 1960 he is as well as farming at W are Neck, Virgínia. He is author of Ovrr the Hump, pubhshCB by Duell, Sloan and Pearce in 1964. LiErre x A ST Colo.vei D onald F. M artin is assigned to Hq Pacific Air Forcei and is in charge oí Project CHECX) ( Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations >. After flying training in 1943, he »as assigned to the Eighth Air Force and flew thirty combat missions. Postwar assignments have been as student. Statistical School, Harvard University; in the Coinptrol- U-r’s Office. Hq Air Materiel Cora- rnand; again in Engtand 1948-51; in the Dírectorate af Flight Safety Re­ search. XurtoE AFB. 1951-54; as stu­ dent, Air Comraand and Staff College, 1955; as Deputy Director of Opera­ tions. 38 th Air Division. Strategic Air Command, 1957-58; and in the Di- rectorate of Plans, DCS Plans and Operations. Hq USAF, 1958-63.

Db. Houit H. Pco l iit ( Ph-D., University oí Chicago) is Assistant Profes­ sor af Gorerom enr and Forelgn Affairs. Universúv of Virgínia. Previously he iras a ooíisuhant to the RAND Corporation. 1962: Assistant Professor of Bafitical Science. Mary Washington College, University of Virgínia. 1961-63; md Social Science Research Cosmcil Postdoctoral Fellow and \’isiting Scholar st the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1963-64. He is the author of "The Mibtary Role in Space A Sommary of OffiaLal. Public Justificatkm s.” UN D publiration P-2631, August 1962, reprinted m Re^ertitms on Space. J.5. Air Force Acodem), 1964.

I ajum t t a x u u B tM *« . Ja., USAFR ( M_V. University uf Michigan i is Staif Infor- utiun O ficer, Aeronauticãi Systems Divmon (Part l. Reservei. In civilian life he i Public Information Offiter for the C a n tm ty of Mu. higan's health Science scbools nd hospital. Dunng World W ar 11 he terved as celestial nasigation uístructor and in br Public Reiations Office for Operation Crussruads. Rcsallrd to active duty in 1950, e im une OiC, Radio Srctwn, Hq FEAF-PIO, and in July 1951 he vias among the nt AP Information ofBcrrv assigned to the Muasan Press Camp covenng the start of rgutiatiuns with the CCF and NKPA at Karscmg. Maior Bender is the author of nmernus articles and short stories and a novel, Tokyo fntngue (1956).

CarTaiv Fma n b H. Dowku. (Ph.D., University of Tennessee) is O i.ef Knl.-m.ili.givt, 5th Kpidemiological Flight ÍP A C A F). After u-rving in the Infantry during World War II, he was an instruetor at tlie liuvrrvity of the South and an assistant professor at Presbytcrinn College before entrring the Air Force in 1951. He has served as in- •tnictor in entorno|ogy and parasitology. USA F School of Aviation M*«l i eme. 19 >1-55. i ntomologist and parasitologist, 5th Epidetniologi- cal Flight. 1955-58. Chief, Erivironmental Research Branch, Army Bi .l igioal Warfarr Laboratories. Fort Detrlch, Maryland, 1958-59; Knt .11 'I ogist. Speoal Aerial Spray Flight (TAC), 1959-62; and as USAF1T student at the University of Tennessee, 1962-64. Captain D °»dl taas a mrmber of thr Armerl Forces Pest Control Board, 1958- 62. and was electrd Vier* Chairmun in 1961; he also served on the fr.t-„|rpartmental Committee on Prst Control. 1959-62. He Is b 1953 gr ul i itp of the Sqoadmn Officer School and hiu published numerous •cienttfic papen. B hicaoieh G en er a l H a iih y J. S ands, J r . ( B .S ., Ohio State University) is Commander, Ballistic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command. He completed pilot training in 1940, and in 1942 he was assigned to activate and command the 403d Troop Carrier Group, which went to the South Pacific Theater in June 1943. He later became deputy commander of the South Pacific combat air transport operation. In 1945 he was assigned to the Engineering Division, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, where he worked on missile development, becoming Chief, Guided Missile Section, a part of the Air Research and Development Command. Other assignments have heen as Assist- ant Chief of Development for Aircraft and Missiles, Hq ARDC, to 1953; Deputy for Operations, later Deputy Commander for Tests, Air Force Eastem Test Range, to 1956; student, Advanced Management Program, Harvard University, 1956; student. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1957; Commander, 38th Tactical Missile Wing, Germany, 1958-61; Vice Commander, Air Force Eastem Test Range, from July 1961 until he was named Commander in January 1964.

D r . K en n et h R. VVhitinc (Ph.D., Harvard University) is a mem- her of the Aerospace Studies Institute and of the faculty, Air Uni­ versity. He formerly taught Russian history at Tufts College. Dr. W hiting is the author of The Sovict Union Today: A Concisa Hand- hook ( 1962) and of numerous studies and monographs on Russian subjects, including R eadings in Soviet M ilitary Thcory, Essays on Soviet Problem s of Nationality and Industrial M anagement, Iron Ore Resources of the U.S.S.R.. and M aterials on the Soviet Petro- leum Industry. He also contrihuted two chapters to Asher Lee’s book, The Soviet Air Force, and an article to Eugenc Emme’s book, The Im pact of Air Power.

Colonel J. Tod Meser o w (M .S., University of the Philippines; M .B.A., George Washington University) is Chief, Manpower and Organization Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq Pacific Air Forces. From 1941 through World War II he served in various supply and maintenanee positions. After five years on inaetive status, he was recalled to active duty in 1951 for the Korean War. He has since served in manpower and organization activities with the 97th Bomb Wing, the Thirteenth Air Force, Hq USAF, and Hq ADC. Colonel Meserow is a 1963 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Susumu Nish iu r a , formerly Colonel, Japanese Anny, is Chief, W ar History Office, Defense Agency, Japan. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1922 and from the War College in 1930, then served with the Ministry of the Army. He studied mil­ itary affairs in China ( six months) and in France (two years) as a resi- dent officer, 1934-37. Next he served as Secretary to the Minister of the Army and as Chief of the Military Administration Section until 1944, when he was assigned as a sênior staff officer with the Expeditionary Force in China. Since the war he has heen engaged in historical investigation of the Japanese Army and Xavy and the conduct of the Pacific war.

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel James T. H arcrove is Direetor of Adminis* trative Services, Headquarters United States Air Force Academy- EDITORIAL STAFF

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. Gantz, USAF, Ph.D., Editor Jack H. Moonev, M.A., Managing Editor Lieutenant Colonel Harmon H. Harper, USAF. C.hief, Acquisition Branch Edmund O. Barkcr, Financial and Administrativo Manager John A. Westcott, Jr., Art Director and Production Managcr Enrique Caston, Ph.D.. Associate Editor, Spanish Languagc Edition L. Midosi May Patterson, Assistant Editor. Portuguesa Languagc Edition William J. DePaola. Ulustrator Major Robert G. Sparkman. USAF, M.A., Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

Coloxel Glex W. Clark, Hq Air Defense Command Coloxel William J. Mc Glnty, Hq Air Force Systems Command Coloxel Geo r g e Schexkein, Hq Tactical Air Command Coloxel Joseph A. Stuart. J r ., Hq Military Air Transport Service Lieu t ex a x t Coloxel Jack Rose, Hq United States Strike Command Lieu t ex a x t Coloxel James F. Suxder max, Hq Pacific Air Forces Hahry A. Ha ber er , Hq Air Force Logistics Command L a Ver xe E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air Umversity Review is published to stimulafe professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, ond related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opimons of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and ore not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart­ ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed.