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Ministry of Defence Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym Long Title 1ACC No. 1 Air Control Centre 1SL First Sea Lord 200D Second OOD 200W Second 00W 2C Second Customer 2C (CL) Second Customer (Core Leadership) 2C (PM) Second Customer (Pivotal Management) 2CMG Customer 2 Management Group 2IC Second in Command 2Lt Second Lieutenant 2nd PUS Second Permanent Under Secretary of State 2SL Second Sea Lord 2SL/CNH Second Sea Lord Commander in Chief Naval Home Command 3GL Third Generation Language 3IC Third in Command 3PL Third Party Logistics 3PN Third Party Nationals 4C Co‐operation Co‐ordination Communication Control 4GL Fourth Generation Language A&A Alteration & Addition A&A Approval and Authorisation A&AEW Avionics And Air Electronic Warfare A&E Assurance and Evaluations A&ER Ammunition and Explosives Regulations A&F Assessment and Feedback A&RP Activity & Resource Planning A&SD Arms and Service Director A/AS Advanced/Advanced Supplementary A/D conv Analogue/ Digital Conversion A/G Air‐to‐Ground A/G/A Air Ground Air A/R As Required A/S Anti‐Submarine A/S or AS Anti Submarine A/WST Avionic/Weapons, Systems Trainer A3*G Acquisition 3‐Star Group A3I Accelerated Architecture Acquisition Initiative A3P Advanced Avionics Architectures and Packaging AA Acceptance Authority AA Active Adjunct AA Administering Authority AA Administrative Assistant AA Air Adviser AA Air Attache AA Air‐to‐Air AA Alternative Assumption AA Anti‐Aircraft AA Application Administrator AA Area Administrator AA Australian Army AAA Anti‐Aircraft Artillery AAA Automatic Anti‐Aircraft AAAD Airborne Anti‐Armour Defence Acronym -
The Gulfwar Andrew Charles Watt Andrew Charles Wall - the Gull War
The GulfWar Andrew Charles Watt Andrew Charles Wall - The Gull War TABLE· OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 3 CHAPTER 1 7 Strategy and Technology- A Theoretical and AnalYlical Framework 7 CHAPTER 2 14 TcchrlOlogy and (he Gulf War 14 CHAPTER 3 27 Technology and the Decision-making Process of War - An Analysis of the Grand Strategic, Stratcgic ami Operational Leveh of Strategy 27 Thc Grand Suategic Level 27 The Strategic Level 30 Th~ Operational Level 38 CHAPTER 4 43 Technology, Strategy and the Decision Procc:;s 43 CHAPTER 5 55 Conclusiom; 55 APPENDIX 1 62 US Spacc Systems Employed in the Persian Gulf 62 APPENDIX 2 64 Organisaliom Reporting to the Secretary of Defense 64 2 Andrew Charles Wall - The Gull War Introduction 'It is not a Nintendo game. It is a tough battlefield where people are risking their lives' SC/Jwarzkopf (1) It is interesting btl[ not unexpected that General Schwarzkopf had to make this exhortation to the media. This 'Ninlendo' image of war was. however. poruayed by the military themselves in their initial briefings. Clearly there was no willingness to divnlge (he detail of the operation, so a hungry press was fed pictures of the snccessful performance of the Coalition weapons. Modern telecommunications allowed the entire world to bare witness to the dramatically effectivc impact of high technology weapon systc::.ms. Real time broadcasts were available for the rust time and as such the Gulf War developed into an immensely successful media event. The mcdia's fascination with the technologies employed in battle and their access availability to real time coverage meant that the world saw a high speed low casna]ty conflict. -
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BALLISTIC MISSILE ANALYSIS COMMITTEE 2 KEY FINDINGS Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power, especially when those systems are armed with weapons of mass destruction. However, numerous types of ballistic and cruise missiles have achieved dramatic improvements in accuracy that allow them to be used effectively with conventional warheads. Some weapon systems have characteristics of both ballistic and cruise missiles. For example, ballistic missile-launched hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) can maneuver in the atmosphere similar to cruise missiles, and future supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles may be launched by large rocket boosters. Highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles can be used to deter or counter adversary forces deploying to or operating within a defined space or theater. Russia SS-27 ICBM TEL NORTH KOREA North Korea has a strong desire to develop long-range ballistic missile systems that can threaten the United States and its allies. During a 2012 military parade, North Korea unveiled its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-13, and subsequently debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade. Flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) began in April 2016 with a series of failures. North Korea followed those failures by launching multiple new missiles in 2017. In April 2017, North Korea also commenced flight testing of a new liquid-propellant IRBM, the Hwasong-12. That same year, North Korea performed the inaugural flight tests of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBMs. Upon its launch in 2017, the Hwasong-14 marked the first flight-tested ICBM-class missile for North Korea. -
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017
2017 BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THREAT DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BALLISTIC MISSILE ANALYSIS COMMITTEE 2 Key Findings India Agni IV IRBM Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power. These weapons present an asymmetric threat to US forces. Many ballistic and cruise missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction. However, numerous types of ballistic and cruise missiles have achieved dramatic improvements in accuracy that allow them to be used effectively with conventional warheads. These highly accurate weapons can be used in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missions. The term A2/AD refers to capabilities designed to deter or counter adversary forces from deploying to or operating within a defined space. North Korea has been developing the road-mobile Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for several years and in October 2015 unveiled the Hwasong-14, a new road-mobile ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which placed a satellite in orbit for the first time in December 2012, placed a second satellite in orbit in February 2016. Flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) began in April 2016 with multiple failures. Several new solid-propellant missiles including a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) are also being developed. In April 2017, North Korea also commenced flight testing of a new liquid-propellant IRBM, the Hwasong-12. Tehran’s desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM. -
Air University Review: March-April 1965, Volume XVI, No. 3
PROJECT FORECAST...THE YF-12A INTERCEPTOR WEAPON S Y S T E M . J O I N T EXERCISE GOLD FIRE I M A RC H -A PR IL 1965 STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AIR UNIVERSITY R eview THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE F orecast............................................................................................................................................................... 2 Gen. Bemard A. Sehriever, usaf T he YF-12A Interceptor Wea po n Syst em........................................................................................ 13 Col. Allen K. McDonald, usaf Do W e Waxt a Super sonic Transport or an $89 Trip to Eur ope? ................................... 18 Lt. Gen. William H. Tnnner, usaf (Ret) E xer cise Gold Fir e I ...................................................................................................................................... 22 Maj. Robert G. Sparkman, usaf Amer ic a n Spa c e Policy: C iv il ia n /M il it a r y Dic h o t o my................................................................45 Dr. Robert H. Puckett Viet Nam: T he Diffic u l t Yea r s...............................................................................................................51 Lt. Col. Donald F. Martin, usaf The Co mma xder and His Information Officer ..................................................................................59 Maj. William Bender, Jr., usafr The Bio l o c ic a l Basis of Arms Control..............................................................................................64