Swann, Peter William (1994) British Attitudes Towards the Soviet Union, 1951-1956
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Swann, Peter William (1994) British attitudes towards the Soviet Union, 1951-1956. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1506/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] British Attitudes towards the Soviet Union, 1951-1956 Peter William Swann Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D. Faculty of' Arts University of Glasgow September, 1994 Abstract The thesis is concerned with the British perception of Soviet foreign policy between 1951 and 1956. In particular it examines the understanding that British diplomats, politicians and civil servants had of the process of change which the death of Stalin stimulated in the Kremlin's relations with the outside world. The core of the study centres around 1955, as this was the pivotal point for the British. With the ascendancy of Khrushchev there was perceived not only a new emphasis in Moscow on the necessity of avoiding global war between East and West, but also a new interest in economic competition. By 1956 Whitehall and concluded that there were a number of factors informing the Soviet re-evaluation of foreign policy. Among which were: the stabilisation of the Western alliance culminating with West German rearmament in 1955; the cost of defence expenditure both in armaments and in supporting the satellite regimes and China; the development of American and Soviet thermonuclear potentials. The latter was thought by the British to be the most profound in its implications on the Soviet approach to the future of international relations. The Soviet leadership certainly appeared eager to be friendly and particularly to communicate an awareness of the grotesque futility of a war employing the latest weaponry. To this end they agreed to the Geneva Summit of 1955. Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan were convinced by this meeting that, in Macmillan's words, "there ain't gonna be no war". For a few brief, golden months, it seemed in London as if the Cold War might even be negotiated into history. However, by the end of 1955 it was apparent to the British that Geneva did not mean the Kremlin had liven up aspirations to global supremacy, rather that the means to this end were now to be different. Khrushchev, according to the Foreign Office analysis, placed a new emphasis on the role of economic power in the process of undermining Western forms of politics and society, both directly in the potential of Soviet style economies to out-perform capitalist and in the use of economic muscle as a conduit of political influence through economic aid and trade. The latter policy appeared to play a crucial role in the Soviet attempt to take advantage of the birth of post-colonial states in Asia and Africa. The thesis does not go on to discuss in any detail the implications of the above for British foreign policy, but it does make a broader point about the bearing which British perceptions of Soviet policy had upon their attitude to Egypt before and during the Suez Crisis. The threat of global war might have receded, but the Soviet Union was now seen to be posing a new challenge to British influence in areas of the world which were still of vital economic importance, Egypt being chief among them. Britain's influence in the Third World was not only challenged by the rise of indigenous nationalisms, but these nationalisms could now turn to the Soviet Union for succour and support. From this perspective Britain's position was more precarious than it had ever been before. Table of' Contents Preface. p. 5 Chapter 1. Soviet Iorci, Policy its k Intý, 1050-1050, h. 7 -,n and rit1"11 Soviet I Policy, 7 orei, -,n p. The British Perceivers, p. 18 Chapter '. Churchill. MdknLov and the ýýýircI1 In'r a ýuinnýit: "Whoring after the Russians", I). 25 The End of the Stalin Fri, h. 27 M9alcnkov 'klkc 0% s cr. h. I'oreion N1iniStcridl 1\1ectin, p. 40 -,s. The 1954 Geneva Coni'crenLý.e, I). 47 Toward the I"Id I N1:denkov 50 of . l). Chapter 3. The Austrian State Trcaty and tllý: So\ iDiplomaticCl 'I h tvy'; Vienna, Warsaw and Belgrade, l). 58 The Austri in St<ttc i'rcaty, 1). 0? Snowdrops and 1). 7? Chapter 4. I1rc1udc to the (iCf. cva -Sum lit. IL)»: (', inuk' and the Rising Tile of Soviet Amity. I). 50 ThL FUrtiun Office FIXT)ii "ion. 1). X4 The British Prcparc for tic Suniniil. 1). 8's Angle-: Ain ricýin I)il'l'; 'rL»ccs. 1). ý)ý Chapter 5. The GCfCva Summit, lo5i; "!Thýrnioiitic lcaarStand-oll, p. 103 103 TIic Far l). 100 Opcii Shies ýtnd open Invitations, l). 1 10 "]'hc Liuýitýitiuný the p. 114 ()I, 'Sullillill. 1 1-' ý,ýýnn, i he no l). Tablc of Contents / Page 4 Chapter 6. The Czech Arms Deal and the Aswan Dam; Descent from Pisgah, p. 122 The Czech Arins Deal, p. 127 The Aswan Dam Riposte, p. 138 Chapter 7. Soviet Economic Diplomacy in the "Under-developed World"; Bulganin and Khrushchev go to Asia, p. 142 The British Analysis, p. 143 The View from the Embassies and the High Commission, p. 151 The Washington Conference, p. 157 Chapter 8. The Impact of the 20th Party Congress and the Soviet Visit to Britain; Taking Tea with Dukes and Duchesses, p. 168 The Party Congress, p. 169 The Visit, p. 176 Economic Cold War, p. 185 Conclusion. p. 192 Appendix. Foreign Office Officials, p. 200 Bibliography. p. 205 Preface There is something of a hiatus in the historiography of Britain and the Cold War. Most research has up until recently concentrated oll the issue of greatest controversy, the part played by Britain in the initial developnlent of East-West rivalry. This is understandable, not least because the releasing of official documents imposes its own delay, it does, however, leave the reader wondering quite what was to happen next? Indeed some discussions of the decline in Britain's world role in the years after 1945 treat the Cold War almost as a side show which impinged very little upon the main course of events. Britain may have had a more substantial role to play immediately after 1945 than many have given her credit for, but very quickly her lack of super power standing left her as not much more than an interested observer. Such a state of affairs might not be so very bad if the Cold War were a static thing which once set up an running, remained true to the original pattern. This was, of course, not to be the case. In fact the Cold War underwent very considerable changes in the course of the 1950's, and it is the British understanding of these changes with which this thesis is concerned. In particular it will examine the way in which British diplomats, politicians and civil servants perceived the process of re-evalution in foreign policy which the death of Stalin stimulated within the Kremlin. The discussion will concentrate around the year 1955 because - as far as the British were concerned - this was the pivotal point. Khrushchev's ascendancy marking a new departure for the Soviet Government in its relations with the outside world. So great was the innovation that the British were forced to think of the threat which the Soviet Union posed to Britain's vital international interests in a fundamentally different way. Stalin's death cane at an interesting point in the technological rivalry between East and West. With the development of thermonuclear potentials in the Soviet Union and America a new stage in the military balance was reached which had the most disturbing implications for either side's war-making potential. The Soviets fumbled towards an understanding of these implications between 1953 and 1955 and by 1955 they were persuaded to change their foreign policy, at least partly, to take account of the unacceptable level of destruction which these new weapons promised in a future war. There were to be substantial manifestations of this during 1955; the Geneva Conference, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and the visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India and the Far East. In essence the Soviets wanted to ensure that the use of their new capacities would not prove necessary. To this end a warmer relationship was needed with the West, and thus the Geneva process was begun. However, this did not mean that the Soviets had given up their aspirations to global supremacy, rather the end was to be achieved by different means. Herein lay the impetus behind the Soviet Union's new found interest in sponsoring the armament of Egypt and in attempting to extend her influence into the "underdeveloped world" by providing economic aid and Preface / Page 6 trade agreements with countries such as Burma. By 1956 it was apparent to Britain that she was dealing with a Soviet foreign policy which posed a lessened danger of war, but an increased threat to the maintenance of her position in a number of important parts of the world. This is, essentially, as far as the thesis will run.