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Occupied Palestinian Territory OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY: Gaza offensive adds to scale of displacement A profile of the internal displacement situation 30 December, 2009 This Internal Displacement Profile is automatically generated from the online IDP database of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It includes an overview of the internal displacement situation in the country prepared by the IDMC, followed by a compilation of excerpts from relevant reports by a variety of different sources. All headlines as well as the bullet point summaries at the beginning of each chapter were added by the IDMC to facilitate navigation through the Profile. Where dates in brackets are added to headlines, they indicate the publication date of the most recent source used in the respective chapter. The views expressed in the reports compiled in this Profile are not necessarily shared by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The Profile is also available online at www.internal-displacement.org. About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide. Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations. At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries. Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives. For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Norwegian Refugee Council Chemin de Balexert 7-9 1219 Geneva, Switzerland Tel.: +41 22 799 07 00 [email protected] www.internal-displacement.org 2 CONTENTS OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................................7 GAZA OFFENSIVE ADDS TO SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT ........................................................... 7 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 17 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 17 BACKGROUND FROM THE 1967 WAR TO FIRST INTIFADA ..................................................... 17 FROM 1991 TO 2006: MAKING AND LIMITS OF OSLO ACCORDS.......................................... 19 YEARS 2006 - 2008: PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 2006 TO GAZA-ISRAELI TRUCE 2008..................................................................................................................... 20 FROM 2008 TO 2009: OPERATION CAST LEAD TO THE GOLDSTONE REPORT ...................... 23 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 25 METHODOLOGY: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT/FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE OPT ............... 25 CAUSES ........................................................................................................................... 27 PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT IN THE OPT (2009) ................................................ 27 APPLIED LAW ................................................................................................................... 29 APPLICABLE LAW IN THE OPT ........................................................................................... 29 POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE ...................................................................... 34 GLOBAL FIGURES ............................................................................................................. 34 GLOBAL FIGURES (2009) .................................................................................................. 34 PROFILE ........................................................................................................................... 39 PROFILE OF PERSONS DISPLACED..................................................................................... 39 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION (2009) ............................................................................... 40 VOICES OF THE DISPLACED ............................................................................................... 41 PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT ................................................................................. 43 GENERAL PATTERNS ........................................................................................................ 43 GENERAL PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT............................................................................ 43 HOUSE DEMOLITIONS & DISPLACEMENT............................................................................ 43 GENERAL HOUSE DEMOLITIONS (2009) ............................................................................. 43 MILITARY CLEARING OPERATIONS & HOUSE DEMOLITIONS:................................................ 50 PUNITIVE HOUSE DEMOLITIONS (2009) .............................................................................. 51 HOUSE DEMOLITIONS BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (2009) ............................ 55 SEPARATION WALL .......................................................................................................... 58 SEPARATION WALL/BARRIER............................................................................................. 58 INTERNATIONAL AND ISRAELI RULINGS ON THE SEPARATION WALL (2009) .......................... 65 SETTLEMENTS & DISPLACEMENT ...................................................................................... 69 SETTLEMENTS, SEPARATION WALL AND SETTLER VIOLENCE IN OPT .................................. 69 3 NATURE AND IMPACT OF SETTLEMENTS & OUTPOSTS ........................................................ 72 SETTLEMENTS & OUTPOSTS SINCE ANNAPOLIS (2009) ...................................................... 76 SETTLEMENTS, AND SETTLER VIOLENCE (2009) ................................................................ 79 SETTLEMENTS, ‘CLOSED MILITARY AREAS’, AND SETTLER & IDF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION: EXAMPLE OF SOUTH HEBRON HILLS .................................................................................. 81 HEBRON: EFFECT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, ISRAELI POLICIES, AND VIOLENCE (2009)........ 83 EAST JERUSALEM............................................................................................................. 86 EAST JERUSALEM (WEST BANK)........................................................................................ 86 EAST JERUSALEM & HOUSE DEMOLITIONS (2009).............................................................. 87 MUNICIPAL PLANNING & BUILDING PERMIT IN EAST JERUSALEM ......................................... 91 SETTLEMENTS IN EAST JERUSALEM (2009)........................................................................ 95 REVOCATION OF JERUSALEM RESIDENCY & FAMILY REUNIFICATION................................... 96 EAST JERUSALEM & SEPARATION WALL .......................................................................... 100 MILITARY INCURSIONS & STRATEGY................................................................................ 104 ISRAELI INCURSIONS & CLEARING STRATEGY IN WEST BANK & GAZA ............................... 104 ISRAELI INCURSIONS IN WEST BANK AND GAZA (2009)..................................................... 105 MILITARY CLEARING STRATEGY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF BUFFER ZONES (2009).............. 109 CLOSURES AND DISPLACEMENT...................................................................................... 114 CLOSURE REGIME, RESTRICTIONS IN FREEDOM OF MOMENT & ISRAELI INFRASTRUCTURE (2009)............................................................................................................................ 114 TIGHTENING CONTROL AND DISPLACEMENT: EXAMPLES OF VILLAGE OF AL-NU’UMAN AND CITY OF NABLUS ............................................................................................................. 117 PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT .............................................. 120 PHYSICAL SECURITY....................................................................................................... 120 GENERAL PHYSICAL SECURITY IN OPT (2009) ................................................................ 120 ISRAELI IDF INTIMIDATION, HARASSMENT & MILITARY INCURSIONS (2009)........................ 123 SETTLER VIOLENCE & LACK OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2009)............................................. 127 INTRA-PALESTINIAN CLASHES IN WEST BANK AND GAZA (2009) ....................................... 130 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT................................................................................................ 132 GENERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ................................................................................ 132 INTERNAL CLOSURES & EXTERNAL
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