You Cannot Surge Trust: Time the U.S
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As all the essays make abundantly variations in national rules of engagement clear, two key factors lie at the heart and by a lack of clarity regarding com- of the U.S.-UK-Canada-Australia mand relationships in ad hoc coalition cooperative relationship. The first, so operations. Either, and certainly both, obvious it rarely is mentioned in the es- of these factors could have prevented says, is common language and heritage. the four operations from achieving their Communication is far easier when the goals. communicants speak the same language, What was remarkable, however, was share the same values, and, to a great the degree to which those constraints extent, draw upon a common heritage. were overcome in operations that were As an example of the latter, this author joint as well as combined, involving recalls that at a Pentagon meeting of air and/or land forces. As Sarandis British and American planners during the Papadopoulos, author of four of the 1982 Falklands War, the senior U.S. Navy book’s chapters, writes in his introduc- representative was a direct descendant of tion, “coalitions always have seams, Captain John Strong, who claimed the especially in politically complex situations, islands for the British. but the trust built on common doctrine, The second factor is a history of co- shared training, and technically interop- operation. The Anglo-American “special erable systems minimized any fraying relationship” generally is dated from of relations” (p. 14). Indeed, as all the World War II, but it had its informal start authors point out to a greater or lesser in the previous world war. Thus, by the extent, sailors from the four fleets often You Cannot Surge Trust: time the U.S. and Royal navies worked had to overcome shortfalls in interoper- Combined Naval Operations as a combined team to enforce sanctions ability as well, rendering their success that of the Royal Australian Navy, against Iraq by conducting maritime much more remarkable. Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and interdiction operations in the aftermath Papadopoulos’s observations are borne United States Navy, 1991–2003 of the 1991 Gulf War, they had nearly a out throughout the volume, one of whose century’s experience of cooperating with most valuable features is its presentation of Principal Investigator: Gary E. Wei each other. the same operations from both American Editor: Sandra J. Doyle The U.S. Navy’s relationship with its and allied vantage points. Thus, Stephen Naval History and Heritage Command, Canadian and Australian counterparts Prince and Kate Brett, of the UK Naval 2013 dates to World War II as well. The U.S. Staff, offer their perspectives on Sharp 345 pp. $38 and Canadian navies fought side by Guard alongside that of Papadopoulos’s ISBN: 978-0945274704 side in the Atlantic; the American and recounting of the U.S. Navy’s role in that Reviewed by Dov S. Zakheim Australian navies did the same in the operation. David Stevens, of Australia’s Pacific. In the case of American com- Sea Power Centre, and Papadopoulos do bined operations with both Canada and the same in evaluating the performance ou Cannot Surge Trust is a valu- Australia, as indeed with their mother of their respective maritime forces, no- able review of the unique rela- country, Britain, formal arrangements tably including amphibious forces (pp. Y tionships that bind the U.S. Navy were supplemented by close personal and 130–131), in supporting land-based and its British, Canadian, and Austra- professional ties among the sailors in all operations that ensured Indonesia’s with- lian counterparts. Edited by Sandra four fleets. drawal from East Timor. Two essays by Doyle of the Naval History and Heri- Nevertheless, despite these ties, effec- Jeffrey Barlow, of the Naval History and tage Command, the book is a collec- tive and successful combined operations Heritage Command, on the U.S. Navy’s tion of essays by naval historians from among them have never been a foregone role in coalition maritime operations in the United States, Australia, Canada, conclusion. Each of the case studies—the the Arabian Gulf from 1991–2001, and and United Kingdom (UK) that aforementioned maritime interdiction on its support for maritime interdiction provide insights drawn from common operations and those that followed dur- operations in the first 2 years of Operation experiences derived from combined ing Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation Enduring Freedom, complement that peace support operations between 1991 Sharp Guard off the coast of Yugoslavia of Robert Caldwell, of the Directorate and 2003. These insights offer useful during the Balkan Wars; Operation of History and Heritage at Canada’s pointers for the U.S. Navy leadership Stablise in East Timor; and maritime National Defence Headquarters, who car- as it seeks to establish close cooperative operations in support of Operation ries the story up to 2008. arrangements with other navies around Enduring Freedom—highlights the Unlike the twinned chapters relating the world. complications caused by politically driven to the other operations, which follow JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Book Reviews 135 immediately upon each other, Barlow’s 1980s, the U.S. Navy must work even review of Arabian Gulf operations, the more closely than before with allied first such essay in the book, is not col- and partner navies worldwide. It would located with his other chapter and that do well to draw upon the lessons of its of Caldwell. Instead, it is followed by successful combined operations with its intervening chapters that address the sister navies from Britain, Canada, and other operations. As a consequence, the Australia, and apply them to others with reader will not obtain as clear a sense of whose countries America shares com- comparative Canadian and American per- mon interests. The fact that English is spectives as would have been the case if the international lingua franca for most the three chapters appeared in succession. partner navies creates opportunities for But this is a minor quibble. ever tighter and more fruitful opera- All the essays provide the historical tional relationships between them and context for each operation and recount the U.S. Navy. the challenges that had to be overcome The Navy already conducts numer- in every case, not least of which was the ous exercises with its partners across the fact that other allies also were involved in globe. But exercises are not enough. The these efforts, and, like the four English Navy should redouble its efforts to make speaking navies, were subject to their its communications technology in partic- own national rules of engagement. In ular available to more allies and partners. addition, every chapter bears out the Even the three close partners highlighted critical and central role of the U.S. Navy, in this volume have difficulty accessing whose resources have long outstripped technologies that would significantly Engineers of Victory: The those of its allies. Even in those cases, like enhance their ability to pursue combined Problem Solvers Who Operation Stabilise, where the Navy did naval operations with the United States. Turned the Tide in the not lead the operation, its role was crucial In addition, and in line with the prin- Second World War as a unique provider of intelligence and ciple that “you cannot surge trust,” the By Paul Kennedy logistics support without which success Navy should sponsor more professional Random House, 2013 could not have been achieved. and educational exchanges between its 436 pp. $30.00 Summarizing the volume’s main find- officers and their many counterparts. In ISBN: 978-1846141126 ings, Edward Marolda, formerly of the a budget-constrained environment, such Naval History and Heritage Command, exchanges are tremendously cost-effec- Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald reprises and underscores its central thesis. tive. Relatively speaking, they are low cost His observation deserves to be quoted at items. Yet they provide the foundation length: for creating the kinds of relationships that est-selling author and historian have enabled the navies of the United Paul Kennedy, the Dilworth Pro- The key to the success of several post–Cold States, Britain, Canada, and Australia to B fessor of History and Director of War multinational naval operations work so closely and well together. International Security Studies at Yale involving Australian, Canadian, British, With the Navy likely to play an in- University, has written a stimulating and American navies was the trust, un- creasingly important role in a variety of book about the middle—the middle derstanding, and mutual respect of leaders operational contexts for the foreseeable years of World War II, the middle or and commanders for one another in often future, its ability to work with a host of operational level of war, and the mid- challenging situations. Years of experience different partners will be critical to its dlemen, problem-solvers, and midlevel with combined . operations, at-sea exer- success. You Cannot Surge Trust demon- commanders that made victory pos- cises, shore-based education and training, strates how that success can be achieved. sible. In doing so, he focuses attention and professional and social interaction It should be required reading for all on a largely unexplored portion of the had created a corps of allied naval officers officers who aspire to lead combined war’s history and provides professional confident in the abilities of their foreign maritime operations some time in their historians and general readers a deeper counterparts. The human element was and careers. JFQ understanding of how and why the is the key factor that binds the operations of Allies won World War II. [the four navies] (p. 279). Much of the English-language his- Dov S. Zakheim, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the tory of World War II obscures or bypasses Center for Naval Analyses.