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Networks That Organised Competition Corporate Resource Sharing Between Swedish Property Underwriters 1875-1950 Networks that Organised Competition Corporate Resource Sharing between Swedish Property Underwriters 1875-1950. Josef Lilljegren Economic History This work is protected by the Swedish Copyright Legislation (Act 1960:729) ISBN: 978-91-7855-112-5 ISSN: 0347-254-50 Copyright: Josef Lilljegren Cover picture and typesetting: Josef Lilljegren Dark-mode version for on-screen reading available at: http://www.lilljegren.com/thesis Printed by: CityPrint i Norr AB, Umeå, Sverige 2019. 5-4, 3-4, 4-5 2-3, 1-5, 3-1, 3-5, 1-5, 1-4 3-2, 1-5 1-1 3-1, 3-4, 4-4 4-4, 2-3, 1-1, 3-3, 1-3, 4-3 Foreword Arriving at a final manuscript is a lonesome job, yet a PhD-candidate is never alone. John Donne wrote that No man is an island, entire of itself. My island has been connected in an ever-helpful, invigorating, and dependable network G(V,E) to so many j V , without whom this book 2 might never have been brought to completion. In this network, I am i, and i owe gratitude and honourable mentions, g, to all of my connected j:s like: V | | g = f(Hj,Wj) (1) Xj=1 where g is gratitude as a function of academic and practical help and advice, H, and friendly support, W , given by each and every j. First of all, g computes very highly for my supervisors Magnus Lindmark, and Ann-Kristin Bergquist at Umeå University. Without their wise advice and stimulating discussions i would have been lost. Their patient efforts to encourage my work, have quite exceeded the ordinary. i have also particularly benefited from the H of Lena Andersson-Skog who, like Tomas Pettersson and other peers at the department, have given patient attention and pivotal comments on my manuscript. So has my former supervisor Lars-Fredrik Andersson, who most unselfishly has encouraged the finalisation of my thesis despite our other collaborations. Even amongst my direct benefactors, there are many more j V 2 than i could be mentioned here by name. They include enthusiasts at stack-overflow, librarians and mathematicians, coders, and authors of the LATEX-wiki, man-page and package writers and many more who couldn’t possibly foresee that their efforts would ever benefit the work that has gone into this book. i can only rejoice in the thought of how all good being done in a networked world have the potential to ripple across the nodes to help, inspire, motivate, encourage, and intrigue people far beyond the horizons of our known ego-network. As for you, who read this now; if you have still never answered a forum-question relating to your expertise or never enhanced a Wikipedia-page, i kindly ask you to reconsider whether the time you’ve set aside to read this book couldn’t really be better spent. An interconnected world awaits your good deeds. Through complex networks they will ripple beyond your horizons, as did those countless ripples that have reached me and helped me advance in the work with the thesis at hand. v My research visit at Business History @ Erasmus in Rotterdam was most generously organised by Abe de Jong and a much more crucial stage of the work than i realised for which i am much more grateful than i believe i was able to express there and then. I’m also grate- ful to the University of Seville where i was invited and cared for by Gerònia Pons Pons and Pablo Gutiérrez González. i am also grateful to Christian Stiglitz and Tom Snijders for their spectacular network course in Groningen. As an often nomadised doctoral student, text and code for my experiments have been written in, and facilitated by j:s who’ve gener- ously opened doors for me, in Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Göttingen, Bishkek, Tbilisi, Vienna, Brussels and more. All j V are not individuals 2 either, but organisations too, like Andréssian Consulting for generously providing a crucial writing retreat. Particularly, i am grateful for the financial support from The Lars Hierta Memorial Foundation. It has been truly great to have the reliable support of friends and col- leagues at the department for Geography and Economic History at Umeå University. Throughout the work of calculating this thesis, i have been able to count on Guilherme Kenji Chihaya, ever since he taught me that networks existed. i also learned much during my coding workshops with Emil Edeholt. New directions forward in my work was pointed out by Jan Ottosson (Uppsala), Mike Adams (Kent), Mats Larsson (Uppsala) and Ben Gales (Groningen). They have given sharp, constructive and eye-opening comments on earlier versions of my manuscript. i am also grateful to Kerstin Thörn and Sofie Le-Poutre and Liselotte Eriksson for their insightful advice. Thanks also to Jasmine for the Chinese transla- tion, my personal librarian Joakim Lilljegren and other ever-supportive members of the Lilljegren and Strandberg tribes. And finally, to friends and lovers (j V where W >H). i do 2 j j know that the truly meaningful discoveries are made outside the world of academic pursuits. Thank you for reminding me. Vienna, January 2019. vi ABSTRACT Networks that Organised competition - Corporate Resource Sharing between Swedish Property Underwriters 1875-1950. Umeå Studies in Econopmic History (50) 2019. ISBN:978-91-7855-112-5 ISSN:0347-254-50 Author: Josef Lilljegren Doctoral dissertation in economic history at the Unit for Economic History at Umeå University. This thesis investigates the corporate networks of Swedish property underwriters 1875- 1950. During this period, networks of increasing intensity was an essential part in the organisation of the Swedish property insurance market. Corporate resource sharing al- lowed underwriters to accommodate the ever-changing industrialised demand for prop- erty insurance. Interlocking directorates, ownership ties and membership in collaborative organisations were the vessels of this corporate resource sharing. This study proposes a network perspective on the organisation of competition and col- laboration. It finds that networks lowered firms’ cost-threshold for underwriting diversi- fication, causing well-connected firms to expand into new markets more easily. An es- sential resource to underwriters was information, and information exchange motivated several interfirm rapprochements. The driving forces for the organisational shift towards increased networking were, however, complex, and included both socioeconomic and stra- tegic factors. Through networks of mutual resource sharing, the consolidation that appears in the in- dustry after 1950 was preceded by a long historical process in which firms who would later merge developed measurably clustered network structures as early as in the 1910s. In the 1920s the networks already contributed to a high market concentration. Networks thereby conditioned the underwriting operation of individual firms as well as the structural evolution of the Swedish insurance market as a whole. Keywords: corporate networks, business history, property insurance, interfirm, insurance history, in- terlocking directorates vii Contents Page Foreword .............................. v Abstract............................... vii Contents............................... xii ListofFigures ........................... xiv ListofTables ............................ xiv Notationsinnetworkanalysis . xv 1Introduction 1 1.1 Aimandquestions ...................... 5 1.2 Scopeanddelimitations . 8 1.3 Analyticalframework. 10 1.3.1 A sliding scale of horizontal integration . 12 1.4 Theoretical perspectives . 14 1.4.1 Interorganisational resource management . 15 1.4.2 Transactioncosttheory . 16 1.5 Previousresearch ....................... 18 1.5.1 Networkedmarketorganisation . 19 1.5.2 Network implications for the organisation of firms . 23 1.5.3 Historical networks and Swedish insurance . 28 1.6 Contribution ......................... 34 1.7 Disposition . 35 2Data,design,andmethods 37 2.1 Operationalisation . 37 2.1.1 The design of specific investigations . 38 2.1.2 Deriving meaning from network structure . 41 2.2 Source Material and historical networks . 42 2.2.1 Principalsourcematerial . 43 2.2.2 Structuring historical network data . 47 ix 2.2.3 Formalising relational data as network graphs . 50 2.3 Networkmethodology . 55 2.3.1 Network metrics . 55 2.3.2 Random graphs and non-random networks . 56 2.4 Summary . 58 3Thedynamicinsurancemarket 61 3.1 Economic and institutional environments . 62 3.1.1 Swedish insurance and industrial growth . 63 3.1.2 Institutional change . 65 3.2 Organisational forms of underwriters . 66 3.2.1 A nascent market of commercial underwriting . 67 3.2.2 National, local, mutual and investor-owned firms . 70 3.3 Firmdynamicsanddiversification. 72 3.3.1 Market entries and exist . 72 3.3.2 Underwriting diversification . 76 3.4 Summary . 80 4Theemergingnetworks 83 4.1 The evolution of the underwriting network . 84 4.1.1 The early ties between underwriters . 84 4.1.2 Insurancenetworks1875-1950 . 86 4.1.3 Network density and cluster coefficients . 92 4.2 Comparing structures across network layers . 96 4.2.1 Degreedistributions . 96 4.2.2 Network layer correlations . 99 4.3 Summary . 102 5 Ownership of insurance 105 5.1 Changing trends in ownership . 106 5.1.1 OwnershipofSwedishindustry . 106 5.1.2 Ownership of Swedish property insurance . 108 5.2 Fromverticaltohorisontalties . 111 5.2.1 Vertical ownership ties of the 19th century . 112 5.2.2 Horizontal ties and insurance groups . 114 5.2.3 Driving forces to network structure . 117 5.3 Resource sharing and ownership ties . 119 5.3.1 Reorganisation and horizontal ties . 119 5.3.2 Ownership and control reciprocation . 123 5.4 Summary . 125 x 6Directors-Elitecoordinators 127 6.1 Categorisingtheinsuranceelite . 128 6.1.1 Theories of elite formation . 128 6.1.2 Director titles as source material . 129 6.2 Business elites in industry and insurance . 132 6.2.1 The Swedish business elite . 132 6.2.2 The Swedish insurance elite . 135 6.3 Insurance directors and their social spheres . 137 6.3.1 Distribution of socio-vocational categories .
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