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Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA Asia Report N°242 | 15 January 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. PATA’s Legal Framework and the Roots of Conflict ........................................................ 3 A. Constitutional and Legal Status ................................................................................. 3 B. The Onset of Islamist Militancy ................................................................................. 5 1. Revolt of the elite .................................................................................................. 5 2. Empowering militants .......................................................................................... 7 III. The Military Operation in Malakand ............................................................................... 11 A. Scorching the Earth ................................................................................................... 11 B. The Morning After ..................................................................................................... 12 1. Security challenges in Swat and Dir ..................................................................... 12 2. Growing violence in Chitral .................................................................................. 14 IV. The State’s Response: Progress or Regression? ............................................................... 16 A. The Detainee Conundrum ......................................................................................... 16 1. Justice denied ....................................................................................................... 16 2. Deradicalisation efforts ........................................................................................ 20 B. Outsourcing Law Enforcement .................................................................................. 21 V. PATA’s Militarisation ....................................................................................................... 22 A. Controlling Malakand ................................................................................................ 22 B. Economic Encroachment ........................................................................................... 23 C. The Costs of Conflict .................................................................................................. 24 VI. Moving Forward ............................................................................................................... 27 A. Improving Policing .................................................................................................... 27 B. Legal Reforms ............................................................................................................ 30 1. Parallel Legal Systems .......................................................................................... 30 2. Anti-Terrorism laws ............................................................................................. 31 C. Political Ownership .................................................................................................... 34 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 38 APPENDICES A. Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................................ 39 B. Map of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and FATA .......................................................... 40 C. Glossary of Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 41 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°242 15 January 2013 Executive Summary Pakistan’s Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), which include Swat and six neighbouring districts and areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK), re- mains volatile more than three years after military operations sought to oust Islamist extremists. Militant groups such as the Sunni extremist Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Mohammadi (TNSM) and its Pakistani Taliban-linked Fazlullah faction are no longer as powerful in Swat and other parts of PATA as they were in 2008 and early 2009, but their leaders and foot soldiers remain at large, regularly attacking security personnel and civilians. If this once dynamic region is to stabilise, PATA’s governance, security and economic revival must become a top priority for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government in Islamabad and the Awami National Party (ANP)-led gov- ernment in Peshawar – and for their successors following the next general elections. While the militants continue to present the main physical threat, the military’s poorly conceived counter-insurgency strategies, heavy-handed methods and failure to restore responsive and accountable civilian administration and policing are proving counter-productive, aggravating public resentment and widening the gulf between PATA’s citizens and the state. Meanwhile neither the federal nor the KPK provincial government is fully addressing the security concerns of residents. Public and political support for action against the TNSM and allied Pakistani Tal- iban networks in Swat and its neighbouring districts remains strong, demonstrated by the outrage against the 9 October 2012 attack by Mullah Fazlullah’s Taliban fac- tion on Malala Yousafzai, a Swat-based fourteen-year-old activist for girls’ right to education. That attack has also further eroded public confidence in the military’s claims of having dismantled the insurgency and underscores the grave security chal- lenges that PATA’s residents face. The military’s continued control over the security agenda, governance and admin- istration in PATA and the state’s failure to equip KPK’s police force with the tools and authority it needs to tackle extremist violence lie at the heart of the security and governance challenges. Some serious efforts have been made to enhance police capac- ity, functioning and presence on the streets, including by increasing the size of the force and the number of police stations, particularly in Swat. However, they are insuf- ficient. The KPK police should be properly trained, equipped, and accountable. Islam- abad and Peshawar, KPK’s provincial capital, need to abolish parallel law enforce- ment entities such as Levies, dismantle state-supported tribal lashkars (militias) and give KPK’s police the lead in enforcing the law and bringing extremists to justice. Yet, the complexities of PATA’s legal framework still make upholding the rule of law a daunting task. Unlike the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), PATA is subject to Pakistan’s basic criminal and civil law framework and falls under the ju- risdiction of the provincial KPK legislature (in addition to the National Assembly) and the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court. However, under Article 247 of the constitution, laws apply to PATA, as in FATA, only if specifically extended by the governor (the federation’s representative), with the president’s consent. Since formally joining KPK (then called Northwest Frontier Province) in 1969, PATA has also been governed by various parallel legal systems that have under- mined constitutional rights and isolated it from the rest of KPK. More recent reforms have only expanded that isolation. Despite public opposition to Islamist militancy in Swat and neighbouring PATA districts, the ANP-led provincial government has not repealed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, which imposed Sharia (Islamic law) in Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA Crisis Group Asia Report N°242, 15 January 2013 Page ii PATA as part of a military-devised peace deal with the Taliban-allied TNSM in April 2009. In August 2011, President Asif Ali Zardari promulgated the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 (AACP) for PATA and FATA, vesting the military with virtually unchecked powers of arrest and detention and further undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. While the AACP provides legal cover for the military’s human rights abuses, the imposition of Sharia has made effective and accountable governance elusive. Efforts to revive a shattered economy, once heavily dependent on tourism, have also faltered, and pressing humanitarian needs remain unmet because of continued instability and short-sighted military-dictated policies and methods. These include travel restrictions on foreigners, stringent requirements for domestic and interna- tional NGOs, abrasive and intrusive questioning at military checkposts and the mili- tary’s deep economic encroachment. To overcome PATA’s rising security challenges, the national and provincial lead- erships should reclaim the political space ceded to the military. Islamabad and Pesh- awar must develop and assume ownership over a reform agenda that ends PATA’s legal and political isolation, strengthens a deteriorating justice system, revokes laws that undermine constitutionally guaranteed fundamental