Ogbonna Nkiru DN : CN = Webmaster’S Name O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka OU = Innovation Centre

OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES

PG/M.Sc./13/66659

INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Digitally Signed by: Content manager’s Name Ogbonna Nkiru DN : CN = Webmaster’s name O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka OU = Innovation Centre

1 INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW

MILLENNIUM.

OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES

PG/M.Sc./13/66659

A PROJECT REPORT

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NUSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: PROF. OBASI IGWE

OCTOBER, 2014.

2 TITLE PAGE

INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES

PG/M.Sc./13/66659

APPROVAL PAGE

This project has been approved for the award of Master of Science degree (M.Sc) in political science

------

Prof. Jonah Onuoha Prof. Obasi Igwe

(Head of Department) (Project Supervisor)

------

(External Examiner)

DEDICATION

To my lovely wife, Rita, and a great Teacher, Obasi Igwe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I give glory to almighty God for all his mercies in keeping me in good health throughout the period of research project. Second, I immensely owe a huge gratitude to my wife, my lover and best friend for all her encouragement and assistance to make this work possible. I equally appreciate my beautiful daughters, Ugochi and Kasie who have not relented in pushing me ahead. I equally wish to thank all my lecturers for their sound academic guidance and drilling.

Most of all, my profound gratitude goes to Prof. Obasi Igwe for his mentorship and inspiration towards academic excellence. I cannot forget my typists for their enduring patience in making this huge task a reality. May God bless you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page ------i Approval Page ------ii Dedication ------iii Acknowledgements ------iv Table of Contents ------v List of Tables ------vii List of Figures ------viii Abbreviations ------ix Abstact ------xi CHAPTER ONE (INTRODUCTION) ------1 1.1 Background of the Study ------1 1.2 Statement of the Problem ------6 1.3 Objectives of the Study ------18 1.4 Significance of the Study ------18 CHAPTER TWO (LITERATURE REVIEW) - - - - - 39 2.1 Empirical Literature ------39 2.2 Theoretical Literature ------67 2.3 Gaps in Literature ------87 CHAPTER THREE (METHODOLOGY) - - - - - 88 3.1 Theoretical Framework ------88 3.2 Hypotheses ------90 3.3 Research Design ------90 3.4 Method of Data Collection ------91 3.5 Method of Data Analysis ------91 3.6 Logical Data Framework ------122 CHAPTER FOUR ------125

7 4.1 Scenarios of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan - - - 125 CHAPTER FIVE ------146 5.1 Consequences of Nuclear War between India and Pakistan - - - 146 CHAPTER SIX ------167 6.1 Measures to restore peaceful India-Pakistani Relations - - - - 167 CHAPTER SEVEN ------228 7.1 Summary ------228 7.2 Recommendations ------234 7.3 Conclusion ------235 Bibliography ------237 Appendices

LIST OF TABLES

• Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks in 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities

• 15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads.

LIST OF FIGURES

• Interactive Maps of Kashmir

10 ABBREVIATIONS

LOC - Line of Control

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

LET – Lakshar –E-Taiba

INDO – India

PAK – Pakistan

C.I.A – Central Intelligence Agency

PTI – Press Trust of India

NPT – Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty.

JKLF – Joint Kashmir Liberation Force

NH – National Highway

TNT – Trinitrotoluene (Explosive Toxic Compound)

NRDC – Natural Resources Defence Council

MAD – Mutual Assured Destruction

PSR – Physicians for Social Responsibility

MTCR – Missile Technology Control Regime

CBM – Confidence Building Measures

11 MRBM – Medium Range Ballistic Missile

MIND – Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

CTBT – Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSG – Nuclear Supplies Group

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile

NWS – Nuclear Weapon States

FMCT – Fissile Material Cut off Treaty

GICNT – The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative

HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium

ABSTRACT

The India-Pakistani perennial conflicts over the past six decades, in the struggle to possess Kashmir, have been posing serious problems to the international community. This anomaly in their relations has raised some crucial questions by this study such as: Does the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of nuclear war in Asia? Furthermore, would the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute create the opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia? In this context, this study was undertaken to determine whether the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in Asia. It will also establish if the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create an opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. A literature review of books and articles in respect of the various wars were used to unveil the critical facts. To achieve this, the qualitative method of data collection and analysis was used. Afterwards, the study found out that religious fundamentalism had eroded peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. In a bid to describe the tenets of the study, the balance of power theory was employed as analytical framework. In line with these, it hypothetically held that the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in Asia. Again, that the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create an opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. Finally, the study recommended that under a multilateral declaration, the withdrawn sovereignty and independence of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu be restored by the UN, forcing India and Pakistan to withdraw their controls. Alternatively, the UN should permanently station their peace-keeping forces in the Line of Control to check the incessant infiltrations and resultant conflicts between them.

INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM.

OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES

PG/M.Sc./13/66659

A PROJECT REPORT

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NUSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: PROF. OBASI IGWE

OCTOBER, 2014.

TITLE PAGE

INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES

PG/M.Sc./13/66659

APPROVAL PAGE

This project has been approved for the award of Master of Science degree (M.Sc) in political science

------

Prof. Jonah Onuoha Prof. Obasi Igwe

(Head of Department) (Project Supervisor)

------

(External Examiner)

DEDICATION

To my lovely wife, Rita, and a great Teacher, Obasi Igwe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

19 4.1 Scenarios of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan - - - 125 CHAPTER FIVE ------146 5.1 Consequences of Nuclear War between India and Pakistan - - - 146 CHAPTER SIX ------167 6.1 Measures to restore peaceful India-Pakistani Relations - - - - 167 CHAPTER SEVEN ------228 7.1 Summary ------228 7.2 Recommendations ------234 7.3 Conclusion ------235 Bibliography ------237 Appendices

LIST OF TABLES

• Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks in 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities

• 15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads.

LIST OF FIGURES

• Interactive Maps of Kashmir

22 ABBREVIATIONS

LOC - Line of Control

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

LET – Lakshar –E-Taiba

INDO – India

PAK – Pakistan

C.I.A – Central Intelligence Agency

PTI – Press Trust of India

NPT – Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty.

JKLF – Joint Kashmir Liberation Force

NH – National Highway

TNT – Trinitrotoluene (Explosive Toxic Compound)

NRDC – Natural Resources Defence Council

MAD – Mutual Assured Destruction

PSR – Physicians for Social Responsibility

MTCR – Missile Technology Control Regime

CBM – Confidence Building Measures

23 MRBM – Medium Range Ballistic Missile

MIND – Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

CTBT – Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSG – Nuclear Supplies Group

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile

NWS – Nuclear Weapon States

FMCT – Fissile Material Cut off Treaty

GICNT – The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative

HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The hope that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new world order in the form of international peace and security as well as economic prosperity to many parts of the world has not been realized following persistent and intractable disputes, which seem to have become a permanent feature in international relations up to this new millennium. The India-Pakistani dispute over the Kashmir region for the past six decades is one of the strong indications as regards the escalating erosion of peace and security in the global arena, especially in the South

Asian subcontinent. As posited by Effendi, M.S (2010:3) “Many lives have been lost since the inception of these conflicts and the Kargil conflict of 1999 highlighted how perilously close the region could be to nuclear war, which would be devastating not only for both countries but also for the whole region. In this light, the normalization of relations between the two countries as well as the reduction of the mounting human and financial costs of the conflicts is highly needed and this, therefore, necessitates a speedy and sustainable resolution of the Kashmir issue.” This study, invariably, was undertaken to examine the impact of these conflicts on Asia and strategies for possible resolution.

Historically, India and Pakistan have a long complicated relation with each other. When the

British-India became independent, it was divided into two parts; areas consisting up to 75% of

Muslims became Pakistan and the rest of the territory, India. This arrangement did not include

26 the Princely States, one of which is Kashmir. The Princely States were at liberty to determine their own future; they could either join India or Pakistan, or remain a separate state. The

Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh Dogra, decided not to join India or Pakistan. The first war that broke out between these two countries in 1947, over Kashmir, a few weeks after the granting of independence, was caused by the action that Pakistan claimed to have sent emissaries to talk to

Kashmir about their decision of autonomy. When this happened, the Indians were suspicious that

Pakistan could try to invade Kashmir and sent their troops to help defend the state of Kashmir; though this claim was later discovered to be unfounded. The result of this first war involving

Kashmir left Pakistan controlling 37%, while India controlled 63% of Kashmir. (Prasad and

Dharm, 1987: 418).

Since then, there have been other wars and conflicts of various kinds between these two neighbours which have generated so much tension and discord among their neighbouring countries such as China, Nepal, Bangladesh, (formerly East-Pakistan) Afghanistan, Bhutan and

Sri Lanka. The subsequent wars came in 1965, 1971 and 1999, respectively has made this study to be organized to look into the reasons why India and Pakistan have failed all strategies towards the settlement of perennial conflicts between them. The various wars of 1947 1965, 1971 and

1999 have become pointers to this fact and have, therefore, raised fears of more devastating wars that may ensue between them despite the fact that these two countries simultaneously became independent from Britain in 1947 during the Partition of India.

As it stands, this mutual rivalry between India and Pakistan is believed to be deep-rooted with a religious undertone. Pakistanis are predominantly Muslims and Indians are mainly

Hindus. There is also a strong speculation that Hinduism and Islam are practically very incompatible. Islam is said to be younger, simpler and more explicit with a doctrine of one God,

27 Muhammad; the messenger, and Quran; the message. On the other hand, Hinduism is rooted in the past and does not have a prescribed dogma or scripture, but pay allegiance to many gods.

Since these two systems are seen to be worlds apart, it may have permeated the socio-cultural and the political psychology of both countries and instigated a struggle for supremacy. This anomaly has lingered for many years and severally attracted the attention of the world body but remained unabated. Recent records have it that Indian Muslim population has grown up to 120 million, even more than that of Pakistan; while Pakistan has virtually driven away all non-

Muslims from their country. As for Kashmir, the population consists of 77% Muslim, 20%

Hindu and 3% other minor religions (Steve Marin, 2011: 394).

As Hutchison & Vogel (1933: 536) narrated, “the area now known as Jammu and Kashmir

Comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and 6 Muslim) carved out of the territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan in conjunction with the local small rulers, which were hitherto referred to as “Punjab Hill States”. These small states, ruled by Rajput Kings, were independent vassals of the Mughal Empire. This was during the reign of Emperor Akbar.

Following the decline of the Mughals, trouble erupted in Kangra and Gorkha in form of invasions, and the hill states fell under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. The first

Anglo-Sikh war in 1845-46, was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East-India company. In the treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were forced to surrender the valuable region between the Beas River and Sutlej River and were also required to pay and indemnity of 1.2 million Rupees. Due to the fact they could not raise the sum, the East-India company allowed the Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh to become the first Maharaja of the newly formed Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the second Largest Principality during the British Raj, until India gained independence in 1947.”

28 The Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) narrated that “Initially occupied by Brahmin Hindus,

Buddhist missionaries arrived Kashmir around 274 BC. Hindu Dynasties continued to rule

Kashmir, despite the arrival of Muslims beginning in 1001 AD. By the late 16th century the ruling Muslim Dynasty had managed to overthrow the Hindu ruler and Kashmir was a Muslim- dominated state ever since. Hundreds of years later the United Kingdom colonized the Indian subcontinent. In 1846 the British defined Kashmir’s boarders to create a safeguard between the

Indian Commonwealth and the Russian and Chinese empires. Specific border locations were difficult to define due to sparse population and rugged terrain. When the UK granted India sovereignty in 1947 the region's Muslim population decided to form their own country, in what is now Pakistan. At this time Kashmir was a mutually agreed upon neutral state, and Pakistan thought they would receive control, since it was predominantly Muslim. Kashmir’s ruler instead, granted India ruling authority”.

The Himalayan Mountains' snowcapped peaks extend westward into Kashmir. Due to the affects of global climate change those high altitude glaciers are retreating at an unprecedented rate, threatening the security of the water supply of hundreds of millions of people within the watershed. The effects of this warming are beginning to be felt in the Himalayas, as formerly infrequent flooding events are happening every few years and through the obvious visible retreat of its glaciers over time through photographs. India and Pakistan’s irregular diplomatic talks now have an extra thread of tension to them as the glaciers are seen as important resource reserves.

Pakistan’s Indus River, which is used to irrigate about three quarters of Pakistan’s farming, has its source in the Indian controlled Siachen Glacier. ( Zeenews, 2006)

Punjab, Pakistan’s heavily populated province and home of the nation’s capital, Islamabad, means “The land of the five rivers”. Three of these rivers begin or pass through the Indian

29 controlled Jammu and Kashmir region. It is in the interest of Pakistan’s national security for it to have control over the origin of its water resources, rather than their enemy. Thus, Pakistan has been trying to cement its authority over Kashmir by increasing their presence. In 1981 Pakistan extended Pakistani citizenship to all inhabitants in the Northern Areas. It is hypothesized that

Pakistan galvanized settlement of the Mujahideen, beginning in the 1980s, in the Northern Areas to enhance their military presence. Mujahideen is any Muslim involved in a battle or struggle. In this instance they can be thought of as a militia deployed or serviced by Pakistan as an aggressive means to enhance its control of the region.

Currently, only India and Pakistan are fighting over control of Himalayan water resources, but there is still much unknown about the sources of many of the rivers in the region. As glaciers melt and water resources become scarcer there is a possibility that neighboring countries, such as

Nepal and Bangladesh, may become involved if their water supplies necessary to sustain their agriculture dominated economy appear to be in jeopardy. China and India have had a tense relationship over water that flows across their shared borders. China has undertaken controversial waterworks projects, diverting water that would flow into Pakistan or India to meet its own needs. Relations between India and China are currently friendly, as both emerging economies trade heavily with each other. This truce may be temporary, as China is uneasy over

India’s relationship with the United States, as is India- China’s friendly relations with rival

Pakistan interests.

Both India and Pakistan wish to control the Kashmir territory. Originally it was simply a boarder dispute, with each country wanting the land to enhance their regional control, but today the situation is direr. With the water resources of both countries jeopardized by global climate change, they are in a race to ensure their countries’ future water security. The situation is more

30 tenuous for Pakistan, as the source of their most important rivers, the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus, begin in the Indian managed half of Kashmir. If India had full sovereignty of Kashmir it could hold its enemy at its mercy, as water is absolutely necessary for the survival of a country’s economy, and its people. (Raman, A.D., 2004: 187-228)

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The state of relations between India and Pakistan leaves one to wonder why in this era of globalization and widespread cooperation on various platforms between states, these two neighbouring countries, after sixty years of a particular struggle appear to be unwilling to stop fighting and accept compromises, as is obtainable elsewhere. These wars and cleavages have persisted regime after regime and have ravaged peaceful relations in the sub-continent. Each accuses the other of the cause of hostilities and readily engages in armed-combat. In the interim, there is a fear of possible nuclear war between India and Pakistan if the dispute can still not be resolved in the near future. This is because both of them possess Nuclear Weapons (WMD) and are likely to make use of them as Pakistan has threatened at the end of the 1999 war.

Furthermore, Pakistan is engulfed in “terrorism”, which promotes ultimate use of ‘weapons of death’.

As pointed out by Markey (2010:8), “India faces the real prospect of another major terrorist attack by Pakistani-based terrorist organizations in the near future; an event that would jeopardize U.S. security interests in South Asia. Markey concludes that a terrorist attack is likely to trigger a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan because of a likely retaliation by India and Pakistan’s counter-retaliation”.

31 About half a million Muslims and Hindus were killed in communal riots following the partition of British India. Millions of Muslims living in India and Hindus and Sikhs living in

Pakistan emigrated in one of the most colossal transfers of population in the modern era. Both countries accused each other of not providing adequate security to the minorities emigrating through their territory. This served to increase tensions between the newly-born countries.

According to the British plan for the partition of British India, all the 680 princely states were allowed to decide which of the two countries to join. With the exception of a few, most of the

Muslim-majority princely-states acceded to Pakistan while most of the Hindu-majority princely states joined India. However, the decisions of some of the princely-states have contributed to shape the Pakistan-India relationship considerably. An example is the Junagadh dispute.

Junagadh is one of the modern districts of Saurastra, Gujarat Junagadh was a state on the southwestern end of Gujarat, with the principalities of Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad. It was not contiguous to Pakistan and other states physically separated it from Pakistan. The state had an overwhelming Hindu population which constituted more than 80% of its citizens, while its ruler, Nawab Mahabat Khan, was a Muslim. Mahabat Khan acceded to Pakistan on 15 August

1947.

Pakistan confirmed the acceptance of the accession on 15 September 1947. India did not accept the accession as legitimate. The Indian point of view was that Junagadh was not contiguous to Pakistan, that the Hindu majority of Junagadh wanted it to be a part of India, and that the state was surrounded by Indian territory on three sides. The Pakistani point of view was that since Junagadh had a ruler and governing body that chose to accede to Pakistan, it should be allowed to do so. Also, because Junagadh had a coastline, it could have maintained maritime links with Pakistan even as an enclave within India. Neither of the states was able to resolve this

32 issue amicably and it only added fuel to an already charged environment. Sardar Patel, India's

Home Minister, felt that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would create communal unrest across Gujarat. The government of India gave Pakistan time to void the accession and hold a plebiscite in Junagadh to pre-empt any violence in Gujarat. Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Arzi Hukumat of the people of Junagadh. Patel ordered the annexation of Junagadh's three principalities. India cut off supplies of fuel and coal to Junagadh, severed air and postal links, sent troops to the frontier, and occupied the principalities of Mangrol and

Babariawad that had acceded to India.

On 26 October, Nawab of Junagadh and his family fled to Pakistan following clashes with

Indian troops. On 7 November, Junagadh's court, facing collapse, invited the Government of

India to take over the State's administration. The Dewan of Junagadh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the father of the more famous Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, decided to invite the Government of India to intervene and wrote a letter to Mr. Buch, the Regional Commissioner of Saurashtra in the

Government of India to this effect. The Government of Pakistan protested. The government of

India rejected the protests of Pakistan and accepted the invitation of the Dewan to intervene.

Indian troops occupied Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, a plebiscite held almost unanimously voted for accession to India. ( Lumby, E.W.R., 1954:238)

As earlier asserted, Kashmir was a Muslim-majority princely state, ruled by a Hindu king,

Maharaja Hari Singh. At the time of the partition of India, Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of the state, preferred to remain independent and did not want to join either the Union of India or the

Dominion of Pakistan. He wanted both India and Pakistan to recognise his princely state as an independent neutral country like Switzerland. He wanted to make his state the Switzerland of the

East since the population of the state depended on tourism and persons from all regions could

33 come to an independent Jammu and Kashmir with ease. For this reason, he offered a standstill agreement (for maintaining the status quo) to both India and Pakistan. India refused the offer but

Pakistan accepted it. ( Magajan, M.C., 1963: 162)

Despite the standstill agreement, teams of Pakistani forces were dispatched into Kashmir.

Backed by Pakistani paramilitary forces, Pashtun Mahsud tribals invaded Kashmir in October

1947 under the code name "Operation Gulmarg" to seize Kashmir. They reached and captured

Baramulla on 25 October. Instead of moving on to Srinagar just 50 km away and capturing its undefended airfield, they stayed there for several days. Kashmir's security forces turned out to be too weak and ill-equipped to fight against Pakistan. Fearing that this invasion would bring about an accession to Pakistan, the Maharaja now turned to India and requested India for troops to safeguard Kashmir. Indian Prime Minister Nehru was ready to send the troops, but the acting

Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, advised the Maharaja to accede to India before India could send its troops. Hence, considering the emergent situation he signed the instrument of accession to the Union of India on 26 October 1947.(Haroon, Sana, 2007:179-180)

Charles Chevenix Trench writes in his 'The Frontier Scouts' (1985:121) “In October 1947, tribal lashkars hastened in lorries, undoubtedly with official logistic support into Kashmir at least one British Officer, Harvey-Kelly, who took part in the campaign. It seemed that nothing could stop these hordes of tribesmen taking Srinagar with its vital airfield. Indeed nothing did, but their own greed. The Mahsuds in particular stopped to loot, rape and murder; Indian troops were flown in and the lashkars pushed out of the Vale of Kashmir into the mountains. The Mahsuds returned home in a savage mood, having muffed an easy chance, lost the loot of Srinagar and made fools of themselves”.

34 In the words of Gen. Mohammad Akbar Khan, Brigadier-in-Charge, Pakistan, in his book

“War for Kashmir in 1947 ”observed that while the invading Pakistanis spread across the State and looted Baramulla town just 50 km from the state capital, Srinagar, for several days starting

25 October 1947, the Maharaja signed Instrument of Accession to the Dominion of India on 26

October 1947. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had already reached Delhi a day earlier on 25

October to persuade Nehru to send troops. He made no secret of the danger the state faced and asked Nehru to lose no time in accepting the accession and ensuring the speedy dispatch of

Indian troops to the State. Sheikh Abdullah corroborates this account in his Aatish e Chinaar (at pages 416 and 417) and records (at page 417) that V.P. Menon returned to Delhi on 26 October with signed Instrument of accession. The Instrument of Accession to the Union of India was signed on 26 October 1947, and accepted the following day. Page 2 of the Instrument of

Accession bears signatures of Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, Viscount

Mountbatten of Burma and the Governor-General of India. The Instrument was accepted by the

Governor-General of India the next day, 27 October 1947. With this signing by the Maharaja and acceptance by the Governor-General, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became a part of

Dominion of India as per the Indian Independence Act 1947 passed by the British Parliament.

(Chandigarh, India-Main News, 2004)

Indian troops were airlifted from Delhi, landed at Srinagar airport in Kashmir on 27 October

1947 and secured the airport before proceeding to evict the invaders from Kashmir valley. The

Indian troops managed to evict the aggressors from parts of Kashmir but the onset of winter made much of the state impassable. After weeks of intense fighting between Pakistan and India,

Pakistani leaders and the Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared a ceasefire and sought U.N. arbitration with the promise of a plebiscite. Sardar Patel had argued against both, describing

35 Kashmir as a bilateral dispute and its accession as justified by international law. In 1957, north- western Kashmir was fully integrated into Pakistan, becoming Azad Kashmir (Pakistan- administered Kashmir). In 1962, China occupied Aksai Chin, the northeastern region bordering

Ladakh. In 1984, India launched Operation Meghdoot and captured more than 80% of the

Siachen Glacier. Pakistan now maintains Kashmiris' right to self-determination through a plebiscite and the promised plebiscite should be allowed to decide the fate of the Kashmiri people. India on the other hand asserts that with the Maharaja's signing the instrument of accession, Kashmir has become an integral part of India. Elections in the state to the state legislature and the national parliament have also led to no separatist or secessionist ever being elected, reflecting the will of the people of the state. Due to all such political differences, this dispute has been the subject of wars between the two countries in 1947 and 1965, and a limited conflict in 1999. The state remains divided between the two countries by the Line of Control

(LoC), which demarcates the ceasefire line agreed upon in the 1947 conflict modified in 1972 as per Simla Agreement. The relations are locked in other territorial disputes such as the Siachen

Glacier and Kori Creek.The Indus Waters Treaty governs the rivers that flow from India into

Pakistan. Water is cited as one possible cause for a conflict between the two nations, but to date issues such as the Nimoo Bazgo Project have been resolved through diplomacy. (The Economist,

2011)

Bengal Refugee Crisis

In 1949, India recorded close to 1 million Hindu refugees, who flooded into West Bengal and other states from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), owing to communal violence, intimidation and repression from authorities. The plight of the refugees outraged Hindus and

Indian nationalists, and the refugee population drained the resources of Indian states, which were

36 unable to absorb them. While not ruling out war, Prime Minister Nehru and Sardar Patel invited

Liaquat Ali Khan for talks in Delhi. Although many Indians termed this appeasement, Nehru signed a pact with Liaquat Ali Khan that pledged both nations to the protection of minorities and creation of minority commissions. Khan and Nehru also signed a trade agreement, and committed to resolving bilateral disputes through peaceful means. Steadily, hundreds of thousands of Hindus returned to East Pakistan, but the thaw in relations did not last long, primarily owing to the Kashmir dispute. (Halim, A. & Jing, L. 2008)

Afghanistan Relations

After the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance in much of Afghanistan in 1996 in civil war, the Taliban regime was strongly supported by Pakistan – one of the three countries to do so – before the 11 September attacks. India firmly opposed the Taliban and criticised Pakistan for supporting it. India established its links with Northern Alliance as India officially recognised their government, with the United Nations. India's relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan's neighbour, and its increasing presence there has irked Pakistan. The 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul was a suicide bomb terror attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on 7 July 2008 at 8:30 AM local time. US intelligence officials suggested that Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency had planned the attack. Pakistan tried to deny any responsibility, but United

States President George W. Bush confronted Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani with evidence and warned him that in the case of another such attack he would have to take "serious action". (Lamb, Chritiana, 2008)

Pakistan has been accused by India, Afghanistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, of involvement in terrorism in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In July 2009, current President of

Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari admitted that the Pakistani government had "created and nurtured"

37 terrorist groups to achieve its short-term foreign policy goals. According to an analysis published by Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution in 2008 Pakistan was the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism including aiding groups and Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of

Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. (Nelson, Dean., 2009)

Insurgency in Kashmir

According to some reports published by the Council of Foreign Relations, the Pakistan military and the ISI have provided covert support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-

Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan has denied any involvement in terrorist activities in

Kashmir, arguing that it only provides political and moral support to the secessionist groups who wish to escape Indian rule. Many Kashmiri militant groups also maintain their headquarters in

Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is cited as further proof by the Indian government.

Author Gordon Thomas stated that Pakistan still sponsored terrorist groups in the disputed state of Kashmir, funding, training and arming them in their war on attrition against India. Journalist

Stephen Suleyman Schwartz notes that several militant and criminal groups are backed by senior officers in the Pakistani army, the country's ISI intelligence establishment and other armed bodies of the state. ( Thomas, Gordon, 2007: 536)

A report in Times of India (2006) listed Insurgents attacks on Jammu and Kashmir. At the

State Assembly: A car bomb exploded near the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on 1

October 2001, killing 27 people on an attack that was blamed on Kashmiri separatists. It was one of the most prominent attacks against India apart from on the Indian Parliament in December

2001. The dead bodies of the terrorists and the data recovered from them revealed that Pakistan was solely responsible for the activity. Others are;

38 • 1997 Sangrampora massacre: On 21 March 1997, 7 Kashmiri Pandits were killed in

Sangrampora village in the Budgam district.

• Wandhama Massacre: In January 1998, 24 Kashmiri Pandits living in the city Wandhama

were killed by nonsense Islamic terrorists.

• Qasim Nagar Attack: On 13 July 2003, armed men believed to be a part of the Lashkar-e-

Toiba threw hand grenades at the Qasim Nagar market in Srinagar and then fired on

civilians standing nearby killing twenty-seven and injuring many more.

• Assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone: Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party Hurriyat

Conference leader, was assassinated by an unidentified gunmen during a memorial rally

in Srinagar. The assassination resulted in wide-scale demonstrations against the Indian

occupied-forces for failing to provide enough security cover for Mr. Lone.

• 20 July 2005 Srinagar Bombing: A car bomb exploded near an armoured Indian Army

vehicle in the famous Church Lane area in Srinagar killing four Indian Army personnel,

one civilian and the suicide bomber. Terrorist group Hizbul Mujahideen, claimed

responsibility for the attack.

• Budshah Chowk attack: A terrorist attack on 29 July 2005 at Srinigar's city centre,

Budshah Chowk, killed two and left more than 17 people injured. Most of those injured

were media journalists.

• Murder of Ghulam Nabi Lone: On 18 October 2005 suspected man killed Jammu and

Kashmir's then education minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. No Terrorist group claimed

responsibility for the attack.

Alleged Human rights violations by India

39 Pakistan has accused India of gross human rights violations in Indian-administered

Kashmir. A report by the Human Rights Watch stated two main reasons for the improving human rights condition in the region: First, sincere efforts were made by the new Jammu and

Kashmir state government headed by Mufti Muhammad Sayeed to investigate cases of human rights abuses in the state and to punish those guilty including Indian soldiers. More than 15

Indian army soldiers were convicted by the Indian government in 2004 for carrying out human rights abuses in the state. Second, the decrease in cross-border infiltration into India by armed insurgents. The attack on the Indian Parliament was by far the most dramatic attack carried out allegedly by Pakistani terrorists. India blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attacks, an allegation which Pakistan strongly denied and one that brought both nations to the brink of a nuclear confrontation in 2001–02. However, international peace efforts ensured the cooling of tensions between the two nuclear-capable nations.

Apart from this, the most notable was the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 en route New Delhi from Kathmandu, Nepal. The plane was hijacked on 24 December 1999 approximately one hour after take off and was taken to Amritsar airport and then to Lahore in

Pakistan. After refueling the plane took off for Dubai and then finally landed in Kandahar,

Afghanistan. Under intense media pressure, New Delhi complied with the hijackers' demand and freed Maulana Masood Azhar from its captivity in return for the freedom of the Indian passengers on the flight. The decision, however, cost New Delhi dearly. Maulana, who is believed to be hiding in Karachi, later became the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, an organisation which has carried out several terrorist acts against Indian security forces in Kashmir.

On 22 December 2000, a group of terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba stormed the famous Red Fort in New Delhi. The Fort houses an Indian military unit and a high-security

40 interrogation cell used both by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Indian Army. The terrorists successfully breached the security cover around the Red Fort and opened fire at the

Indian military personnel on duty killing two of them on spot. The attack was significant because it was carried out just two days after the declaration of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan.

In 2002, India claimed again that terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir were infiltrating into India, a claim denied by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, who claimed that such infiltration had stopped—India's spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry did away with Pakistan's claim, calling it “terminological inexactitude”.( The Economic Times, 2002)

According to Haroon Sana (2007: 201) Months later, two Kashmiri terrorists belonging to

Jaish-e-Mohammed raided the Swami Narayan temple complex in Ahmedabad, Gujarat killing

30 people, including 18 women and five children. The attack was carried out on 25 September

2002, just few days after state elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir. Two identical letters found on both the terrorists claimed that the attack was done in retaliation for the deaths of thousands of Muslims during the Gujarat riots. Two car bombs exploded in south Mumbai on 25

August 2003; one near the Gateway of India and the other at the famous Zaveri Bazaar, killing at least 48 and injuring 150 people. Though no terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attacks,

Mumbai Police and RAW suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba's hand in the twin blasts. In an unsuccessful attempt, six terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba, stormed the Ayodhya Ram

Janmbhomi complex on 5 July 2005. Before the terrorists could reach the main disputed site, they were shot down by Indian security forces. One Hindu worshipper and two policemen were injured during the incident.

The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings was a terrorist attack targeted on the Samjhauta

Express train on 18 February. The Samjhauta Express is an international train that runs from

41 New Delhi, India to Lahore, Pakistan, and is one of two trains to cross the India-Pakistan border.

At least 68 people were killed, mostly Pakistani civilians but also some Indian security personnel and civilians. Prasad Shrikant Purohit, an Indian Army officer and leader of a shadowy Hindu fundamentalist group, was later identified and investigated as a key suspect responsible for the bombing. The attack was a turning point in Indo-Pakistani relations, and one of the many terrorist incidents that have plagued relations between the two.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks by ten Pakistani terrorists killed over 173 and wounded 308. The sole surviving gunman Ajmal Kasab who was arrested during the attacks was found to be a

Pakistani national. This fact was acknowledged by Pakistani authorities. In May 2010, an Indian court convicted him on four counts of murder, waging war against India, conspiracy and terrorism offences, and sentenced him to death. India blamed the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan- based militant group, for planning and executing the attacks. Islamabad resisted the claims and demanded evidence. India provided evidence in the form of interrogations, weapons, candy wrappers, Pakistani Brand Milk Packets, and telephone sets. Indian officials demanded Pakistan extradite suspects for trial. They also said that, given the sophistication of the attacks, the perpetrators must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.

(Washington Post, 2009).

The most critical question is why the continued clamour for Kashmir. Are there so much peculiar benefits of importance, in that who controls Kashmir gains much? Is it just a mere show of supremacy and dominance since the Kashmir region appear relatively small compared to both countries? History has it that the wars of 1965 and 1971 left millions dead and generated a refugee status of more than 10 million. Even though India has always adopted a secular system of government, but when the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Ghali offered

42 mediation, in 1993, India refused to accept it, saying that the dispute is essentially domestic and does not entail external intervention. There had been many efforts of this nature, especially from the Western world. This has, therefore, become a huge problem in that more pragmatic ways of restoring peace between India and Pakistan should be sought mainly because of its implications for an enduring peaceful atmosphere in South-Asia.

This has, primarily, brought us to the following Research Questions :

(1) Does the Continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of

a nuclear war in Asia?

(2) Would the resolution of the Indian-Pakistani dispute create the opportunity for the

settlement of other boundary problems in Asia?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

(1) The broad objective of this study is to determine whether the dispute between India and

Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of a nuclear war in Asia.

(2) The specific objective is to establish if the resolution of the Indian-Pakistani dispute would create the opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.

The reason for these are not far-fetched since both counties are nuclear powers coupled with the fact that each of them has no plans, presently, of compromising the Kashmir border issue; which has always been at stake. The second objective is informed by land/boundary problems presently widespread in Asia, which include the Israeli-Palestinian, North-South Korean, China-Taiwan,

China-Tibetan, among others.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The India-Pakistani conflict has been known to be one of the most difficult crises around the globe that needs permanent resolution. This study deems it necessary, considering the various

43 past strategies applied by the UN towards its settlement, to unravel more reasons regarding this misnomer. Theoretically, the study serves to input more knowledge which is required in respect of the India-Pakistani dispute and hence its resolve to impart more on the existing knowledge by offering a viable point of reference to the academia and students of International Relations as regards problems of this nature with regard to the recommendations postulated by the study.

Practically, the study will contribute immensely in aiding the international institutions and other regional organizations in their endeavour to promote and maintain peace among nations in the international arena.

It is a well-known fact that among the five continents of the world, Asia happens to be the largest. In this regard, it is pertinent to presume that any manner of regional unrest, instability or war affecting major countries in that continent, such as India, with a 2011 estimated population of over 1.2 billion, inhabiting a land mass or area, measuring 3,166,829 square kilometers, should not be and issue to trifle with (C.I.A. World Factbook- India, 2014).

While Pakistan, her counterpart, though not as big as India ( both in population and size) is equally a force to reckon with. One of the things they seem to have in common is that both of them are nuclear powers. Because of this development, there is a fear or likelihood of nuclear war between the two countries. Where this happens, it will surely erode and devastate the relative chaotic relations in South-Asia further.

Sublette (2001) submitted that, India has a long history of development of nuclear weapons.

Origins of India's nuclear program dates back to 1944, when it started its nuclear program soon after its independence. In the 1940s–1960s, India's nuclear program slowly matured towards militarisation and expanded the nuclear power infrastructure throughout the country. Decisions on the development of nuclear weapons were made by Indian political leaders after the Chinese

44 invasion and territorial annexation of northern India. In 1967, India's nuclear program was aimed at the development of nuclear weapons, with Indira Gandhi carefully overseeing the development of weapons. In 1971, India gained military and political momentum over Pakistan after a successful military campaign against Pakistan. Starting preparations for a nuclear test in

1972, India finally exploded its first nuclear bomb in Pokhran test range, codename Smiling

Buddha , in 1974.

After the secession by East-Pakistan, Pakistan launched its own nuclear bomb program in

1972, and accelerated its efforts in 1974. This large-scale nuclear bomb program was directly in response to India's nuclear program. Since the 1980s, India and Pakistan have carried out research and development in supercomputing, information technology and scientific applications relating to computer science. Since the early 1990s, the economic liberalisation and privatisation policy measures and programs led to a boom in information technology in both countries. The scientific competition in the 1970s led to increased funding for science and technology development from primary education through the post-graduate level in Indian and Pakistani school systems. Pakistan annually invites scientists from all over the world to participate in a physical sciences and mathematics summer research seminar, to support joint development of and benefit science and technology.

In 1983, Pakistan achieved a major milestone in its efforts after it covertly performed a series of non-fission tests, codename Kirana-I. No official announcements of such cold tests were made by Pakistan government. Over the next several years, Pakistan expanded and modernized nuclear power projects around the country to supply its electricity sector and to provide back-up support and benefit to its national economy. In 1988, a mutual understanding was reached between the two countries in which each pledged not to attack nuclear facilities.

45 Agreements on cultural exchanges and civil aviation were also initiated, also in 1988. Finally, in

1998, India exploded its second nuclear test ( Pokhran-II ) which invited Pakistan to follow the latter's step and performed its own atomic tests ( Chagai-I and Chagai-II ).

Pakistan pursued its research and development in space and astrophysics in 1961 after starting its space program led by Space Research Commission (SUPARCO). Its unmanned flight test program launched its first rocket into orbit, Rehbar-I. By 1969, India had an active and large- scale space program directed by ISRO. Development towards launching satellites began in the

1970s; in 1975, India's space program recorded its first success when Indian ISRO put the country's first artificial satellite, Aryabhata in orbit. Pakistani concerns that they had fallen behind India in the race to space led quickly to a push by legislators and educators for greater emphasis on mathematics and the physical sciences in Pakistan's schools and universities.

(Pakistan inventions and discoveries and SRC scientific missions)

Finally in 1990, Pakistan put its own first artificial satellite, Badr-1, in orbit. During the 1980s–

90s, India began development of space and nuclear rockets, which marked Pakistan's efforts to engage in the space race with India. Pakistan's own program developed space and nuclear missiles and began unmanned flight tests of its space vehicles in the mid-1990s, which continues in the present. (Lodhi, S.F.S., 2013)

Other Confidence Building Measures

After the 1971 war, Pakistan and India made slow progress towards the normalisation of relations. In July 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto met in the Indian hill station of Simla. They signed the Simla Agreement, by which India would return all Pakistani personnel (over 90,000) and captured territory in the west, and the two countries would "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations."

46 Diplomatic and trade relations were also re-established in 1976. In 1997, high-level Indo-

Pakistan talks resumed after a three-year pause. The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met twice and the foreign secretaries conducted three rounds of talks. In June 1997, the foreign secretaries identified eight "outstanding issues" around which continuing talks would be focused.

The dispute over the status of Kashmir, (referred by India as Jammu and Kashmir), an issue since

Independence, remains the major stumbling block in their dialogue. India maintains that the entire former princely state is an integral part of the Indian union, while Pakistan insists that UN resolutions calling for self-determination of the people of the state / province must be taken into account. It however refuses to abide by the previous part of the resolution, which calls for it to vacate all territories occupied.

In September 1997, the talks broke down over the structure of how to deal with the issues of

Kashmir, and peace and security. Pakistan advocated that the issues be treated by separate working groups. India responded that the two issues be taken up along with six others on a simultaneous basis. Attempts to restart dialogue between the two nations were given a major boost by the February 1999 meeting of both Prime Ministers in Lahore and their signing of three agreements. A subsequent military coup in Pakistan that overturned the democratically elected

Nawaz Sharif government in October of the same year also proved a setback to relations.

In 2001, a summit was called in Agra; Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf turned up to meet

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The talks fell through. On 20 June 2004, with a new government in place in India, both countries agreed to extend a nuclear testing ban and to set up a hotline between their foreign secretaries aimed at preventing misunderstandings that might lead to a nuclear war. ( The Indian Express, 2005)

47 After Dr. Manmohan Singh become prime minister of India in May 2004, the Punjab provincial Government declared it would develop Gah, his place of birth, as a model village in his honour and name a school after him. There is also a village in India named Pakistan, despite occasional pressure over the years to change its name the villagers have resisted. Violent activities in the region declined in 2004. There are two main reasons for this: warming of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad which consequently lead to a ceasefire between the two countries in 2003 and the fencing of the LOC being carried out by the Indian Army.

Moreover, coming under intense international pressure, Islamabad was compelled to take actions against the militants' training camps on its territory. In 2004, the two countries also agreed upon decreasing the number of troops present in the region. Under pressure, Kashmiri militant organisations made an offer for talks and negotiations with New Delhi, which India welcomed.

India's Border Security Force blamed the Pakistani military for providing cover-fire for the terrorists whenever they infiltrated into Indian Territory from Pakistan. Pakistan in turn has also blamed India for providing support to terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan such as the

BLA.

In 2005, Pakistan's information minister, Sheikh Rashid, was alleged to have run a terrorist training camp in 1990 in N.W. Frontier, Pakistan. The Pakistani government dismissed the charges against its minister as an attempt to hamper the ongoing peace process between the two neighbours. Both India and Pakistan have launched several mutual confidence-building measures

(CBMs) to ease tensions between the two. These include more high-level talks, easing visa restrictions, and restarting of cricket matches between the two. The new bus service between

Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has also helped bring the two sides closer. Pakistan and India have also decided to co-operate on economic fronts. Some improvements in the relations are seen with

48 the re-opening of a series of transportation networks near the India–Pakistan border, with the most important being bus routes and railway lines. A major clash between Indian security forces and militants occurred when a group of insurgents tried to infiltrate into Kashmir from Pakistan in July 2005. The same month also saw a Kashmiri militant attack on Ayodhya and Srinagar.

However, these developments had little impact on the peace process. An Indian man held in

Pakistani prisons since 1975 as an accused spy walked across the border to freedom 3 March

2008, an unconditional release that Pakistan said was done to improve relations between the two countries. (Times of India, 2009)

In 2006, a "Friends Without Borders" scheme began with the help of two British tourists.

The idea was that Indian and Pakistani children would make pen pals and write friendly letters to each other. The idea was so successful in both countries that the organisation found it

"impossible to keep up". The World's Largest Love Letter was recently sent from India to

Pakistan. In December 2010, several Pakistani newspapers published stories about India's leadership and relationship with militants in Pakistan that the papers claimed were found in the

United States diplomatic cables leak. A British newspaper, The Guardian , which had the

Wikileaks cables in its possession reviewed the cables and concluded that the Pakistani claims were "not accurate" and that Wiki Leaks was being exploited for propaganda purposes.

On 10 February 2011, India agreed to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended after

26/11 Mumbai Attacks. India had put on hold all the diplomatic relations saying it will only continue if Pakistan will act against the accused of Mumbai attacks. (Walsh, D., 2012)

On 13 April 2012 following a thaw in relations whereby India gained MFN status in the country,

India announced the removal of restrictions on FDI investment from Pakistan to India.

49 The Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 11 July 2012, stated in Pnom Penh that her country is willing to resolve some of the disputes like, Sir Creek and Siachan on the basis of agreements reached in past. On 7 September 2012, Indian External Affairs Minister would pay 3-day visit to

Pakistan to review the progress of bilateral dialogue with his Pakistani counterpart.

(Banerji, A. 2012)

According to a Reuters report (2011) India and Pakistan have much in common, like:

Cultural links: India and Pakistan, to some degree have similar cultures, cuisines and languages which underpin the historical ties between the two. Pakistani singers, musicians, comedians and entertainers have enjoyed widespread popularity in India, with many achieving overnight fame in the Indian film industry Bollywood. Likewise, Indian music and film are very popular in

Pakistan. Being located in the northernmost region of the South Asia, Pakistan's culture is somewhat similar to that of North India. The Punjab region was split into Punjab, Pakistan and

Punjab, India following the independence and partition of the two countries in 1947. The Punjabi people are today the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and also an important ethnic group of northern India. The founder of Sikhism was born in the modern-day Pakistani Punjab province, in the city of Nankana Sahib. Each year, millions of Indian Sikh pilgrims cross over to visit holy

Sikh sites in Nankana Sahib. The Sindhi people are the native ethnic group of the Pakistani province of Sindh. Many Hindu Sindhis migrated to India in 1947, making the country home to a sizable Sindhi community. In addition, the millions of Muslims who migrated from India to the newly created Pakistan during independence came to be known as the Muhajir people; they are settled predominantly in Karachi and still maintain family links in India.

50 Relations between Pakistan and India have also resumed through platforms such as media and communications. Aman ki Asha is a joint venture and campaign between The Times of India and the Jang Group calling for mutual peace and development of diplomatic and cultural relations.

Geographic links: The India-Pakistani border is the official international boundary that demarcates the Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat from the Pakistani provinces of

Punjab and Sindh. The Wagah border is the only road crossing between India and Pakistan and lies on the famous Grand Trunk Road, connecting Lahore, Pakistan with Amritsar, India. Each evening, the Wagah border ceremony takes place at the Wagah border in which the flags are lowered and guards on both sides make a pompous military display and exchange handshakes.

Linguistic ties: Hindustani is the linga franca of North India and Pakistan, as well as the national language of both countries, under the name Hindi and Urdu, respectively. Standard Urdu is mutually intelligible with Standard Hindi. Both languages share the same Indic base and are all but indistinguishable in phonology and grammar. Most linguists consider them to be two standardised forms of a same language; when speaking colloquially, a speaker of Urdu has no trouble understanding a speaker of Hindi, and vice-versa. Apart from Hindustani, India and

Pakistan also share a distribution of the Punjabi language (written in the Gurmukhi script in

Indian Punjab, and the Shahmukhi script in Pakistani Punjab), Kashmiri language and Sindhi language.

Matrimonial ties: Some Indian and Pakistani people marry across the border, particularly with present generation of relatives who had migrated from India at the time of partition.

In April 2010 a high profile Pakistani cricketer, Shoaib Malik married the Indian tennis star

Sania Mirza. The wedding received much media attention and was said to transfix both India and

Pakistan.

51 Sporting ties: Cricket and hockey matches between the two (as well as other sports to a lesser degree such as those of the SAARC games) have often been political in nature. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan General Zia-ul Haq traveled to India for a bout of "cricket diplomacy" to keep India from supporting the Soviets by opening another front. Pervez Musharaff also tried to do the same more than a decade later but to no avail. In tennis, Rohan Bopanna of India and

Aisam-ul-Haq Qureshi of Pakistan have formed a successful duo and have been dubbed as the

‘Indo-Pak Express’.

Diasporic relations: The large size of the Indian diaspora and Pakistani diaspora in many different countries throughout the world has created strong diasporic relations. British Indians and British Pakistanis, the largest and second-largest ethnic minorities living in the United

Kingdom respectively, are said to have friendly relations with one another. It is quite common for a "Little India" and a "Little Pakistan" to co-exist in South Asian ethnic enclaves in overseas countries. There are various cities such as Birmingham, Blackburn and Manchester where British

Indians and British Pakistanis live alongside each other in peace and harmony. Both Indians and

Pakistanis living in the UK fit under the category of British Asian. The UK is also home to the

Pakistan & India friendship forum. In the United States, Indians and Pakistanis are classified under the South Asian American category and share many cultural traits. The British MEP Saj

Karim is of Pakistani origin. He is a member of the European Parliament Friends of India Group,

Karim was also responsible for opening up Europe to free trade with India. He narrowly escaped the Mumbai attacks at Hotel Taj in November 2008. Despite the atrocity, Mr Karim does not wish the remaining killer Ajmal Kasab to be sentenced to death. He said: "I believe he had a fair and transparent trial and I support the guilty verdict. But I am not a supporter of capital punishment. I believe he should be given a life sentence, but that life should mean life."

52 The Pakistani Dawn (2005) noted that the insurgents who initially started their movement as a pro-Kashmiri independence movement have gone through a lot of change in their ideology.

Most of the insurgents portray their struggle as a religious one. Indian analysts allege that by supporting these insurgents, Pakistan is trying to wage a proxy war against India while Pakistan claims that it regards most of these insurgent groups as "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists.

Internationally known to be the most deadly theatre of conflict, nearly 10 million people, including Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, have been fighting a daily battle for survival. The cross-border firing between India and Pakistan, and the terrorist attacks combined have taken its toll on the Kashmiris, who have suffered poor living standards and an erosion of human rights.

Since their mutual formation in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in three major wars and countless other skirmishes and diplomatic rows. With at least 100 nuclear warheads in each other’s arsenals, the prospect of a South Asian atomic holocaust casts a dark shadow over the entire region. However, the most important issue that divides these longtime enemies is not necessarily nuclear arms nor territorial disputes over Kashmir nor a hundred other contentious subjects -- rather, the dominant overriding conflict between India and Pakistan lies with the simplest, but most crucial, necessity of life: water. With the concurrent factors of rising populations and global climate change, the scarcity of water could make all other problems and disagreements between India and Pakistan seem quite irrelevant. Indeed, the lack of access to clean, safe drinking water not only poses a threat to hundreds of millions of people’s lives on the subcontinent, but could conceivably lead to another war. For Pakistan, the numbers are extremely grim. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) released a report earlier this year which declared Pakistan as one of the most “water-stressed” countries in the world, not far from being classified, “water-scarce," with less than 1,000 cubic meters of water per person per year (the

53 same level as parched Ethiopia), down from 5,000 cubic meters in 1947. India itself is projected to become “water-stressed” by the year 2025 and “water-scarce” by 2050. Due to increased demand and dwindling supplies, Pakistan is drawing too much water from its existing reservoirs, placing the country in grave danger of future shortages. ADB estimated that Pakistan's water storage capacity -- that is, the volume of water it can rely upon in case of an emergency, amounts to a 30-day supply -- far lower than the 1000 days that are suggested for nations with similar climates, The Atlantic noted. (For comparison sake, India’s storage capacity is 120 days.)

On a per capita basis, the availability of water in Pakistan has plunged by almost 75 percent over the last 60 years, Reuters reported, largely due to soaring population growth. The World

Wildlife Fund-Pakistan project estimates that by 2025, the country will have 33 percent less water than it will need at that time. Some officials in Pakistan hold India responsible for its grave predicament. Chaudhry Abid Sher Ali, Pakistan's state minister for water and power, recently specifically blamed the country's water shortage on neighboring India for having constructed dams and hydropower projects on rivers that flow between the two countries. Such a shortage,

Sher Ali warned, will spell catastrophe for Pakistan -- a nation already burdened by myriad other woes, including terrorism, political corruption, widespread poverty, and chronic power outages.

He has urged Islamabad to build its own dams. “If Pakistan does not think seriously about the construction of dams, its soil will become infertile in future,” he told reporters in Islamabad. The federal minister for water and power, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, believes Pakistan could be facing an Ethiopian-type drought catastrophe within just 10 to 15 years. “We are on the verge of facing a life and death situation,” Asif said at a press conference. He also laid part of the blame on India for restricting water flow to Pakistan. “The Indians are not giving us our rightful share of water,” he said. “We have lost a lot of water over the past 50 years. Now we need to make a

54 plan for the future. We need to control our population and construct new water reservoirs.” India is indeed constructing dams and hydropower projects at a feverish pace to meet its own surging energy demands. Time magazine reported in 2012 that plans by India to build a dam structure at the mouth of Wular Lake, on the Jhelum River in Kashmir, to increase the flow of water to its farms during winter angered Pakistan. But India's Indus water commissioner G. Aranganathan denied that the dams and hydro projects on its side of the border prevents Pakistan from receiving any of their rightful water. "There is absolutely no question of interrupting or reducing

Pakistan's water supply," he told Time.

Under terms of the historic 1960 water accord between India and Pakistan, the Indus Waters

Treaty (an extraordinary treaty that has lasted and remained largely intact for more than half a century through periods of recurring turbulence, even war, between the two signatories), India received control over the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej rivers, while Pakistan gained control over the

Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers. However, from Pakistan’s perspective, India holds the upper hand since all these rivers flow through India first, meaning New Delhi has first dibs on where and how to irrigate the rivers and enjoys control over establishing transportation and hydropower projects on them. "Given the mutual hostility between the two countries, it is not surprising that there is a tendency in Pakistan to believe that the scarcity it is experiencing or fearing is partly attributable to India," Ramaswamy Iyer, the former secretary for water resources in India, opined in a column in the Hindu newspaper. Nasim A. Khan, former secretary of Pakistan’s Alternative

Energy Development Board, is greatly concerned about India's rapid development of dams and how it relates to territorial disputes over Kashmir. “The roots of the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus rivers are in Kashmir, and any foul play can create tremendous differences,” he told

Reuters. “The Sutlej and Beas rivers]are already dry, and the Ravi river is partially dry. All water

55 is being stopped in India.” Khan suspects that by building dams on the Jhelum, India is diverting water meant for Pakistan. “India continues to violate the 1960 treaty by consuming more water and building dams. Pakistan has raised this concern with the World Bank,” he said.

However, some Pakistani officials do not blame India for the country’s water woes. Shamsul Mulk, the former chairman of Pakistan's Water and Power Development

Authority, places the culpability squarely on incompetence and negligence by

Islamabad. "Pakistan has acted like an absentee landlord vis-a-vis water reserves," he told UPI, adding that Pakistan has only constructed two large dams over the past 40 years -- and those are damaged by sedimentation. In contrast, China has built 22,000 dams during that period, while

India has constructed about 4,000. Plans to construct new dams in Pakistan have been frustrated by provincial disputes. "It is our mismanagement and criminal negligence of our successive governments which would lead us towards starvation and draughts and war with India," Mulk added. "No specific evidence is brought forth so far that India is actually obstructing the flow or is diverting the waters," said Ahmer Bilal Soofi, the former caretaker law minister. Mulk proposed that Pakistan needs to build many more dams and manage them properly, estimating that the country lost some 18 million gallons of water in 2011 alone simply by run-off to the sea.

Poor planning is also a problem. "There is no groundwater recharge scheme in Pakistan due to our ill-planning," said Muhammad Javed, of the Punjab Irrigation Department, to UPI. "There are 1 million tube wells in Punjab alone, but there is no planning and regulation for farmers vis- a-vis water usage. Factories are also polluting our groundwater, and sweet pockets of waters are being contaminated. This situation, if it continues, may bring a disaster of high magnitude in

Pakistan. The same treatment is being meted out to surface water."

56 A severe water shortage and the drying up of irrigation sources would, of course, doom

Pakistan's agricultural sector and condemn millions of people to starvation. Pakistan's agriculture-dominated economy depends heavily on water flowing from the Indus River and its tributaries. Agricultural enterprises (both big and small) employ about one-half of all Pakistanis and represents a sizable chunk (about 25 percent) of the country’ annual GDP. According to media reports in Pakistan, the nation receives 70 to 75 percent of its water flow for only three months a year to irrigate crops. Pakistan’s water woes are exacerbated by other factors as well, including the government's erratic water management policies, poor infrastructure and wasteful farming practices. “Requiring and enforcing updated, modern farming techniques is a start to alleviating the water crisi,” wrote Aziz Nayani, an independent consultant advising businesses on

South Asian social trends, in the Atlantic. “Pakistan's agriculture industry is notorious for its inefficient irrigation and drainage processes, which have contributed to the scarcity.”

Akmal Hussain, an economics Professor at Beaconhouse National University in Lahore, said that water should be Pakistan’s number-one foreign and domestic policy concern. "First, we should realize that water is a lifeline for Pakistan," Hussain told UPI. "Water sense should be increased among citizens. Then, we should hold meaningful dialogue with India over water because agriculture is the backbone of our economy, which is heavily dependent on water flow from India.” Munawar Sabir, a Punjab University geography professor, laid out in stark terms what the water crisis has already done and will continue to do to Pakistan. "Our agricultural input has decreased; annual floods have become routine, and in 2013 alone, more than 178 people have been killed. The infant mortality rate is high because of contaminated water," he told

UPI. "Water resources of both India and Pakistan are eventually sharply depleting, amounting to dangerous levels.” Water also plays a role in geo-political maneuvers between the two hostile

57 states. In early December, Pakistan's water crisis even prompted it to ask India to remove its troops from Siachen, a glacier in the disputed region of Kashmir, over fears that their presence would further damage the local environment and pollute one of Pakistan's principal water sources. The Press Trust of India (PTI) reported that Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan's adviser to Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif on national security and foreign affairs, accused Indian military forces stationed in Siachen of posing a serious threat to Pakistan's environment by damaging the virgin snow of Siachen.

For the record, India has stated that it will withdraw from Siachen only if Pakistan reveals its exact troop positions on the glacier, which Islamabad has rejected. Both India and Pakistan have maintained troops on Siachen since 1984, with a ceasefire in place since 2003. However, soldiers on both sides have since perished from adverse weather conditions on the glacier. Any hope of resolving the water dispute lies at the highest levels of government in Islamabad and

Delhi, something even Sartaj Aziz has advocated for. In October 2013, Pakistan said it wished to ask India to review terms of the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan's water and power minister Asif reiterated that the treaty favors India by allowing it to block water and construct dams on rivers allocated to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan would receive far less water than India. Additional

Indus Waters Commissioner Sheraz Memon said Pakistan had expressed his objections to seven projects undertaken by India. On the whole, Memon alleged that India is building 53 power projects and seven dams -- all of which, he claims, threatens the flow of water to

Pakistan. Pakistan has vowed to take the issue in front of global bodies like the United Nations for mediation. But Aziz also recommended that Pakistan must take pre-emptive actions internally to prevent a future water crisis, including conservation and the construction of new reservoirs.

58 Some factors though may be beyond the scope of human intervention. In conjunction with global climate change, Asif warned that Pakistan may face a very bleak waterless future. Illegal logging and deforestation have laid waste to the nation's rangelands, triggering devastating annual flash floods. Environmentalists are gravely concerned that the presence of humans on glaciers in the Himalaya and Karakoram mountain ranges has accelerated glacial retreat in recent years. A recent survey by three Dutch scientists, Walter Immerzeel, Ludovicus P. H. van Beek and Marc F. P. Bierkens warned that water flow in the Indus river valley will be reduced by 8 percent by the year 2050 due to shrinking glaciers. Haris Gazdar, a development economist who also works for the Collective for Social Sciences, a Karachi-based independent think tank, believes conservation and technology upgrades are critical in preventing a long-term water crisis. "In theory there is no reason why more water cannot be made available,” Gazdar said.

“But conservation and management require not only investment but changes in social and political organization and technology.”

If all that wasn't enough to worry about, much of Pakistan's water is not clean -- thousands die every year from water-borne diseases like dengue and diarrhea, which millions more are exposed to. UPI reported that Pakistan has too few dams of its own to capture rainwater, leading millions of people to have no access to clean drinking water. A lack of adequate storage reservoirs leads to enormous wastage of rainwater. In August of this year, the government released a report admitting that an astounding 80 percent of water samples taken from across the nation were deemed unsafe to drink. Salman Yousaf, deputy secretary of housing, urban development and public health engineering in Punjab province, said water was polluted by excessive groundwater pumping as well as by the presence of untreated wastes in tandem with aging water and sewage pipes. In addition, unregulated pesticides from farms are seeping into

59 streams and groundwater. In the teeming coastal capital city of Karachi (population of at least 18 million and already racked by endless sectarian violence), millions have no access to clean water, forcing many people to consume contaminated water. "In Lahore, groundwater pollution -- which causes typhoid, cholera, dysentery and hepatitis -- is a major issue because of fertilizer, pesticides and industrial discharge," Iqtidar Shah, deputy managing director of the Water and

Sanitation Authority in Lahore, told UPI. "The scarcity of clean water may also hit Lahore hard like Karachi. There is more pumping but no dumping of water, plus water pollution. The water level is decreasing constantly every year.”

General Farooq Hameed Sheikh, director of the Punjab Environment Protection

Department, said groundwater pollution presents immediate danger to existing water supplies -- and he blamed the politicians. "The negligence of successive governments resulted in contamination of water in the River Ravi in Lahore,” he told UPI. “The entire human waste of

Lahore has been poured into it. It has become the most polluted river in the world. It is now badly affecting groundwater in the Lahore City." Pakistani consumers further exacerbate the shortage by wasting water. The National reported that many people leave their taps running, while the utility companies’ practice of applying 'fixed charges' encourages such wastage. The government also lacks a regulatory framework to prevent the wasting of water. In total, nearly 90 percent Pakistan's total water use goes for agriculture (versus an average of 75 percent for the developing world). This means that only 10 percent of Pakistan's water is available for household, sanitation and industrial usage. As a result, one-third of the country’s whole population has no access to safe drinking water.

Moreover, within the vast agricultural community of Pakistan, two-thirds of their water is wasted through inefficient and archaic practices. Dr. Qamar-uz-Zaman, the former chief of

60 Pakistan's metrological department, told The National that wealthy landowners who either have connections to powerful politicians (or are lawmakers themselves) can resist modern agricultural and irrigation techniques. As a result, Pakistan has one of the world's lowest agricultural productivity rates in terms of units of water and per unit of land. Pakistanis already contend with marathon electric power outages, some of which can last up to 16 or 18 hours a day, resulting in anger and frustration, often in street demonstrations, and damaging the economy even further.

The Atlantic posits that recurring water shortages would only worsen the public’s immense discontent with its leaders, intensifying an “already unstable situation in the country.” Not surprisingly, some extremist groups in Pakistan have exploited the water shortage to upgrade their violent rhetoric against India. Hafiz Saeed, who founded Lakshar-e-Taiba (LeT), the militant group that perpetrated the 2008 attacks in Mumbai which killed nearly 170 people, squarely accused the Indian government of committing acts of "water terrorism" to deny Pakistan its own access to the precious natural resource. Michael Kugelman, senior program associate for

South and Southeast Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, noted that there is a risk that Pakistani terror groups such as LeT could use water as a pretext to again attack India. “LeT has often threatened to attack India in retaliation for India's ‘water theft,’" Kugelman said in an interview. “Because of LeT's ties to the Pakistani security establishment, such a scenario could certainly raise concerns about conflict and especially if India is led by a more hawkish government than the present one.”

Adding to the fears of social chaos, Pakistan faces a future of too many people and too little water to service them. Already bursting with 190 million people (two-thirds of them under the age of 30), Pakistan’s population is expected to reach 256 million in 2030 and double from current levels by the year 2050. But there will be less water available to these teeming masses of

61 people. Some analysts’ worry that competition of diminishing amounts of water may actually culminate in another war between the two South Asian countries. “They (India and Pakistan) need to regard water as a precious resource and a human right that has to be shared between nations,” said Paul Brown, a British journalist who has written extensively on climate change to

Reuters. “If supplies run low for irrigation or drinking water, local populations are likely to take the law into their own hands and grab what water is available. This could lead to serious local tensions getting out of control.” A joint study by researchers from the Stimson Center, a U.S- based think tank; the Observer Research Foundation in India; and the Sustainable Development

Policy Institute in Pakistan determined that ‘‘water shortages could hit the subcontinent in a few years because growing populations and increasing development are placing rising pressure on the

Indus Basin, to the point that water removals from the Indus are outpacing natural rates of renewal.’’ A report issued by the CIA also determined that "the likelihood of conflict between

India and Pakistan over shared river resources is expected to increase."

Pakistan's water scarcity threatens peace in the region, wrote Sajjad Ashraf, an adjunct professor at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, and an associate fellow at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies, “Instead of passing blame

Pakistan needs to look within to prevent waste and devise better management methods to reverse this looming crisis. The situation, if not tackled, will fan discord with India and exacerbate inter- provincial disharmony in Pakistan.” But Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson Center, does not believe water tensions could spark a war between India and Pakistan. “Bilateral relations, while still tense, have softened a bit in recent years,” he said in an interview. “One of the consequences of this slight warming pattern in relations is that Pakistan's government no longer states as a matter of policy that India is ‘stealing’ Pakistan's water.” Dawn, an English language Pakistani

62 daily, urged the country's leaders to find a solution to the water dispute with India lest it risk a complete collapse of society. This water crisis has led many - from farmers to opposition politicians to ministers to jihadi (Islamic fundamentalist) groups- to blame India for Pakistan’s water crunch,” Dawn said in an editorial. “It isn’t without reason that some experts have warned of water wars in South Asia, one of the world’s most water-stressed regions.” The paper further warned: “More worrying is the fact that water stress is fast developing into water scarcity. The country’s population is predicted to double by 2050, meaning that the people will have access to just half the water in 2050 they have now even if they start using the available resource efficiently and climatic changes don’t reduce flows in the Indus river system.”

Largely blaming the Pakistani government for inaction, Dawn nonetheless offered some semblance of hope. “The situation can still be salvaged. But it will require efficient use of water, the development of more storage capacity, resolution of provincial water disputes as well as engagement with India to find a peaceful solution to trans-boundary water-sharing, Unless effective actions are taken now, the future appears grim. Other voices also expressed their grave concerns. Without any meaningful action, the future looks alarming, Nayani soberly warned. “A growing population without the resources it needs to survive, let alone thrive economically, will throw the country into a period of instability that may be far worse than anything we see today,” he declared. Kugelman concluded that both India and Pakistan are equally culpable for their water crises -- and the problem is not quite as dire as others have stated. “The root of the problem in both countries is that existing water resources are not used judiciously,” Kugelman said.

“Water is often misallocated and wasted. This all gives the illusion of scarcity. In both countries, better demand-side management would resolve the water crisis.” (U.S. Foreign Policies Peace

Channel, 2014)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

In our quest to have more informed knowledge of the reasons behind the conflicts between

India and Pakistan and why they have persisted, this study we will adopt the chronological style or approach in the review of relevant literature pertaining to books and articles of the wars of

1947 1965, 1971 and 1999, respectively. In this regard, we shall present some background and assessments of the wars sequentially since there have been several analyses and assessments of the gains and losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the conflicts by various writers.

2.1 1947 Kashmir War (Empirical Review)

As Marin (2011: 316) asserted in his editorial article, ‘ Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic

World’ “The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948, sometimes known as the First Kashmir War, was fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four wars fought between the two newly independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the War a few weeks after independence by launching tribal lashkar (militia) from

Waziristan, in an effort to secure Kashmir, the future of which hung in the balance. The inconclusive result of the war still affects the geopolitics of both countries. On 22 October 1947,

Muslim tribal militias crossed the border of the state, claiming that they were needed to suppress a rebellion in the southeast of the kingdom. These local tribal militias and irregular Pakistani forces moved to take Srinagar, but on reaching Uri they encountered resistance. Hari Singh made

64 a plea to India for assistance, and help was offered, but it was subject to his signing an

Instrument of Accession to India. British officers in the sub-continent also took part in stopping the Pakistani Army from advancing.

Hutchinson and Vogel (1933: 224) wrote in their book, ‘History of the Panjab Hill States’ that “Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and 6 Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Amir

(King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and Gorkha invasions, the hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh.”

As told in The Encyclopedia Britannica-Kashmir (2011) “The First Anglo-Sikh War

(1845–46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were made to surrender the valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and the Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 1.2 million rupees. Because they could not readily raise this sum, the East

India Company allowed the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of 750,000 rupees to the Company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly formed princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, founding a dynasty, that was to rule the state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj, until India gained its independence in 1947.”

65 The Indian Independence Act of 1947, Chapter 30 revealed that “The partition of British

India and the independence of the new dominions of India and Pakistan was the result of the

Indian Independence Act 1947. Article 2 (4) of the Act provided for the termination of British suzerainty over the princely states with effect from 15 August 1947, and recognised the right of the states to choose whether to accede to India or to Pakistan or to remain outside them. Before and after the withdrawal of the British from India, the ruler of the princely state of Kashmir and

Jammu came under pressure from both India and Pakistan to agree to accede to one of the newly independent countries. Faced with painful choices, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, decided to avoid accession to either country.”

Prasad and Dharm (1987: 18) in , ‘History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948 observed that, “Following a Muslim revolution in the Poonch and Mirpur areaand an allegedly

Pakistani backed Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa aimed at supporting the revolution, the Maharaja asked for Indian military assistance. India set a condition that

Kashmir must accede to India for it to receive assistance. The Maharaja complied, and the

Government of India recognised the accession of the princely state to India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it. The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference volunteers aided the

Indian Army in its campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders.

Axmann (2008: 273) in his work, ‘Back to the Future’ highlighted; “The Gilgit and

Baltistan territories were secured for Pakistan by the Gilgit Scouts and the Chitral Scouts of the state of Chitral, one of the princely states of Pakistan, which had acceded to Pakistan on 6

October 1947. The state forces stationed in the border regions around Muzaffarabad and Domel were quickly defeated by tribal forces (some Muslim state forces mutinied and joined them) and the way to the capital was open. Among the raiders, there were many active Pakistani Army

66 soldiers disguised as tribals. They were also provided logistical help by the Pakistan Army.

Rather than advancing toward Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the captured cities in the border region engaging in looting and other crimes against their inhabitants.

As told by Cooper (2003) “In the Poonch valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence perimeter and defeated the tribal forces on the outskirts of the city. The successful defence included an outflanking manoeuvre by

Indian armoured cars. The defeated tribal forces were pursued as far as Baramulla and Uri and these towns were recaptured.In the Poonch valley, tribal forces continued to besiege state forces.

Sinha (1977: 174) informed that “In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the Gilgit

Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby obtained control of this northern region of the state. The ethnic forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose ruler, the Mehtar of

Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan.Indian forces ceased pursuit of tribal forces after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent a relief column southwards, in an attempt to relieve Poonch. Although the relief column eventually reached Poonch, the siege could not be lifted. A second relief column reached Kotli, and evacuated the garrisons of that town and others but were forced to abandon it being too weak to defend it. Meanwhile, Mirpur was captured by the tribal forces on

25 November 1947.”

Prasad and Dharm (1987: 308-324) write, “The ethnic forces attacked and captured Jhanger.

They then attacked Naoshera unsuccessfully, and made a series of unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the south a minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this stage of the war the front line began to stabilise as more Indian troops became available. The Indian forces launched a counterattack in

67 the south recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the tribal forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north Skardu was brought under siege by the Gilgit scouts.The

Indians held onto Jhanger against numerous counterattacks, which were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces. In the Kashmir Valley the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail.

The Gilgit scouts made good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring

Leh under siege, capturing Kargil and defeating a relief column heading for Skardu.”The Indians continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and Gurais

(Operation Eraze) .They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Tithwal. In the Jammu region, the forces besieged in Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up with the outside world again. The

Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the Chitral Forces under Mata-ul-Mulk besieged

Skardu and with the help of artillery were able to take Skardu. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh.

Lt. Gen. Sinha (1977: 103- 127) rightly noted that “During this time the front began to settle down. The siege of Poonch continued. An unsuccessful attack was launched by 77

Parachute Brigade (Brig Atal) to capture Zoji La pass. Operation Duck, the earlier epithet for this assault, was renamed as Operation Bison by Cariappa. M5 Stuart light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in dismantled conditions through Srinagar and winched across bridges while two field companies of the Madras Sappers converted the mule track across Zoji La into a jeep track. The surprise attack on 1 November by the brigade with armour supported by two regiments of 25 pounders and a regiment of 3.7-inch guns, forced the pass and pushed the tribal/Pakistani forces back to Matayan and later Dras. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing from Leh while their opponents eventually withdrew northwards toward

68 Skardu. The Indians now started to get the upper hand in all sectors. Poonch was finally relieved after a siege of over a year. The Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who had previously made good progress, were finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far as Kargil before being forced to halt due to supply problems. The Zoji La pass was forced by using tanks (which had not been thought possible at that altitude) and Dras was recaptured.”

1965 Kashmir War (Empirical Review)

An excerpt in India-Main News (1968) highlighted that “The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India. This conflict became known as the Second Kashmir War and was fought by India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in

1947. The war began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. The five- month war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between

India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of

British India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoffs between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.”

According to Global Security Organisation, “On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and

33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease

69 fire line on 15 August. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and

Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, 8 km into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir.”

A report captioned, ‘ Underestimating India’ in the Indian Express (2009) mentioned that

“On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that ‘Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place’ although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against

Indian forces, which were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.”

Brigadier Hayde (2006: 8-9) write, “India crossed the International Border on the

Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war. On 6 September, the

15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB

Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was

70 ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in

Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September.”

Indian Tribune (1987) asserted that “The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on

Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by

Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point.

Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-

Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.”

The Hindustan Times (2009) narrated that “On 8 September 1965, a company of 5

Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at

71 Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at

Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani

Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 th September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed. On the days following 9 th

September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st

Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards

Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th

Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in

Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.

Malik (1991: 78) in his book, ‘The Story of My Struggle’ confirmed that “The Pakistani

1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10

September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The

72 Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other.

The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 miles² (1,800 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian Territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani land gains were primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north.”

Fricker (1969:89) rightly observed in his article, ’ Pakistan’s Air Power’ “The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First

Kashmir War during the late 1940’s that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the

1965 conflict. The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured

Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The

PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57

Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1. The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and

Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker

Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counterpart, the F-86 Sabre.”

73 Faruqui (2009) in his Dawn News publication, held that “Although the IAF's de

Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker

Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired)

Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war. According to the

Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed ‘Sabre Slayer’. The

PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise

Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region.”

Coggins (2000: 164) opined that “In combat the starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter. Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the

Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the star-fighters snuffed it. This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi.

Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.”

As noted by Fricker (1969: 90) “The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country.

The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it

74 shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59. According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-

86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over.

Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force. Indian sources have pointed out that, despite

PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war. But this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.”

According to Amin (2001: 105) in The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor “The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the

Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.

Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36

Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4

Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the

105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Sstuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.”

Seidenman (1978: 269) in his story said that “At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the

Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments

75 served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation. The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and

188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units was equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black

Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called

'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hudson’s Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light

Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.”

Haginbotham and Wriggins (1971: 254) in their analysis of the war asserted that “ Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour, Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counter offensive on Amritsar; they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal

Uttar.After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter- offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially. The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.

Zaloga and Laurier (1999: 37) in their book M47 and M48 Patton Tanks write “Although

India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector.

76 Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the

Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda.

In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd

Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.”

Kavic (1967: 190) argued that “Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore

S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of

Dwarka, which was 200 miles (320 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation

Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war contested as a nuisance raid by some.The attack on Dwarka caused the Indian Navy led to questions being asked in

India's parliamentand subsequent post-war modernization and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores”

Hiranandani (2002: 306) mentioned that “According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.

Quadir (2002) in his article contributed that “The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases. On 7 September 1965, the Special

Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of

77 Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster”. Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner

(including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians. The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.”

TIME magazine of 17 th September, 1965 observed that “Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the

Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles. India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations; sending commandos deep into Pakistan Territory but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.

1971 Bangladesh Liberation War (Empirical Review)

Cohen (2004:382-384) in his book ‘ The Idea of Pakistan’ narrated that, “the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan during the Bangladesh

Liberation War in 1971. Indian, Bangladeshi and international sources consider the beginning of the war to have been Operation Chengiz Khan, when Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on 11 Indian airbases on 3 December 1971, leading to India's entry into the war of independence in East Pakistan on the side of Bangladeshi nationalist forces, and the commencement of hostilities with West Pakistan. Lasting just 13 days, it is considered to be one of the shortest wars

78 in history. During the course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistani

Armed Forces signed the Instrument of Surrender, on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking the liberation of the new nation of Bangladesh. East Pakistan had officially seceded from Pakistan on 26 March 1971. Between 90,000 and 93,000 members of the Pakistan Armed Forces including paramilitary personnel were taken as Prisoners of War by the Indian Army. It is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 civilians were killed in Bangladesh. As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country.”

Riedel (2011: 10) in ‘Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad’ held that “Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-co-operation movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26

March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to

West Pakistan. The next action carried out was Operation Searchlight, an attempt to kill the intellectual elite of the east.”

Raja (2010: 35) in ‘O General My General:Life and Works of General Osmany’ observed that “the Pakistan army conducted a widespread genocide against the Bengali population of East Pakistan, aimed in particular at the minority Hindu population, leading to approximately 10 million people fleeing East Pakistan and taking refuge in the neighbouring

Indian states. The East Pakistan-India border was opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India.

The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee

79 camps along the border. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees placed an intolerable strain on India's already overburdened economy.”

An excerpt in Los Angeles Times (2002) in its account mentioned that “General Tikka Khan earned the nickname 'Butcher of Bengal' due to the widespread atrocities he committed. He was previously known as the 'Butcher of Balochistan' for other infamous atrocities he had committed.

General Niazi commenting on his actions noted 'On the night between 25/26 March 1971

General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning.

General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan.

General Tikka resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land not the people...' Major General Farman had written in his table diary, "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red". It was painted red by Bengali blood.”

As contained in the United States Department of State Telegram of October 26, 1971, “the

Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but failing to elicit any response, The Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan. The Indian leadership under Prime Minister Gandhi quickly decided that it was more effective to end the genocide by taking armed action against Pakistan than to simply give refuge to those who made it across to refugee camps. Exiled East Pakistan army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using these camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.”

The mood in West Pakistan had also turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East

Pakistan and India. By the end of September, an organised propaganda campaign, possibly

80 orchestrated by elements within the Government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers proclaiming

Crush India becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi,

Islamabad and Lahore and soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan. By October, other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh MujiburRahman.”

In another US Department of State Telegram of November 9, 1971, In November, war seemed inevitable. Throughout November, thousands of people led by West Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across West Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to Crush India . India responded by starting a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East Pakistan. The

Indian military waited until December, when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention.

A publication in Time News of 30 November, 1971 noted that, “On the evening of 3

December Sunday, at about 5:40 pm, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on eleven airfields in north-western India, including Agra, which was 300 miles (480 km) from the border. At the time of this attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight. This preemptive strike known as Operation Chengiz Khan, was inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India. In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air

Force responded with initial air strikes that very night. These air strikes were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning and thereafter which followed interceptions by

Pakistanis anticipating this action.”

81 An excerpt in Newsweek Magazine (1971: 34) asserted that “Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion. This involved

Indian forces in a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight. The main Indian objective on the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan. Pakistan's PNS Ghazi sank off the fairway buoy of

Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India, making it the first submarine casualty in the waters around the Indian subcontinent.”

According to Global Security Organisation (2002) “Naval reconnaissance submarine operations were started by the Pakistan Navy on both eastern and western regions. In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi's port in Operation Trident on the night of 4 th and 5 th December, using missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz;

PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged. 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and

Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python on the night of

8–9 December, in which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships.”

Olsen (2011: 237) narrated that, “In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Navals

Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea

Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistanincluding Chittagong and

82 Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious circumstances off Vishakapatnam's coastreducing Pakistan's control of

Bangladeshi coastline. But on 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.”

According to Ali (1983:61) “the Pakistani Navy lost a third of its force in the war. The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of

Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. After the initial preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day.”

The Library Congress Country Studies giving a summary of the war held that, The Indian

Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict. Though the PAF did not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on Pakistani naval port city of Karachi, it retaliated by bombing the Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that had attacked. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission

83 and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east. While India's grip on what had been East

Pakistan tightened, the IAF continued to press home attacks against Pakistan itself. The campaign developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar and close-support attacks by fighters, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by B-57s and C-130 (Pakistan), and Canberras and An-12s (India). The PAF's F-6s were employed mainly on defensive combat air patrols over their own bases, but without air superiority the PAF was unable to conduct effective offensive operations, and its attacks were largely ineffective. During the IAF's airfield attacks, one US and one UN aircraft were damaged in Dacca, while a Canadian Air Force

Caribou was destroyed at Islamabad, along with US military liaison Chief Brigadier General

Chuck Yaeger's USAF Beech U-8 light twin.

Bishop (2004 :384-387) in his analysis noted that, "Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against Pakistan's forward air bases in the West until the end of the war, and large scale interdiction and close-support operations, and were maintained. The PAF played a more limited part in the operations, and were reinforced by F-104s from Jordan, Mirages from an unidentified

Middle Eastern ally (remains unknown) and by F-86s from Saudi Arabia. Their arrival helped camouflage the extent of Pakistan's losses. Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from

Saudi Arabia. Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), and the independence of Pakistan's East wing as

Bangladesh was confirmed. India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in the West, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close- support and interdiction, and about 65 IAF aircraft were lost (54 losses were admitted), perhaps

84 as many as 27 of them in air combat. Pakistan lost 72 aircraft (51 of them combat types, but admitting only 25 to enemy action). Of the Pakistani losses, at least 24 fell in air combat

(although only 10 air combat losses were admitted, not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six

Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors). But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while

India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan.”

Schofield (2003: 124) in her story wrote that, “Pakistan attacked at several places along

India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian army successfully held their positions. The

Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 square miles (14,000 km 2) of Pakistan territory.

This land was gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir; Pakistani Punjab and Sindh sectors were later ceded to Pakistan by India in the Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill.

Paret (1986:802) observed that, “On the eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini (Allied forces); unlike the 1965 war which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three- pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the eighth, twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into

East Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian Air Force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission.

In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.The Indian campaign

85 employed blitzkrieg techniques, exploiting weakness in the enemy's positions and bypassing opposition, and resulted in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight. On 16 December, the Pakistani forces stationed in

East Pakistan surrendered.”

1999 Kargil War (Empirical Review)

Clancy et al (2004: 19) postulated that “The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the

LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC.

According to Wirsing (2003:38) “The infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr" its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute.

Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Pakistan’s

Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz, and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed there were no mujahideen but only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil War.

86 Musharraf (2006: 9) observed that “During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and

Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed. In February the Pakistan

Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC.”

India Tribune (1999) held that “ Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular

Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian- controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower

Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns

North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.”

Qadir (2002) argued that “Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led by Capt Saurabh Kalia, who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration.

Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in

87 tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize that the plan of attack was on a much bigger scale.”

Malik (2009) in ‘ Lessons from Kargil’ informed that “The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who provided additional artillery support.”

Lambeth (2012: 54) in ‘ Airpower 18000 ft...’ asserted that “The Indian Air Force launched

Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but its effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude and weather conditions, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used.The Indian Navy also prepared to blockade the Pakistani ports (primarily the Karachi port) to cut off supply routes under

Operation Talwar .”

As told by Hiranandani (2009: 128) “The Indian Navy's western and eastern fleets joined in the North Arabian Sea and began aggressive patrols and threatened to cut Pakistan’s sea trade.

Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-scale war had broken out.

88 Wirsing (2003: 36) rightly observed that “The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of

Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.”

Adebayo and Lekha (2001: 192-193) in their work, ‘Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21 st

Century’ narrated that “The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.”

Hiranandani (2009: 152) argued that “The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route. This was

89 soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point

4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D. The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict.

Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.”

Barua (2005 : 261) in his story held that “Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1D, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war.

Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat.”

According to Global Security Oganisation report, “As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line- of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. It was in this type of

90 terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the

Pakistani forces. However, The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory. One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to

Stinger SAMs. On May 27, 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down by a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds.”

As Ali (1983: 171) mentioned in ‘ Bitter Chill of Winter’ , “In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −15 °C to −11 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops.

Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were

91 encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground were back under Indian control.”

Abbas (2004:173) highlighted that “Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, who was then an aide to

President Bill Clinton, reported that U.S. intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. Following the Washington accord of July 4, 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the

United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb- down, instead deciding to fight on.”

India Today (2008) reported that “The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India.

By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of

Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.”

2.2 1947 War (Theoretical Review)

Alastair (1997 : 34) opined in, ‘Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir War’ noted that “The war was initially fought by the forces of the princely state and by ethnic militias from the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas. Facing the assault and a Muslim revolution in the Poonch and

Mirpur area of Kashmir, the ruler of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu, who was a Hindu,

92 signed an Instrument of Accession to the Union of India. The Indian and Pakistani armies entered the war after this. The fronts solidified gradually along what came to be known as the

Line of Control. A formal cease-fire was declared at 23:59 on the night of 1/2 January 1949.”

Hutchinson and Vogel (1933: 536) argued that “Pakistan was of the view that the Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the Indian Army, because it held that the Maharaja of Kashmir was not a hereditary ruler and was merely a British appointee, after the British defeated Ranjit

Singh who ruled the area before the British conquest. There had been no such position as the

"Maharaja of Kashmir" before that. Hence, Pakistan decided to take action, but the Army Chief of Pakistan General Sir Douglas Gracey, would not send troops to the Kashmir front, refusing to obey the order to do so given by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan. Gracey justified his insubordination by arguing that Indian forces occupying Kashmir, like those of

Pakistan, had taken an Oath of Allegiance to King George VI —in his roles of King of India and

King of Pakistan— and hence he could not engage in a military conflict with Indian forces.

Pakistan finally did manage to send troops to Kashmir, but by then the Indian forces had taken control of approximately two thirds of the former principality.

In a Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, it was stated that “After protracted negotiations a cease-fire was agreed to by both countries, which came into effect. The terms of the cease-fire as laid out in a United Nations resolution of 13

August 1948, were adopted by the UN on 5 January 1949. This required Pakistan to withdraw its forces, both regular and irregular, while allowing India to maintain minimum strength of its forces in the state to preserve law and order. On compliance of these conditions a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the territory.

1965 War (Theoretical Review)

As noted by Brecher and Wilkenfield (1997: 171-172) in A Study of Crisis, “Since Partition of India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the

Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area. Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965. Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (910 km 2) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km 2).”

Mankekar (1967: 62-63) in his book Twenty two faithful days pointed out that “after its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian

Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. The

Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris, and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

94 Bishop (1997: 384-387) posited that “India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air forces were quite evenly balanced in the West. The PAF lost some 25 aircraft (11 in air combat), while the Indians lost 60

(25 in air combat). This was an impressive result, but it was simply not good enough. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and

India's losses totaling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and was unable to prevent

IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberra’s from flying daylight missions over Pakistan.

Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.

According to the Library of Congress Country Studies(1994) conducted by the Federal

Research Division of the United States “The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the

Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.”

TIME magazine of October 1, 1965 reported that “India held 690 mi 2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi 2 of Indian Territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally,

Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily. The article further elaborates that; severely

95 mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.”

Hagerty (2005: 38) wrote in his book ‘ South Asia in world politics ’: “The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore,

Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.”

Gertjan Dijkink (1996:285) in his book ‘National identity and geopolitical visions’ , writes:

“The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.”

According to Stanley Wolpert (1990) in his work ‘ India ’ summarizing the Indo-Pakistani

War of 1965, “In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.”

Praagh (2003: 278) in his book titled ‘ The greater game: India's race with destiny and

China’ argued that “India won the war. It gained 1,840 km 2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory:

640 km 2 (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km 2 (180 sq mi) of the

Sailkot sector; 380 km 2 (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km 2

(140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km 2 (210 sq mi) of Indian Territory: 490 km 2

(190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km 2 (19 sq mi) around Khem Karan.”

96 Kux (1992 :129) “ India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war: “Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated. The defeat in the 1965 war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. This became a surge after his protégé, Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto, deserted him and established the Pakistan People's Party.”

Johnson (2005:110) mentions in a ‘ A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947 ’

“ India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles (1,900 km 2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km 2) of its own.”

An excerpt from Carpenter and Wiencek’s ‘ Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment ’(2005:80) “A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert

Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.”

Keay (2001: 301) " India: A History " provides a summary of the 1965 war: “The 1965 Indo-

Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.”

Heo and Horowitz (2003: 64) write in their book Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan, “Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory”

97 Newsweek magazine, September 20, 1965, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold off the much larger Indian Army.

Fortna (2004:211) notes that “The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in

Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani

President, Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966. With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.

Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India bowed to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire. On 22 September, the United Nations Security

Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.”

The Library of Congress Country Studies, U.S.A. (1994) held that “Pakistan and the United

States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of

Pakistan at its request. However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country. However, Pakistan did receive significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's

Republic of China.”

Paul (1994: 119) in his book ‘Asymmetric Conflicts’ argued that “Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of

98 Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the

UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders. India's participation in the Non-Aligned

Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.”

Conley (2001: ) observed that “Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. In its October

1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war.

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a

"politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.

As noted by Khan (2013: 45-48) in ‘Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb’

“According to veterans of the war, the war had greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily. Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military forces, and Pakistan's own position in international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China was indeed improved. Noted in the memoirs of war veteran, General Tariq Majid (later four-star general), Chou En-Lai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzus: ‘to go slow, not to push India hard; and avoid a fight over Kashmir, ‘for at least, 20-30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power’.’ General Majid maintained in Eating Grass ,

99 that the ‘sane, philosophical and political critical thinking’ was missing in Pakistan, and Pakistan had lost a tremendous human resource that it had fought the war with India.”

Haass (1998: 172) rightly mentioned: “Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the

United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States. After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.”

1971 Bangladesh Libration War (Theoretical Review)

Bose (2005) in her article ‘Anatomy of Violence’ writes that, “The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally dominant

West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in

East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora

(Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six

Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to

Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis, to suppress dissent in East Pakistan.”

Lt. Gen. Matinudinn (1994: 255) in his story confirmed that “On 26 March 1971, Ziaur

Rahman, a major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh. In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The

East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. Bangladesh Force namely

Mukti Bahini consisting of Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Gono Bahini (Guerilla Force)

100 was formed under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Mohammad Ataul Ghani

Osmany.”

Nayar (1998) in the Indian Express reported that, “The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at 16.31 IST on 16

December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in- chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi,

Commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Aurora accepted the surrender, the surrounding crowds on the race course began shouting anti-Niazi and anti-Pakistan slogans.

India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war, including Pakistani soldiers and their East

Pakistani civilian supporters. 79,676 prisoners were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were

Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 Police, 1,000 Navy and 800 PAF. The remaining prisoners were civilians – either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (razakars). The

Hamoodur Rahman Commission report instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as follows: Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.”

The World Reporter (1972) stated that: “The Soviet Union sympathised with the Bangla- deshis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognising that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals—the United States and

China. The USSR gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971. The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia.”

101 Hanhimaki (2004: 78) argued that, “Pakistan was a close ally of the People's Republic of

China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total

Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the

United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. Nixon encouraged countries like Jordan and Iran to send military supplies to Pakistan while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, most notably the

Blood telegram. This prompted widespread criticism and condemnation both by the United

States Congress and in the international press.”

Burne (2003: 215) in his book, U.S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988, mentioned that,

“Then-US ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush (later 41st President of the

United States) introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get

India to withdraw, but to no avail. It has been documented that President Nixon requested Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter jets in aid of Pakistan. When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployed Task Force 74 led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. The Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11 December 1971. According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, although this is unlikely as the Eagle was decommissioned at Portsmouth, England in January 1972.”

102 A Time report of 13 th December, 1971 observed that, “As a long-standing ally of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Believing that just such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with India to discourage it. The Chinese did not, however, respond to this encouragement, because unlike the 1962 China-Indian War when India was caught entirely unaware, this time the Indian Army was prepared and had deployed eight mountain divisions to the Sino-Indian border to guard against such an eventuality. China instead threw its weight behind demands for an immediate ceasefire.

An excerpt in The Press Courier (1975) held that, “When Bangladesh applied for membership to the United Nations in 1972, China vetoed their application because two United

Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians had not yet been implemented. China was also among the last countries to recognise independent

Bangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August 1975.”

The Time News (1971) asserted that, “The war stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, clearly established India's military dominance of the subcontinent. In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction. Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goals—the establishment of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war. In announcing the Pakistani surrender, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in the Indian

Parliament:"Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in

103 their hour of triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognize it as a significant milestone in man's quest for liberty."

Haqqani (2005: 87-88) writes, “For Pakistan it was a complete and humiliating defeat, a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of intense rival India. Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion of its economy and suffered setbacks to its geopolitical role in South Asia. Pakistan feared that the two-nation theory was disproved and that the

Islamic ideology had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis part of Pakistan. Also, the Pakistani military suffered further humiliation by having their 90,000 prisoners of war (POWs) released by

India only after the negotiation and signing of the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972. In addition to repatriation of prisoners of war also, the agreement established an ongoing structure for the negotiated resolution of future conflicts between India and Pakistan (referring to the remaining western provinces that now composed the totality of Pakistan). In signing the agreement,

Pakistan also, by implication, recognised the former East Pakistan as the now independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh. The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept defeat, as the state-controlled media in West Pakistan had been projecting imaginary victories. When the surrender in East Pakistan was finally announced, people could not come terms with the magnitude of defeat, spontaneous demonstrations and mass protests erupted on the streets of major cities in West Pakistan. Also, referring to the remaining rump Western Pakistan as simply

"Pakistan" added to the effect of the defeat as international acceptance of the secession of the eastern half of the country and its creation as the independent state of Bangladesh developed and was given more credence.”

Ali (1997:491) postulated that, “The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and human resources was very high. Demoralized and finding himself unable to control the situation,

104 General Yahya Khan surrendered power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was sworn-in on 20

December 1971 as President and as the (first civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator. A new and smaller western-based Pakistan emerged on 16 December 1971. The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military. Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army. The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan.”

The Dawn News (2002) quoted thus, “In his book, “ The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier’s

Narrative” Pakistani Major General Hakeem Arshad a veteran of this conflict noted, “We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective 'conduct' that had provided the enemy an opportunity to dismember us."

According to Murshid (1997: 1-34) “On the brink of defeat around 14 December, the

Pakistani Army, and its local collaborators, systematically killed a large number of Bengali doctors, teachers and intellectuals, part of a pogrom against the Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals. Young men, especially students, who were seen as possible rebels were also targeted. The extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known. R.J.

Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed. Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh government figures state that Pakistani forces aided

105 by collaborators killed three million people raped 200,000 women and displaced millions of others.”

As Halarnkar (2000) rightly opined, “Bangladesh became an independent nation, the world's fourth most populous Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was released from a West Pakistani prison, returning to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and becoming the first President of Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister.In 2010 Bangladesh government set up a tribunal to prosecute the people involved in alleged war crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan. According to the Government, the defendants would be charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson. In aftermath of war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur

Rahman Commission headed by Justice Hamoodur Rahman in 1971 to investigate the political and military causes for defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities during the war. The commission's report was classified and its publication banned by Bhutto as it put the military in poor light, until some parts of the report surfaced in Indian media in 2000.”

Haqqani (2005: 108) posited that, “In 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, the treaty ensured that Pakistan recognised the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs. India treated all the POWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925. It released more than 90,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months. The accord also gave back more than 13,000 km² of land that Indian troops had seized in

West Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas. But some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East

Pakistan.”

106 Coll (2005:221) in his book Ghost Wars , argues that the Pakistan military's experience with

India, including Pervez Musharraf's experience in 1971, influenced the Pakistani government to support jihadist groups in Afghanistan even after the Soviets left, because the jihadists were a tool to use against India, including bogging down the Indian Army in Kashmir.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973), writing about the war in Foreign Affairs magazine, stated

“There is no parallel in contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed Pakistan in 1971.

A tragic civil war, which rent asunder the people of the two parts of Pakistan, was seized by

India as an opportunity for armed intervention. The country was dismembered, its economy shattered and the nation's self-confidence totally undermined.”

Branch Number of captured Pakistani POWs

Army 54,154

Navy 1,381

Air Force 833

Paramilitary including police 22,000

Civilian personnel 12,000

Total: 90,368

Source: Bharat Rakshak (2006) in ‘ Huge Bag of Prisoners in Our Hands’

1999 Kargil War (Theoretical Review)

Nawaz (2003: 420) in ‘Crossed Swords...’ opined: “The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. To date, it is also the only instance of direct, conventional warfare between nuclear states (i.e., those possessing nuclear weapons). India had conducted its

107 first successful test in 1974; Pakistan, which had been developing its nuclear capability in secret since around the same time, conducted its first known tests in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of tests by India.”

Hussain (2006) in a Dawn news article, held that “Before the Partition of India in 1947,

Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947–48) concluded with the LOC bisecting the

Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-

Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.”

Chandran (2004) rightly observed that “The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 mi) from

Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F). An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh.

The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres

(16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft). Apart from the district capital,

Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushko Valley and the town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas, northeast of

Kargil.”

108 Acosta (2003: 2) argued that “Kargil was targeted partly because the terrain was conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants.”

Kapur ( 2007 :10 ) in his article ‘The Fate of Kashmir’ posited that “After the Indo-

Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors – notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, there were escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict. During the winter of 1998–1999, some elements of the

Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of Mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC.

Lt. Gen. Aziz wrote in his article in The Nation daily in January 2013. ‘There were no

Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition’, some writers have speculated

109 that the operation's objective may also have been retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in

1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.

Kapur (2007: 118) noted that “According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and

1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war.”

Qadir (2002:228) in his analysis of the war stated that “After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime

Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari

Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies" a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan. Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20.”

The Times of India (2006) reported “There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First,

Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of

India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing some territory held by

Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of

Control after international pressure.”

110 The News (1999) stated that “Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started, a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified. International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead

Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.”

According to Perkovich (2006) “This was immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed". Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited nuclear arsenals in "tactical" nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase coercion against India.”

An excerpt from ‘ India had Deployed Agni during Kargil’ in Indian Express (2000) noted that “The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the United States received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill

Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even

111 threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In a May 2000 article, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof”.

2.3 GAP IN LITRATURE

As can be observed in the above literature review, there had been various literature attributed to the India-Pakistani wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. These are mainly in form of narratives stressing the causes and outcomes of these wars, which have highlighted the previous

Agreements, Accords and Declarations made in respect of the conflicts as brokered by the

United Nations. These were done without advancing more solutions towards the settlement of the said crisis. Therefore, this study seeks to suggest more practical means of filling this gap by way of proffering solutions towards possible settlement of the India-Pakistani conflict.

112 CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical Framework

This study will adopt the “Balance of Power” theory as a theoretical framework to the

‘Indian-Pakistani conflict. It will be used to describe, analyze, interpret and predict the relations between India and Pakistan, which has been chaotic over the years. The Balance of power theory is one of the oldest and most enduring concepts of international relations. As rightly noted by Paul (1994: 15) ‘In a world of powerful and threatening states, it is often the only dependable strategy, in that leading international security experts assessments of the current status of balance of power theory, confirm the peculiarity of today’s international system tilting towards a unipolar structure ’. In light of this opinion, Balance of Power is seen in terms of the patterns of distribution of power among states, which has been responsible for stability, peace and order in world politics. Hedley Bull (1977) sees Balance of Power as the “existence of a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down rules to others in the international system”. He went further to argue that the general and local balance of power, where they existed, have provided the conditions on which other institutions in the international order depend and have been able to operate, such as Diplomacy, War, Power management, and so on.

Over the years, the primary concerns of International Organisations and Scholars have been how to create and maintain international peace and control international violence. In this vein, the concept of balance of power has been regarded as one way through which the issue of war and peace can be managed.

113 Application of the Theory

In the context of our study, the Balance of Power theory focuses on the technique of

‘Disarmament’ that is used in the control of arms race. This can be applied to the bi-polar

relations between Indian and Pakistani wars and conflicts and thereby reducing the conflicts

between the two neighbouring countries. By applying the Disarmament strategy of balance of

power, the stock of arms in possession of the competing states will be reduced proportionately

and reasonable limits placed on the level of armaments and further development of certain

category of arms. (Ojo and Seseh, 1998:138). India, no doubt, is more populous and has a

relatively larger military strength than Pakistan. However, in concrete terms, their military

capabilities seem to be balanced. This can be ascertained from the results of the 1947,1965, and

1999 wars in which there was relatively, no victor, no vanquished up to cease-fire. The

situation is further buttressed by the fact that when India built and tested her nuclear arsenal in

1974 and 1998, Pakistan also completed and tested her nuclear weapon in the same year (1998)

which it started building since 1972. This specifically depicts a Balance of Power. As reported

by the National Security Archive: George Washington University, “The Indian nuclear arsenal

was built by the United States in order to ward off any alignment plans between India and the

former Soviet Union due to the relative proximity of India to U.S.S.R than U.S.A. On the other

land, the U.S. has been a major supplier of weapons to Pakistan but at a point refrained from

doing so, due to alleged Pakistan’s illicit use of the weapons”. This resulted in Pakistan looking

up to China for aid and China jumped at the opportunity in order to undo her enemy, India.

China, in actual sense, helped Pakistan build her nuclear weapons. From the forgoing, one can

easily deduce that the super powers had been using India and Pakistan as a front in the Balance

of Power politics.

114 The Balance of Power theory can, therefore, be applied as a stratagem for peace and order.

As asserted by Tailor (1954) “Europe has known as much peace as war; and it has owed these periods of peace to the balance of power. No one state has been strong enough to eat up the rest.

Even the mutual jealousy of the great powers has preserved the smaller states, which could not have preserved themselves”.

3.2 Hypotheses

With regard to the research questions, the study posits the hypotheses that;

(1) The dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in

Asia.

(2)The resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create the opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.

3.3 Research Design

A research design is the strategy or approach to be used in conducting a scientific enquiry. It is the enabling operational paradigm of the scientific study that gives shape, form and identity to the research activity. (Eboh, E.C.1998: 20). According to Anikpo (1986) research design is a plan or structure of any aspect of the research procedure. This plan will be realised in the selection of the most appropriate concepts, hypothesis, and analytical paradigms, specific sampling techniques, tests for the hypothesis and also the most effective format to present a research report. The research design, therefore, provides the frame work for the generation of analysis of data according to the priorities set by the researcher. In line with the above definitions, this study has adopted the ‘One group pretest-posttest’ research design since it is a historical research. In this type of design, a single group is compared with itself, and then a measurement is taken before a causal event occurs and after the causal event occurs. In this

115 instance, Indian-Pakistan conflict is our independent variable and a peaceful relation in South

Asia is taken to our dependent variable. Applying the above design to our hypothesis, we shall analyse the peaceful relations in South Asia before the conflicts and after the conflicts.

This is symbolically represented by 0 1, X, 0 2

01 = First observation

X = Experimental variable

02 = Second observation.

3.4 Method of Data Collection

This study has adopted the qualitative method of data collection. In this case, the secondary source was employed, which basically relies on documented evidences and information accessed from Books, Journals, Official documents, Conference papers, Newspapers and magazine articles, Internet sources, etc.

3.5 Method of Data Analysis

This study has used the qualitative content analysis as a method of analysis based on findings of the research. As noted by Barbie C.R. (2010), content analysis is a method in social science for studying the content of empirical documentation, which can be referred to as mute evidence in that they are written texts and recorded human communications, such as books, journals, articles, official documents, etc. In the process of this study, the researcher has delved into some viable literature, some dating back to the 1960s up to the contemporary works on the Indian-

Pakistani wars and conflicts. Through the literature reviews, the study has been able to confirm or determine that Kashmir region had been, and still is, at the centre of the Indian-Pakistani volatile relations. As elaborated from the start, India and Pakistan were, initially known as

British-India, being one of the British colonies dating back in the 19 th century. It was also

116 discovered that the cause of their incompatibility stemmed from divergent religious ideologies and fundamentalism, namely, Hinduism and Islam. It also explained that these cleavages were on during the colonial period, so much so it prompted the British to divide the colony into two on granting them independence. In all the wars namely, the 1947 ‘First Kashmir war’, 1965,

‘Second Kashmir war, 1971 ‘Bangladesh Liberation war’ and the 1999 ‘Kagil war’, hostilities had always emanated from Pakistan.

From the findings of this study, the UN, after the 1947 war, awarded 37% of the disputed region to Pakistani control and the rest 63% went to India. In this instance, the boundary was code-named ‘Cease-fire Line’ and was later changed to ‘Line of Control’ (LoC) in the Simla

Accord of 1972. Pakistan, not satisfied, always infiltrated across this boundary in a bid to annex more territory on the Indian side of the divide. Apart from the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation war, most of the fighting went on in the Kashmir and Jammu region. It is believed that India had covertly sponsored the Bangladesh Liberation Movement, (Awami Leage) since East Pakistan happened to be on the other side of India. This meant that before the liberation, Pakistan was fighting India from the East and from the West and that was a more difficult task.

As George Perkovich rightly observed in ‘ The News’ (1999), “International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, made a statement on May 31 st , warning that “an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use any weapon in its arsenal”. In addition to the above statement, the Pakistani Senate leader noted, “The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed. Many of such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider the use of their limited nuclear arsenals in tactical nuclear warfare”. In this regard, concerted efforts should be made to forestall

117 more wars from erupting between India and Pakistan. There is strong suspicion that the crises are likely being promoted by the developed nations who had been using the two countries as an ideological play-ground and business outlet. They supply them arms which are very sophisticated, including the nuclear weapons, to kill each other and like match referees; tell them when to cease fire.

There is always the need in this type of study to explicate the variable indicators. In this case the independent variable (X) in our research topic is given as the “Indian-Pakistani Conflict.”

The said conflict has been found by this study to be incessantly repeated and have been of very high dimensions. This assertion has been verified by series of wars which have been fought between the two countries in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999, respectively.

The 1947 war commenced 22 nd October 1947 and ended 1 st January 1949. This means that it lasted for 1 year, 2 months, 1 week and 3 days. The location of the war was Kashmir and the ceasefire was mandated by the United Nations. It resulted in the dissolution of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan conquered roughly a third of Kashmir (Azad-

Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltisan). India retained the rest of Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh.

India, at the end of the war, sustained casualties of 1500 men killed and 3500 wounded while

Pakistan had 6000 killed and 14000 wounded.

The 1965 war commenced August 23, 1965 and ended September 23, 1965. The location of the war Kashmir and the ceasefire was also UN mandated. It did not result in any territorial changes

India lost 3000 men while Pakistan lost 3800 men.

The war of 1971 started on 3 rd December, 1971 and ended 16 th December of the same year.

The locations were East Pakistan, Indian West Pakistan border, the Line of Control, the Arabian

Sea and the Bay of Bengal. It ended with a decisive Indian and Bangladeshi victory when the

118 Pakistan forces in East-Pakistan surrendered. The result was the liberation of East Pakistan as an

Independent-Bangladesh. The total strength of the India forces was 500,000 plus 175,000 Mukti-

Bahini militants from Bangladesh. The total strength of the Pakistan forces was 365,000. India had 3843 men killed and 9851 wounded. On the Pakistan side, 9000 were killed and 4350 wounded. A total of 97,368 Pakistan soldiers were captured by the Indian forces.

The 1999 war took off on 3 rd May, 1999 and ended on 26 th July, 1999 following a U.N.- mandated ceasefire. Location was in Kargil-Kashmir. On the Indian side, 527 men were killed and 1363 wounded. Pakistan lost 1042 soldiers and 665 wounded. One Indian pilot was captured by Pakistan and eight Pakistan soldiers’ were captured by Indian during the fighting. Borders remained unchanged.

Apart from the wars, there have been series of intermittent conflicts over the years; around the Kashmir border and other skirmishes up till recent times.

On February18, 2007, the train service between India and Pakistan was bombed near Panipat,

North of New Delhi with a death toll of 68 people. There was terrorist attack on Indian Embassy in Pakistan on July, 2007. On November 26, 2007, many gunmen opened fire on civilians in

Mumbai, this left hundreds of people dead. Indian forces killed all the gunmen except one, named, Ajmai Kasab of the Lashkar e-Taiba sect. In January, 2010 Pakistani and Indian forces exchanged fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir. In 2013- A Pakistani soldier was killed,

Pakistan retaliates by killing two Indian soldiers, beheading one.

As regards the dependent variable in the study, which is taken as “Peaceful Relations in

South-Asia”. It is imparative to note that the Indo-Pakistani turbulent relations, has a lot of implication for peace in South-Asia. Due to the strategic location of both India and Pakistan; bordered by the India ocean, Bay of Bengal, land border with China, Afghanistan, Bagladesh and

119 some other countries with diverse problems in South Asia, conflict between the two is likely to be contagious. As found by the study, the India-Pakistani conflicts have had several Agreements,

Accords and Declarations which were mainly bi-laterally signed in respect of proposed peaceful co-existence, and still, the hostilities continued unabated.Major examples of these Peace

Agreements, are, the U.N. Ceasefire Agreement of 1949, the Simla Accord of 1972, the Tashkent

Declaration of 1965 and the Lohore Declaration of 1999. After these, there had been some other bilateral agreements, which had not been able to quell the conflicts.

Meredith Weiss (2002:10) succinctly captures the core questions underlying the conflict.

She opines that the root of the conflict is the question of sovereignty and the possibility of self- determination by Kashmiris of whether to remain in India, join Pakistan, or form an independent state. But the issue is not all that simple. While New Delhi insists that “Kashmir is an integral part of India, Pakistan on the other hand insists that “Kashmir is its life line” and is the unfinished agenda of the partition of the Indian sub-continent. What would happen if Kashmir gets Independence, would it be able to survive as an economically viable and politically sovereign State amid Pakistan and India’s strategic interests? This study will examine these questions by highlighting the positives and negative effects of all these options. From our findings so far in this research, Kashmir has always been at the centre of the dispute between

India and Pakistan but unfortunately both sides have failed to give reasonable concessions to each other in order to solve the problem. The heavy militarization on both sides has caused severe damage to all the efforts of peace building and reconciliation.

According to Moonis Ahmar (2009:21) “the conflict is seen in terms of it being an “outcome of process of neglect, discrimination, suppression of Kashmiri identity and the pre-eminence of power-centric approach held by the successive regimes of India and Pakistan. Regretfully, the

120 end of the cold war at the superpower level couldn’t bring any qualitative change in the mindset of people at the helm of affairs in New Delhi and Islamabad. On the contrary, India-Pakistani tension over Kashmir reached new levels after the outbreak of uprising in the Indian controlled

Valley of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s”. The number of dead varies, depending on the source. The numbers for the 1947, 1965 and 1971 wars are from the Atlas of 20th Century Death

Tolls since it has the most sources quoted. These wars weren’t fought over Kashmir, per se, but rather were part of deeper issues; death totals are for the entire war, not who died in each region.

In the 1947 war for national sovereignty it is estimated that at least 500,000 people died in the melee that ensued during mass migration. In the 1965 war about 4,000 Pakistanis and 3,000

Indians were killed and an additional 18,000 civilians from both sides. The numbers for the 1971 war are more complex. This was the Bangladeshi war of independence, as Bangladesh was once

East Pakistan. Then number of dead from West Pakistan (now simply Pakistan) is about 8,000 and about 3,000 from India. It is estimated that at least 1 million and up to 3 million

Bangladeshis died in this war, but will not be counted towards the Kashmir fatality total. The total dead from both countries from all three wars is about 536,000. Between 1989 and 1998 it is estimated that 8,989 people were killed in Jammu-Kashmir by Indian security, with about three- quarters of the killed classified as Muslim extremists or Pakistan-sympathizers. On July 11, 2006 a series of coordinated bomb explosions on the commuter train in India’s capital kills 160 people. India has blamed the attack on Pakistan, but unlike in past instances, both sides have been cautious in choosing their words and further escalation has been avoided. (Raman Anita,

2004: 220-225)

Kashmir is a divided state. Two of its regions are controlled by Pakistan and three regions are controlled by India. Both countries, however, lay claim to the entire state of Jammu and

121 Kashmir. The Kashmiri people themselves have long been striving for autonomy and ultimately independence. At its core therefore, this is a conflict that is both intrastate and interstate in its nature. The insurgency began in 1988 initiated by young nationalists from Jammu Kashmir

Liberation Force (JKLF) - who crossed over to Pakistan to get trained and armed - supported by

Kashmiris who took to the streets to call for a plebiscite after years of being forced to abide by the wishes and rules imposed by the central government. India labeled the insurgency a proxy war by Pakistan and responded with force. In response to the insurgency, India introduced direct rule in 1990. Security forces moved in, the Kashmiri civil administration - education, services, courts, etc. - collapsed, leading to further suffering, discontent and increased despair in the valley. The desperate situation in Kashmir influenced more young Kashmiris to join the militants, as they could see no nonviolent avenue to initiate change. The militant groups thereby grew in size and also turned more Islamist. This was particularly evident after the cease-fire in

1994, as groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba joined, bringing hardened fighters from Afghanistan, which today form the core of the militants. After three wars - in 1947, 1965 and 1971 - a serious armed conflict in 1999 in Kargil and a UN resolution promising plebiscite, the conflict is still far from over. Despite numerous attempts at finding a solution, parties to the conflict have repeatedly failed at finding an alternative that would satisfy everyone involved. (Evans, A. 2001:

171- 175)

Ultimately, the Kashmir conflict embodies a complex amalgamation of religious, nationalist and political factors which are deeply rooted in history. This history dates back to the time when

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were one, a time when the British colonizers adopted their policy of 'divide and rule' to create artificial boundaries between people, instigating the religious violence that continues to plague many parts of India today. The result has been a conflict that

122 has created immense volatility in the entire South Asian region and - because both India and

Pakistan possess nuclear weapons - in extension also poses a grave threat to security and peace in the world at large. The conflict in Kashmir is rooted in colonialism. As early as 1848 the British

Raj sold Kashmir to Hindu Dogra kings for Rs 75 lakhs. During the British rule, the British used

'divide and rule' to exert control over the country. As a result, people who had been living in harmony, despite their varying religions, were now exposed to a classification that created artificial boundaries between them. This was predominantly the case between Hindus and

Muslims. (Navlakha, G., 2009: 26)

When Partition took place Kashmir was one of the few states with a majority Muslim population, but with a Hindu king who was unpopular and oppressive. The king, Hari Singh, did not want to side with either India or Pakistan, but when a spontaneous incursion - supported by the Pakistani government - took place, he asked for help from the Indian army. Thus, he also agreed to make

Kashmir a part of India by signing the instrument of accession. The very method by which this transfer took place lays the foundation for criticism from Pakistan's sides. (Bhatt, S., 2003: 216)

Initially it was determined that the people of Kashmir should decide its future. But this promise was not fulfilled. In 1949, Article 370 was established. This granted most governing powers to Kashmiri's except critical powers such as defense, foreign affairs, currency and communication. Kashmir was given its own constitution and flag and the Kashmiri Assembly was allowed to decide which Indian laws should be applied to Kashmir. Initially, therefore,

Kashmir's Indian identity was not problematic for the Kashmiri's themselves. However, the autonomy that Kashmir enjoyed became a problem for the central government. Hence, in 1953

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru removed the Prime Minister of Kashmir and whittled down

Article 370, drastically limiting Kashmiri autonomy. The discontent the people had felt for their

123 previous ruler - the king - was now transferred to the Indian central government, which was once again oppressing and mistreating them. Hence resentment began to fester.

In addition to the dissatisfaction felt by the Kashmiris, the Indian government is also faced with Pakistani opposition to Indian rule over Kashmir. And thus, ever since partition, there has been mounting tension between the two states as they both want to exert control over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. It was the Indian government's hard-line control over elections in 1987, however - where candidates as well as counting agents were beaten - that ultimately instigated a violent turn to this conflict. Kashmiri youth began to cross the border into Pakistan to get trained and armed, and hence began the military insurgency that continues today. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 24-

25)

In June 2008, the government - consisting of the Kashmiri People's Democratic Party ruling with Congress - collapsed after its decision to cede land in Kashmir to Hindu pilgrims.

This sparked mass protests against Indian rule and resulted in two months of uproar and the largest anti-Indian demonstrations since the early 1990s. Similarly, tensions between India and

Pakistan escalated after the Mumbai attacks in November 26-28, 2008 when it became clear that

Pakistan-based militants were involved via the Kashmiri group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. India was then at war-level security. On November 30 Pakistani President Zardari urged India to adopt a joint approach to fighting the militants. Prior to the attacks, on November 22, Zardari had hinted at a "no first use" nuclear weapons policy and proposed closer contact across the LOC by lowering visa restrictions.(The Economist, 2008)

After the Mumbai attacks Pakistan cut back its support for Pakistani Islamist militants fighting in Kashmir. This caused the insurgency to decline: it claimed approximately 540 lives in

2008 compared with 4,500 in 2001. But the stand-off between India and Pakistan, resulting from

124 the terrorist attacks instigated by those very Pakistani militants, is threatening to undermine this progress. Simultaneously, the phased state assembly elections in Indian-administered Kashmir, which began on November 17, ended on December 24 with 60 percent overall turnout amidst a heavy security crackdown by the central government and several clashes between security forces and separatists. The elections were seen as a victory for democracy. Though ideally Kashmiris would like to secede, their participation is testament to their realizing the importance of elections in facilitating a better and more representative state government.

In addition, India is preparing for a general election, due by May. The recent attacks in

Mumbai and the ensuing tension were therefore exacerbated by politicians vying for voter support and officials blaming one another for the mistakes made in handling the crisis. For now, however, as neither side is likely to gain from fighting, and because both India and Pakistan realize that this dispute requires careful negotiation, war seems unlikely. Kashmir has borders in

India, Pakistan and China. Two of its regions are controlled by Pakistan - Azad and the mountainous northern territories - while three regions - Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley - are controlled by India. Of the three regions India controls, it is only the Kashmir valley that has a majority Muslim population. Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist, while Jammu once had a

Muslim majority, but due to communal violence in 1947 and 1948, today has a Dogra Hindu majority. Both countries want control over Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety. ( Evans, A., 2001:

170)

Kashmir is heavily dependent on subsidies from the Indian government - needing subsidies even to pay official salaries - and therefore economic development is untenable. Due to the ongoing crisis and the economic blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation, the local economy is in shatters and tourism, which has otherwise been important for generating incomes, has dwindled.

125 Also, Kashmir's natural resources are exploited and the benefits are reaped by other parts of

India. Hydroelectric plants in Kashmir, for instance, generate a large amount of electricity that is exported to other Indian states, while Kashmir itself suffers from debilitating power shortages.

The large deployment of troops further impacts economic activities as it restricts crucial movement between fields and the market. (Navlakha, S., 2007)

India and Pakistan both believe that they have a rightful claim to Kashmir. Kashmiri's themselves are divided between being pro-India, pro-Pakistan and wanting to be independent from both countries. Hindu Fundamentalists have used terrorist attacks by Kashmiri militants to retaliate against Muslims all over India, via incidents such as those that took place in Mumbai in

1992 and Gujarat in 2002. The primary parties involved in this conflict are India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people (some pro-Pakistan, some pro-independence, some pro-India). Secondary actors include the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the U.K. at the time of partition, China - which supports Pakistan in an attempt to balance against India - and Islamist fighters from various countries who have declared the conflict a Muslim cause. Third parties to this conflict include the United Nations, the World Bank and at times the United States, though all three have maintained a distance from the conflict in recent years. Overall there is very little third party intervention in this conflict, especially due to India's aversion to 'outside interference'.

In fact, the international community enters the issue mainly as a result of the UN resolutions of

1948-49 and also because of the water treaty that the World Bank helped implement. (Schaffer,

H.B. and T.C., 2005: 295).

At the heart of this conflict is a confrontation between two nationalisms. For Pakistan, the belief is that Muslims will be oppressed under Hindu rule and therefore need their own state.

Since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Pakistan believes it should belong to them. Moreover,

126 Kashmir has to be won to justify the religious moral significance of Pakistan's nationhood.

India's identity, in contrast, hinges on a strong belief in secularism. Kashmir is seen as a smaller

Pakistan, and therefore the government believes that having Kashmir under its control will give credence to its secular beliefs. Kashmir has thus "become hostage to these bitterly contending nationalities". (Chenoy, K. 2006: 24)

This conflict is also rooted in identity, based on geographic location, religion, language and culture. It is the clash of these enduring identities that makes the conflict so persistent. There is a confrontation between Hindus and Muslims, spiritual Islam, radical Islam and secularism and central government control versus self government. The demand for rights is also central to this dispute. The political autonomy that Kashmir did enjoy early on was destroyed by the central government which has instead imposed a hegemonic control on the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Hence, the current demand is for a three choice referendum which would include independence, apart from the choice of acceding to Pakistan or India. Due to the large scale presence of Indian troops in Kashmir the local people's public and private lives are heavily controlled and regulated, impinging on their freedom of movement and their ability to carry out daily activities. Currently, civil rights and political liberties are virtually non-existent.[26] Past elections have been plagued by fraud and intimidation and democratic institutions and processes have repeatedly been

"subverted and permanently retarded". ( Bose, S., 2007:170)

In addition, Kashmiris are struggling to meet their basic needs, such as healthcare, education and water, the lack of which breeds further resentment and desperation. Finally, human rights violations by insurgents and also by the Indian army are widespread. War crimes and crimes against humanity are common, while redress for these abuses is severely lacking or non-existent.

Water is one of the most contested resources in Kashmir. As per the Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

127 of 1960 signed between India and Pakistan - at a time when both countries directly ruled their occupied areas - the three rivers which traverse J&K were given to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan is entirely dependent on water basins which are in India held areas. Last year Pakistan complained that water flow was reduced by India in order to fill water for a dam India was constructing in its held area called the Baglihar project. The matter went to the World Bank and was resolved, but problems remain. As a consequence of the treaty, people of J&K, as upper riparians, were denied the right to water. (Navlakha, G., 2009)

Also, numerous restrictions were placed on the use of water for irrigation and for harnessing power by the IWT. So despite having significant hydroelectric potential, Kashmir lags behind the rest of India in its energy production. Thus, even where the state has a real advantage it is paradoxically dependent on outside sources to meet 80 percent of its requirements. And while some hydroelectric projects are being taken on, their high cost could compel the state to export power to service the debt, resulting in little improvement for J&K. Similarly, land is of critical importance in Kashmir. Currently, the law in J&K restricts ownership of land by non-state subjects. In order to circumvent this rule, others claim that in order to strengthen the tourism sector, this law should be removed. This is despite the fact that the tourism sector is not the backbone of the economy that these opponents claim it to be. Furthermore, land rights have been heavily impinged upon as civilian land has been occupied by the Indian security forces.

Approximately 250,000 acres of state land have been encroached on with a market value of Rs

25,000 crore. When this was regularized, it was done so at a fraction of its actual value. In addition to issues of interests, identities, rights and resources, fear is central to this conflict. Fear of people belonging to another religion having a different value system that threatens one's own, as well as fear concerning the loss of control or the loss of power. This fear has paralyzed

128 progress towards peace as it works against the one ingredient which is essential for positive change: trust.

There are three critical events that triggered the current violent insurgency. The first took place in 1953, when Nehru removed the PM of Kashmir - due to his outspoken assertion of autonomy - and then whittled down Article 370 to the extent that Kashmiris lost much of their autonomy. This gave rise to deep-seated resentment toward the central government by the

Kashmiris. The second event was the election in 1987. When opposition Muslim Front

Candidates were robbed of seats and counting agents and candidates were beaten tensions rose in

Kashmir. Many Kashmiri youth then started to cross over to Pakistani territory to be trained and armed. This gave rise to the Kashmir insurgency which was backed by popular support from within Kashmir and from Pakistan. Prior to this the conflict had been mainly inter-state, but now the Kashmiris themselves got involved. (Bose, S., 2007: 177-178)

The Indian Government tainted and stunted political institutions in Kashmir, leaving few channels open for Kashmiris to express their discontent and dissent. This was exacerbated by the intolerant behavior of the army. Pakistan thereby began to achieve support for proxy war and hence tensions became militarized. The third is a combination of two events: the bombing of

Parliament in New Delhi and the bombing of the State Assembly in Srinagar in 2001. These events resulted in a military build-up and instigated a cut off in diplomacy and transportation between India and Pakistan. India has since insisted on an end to Pakistani support for terrorism in order to negotiate, while Pakistan continues to deny such involvement and fears that without violence there would be no need for India to negotiate at all. Adding to the intensity of the situation is the fact that nuclear weapons are used as subtle threat. (Schaffer et al, 2005: 301)

129 India and Pakistan are deeply polarized as they are both trying to further their own strategic interest, rather than considering what is in the best interest of the Kashmiri's. India sees the conflict as a Pakistani proxy war, while Pakistan sees it as an indigenous quest for self determination. Furthermore, there is a clash between what the majority of the Kashmiri people want - independence - and what the militants want - union with Pakistan. Because all primary parties to the conflict have such starkly opposing desires, finding a middle ground for compromise has proved cumbersome. (Evans, A., 2001: 171-175).

The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for more than 60 years now. During this time there have been ebbs as well as tides in the tensions between parties, but there have nevertheless been numerous actions and events that have caused the conflict to spiral. To begin with, the

Indian occupation of Kashmir has facilitated the process of mobilizing people around their identity as Muslims. People, who may otherwise have based their identity on language or culture, were thereby drawn into a community based on religion that stretches beyond the borders of the conflict. In addition, Pakistan's fight over Kashmir has legitimized military dictatorship and draconian anti-terror laws in the country hardening the stance against India. Simultaneously,

India has introduced sweeping anti-terror laws and which discriminate against Muslims and suspended the constitution in 'disturbed areas' without parliamentary oversight, making

Kashmiris feel more alienated and desperate and pushing them further towards their Muslim identity in order to seek respite. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 25)

Youth, in particular, turn to Islamic militancy as venue for addressing their needs and grievances since they fail to find any other recourse for their political dissatisfaction. As is clear from the elections in 1987, unfair election practices exacerbate the dispute. The central government has repeatedly thwarted the political will of Kashmiris, alienating the common

130 people. The government is thus pushing the Kashmiri people further away, making them view secession as the only viable option for peace and justice. The conduct of the conflict also leads to its perpetuation. Militant attacks and low intensity conflicts are designed to force India to accept a solution palatable to Pakistan, making India even more reluctant to accede to anything until

Pakistan admits to sponsoring terrorism and stops doing so. The Indian government has deployed over 600,000 soldiers as the only representatives of the government in the state. The population of Kashmir is 13 million, making this the highest troop to population concentration in the world in 2003. (Bhatt, S., 2003: 221)

Violations by the army further perpetuate entrenched distrust and contempt for Indian government. The conduct of internal war is to "isolate the conflict zone from external material assistance for optimal utilisation of army resources". In effect this is a method used to control the population, stifling their will, but instead it only fuels their resentment. Moreover, in the name of fighting insurgents, Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir are hounded outside the territory when travelling within the country making them feel even more vulnerable. In addition, security forces occupy 90,000 acres of farm and orchard land and 1500 buildings and the quest for land continues to grow. Over 20 years 70,000 people have died, 60,000 are in detention, 20,000 have been tortured, 8,000 have simply disappeared and 60,000 people have been denied a passport.

The resentment is therefore building up and spilling over into the public sphere as people are overcoming their fear of the security forces. There is a blurring of distinction for Indian forces between fighting the enemy and fighting their own people. In addition to increased resentment, the separatist sentiment was consolidated by the transfer of land to the Amarnath board, the occupation of civilian land by security forces and the economic blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation. (Navlakha, G., 2008: 13-14).

131 External actors and events have also instigated a spiraling of the conflict. The violent and

Islamic fundamentalist aspect of the insurgency was, for instance, reinforced by the success of the Palestinian intifada as well as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan which gave

Mujahedeen's a new cause to fight for. Similarly, the U.S. promise of military aid to Pakistan in

1956 created Indian doubts over UN Commission mediation since 18 members were American, debilitating the process. Also, during the Cold War, Moscow supported India while Washington supported Pakistan, hardening the stance of each country on Kashmir. Hence, at the time, any prospect that the UN could play a useful role in resolving dispute was quashed. The global war on terrorism has increased international talks, but is has also hardened Indian and Pakistani stances, particularly since both countries have acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels it can continue to support militancy since the U.S. won't do anything until Afghanistan and Iraq are settled. India is also emboldened in its characterization of the dispute with Pakistan as merely a terrorism problem, strengthening a case for preemptive action. (Schaffer, H.B., 2005: 304-311).

Finally, Climate change is likely to aggravate the problem, but due to the on-going conflict, environmental concerns are blatantly neglected. The Kolahoi glacier, for instance, is slowly melting. If this persists it will result in water scarcity and a decrease in fertile land, exacerbating the two resource issues that are already at the heart of this dispute. Widespread stereotyping has sowed the seeds for the polarized situation that exists today on the issue of Kashmir. Elites from both India and Pakistan stereotype the opposite country. This is the result of misappropriation of information in the education system as well as in the media. Schools can sustain conflict through the perpetuation of religious or ethnic division, through discriminatory or preferential practices and through biased or restricted curriculum. History textbooks, for example, distort history to reinforce a particular image, providing an enduring basis for hatred. Because education often

132 consists of rote memorization with little emphasis on critical thinking, children are socialized at a young age by what are often blatant factual errors. (Antal, C., 2008: 87, 90-91).

Similarly, mass media present few programs that humanize the other by reflecting true realities and similarities, focusing instead on stark differences and problems. Therefore, media, which could otherwise serve to educate a misinformed public, fail to embrace this opportunity and instead perpetuate the flawed socialization process. There is potential for change in regards to

Kashmir, but this is hindered by several internal and external factors that escalate the conflict.

First, stereotyping has given rise to perception and expectations that place India and Pakistan at opposite ends of the spectrum with little chance of finding common ground. Instead, Hindu fundamentalists are gaining ground using the insurgency as an excuse to carry out prejudiced actions, such as using that the Amarnath Yatra to promote religious tourism, while in reality it was a way to acquire land and promote nationalism. Also, political parties and extremists, such as Shiv Sena, continue to demonize Muslims and Pakistanis creating a rift between the public in both countries. This is further exacerbated by the strict visa rules that prevent travel between the countries and the fact that there is very little contact between people from both countries as well as with people from Kashmir. Hence dialogue across conflict lines is greatly restricted, impinging transformation. (Navlakha, G., 2008: 17)

In addition, the process of negotiation is limited. Indo-Pak talks continue to exclude

Kashmiris from the discussion table despite their clear role in the process. The current peace process will therefore continue to be seen as illegitimate, as it doesn't address the issue of the presence of hostile security forces among civilians. In terms of the Kashmiris, they lack clear leadership, and so there is no concerted, political effort that can balance against the Indian and

Pakistani governments. Much of this is rooted in the fact that while Kashmiris are tired of

133 violence, there are few legal or political alternatives available to them. Moreover, discussions are restricted to talks between government officials and elites, disregarding middle-level and grassroots actors altogether. (Schaffer et al, 2005: 316)

The current situation in Kashmir is such that grievances and problems are not met constructively leaving them to fester and grow into desperation and bitterness. The legal and administrative systems are incompetent and hence justice is greatly restricted. There is also a lack of government transparency which breeds suspicion and frustration. As non-state actors, the abuses carried out by the insurgents go unchecked and the Indian security forces in turn, though they are answerable, are given special powers and immunity by the government, essentially ridding them of responsibility of their actions. Indeed, India is not a signatory to Geneva

Protocol III. For Pakistan as well as for India, the cost-benefit analysis favors inertia. The issue is so intransigent that exerting resources, time and effort on resolving it, is far more costly than letting it continue but under a certain degree of control. Moreover, India is complacent, because militancy strengthens the central government's control over Kashmir. As long as militants continue to instigate violent resistance, the government can justify the heavy security force presence in Kashmir. Thus, despite the volatility of the situation, its continuation ensures central government control over Kashmir, which would be more questionable if a peace settlement was reached.(Chenoy, K., 2006: 27).

As mentioned, earlier, there are several external factors that further complicate the conflict in

Kashmir. First, the conflict has now stretched beyond Kashmir and beyond India and Pakistan and become a central cause for Islamists. Islamic fundamentalists in almost every part of the world are working to promote the spread of Islamism. Hence militants in Kashmir are increasingly neither Indian nor Pakistani and instead consist of Islamists from various countries.

134 This has expanded the conflict, and it has also heightened violence as these fighters have brought with them tenets of Jihadi warfare. Because these are non-state actors, there is little possibility to hold them accountable for their actions. In addition, Pakistan is itself vulnerable to activities of radical militant groups. The government is heavily reliant on the military to withstand pressures from these groups, yet the Pakistani military and intelligence agency are often also collaborating with some of these groups. So it is questionable whether they will be able to curb militant activities in Kashmir. (Evans, A., 2001: 174)

External influence is in itself often intrusive and destructive. China is, for instance, exploiting

Indo-Pak enmity. The Chinese government is aligned with Pakistan, providing Pakistan with military wherewithal, as a strategic and economic investment to put pressure on India. China sees

India as a peer competitor and major strategic rival in Asia and is hence manipulating the conflict in Kashmir to further its own economic and strategic goals. The Chinese government is particularly alarmed at U.S. talks of using India as counterweight to China, increasing its eagerness to limit Indian advancement. The U.S. role has thus far been fairly noncommittal. U.S. interest in the Kashmir conflict goes beyond Kashmir itself. Washington is concerned about nuclear nonproliferation, controlling the Taliban and general peace between India and Pakistan.

However, due to the high stakes involved if the U.S. were to take too active a role in South Asia

- in terms of Pakistan being an important military ally and India an important trade partner - the government has tended to refrain from taking on an active mediating role. ( Malik, M., 2003: 43-

45)

Kashmir, therefore, presents a dilemma for the international community. International actors are wary of intervening all too obtrusively, especially since India is so averse to external interference. Yet, due to the lack of a concerted international mediation effort in Kashmir, there

135 is not enough pressure to push India towards working out a democratic solution which meets with the aspirations of the people, and can be ascertained through a transparent, peaceful and democratic process. As mentioned previously, India maintains that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that precludes third party intervention. External actors are also hesitant to get involved due to the intensity of the situation and the risks that involvement could imply for their own economic or political system. Moreover, the conflict in Kashmir does not represent the typical peacebuilding scenario for many reasons. First, it is both intrastate and interstate in its nature. Second, India is already a democratic country, so introducing democracy or market economy, which are otherwise common strategies, are not useful in this situation. And lastly, both countries have nuclear weapons, making the situation highly volatile.( Navlakha, G., 2009: 11)

Nevertheless, external actors could play a significant role in alleviating this conflict. At a basic level they could observe and monitor elections to ensure that they are fair and reliable. In addition, third parties could facilitate Track II and Track III talks. Currently, talks occur mainly at the elite level, but these are limited in their scope and as is clear by their progress thus far, they have not been very successful. By including retired bureaucrats and civil society, however, it is more likely that the negative stereotypes underlying the animosity between parties to the conflict can be broken down, initiating a more sustainable dialogue towards transformation. Clearly, however, no viable solution to this conflict will be reached unless Pakistan, India and the

Kashmiris are involved in the process and satisfied with the solution. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 25)

The recent elections in Kashmir for the state legislature play a small role in instigating change, especially in terms of the demilitarization of the state. But as the Kashmiris themselves recognized, which is evidenced by a voter turnout of 60 percent, participating in this election does offer a critical venue for tackling practical grievances. The state legislature, though limited

136 in its reach, does have the power to build roads, schools, health centres and to create jobs and can restrain the harassment and brutality of the security forces. Hence, this process provides material succor to a population which has suffered immensely for over 2 decades. The elections themselves were, however, flawed. A total of 1354 candidates stood for just 87 seats, making voting by the public arduous and the process unnecessarily complex. Also, despite the fact that militants halted all activities obstructing people from voting, the government had still sent 538 companies of central paramilitary forces and 60-70 companies of the Central Reserve Police

Force for election duty. The army presence was hence grossly disproportionate to the need for security and hence merely served to curtail movement and actions by imposing curfews and patrolling the streets.

It is believed by some that these recent elections could be catalyst for a shift in the equation.

The Kashmiri people's nonviolent assertion for Azadi (independence) persuaded militants to silence their guns and their use of a legal venue to address their concerns, despite years of exploitation, could sow the seeds for a less violent approach to the conflict. Fittingly, this would be a counter balance to the 1987 elections which was a catalyst for militancy. This will, of course, depend on whether public concerns and aspirations are adequately addressed. This includes not just basic needs - such as schools and health care - but also integral needs including the use of water resources and access to land. If there is to be constructive and positive change, public support is integral. (Navlakha, G. 2007)

The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for over 60 years. Clearly, there is no simple solution to the problems that exist, and because the conflict is not just territorial, a military solution is out of the question. Addressing the true elements of the conflict involves striving for justice, truth, peace, mercy and ultimately reconciliation. Truth relates to acknowledging the

137 past, the rights and the wrongs, the decisions made, actions taken and their consequences on all involved. Justice and mercy are then integral to providing closure to grievances that arise from these truths, in the form of legal retribution, simple acknowledgment of wrongdoing, mercy for

Kashmiris who joined the militancy by recognizing the concerns and circumstances that led them to turn violent and assistance to the people to help them rebuild their lives and livelihoods and move forward. Peace is related not only to a ceasefire but also to the reestablishing of relationships across the various borders that this conflict entails - Pakistani-controlled-Kashmir and Indian-controlled-Kashmir, Pakistan and India, J&K and the central government and J&K and Pakistani government. These four elements are therefore ongoing processes that enhance each other and provide the integral basis for long-term reconciliation which is essential for sustainable change. (Lederach, J.P., 1997: 184)

Change will be incremental and will stretch over a long period of time before a substantial metamorphosis of the conflict can take place. This process in itself can, however, result in small- scale benefits and improvements that can be reaped before the ultimate transformation is complete. Hence, I propose seven initial goals that could initiate a constructive transformation process. To begin with, there is a need for significant self-rule to be re-instated in J&K, including a provision for autonomy within autonomy for Jammu and Ladakh. As opposed to a plebiscite - which at this point is obsolete as it promotes a winner take all approach that could merely fuel further conflict - autonomy for J&K would be constructive as it would give Kashmiris themselves a stronger voice. It is their lack of voice and their inability to influence actions and decisions that shape their lives that originally led to the insurgency. By addressing these needs - via providing the important civil and political rights entailed by autonomy - the Indian

138 government could eradicate, or at least subdue, one of the most contentious causes of this conflict, even if this is limited to the Indian side.

Autonomy does, however, have its pitfalls. While it has been successful in the past - before

Article 370 was whittled down - the current situation has altered the circumstances necessary for its success. Hence, the state of J&K should be awarded autonomy and also, the regions within

J&K - Jammu, the Kashmir valley and Ladakh - with their varied religious makeup should also be granted a degree of autonomy within this autonomy. For the transition period at least, state institutions and the state government should be built on inclusive power sharing by representatives from all three regions. (Bose, S., 2007: 184-186)

Furthermore, civil and political rights need to be supplemented with socio-economic rights and basic human rights. This is particularly important in regards to land and water resources and in regards to the human rights abuses that have taken place. In order to strengthen the state economy and to protect the dignity of the Kashmiri people, infringements on land rights - especially by the Indian army - and the mismanagement of water resources need to be stopped.

While the army is not likely to return all land, a decrease in the imposing troop presence in

Kashmir could be feasible if violence decreased, as it is hoped to do due to autonomy. Similarly, water needs serious attention not just in terms of access and productive use of water resources, but also in terms of the environmental damage being done due to global warming that can worsen the conflict. Improving access to land and mobility for farmers to sell their produce, as well as making better use of water for electricity generation and reducing pollution and environmental damage are, therefore, critical for the strengthening of the local economy and society.

139 Tackling human rights abuses is another important goal. With the excessive war crimes and crimes against humanity that have taken place during this conflict there is a need for a venue to adequately handle grievances and provide justice for those who have suffered. As long people feel they have been wronged and see no legal way to deal with the consequences they are likely to turn to more desperate measures in order to handle their grief. By accepting human rights law and humanitarian law, and shaping national laws accordingly - for instance, if the Indian army was to accept Geneva Protocol III - there would be more room for legal resolutions to problems, preventing them from fueling the conflict. Once again, providing a legal avenue for people to enhance their voice is a critical goal. In addition to negotiations between the Indian government and the Kashmiris, negotiations also need to take place between Pakistan and the Kashmiris, between Kashmiris on both sides of the border and between Pakistan and India.[84] These dialogues can and should take many forms. In terms of interactions between India and Pakistan, discussion should center on the development of cross-border cooperation between India- controlled-Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled-Kashmir, including a mutual ceasefire. Ultimately, the goal would be to transform the LOC from being a rigid separator to a permeable border that allows for cultural and economic exchange.[85] This would, however, also require that cross- border ties are enhanced in the subcontinent as a whole based on shared economic and security interests.Therefore there is a need to strive for a structured and persistent peace process, in contrast to the joint declarations that characterize the process thus far. (Bose, S., 2007: 161, 192-

198).

However, while Track I dialogues are important, and negotiations between the central government and local population are essential, this is not enough. There is also a need for constructive dialogue that takes the shape of Track II and Track III talks, moving beyond the

140 elites. This brings multiple non-state actors into the transformation process making it more comprehensive. Track II would, for instance, involve businesses, NGOs, newspapers etc. that are able to discuss issues without the polarized nature of the conflict impeding dialogue. Such discussions have the potential to give rise to concrete small steps that can be taken to enhance peace, where elites tend to focus only on big changes. Similarly, public awareness and involvement is critical. Public opinion, articulated by independent and private media outlets, has become a critical part of foreign policy in India today. Currently, the public in both India and

Pakistan are ill-informed giving rise to dangerous stereotyping that exacerbates the conflict.

Integral to any move towards betterment, therefore, is better educating the public and creating more opportunities for people from either side of the border to interact so as to decrease the rift that has emerged between civilians in India and Pakistan. (Evans, A., 2001: 171-172)

International actors also play an important role in this process, but it is critical that involvement remains limited and subtle. Due to the inertia that plagues relations between India and Pakistan, there is a clear need for outside help. But India remains highly antagonistic towards external involvement. The growth of the Indian economy has made India an increasingly important player in the international community, and this could potentially make decision- makers more open to abiding by international norms in order to acquire recognition and status.

However, sovereignty is still seen as supreme, and hence the government is likely to continue to remain resistant to external involvement.

In addition, third party intervention can be arduous when there is a stark difference in the power between parties to a conflict allies may sometimes be as big a problem as enemies, as is the case with China for instance. In addition to border conflicts between India and China in the past, China sees India as its main economic rival in Asia. Therefore, to further the state's own

141 interest, the Chinese have provided Pakistan with nuclear bombs, uranium, nuclear plants and nuclear delivery systems. Pakistan in essence provides Beijing with a counterbalance to India.

Under these circumstances, increased international engagement will only be beneficial if it is indirect. The international community can help via subtle mediation such as human rights agreements, by pushing for article 370, ending military support and by monitoring and overseeing elections. The UN, in this situation appears to be unsuited for the task, especially due to its lack of legitimacy after the previous UN peace-building mission in the early years of the conflict. The only area in which the UN could play an important part is, perhaps, in regards to election monitoring. Instead the United States would be the most plausible alternative as the country has leverage over Pakistan and influence - in terms of strategic and economic relations - over India. However, this involvement must be discreet and behind the scenes.( Bose, 2007: 198)

The intermediate goals will by no means resolve the conflict or ensure that it ends. Instead, they would serve to steer the conflict on another course, one that is less violent and destructive and that could potentially lead to constructive change. There are several obstacles to reaching the goals mentioned above. Firstly, as the length of this conflict indicates, India and Pakistan have a contentious history that continues to taint their relations. Because Kashmir represents a crucial element of their national identity, this deep-rooted historical conflict is resilient to change.

Second, the relationship between the Indian central government and the population of Kashmir is also very troubled. The Kashmiris, in general, do not see Indian rule as legitimate, and therefore the governments continued efforts to exert control over the state have only increased resentment and resistance. Third, political allegiances are diverse and complex within Indian-controlled-

Kashmir. The population is divided into those who side with Pakistan, those who side with India

142 and those who strive for independence. Therefore, arriving at a solution that meets all interests is extremely cumbersome.

Nevertheless, a process for change can be generated and the aforementioned goals can be reached if the appropriate channels are utilized. To date, efforts have mostly been centered on

Track I negotiations between governments and these have yet to result in any substantial peace agreement. It would therefore, be more productive to utilize Diamond and McDonald's Multi- track Diplomacy which creates a truly multifaceted dialogue, involving a variety of actors. These different tracks to diplomacy, combined with multiple theories of change could together initiate a dynamic process of transformation. (McDonald, J.W., 2003: 77-78)

In order to meet the goal of autonomy, government involvement is essential. This would involve working with political elites to change their perception of interests. Because Kashmir is integral to national identity in India and Pakistan there is a need for framing the issue in a different light. While little concrete progress has been made so far in this respect, both India and

Pakistan have increasingly realized the need for a resolution to this conflict for their national self-interest and hence the situation appears ripe for change. India aspires to become a global power in terms of its growing economy, but also due to its democratic identity. The Kashmir conflict is therefore a distinct blemish on its record, causing diplomatic embarrassment and exhausting human and financial resources that could be used elsewhere. For Pakistan, it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue to support the insurgency due to the regional and military context of being an important U.S. ally in the war against terror, and because it has had dangerous impacts on the country itself. (Bose, S., 2007: 202)

Both countries are therefore seemingly ready to consider negotiating an end to the conflict.

In addition, J&K autonomy is not a foreign concept, it has worked in the past and Article 370

143 still exists on paper. The tools for instituting autonomy, therefore, already exist. Such a negotiation would have to involve not only representatives from India and Pakistan, but also from Kashmir. Pakistan may not willingly agree to allow J&K to remain a part of India and this is certainly a complication. Also, due to the multitude of political affiliations in Kashmir, all

Kashmiris may not be too happy with autonomy either. And India will most definitely be reluctant to give up control in the valley.

There is, however, a chance that this could offer a common ground which no party is completely happy with, but which they may accept as a short-term solution as it would meet at least part of their needs. For India, Kashmir would remain part of Indian territory ensuring

India's secular identity. Kashmiris would gain more influence over their state affairs and have more power to counterbalance central government control. For Pakistan, though this part of

Kashmir would be lost to India, it is likely that cooperation and trade across the border with

Pakistan-controlled-territory would increase and Islamist forces within the country would be weakened. And for all three parties, decreased violence would nurture economic, social and political stabilization and growth.

Related to the issue of granting autonomy, is establishing institutions that support this autonomy. As a short-term solution during the transitional phase, power sharing will be important to build legitimacy for the state government. Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley are three distinct regions within the state of J&K with different religious majorities and therefore different identities. Hence, it is critical that each region within the state is given the same degree of power and status to avoid initiating a new conflict. This process may require limited assistance by professional conflict resolution personnel in order to ensure that the power sharing agreement is thorough and fair.

144 Upholding socio-economic and human rights present a second complex goal. This would, once again, involve the government and conflict resolution specialists, but it is also vital that it incorporates civil society who can help advocate for the local population. This would require social and transitional justice mechanisms. Social justice would address land and water issues not just in terms of distribution and access but also in terms of environmental degradation. This must be tackled, or else the resulting environmental damage will likely fuel a new conflict.

Transitional justice, in turn, would address issues related to human rights abuses. In

Kashmir this is a huge problem because of the sheer numbers of those who have been detained, disappeared, tortured and killed. Due to the immunity awarded to the Indian army, punishment of soldiers who commit these abuses is often lessened or non-existent. Similarly, the incompetent legal and administrative systems in place make legal avenues for recourse very weak. There are about 300 cases pending at the moment, as judges are hesitant to rule for fear of being transferred or because their appointment was politically motivated. Finally, the non-state militants involved in this conflict complicate the justice process further as they are not held accountable to the same rules that states are. Even when legal avenues are pursued to punish non-state actors it is often the individual, rather than the group that is punished. Hence, violent acts by these actors are not necessarily averted and the group itself is not significantly weakened, indeed it may be strengthened by the publicity it receives. (Keohane, R.O. et al, 1991: 151-153)

Providing transitional justice will, therefore, be a cumbersome and highly sensitive process for all those involved and requires a long-term commitment to establishing stable institutions that can oversee and implement the process. The nature of the crimes also makes this an issue that could severely tarnish India's image in the international community. Therefore it is integral that it is handled domestically, at least initially, without direct international actor involvement. The

145 impetus for such a measure to be taken would have to come from the public and indirectly, from the international community.

The public supported by civil society would play a predominant role in putting pressure on the government to take an initiative. The international community, in turn, could participate by holding the Indian government accountable in the international arena and instating and promoting norms that highlight the importance of upholding and protecting human rights. This would give the Indian government an incentive - the pursuit of soft power - to take the necessary steps to provide transitional justice. In addition, international actors could help by providing funding which would be critical to this process and by acting as consultants for the private citizens, NGOs and grassroots groups working on the ground. (Keohane, R.O. et al, 1991:155)

146

147

Operationalization of Key Concepts

Nuclear Warfare : This is a military conflict or political strategy in which nuclear weaponry is used to inflict damage on the enemy. When compared to conventional warfare, it can be vastly more destructive in range and extent of damage, and in a much shorter time frame. A major nuclear exchange would have long–term effects, primarily from the fallout released, and could lead to a nuclear winter that could last for decades or more, after the initial attack. Some analysts opine that, with this potential nuclear winter side-affect of nuclear war, almost every human on earth could starve to death, while others dismiss the nuclear winter hypothesis. As of 2014, only two nuclear weapons been used in the course of warfare; (one in Hiroshima, and another in

Nagasaki in Japan) by the United States near the end of World War II in 1945. Some nuclear- armed states in the world are: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India,

Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel (undeclared).

(U.S. National Academy of Sciences, 2008: 5307-12).

Peace: According to Wikipedia, Peace is an occurrence of harmony characterized by lack of violence, conflict behaviours and the freedom from fear of violence. Invariably, it is commonly understood as the absence of hostility. Peace also suggests sincere attempts at reconciliation, the existence of healthy or newly healed inter-personal or international relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the interest of all. Etymologically, the term originates most recently from the

Anglo-French pes, and the old French pais meaning, peace, reconciliation, agreement.

Conflict: In literature, conflict connotes an inherent incompatibility between the objectives of two or more characters or forces. According to the Oxford Dictionary, conflict is defined as a

148 disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Within the context of disagreement, it is seen as a level of difference in the positions of two (or more) parties involved in the conflict. Although conflict is normal part of organizational life, it has many negative consequences essentially because of the inevitable negative experiences caused by abnormal difficult circumstances, including untimely death.

149 CHAPTER FOUR 4.1 SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

In this Chapter, the study will examine the possible scenarios should a nuclear war ensue between India and Pakistan and this will be viewed in terms of the degree of deaths and fatalities.

It is also meant to test our first hypothesis which states that the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in Asia? On this note, we shall later take a look into the possible consequences of nuclear war between both countries. As reported by

Natural Resources Defense Council of the United States, diplomatic pressure to avert war has intensified. The results of a classified Pentagon study that concludes that nuclear war between these two countries could result in more than 12 million deaths. Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC) has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South

Asia. Before the recent crisis, two nuclear scenarios were calculated. The first assumes ten

Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout; the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. (McKinzie M. et al, 2001.) Below are discussions of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear war in South

Asia.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Possessions

According to the NRDC postulations, it is difficult to determine the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but estimates has it that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is believed India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48 nuclear war heads. Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates that their explosive

150 yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior

Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft. NRDC's Nuclear

Program initially developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South Asian nuclear war to examine and analyse the U.S. nuclear war planning process. The combined

Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with meteorological and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds of attacks using different types of weapons.(U.S. Nuclear War Plan, 2001). http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp.

First Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities

For the first scenario casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb was used to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in

Pakistan. The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero.

Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the victims at the time of the attack. The closer they are to ground zero, the higher the fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated population.

151 Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities

City Name Total Population Number of Number of Number of

Within 5 Kilometers of Persons Killed Persons Severely Persons Slightly

Ground Zero Injured Injured

India

Bangalore 3,077,937 314,978 175,136 411,336

Bombay 3,143,284 477,713 228,648 476,633

Calcutta 3,520,344 357,202 198,218 466,336

Madras 3,252,628 364,291 196,226 448,948

New Delhi 1,638,744 176,518 94,231 217,853

Total India 14,632,937 1,690,702 892,459 2,021,106

Pakistan

Faisalabad 2,376,478 336,239 174,351 373,967

Islamabad 798,583 154,067 66,744 129,935

Karachi 1,962,458 239,643 126,810 283,290

Lahore 2,682,092 258,139 149,649 354,095

Rawalpindi 1,589,828 183,791 96,846 220,585

Total 9,409,439 1,171,879 614,400 1,361,872

Pakistan

India and Pakistan

Total 24,042,376 2,862,581 1,506,859 3,382,978

Source: The U. S. ‘Natural Resources Defense Council’ study (2001)

As in the case of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario the 10 bombs over Indian and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which maximized blast

152 damage and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet above Hiroshima.

The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about 140,000 died by the end of the year.

Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki, which killed about 70,000 of the estimated

270,000 residents by the end of the year. Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in

India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.

Second Scenario: 24 Ground Bursts

In this scenario, NRDC calculated the consequences of a much more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. It calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground (unlike the Hiroshima airburst) resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout. Exploding a nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States detonated "Little Boy" weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of

1,900 feet. At this height, the radioactive particles produced in the explosion were small and light enough to rise into the upper atmosphere, where they were carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after the radioactive bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to earth as a measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination that would cause immediate radiation sickness or death. Unfortunately, it is easier to fuse a nuclear weapon to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the air. If the nuclear explosion takes place at or near the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and mix it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles. These heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or hours after the explosion, producing

153 potentially lethal levels of nuclear fallout out to tens or hundreds of kilometers from the ground zero. The precise levels depend on the explosive yield of the weapon and the prevailing winds.

(Newsweek, January 14, 2002.)

For the second scenario, the calculated fallout patterns and casualties for a hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted major cities. The chosen target cities throughout Pakistan and in North-Western India to take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The target cities, listed in the table below, include the capital cities, Islamabad and New Delhi, and large cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton warheads would be detonated as ground bursts in Pakistan and another dozen in India, producing substantial fallout. The devastation that would result from fallout would exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario would produce far more horrific results than the first scenario because there would be more weapons, higher yields, and extensive fallout. In some large cities, it is assumed more than one bomb would be used. This is as presented in the table below.

15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads

Country City City Population Number of Attacking

Bombs

Pakistan Islamabad (national capital) 100-250 thousand 1

Pakistan Karachi (provincial capital) > 5 million 3

Pakistan Lahore (provincial capital) 1-5 million 2

Pakistan Peshawar (provincial 0.5-1 million 1

capital)

Pakistan Quetta (provincial capital) 250-500 thousand 1

154 Pakistan Faisalabad 1-5 million 2

Pakistan Hyderabad 0.5-1 million 1

Pakistan Rawalpindi 0.5-1 million 1

India New Delhi (national capital) 250-500 thousand 1

India Bombay (provincial capital) > 5 million 3

India Delhi (provincial capital) > 5 million 3

India Jaipur (provincial capital) 1-5 million 2

India Bhopal (provincial capital) 1-5 million 1

India Ahmadabad 1-5 million 1

India Pune 1-5 million 1

Source: The U.S. ‘Natural Resources Defence Council’ Study (20 01)

Further calculations show that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem (roentgen equivalent in man) or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries. Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction. Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military forces would still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict.

After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear

155 standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence ensures military restraint. The two cases are found not be similar on the grounds that there are major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis between India and Pakistan. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep- seated hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism. A second difference is that India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery.

While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction"(MAD) that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War. The two South Asian scenarios assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War period this was the deterrent strategy of the

United States and the Soviet Union. But as both countries introduced technological improvements into their arsenals, they pursued other strategies, targeting each other's nuclear forces, conventional military forces, industry and leadership. India and Pakistan may include these types of targets in their current military planning. For example, attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in massive disruption, economic consequences and casualties.

Concentrations of military forces and facilities may provide tempting targets as well.

Possible Failure of Nuclear Deterrence Between India and Pakistan.

Since the tests of May 1998 and their overt nuclearisation, India-Pakistan-relations have visibly deteriorated. Crisis has followed crisis and nuclear weapons have played an increasingly prominent role. The massive military mobilisation and threat of war in 2002 exposed several

156 important features of the dynamics shaping nuclear South Asia, especially the repeated use of nuclear threats and the apparent fearlessness of policy makers and the public when faced with the prospect of nuclear war. The context for these developments is a growing unwillingness among political and military leaders in South Asia to confront changed realties. As Einstein famously remarked, “the bomb has changed everything except their way of thinking. An arms race is growing, in fits and starts, as best as the two states can manage. Military doctrines are inter- linked in ways that lead inexorably to nuclear war. The poor are uneducated, uninformed and powerless. The well-to-do are uninformed or possessed by the religious fundamentalism – Islam and Hindu - that is rapidly changing both countries. These forces are now being wedded to nationalism in ways that suggest restraints that were at work in previous India-Pakistan wars and crises may increasingly be over-ridden or suppressed”. The efficacy of nuclear deterrence is predicated on the ability of these weapons to induce terror. It presupposes a rational calculus, as well as actors who, at the height of tension, will put logic before emotion. Recent events in South

Asia have put all these into question. We therefore fear that perhaps a new chapter may someday have to written in textbooks dealing with the theory of nuclear deterrence.

As Riedel (2002) rightly postulated, “there is a fundamental link between crises and nuclear weapons in South Asia. Soon after the defeat of Pakistan by India in the 1971 war, Prime

Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called a meeting of Pakistani nuclear scientists in the city of Multan to map out a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was pushed further into the nuclear arena by the

Indian test of May 1974, seen as a means to further consolidate Indian power in South Asia.

Challenged again in May 1998 by a series of 5 Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan was initially reluctant to test its own weapons out of fear of international sanctions. Belligerent statements by

Indian leaders after the tests succeeded in forcing it over the hill. But success brought change.

157 Pakistan saw nuclear weapons as a talisman, able to ward off all dangers. Countering India's nuclear weapons became secondary. Instead, Pakistani nuclear weapons became the means for neutralizing India's far larger conventional land, air, and sea forces. In the minds of Pakistani generals, nuclear weapons now became tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. The notion of a nuclear shield led them to breath-taking adventurism in Kashmir. Led by Chief of Army

Staff General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan sent troops out of uniform along with Islamist militant fighters across the Line of Control to seize strategic positions in the high mountains of the Kargil area. The subsequent Kargil war of 1999 may be recorded by historians as the first actually caused by nuclear weapons.

As India counter-attacked and Pakistan stood diplomatically isolated, a deeply worried Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington on 4 July 1999, where he was bluntly told to withdraw Pakistani forces or be prepared for full-scale war with India”. Bruce Reidel, Special

Assistant to President Clinton, writes that he was present in person when Clinton informed

Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Army had mobilized its nuclear-tipped missile fleet. If this is true, then the preparations for nuclear deployment and possible use could only have been ordered by General Pervez Musharraf at either his own initiative or in consultation with the army leadership. Unnerved by this revelation and the closeness to disaster, Nawaz Sharif agreed to immediate withdrawal, shedding all earlier pretensions that Pakistan's army had no control over the attackers.

According to Richardson (2002) in his news article, opined that “despite the defeat in the

Kargil War, Pakistan political and military leaders insisted that Pakistan had prevailed in the conflict and that its nuclear weapons had deterred India from crossing the Line of Control or the international border. This belief may be especially strong in the military, which would otherwise

158 have to accept that their prized weapons were of no military utility. On 13 th December 2001,

Islamic militants struck at the Indian parliament in Delhi sparking off a crisis that has yet to end.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee exhorted his troops in Kashmir to prepare for sacrifices and "decisive victory", setting off widespread alarm. It seemed plausible that India was preparing for a "limited war" to flush out Islamic militant camps in Pakistan administered

Kashmir. Sensing a global climate now deeply hostile to Islamic militancy, India's ruling BJP have sought to echo the U.S. "war on terror" slogan as a way to garner international support for their military campaign in Kashmir. Although an embattled Musharraf probably had little to do with the attack on the Indian Parliament, India cut off communications with Pakistan. The Indian ambassador in Islamabad was recalled to Delhi, road and rail links were broken off, and flights by Pakistani airlines over Indian territory were disallowed. Such Indian reactions have played into the hands of jihadists in Kashmir who now operate as a third force almost autonomous of the

Pakistani state. There is a real possibility that jihadists will commit some huge atrocity - such as a mass murder of Indian civilians. Indeed, their goal is to provoke full-scale war between India and Pakistan, destabilize the government and settle scores with America.”

In May. 2002 Outlook Magazine, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former chief of

Pakistan's army, declared: ‘We can make a first strike, and a second strike, or even a third. The lethality of nuclear war left him unmoved. ‘You can die crossing the street,’ he observed, ‘or you could die in a nuclear war. You've got to die some day anyway.’ Pakistan's ambassador to the

UN in Geneva, Munir Akram, reiterated Pakistan's refusal of a no-first-use policy. Across the border, India's Defence Minister George Fernandes told the International Herald Tribune ‘India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot.’ Indian Defence Secretary Yogendra Narain took things a step further in an interview with Outlook Magazine of June 10, 2002: "A surgical

159 strike is the answer," adding that if this failed to resolve things, "We must be prepared for total mutual destruction." Indian security analyst, Brahma Chellaney, claimed "India can hit any nook and corner of Pakistan and is fully prepared to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff."

As India began to seriously consider cross-border strikes on militant camps on the

Pakistani side of the Line of Control, it became convenient for those urging action to deny

Pakistan's nuclear weapons by challenging its willingness and ability to use them. This is not the first time this notion has been exercised, but it has now gained astonishingly wide currency in

Indian ruling circles and carries increasingly grave risks of a misjudgment that could lead to nuclear war. Two months before the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, a delegation from Pugwash met in Delhi with Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral. As a member of the delegation expressed worries about a nuclear catastrophe on the Subcontinent. Gujral repeatedly assured - both in public and in private - that Pakistan was not capable of making atomic bombs.

The Prime Minister was not alone. Senior Indian defense analysts like P. R. Chari had also published articles before May 1998 arguing this point, as had the former head of the Indian

Atomic Energy Agency , Dr. Raja Ramana.

Although Pakistan's nuclear tests had dispelled this scepticism, senior Indian military and political leaders continue to express doubts on the operational capability and usability of the

Pakistani arsenal. Still more seriously, many Indians believe that, as a client state of the US,

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under the control of the US. The assumption is that, in case of extreme crisis, the US would either restrain their use by Pakistan or, if need be, destroy them. At a meeting in Dubai, senior Indian analysts said they were bored with Pakistan's nuclear threats and no longer believed them. K. Subrahmanyam, an influential Indian who has advocated overt

Indian nuclearization for more than a decade, believes that India can sleep in peace. To fearlessly

160 challenge a nuclear Pakistan requires a denial of reality, which some Indians seem prepared to make. It is an enormous leap of faith to presume that the United States would have either the intention - or the capability - to destroy Pakistani nukes. Tracking and destroying even a handful of mobile nuclear-armed missiles would be no easy feat. During the Cuban missile crisis, the

U.S. Air Force had aerial photos of the Soviet missile locations and its planes were only minutes away, yet it would not assure that a surprise attack would be more than 90 percent effective.

More recently, in Iraq, U.S. efforts to destroy Iraqi Scuds had limited success. No country has ever tried to take out another's nuclear bombs. It would be fantastically dangerous because one needs 100 percent success. Nonetheless, there are signs that India is boosting its military capability to where it might feel able to overwhelm Pakistan. (Ahmedullah M. in Defence Week,

2001).

The Arms Race

As summarized by the Defence Week Magazine (2001) “Since the 1998 nuclear tests, there have been very large increases in Indian military spending. The Indian defence budget for

2001-2002 was set at 630 billion rupees ($13 billion). This is nearly three times Pakistan's and follows an earlier increase of 28%, which was larger than Pakistan's entire military budget. A further increase of 4.8% is intended for purchases of fighter planes, submarines, advanced surveillance systems (including Phalcon airborne early warning systems from Israel), and a second aircraft carrier.”

An excerpt in The Hindustan Times of 15 th February, 2002, mentioned that, “In a paper entitled "Vision 2020", the Indian Air Force has laid out its requirements - it proposes increasing the number of squadrons from 39 to 60 by 2020 and replacing the aged MiG-21 planes with more modern fighters, such as the Russian Sukhoi-30s, or the Mirage-2000 or Rafael fighters

161 from France. This Indian air force internal document is reported also to advocate the creation of a first-strike capability. A missile regiment to handle the nuclear-capable Agni missile is being raised. Military officers are being trained to handle nuclear weapons and there have been statements by senior officials about Agni being mated with nuclear warheads. All of this is consistent with eventual deployment.”

Pakistan's generals would like to keep up with India in this effort but the economy is faltering and cannot stand the strain. A World Bank report is worth quoting at length "The 1990s were a decade of lost opportunities for Pakistan. From independence to the late 1980s, Pakistan outperformed the rest of South Asia. Then in the 1990s progress grounded to a halt. Poverty remained stuck at high levels, economic growth slowed, institutions functioned badly, and a serious macroeconomic crisis erupted." As and when the economy begins to revive, Pakistan's military leaders will no doubt resume the race.(World Bank, 2002).

Pakistani generals know why they want nuclear weapons. They anticipate that in the event of hostilities, India is likely to take losses in a terrain unsuitable for heavy armour or strike aircraft.

So it could shift the theatre of war - escalating horizontally but without attacking nuclear facilities. Thereafter, India would have several options available to it, which are:

• Push into lower Punjab or Upper Sindh to sever Pakistan's vital road and rail links.

• Destroy the infrastructure of the Pakistan military (communication networks, oil supplies,

army bases, railway yards, air bases through the use of runway busting bombs).

• Blockade Karachi, and perhaps also Gwadur, Pakistan's other port.

Pakistan's generals have sought to make it impossible for India to achieve these goals. They have articulated a set of conditions under which they will use their nuclear weapons. Pakistani nuclear

162 weapons will be used, according to General Kidwai of Pakistan's Strategic Planning Division, only "if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake" and this, he specified, meant:

• India attacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its territory

• India destroys a large part of Pakistan armed forces

• India imposes an economic blockade on Pakistan

• India creates political destabilization or large scale internal subversion in Pakistan

India, in turn, has started to prepare its military to be attacked by nuclear weapons on the battlefield and to continue the war. The major Indian war game Poorna Vijay (Complete Victory) in May 2001, the bigggest in over a decade, was reported to center on training the army and airforce to fight in a nuclear conflict Taken together, Indian military options and Pakistani planning would seem to ensure that that any major India-Pakistan conflict would lead inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons.(Indian Express, April 30, 2001)

Zia Mian (1998: 305) in his editorial article, Renoucing the Nuclear Option held that, “In early 2002, with a million troops mobilised and leaders in both India and Pakistan threatening nuclear war, world opinion responded fearfully, seeing a fierce and possibly suicidal struggle up ahead. Foreign nationals streamed out of both countries, and many are yet to return. But even at the peak of the crisis, few Indians or Pakistanis lost much sleep. Stock markets flickered, but there was no run on the banks or panic buying. Schools and colleges, which generally close at the first hint of crisis, functioned normally. What explains the astonishing indifference to nuclear annihilation? In part, the answer has to do with the fact that India and Pakistan are still largely traditional, rural societies, albeit going through a great economic and social transformation at a furious pace. The fundamental belief structures of such societies (which may well be the last

163 things to change), reflecting the realities of agriculture dependent on rains and good weather, encourage a surrender to larger forces. Conversations and discussions often end with the remark that "what will be, will be," after which people shrug their shoulders and move on to something else. Because they feel they are at the mercy of unseen forces, the level of risk-taking is extraordinary. But other reasons may be more important. In India and Pakistan, most people lack basic information about nuclear dangers. A 1996 poll of elite opinion showed that about 80% of those wanting to supporting Pakistan acquiring ready-to-use nuclear weapons found it "difficult" or "almost impossible" to get information, while about 25% of those opposed to nuclear weapons had the same concern.”

The Indian Express of May 24, 2002 reported that “the Indian Defence Research and

Development Organization claims to have developed an integrated field shelter to protect personnel from nuclear, biological and chemical agents in a nuclear war scenario. The shelter is said to be capable of accommodating 30 people and of giving protection for 96 hours. It is not known whether there are plans for mass production. In India, a November 1999 post-election national opinion poll survey found just over half of the population had not even heard of the May

1998 nuclear tests. First hand evidence bears out these judgments. Even educated people seem unable to grasp basic nuclear realities. Some students at the University in Islamabad, when asked, believed that a nuclear war would be the end of the world. Others thought of nuclear weapons as just bigger bombs. Many said it was not their concern, but the army's. Almost none knew about the possibility of a nuclear firestorm, about residual radioactivity, or damage to the gene pool. In Pakistan's public squares and at crossroads stand missiles and fiberglass replicas of the nuclear test site. For the masses, they are symbols of national glory and achievement, not of death and destruction.Previous crises have also seen such lack of fear about the threat and use of

164 nuclear weapons. With each crisis, there seems to be a lessening of political restraints and greater nuclear brinksmanship. A key factor is the absence of an informed and organized public opinion able to keep political and military leaders in check and restrain them from brandishing nuclear weapons. Close government control over national television, especially in Pakistan, has ensured that critical discussion of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is not aired. It is harder to understand the absence of such critical debate in India. Because nuclear war is considered a distant abstraction, civil defense in both countries is non-existent.”

As India's Admiral Ramu Ramdas, now retired and a leading peace activist, caustically remarked, “There are no air raid shelters in this city of Delhi, because in this country people are considered expendable. No serious contingency plans have been devised--plans that might save millions of lives by providing timely information about escape routes, sources of non-radioactive food and drinking water. It is unimaginable to think of providing adequate protection against nuclear attack to the many millions in South Asia's mega-cities. We have not been able to provide homes, food, water and health care to so many even in peace time. There is, nonetheless, something to be said for having credible plans to save as many as possible from the folly of their leaders. The development of and debate over such plans, in itself, may serve to convince some people of the horrors of what may be in store and motivate them to protest to survive.”

The US and South Asian Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War, to all intents and purposes, the super-powers were able to ignore the rest of the world. The fears and entreaties of other countries counted for little in super power strategic planning and policy. Following India's 1974 nuclear test, perceiving the threat of proliferation and the consequences of India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, the United States tried unsuccessfully to block the development of a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability through the

165 use of sanctions of various kinds. By the early 1990s, President Bill Clinton was fruitlessly engaged in a campaign to persuade both countries to cap, and then ultimately roll-back their programs. After the 1998 nuclear tests, the hope was that the two states could be made to sign the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In early 2000, this was on the verge of being signed by

Pakistan and India. However, Clinton's efforts were undermined by the refusal of the Republican controlled Senate to ratify the Treaty. The treaty died, leaving open the possibility of a resumption of nuclear testing by the U.S. and inevitably by the other nuclear weapons states, including in South Asia. This possibility has grown because of the policies of the Bush

Administration.

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the U.S. seems set to undo any and all arms control treaties, except those that clearly favor the US. The CTBT was the first victim.

The Biological Weapons Convention followed. The U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty is the first withdrawal from any arms control treaty by a state, creating a possibly terrible precedent. These steps have cleared the way for a more aggressive set of nuclear policies.

The Bush Administration's January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for development of operational strategies that would allow use of nuclear weapons by the US even against those states that do not possess nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons of mass destruction; it proposes that U.S. military forces, including nuclear forces, will be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends." New special-purpose nuclear weapons such as deep penetration weapons

(bunker busters) are already being developed. (As the U.S. has focused on further developing its military capacity to achieve its goals it the post-Cold War world, it has worried less about what

India and Pakistan may do to each other. With both India and Pakistan seeking to woo the United

166 States over to their side, the U.S. has little to fear from either. Although it seems to have taken out insurance. The Nuclear Posture Review recommends "requirements for nuclear strike capabilities" might include "a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group." Events since the terrorist attacks on the United

States on September 11 suggest Pakistan may be a particular concern for the U.S. in this regard. (

US Nuclear Posture Review, 2001)

Moore and Khan (2001) in Washington Post asserted that “Immediately after the September 11 attack, although Pakistan's military government insisted that there was no danger of any of its

25-40 nuclear weapons being taking for a ride, it wasn't taking any chances. Several weapons were reportedly airlifted to various safer, isolated, locations within the country. This nervousness was not unjustified - two strongly Islamist generals of the Pakistan Army (the head of Pakistan's

ISI intelligence agency, Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed, and Deputy Chief of Army Staff, General

Muzaffar Hussain Usmani), close associates of General Musharraf, had just been removed.

Dissatisfaction within the army on Pakistan's betrayal of the Taliban was (and is) deep - almost overnight, under intense American pressure, the Pakistan government had disowned its progeny.

Fears about Pakistan's nukes were subsequently compounded by revelations that two highly placed members of the nuclear establishment, Syed Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Majid, had journeyed several times into Afghanistan during the last year. Both scientists are well known to espouse radical Islamic views.

As Spector (1984:124) posited “It is not impossible that the two Pakistanis could have provided significant nuclear information or materials potentially useful to Al-Qaeda's allies and subsidiaries in other parts of the world. If it turns so out, this will scarcely be the first instance of nuclear leakage. In 1966, sympathizers of Israel working in the U.S. Nuclear Materials and

167 Equipment Corporation were instrumental in diverting more than 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the Israeli nuclear weapons program, material which was reported by the

CIA to most likely have been used by the Israelis in fabricating weapons. Pakistan's loose nuke problem underscores a global danger that may already be out of control. The fissile materials present in the thousands of ex-Soviet bombs marked for disassembly, the vast amounts of radioactive materials present in nuclear reactors and storage sites the world over, and the abundance of nuclear knowledge, make it only a matter of time before some catastrophic use is made of them.”

Alasttair Campbell’s diaries recount warning by army general at height of military standoff between India and Pakistan.Pakistan could launch a nuclear strike on India within eight seconds, claimed an army general in Islamabad whose warning is described in the latest volume of

Alastair Campbell's diaries. Musharaf asked Tony Blair's former communications director to remind India of Pakistan's nuclear capability amid fears in Islamabad that Delhi was "determined to take them out". Britain became so concerned about Pakistan's threat that Blair's senior foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, later warned in a paper that Pakistan was prepared to "go nuclear". The warnings are relayed by Campbell in a section in his latest diaries, The Burden of

Power, which are being serialised in the Guardian on Saturday and Monday. The diaries start on the day of the 9/11 attacks and end with Campbell's decision to stand down in August 2003 after the Iraq war.

The nuclear warnings came during a visit by Blair to the Indian subcontinent after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Campbell was told about the eight-second threat over a dinner in Islamabad on 5

October 2001 hosted by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan's president.

168 Campbell writes: "At dinner I was between two five-star generals who spent most of the time listing atrocities for which they held the Indians responsible, killing their own people and trying to blame 'freedom fighters'. They were pretty convinced that one day there would be a nuclear war because India, despite its vast population and despite being seven times bigger, was unstable "When the time came to leave, the livelier of the two generals asked me to remind the

Indians: 'It takes us eight seconds to get the missiles over,' then flashed a huge toothy grin."Blair visited Pakistan less than a month after the 9/11 attacks as Britain and the US attempted to shore up support in Islamabad before the bombing of Afghanistan, which started on 7 October 2001.

Campbell writes that the Pakistani leadership seemed to be keen for Britain and the US to capture Osama bin Laden, though he added it was difficult to be sure.

Relations between Islamabad and Delhi plummeted after the Blair visit when terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, killing seven people. Five of the attackers died. India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-

Mohammed terror groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. The tensions became so great that

Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, was sent to the region in May 2002.

Blair returned to the Indian subcontinent in January 2002, shortly after the fall of the Taliban in

Afghanistan, amid one of the tensest nuclear standoffs between Indian and Pakistan since independence in 1947. In the preparations for the visit, Manning prepared a paper for Blair that warned of the real threat of a nuclear conflict. In an extract from his diaries for 4 January 2002,

Campbell wrote: "DM had a paper, making clear our belief that the Pakistanis would 'go nuclear' and if they did, that they wouldn't be averse to unleashing them on a big scale. TB was genuinely alarmed by it and said to David 'They wouldn't really be prepared to go for nuclear weapons over

Kashmir would they?' DM said the problem was there wasn't a clear understanding of strategy

169 and so situations tended to develop and escalate quickly, and you couldn't really rule anything out."

A few days after the visit, the India-Pakistan standoff was discussed by the British war cabinet. In an extract for his diaries on 10 January 2002, Campbell wrote: "CDS chief of the defence staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce said if India and Pakistan go to war, we will be up the creek without a paddle. Geoff Hoon said there may have to be limited compulsory call-up of

Territorial Army reserves. TB gave a pretty gloomy assessment re India/Pakistan, said [the

Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was really upset at the way Pakistan's president,

Musharraf treated him. Military dispositions remained the same, with more than a million troops there [in Kashmir]. He assessed that the Indians believed that they could absorb 500,000 deaths.

Pakistani capability was far greater than the Indians believed."Relations between Delhi and

Islamabad have eased in recent years, though they still remain tense because Delhi believes that elements in the Pakistan state encourage Kashmiri terror groups. During his first visit to India in

2010 David Cameron famously accused Pakistan of exporting terrorism.

170 CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 THE CONCEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN According to a study by an anti-nuclear group, the International Physicians for the

Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), nuclear war between

South Asian rivals India and Pakistan would trigger a global famine that would immediately kill

2 billion people around the world and spell the ‘end of human civilization’. They also warned that even a limited nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would destroy crop yields, damage the atmosphere and throw global food markets into chaos. China, the world’s most populous country, would face a catastrophic food shortage that would lead to enormous social convulsions. A billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human history, said Ira Helfand, co-president of PSR and the study's lead author.

“But then, if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of civilization.” Helfand explained that China’s destruction would be caused by longstanding tensions between its neighbors, India and Pakistan, two enemies that have already fought four wars since 1947. Moreover, given the apocalyptic power of contemporary nuclear weapons – which are far more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 – the impact of an India-Pakistan war would be felt across the globe.

A crisis is brewing between nuclear armed India and Pakistan that could be their most dangerous ever.

India and Pakistan have fought wars and had several crises that went to the brink of war.

Both tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Now tensions are escalating between the two again. It began in May, 2014, when a heavily armed squad of Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

(Army of the Pure) attacked India’s consulate in Herat, in western Afghanistan. They planned to

171 massacre Indian diplomats on the eve of the inauguration of India’s new Hindu nationalist Prime

Minister, Narendra Modi. The consulate’s security forces killed the LeT terrorists first, preventing a crisis. Since LeT is a proxy of Pakistan's military intelligence service known as the

ISI, Indian intelligence officials assume the Herat attack was coordinated with higher-ups in

Pakistan. They assume another LeT attack is only a matter of time. They are probably right on both counts. This summer, clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops have escalated along the

Ceasefire Line in Kashmir, called the “Line of Control”. The Kashmiri front line has witnessed the worst exchanges of artillery and small arms fire in a decade this year, displacing hundreds of civilians on both sides. Over 20 have died in the crossfire already this month. Modi has ordered his army commanders to strike back hard at the Line of Control to demonstrate Indian resolve.

Although Modi made a big gesture in May, 2014, when he invited his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to his inauguration, since then Modi has cancelled routine diplomatic talks with Pakistan on Kashmir and signaled a tough line toward terrorism. He also appointed a very experienced intelligence chief, Ajit Doval as his National Security Adviser. Doval is known as a hard liner on terrorism; and on Pakistan. Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party strongly criticized his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, for what it saw as a weak response to the LeT 's attack on Mumbai in 2008. No military action was taken after 10 LeT terrorists, armed and trained by the ISI, killed and wounded hundreds of innocents, including six American dead. In

2001, a previous BJP government mobilized the Indian military for months after a Pakistan- based terror attack on the Indian parliament. The two countries were eyeball to eyeball in a tense standoff for almost a year. Two years before that, the two countries fought a war in Kashmir around the town of Kargil.

172 In the 1999 Kargil War the Pakistani army crossed the LOC to seize mountain heights controlling a key highway in Kashmir. BJP Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee responded with air strikes and ground forces. The Indian navy prepared to blockade Karachi, Pakistan's major port and it's critical choke point for importing oil. A blockade would have rapidly cut off Pakistan from oil supplies. The Indian navy was so eager to strike it had to be restrained by the high command. The Pakistanis began losing the fight at Kargil. Then they put their nuclear forces on high alert. President Bill Clinton pressured Nawaz Sharif (the prime minister then and now) into backing down at a crucial summit at Blair House on July 4, 1999. If Clinton had not persuaded

Sharif to withdraw behind the LOC the war would have escalated further, perhaps to a nuclear exchange.Kargil is a good paradigm for what a future crisis might look like. A BJP government is not likely to turn the other cheek. It cannot afford to let terror attacks go unpunished. That would encourage more. The difference between the Kargil War and today is that both India and

Pakistan now have far more nuclear weapons and delivery systems than 15 years ago. Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons and has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.

China provides Pakistan with its nuclear reactors. India has missiles that can reach all of

Pakistan and even to Beijing. The escalatory ladder is far more terrifying than it was on the eve of the millennium.

For retreating in 1999 Sharif was overthrown in a coup by the army commander, Pervez

Musharraf, who had planned the Kargil War. Now Musharraf is calling for Sharif to stand up to

Modi and not be pushed around by India. The main opposition party leader. Bilawal Bhutto, has called for a tough line defending Kashmiri Muslim rights, promising to take "every inch" of

Kashmir for Pakistan if he is elected prime minister in the future. Sharif is under pressure from another party leader, Imran Khan, to resign. The politics on both sides in South Asia leave little

173 room for compromise or dialogue. Meanwhile, America is seen in South Asia as a power in decline, a perception fueled by the Afghan war. U.S. influence in New Delhi and Islamabad is low. A Clinton-like intervention to halt an escalation will be a tough act to follow. But the consequences of a nuclear exchange are almost too horrible to contemplate.

According to Anthony H. Cordesman, (2013) “The consequences of an actual nuclear war, and consider which side might win. While the story may be apocryphal, Kahn is also said to have told Curtis Lemay – then head of the Strategic Air Command – that Lemay did not have a war plan because he focused too heavily on strikes and inflicting maximum damage, while ignoring the consequences of nuclear weapons. Kahn is said to have told Lemay that he lacked a war plan and all he had was a wargasm.” The end of the Cold War seemed to put an end to the need for such thinking, but recent developments in North Korea and Iran make it all too clear that there is still a need for such horrifying yet “realist” analysis. Of course, calmer heads may prevail.

Reason, deterrence, and arms control may still curtail nuclear proliferation, and are the most probable result of today’s nuclear arms races. But, that probability is declining. Four different nuclear arms races are now interacting to change the need for strategic calculus and demand a strategy that looks beyond arms control and considers a much grimmer future Any war between

India and Pakistan would be a pointless human tragedy, and a serious nuclear exchange would bring about the worst possible outcome. Of the current potential nuclear arms races, a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan risks the most damaging consequences in terms of human deaths, as well as the costs and time necessary to recover. Ground burst strikes on Indian and

Pakistani cities – “countervalue” strikes – would produce extremely high immediate and long- term deaths. Neither country has the medical and security facilities necessary to deal with such casualty burdens; no emergency aid agency is equipped and trained to deal with such events; nor

174 is it clear significant outside aid could come or would come in time to be effective.At present, both countries continue to build up their nuclear-armed missile forces and stockpiles of nuclear weapons. While unclassified estimates are very uncertain and differ greatly in detail, an Open

Briefing report on Indian nuclear forces drawing on material published in the Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists noted that India continued to improve the nuclear strike capabilities of its combat aircraft and develop sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and that its nuclear weapons stocks and missiles could be summarized as follows:

“India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium

(IPFM, 2011), sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India is building an unsafeguarded prototype fast-breeder reactor at the Indira

Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or 620 miles south of Visakhapatnam), which will significantly increase India’s plutonium production capacity once it becomes operational.”

“India has three types of land-based missiles that may be operational: the short-range Prithvi I, the short-range Agni I, and the medium-range Agni II. The Prithvi I has been deployed for almost 15 years, but the Agni I and II, despite being declared operational, both have reliability issues that have delayed their full operational service.

“India has been busy growing its missile program, with four more Agni versions in progress: an

Agni II+ was test-launched in 2010 but failed; the longer-range Agni III, after at least four flight-

175 tests, remains under development; and the Agni IV may be a technology bridge to the newest type, the long-range Agni V, which had its first test-launch in April. Some of these Agni programs may serve as technology-development platforms for longer-range versions.

“The bulk of the Indian ballistic missile force is comprised of three versions of Prithvi missiles, but only one of these versions, the army’s Prithvi I, has a nuclear role. Given its small size (9 meters long and 1 meter in diameter), the Prithvi I is difficult to spot on satellite images, and therefore little is known about its deployment locations. The Prithvi I is a short-range missile (up to 150 kilometers or 93 miles) and is the mainstay of the Strategic Forces Command, India’s designated nuclear weapons service.

“In December 2011, India successfully test-launched its two-stage Agni I missile, which has a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles), for the eighth time—suggesting that the missile might finally have become fully operational. But a ninth test-launch scheduled for early May 2012 was postponed due to a technical glitch.

“The road- or rail-launched Agni II, an improvement on the Agni I, can fly up to 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and it takes just 15 minutes for the missile to be readied for firing. The missile has been test-fired eight times with several failures, but more recent test-flights, on May 19, 2010 and September 30, 2011, were successful, demonstrating some progress toward making the Agni II fully operational. A 2010 test-launch of an extended-range Agni II, known as the Agni II+, failed.”

“Still under development is India’s rail-mobile Agni III, a two-stage, solid-fuel missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles)…. India took a significant step forward with the successful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic missile on April 19, 2012. With a range reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), the Agni V can reach any target in China;

176 however, the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment.

A slightly more dated article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists describes Pakistan’s nuclear program as including its F-16 fighters and the following nuclear and missile capabilities:

“Pakistan is building two new plutonium production reactors and a new reprocessing facility with which it will be able to fabricate more nuclear weapons fuel. It is also developing new delivery systems. Enhancements to Pakistan’s nuclear forces include a new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the development of two new nuclear-capable short- range ballistic missiles, and the development of two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

“We estimate that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 90–110 nuclear warheads, an increase from the estimated 70–90 warheads in 2009 (Norris and Kristensen, 2009). The US

Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that by 2020 Pakistan would have 60–80 warheads (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1999); Pakistan appears to have reached that level in

2006 or 2007 (Norris and Kristensen, 2007), more than a decade ahead of predictions. In January

2011, our estimate (DeYoung, 2011) of Pakistan’s stockpile was confirmed in the New York

Times by “officials and outsiders familiar with the American assessment,” who said that the official US estimate for “deployed weapons” ranged from the mid-90s to more than 110 (Sanger and Schmitt, 2011).1 With four new delivery systems and two plutonium production reactors under development, however, the rate of Pakistan’s stockpile growth may even increase over the next 10 years.

“The Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that its minimum deterrent requires. But Pakistan’s pace of nuclear modernization—and its development

177 of several short-range delivery systems—indicates that its nuclear posture has entered an important new phase and that a public explanation is overdue.

“Pakistan has three operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the short-range Ghaznavi

(Hatf-3) and Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5). It has at least three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles under development: the medium-range Shaheen-2 (Hatf-

6), which may soon be operational, and the short-range Abdali (Haft-2) and Nasr (Haft-9) systems.

“Pakistan is developing two new cruise missiles, the Babur (Hatf-7) and Ra’ad (Hatf-8), and it uses similar language to describe both missiles. According to the ISPR, the Babur and Ra’ad both have “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy,” and each is described as “a low- altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability”

One has to assume that there should be a high level of rational restraint and deterrence,but both states have a history of overreaction, nationalism, and failure to demonstrate stability and restraint in arms control. More broadly, historical precedent, particularly over the 20th century, does not make a strong case for behavior based on rational bargaining. It is unclear that either has really thought out the consequences of a nuclear exchange beyond the “Duke Nukem” school of planning: who can kill more of the enemy. Rhetoric asides, the military buildup by both sides suggests a competition aimed at creating the largest possible nuclear “wargasm.”

The bad news is that this ongoing nuclear arms race receives little real attention in terms of what would happen if both sides actually went to war. The good news, from a ruthlessly “realist” viewpoint, is that such a human tragedy does not necessarily have serious grand strategic consequences for other states, and might well have benefits. Some fallout perhaps, but not that much in terms of serious radiation exposure in terms of exposure measured in rads. The loss of

178 India and Pakistan might create some short term economic issues for importers of goods and services. However, the net effect would shift benefits to other suppliers without any clear problems in substitutions or costs. Some outside aid costs may be incurred, although one has to question whether outside states have any moral obligation to help the truly self-destructive, and how much outside aid could really be useful. In this sense, assistance would be a matter of sentiment rather than imperative. This is not a reason for outside powers to give up on seeking some form of arms control agreements, confidence building measures, and restraint. It is, however, a cause for Indian and Pakistan strategic analysis to start realistically modeling where they are headed if a nuclear war occurs now, or 5 or 10 years in the future. Unlike conventional weapons, this is not a matter of “toys for the boys.”

It may also be a reason for outside actors like the US and the International Atomic Energy

Agency to start assessing these consequences independently, and to force transparency in terms of nuclear stockpiles, delivery capabilities and the results of given types of exchange. It might also be a time for nations, NGOs, and the UN to make it clear there will be no aid to either country in the event a nuclear exchange does occur. These two options, in conjunction with arms control efforts, seem to be the only options where the outside world can really make a difference.

The Pakistani Cards

If there are wild cards in the India-Pakistani nuclear arms race, they lie in two aspects of the

Pakistani nuclear and missile program. First, is the issue of proliferation beyond Pakistan.

Pakistan seems to be heading towards over-capacity in nuclear fissile material production and it is developing reliable missiles it can export to third countries that probably do not require a covert presence of the kind China provides in Saudi Arabia. The end result is the potential to

179 export nuclear armed missiles to a country that Pakistan is convinced would never share nuclear weapons or lose control over them, such as Saudi Arabia. Such a transfer could produce a massive cash transfer and create a new nuclear power opposing Iran – not a serious threat to

Pakistan but a regional nuclear rival on its borders. An abundant stockpile also provides Pakistan the potential to sell nuclear weapons design and test data, as well as missile designs and components. In short, no one can totally decouple Pakistan from future cases of proliferation, nor can one be certain Pakistan would not create new threats through such transfers. Second, there is the marginal risk that Pakistani nuclear weapons might fall into extremist hands or Pakistan might become an extremist state. Either scenario would leave little hope of rational behavior.

Rambo-like fantasies of US Special Forces securing Pakistani nuclear forces aside, these are possibilities that both broaden the scope of possible Pakistani-related nuclear strikes, and significantly decrease the impact of deterrence and restraint in terms of rational bargaining. The good news is that neither option seems particularly probable in the near term. The bad news is that it is becoming far more difficult to assign such probabilities in the near term, and there is little the US and outside powers can really do to affect the situation. Preventive strikes do not seem any more credible than the “Rambo” option, threatening retaliation risks triggering further escalation and strikes, and Pakistani nationalism is hostile enough already. Negotiating safety measures, maintaining foreign aid, and pushing for arms control can all have some benefits, but they seem likely to be marginal or useless if internal developments within Pakistan continue to radicalize certain elements.

Comparative Analysis with other Asian countries

Iran: Iran has already managed to trigger a nuclear arms race without even having a nuclear weapon. Israel long ago extended the range of its nuclear-armed land-based missiles, probably

180 now targets Iran with thermonuclear weapons, and is examining options for sea launched cruise missiles. The US has offered the Gulf states and the region “extended deterrence” – although without specifying whether this would be nuclear or conventional – and is deploying ballistic missile defense ships and selling THAAD, PAC 3, and radars. It is cooperating with Israel in improving the Arrow and shorter-range missile defenses. A credible Saudi voice like Prince

Turki has stated that Saudi Arabia is examining nuclear options. The de facto failure of the latest

5+1 talks with Iran, and the failure of the regime to react to sanctions – at least to date – does not mean that negotiations have failed. Iran has scarcely been forthcoming and has long used negotiations as a cover for continued nuclear programs, but the option of negotiations is still available. Moreover, sanctions are limiting Iran’s military import, and it can take several years for the damaging and most recent rounds of sanctions to have their most severe political and economic impact. There is also the possibility that the coming Iranian election may signal that

Iran is willing to accept some level of “reform” and added compromise; although it is just as likely that elections signal the opposite—that the Supreme Leader is in total control and will tolerate no real challenge.

At the same time, Iran’s red lines have shifted to the point where they now are at the nuclear breakout and IRBM stage of development, and where Iran can now move towards the following new red lines: fissile grade enrichment, “cold” or passive nuclear weapons testing, creation of new dispersed or sheltered facilities with more advance centrifuges, testing an actual nuclear device, and arming its missiles with an untested nuclear warhead – a risk that sounds extreme until one remembers the reliability and accuracy of US nuclear-armed systems like Jupiter and the M-4/MGM-18 Lacrosse. There is no reliable way to predict such events in advance. They are only likely to become “red lines” when they are actually crossed and have been detected. There

181 also is no unclassified way to know how much design and test data Iran has received from the outside, and how well it can hide its efforts and leap frog to some form of weapons deployment.

Equally important, there is no way to know exactly how the US would react and how much international support it would get. Gulf leaders, for example, talk privately about such support but are remarkably silent when the subject of supporting and basing US preventive strikes is raised in any open forum that even hints at public commitment.

Moreover, there is no way to know how Israel would react. At this point, its nuclear efforts are so tightly concealed that there is no public debate over its nuclear weapons holding, missile forces, and possible addition of sea or air-launched systems. The US has made it clear that it does not want Israeli preventive strikes, but has never publicly said it would ride out any Israel effort and let Israel take the consequences. Israel may or may not be able to hit at all of Iran’s current major publically known nuclear enrichment facilities. The hardening of Natanz and

Fordow raise questions for a force of fighter-bombers using conventional earth penetrators

(although nuclear-armed penetrators would be a very different story). As for the US, it has steadily refined its military strike options and kept them very real. The US can hit at the full mix of suspect sites – including research and centrifuge production, take out much of Iran’s defenses and missile capabilities, and has access to Gulf bases. And it can restrike if Iran tries to recreate its facilities.

These are all capabilities Israel probably lacks, although several factors may have eased its may have eased its penetration and refueling problems, including Israel’s quasi-rapprochement with Turkey, Syria’s civil war, and Iraq’s problems in getting advanced fighters and weapons from the US. The US has also said that an Iranian nuclear force is “unacceptable.” Preventive strikes by either the US or Israel can trigger a far more intensive Iranian nuclear effort,

182 withdrawal from the NNPT with claim the act is “defensive,” and a wide range of low level military acts in the Gulf or effort to use proxies and surrogates in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza.

Sustaining even a major US strike requires sustain support from the Arab Gulf states for restrikes, as well as willingness to counter Iranian asymmetric and even missile strikes.

At the same time, the US cannot underreact as well. If some argue that Iran should learn from Libya, the US should definitely learn from North Korea. Brazil, South Africa and

Argentina are not the models for dealing with Iran. Once Iran has become an active military power, it is likely to move forward toward more and more nuclear weapons, boosted and thermonuclear weapons designs, and combinations of launch on warning, launch under attack and then dispersed and shelter forces. Pressure from Israel, Saudi (and possibly Turkish) nuclear and missile forces will add to the resulting arms race, as will the US need to constantly upgrade any forces for “extended deterrence.” The most “quiet” or discrete extended deterrence option would be nuclear armed, submarine or surface launched cruise missiles backed with the deployment of conventionally armed cruise or ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems capable of point attacks on Iran’s most valuable civil and military assets.

The most decisive extended deterrence options would be the equivalent of the combination of

Pershing II and GLCMs that were land based, had US operating crews both deep inside the Arab

Gulf and other regional states and in or near key major cities, and had both nuclear and precision conventional warheads. Iran would be faced with the inability to strike at key Arab population centers without striking at US forces and still see mobile US nuclear armed forces in reserve. It also could not use conventional warheads without facing a more accurate and reliable US strike force in return .The US could work with key Arab allies and the GCC to create the same kind of layered defenses against missiles and rockets being developed in Israel, and (as is suggested later

183 ) use the South Korean model to help create layered defenses in the gulf, allowing an indirect form of cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states without overt ties or relations.

As is the case with India and Pakistan, it also is important to think the unthinkable in terms of what a nuclear war in the region might become. Even today, it is possible to think of some

Iranian covert nuclear attack on Israel or a Gulf state using a gun device hidden in a ship – or less credibly – given to a proxy like the Hezbollah. The end result of an attack on Israel might well be nuclear ground bursts on Iranian cities – a far great “existential threat” to Iran than the kind of attack Iran could launch again Israel during the first years of its nuclear forces. And, the situation is scarcely likely to get better as all of the current and potential nuclear powers affecting the nuclear balance steadily increase their capabilities over the years and decades ahead.

Israel would have no reason to limit the scale of its retaliation, and outside states would have no strategic reason to urge such restraint. The outside world may need Iranian oil – although that is now questionable given developments in shale oil and gas and other sources of energy and liquid fuels. No one needs Iranians and no one needs an Iranian regime with any chance of recovering nuclear capability. Horrible as a nuclear exchange of any kind could be in humanitarian terms, the grim logic of strategic realism does not place any restraints on Israeli retaliatory attacks on Iran. As for Saudi Arabia and extended deterrence, the US has to consider the tradeoff between all of the risks and costs of preventive strikes and the costs and risks of nuclear exchanges or the use of extended deterrence if the US does not act. Arms control negotiations, sanctions, clearly defined redlines and public analysis of the cost to Iran of a nuclear exchange are all interim steps that might eliminate the need for preventive strikes, but some red lines are deadlines and make it time to act.

184 A launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 missile as part of a failed satellite launch in April 2009 traveled further than earlier unsuccessful launches but still did not achieve a complete test. An

April 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (called the Unha-3 by North Korea) also failed in the first stage. The December 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (Unha-3) was North Korea’s first successful launch of a satellite into space. However, putting a satellite into orbit, while moving

North Korea technically to its goal, does not translate into a reliable missile. Further testing would be required.” Where Iran officially denies that it has a nuclear weapons program, North

Korea has talked about nuclear strikes on the US long before it even has a credible capability to launch them and makes no secret of the threat it poses to its neighbors. It also clearly is set on a course where it will steadily deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft with progressively longer ranges, higher yields, and more accuracy and reliability over time. It will exploit any failure to match these forces, and there is no clear way to estimate how a mature and survivable nuclear force would affect North Korean uses of force at lower levels or its perceptions of risk.

North Korea

Once again, it is important to think about the consequences of North Korea going from a token or no serious nuclear force to even a limited capability to strike the US matched by a serious capability to strike at South Korea or Japan and develop enough weapons for a serious tactical or theater nuclear strike capability. There is no way to calculate North Korea’s willingness to take nuclear risks and the fact its threats and strategic rhetoric are extreme does not mean its actions will be. The fact remains, however, that it is the only power that openly threatens nuclear war and whose strategic leadership is openly uncertain enough to raise serious questions about its judgment and restraint.

185 US options are limited by the fact that North Korea has a powerful – if cautious and sometimes restraining – protector in China. It is far harder for the United States to talk about preventive strikes after the fact and in the face of Chinese desire to keep a buffer state between it and the

US. US options are also affected by the fact that any deployment of US nuclear forces or extended deterrence that focuses on North Korea will be seen by China as a potential threat.

At the same time, the US faces the reality that the risks of a growing North Korean nuclear force

– coupled to a large stock of chemically armed bombs and missiles and possible biological weapons – mean it cannot simply let a key ally like South Korea bear a one-sided threat or leave

Japan in the position where it, too, has no balancing force. While arms control options are not impossible, it is also all too clear that that they offer even less chance of success than negotiations with Iran.

This leaves the US with a number of alternatives, none of which offer the prospect of lasting stability, but all of which are very similar to the options the US might use against Iran and would put pressure on both North Korea and China for reasons analyzed in more depth in the following sections, and say the US will offer extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea unless

China can persuade North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear programs. It could confront

China and aid South Korea with two major options:

South Korea announced on Oct. 7 (2012) it had reached an agreement with the United States that will allow Seoul to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500- kilogram payload, an increase the governments of both countries say is necessary to counter the growing threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Under a 2001 agreement with the

United States, South Korea was limited to developing ballistic missiles with ranges of no more than 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. That agreement increased South Korea’s

186 ballistic missile range from the 180-kilometer restriction that the two parties had negotiated in

1979. Under the new guidelines, South Korea will be able to target any site in North Korea from anywhere in its own territory.

In an Oct. 7 Press briefing, White House spokesman Jay Carney described the extension as a

“prudent, proportional, and specific response” that is designed to improve South Korea’s “ability to defend” against North Korea’s ballistic missiles… In the Oct. 18 e-mail, the State Department official dismissed the possibility that the new South Korean missile guidelines would have an adverse effect on the MTCR, saying that the extension will have “no implications for other countries’ missile-related export behavior” and that it does “not impact the export control commitments” to which South Korea agreed when it joined the MTCR. The North Korean

Foreign Ministry responded to Seoul’s announcement in an Oct. 10 statement saying that the

United States “discarded its mask of deterring” missile proliferation by supporting South Korea’s increased missile ranges and killed efforts to restrain the development of long-range missile launches on the Korean peninsula.

The US can put pressure on both North Korea and China in ways that would allow several years for negotiation while not seriously opposing South Korea in any way that would bind or sanction its ally. While Japan is far less likely to take a decision to go nuclear, particularly in the near-term, the US could decide that the Missile Technology Control Regime had essentially outlived its usefulness – binding the US without binding China – and encourage Japan to create precision strike conventional missiles as well as missile defenses. This would confront both

North Korea and China with the reality that once such a Japanese force was created, Japan could quickly arm them with nuclear weapons if it came under increasing North Korean or Chinese pressure. Such options would give the US, South Korea, and Japan growing leverage to pressure

187 China to restrain North Korea as well as deter and contain the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. In fact, one way to put pressure on China would be to start a dialogue that could be either official or think tank, including discussions of both missile defense and extended deterrence, and encourage South Korea and Japan to surface the nuclear option. If this succeeded in pushing

China into far more decisive pressure on North Korea, there would be no need for either extended deterrence or South Korean or Japanese nuclear forces. Moreover, such options could be used to lever Chinese restraint in transferring missile technology to Iran. There also is no reason that the US, South Korea and Japan could not offer quid pro quos in terms of incentives for a North Korean roll back, including some formal agreement on all sides for a local weapons of mass destruction free zone and economic incentives to a more open North Korea.

At the same time, for all the reasons discussed below, the US may have to tacitly encourage

South Korean and Japanese creation of at least precision guided conventional missile forces and possibly nuclear forces as a local regional counterbalance to the Chinese nuclear effort. This is scarcely a desirable option, or one that can easily be kept stable, but North Korea is only part of the problem and the US should not passively allow itself to be trapped into a Chinese-US nuclear relationship. It should be clear to China that it faces other potential nuclear powers if China’s nuclear forces grow too much and are even indirectly linked to Chinese pressure on maritime and island disputes in the Pacific.

China

Finally, it is time to take a much harder look at the broader interaction between China’s nuclear and missile programs and the overall balance of nuclear forces. Quite frankly, it is both incompetent and intellectually dishonest to decouple China’s expanding nuclear and missile forces from the US and Russian strategic and theater nuclear balance and to pretend that cuts in

188 US nuclear forces are not connected to the future mix of Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces and how they interact with the forces (or non-forces) of South Korea and Japan. Edition after edition of the Department of Defense report on Chinese military power has described the changes in Chinese missile forces. The 2012 edition notes, "The PLA Second Artillery Corps is modernizing its short range ballistic missile force by fielding advanced variants with improved ranges and payloads. It is also acquiring and fielding greater numbers of conventional medium- range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores beyond the First island chain. Similarly, China continues to produce large numbers of advanced ground launched cruise missiles capable of standoff, precision strikes. By 2015, China will also field additional road-mobile DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhanced, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs. China continues investments in its land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs. It is developing several variants of offensive missiles, upgrading older systems, forming additional units, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.

The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate, domestically built cruise missiles, and has previously acquired large numbers of Russian ones. These include the domestically produced, ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM); the domestically produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM); the Russian SS-N-

22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class guided missile destroyers; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM on China’s Russian- built KILO-class diesel-powered attack submarines.“By October 2011, the PLA had deployed between 1,000 and 1,200 SRBM to units opposite Taiwan. In the past year, China has fielded

189 new SRBM systems, added additional missile brigades in southeastern China, and upgraded the lethality of its existing SRBM force by introducing variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.

During comments to the media in 2011, China confirmed it is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Known as the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5), this missile is intended to provide the

PLA the capability to attack large ships, particularly aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific

Ocean. The assessed range of the DF-21D exceeds 1,500 km, and the missile is armed with a maneuverable warhead.”No similar unclassified discussion has taken place of the growing expert debate over the size and nature of the Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile raised in studies by

Phillip Karber and others. Estimates ranged from 80 to 2,000 weapons in 2005, and some now put the total at 300-400 while others claim levels of 1,800 to over 3,000. There are also debates over delivery systems, some crediting China with a major cruise missile as well as a ballistic missile force.

This debate takes on a very different meaning when there is talk of reducing US and

Russian stockpiles to zero and the US has already reduced its nuclear weapons holds from a reported peak of 31,255 to less than 5,000, and under 2,500 strategic warheads. The Arms

Control Association, for example, provided the following estimate in late 2012:

• China: About 240 total warheads.

• France: Fewer than 300 operational warheads.

• Russia: Approximately 1,499 deployed strategic warheads… The Federation of

American Scientists estimates Russia has another 1,022 nondeployed strategic

190 warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Additional

thousands are awaiting dismantlement.

• United Kingdom: Fewer than 160 deployed strategic warheads, total stockpile of

up to 225.

• United States: Approximately 5,113 nuclear warheads… including tactical,

strategic, and nondeployed weapons. According to the latest official New START

declaration, the United States deploys 1,722 strategic nuclear warheads on 806

deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers… The Federation of American

Scientists estimates that the United States' nondeployed strategic arsenal is

approximately 2,800 warheads and the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal numbers 500

warheads. Additional warheads are retired and await dismantlement.

The practical problem for the US – as has been discussed earlier – is not only to assess the overall nuclear balance in strategic terms and how China’s development affect its strategic forces, but the overall balance in Asia, and particularly involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and

Southeast Asia. The US should not overreact to China’s actions. China is becoming a major global power and its nuclear forces will expand. The US should not, however, underreact, fail to assess Chinese nuclear weapons developments as openly and transparently as it assesses its other military actions, or somehow talk about zero options as if the nuclear arms race in Asia was not now more important in terms of deterrence and warfighting risks than the nuclear balance with

Russia and in Europe. To do so is not simply intellectually dishonest, it is intellectually absurd: a clear case of unthinking about the thinkable.

191 CHAPTER SIX

6.1 MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACEFUL INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

. In this chapter we will endeavour to address our second hypothesis, which postulated that the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create an opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. Kashmir has been one of the longest running disputes in contemporary times. As we earlier learnt, dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir arose almost simultaneously as India and Pakistan obtained independence from British rule in 1947.

Although Kashmir is not the only dispute between the two countries whose relations have been characterized by mutual distrust and have hence prevented resolution of less protracted disputes such as the ones over Sir Creek, Baglihar Dam, Wullar Barrage, Rann of Kutch, Siachen Glacier, to name a few. Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir predicated fundamentally on religious basis, while Indian claims sought to be couched in terms of Kashmir, being the only Muslim majority state, as a test-case for secularism. Thus, the dispute over Kashmir was viewed no longer as one over territory, but rather in terms of two conflicting ideologies. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars (1947, 1965 and 1971) of which the first two were fought over Kashmir. There were several low intensity military skirmishes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in the past six decades, most intense being the standoff over Siachen Glacier in 1983 and 1999 Kargil

Conflict.

Thus far, many lives have been lost due to this conflict and the Kargil conflict highlighted how perilously close the region could be to a nuclear war, which would be devastating not only for both countries but also for the whole region. Any normalization of relations between the two countries as well as the mounting human and financial costs of the conflict necessitates a speedy resolution of the Kashmir issue. Efforts have been made to find viable solutions for this problem,

192 however they have failed to realize their objectives due to lack of political will by both India and

Pakistan. Ironically, the people of Kashmir have never been given a chance to decide their fate in spite of the United Nation Security Council Resolution of 1948, which proposed that the issue be resolved by plebiscite. However, its implementation was never realised largely stemming from a trust deficit as well as lack of political will on both sides. ( Effendi M.,2010: 3)

Meredith Weiss (2002:10) opines that the root of the conflict is the question of sovereignty and the possibility of self-determination by Kashmiris of whether to remain in India, join

Pakistan, or form an independent state. But the issue is not all that simple. While New Delhi insists that “Kashmir is an integral part of India, Pakistan on the other hand insists that “Kashmir is its life line” and is the unfinished agenda of the partition of the Indian sub-continent. What would happen if Kashmir gets Independence, would it be able to survive as an economically viable and politically sovereign State amid Pakistan and India’s strategic interests? This study will examine these questions by highlighting the positives and negative effects of all these options. From our findings so far in this research, Kashmir has always been at the centre of the dispute between India and Pakistan but unfortunately both sides have failed to give reasonable concessions to each other in order to solve the problem. The heavy militarization on both sides has caused severe damage to all the efforts of peace building and reconciliation.

According to Moonis Ahmar (2009:21) “the conflict is seen in terms of it being an

“outcome of process of neglect, discrimination, suppression of Kashmiri identity and the pre- eminence of power-centric approach held by the successive regimes of India and Pakistan.

Regretfully, the end of the cold war at the superpower level couldn’t bring any qualitative change in the mindset of people at the helm of affairs in New Delhi and Islamabad. On the contrary,

193 India-Pakistani tension over Kashmir reached new levels after the outbreak of uprising in the

Indian controlled Valley of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s”.

India blames Pakistan for supporting militants and Pakistan claims that India is violating Human

Rights in Kashmir. Several talks have been held between India and Pakistan but they have not yielded any substantive results till date. This is reflected in the fact that Kashmir remains one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world with close to half a million troops and between

40,000 to 70,000 civilian casualties in Indian administered Kashmir alone, while the figures for the Pakistani side, though lower, remain unknown. (Malik, I.T., 1993:8)

The colonised India was divided on the basis of two-nation theory according to which Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations, who therefore could not cohabit in a single nation-state.

Pakistan’s official view is that Kashmir is the root cause of animosity with India. According to

Pakistan, all other issues are irritants and can be solved if the issue of Kashmir will be addressed and resolved. Whereas, India doesn’t consider Kashmir as a territorial dispute, as India claims that the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the accession treaty in 1947 with the Union of India and therefore Indian claims to Kashmir are absolutely legal and justified. India denies Pakistani assertion that Kashmir is a disputed territory and blames Pakistan for supporting militants and providing them with logistics and training for terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir. Within the state of Jammu and Kashmir the situation is even more complex given the sheer cultural, religious, ethnic and regional diversity that characterizes the state. The state of Jammu &

Kashmir has three districts, Kashmir valley, the district of Jammu and Ladakh. ( Brecher and

Wikenfield, 1997: 165).

The Kashmir valley is 95% Muslim, many of whom support either accession to Pakistan or independence. The minority of Kashmiri Hindu Pundits, many of whom were driven out from

194 the valley, wish to stay with India. The region of Jammu has a Hindu majority, which wants to remain with India because they fear that if Kashmir becomes the part of Pakistan, they will be denied their rights under Muslim majority. In Ladakha district, Buddhists and Shia Muslims are in majority, who wish to stay with India but feel discriminated by New Delhi in its dealing with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as they feel the people of valley have hijacked relations with

India. After being a battle ground between India and Pakistan for decades with the attendant economic deprivation, many Kashmiri groups want to exercise their right of self-determination.

The Kashmir conflict represents a self-determination (and more recently, secessionist) movement for Kashmiris; an irredentist movement for Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir; and a civil insurgency for India. (Effendi M.S., 2010:4)

Suggested Solutions to Kashmir Conflict

As the Kashmir conflict enters the 66 th year, the issue continues to remain complex and intractable. Various options have been proposed by different stakeholders to the problem of Kashmir but no success has been achieved due to the rigid stands of both Islamabad and New

Delhi. Both Governments are not ready to give concessions to each other and to find compromises. The reality is that ‘Kashmir’ has always been used to gain political mileage by both sides in spite of the fact that the cost of the conflict is very high for both countries. The rigid positions and failures to agree to a just and peaceful solution of the dispute have placed the region as a dangerous spot and a probable outbreak of nuclear war. In light of the above assertions, it is the time to think deeper in order to solve this protracted and intricate conflict; though the path to its resolution is not that easy. It requires strong political will, if the issue of

Kashmir is to be realistically addressed. There is no short cut, and no easy formula to solve the problem and especially if there is no mutual trust between the concerned parties. Now, it has

195 become imperative to suggest a path through which India and Pakistan can go for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

Sumantra Bose (2005: 202) in her book, Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, argues that “The key to breaking the deadlock in Kashmir lies in the metropolitan capitals of India and Pakistan. Concerted sustained intergovernmental cooperation between India and

Pakistan is the essential basis of any Kashmir process. If such intergovernmental cooperation were to occur, the other dimension of the Kashmir problem might turn out to be surprisingly tractable. In its absence, however, no lasting, substantial progress is possible on those other fronts, and the Kashmir question will continue to be a prime source of international tension, regional instability, and violent internal conflict. Therefore it is important for both India and

Pakistan to step back from their traditional rhetoric on Kashmir”.

Effendi M., (2010: 12) wrote that “After 9/11 episode, when Pakistan came under immense international pressure to curb the militants and their training camp within the territory of

Pakistan, President Musharraf took some actions against militant groups and also signed a declaration with India on January 6, 2004, which was read out to the media in Islamabad by

India’s External Minister, Yashwant Sinha, and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Kurshid Mahamud

Kasuri. In this agreement Pakistan pledged that it will not allow its territory for terrorism and

India committed that it will discuss all issues including Kashmir. Afterwards several sessions of talks were held to explore an acceptable solution to the problem of Kashmir but no concrete result could be achieved towards this end due to regime change in Pakistan and subsequently stalling of the peace process stopped after Mumbai attacks of 26 November,2008.In last few years both India and Pakistan have shown some interest and willingness to resolve Kashmir issue along with others. In this regard, several Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were taken by

196 both sides like the bus service between Azad Kashmir and Jammu Kashmir, and bilateral trade was encouraged during this time. These steps reflect both sides’ intention to lose ground on their traditional positions to foster the dialogue process and increase mutual trust. Initially these

CBMs were welcomed by both sides but lately have failed to realize its potential, because of travel restrictions, visa difficulties, trade is in barter and its value pegged against the US dollar.

Also there are no banking and credit facilities for traders and no telephonic links. Trade lists decided by officials rather than traders and obviously bilateral trade and bus/train services would not resolve the issue and hence would not be of any interest to the people of Kashmir largely.

Secondly these CBMs won’t tackle the demand of an Independent State by Jammu Kashmir

Liberation Front, Hurriat Conference (Mir Wais Group) and some of the militant’s organizations.”

‘Independence’ is one of the proposed solutions to Kashmir conflict, which will be examined later in this study along with other proposed solutions. The following solutions have been brought forward time to time, let us analyse them critically.

United Nation’s Plebiscite

On December 31, 1947, India filed a complaint against Pakistani aggression with the United

Nations. The U.N. passed resolutions asking for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the occupied territory in Kashmir, for the reduction in the number of Indian troops in the state of

Jammu and Kashmir, and finally for a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir with regard to their political affiliations. But since then no plebiscite could be held because of the lack of cooperation by both sides. India says that Pakistan should first withdraw its forces from

Azad Kashmir and Pakistan holds India responsible for not allowing Kashmiris to ascertain their will. After so many years UN resolution is still seeking its implementation, which has very less

197 prospects in near future to be implemented in its lateral spirit. One other drawback of this resolution is that it doesn’t give Kashmir is an option to decide for their independent state and for this reason it is not wrong to claim that under current circumstances the solution of UN Plebiscite has lost its importance and can no more be considered as a viable solution to the problem.

Because, if according to the current resolution a plebiscite would be held, it will only ask for the accession with either Pakistan or India, which is not going to be accepted by the either side, if the decision goes against one of them. On this note, it is important to include the option of independence in the current UN resolution, only then it could be considered as a plausible solution.(Ahmar M., 2004: 9)

United Nation’s Trusteeship Option

There has been a proposal that to resolve the issue of Kashmir for some time the territory may be placed under control of trusteeship of United Nations and after a period of ten to fifteen years the matter may be referred to the people (referendum) for the final verdict with regard to future status of the State. This arrangement will provide a face-saving arrangement for India, and will also give Kashmiris, on both sides of Line of Control, enough time to decide their future without any pressure or compulsion from any country or group”.

But this option is not workable until both India and Pakistan agree to withdraw their forces from the occupied areas. Secondly, India has repeatedly refused the involvement of any third party and always argues that this is a bilateral issue and only India and Pakistan should solve it. On the other hand, it would be difficult for Pakistan to dismantle all the military establishments and especially the militant groups would not agree to the presence of any International Forces

198 because then they have to disarm and stop militancy. So this option doesn’t look practical under current situation. (Chaudhry, R., 1996: 471-497)

Independence

The idea of Independent Kashmir is a new one. However, it is a view which has found favour with a large number of Sunni Muslims in the Kashmir valley. Over the last 63 years, political manipulations, human rights abuses, rigging of elections and corrupt government has created a sense of alienation among Kashmir population and they have become more defiant and assertive. But one important thing is that there is a divide on this option among the political parties, militant groups in Kashmir and people from different regional, religious and ethnic background who make up the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some political parties like Hurriyat

Conference (Ali Gillani Group) and Hizbul-Mujhahideen (militant group) demands accession with Pakistan and hence would not buy this idea of independence but on the other handsome

Political parties like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hurriyat Conference (Mir

Wais Group) are in favour of independence. Therefore there is no consensus on this option, which makes it difficult to adopt. But even if Kashmir gets independence, it would be difficult to survive as a sovereign state because of its land locked territory and would be dependent on

Pakistan and India for trade and other resources. Moreover, it has very strategic position, Main water sources are coming from Kashmir and there would be again a competition to install a pro

Pakistani or pro Indian government in order to secure their strategic interests. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to envisage a viable and sovereign state. The Hindu minority, which already feels threatened by militants would not favour the independence and would like to remain with India. (http://viewstonews.com/index.php/possible-solutions-of-kashmir- dispute/pakistan)

199 The Way Forward

As postulated by Raman (2010: 51) in ‘ Understanding Kashmir: A Chronology of the

Conflict’ “Those who profit from war are in the driving seat in Washington, Delhi and

Islamabad. If South Asia is to hope for better times, then fundamental shifts in all three countries will be absolutely necessary. In Pakistan, for the past five decades, school children have been taught that Kashmir is the ‘jugular vein’ of Pakistan, the unfinished business of ‘partition’ without which the country will remain incomplete’. This national obsession must be dropped; it has supported three wars and is an invitation to unending conflict and ultimate disaster. As a first step, Pakistan must visibly demonstrate that it has severed all links with the militant groups it formerly supported and shut down all the militant camps it set up for them. Pakistan must find more positive ways to show its solidarity with the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. In

India, New Delhi's sustained subversion of the democratic process and iron fist policy in

Kashmir has produced a moral isolation of India from the Kashmiri people that may be total and irreversible. The brutality of Indian forces, typical of state counter-insurgency efforts to deal with separatists and independence movements, is well-documented by human rights groups.

India's rigid refusal to deal with Kashmir's reality must go. A first step would be to withdraw

Indian troops and allow democracy and normal economic life to resume and for Kashmiri civil society to begin to repair the profound damage done to that community. This could be done by restoring to Kashmir the autonomy granted it under Article 370 of the Indian constitution pending a permanent solution.”

The impression is that Indian and Pakistani leaders seem to have abdicated their own responsibility and have entrusted disaster prevention to US diplomats and officials, as well occasionally to those from Britain. There is no doubt that the US is interested in preventing a

200 South Asian nuclear disaster. But this is only a peripheral interest, the United States main interest in South Asian nuclear issues is now driven largely by fear of Al-Qaida, or affiliated groups, and a possible nuclear connection. This is a valid concern, and as a first step tight policing and monitoring of nuclear materials and knowledge is essential. But this is far from sufficient. If nuclear weapons continue to be accepted by nuclear weapon states as legitimate, for either deterrence or war, their global proliferation - whether by other states or non-state actors - can only be slowed down at best. By what moral argument can others be persuaded not to follow suit? Humanity's best chance of survival lies in moving rapidly toward the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The US, as the world's only superpower, must take the lead.

Reducing Nuclear Risks in South Asia

The gravity of the situation in South Asia is such that commonsense dictates the need for urgent transitional measures to reduce the nuclear risks while seeking a path to nuclear disarmament. An important set of proposals for nuclear risk reduction measures between India and Pakistan was released by the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) in Delhi on June 18, 2002. There are many technical steps that can quickly be taken in South Asia, including ensuring that nuclear weapons are not kept assembled or mated with their delivery systems, ending production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and closing down nuclear tests sites. Again, none of these is a substitute for nuclear disarmament.

Mian Z. (1999:17) in his book, Beyond Lahore: from Transparency to Arms Control posited: There also steps that might be helpful at the level of nuclear diplomacy, education, policy and doctrine, for example: (1) Establish India-Pakistani nuclear risk reduction dialogues.

Such dialogues need to be completely separated from the Kashmir issue, a point of view that

Pakistan must be brought around to. Shared understandings are vital to underpin nuclear crisis

201 management by adversaries. There are interdependent expectations - I act in a manner that

depends on what I expect you to do, which in turn depends on what you think I plan to do. (2)

Commission nuclear weapons use and consequences studies. There is a need to increase

understanding among policy makers and the public of nuclear weapons effects through

commissioning public and private studies that will assess impacts of nuclear attacks made by the

other on city centers, military bases, nuclear reactors, dams, targets of economic value etc. This

will help in making clear the catastrophe that would be caused by a nuclear war and create

stronger restraints against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as removing the commonly held,

but false, belief that nuclear war is as an apocalypse after which neither country will exist. This

quintessential feature of nuclear war was best captured by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev

when he said that "In the event of a nuclear war, the living will envy the dead."

Mian (1976: 27-37) in Limited Nuclear War further suggested that it is important to arrive at a mutual understanding that it is not in either state's interest to target and destroy the leadership of the other and to keep nuclear weapons command centers from urban centers. Attacking political and military leadership with a view to destroying nuclear command and control is likely to be a strong incentive in early use of nuclear weapons. Given the likelihood of pre-delegation of authority to retaliate, it is most probable that such an attack will not succeed in preventing a return strike. Attacks on leadership also make it very difficult to negotiate and institute an early end to nuclear war after it has started (it might end only when all functional weapons have been used by both sides). Therefore, nuclear command centers should not only be far from civilian populations but also from nuclear weapons storage or deployment sites.

Sagan (1984:33) in Climatic Effects of Nuclear War also recommended the Declaration of a

policy of not targeting cities. In this sense, nothing can ever justify the deliberate targeting of a

202 civilian population, especially with a nuclear weapon. The population densities of the mega- cities of India and Pakistan ensure that any nuclear attack would lead to hundreds of thousands or even millions of immediate fatalities. It should be avoided at all costs.

Some Border Problems in Asia

South Asian trans-boundary issues are inextricably linked to regional geopolitics given that the main trans-national river systems that are circum-Himalayan and involve countries that are widely unequal in size and power and have been involved in wars in the last six decades. For instance, the main river systems, the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra are all connected to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. The Indus basin connects China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India while the Brahmaputra and the Ganga connect China, Bhutan, India, Nepal and

Bangladesh. India has been involved in military conflict with China and Pakistan and water related tensions with Pakistan and Bangladesh. In effect, India’s riparian policies affect four countries- Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh- as it concerns the Indus, the Ganga and the

Brahmaputra. China’s riparian policies affect nine countries to the south- Pakistan, Nepal, India,

Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam- in connection with, the Ganga, the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Salween and the Mekong. ( Salman and Oprety, 2002:37-61)

In a study carried out by The Economist in 2010, on ‘South Asian Territorial Disputes and

Claims’, it was reported that; disputed borders are both a cause and a symptom of tensions between big neighbours in South Asia. When the colonial power, Britain, withdrew from India it left a dangerous legacy of carelessly or arbitrarily drawn borders. Tensions between India and

China flare on occasion, especially along India's far north-eastern border, along the state of

Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years Chinese officials have taken to calling part of the same area

“South Tibet”, to Indian fury, as that seems to imply a Chinese claim to the territory. A failure to

203 agree the precise border, and then to demarcate it, ensures that future disagreements may flare again. Pakistan, too, is beset by difficult borders. Afghanistan, to the north, has long been a hostile neighbour. This is largely because Afghanistan refuses to recognise the frontier—known as the Durand line—between the countries, drawn by the British. Most contentious of all, however, are the borders in Kashmir, where Pakistan, India and China all have competing claims. By the time of independence, in 1947, it was clear that many Indian Muslims were determined to break off from Hindu-majority India. It fell to a British civil servant, who knew nothing of the region, to draw a line of partition between territory that would become Pakistan and India. Pakistan was given Muslim dominated areas in the far North West, plus territory in the east (which itself got independence as Bangladesh in 1971). The rulers of some disputed areas, notably Kashmir, were told to choose which country to join. While Kashmir's Hindu rulers prevaricated, hoping somehow to become an independent country, Pakistan's leaders decided to force the issue. Since Kashmir was (and is) a Muslim majority territory, Pakistan felt justified in seeing Pushtun warlords charge in from the north-west of Pakistan, late in 1947, to seize control of Kashmir. In response India, apparently invited by Kashmir's rulers, deployed its national army and stopped the invaders taking Srinagar, Kashmir's capital, located in the Kashmir valley, the most coveted part of the territory. The resulting line of control, by and large, remains the de- facto international frontier within Kashmir and, in effect, is accepted by Paksitan and India.

Huge numbers of Indian and Pakistani soldiers remain in Kashmir today as both countries profess to be the rightful authority for the rest of Kashmir. Complicating matters, China has also extended its influence, and control, over portions of Kashmir, largely with the support of

Pakistan, an ally. In 1839, the British Empire sought to expand the borders of its colony of

British India, by launching a war of conquest against the neighboring Pashtuns. The Pashtuns, as

204 a fiercely independent tribal warrior people, resisted ferociously, so that the British conquest of them was not successful. The British were only able to conquer part of the Pashtun territory, and even that remained in constant rebellion against them. Meanwhile, the remaining unconquered portion of Pashtun territory became the nucleus for the formation of Afghanistan. In 1893, the

British imposed a ceasefire line on the Afghans called the Durand Line, which separated British- controlled territory from Afghan territory. The local people on the ground however never recognized this line, which merely existed on a map, and not on the ground.

In 1947, when the colony of British India achieved independence and was simultaneously partitioned into Pakistan and India, the Pakistanis wanted the conquered Pashtun territory to go to them, since the Pashtuns were Muslims. Given that the Pashtuns never recognized British authority over them to begin with, the Pakistanis had tenuous relations with the Pashtuns and were consumed by fears of Pashtun secession. When Pakistan applied to join the UN in 1947, there was only one country which voted against it. No, it wasn't India - it was Pashtun-ruled

Afghanistan which voted against Pakistan's admission, on the grounds that Pakistan was in illegal occupation of Pashtun lands stolen by the British. Their vote was cast on September 30,

1947 and is a fact. In 1948, in the nearby state of Kashmir, its Hindu princely ruler and Muslim political leader joined hands in deciding to make Kashmir an independent country rather than joining either Pakistan or India. Pakistan's leadership were immediately terrified of this precedent, fearing that the Pashtuns would soon follow suit and also declare their own ethnically independent state. In order to pre-empt that and prevent it from happening, Pakistan's founder and leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah quickly decided to raise the cry of "Hindu treachery against the Muslims" and despatched hordes of armed Pashtun tribesmen to attack Kashmir. This was his way of distracting the Pashtuns from their own ethnic nationalism by diverting them into war

205 against Kashmir "to save Islam". These are the same Pashtun tribesman whose descendants are today's Taliban. Fleeing the unprovoked invasion of their homeland, Kashmir's Hindu prince and

Muslim political leader went to India, pledging to merge with it if India would help repel the invasion. India agreed, and sent its army to repel the Pashtun invasion. Pakistan then sent its army to clash with Indian forces, and the result was Indo-Pakistani conflict, which has lasted for decades.

Pakistan's fear of Pashtun nationalism and separatism, which it fears can break up

Pakistan, is thus the root of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and also the root of Pak conflict with Afghanistan, not any alleged Indian takeover of Kabul. This is all due to the legacy of 1839, which happened long before Pakistan was even created. When a communist revolution happened in Kabul in the late 70s, Pakistan's fear of potential spillover effects on Pashtun nationalism caused Pakistan to embark on fomenting a guerrilla war against Kabul that led to

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Aligned with the USA, Pakistan then proceeded to arm the

Pashtuns while indoctrinating them with Islamic fanaticism. The USA was not allowed any ground role, and was told it could only supply arms and funds to Pakistan, which would take care of the rest. Pakistan then simultaneously embarked on destabilization of India by fomenting insurgency there.

After the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan again feared that the well-armed Pashtuns would turn on it and pursue secession. So Pakistan then created the Taliban as a new umbrella movement for the fractious factional guerrilla groups under an ultra-fundamentalist ideology. Bin Laden's

AlQaeda then became cosy with Taliban, and the result was 9-11. When the 9-11 attacks occurred, the cornered Pakistanis then did a 180 and promised to help the US defeat the Taliban and bring the terrorists to justice. Meanwhile they were racking their brains hoping to come up

206 with a way to undermine the War on Terror from within. Now that they have succeeded in doing that, and in bleeding US/NATO forces, they hope to jump horses by kicking the US out and aligning with China. Because of Pakistan's attempts to illegitimately hang onto Pashtun land, it has brought itself into conflicts with so many countries - first against its neighbors and then against more distant larger powers. This is the reason why Pakistan is an irredentist state and can never be an ally against Islamic extremism, because Pakistan depends on this very Islamism as a national glue to hold itself together, and keep nationalistic ethnic groups like the Pashtuns from breaking Pakistan apart. At the same time, Pakistanis don't dare own up to the Pashtun national question at any level, nor its effect on their national policies, because any attempt to do so would open up the legitimacy of their claim to Pashtun land.

Sovereignty is a two-way street, entailing not just rights but obligations. Pakistan only wishes to assert rights owing to it from sovereignty, and wishes to completely duck the issue of any sovereign obligations to apprehend terrorists on what it claims as its own territory. This is because the fundamental reality is that the Pashtun territory is not really theirs, is not really under their control, and the Pashtuns don't really recognize Pakistani central authority over them.

Pakistan uses Islamic fundamentalism to submerge traditional Pashtun ethnic identity in a desperate attempt to suppress Pashtun ethnic nationalism, and to stave off the disintegration of

Pakistan. The Pashtuns are a numerically large enough ethnic group possessing the strength of arms to be able to secede from Pakistan at any moment, should they decide upon it. The answer is to let the separatists have their way and achieve their independent ethnic states, breaking up

Pakistan. It's better to allow Pakistan to naturally break up into 3 or 4 benign ethnic states, than for it to keep promoting Islamic fundamentalist extremism in a doomed attempt to hold itself together. Pakistan is a failing state, and it's better to let it fail and fall apart. This will help to end

207 all conflict in the region and the trans-national terrorist problem. An independent ethnic Pashtun state will be dominated by Pashtun ethnic identity instead of fundamentalist Islam, and thus

AlQaeda will no longer be able to find sanctuary there. Conventional ethnic identity is far more natural and benign than trans-nationalist Islamism with its inherent collectivist political bent.

Supporting the re-emergence of 4 natural ethnic states - Pashtunistan, Balochistan, Sindh and

Punjab - would be far better than continuing to support a dangerous and dysfunctional failed state like Pakistan which continues to spew toxic Islamist extremist ideology in a doomed attempt to hold itself together.

Following the failure of the Vietnam War, many Americans later recognized that war was really a war of ethnic reunification by the Vietnamese people. It wasn't a case of one foreign country attempting to conquer another foreign country - indeed, the north and south Vietnamese were not strangers or aliens to one another - they were 2 halves of a common whole. The question was whether they would reunify under communist socialism or under free democracy, but because a blinkered American leadership refused to recognize the Vietnamese grassroots affinity for one another and their desire to reunify, it pretty much ensured that Vietnamese reunification would take place under communist socialism.

Likewise, the Pashtun people live on both sides of an artificial Durand Line (Afghan-Pak border) which they themselves have never accepted or recognized. It's a question of whether they will politically reunify under close-minded theocratic Islamism or under a more secular and tolerant society. Because today's blinkered American leadership is again blindly defending another artificial line on a map, and refusing to recognize the oneness of the people living on both sides of that artificial line, America is again shutting itself out of the reunification process, guaranteeing that Pashtun reunification will occur under fanatical fundamentalist Islamism as

208 prescribed by Pakistan (much as Hanoi's Soviet backers prescribed reunification under communist socialism.) It's only later on, much after America's defeat, that some Americans will realize too late that they should have seen that the Pashtuns on both sides of the artificial line were actually one people. Pakistan knows it all too well, because they've been living with the guilt and fear of it ever since Pakistan's creation - but that's why they're hell-bent on herding the

Pashtuns down the path of Islamist fanaticism, using Islamist glue to keep the Pashtuns as a whole hugged to Pakistan's bosom. Pakistan is rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal, as it moves to surpass Britain to become the world's 5th-largest nuclear state. The Pakistanis are racing to build up as much hard-power as possible to back up the soft-power they feel Islamist hate- ideology gives them.

Strategies for Global Arms control/ Nuclear Disarmament

George Bunn, the first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, helped negotiate the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and later became U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference elaborates that, Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or non-state actors, poses one of the greatest threats to international security today. Iran's apparent efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, what amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network all underscore the far-from- remote possibility that a terrorist group or a so-called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass destruction or materials for a dirty bomb. The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective response must also be multilateral. Nine states (China, France, India, Israel, North

Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are known or believed to have nuclear weapons, and more than thirty others (including Japan, Germany, and South Korea) have the technological ability to quickly acquire them. Amid volatile energy costs, the

209 accompanying push to expand nuclear energy, growing concerns about the environmental impact of fossil fuels, and the continued diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, access to dual- use technologies seems destined to grow.

In the background, a nascent global consensus regarding the need for substantial nuclear arms reductions, if not complete nuclear disarmament, has increasingly taken shape. In April 2009, for instance, U.S. President, Barack Obama reignited global nonproliferation efforts through a landmark speech in Prague. Subsequently, in September of the same year, the UN Security

Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1887, which called for accelerated efforts toward total nuclear disarmament. In December 2011, the number of states who have ratified the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty increased to 157, heightening appeals to countries such as the

United States, Israel, and Iran to follow suit. Overall, the existing global nonproliferation regime is a highly developed example of international law. Yet, despite some notable successes, existing multilateral institutions have failed to prevent states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea from ‘going nuclear,’ and seem equally ill-equipped to check Iran as well as potential threats from non-state terrorist groups.

The current framework must be updated and reinforced if it is to effectively address today's proliferation threats, let alone pave the way for the "peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". International instruments for combating nuclear proliferation were largely successful before 1991, but are proving unable to meet today's challenges. Although three states

(India, Israel, and Pakistan) are known or believed to have acquired nuclear weapons during the

Cold War, for five decades following the development of nuclear technology, only nine states have developed—and since 1945 none has used—nuclear weapons. However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation since the early 1990s—Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North

210 Korea, Libya, or Syria—was deterred or reversed by the multilateral institutions created for this purpose. The continued advancement of Iran's nuclear program—despite the implementation of crosscutting economic sanctions and near universal global condemnation—has elicited serious concerns from states including Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, recent nonproliferation success stories, such as Libya's abandoning its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet successor states except Russia to the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states, have been the result of direct government-to- government negotiations and pressure rather than action by global bodies.

In dealing with today's proliferation challenges, international organizations work in tandem with ad hoc forums of interested parties, such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea, the P5 grouping on Iran, and the most recent development of biannual global nuclear security summits.

But such forums have often proven inadequate to arrest the spread of nuclear technology, and states such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear capability, if e no not outright weaponization. Given these trends, rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime are no surprise.

Fifty years ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his “Atoms for Peace” address to the

UN General Assembly. He proposed to share nuclear materials and information for peaceful purposes with other countries through a new international agency. That speech led to negotiations which, several years later, created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA today has the dual responsibility of helping countries that do not have nuclear weapons to engage in peaceful nuclear programs while ensuring that they do not make nuclear weapons. In the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA gained authority for policing the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure that those without nuclear weapons

211 did not acquire them. Today, the NPT is a worldwide treaty that bans all members except the

United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States from having nuclear weapons and commits those five states to eventually eliminating their atomic arsenals. The treaty provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. The 187 states that subscribe to the NPT include all significant states of concern with the exception of India, Israel, Pakistan, and—arguably—North Korea. According to Ambassador Robert T. Grey, a former U.S. arms control negotiator, the NPT is “in many ways an agreement as important as the UN Charter itself.” Yet, many believe that the NPT regime is battered and in need of strengthening.

The NPT has in fact suffered major blows. Since 1991, uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and other possibly weapons-related activities that Iraq, North Korea, and Iran hid from IAEA inspectors have been discovered. Iraq’s weapons program was found after the 1991

Persian Gulf War thanks to UN Security Council orders demanding more intrusive inspections than were then required by IAEA inspection standards. North Korea’s weapons program later became known through intelligence, IAEA inspections, and North Korea’s own admissions. The

IAEA’s discovery of Iran’s failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to inspectors has recently led to a standoff with Tehran. Historically, the

IAEA has rarely demanded inspections beyond the perimeter of reactors or related nuclear sites that had been declared open for inspection by the countries where they were located. Further, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation does not violate the NPT if done for peaceful purposes under IAEA inspection. In fact, a number of more developed countries (e.g., Japan) conduct such activities. In the three countries where uranium enrichment or plutonium separation was thought to have been conducted for weapons purposes—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—the

212 activities had taken place largely at locations not declared open for inspection to the IAEA.

Moreover, that North Korea and Iran both obtained enrichment technology from Pakistan suggests dangers to the NPT regime from nonparties that are not bound by the treaty’s prohibition against assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons. The back- to-back nuclear tests by New Delhi and Islamabad in 1998 illustrate the dangers that an arms race in South Asia can have and suggest the temptation that such tests could encourage current non-nuclear-weapon parties to withdraw from the treaty in order to follow suit.

At the same time, the United States has not complied with some of its own NPT-created obligations. For example, in 1995 the United States won the agreement of the non-nuclear- weapon NPT states-parties to extend the NPT indefinitely by promising to negotiate a

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty was duly negotiated and signed by

President Bill Clinton in 1996, but the Senate failed to ratify it in 1999. The Bush administration now opposes the CTBT, and the Senate is unlikely to consider it again, at least before the next election. That reflects a broader tendency by this Bush administration to downgrade treaties and regimes and to upgrade unilateral efforts, such as the pre-emptive use of force against Iraq, to enforce compliance with nonproliferation.

In addition, the Bush administration has undertaken efforts to create new types of nuclear weapons that might well require new testing. Thus, while pushing other countries to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to be relying ever more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense. This double standard constitutes another threat to the NPT regime. These points are all relevant to the status of the NPT today and will be explained in more detail below or in other articles in this issue.

213 Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech came after the failure of earlier U.S. nonproliferation efforts. At the end of World War II, when the United States had the only nuclear weapons in the world, President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal if other countries would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and would permit inspections to verify that agreement. The “Baruch Plan” of the Truman administration would have given an agency under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council a monopoly over research on how to make nuclear explosives and the power, free of veto and backed up by military force if necessary, to conduct inspections in other countries to make sure they were not making nuclear weapons. The United States, however, would not surrender its weapons to the agency until inspectors were on duty in the Soviet Union and in other countries with nuclear potential. The

Soviet Union rejected this approach; it was already seeking its own nuclear weapons. Skeptical about the Baruch Plan being debated at the United Nations, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946

Atomic Energy Act with provisions designed to keep nuclear technology secret from other countries. (Elbaradei, M., 2003:47; Drell, S. 2003:3; Bunn, G., 1992:59-72).

By contrast, Eisenhower proposed providing assistance to other countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of his proposal, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was amended to authorize nuclear assistance to others, and the IAEA was created to provide both assistance and inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, followed by the Soviet Union,

France, and others, began providing research reactors that used weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (though usually in lesser amounts than needed for a weapon) to non-nuclear-weapon states around the world. These transfers and the training that accompanied the reactors helped scientists in many countries learn about nuclear fission and its potential uses.

As these scientists moved up the nuclear learning curve, global support increased for controlling

214 the spread of the new technology in order to prevent its use for weapons. Soon, debate about nonproliferation in the UN General Assembly produced a 1961 consensus Irish resolution saying that countries already having nuclear weapons would “undertake to refrain from relinquishing control” of them to others and would refrain “from transmitting information for their manufacture to States not possessing” them. Countries without nuclear weapons would agree not to receive or manufacture them. These ideas were the basis for the NPT.(Weiss, L., 2003:34-37)

The United States submitted a simple draft treaty based on this resolution to the Soviet

Union when a new 18-nation Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva in 1962. The Soviet response was to insist on a treaty that would prohibit the arrangements that the United States then had with NATO allies such as West Germany for deployment, in their countries, of U.S. nuclear weapons under the control of U.S. soldiers—weapons to be used to protect these countries, if necessary, in the event of an attack on them by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet proposal and U.S. plans for a “multilateral force” of naval vessels with nuclear weapons— vessels manned by sailors from participating NATO countries and under NATO command— became major obstacles to agreement. By then, the multilateral force plan was strongly supported only by West Germany.

However, for the United States to agree that an NPT should prohibit U.S. allies not having nuclear weapons from joining in control of U.S. nuclear weapons in peacetime required meetings with President Lyndon Johnson at Camp David, further negotiations with Soviet representatives, recommendations to the president from an important committee of distinguished advisers, lengthy discussions with West Germany and other allies, a congressional resolution urging negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, and bureaucratic maneuvering to gain Johnson’s approval for proposed treaty language. In the compromise, the United States gave up on the

215 multilateral force; the Soviets gave up on a prohibition against U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and other allied countries), provided the weapons remained under sole control of U.S. personnel. The non-nuclear-weapon states were asked to accept draft language which prohibited them from having nuclear weapons and which called for the IAEA to be permitted to carry out inspections to guarantee that their nuclear programs were limited to peaceful uses. In addition, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed to provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to conduct future negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

Negotiations then began for gaining acceptance of these provisions by important non- nuclear-weapon governments and their parliaments and for prescribing the inspections that would be conducted by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT. India, which had participated actively in the NPT negotiations as a country without nuclear weapons, refused to join. It wanted to retain the option to produce its own nuclear weapons as its then-adversary, China, already had.

Pakistan, another adversary of India, refused to join because India would not. Israel, which the

United States had tried to restrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in separate negotiations during the 1960s, also refused to join. China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations but had acquired nuclear weapons before its negotiation was completed. The NPT draft permitted them to join the treaty with the same rights and duties as the other nuclear- weapon states—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. They did so later.

States began signing the treaty in 1968, and it went into force in 1970. However, the negotiations at the IAEA among parties and potential parties on the scope of inspections for non-nuclear- weapon parties continued for several years. Many countries, including West European allies of

216 the United States, did not ratify the treaty until these negotiations were completed to their satisfaction. (Seaborg, G.T., 1987:305).

There were also further negotiations every five years at NPT review conferences. These dealt with implementation of treaty provisions such as those promising assistance to non-nuclear- weapon states for peaceful uses and calling for reductions of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament. At an important conference in 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely from its initial 25-year term. The 1995 decision and the review conference of 2000 focused particular attention on the NPT-related promises of the nuclear-weapon states to “cease the nuclear arms race” including stopping nuclear testing, negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons, and eventually achieving nuclear disarmament. Even as the legal regime was expanded by these agreements, the NPT came under strain elsewhere. One of the most significant blows was Iraq’s demonstrated ability to hide its nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the

Gulf War. With inspection authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that war—authority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification standards had given the

IAEA—inspectors found previously hidden Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons and even an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched research-reactor uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet Union.( Cirincion, J.W. 2002: 271-275).

These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEA’s NPT inspection authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA parties who negotiated the 1997 model for this protocol did not agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept the model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards. It is now up to each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards agreement pursuant to the model. As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards agreements; only 37, or about 20

217 percent, had given final approval to them through parliamentary or other ratification. Even the

United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States rejects an important one—the CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing—and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself. After the experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques to deal with other problem states such as North Korea. Some evidence was produced by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s using a new technique called “environmental monitoring”—testing for small traces of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or vegetation in areas within or surrounding a nuclear site, or in streams or rivers nearby. This is explicitly authorized in the

1997 Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors that a country has declared open for Inspection.

Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites encouraged the IAEA to press

North Korea for broader inspections in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused. A stalemate between North Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations between the United

States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle a reactor whose spent fuel rods had apparently been used by North

Korea to produce plutonium. Pyongyang was also asked to provide information about its past activities. These steps were to be in exchange for the construction of new, more proliferation- resistant nuclear reactors from South Korea and Japan, as well as interim supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States. However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities at other sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003, North Korea and

218 the United States each concluded that the 1994 agreement was not to their liking, and North

Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT.

Discovery of Iran’s failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered concern since last year. Using environmental monitoring and other techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that Iran permitted them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items, including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used for enriching uranium in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uranium—none of which Iran had reported to the IAEA. In negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to sign an additional protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside its uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though the IAEA director-general’s report shows that Iran had not disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-enrichment efforts or an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making weapons—to the consternation of officials in the United States. The IAEA Board of Governors then adopted, with U.S. support, a decision to order continued inspections in Iran for clandestine activities. (Schaffer, B., 2003: 7)

The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not to permit such efforts even if subject to IAEA inspection. The concern is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it might then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium to make weapons. The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants of non-nuclear-weapon states be placed under multilateral ownership and control so that the co-owners from the different

219 countries could check on each other. However, Japan; some western European non-nuclear- weapon countries; and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and a few others, as well as all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities.

Should these all now be subject to a rule requiring multilateral ownership and oversight? Would limiting the requirement to non-nuclear-weapon countries be regarded as adding further insult to the NPT’s existing discrimination in favor of nuclear-weapon states? IAEA Director-General

Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled in the future, with each country involved being urged to check on what its partner countries are doing to make sure that the enriched uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons purposes. (Broad, W.J.,

2003:3)

The Bush administration has pressed hard on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to restrain them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it has done so sometimes in unilateral or domineering ways that seem inconsistent with a multilateral regime like that of the NPT. The American-led, counter-proliferation-justified, preventive-war invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the United States waged without UN Security Council authorization is a recent example. At the time, the invasion was said to be necessary to prevent Iraq from again acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or long-range missiles. It took place even though Security Council-authorized inspections, consistent with the NPT, were going on in Iraq to look for these weapons. It resulted in UN inspectors being withdrawn from Iraq for their own safety. U.S inspectors have subsequently found little evidence of ongoing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons programs but the decision reflected Bush’s tendency to downgrade treaties and international efforts in favor of more proactive proliferation efforts.”(Ellis, J.D., 2003: 116-117)

220 Problems of this sort occurred with Article VI of the NPT, agreed to in the original treaty negotiations in order to gain the support for the treaty of non-nuclear-weapon states. In that provision, the United States and the other recognized nuclear-weapon states promised to negotiate nuclear-weapon reductions with the goal of nuclear disarmament. Then, to gain the votes of these parties for extension of the NPT in 1995, the United States agreed to pursue progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. At the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration made similar commitments. It also promised to implement START II (negotiated in the prior Bush administration) and to conclude START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.

These promises were shredded when the present Bush administration withdrew from the ABM

Treaty. The withdrawal nullified START II because the Russian Duma had conditioned its approval vote for START II on a continuation of the ABM Treaty. The substitute for START II negotiated with Russia by President George W. Bush, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, required withdrawal of warheads from many long-range missiles on each side to the end that, by 2012, no more than 2,200 warheads would be deployed on either side. (Pullinger, S.

2003:5)

The treaty, however, does not require the warheads to be destroyed, calls for no inspections, has a more permissive withdrawal clause than in START II, and contains no stated plan for a subsequent treaty such as START III that would require further reductions. Does this satisfy the NPT commitment to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament? ElBaradei has suggested that the United States may be employing a double standard by not actually cutting its own arsenal of nuclear weapons (as distinct from its missiles) while attempting to restrain other

221 countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon

NPT parties to the treaty’s extension in 1995, the United States also made promises in connection with a UN Security Council resolution calling for what are called negative security assurances, which for the United States was a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non- nuclear-weapon NPT parties unless they attack the United States while in alliance with another nuclear-weapon state. Yet, in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 and its National Strategy on

Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002, the Bush administration made clear that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT party that threatened the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies whether or not this NPT party was allied with a nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the United States watered down another promise that was important to gaining the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties for renewal of the NPT in 1995. Whether all these problems will produce further withdrawals from the NPT is, of course, unknown, but they might be used as excuses for withdrawal by any who want to do so.( Bunn, G., 1997: 1)

The NPT Accomplishments

The NPT nonproliferation norm, the long-term efforts of the United States and others to gain acceptance of it, and the international inspections the NPT produced deserve significant credit for the fact that the world does not now have 30 or more countries with nuclear weapons.

In 1963 the Department of Defense looked at the motivations of the “nuclear-capable” countries at the time and estimated for Kennedy that perhaps 10 more of them could have nuclear weapons and suitable delivery vehicles in less than a decade if nothing was done to prevent such a scenario from unfolding; they were the remaining major industrialized Group of Seven allies of

222 the United States plus China, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Poland, and Sweden. Thus, based on the 1963 list, 14 or more countries could have had nuclear weapons by the early 1970s. The

Defense Department’s list did not include Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, or Taiwan, which all had scientists who were then considering or would soon consider how to build nuclear weapons. It did not include South Africa, which later built several nuclear weapons, then gave them up and, like the others, joined the NPT. It did not include any republics of the Soviet

Union. Three republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—had Soviet weapons on their territory when the Soviet Union collapsed and gave them up to join the NPT after negotiations with Russia and the United States supplied them with financial incentives and promises not to attack them with nuclear weapons. Without the NPT norm, these countries would probably not have given their inherited weapons up. The Pentagon list did not include Argentina and Brazil, which later began nuclear weapons programs but then negotiated a bilateral agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and joined the NPT—turning rivalry into cooperation in response to the norm of the NPT and of a Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone agreement. (Reiss, M.,

1995: 1-5)

North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq began later and were not on the Pentagon’s 1963 list either. If there had been no NPT, if all these countries plus the ones on the list acquired nuclear weapons, the total would have been at least 28 by now. Some neighbors and rivals would then probably have been motivated to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. What would the total have become? More than 30 countries with nuclear weapons? Today, we have nine counting North

Korea but not Iran. The single most important factor in producing this success has been the nonprliferation norm established by the NPT and the incentives for remaining non-nuclear that the NPT helped initiate. The next most important factor has probably been leadership,

223 cooperative efforts, and financial assistance in some cases from the United States working with many other NPT parties. Given the more difficult nonproliferation and security challenges of today, it is vital that U.S. leadership be used to strengthen, not to weaken or abandon, the nuclear nonproliferation regime. But nonproliferation as an international issue has recently benefited from revived attention. The United States and Russia signed a legally binding replacement agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009.

New START entered into force in February 2011.

Recently, President Obama has made nuclear issues a centerpiece of his international agenda, convening a high-level Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, dedicating serious political effort to strengthen the NPT at the NPT Review in May 2010, and building consensus in the UN Security Council and elsewhere for new economic sanctions targeting Iran. The Obama administration has also pledged to win U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense doctrine. Recently, it initiated discussions with the Pentagon about potential deep cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Yet even with these renewed efforts, major challenges and threats remain, namely with regard to Iran and North Korea.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the core component of the global nonproliferation regime, and establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework based on three principles: (1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967—a year before the treaty opened for signature—agree not to acquire them; (2) the five states known to have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967—the nuclear weapon states (NWS)—agree to not assist other states in acquiring them and to move toward eventual disarmament; and (3) the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology and energy development.

224 Moreover, two important elements of the nonproliferation regime have never come into effect, largely because of resistance by the United States and other nuclear weapon states. The

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 has been signed by 183 countries but cannot enter into force until all forty-four states with significant military or civilian nuclear capacity ratify it. China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet done so.

Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of weapons- grade material have also stalled. The United States has been criticized for blocking progress on both issues, but the Obama administration has signaled that it will move to again ask the Senate's advice and consent on ratification of the CTBT (the body rejected the treaty in 1999) and to revive negotiations on an FMCT with verification measures.

Preventing proliferation by state actors

George Bunn further reported that despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states.

In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. The IAEA did, however, refer Syria to the UNSC in

June 2011 due to an absence of confidence that Syria's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT violations. In

225 2010, the IAEA's inspections budget was approximately $164 million. Not surprisingly, even discounting nuclear facilities the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in Iran and North

Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from installations under IAEA safeguards, namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the adoption of IAEA

Additional Protocols, which strengthen the agency's inspections mandate and is in force in 115 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and, as of 2009, India.

Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet to agree to the toughened inspections regime. A review of the NPT in 2010 failed to reach consensus on U.S. efforts to make the additional protocols mandatory.

Interdicting Illicit Nuclear Transfers

In addition to legal frameworks, several multilateral initiatives have been created in recent years to improve international coordination In preventing nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), launched in 2006, seeks to coordinate international efforts to detect, investigate, and respond to proliferation by non-state actors. Alongside the efforts of the GICNT, many countries are developing a comprehensive detection mechanism to monitor trafficking in nuclear material and related financial transactions. The U.S.-led

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), established in 2003, today involves more than ninety-eight countries in developing the best practices, joint training exercises, and information-sharing activities to improve multilateral interdiction efforts.

Although often cited as a flexible approach to coordinating the international response to proliferation, PSI does not grant any legal authority for ship-boarding or interdiction beyond the

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty and various bilateral agreements. India and China,

226 which do not participate in PSI, have questioned the legality of its interdictions. PSI also cannot interdict ships of nonmember states unless master consents to being boarded are allowed, such as

Iran and Pakistan. Whether the 2003 interdiction of a ship supplying nuclear materials to Libya was the direct result of PSI activities, for example, is still disputed.

Analysts have also criticized the PSI for being a club of developed economies and not addressing the problem of increasing independence among a growing number of developing countries and nonstate actors from the controls enacted by the traditional supporters of the nuclear establishment. Others have pointed out that the initiative is limited by having neither an independent budget nor coordinating mechanisms, and does not provide a legal framework in which to lock in long-term, verifiable, and irreversible member state commitments. However, as a sign that progress may be forthcoming, the United and States and China jointly installed a nuclear radiation detection system at the Yangshan port in Shanghai in December 2011. Two years earlier, the U.S. Navy was also able to successfully pressure a North Korean vessel— which many suspected to be carrying illicit nuclear weapons materials destined for Myanmar—to return to port by tailing the ship in open waters.

Possibly the most successful element of the nonproliferation regime has been the effort to secure so-called loose nukes and fissile material throughout the former Soviet Union. This is critical given that some 135 nuclear facilities worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel— enough HEU to create some 400 nuclear weapons. If terrorist or criminal groups were able to buy or steal even a small portion of this material, they could use it to construct a crude nuclear weapon or bomb.

The United States and Russia have led this effort since 1991. By 2011, some 92 percent of sites in the former Soviet Union with weapons-usable nuclear material had been secured. U.S.-

227 funded efforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Global Threat Reduction

Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism have been complemented by other multilateral initiatives, such as the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of

WMD, which has provided funding and technical assistance to secure nuclear facilities, repatriate fissile material to origin countries, and promote international cooperation to counter In late 2011, the importance of securing nuclear material came into focus again following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime in Libya. In September 2011, ten thousand drums of uranium yellowcake were discovered in a Libyan warehouse, virtually unguarded, although a UN official claimed the material was only "slightly" radioactive and did not pose an immediate threat.

The Obama administration brought additional attention to this issue, pledging to secure all vulnerable nuclear weapons materials by 2014 and convening a high-level global nuclear security summits in 2010 and 2012. The 2010 summit yielded tangible results, with Ukraine announcing that it would get rid of all its Soviet-era highly enriched uranium, and five other countries stating intentions to convert their research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium, which is less dangerous. The next global nuclear security summit is planned for 2014 and will take place in the Netherlands. A related concern, ranging from pioneering nuclear powers like the United States to more recent powers like Pakistan, is the security of nuclear arsenals, specifically regarding safeguarding warheads from accidents, theft, or unauthorized use.

The security of Pakistan's arsenal is a serious concern, especially for the United States.

Reports have emerged that nuclear warheads are often transported on normal roads with little to no protection. While Pakistan has always countered that its arsenal is secure, some U.S. officials have voiced concern about the possibility of one of Pakistan's weapons falling into the hands of

228 terrorists. Similarly, there have been repeated safety issues related to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In

2007 and 2008, two nuclear safety incidents prompted Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates to institute high-level leadership shifts within the U.S. military. In November 2011 a damaged component of an unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile prompted a partial evacuation and emergency response at a U.S. Air Force base in North Dakota. In July 2012, activists broke into the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. It would later come to light that security weaknesses had been discovered at the facility two years previously. These incidents demonstrate that ensuring the safety and security of nuclear arsenal remains a serious and important issue—even for countries with decades of experience with nuclear weapons. Other than safety risks commonly linked with the development of civilian nuclear programs, other countries may also fear that such programs will be used in the future to develop nuclear weapons. The latter concern is most commonly discussed in reference to Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons—regardless of that country's repeated assertions that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes—and how such a development could affect regional security dynamics in the Middle East.

Disarmament

The five recognized nuclear weapon states have committed under the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue in good faith nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The NPT does not specify an end-date for achieving disarmament. Although almost everyone believes that complete disarmament or even nuclear disarmament remains a distant goal, the record of NWS on pursuing nuclear disarmament is mixed. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for agreement from the nonnuclear weapon states to extend the treaty indefinitely, the United States and other nuclear powers

229 reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament. But despite major cuts in the numbers of

U.S. and Russian operationally deployed nuclear warheads, both countries still retain massive stockpiles that account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Many NNWS have repeatedly called for the NWS to make even deeper reductions in their arsenals and argued that the NWS foot-dragging is undermining the legitimacy of the NPT. This perceived failure to make progress toward disarmament has been one factor in the unwillingness of many UN members to support sanctions against Iran for NPT violations, which many developing countries see as a justifiable—even admirable—response to the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states. In

2010, the U.S. government revealed it had 5,113 warheads in its nuclear arsenal. Recently, the

NWS have recommitted themselves to reductions in nuclear arms, particularly in the New

START Treaty and the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Past Developments

November 2013: Breakthrough in Iran talks

On November 24, 2013, the United States and the rest of the P5+1 struck the first meaningful deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program in over a decade. In return for limited and reversible sanctions relief, Iran agreed to halt its nuclear program for a period of six months. Though the agreement does not provide a long-term solution to concerns about Iranian nuclear aspirations, it lays the groundwork for further negotiations. As of January 20, 2014, the IAEA and the United

States verified that Iran had fulfilled its initial commitments under the joint plan of action.

June 2013: Nuclear states defying NPT

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's latest yearbook has suggested that all five recognized nuclear states are either deploying new nuclear weapons or delivery systems for

230 nuclear systems or plan to do so. The report contends that these states "appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely." Such a development would violate the terms of the nonproliferation treaty which states that recognized nuclear states work toward disarmament.

April 2013: Egypt walks out of nuclear meetings

On April 30, Egypt walked out of the Geneva preparatory meeting for the 2015 Review

Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The

Egyptian foreign minister for international organizations explained that the delegation's walkout from the talks stemmed from Egypt's frustration at a lack of progress toward a nuclear-free zone encompassing the Middle East. The creation of such a zone was not on the agenda for the current round of global nuclear talks.

April 2013: Chinese pledge for nuclear-free North Korea

During his visit to China, Secretary of State John Kerry said that China had agreed to help North

Korea demobilize its nuclear arsenal by peaceful means. It is hoped that China, as North Korea's primary trading partner and financier, has the leverage to mitigate the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Pyongyang that has increased fears of military operations on the peninsula.

February 2013: Third North Korea test blast

North Korea conducted a controversial nuclear test on Monday, February 11, the country's third since 2006. North Korean officials claimed the country has successfully miniaturized its nuclear technology, a crucial step in developing long-range missile capabilities, but details of the test remain murky. The United States announced that Washington would push for stricter sanctions in the wake of the most recent test, which has been condemned by South Korea and Russia, among others. Even China, North Korea's closest ally for decades, strongly criticized the test—

231 Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi announced that China was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed" to North Korea's most recent provocation. Its subsequent threats against the

United States and South Korea, combined with its scrapping of a Korean War armistice, have led to widespread condemnation from the United Nations, European Union, and other states.

December 2013: U.S.-Russian disposal program ends

In 1994, the United States and Russia struck a deal to dispose of large stockpiles of Soviet highly enriched uranium (HEU). Over twenty years, Russia converted five hundred metric tons of HEU

(enough bomb-grade uranium for 20,000 warheads) into low-enriched uranium (LEU) that the

United States purchased. The United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase

Agreement, commonly known as the Megatons to Megawatts program, ended with the last shipment of LEU reaching the United States on December 11, 2013.

United States-India Nuclear Agreement

On 18 July 2005, US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached agreement on a plan for civilian nuclear energy and outer space cooperation. The deal, if approved by the US Congress, Indian Parliament, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would lift the US moratorium on nuclear trade with India, provide US assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program, and facilitate opportunities for bilateral space activities.

Nuclear cooperation

Under the proposed deal, India would separate its military and civilian nuclear reactors, and place many—but not all—of its civilian nuclear reactors under International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Military facilities, and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now, will not be subject to inspections or safeguards. Meanwhile, the US will be

232 allowed to build nuclear reactors in India, and provide India with nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors.

In December 2006, US Congress approved legislation changing US law to allow US exports of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India for the first time in 30 years. The approval was granted, however, with the conditions that the US and India conclude a formal nuclear cooperation agreement, that India and the IAEA conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement, and that the deal is approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In July 2007, an operating agreement adopted by Bush and Singh, known as the 123 agreement, sought allowances for India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under IAEA safeguards. Under this agreement, the US would also support the creation of an “Indian strategic fuel reserve” and allow India access to the international fuel market. These measures still have to be approved by Congress.

Space cooperation: The deal would create closer ties between the US and India in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such as the US-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation. For example, in

May 2006, the US and India signed an agreement to fly two US instruments on India's unmanned mission to orbit the moon, scheduled for 2008.

Foreseen Problems

(1)The deal increases India's ability to produce nuclear weapons

The supply of US nuclear fuel to India, under the deal as it is currently structured, would allow

India to divert more of its own uranium resources to significantly expand production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The agreement does not call for any additional measures that would constrain India's fissile material or nuclear weapon production, and does not call upon

India to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would prohibit India from

233 resuming nuclear weapon testing. Under the current proposal, India has pledged only to accept safeguards over civilian nuclear facilities of its choosing. This could allow India to exclude nuclear facilities and fuel for nuclear weapons from international safeguards. In addition, the safeguards would only apply to facilities and material manufactured once the deal is accepted— they will not cover the fissile material produced by India since its nuclear programme began in

1948. Furthermore, if India has access to the international fuel market (as it would through the

123 agreement), it would be protected against the US revoking its supply of nuclear fuel if India resumes nuclear weapon testing.

India already has about 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium, sufficient for roughly

100 nuclear warheads. It also has a stock of about 11.5 tons of reactor grade plutonium produced in the spent fuel of its power reactors. Under the terms of the deal, this stock of plutonium, too, would be kept out of safeguards. India would also keep out of safeguards its Prototype Fast

Breeder Reactor, which is scheduled to start in 2010. It is to be fueled with reactor-grade plutonium and will produce weapons grade plutonium. This would result in a roughly four-fold increase in India's current weapons plutonium production rate. By substituting imports for domestic uranium and expanding existing uranium recycling efforts, India also might be able to produce up to 200 kg a year of weapon grade plutonium in its unsafeguarded power reactors.

(2) The deal could lead to missile proliferation

The space cooperation aspect of the deal could result in transfers of technology and expertise relevant to nuclear missile development. For example, India will use its rocket Chandrayaan-1, which has previously been used to launch satellites into orbit, for its unmanned mission to the moon. Experts have long warned that the same rocket could also be armed with a nuclear warhead and turned into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The methods for

234 integrating payloads into space vehicles, which US engineers will assist Indian engineers in doing for the joint lunar mission, are also relevant to integrating multiple nuclear warheads into

ICBMs. US assistance on Indian civilian space exploration ventures could help India develop the know-how for further developing its ballistic missile capabilities.

(3) The deal could spark an arms race in South Asia

In response to the proposed US-India deal, Pakistan's National Command Authority stated that its “credible minimum deterrence requirements” will continue to be met, indicating the possibility of an expansion of fissile materials stockpiles in Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan's stocks, however, already far exceed the fissile material requirements for a “minimal” nuclear arsenal. China's response will likely be similar if the deal goes through.

The space cooperation element of the deal provides India with the opportunity to increase its missile technology expertise. This in turn could lead to an increase in quantity and quality of its delivery systems, to which its neighbours would surely respond.

US involvement in East and South Asia features policies of selectively favouring or opposing nuclear activities that strongly affects the regions' strategic balances. For example, the geostrategic benefits of using India to assert its interests in Asia is likely one of the primary rationales behind this deal for the US. Former RAND Corporation analyst Ashley Tellis says,

"accommodating India on the issue of nuclear cooperation" would "buttress its potential utility as a hedge against a rising China" and "encourage it to pursue economic and strategic policies aligned with US interests," helping to "shape the Asian environment in a way that suits our interests."

235 (4) The deal violates international and domestic law

The deal violates Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states that

“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.” The deal also violates other positions agreed upon by consensus by NPT members, including a 1995 agreement on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which states, “New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

The deal flagrantly ignores the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament from the 2000

NPT Review Conference, and the principle of universality agreed to by all NPT member states.

The deal provides further examples to non-nuclear weapon states that the US does not intend to honour its 1995 and 2000 commitments, compromising future progress on both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and threatening the integrity of the core bargain on which the treaty is based. It also contravenes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 of 1998, which calls for India and Pakistan to “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs... and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,” and encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist

236 programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect.”

The deal further undermines the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), of which the US is a signatory. The goal of the MTCR is to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is “not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,” a principle which the US-

India deal potentially violates. The proposed arrangement could also trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which offer important barriers against the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies for weapons purposes.

(5) The deal normalizes India's status as a nuclear weapon state

The deal effectively normalizes India's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state outside the NPT, elevating it to the level of a nuclear weapon state under the Treaty but not bound by any of its obligations. It enables India to participate in the international community's system of nuclear activities without conforming to the systems norms, standards, or laws, including those regarding disarmament and non-proliferation. The deal thus represents a step backwards for nonproliferation and disarmament: it allows for an increase in nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and delivery systems, and the resumption of nuclear testing. It undermines the NPT at a time when the regime is facing other crises and needs support to retain its credibility and functionality. The deal indicates the intention of US and India to develop a stronger strategic relationship, which is detrimental to international security because it is being established in an environment of mistrust and geopolitical tensions, and is in clear violation of the spirit and letter of international law and intergovernmental organizations.

237 According to Graham Thomas (2004) in Arms Control Bulletin, “the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT , is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance. A total of 190 states have joined the Treaty, though North Korea, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal in 2003. Four UN member states have never joined the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan. The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its nuclear weapons program”.

The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three- pillar system, with an implicit balance among them: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals”. The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called

238 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by consensus, to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions during the

Review Conference in New York City on 11 May 1995, culminating successful U.S. government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr..

Five states are recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states

(NWS): China (signed 1992), France (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968)

(The United States, UK, and the Soviet Union – the World War II's “Big Three” — were the only states openly possessing such weapons among the original ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970). These five nations are also the five permanent members of the

United Nations Security Council. These five NWS agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to receive, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article III).

The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a

Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS, from 1959 until 1991. The previous United Kingdom

239 Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". In

January 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centers. ( Kimbal, D., 2013)

Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology. Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have what is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use on demand, thus giving them what has been termed a "virtual" nuclear weapons program. The degree to which NPT members have a "right" to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave proliferation implications, therefore, is at the cutting edge of policy and legal debates surrounding the meaning of Article IV and its relation to Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.

Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. However, Iraq was cited by the

IAEA with punitive sanctions enacted against it by the UN Security Council for violating its

NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations, and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual non-consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to report aspects of its enrichment program; and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December 2003. In 1991 Romania

240 reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former regime and the IAEA reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only. In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed. (NPT

Safeguards Agreement, 2005)

The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs, in

1958. It was opened for signature in 1968, with Finland the first State to sign. Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of South African apartheid. In 1992 China and

France acceded to the NPT, the last of the five nuclear powers recognized by the treaty to do so.

In 1995 the treaty was extended indefinitely. After Brazil acceded to the NPT in 1998 the only remaining non-nuclear-weapons state which had not signed was Cuba, which joined NPT (and the Treaty of Tlatelolco NWFZ) in 2002.Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, but has since renounced its nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear arsenal; after this, the remaining African countries signed the treaty. The former Soviet

Republics where nuclear weapons had been based, namely Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, transferred those weapons to Russia and joined NPT by 1994.

Successor states from the breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also joined the treaty soon after their independence. Montenegro and East Timor were the last countries to sign the treaty on their independence in 2006 and 2003; the only other country to sign in the 21st century was Cuba in 2002. The three Micronesian countries in Compact of Free Association with the

USA joined NPT in 1995, along with Vanuatu. Major South American countries Argentina,

241 Chile, and Brazil joined in 1995 and 1998. Arabian Peninsula countries included Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1988, Qatar and Kuwait in 1989, UAE in 1995, and Oman in 1997. The tiny

European states of Monaco and Andorra joined in 1995-6. Also signing in the 1990s were

Myanmar in 1992 and Guyana in 1993. (ElBaradei, M., 2004)

The Case of India, Israel, and Pakistan and other related Proliferation problems

Three states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have never signed the treaty. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel has a long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity (see

List of countries with nuclear weapons). India argues that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab

Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: “If India did not sign the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it did not recognize the need for universal non-discriminatory verification and treatment.”

(Dawn, 2007)

India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having first done so in 1974 and Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test. India is estimated to have enough fissile material for more than

150 warheads. Pakistan reportedly has between 80 and 120 warheads according to the former head of its strategic arms division. India was among the few countries to have a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons, however India's NSA Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden

242 Jubilee celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence".

According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at its Dimona site in the Negev since 1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like David Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to 200 warheads using the plutonium reprocessed from Dimona. The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after Israeli low level nuclear technician

Mordechai Vanunu—subsequently arrested and sentenced for treason by Israel—published evidence about the program to the British Sunday Times in 1986.

On 18 September 2009 the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency called on Israel to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and adhere to the nonproliferation trean b, ty as part of a resolution on "Israeli nuclear capabilities," which passed by a narrow margin of

49–45 with 16 abstentions. The chief Israeli delegate stated that "Israel will not co-operate in any matter with this resolution." In early March 2006, India and the United States finalized an agreement, in the face of criticism in both countries, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, then

Director General of the IAEA, welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime."

In December 2006, United States Congress approved the United States-India Peaceful

Atomic Energy Cooperation Act that was cemented during President Bush's visit to India earlier

243 in the year. The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Despite its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India was granted these transactions on the basis of its clean non-proliferation record, and India's need for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a billion-plus population. On 1 August 2008, the IAEA approved the India

Safeguards Agreement and on 6 September 2008, India was granted the waiver at the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country, which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while India could commence nuclear trade with other willing countries.

The U.S. Congress approved this agreement and President Bush signed it on 8 October 2008.

The NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to Pakistan and

Israel, with very narrow exceptions, since neither has full-scope IAEA safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all its nuclear activities). Attempts by Pakistan to reach a similar agreement have been rebuffed by the United States and other NSG members. The argument put forth is that not only does Pakistan lack the same energy requirements but that the track record of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear deal in the near future.

By 2010, China reportedly signed a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan claiming that the deal was peaceful. The British government looked askance at the deal purporting that 'the time is not yet right for a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan'. In the Pakistan-China case, the parties did not seek formal approval from the nuclear suppliers group, and China preferred to "grandfather" the reactor. Exponents of arms control denounced the China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of

U.S.-India deal claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT.

244 As of January 2011, Australia, a top three producer and home to worlds largest known reserves, has continued their refusal to export Uranium to India because it has not signed the

NPT despite diplomatic pressure from India. In November 2011 the Australian Prime Minister announced a desire to allow exports to India, a policy change which was authorized by her party's national conference in December. On 4 December 2011, Australia's Prime Minister Julia

Gillard overturned its long-standing ban on exporting uranium to India. She further said "We should take a decision in the national interest, a decision about strengthening our strategic partnership with India in this the Asian century," and said that any agreement to sell uranium to

India would include strict safeguards to ensure it would only be used for civilian purposes, and not end up in nuclear weapons.

Quite apart from the fact that North Korean First Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju at one point admitted the existence of a uranium enrichment program. Pakistan's then-President Musharraf revealed that the A.Q. Khan proliferation network had provided North Korea with a number of gas centrifuges designed for uranium enrichment. Additionally, press reports have cited U.S. officials to the effect that evidence obtained in dismantling Libya's WMD programs points toward North Korea as the source for Libya's uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) – which, if true, would mean that North Korea has a uranium conversion facility for producing feedstock for centrifuge enrichment.

Iran: Iran is a party to the NPT but was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute. In November 2003 IAEA

Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program. After about two years of EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran temporarily

245 suspending its enrichment program, the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. This was reported to the UN

Security Council in 2006, after which the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that

Iran suspend its enrichment. Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.

The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and is continuing its work on verifying the absence of undeclared activities. In February 2008, the

IAEA also reported that it was working to address "alleged studies" of weaponization, based on documents provided by certain Member States, which those states claimed originated from Iran.

Iran rejected the allegations as "baseless" and the documents as "fabrications." In June 2009, the

IAEA reported that Iran had not “cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.” The United States concluded that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards obligations, and further argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment program was for weapons purposes and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation obligations.

The November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) later concluded that Iran had halted an active nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and that it had remained halted as of mid-2007. The NIE's "Key Judgments," however, also made clear that what Iran had actually stopped in 2003 was only "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work"-namely, those aspects of Iran's nuclear weapons effort that had not by that point already been leaked to the press and become the subject of IAEA.

246 Since Iran's uranium enrichment program at Natanz—and its continuing work on a heavy water reactor at Arak that would be ideal for plutonium production—began secretly years before in conjunction with the very weaponization work the NIE discussed and for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, many observers find Iran's continued development of fissile material production capabilities distinctly worrying. Particularly because fissile material availability has long been understood to be the principal obstacle to nuclear weapons development and the primary "pacing element" for a weapons program, the fact that Iran has reportedly suspended weaponization work may not mean very much. As U.S. Director of

National Intelligence Mike McConnell has put it, the aspects of its work that Iran allegedly suspended were thus "probably the least significant part of the program."

Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Iran also states that its enrichment program is part of its civilian nuclear energy program, which is allowed under Article IV of the NPT. The Non-

Aligned Movement has welcomed the continuing cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and reaffirmed Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. UN Secretary General Ban Ki- moon has welcomed the continued dialogue between Iran and the IAEA, and has called for a peaceful resolution to the issue. In April 2010, during the signing of the U.S.-Russia New

START Treaty, President Obama said that the United States, Russia, and other nations are demanding that Iran face consequences for failing to fulfill their obligations under the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that “we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security.”

247 South Africa: South Africa is the only country that developed nuclear weapons by itself and later dismantled them – unlike the former Soviet states Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which inherited nuclear weapons from the former USSR and also acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. During the days of apartheid, the South African government developed a deep fear of both a black uprising and the threat of communism. This led to the development of a secret nuclear weapons program as an ultimate deterrent. South Africa has a large supply of uranium, which is mined in the country's gold mines. The government built a nuclear research facility at Pelindaba near Pretoria where uranium was enriched to fuel grade for the Koeberg

Nuclear Power Station as well as weapon grade for bomb production.

In 1991, after international pressure and when a change of government was imminent, South

African Ambassador to the United States Harry Schwarz signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty. In 1993, the then president Frederik Willem de Klerk openly admitted that the country had developed a limited nuclear weapon capability. These weapons were subsequently dismantled before South Africa acceded to the NPT and opened itself up to IAEA inspection. In

1994 the IAEA completed its work and declared that the country had fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.

Libya: Libya had signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was subject to

IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections, but undertook a secret nuclear weapons development program in violation of its NPT obligations, using material and technology provided by the A.Q.

Khan proliferation network-including actual nuclear weapons designs allegedly originating in

China. Libya began secret negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom in March

2003 over potentially eliminating its WMD programs. In October 2003, Libya was embarrassed

248 by the interdiction of a shipment of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia, also as part of A. Q. Khan's proliferation ring.

In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to eliminate all its WMD programs, and permitted U.S. and British teams (as well as IAEA inspectors) into the country to assist this process and verify its completion. The nuclear weapons designs, gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and other equipment—including prototypes for improved SCUD ballistic missiles— were removed from Libya by the United States. (Libyan chemical weapons stocks and chemical bombs were also destroyed on site with international verification, with Libya joining the

Chemical Weapons Convention.) Libya's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards was reported to the U.N. Security Council, but with no action taken, as Libya's return to compliance with safeguards and Article II of the NPT was welcomed. The IAEA Board of Governors rejected this interpretation. Most countries held that a new three-month withdrawal notice was required, and some questioned whether North Korea's notification met the "extraordinary events" and

"supreme interests" requirements of the Treaty. The Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 at the end of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks called for North Korea to "return" to the NPT, implicitly acknowledging that it had withdrawn.

On 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh and declared that he would work to change US law and international rules to permit trade in US civilian nuclear technology with India. Some, such as British columnist George Monbiot, argue that the U.S.-India nuclear deal, in combination with US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian nuclear fuel-making technology, may destroy the NPT regime, while others contend that such a move will likely bring India, an NPT non-signatory, under closer international scrutiny. In the first half of 2010, it was strongly believed that China had signed a

249 civilian nuclear deal with Pakistan claiming that the deal was "peaceful". Arms control advocates criticised the reported China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of U.S.-India deal claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT. Some reports asserted that the deal was a strategic move by China to balance US influence in South-Asia.

According to a report published by U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, China had provided Pakistan with nuclear materials and has given critical technological assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China even then was a signatory. At the Seventh Review

Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the United States, which wanted the conference to focus on non-proliferation, especially on its allegations against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers.

The non-aligned countries reiterated their position emphasizing the need for nuclear disarmament. The 2010 Review Conference was held in May 2010 in New York City, and adopted a final document that included a summary by the Review Conference President,

Ambassador Libran Capactulan of the Philippines, and an Action Plan that was adopted by consensus. The 2010 conference was generally considered a success because it reached consensus where the previous Review Conference in 2005 ended in disarray, a fact that many attributed to the U.S. President Barack Obama's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Some have warned that this success raised unrealistically high expectations that could lead to failure at the next Review Conference in 2015. The "Global Summit on Nuclear Security" took place 12–13 April 2010. The summit was proposed by President Obama in Prague and was

250 intended to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in conjunction with the Proliferation

Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Forty seven states and three international organizations took part in the summit, which issued a communiqué and a work plan. For further information see 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.

In a major policy speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on 19 June 2013, United States

President Barack Obama outlined plans to further reduce the number of warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. According to Foreign Policy , Obama proposed a "one-third reduction in strategic nuclear warheads - on top of the cuts already required by the New START treaty - bringing the number of deployed warheads to about 1,000." Obama is seeking to "negotiate these reductions with Russia to continue to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures," according to briefing documents provided to Foreign Policy . In the same speech, Obama emphasized his administration's efforts to isolate any nuclear weapons capabilities emanating from Iran and

North Korea. He also called for a renewed bipartisan effort in the United States Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called on countries to negotiate a new treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In 24 April 2014 it was announced that the nation of the Marshall Islands has brought suit in The Hague against the

United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan,

North Korea and Israel seeking to have the disarmament provisions of the NPT enforced.

Criticisms against NPT

Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as “a conspiracy of the nuclear 'haves' to keep the nuclear ‘have-nots’ in their place”. This argument has roots in

Article VI of the treaty which “obligates the nuclear weapons states to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states see no signs of this

251 happening”. Some argue that the NWS have not fully complied with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Some countries such as India have criticized the NPT, because it "discriminated against states not possessing nuclear weapons on January 1, 1967," while Iran and numerous Arab states and Iran have criticized Israel for not signing the NPT.

There has been disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads between them and have shown a reluctance to disarm further.

According to Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, the “NPT has one giant loophole”: Article

IV gives each non-nuclear weapon state the 'inalienable right' to pursue nuclear energy for the generation of power. A "number of high-ranking officials, even within the United Nations, have argued that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons". A

2009 United Nations report said that:

The revival of interest in nuclear power could result in the worldwide dissemination of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies, which present obvious risks of proliferation as these technologies can produce fissile materials that are directly usable in nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the NPT says nothing about aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle “such as uranium mines and mills, from which terrorists could easily acquire fissile material”. Dozens of nations remain potential "weak links" in the global defense against nuclear terrorism and tacitly ignore UN mandates on controls over fissile material at uranium mines. Niger, a major uranium exporter, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the source of uranium for the first atomic bomb, are

"among the states falling short in complying with UN Security Council Resolution 1540"

252 CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

In the course of this study, it became imperative to ask a number of questions. The aim is to provide or serve as a guide in the process of the research. On that basis, it aided the formulation of the hypotheses and essentially assisted in providing answers to the research questions.

We now highlight the question once again:

• Does the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of

nuclear war in Asia?

• Would the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute create an opportunity for the

settlement of other boundary problems in Asia?

Thus, the following Hypotheses were posited:

• The continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of

nuclear war in Asia.

• The resolution of the India-Pakistan dispute would create an opportunity for the

settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.

In our attempt to provide answers to the research questions, we delved into vast literature reviews in relation to the various wars fought in the past by India and Pakistan and subsequently dealt with other areas of the unending conflict. In this vein, it examined the first Kashmir war of

1947, which came almost immediately after the independence and partition of India. The 1965, second Kashmir war, followed soothe with comprehensive analyses by various writers and war veterans. Thirdly, the Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971; that resulted in the cessation of East

253 Pakistan from West Pakistan, through the involvement of India, in connivance with the

Bangladesh rebels (Mukti Bahini) subjected Pakistan to a wholesome surrender. The reviews of the 1999 Kargil war was spectacular in that the year marked the end of a millennium and shook the international community, mainly because it happened to be the first conventional warfare between two nuclear countries, and if ceasefire was not called on time it would have, presumably, culminated into nuclear war as many analysts observed.

In the subsequent chapters, we examined the foreseeable consequences of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. In this regard, a study conducted by the United States ‘Natural

Resources Defence Council’ (NRDC), which used the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings of 1945 to predict the degree of fatality, should nuclear war ensue between both countries, was adopted. In our last chapter, we attempted relentlessly to suggest some paths to the resolution of the intractable dispute between India and Pakistan. In this case, the following sub-leadings were showcased as postulated by writers and scholars.

• UN-Monitored Plebiscite option.

• UN-Trusteeship option.

• Independence option.

In the present circumstance, independence was stated as a better option but is largely not easy to come by because of so much insurgencies and disagreements among the Kashmiri populace as regards which country (India or Pakistan) to support, plus other envisaged attendant constraints.

The study went further to prove to a reasonable extent that the root of the India-Pakistan dispute stemmed from an in-depth religious fundamentalism, which has over time, eaten deep into the social and political fabrics of both nations. In this instance, it may continue to remain an uphill task until there is a good degree of social overhauling among the populace of both

254 countries. The study also deduced that the proliferation of Islamic militancy and terrorism within the Kashmir region has marred the possibility of adequate UN intervention, an organized plebiscite, or an outright independence option for the Kashmir region. According to Meredith

Weiss, (2002) “India blames Pakistan for supporting militants and Pakistan claims that India is violating human rights in Kashmir. This and other inherent confusions had prevented the

Kashmiris from taking their destiny in their hands.

With regard to our second hypothesis, the crisis between India and Pakistan has already negatively affected relations between them, their immediate neighbours and beyond. For instance, in contemporary times, India and China have developed huge trade relations and this has invariably undermined the erstwhile relations between Pakistan and China. Other examples of this nature are not far-fetched. This depicts that any strategy used in resolving the ongoing dispute, over Kashmir, can equally be effective in solving other boundary problems in Asia due to the importance and magnitude of the dispute.

Therefore, we have been able to prove and confirm the first and second hypothesis. In other words, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is most likely to lead to nuclear war in Asia if the conflict will be left to linger indefinitely. Moreover, in the course of the study, certain revelations were made. These include:

• That religious fundamentalism is the root of the derailed relations and animosity between

India and Pakistan.

• That leaving the Kashmir region to decide their own fate at the time of Partition of India

by the British Colonialists was a major omission.

• That Pakistan still feels cheated out during the Partition and also coupled with the fact

that Kashmir is predominantly made of up to 90% Muslim population.

255 • The fact that India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons has served as deterrence

towards engaging in nuclear exchange between them because of fear of envisaged total

annihilation of the subcontinent.

• That the high spate of terrorism, militancy and other obnoxious practices has marred the

required cohesion within the Kashmiris towards pursing a common agenda in their desire

for self-determination and independence.

• That the United Nations had never applied any form of force towards the resolution of the

dispute as it had done elsewhere around the world.

In view of the foregoing observations, the study may not be deemed complete if it does not look into the importance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan. This will be in line with a question raised in our statement of problem as to “Why the unending clamour for Kashmir?

According to Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) Kashmir is a mostly mountainous region that has been fought over by Pakistan and India for the past 60 years. The area is sometimes referred to as the “Switzerland of the East” due to its fertile valley and snow-capped mountains. Kashmir is located on the western half of the Himalayan Mountain Range. It is nestled between China, on the east, India on the south, Pakistan to the west and a slight boarder with Afghanistan to the north. The terrain is mainly mountains and plateaus, resulting in most of the population concentrated in the lush Vale of Kashmir. Pakistan currently governs the north and west portions

(known as the Northern Areas), while India the southern (Jammu and Kashmir) and China the easternmost region (Aksai Chin). Due to the effects of global climate change the glaciers, whose melt keep the valley fertile and are the source for many of the regions’ important rivers and water supplies for the region. This feature is already a source of conflict between India and

Pakistan, as India currently controls the area that is the source of Pakistan’s vital water resources.

256 As a result, there is potential for an already tumultuous situation to become even bloodier as the affects of global climate result in shrinking water supplies and a scramble for control over the remaining water resources. Kashmir has been a land of religious conflict since its beginning.

Initially occupied by Brahmin Hindus, Buddhist missionaries arrived Kashmir around 274

BC. Hindu Dynasties continued to rule Kashmir, despite the arrival of Muslims beginning in

1001 AD. By the late 16th century the ruling Muslim Dynasty had managed to overthrow the

Hindu ruler and Kashmir was a Muslim-dominated state ever since. Hundreds of years later the

United Kingdom colonized the Indian subcontinent. In 1846 the British defined Kashmir’s boarders to create a safeguard between the Indian Commonwealth and the Russian and Chinese empires. Specific border locations were difficult to define due to sparse population and rugged terrain. When the UK granted India sovereignty in 1947 the region's Muslim population decided to form their own country, in what is now Pakistan. At this time Kashmir was a mutually agreed upon neutral state, and Pakistan thought they would receive control, since it was predominantly

Muslim. Kashmir’s ruler instead, granted India ruling authority.

Pakistan’s Indus river, which is used to irrigate about three quarters of Pakistan’s farming, has its source in the Indian controlled Siachen Glacier. ( Zeenews, 2006)

257 Punjab, Pakistan’s heavily populated province and home of the nation’s capital, Islamabad, means “The land of the five rivers”. Three of these rivers begin or pass through the Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir region. It is in the interest of Pakistan’s national security for it to have control over the origin of its water resources, rather than their enemy. Thus, Pakistan has been trying to cement its authority over Kashmir by increasing their presence. In 1981 Pakistan extended Pakistani citizenship to all inhabitants in the Northern Areas. It is hypothesized that

Pakistan galvanized settlement of the mujahideen, beginning in the 1980s, in the Northern Areas to enhance their military presence. Mujahideen is any Muslim involved in a battle or struggle. In this instance they can be thought of as a militia deployed or serviced by Pakistan as an aggressive means to enhance its control of the region.

India’s relationship with the United States, as is India- China’s friendly relations with rival

Pakistan interests.

Both India and Pakistan wish to control the Kashmir territory. Originally it was simply a boarder dispute, with each country wanting the land to enhance their regional control, but today

258 the situation is direr. With the water resources of both countries jeopardized by global climate

change, they are in a race to ensure their countries’ future water security. The situation is more

tenuous for Pakistan, as the source of their most important rivers, the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus,

begin in the Indian managed half of Kashmir. If India had full sovereignty of Kashmir it could

hold its enemy at its mercy, as water is absolutely necessary for the survival of a country’s

economy, and its people. (Raman, A.D., 2004: 187-228)

Summarily, the study has found it instructive to suggest some valuable recommendations in

order to provide viable solutions to these problems.

7.2 Recommendations

The study, so far, is left with the impression that there may not be an immediate fool-proof

solution to the problem of Kashmir. The situation had always been complicated due to the

different political and military players with divergent interests. The above impediments

notwithstanding, this study wishes to proffer some recommendations to help the stakeholders in

the task of bringing the impasse to possible low ebb. Before these recommendations, the study

took into consideration the fact that the United Nations had brokered various Agreements

Accords and Declarations between India and Pakistan in relation to the conflict. These include

the Ceasefire Control Line (later Line of Control) agreement of 1948, the Tashkent Declaration

of 1965, the Simla Accord of 1972, the Lahore Agreement of 1999, the Washington Accord of

1983, among others. However, it is note-worthy to mention that the United Nations had failed to

enforce all these agreements, concretely, hence, the continuing nature of the conflict. In line with

this assertion, the study will proffer the following recommendations that;

• Both Azad Kashmir and Kashmir Valley should be declared autonomous entities with their respective internal self-governments by the apex international organization (the UN)

259 under a multilateral declaration. This will be legally implemented by restoring their due, denied sovereignty since the first Kashmir war of 1947. Subsequently, India and Pakistan will be forced to withdraw their controls over the region. This study considers the present situation as, somewhat, a case of “annexation” of the Kashmir region by both states (even though India claims a legal accession). The viable option will be to forcefully return Kashmir to status quo, no matter whose ox is gored; as was done to Iraq over Kuwait. This will enhance the proposed independence of Kashmir region. • Alternatively, since both countries have over the decades been in control of specified portions in the Kashmir region, the Line of Control, which is the international approved boundary, should be permanently policed by the UN peace-keeping forces for reasonable number of years or until hostilities dissipate. This will go a long way to forestall further infiltrations by either side and reduce the attendant hostilities within the disputed region. In effect, these respective portions will permanently become legal and integral parts of both countries through a multilateral Declaration by the United Nations. The Resolution should include the attraction of external military involvement, under the collective security arrangement of the UN, should either side violate the Agreement Resolutions. This option will help India in its purported secularism. On the other hand, Pakistan will be forced to make-do with what it has and normalize relations with India for economic and social benefits. • Another viable, practical solution would be the option of a steady peace-process between India and Pakistan. To achieve this effectively, Kashmiris will be involved in these peace-talks by accepting them as stakeholders. Presently, they feel alienated, and this has resulted in the incessant insurgency and militancy against the Indian government. As noted by Malik, Ifetkhar (1993:18), a Pakistani scholar based in the UK, “In any realistic resolution of the Kashmir conflict, the larger interest of the Kashmiris must receive priority. For a long time, rather than being a focal point, they were simply regarded as a side-issue. Yet, it is the Kashmiris who, for generations, have continued to suffer from decisions, made about them, without consolation.”

7.3 Conclusion In the context of ratings of global conflicts over time, the Indian-Pakistan conflict is one

of the highest and enduring in that in spite of various forms of mediation, bilateral and

260 multilateral peace agreements attributed to it, hostilities between the two countries have not abated. This study has at this point has been able to deduce that, the disputed Kashmir region has remained the object of contention because the omission of not including it as integral parts of

India and Pakistan was made by the British colonialists during the Partition of India in August

15, 1947. It is truism to state that Pakistan had felt cheated during the Partition of India hence its resolve to keep fighting until a more equitable partition occurs.

The study has also been able to determine that the Indian-Pakistani conflicts have undermined peaceful relations in South Asia due to its protracted nature. This has been confirmed by the past wars fought between the two countries and the continuing conflicts and skirmishes (including terrorism supported by Pakistan) going on up till date. In light of the inherent complex situation, it has sought to engage with plausible solutions and its potential impact, in the attempt to address the Kashmir issue. The study has also considered the huge amounts of political capital invested by all parties to the conflict and the practical challenges posed for Kashmir, if it chooses the path of independence.

While realising that the means to a peaceful resolution is not that easy, given the past history of mutual distrust between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, there is no substitute for

‘political will’ on all sides, if the issues are to be earnestly resolved. Attempts at building trust would be the first fundamental step toward the path for resolving what had been, arguably, the longest and perhaps the bloodiest running dispute in the world.

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