Proceedings of the 1984 Doe Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference

Home , Omega West Reactor

.- 0221-1, CONF-840257(Vol. 2) (DE84012694)

COUF-24C257—Vol.2

DE84 0126 94

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1984 DOE NUCLEAR REACTOR AND FACILITY SAFETY CONFERENCE

Rockville, Maryland February 27-March 1, 1984

VOLUME I!

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety CONF-840257(Voi. 2) (DE84012694) Distribution Category UC-41

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1984 DOE NUCLEAR REACTOR AND FACILITY SAFETY CONFERENCE

Rockville, Maryland February 27-March 1, 1984

VOLUME II

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety

Published by Technical Information Center Office of Scientific and Technical Information United States Department of Energy .

These proceedings were compiled under contract number DE-ACO5-76OR00O33 between the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety, and Oak Ridge Associ- ated Universities. TABLE OF CONTENTS

VCLUME I

Preface - vii Monday, February 27, 1984

CNS Overview 3 J. Maher - U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety

Activities e»id Projects r. 31 P., Barber - U.S., Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety QNS/RC Emergency Activitj.es 59 J. Deal - U.S, Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety Potential Conflict Between Safeguards/Security and Safety 69 N. Klug - U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Proposed Changes in Regulatory Standards Effect on DOE ,.... 79 W. Brynda - Brookhaven National Laboratory Impact, of Post TMI-2 Cleanup Activities on Cleanup and Decommissioning of DOE Facilities 105 H. Burton - EG&G Idaho, Inc.

ASPE/ESS.H Ranarks , 135 J. Mares - Assistant Secretary for Policy and Environment, U.S. Department of Energy R. Davit's - Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health, U.S. Department of Energy

Technical Specifications and Operational Safety Requirements Panel T. Dahl - Oak Ridge National Laboratory 137 L. Durney - EG&G Idaho, Inc c 155 G. McRae - Union Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant 165

Space Reactor Systems and Safety Strategies 177 D. Bunch - U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Space Reactor Projects

Probabilistic Risk Assessment W. Durant - I. E. Dupont de Nemours and Company .. = 181 W. Perkins - I.E. Dupont de Nanours and Company 185

What is a Practical Risk Assessment? 195 E. Howard - Los Alamos National Laboratory Tuesday, February 28, 1984 ORR Activities: Rockwell Hanford 199 A. Hawkins - Rockwell Hanf ord Operations ORR Activities: PUREX , 217 M. Zamorski - U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office ORR Activities: "Nn Reactor 219 P. Carlson - UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. ORR Activities: ACRR Upgrade 233 J. Philbin - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque F. Morris - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque T. Luera - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque ORR Activities: "L" Reactor 243 R. Finley - I.E. Dupont de Nemours and Company ORR Activities: nLn Reactor 259 J. Anderson - U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office VOLUME II Program Line Safety Reviews of Savannah River SARF 271 J. Koelling - Los Alamos National Laboratory Safety Review of Experiments 283 K. Elliott - U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office Overview of Criticality Safety *,. 291 B. Brown - U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety Project 319 J. Thomas - Oak Ridge National Laboratory Radiological Accident Considerations 323 J. Graf - Los Alamos National Laboratory Radiological Accident Considerations 329 J. Elder - Los Alamos National Laboratory Wednesday, February 2S, 1984

Overview of TRADE t „ 343 C. LMinelli - Rockwell International, Rocky Flats Plant Reactor Training Coordination Program 351 E. Treat - EG&G Idaho, Inc.

IV Overview of Job and Task Analysis • 365 D. Gertman - EG&G Idaho, Inc. Job & Task Analysis .» 367 L. Junker - Brookhaven National Laboratory Job Performance Aids . 375 R. Moffitt - UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. Job Analysis 379 C. Minelli - Rockwell International, Rocky Flats Plant Robotics .... , 385 W. Hamel - Oak Ridge National Laboratory Man/Machine Interface 413 R. Lindsay - Argonne National Laboratory - West Human Factors Review of DOE Facilities „ 429 R. Peterson - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Inservice Inspection Panel W. Scott - Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 443 R. CLouse - Union Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant 463 Q. Baird - Hanford Engineering Development Lcjoratory 495 W. Kimble - Argonne National Laboratory - Wost 503 Thursday, March 1, 1984 DOE Headquarters and Operations Office Staff Meeting 513 Germantown, Maryland

Conference Attendees 515

V TUESElAY, FEBHJARY 28, 1984 Los Alamos Safety Review Activities J. J. Koelling Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico

Los Alamos was contacted by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1974 to initiate an independent safety review of the proposed Plutonium Conversion Facility at the Allied General Nuclear Service's Barnwell, South Carolina, plant. Los Alamos was tasked with this effort due to the expertise they developed in the plutonium and safety fields. From 1974 until 1977 Los Alamos assisted the NRC in the safety review of nine commercial nuclear fuel plants, that were either planned or in operation. In addition, safety reviews were initiated on the NRC sponsored research reactors. During this same period, Los Alamos became involved with reviewing the physical security of all operating commercial nuclear power reactors and most research reactors. In 1978, the Department of Energy (DCE) asked Los Alamos to provide a similar independent review for their facilities. By 1984, Los Alamos had participated in the safety reviews on four DOE operated facilities.

In all safety review cases, thos° systems associated with site characteri- zation, e.g., geology, hydrology, were not reviewed. Only those areas directly related to facility safety were analyzed.

In addition to the '.>afety evaluations, there was often a need for review of either environmental assessments or environmental impact statements associated with operation of a facility. These reviews concentrated on essentially the same areas as in the safety reviews paying particular attention to the source terms from hypothetical accidents.

271 ABSTRACT Los Alamos Safety Review Activities

Los Alamos has performed independent safety and environmental reviews or has performed evaluations in specific task areas for both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy (DOE) since initiation of the program in 1974.. During this period reviews were performed on nine commercial and four DOE operated nuclear facilities. Safety reviews were completed on fourteen research reactors. In addition, physical security reviews were performed on all operating commercial nuclear power reactors and most research reactors.

272 (8

SF3

m [Oi (3S1 ruui OIL

273 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT Of SAFETY REVIEWS

WB2 DOE - MEW FlR©fi

Los Alamos REVIEWS PERFORCE:)-1 Review of Env ironment Q I Assessment, Bcbcock and Wllcox Park Township Site. 2 Review of Safety Evaluation Report, Babcock and Wllcox Park Township Site. 3. Review of Environmental Assessment, General Electric Vallecitos Review of Nuclear Center. 4. Review of Safety Evaluation Report, Genera! Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center. 5. Seismic Evaluation of Building 102, General Electric Vollecitos Nuclear Center. 6. Review Summary of PSAR, E>>on Nuclear Fuel Recovery and Recycling Center. 7. Review of License Renewal Application; Environmental Report and Emergency Plan; and Comparison of Renewal Application, Battelle Colurribus Laboratory. *m REVIEWS PERFORMED-2 9. Preliminary Review of PSAR, Aerojet General Nuclear Services. 9. Preliminary Review of SAR, Nuclear Fuel Services West Valley. 10. Review of SAR and some input to EIS, Westinghouse Recycle Fuels Plani. 11. Review of Chapter IV (Environmental Impact Due io' the Implementation of Plutonium Recycle) and Chapter VII (Means for Mitigating Adverse Environmental Effects, Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled Rectors (GESMO)). 12. Some Planning on Decommissioning of Kerr—McGee Cimarron Plant.

13.. Review of FSAR9 Purex, Hanford *4. Preliminary Review of PSAR, Rover Fuel Reprocessing V5. Five Year Upgrade of F SAR, Savannah River Production LICENSING AMENDMENTS EVALUATED

* General Atomic - Increase in the quantities ot explosives for irradiation in GA Reactor beam tubes.

3 * Union Carbide - Increase ;n allowable fission product concentration for singly encapsulated in—core thimbles.

* General Electric - Ther modynami c behavior of GETR fuel in an air environment.

Los Alamos NONPOWER REACTOR REVIEWS

APPLICATION FOR LOS ALAMOS RENEWAL OF • REVIEW SAR BY • VISIT STTE • WRITE TER

N3 00

INCORPORATES

Los Alamos SAVANNAH RIVER REACTOR REVIEW

DOEHQ*8 4 TECHNICAL AREAS SRP/DOE HBJD OFFICE for EENTSFED FOR Syr UPGRADE of SAR REVIEW COMPLETE REVIEW

LOS ALAMOS

* IOCS REVIEW DOCUMENTS and COMPLETE JOMMEMDATK ATMOSPHERIC MODEL toDOEHCTs EffyflERQENCY POWER

Los Alamos "1 Safety Assessment Areas

Q-6 H-1 (WX-8) H-3 CMB-11 ITO

Accident Analysis X X X X Confinement X X X

Ventilation & E>haust X X Process Safety X X

lnstrumenta.fi on X and Control Radiation Safety X

Waste Systems X X

Fire & Explosion X Protection

Support & Utilities \

Structural Design X and Andys is

Critic a lit y Safety X X X

280 AFETY IPHYSIICAL kjRDTY KIM ©f ROJO

* mPI D anxd/bfr REVIEWED flte FOLLOWING LI D) ALL OPERATING COMMERCIAL POWER Bl i) NEARLY AdJL NIONIPOWER REACTORS IB 4) FDUR DOE NUCLEAR FUEL FAOLmES

Los Alamos SAFETY REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS AT ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE

K. Elliott

U. S. Department of Energy

Albuquerque Operations Office

283 SAFETY REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS AT AL

The Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office is responsible

for the safety overview of nuclear reactor and critical assembly facili-

ties at Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and

the Rocky Flats Plant. The important safety concerns with these facili-

ties involve the complex experiments that are performed, and that is the

area emphasized.

A determination is made by AL with assistance from DOE/OMA whether or

not a proposed experiment is an unreviewed safety question. Meetings

are held with the contractor to resolve and clarify questions that are

generated during the review of the proposed experiment. The AL safety

evaluation report is completed and any recommer.dations are discussed.

Prior to the experiment a preoperational appraisal is performed to as-

sure that personnel, procedures, and equipment are in readiness for

operations. During the experiment, any abnormal condition is reviewed

in detail to determine any safety concerns.

284 NUCLEAR REACTOR FACILITIES AND CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITIES DOE/AL

1, SANDiA NATIONAL LABORATORIES A. SPR-II (FAST BURST REACTOR) B. SPR-III (FAST BURST REACTOR) C. ACRR (ANNULAR CORL RESEARCH REACTOR - TANK TYPE WITH

BE0-U02 FUEL)

2, Los ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY A. Los ALAMOS CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY (EIGHT CRITICAL ASSEMBLY MACHINES OF VARIOUS TYPES AND SIZES) B, OMEGA WEST REACTOR (TANK TYPE WITH MTR TYPE FUEL BUNDLES)

3, ROCKY FLATS PLANT (FOUR CRITICAL ASSEMBLY MACHINES)

285 TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS PERFORMED IN AL CONTRACTORS' REACTORS

1. MATERIALS IRRADIATIONS A. URANIUM B. PLUTONIUM C. EXPLOSIVES D. CORROSIVE LIQUIDS E. ELECTRONICS COMPONENTS F, SOIL AND WATER SAMPLES G. BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES H. ORGANIC CHEMICALS I. PLASTICS

2. NEUTRON RADIOGRAPHY A, EXPLOSIVE DEVICES B. ASSEMBLIES

3. ACCIDENT STUDIES EXPERIMENTS A. FUEL MOTION B. DEBRIS BED C. RADIATION DETECTOR RESPONSES

4. REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS EXPERIMENTS A. CORE PHYSICS B. FLUX PROFILES C. SYSTEMS CHECKOUT D. BENCH MARKS FOR COMPUTER CODE VERIFICATION E. CALIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTATION

286 SAFETY ASPECTS OF RF.T^Qu EXPERIMENTS

1. MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENTS A. rlSSIONABLE B. EXPLOSIVE C. CORROSIVE D. TOXIC E. FLAMMABLE

2. PHYSICAL AND NEUTRONIC PROPERTIES A. MELTING POINTS B. STRENGTH C. REACTIVITY D. CHANGE OF STATE E. HEAT CAPACITY

3. CONTAINMENT AND CONFINEMENT A. DESIGN B. MATERIALS C. SEALS D. TESTING E. PRESSURE

4. EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTS ON THE REACTOR A. REACTIVITY CHANGES B. COOLING FLOW C. RADIATION LEVELS

287 5. EFFECT OF THE REACTOR ON EXPERIMENTS

A. CHANGE OF STATE

B. TEMPERATURE CHANGES

C. PRESSURE CHANGES

D. NEUTRON ACTIVATION

E. EMBRITTLEMENT

6. HANDLING OF EXPERIMENTS

A. LOADING AND UNLOADING

B. SHTELDING

C. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS

7. OPERATIONS

A. INITIAL CHECKOUT OF EXPERIMENTS

B. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

C. OPERATING PROCEDURES AND CHECKLISTS

D. CONTRACTOR INTERNAL REVIEWS

E. SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION

F. EMERGENCY PLANS

G. POST-IRRADIATION PLANNING

H. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

28-8 ALO REVIEW OF REACTOR EXPERIMENTS

NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED EXPERIMENT DURING OUR INFORMAL VISITS OR BY TELEPHONE

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF PROPOSED EXPERIMENT WITH CONTRACTOR PEOPLE

APPROVAL BY CONTRACTOR'S SUBMITTAL TO ALO FOR APPROVAL REACTOR SAFETY COMMITTEE OF THOSE EXPERIMENTS WHICH OF THOSE EXPERIMENTS WHICH INTRODUCE NEW SAFETY CON- HAVE BEEN PERFORMED PREVIOUS CERNS OR HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED LY OR WHICH INTRODUCE NO AS UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS. SIGNIFICANT NEW SAFETY CON- CERNS. REVIEW OF ALL SIG- NIFICANT EXPERIMENTS.

SUBMITTAL TO DOE/HQ CONCURRENT REVIEW BY

FOR APPROVAL OF OTHER OSD BRANCHES t UNREVIEWED SAFETY IF NECESSARY. QUESTIONS.

289 DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS AND CONCERN? WITH CONTRACTOR PEOPLE

LIST OF SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS SENT TO CONTRACTOR FOR WRITTEN REPLIES-

REVIEW WRITTEN REPLIES AND RESOLVE ISSUES WHICH ARE OUTSTANDING.

WRITE EVALUATION, DISCUSS RECOMMENDATIONS WITH CONTRACTOR, APPROVE EXPERIMENT (FOR UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS OET DOE/HQ APPROVAL.)

PERFORM PREOPERATIONAL REVIEW, FOLLOW-UP TO ASSURE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED.

KEEP INFORMED DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE EX- PERIMENT, DISCUSS ANY UNUSUAL OR UNEXPECTED OPERATIONS OF EQUIPMENT DURING THE EXPERIMENT.

290 OVEWIEW OF CRITICALITY SAFETY Blake P. Brown Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy

ABSTRACT This presentation provides a historical perspective of actions prior to rebuilding the DOE nuclear criticality safety efforts in 1982 and reports key actions/events in the nuclear criticality safety area that have occurred since 1982. Members of the Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety (Panel) Project are listed. Selection criteria are identified for projects in the Nuclear Criticality Safety Outlay Program, and planned projects to maintain and enhance an effective nuclear criticality safety program for prevention of a nuclear criticality accident, are described. Criticality safety funding for FY 1981 thi"ugh FY 1985 is summarized.

291 OVERVIEW OF CRITICALITY SAFETY

BLAKE P. BROWN DIVISION OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY

PSF-2/84 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

• DOE POST-THREE MILE ISLAND INITIATIVES - CRAWFORD COMMITTEE REPORT-MARCH 1981

• DOE ACTION PLAN - MAY 1981

U> • ONS ESTABLISHED-JUNE 1981

• REBUILD NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY EFFORT- 1982 - INITIATED OUTLAY PROGRAM IN CRBTICALITY SAFETY - INITIATED ACTIONS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS

PSF-2/84 KEY ACTIONS/EVENTS

CRITICALITY SAFETY NEEDS IDENTIFIED BY WEAPONS CRITICALITY COMMITTEE - JULY 1982

- RECOMMENDED PROJECTS FOR FUNDING - RECOMMENDED ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PANEL

PSF-2/84 KEY ACTIONS/EVENTS (COIMT'D)

NUCLEAR CRIT1CAUTY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY (PANEL) PROJECT ESTABLISHED AT ORNL JULY 1983

- REVIEW AND CONCURRENCE OF COUNCIL ON NUCLEAR SAFETY - REVIEW AND ADVICE FROM WEAPONS CRITICALITY COMMITTEE - REVIEW AND ADVICE FROM OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

PSF-2/M NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY (CON'T)

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR JOE THOMAS, ORNL

SPECIALIST CONTRACTOR DAVID R. SMITH LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY ADOLF GARCIA ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY (WEST) GLEN PRICE BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY CALVIN M. HOPPER UNION CARBIDE CORP. (Y-12 PLANT) 0. CLINTON KOLAR LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY DONALD R. FINCH SAVANNAH RIVER LABORATORY C, L. BROWN ROCKWELL HANFORD COMPANY ROBERT E. WILSON EXXON NUCLEAR IDAHO KEY ACTIONS/EVENTS (CONT'D)

• MOU SIGNED WITH JAPAN IN THE AREA OF CRITICALITY DATA DEVELOPMENT- AUGUST 1983

- PROVIDES PROGRAMS FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CRITICAL MASS LABORATORIES AT PNL AND LOS ALAMOS - DATA AVAILABLE FOR U.S.

PSF-2/84 KEY ACTIONS/EVENTS (CONT'D)

• PROGRAM PLAN DEVELOPED FOR LOS ALAMOS CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY FOR AT LEAST 3 YEARS, DECEMBER 1983

- REVIEW OF LOSS OF LACAF BY NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY ho AND SAFETY PROJECT VD 00 - FUNDING FROM OFFICES OF MILITARY APPLICATION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION, NUCLEAR ENERGY (JAPANESE WORK) AND OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY - ADVISORY AND COORDINATING GROUPS ESTABLISHED

PSF-2/84 KEY ACTIONS/EVENTS (CONT'D)

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY CONFERENCE

- LAS VEGAS, MARCH 20-22, 1984 - OPTIONAL TOUR OF THE NTS, MARCH 19, 1984

PSF-2/84 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY OUTLAY PROGRAM

o o

PSF2/M NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PROJECTS

PURPOSE ENHANCE AND MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PROGRAM TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY ACCIDENT

STATUS • PROJECTS COMPLETED, UNDERWAY OR PLANNED IN o THE FOLLOWING AREAS: - PHYSICS OF CRSTICALITY - KNOWLEDGE OF FACTORS AFFECTING CRITICALITY - COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITY - COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM

• NRC SPONSORED RESEARCH IS SMALL AND DECLINING FURTHER

PSF-2/M PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA

• ASSESS/ENHANCE SAFETY OF DOE's NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

• COVER GENERIC NUCLEAR SAFETY PROBLEMS

• PROVIDE SUPPORT, ASSISTANCE, AND GUIDANCE AND/OR DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL TECHNIQUES, METHODS, AND SYSTEMS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR SAFETY

• PROV5DE INPUT TO SAFETY POLICY, STANDARDS, ORDERS, AND GUIDANCE AND/OR SUPPORT DOE's INDEPENDENT SAFETY ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW EFFORTS

• NO DUPLSCATION OF EFFORTS SPONSORED BY NRC OR DOE PROGRAM OFFICES

• NO PRE-EMPTION OR RELIEF OF DOE PROGRAM OFFICES OF BASELINE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES

PSF-2/84 PROJECT TITLE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING GUIDELINES

PURPOSE • SURVEY EXISTING TRAINING PROGRAMS AND DEVELOP A GENERIC CRI1 ICALITY SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAM GUIDE • CONDUCT ASSESSMENT OF COMPUTER BASED TRAINING

CONTRACTOR o ORDU

STATUS - PROJECT COMPLETED FY83 - "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING: GUIDELINES FOR DOE CONTRACTORS" PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 1983 - TRADE ORGANIZATION UNDERTOOK PREPARATION OF "A GUIDE TO COMPUTER BASED TRAINING" PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 1982; UPDATE TO BE PUBLISHED FY84 PROJECT TITLE COMPUTATION PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

PURPOSE ASSESS LONG-STANDING DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CRITICAL EXPERIMENTS WITH AQUEOUS FISSILE SOLUTIONS AND CALCULATIONS OF THE EXPERIMENTS. CODES PREDICT A GREATER DEGREE OF SAFETY THAN ACTUALLY EXESTS

O CONTRACTOR OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS - PROJECT STARTED SEPTEMBER 1982 - PLANNED COMPLETION, MID-1984 - NEEDED EXPERIMENTS IDENTIFIED BY THE ASSESSMENT WILL BE PROPOSED FOR THE LOS ALAMOS CRITICAL FACILITY

PSF-2/84 PROJECT T6TLE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY PURPOSE ASSIST DOE IN MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PROGRAM WHICH WILL: - IMPROVE THE CRITICALITY SAFETY DISCIPLINE - PROMOTE COMMUNICATION - FOSTER A CONTINUING COMMUNITY OF CRITICALITY SPECIALISTS o - PROVIDE SPECIALIZED TRAINING (INTERNSHIPS) Ln TO SELECT CONTRACTOR STAFF - SUPPORT SPECIALIZED STUDIES (SAFETY ANALYSIS) CONTRACTOR OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY STATUS - ONGOING PROJECT, STARTED IN FY 1983 - FIRST SPECIALIST MEETING IN LAS VEGAS, MARCH 19-22, 1984

PSF-2/84 PROJECT TITLE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY INFORMATION SYSTEM

PURPOSE - PROVIDE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY INFORMATION TO SAFETY SPECIALISTS AND DEVELOP COMPUTERIZED DATA BASES - ESTABLISH A COMPUTER-BASED FOCAL POINT OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY INFORMATION AND DATA WHICH CAN BE ACCESSED FROM REMOTE COMPUTER TERMINALS BY TELEPHONE DIAL-UP - USE TIS AS HOST COMPUTER FOR INTERACTIVE DATABASE I MANAGEMENT, MODELING AND COMMUNICATION - PUBLISH DATA OF COMMON INTEREST

CONTRACTOR LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS - ONGOING PROJECT, STARTED SEPT '82 - CURRENTLY IN DEVELOPMENT PHASE - EXPANSION OF USER COMMUNITY PLANNED

PSF-2/84 PROJECT TITLE DEVELOP NEUTRON CRITICALITY ALARM SYSTEM

PURPOSE DEVELOP AND CHARACTERIZE A COMPACT NEUTRON DETECTOR FOR USE WHERE GAMMA BACKGROUND RADIATION IS HIGH AND LARGE STRUCTURES ATTENUATE GAMMA RADIATION o 1 - TO OPERATE AT LOW-VOLTAGE BIAS - TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH CONVENTIONAL DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND/OR COMPUTER SYSTEMS

CONTRACTOR LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS - PROJECT STARTED FEBRUARY 1933 - 1ST FIELD TEST: AUG-SEPT. 1983 - PLANNED COMPLETION, APRIL 85 PSF-2/84 PROJECT T^TLE CRITSCALITY SAFETY TRAINING

PURPOSE PROVIDE 2 AND 5 DAY NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY o 00 COURSES WHICH INCLUDE LECTURES AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN ACTUAL CRITICAL EXPERIMENTS CONTRACTOR LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS ONGOING

PSF-2/84 PROJECT TITLE REVISION OFTID-702S

PURPOSE REVISE AND UPDATE TID-7028, "CRITICAL DIMENSIONS OF SYSTEMS CONTAINING 23BU, ^PU AND 233U" TO CORRECT ERRORS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN THIS 20 YEAR OLD DOCUMENT o - RE-EXAMINE DATA - INCORPORATE EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED DURING THE PAST 20 YEARS - ADD SOME DATA DEVELOPED BY VALIDATED CALCULATiONAL TECHNIQUES CONTRACTOR LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS PROJECT TITLE INSTRUMENTATION PROOFING SUPPORT

PURPOSE PROVIDE CAPABILITY AT THE LOS ALAMOS CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY (LACAF) FOR VAUDATION OF CRITICALITY ALARM AND RADIATION INSTRUMENTS FOR DOE CONTRACTORS

CONTRACTOR LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS

PLAN TO ••« • • PSF-2/84

PROJECT TITLE CRITICALITY INFORMATION EXCHANQE WITH FRENCH PURPOSE OBTAIN EXTENSIVE EXPERIMENTAL DATA FROM THE FRENCH "SILENE" CRITICALITY MACHINE ON PRESSURE WAVES, RADIOLYTIC GAS FORMATION, AND TEMPERATURE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM NUCLEAR EXCURSIONS IN FISSILE AQUEOUS SOLUTIONS - U.S. WOULD DEVELOP MODELS OF THE DATA FOR THE FRENCH - ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH DATA WOULD PROVIDE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. TO OBTAIN SAFETY INFORMATION - U.S. HAS NO MACHINE TO DO SIMILAR EXPERIMENTAL WORK CONTRACTOR LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY STATUS PROJECT TITLE CRITICALITY COMPUTATIONAL CENTER

PURPOSE DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN STATE-OF-THE-ART COMPUTER COMPUTATIONAL METHODS FOR ANALYZING CRITICALITY SAFETY PARAMETERS

CONTRACTOR OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS PLAN TO START IN FY 1985 PROJECT TITLE SUBCRITICAL MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE

PURPOSE ANALYZE RESULTS OF COMPLETED EXPERIMENTS MADE WITH AN INSTRUMENT UTILIZING * Cf-SOURCE-D RIVEN NEUTRON NOISE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE TO DETECT AND WARN OF POTENTIAL ACCUMULATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

CONTRACTOR OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS PLAN TO START ANALYSIS IN FY 1986 PROJECT TITLE SAFETY ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS

PURPOSE DEVELOP EFFICIENT NUCLEAR CRITICALITY CALCULATIONAL TOOLS THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED ON SMALL COMPUTERS

CONTRACTOR LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATUS PLAN TO START IN FY-86

PSF-2/84 PROJECT TITLE UPDATE TID-7016

PURPOSE REVISE AND UPDATE TID-7016 "NUCLEAR SAFETY GUIDE"

CONTRACTOR TO BE DETERMINED

STATUS PLAN TO START IN FY 86 CRITICALITY SAFETY FUNDING HISTORV

(al PROJECTS FY-81 FY-82 FY-83 FY-84 FY-8S

ASSESSMENT OF CRITICALITY SAFETY PNL

CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING LANL

CRITICALITY SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM LLNL

COMPUTATION PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ORNL

CRITICALITY ALARM DEVELOPMENT LLNL

CRITICALITY TRAINING SURVEY ORAU

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY ORNL REVISE TID 7028 LLNL

TOTALS $50K $279K $753K $755K

NOTES: (a) FY-84 DOLLARS PER OCTOBER FINANCIAL PLAN PSF-2/84 NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY DIVISION FY-84 ACTUAL BUDGET - $3,330

REACTOR SAFETY 4 PROJECTS $875K NUCLEAR FACILITY 26% 2 PROJECTS $478K 14%

CRITICALITY SAF. NUCLEAR TECH. 5 PROJECTS $590K 4 PROJECTS $552K 18% 17%

TRAINING L5 PROJECTS $835K 25%

PSF-2/M NUCLEAR CRITICALITY TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY PROJECT

J. T. Thomas

Computer Sciences Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

ABSTRACT

A status of nuclear eriticality safety is presented. The Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety Project, funded at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory by the Office of Nuclear Safety, DOE Headquarters, is described. The Project is intended to enhance cooperation among contractor criticality safety people and promote a coherent DOE program in nuclear criticality safety.

INTRODUCTION

It became apparent to the Albuquerque Operations Office a few short years ago that nuclear criticality safety as practiced within the DOE complex was in danger of becoming less than adequate. A clear, already developing dilemma was recognized - that unless some direct effort was made to provide personnel trained in nuclear criticality safety to replace the experienced specialists who would be leaving the field in the next five or more years, the quality of safety assessments could be expected to diminish. Further, communication and cooperation among the different contractors had weakened to the point that - by appearances, if not in fact, - their conduct was not significantly different from that of independent competitive corporations.

In addition, nuclear criticality safety as a 'discipline' - the word here describes an activity not an applied science or branch of nuclear engineering - has come to rely upon calculated values of k more heavily than can be justified by the existing experimental data. Eerious deficiencies have been identified that can only be corrected by scientific research into the physics of the fission process. It is clear that the neutron multiplication factor is a necessary but not sufficient test to confirm the reiiaDility of computational methods.

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319 Finally, the subject of economics cannot be ignored. Available funding is limited, and the assurance of future funding is uncertain. Those funds allocated by ONS in support of field task proposals should benefit the Department's activities. They must be integrated with and be supportive of contractor activities. Contractor safety groups should have an interest in any critical experiment being performed to ascertain that useful, needed, basic information will be obtained through specific measurements or extended experimentation. To repeat an experiment in the future will be difficult, if not impossible, to justify. Criti'ality safety does impact program planning, schedules, and cost in operations with fissionable materials. We can no longer be content with blind, conservative subcriticality in those activities. Efforts to understand in better detail why operations arc subcritical should be encouraged, and, in particular, the characteristics of parameters influencing subcriticality should be codified. Those funds designated for criticality safety must be cost effective.

The DOE Office of Nuclear Safety has established a project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory designed to provide assistance to ONS in evaluating and maintaining programs, adequate in scope and effort, in the areas of computationEi capabilities, basic experimental research, development of criticality safety information for safety guidance, and communication of the results to the safety community. These services are also available to the DOE Program and Field Offices.

The purpose of the project is to assist the Department of Energy in maintaining an efficient and cost effective nuclear criticality safety program which will improve the criticality safety discipline, improve communication within the DOE complex, and foster a continuing community of specialists in the physics of criticality.

The ONS in conjunction with ORNL has appointed a panel of consultants to the project. These are capaDle, experienced people selected from a list of nominees recommended by the Field Offices.

The consultants are:

C. L. Brown, Rockwell Hanford Operations D. R. Finch, Savannah River Laboratories A. S. Garcia, Argonne National Laboratory C. M. Hopper, Union Carbide Corporation; Y-12 0. C. Kolar, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory G. A, Price, Brookhaven National Laboratory D. R. Smith, Los Alamos National Laboratory R. E. Wilson, Exxon Idaho Nuclear Company.

320 It is the consensus of the Panel that activities should be supported in four interrelated area3. These are:

. Physics of Criticality

. Knowledge of Factors Affencing Criticality

. Computational Capabilities

. Communications.

The present understanding of the fission process is incomplete. Evidence the discrepancy between experiment and calculations, the acceptance of computer code validation exhibiting biases, and the almost adversarial relation between those performing differential measurements and those involved with integral quantities. Programmatically funded experiments present an opportunity for the performance of more detailed scientifically oriented experiments. Discretionary time should be allotted to basic research..

The area of parametric studies will contribute to the knowledge base upon which concepts of criticality safety depend. Understanding the factors that affect criticality - and the unexplored region of subcriticality - is essential to advancing practices to the state of a discipline. This will require a thorough analysis of experimental data, the development and the evaluation of models and safety concepts in order to produce sound generalizations of information suitable to design and operations engineers.

There is need to sustain the computational codes used throughout the complex. This will require code development and continuing maintenance, improving users' abilities through resident training opportunities, and providing assistance and services to the complex in the implementation and use of these important tools.

The fourth area, communications, is the primary purpose of the preceding three areas. We need to stimulate cooperation among contractor safety groups, their managements, and among those having oversight of safety responsibilities in the Field Offices in order to effectively work toward more unified criticality safety practices within the DOE complex. An attitude of mutual helpfulness will promote this goal and promote the identification of needs and deficiencies that should be addressed.

The Laboratory and ONS are joint sponsors of a Conference on Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety to be held at the Dunes Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada during March 19-23, 1984. The Conference is for the DOE and its contractor personnel and is intended as a forum for those having interests and responsibilities in nuclear criticality safety. We hope to encourage participation in areas needing attention. The formation of working groups

321 in the following subjects should foster cooperation and the advancement of a discipline.

. Experiments

, Physics Criteria for Benchmark Experiments

. Evaluation Techniques

. Parameter Studies

. Accident Analyses

. Training

. Fission Process Theory

. Rules, Regulations, DOE Orders and Standards.

322 A GUIDE TO RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

Joe Graf Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico

ABSTRACT

A guide to radiological accident analysis for DOE nonreactor facilities is now in draft form. It covers models and parameters to be used in comparing specific facilities to appropriate dose criteria for major accidental releases of radionuclides. The major benefit will be to put accident analysis for DOE facilities on a common technical and philosophical basis; it will also serve as a resource for DOE analysts, promote a more general consistency within DOE, and provide documentation of the DOE approach.

SUMMARY

A guide to radiological accident analysis for DOE nonreactor facilities is being drafted at Los Alamos. The guidance will cover models and parameters used in comparing specific facilities to appropriate dose criteria for major accidental releases of radionuclides. It is intended to apply to siting and major design features of new facilities only. Having such a guide will promote a consistent approach within DOE, putting accident analysis on a common technical and philosophical basis. A thorough peer review is in progress to ensure that current practices are adequately described. Work on this guide began in the fall of 1982 as a result of our assessment of a planned facility that would house operations involving both high explosives and radioactive materials. Both Chapter XXI and Chapter XXII of then draft DOE Order 6*130 could be applied, bu*" the criteria were different. Also the models and parameters used could significantly affect the conclusion. Almost all DOE facilities are so far below the limiting criteria that the analyst can have a free hand in picking models and parameters. However in those cases where a facility approaches the limits, then the selection of comparison techniques can become critical. The guide primarily addresses the criteria and techniques appropriate for major accidents. Additional benefits the guide will provide are a resource for DOE safety analysts and reviewers, a more general consistency within DOE, and documentation of the DOE approach.

323 A Guide to Radiological Accident .E- Considerations

" Joseph Graf ACCIDENT ANALYSIS GUTOE

• Rodiobgicd Accidents

• New DOE Facilities

• Non - reactor Nuclear Facilities

• Not a New Requirement FUNCTION OF GUIDE

Aid to Analyst

Promote Consistency

Meet DOE Orders 4)

o m

327 APPROACH:

Review NRC Practice

• Review DOE

• Draft Guide 00

Obtain Peer Review

Iterate on Glide Contents

Make Guide Available REVIEW OF SPECIFIC RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS

John Elder Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico

ABSTRACT

Specific points of guidance provided in the forthcoming document "A Guide to Radiological Accident Considerations for Siting and Design of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities" are discussed. Of these, the following are considered of particular interest to analysts of hypothetical accidents: onsite dose limits; population dose, public health effects, and environmental contamination as accident consequences which should be addressed; risk analysis; natural phenomena as accident initiators; recommended dose models; multiple organ equivalent dose; and recommended methods and parameters for source terms and release amount calculations. Comments are being invited on this document, which is undergoing rewrite after the first stage of peer review.

329 REVIEW OF SPECIFIC RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS

John Elder Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico

SUMMARY

This presentation reviews specific points of guidance provided in the forthcoming document "A Guide to Radiological Accident Considerations for Siting and Design of DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities." Several areas of guidance are of special interest to the safety analyst due to their recent appearance in DOE Order 6430 for implementation. Guidance is provided in other areas which have received inconsistent interpretation or are in a transitional status.

Two diagrams are presented which describe the major steps of (1) accident release analysis and (2) accident consequence analysis. Thereafter, seven major topics are discussed:

Onsite Dose Limits. New limits equal to maximum offsite dose limits are proposed in DOE Order 6430 and are applicable to a maximally exposed individual at a nearby but separately managed facility.

Consequences Not Covered by Numerical Guidance. Population dose, public health effects, and environmental contamination should also be addressed. The Guide suggests conditions under which these should be addressed.

Risk Analysis. Although risk criteria are not yet in force within DOE, either qualitative or quantitative risk analyses are performed at most DOE sites. Probabilistic methods are encouraged, if performed by a trained analyst, and supported by adequate data bases.

Natural Phenomena. Site-specific descriptions of design basis tornados or earthquakes are forthcoming. Guidance on the selection of static and/or dynamic earthquake analysis methods is offered. Scarcity of data relating damage and release amounts is noted.

Dose Models. A transition from ICRP 2 dose models to ICRP 30 or other dose models is in progress within DOE. Although common dose factors are not offered, use of common parameters in dose models is suggested.

Multiple Organ Equivalent Dose. When multiple organs receive dose from the same exposure, a dose equivalent to whole body dose should be calculated for comparison with dose limits.

Source Terms and Release Amounts. Release fractions and reduction and removal fractions used in release amount calculations are suggested, based on existing data.

330 Review of Specific Radiological Accident Considerations

- John Elder EXTERNAL INITIATOR ACCIDENT RELEASE STEPS

EARTHQUAKE AIRCRAFT TORNADO EXPLOSIONS FLOOD OTHERS SITE BOUNDARY OTHERS

ELEVATED RELEASE

SOURCE REDUCTION L^ TERM AND REMOVALr—^-T LEVEL LI —'-> PRIMARY/ZCONFINEMENT RELEASE | J INTERNAL INITIATOR: I EXPLOSION. FIRE. CRITICALITY, OR LEAKS \ X \SECONDARY CONFINEMENT AQUATIC JU -^-^ RELEASE W XX A X X /TERTIAHV CONFINEMENT XXX

DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION RADIONUCCIDES MODE QUANTITY NATURAL REMOVAL QUANTITY PATHWAY FINAL FORM FILTRATION LOCATION TRACTION PARTICLE SIZE TRAPPING INITIAL FORM SOLUBILITY OTHER ESF ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE STEPS

MAXIMUM MAXIMUM ONSITE OFFSITE ELEVATED ATMOSPHERIC DOSE DOSE RELEASE DISPERSION

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION GROUND LEVEL RELEASE POPULATION PUBLIC DOSE HEALTH EFFECTS AQUATIC AQUATIC RELEASE DISPERSION

\ | DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION | METEOROLOGY DILUTION INHALATION DIRECTION PATHWAY IMMERSION DISTANCE MODELS INGESTION MODIFICATIONS MODELS MODELS ONSITE DOSE UM1TS

• IDCAT10N

METHODODGY

Los Alamos National Laboratory Los AlamosJtew Mexico 87545 CONSEQUENCES NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY NUMERICAL GUIDANCE

POPULATION DOSE

PUBUC HEALTH EFFECTS

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

Los Alnmos Natic.-sal Laboratory Los AlanwiNew Mexico 87545 RISK ANALYSIS

• NO RISK

PERFORMED BY LOCAL OPTION

• PRA BKXXJRAGB), F....

• MAJOR DATA BASES REQURED

Los Alamos National I Los Alamo&New Mexico 87 NATURAL PHENOMENA

• EVBtf DESCRIPTKDN • STATIC OR DYNAMIC ANALYSIS • TORNADO DISPERSION • DAMAGE/RBEASE DATA

Los Alnmos National Labomlory LosAlamos^tewMexkx) 87545 DOSE MODELS

oo ICRP 2 OR ICRP 30 OR OTHER

• COMMON DOSE FACTORS

Los Alamos National Laboratory Los AlamosJ*w Mexico 87545 MULTIPLE ORGAN EQUIVALENT DOSE

• EOAJIVALW TO WHOLE BODY DOSE • BASED ON COMMON HEALTH RISK

Los Alamos National Laboratory Los AlamosJ^lew Mexico 87545 SOURCE TERMS AND RELEASE AMOUNTS

o RELEASE FRACTIONS

• REDUCTION AND REMOVAL FRACTIONS

Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos,New Mexico 87545 WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984 OVERVIEW OF TRADE Carol K. Minelli Rockwell International (Rocky Flats) Golden, Colorado

ABSTRACT Training Resources and Date Exchange (TRADE) refers to a series of activities designed to increase coinmunication and exchange of ideas, information, and resources among Department of Energy (DOE) contractor facilities in the field of human resource development. TRADE activities are planned and implemented by the DOE Contractor TRADE Committee composed of representatives from ten DOE facilities. The Committee Charter, adopted in November 1978, specifies that:

The purpose of the DOE Contractor Training Resources and Data Exchange Committee (to be known as the TRADE Committee) is to encourage and facilitate the exchange of ideas, techniques, and resources for ii proving human resource development within the DOE contractor community. This may be accomplished through the following: •Training Resources Inventories •Conferences/Workshops •Publications •Task Groups

343 TRADE (TRAINING RESOURCES AND DATA EXCHANGE)

WHAT IS TRADE? Training Resources and Data Exchange (TRADE) refers to a series of activities designed to increase communication and exchange of ideas, information, and resources among Department of Energy contractor facilities in the field of human resource development. TRADE activities are planned and implemented by the DOE Contractor TRADE Executive Committee. The Committee Charter, adopted in November 1978 specifies that: "THE PURPOSE OF THE DOE CONTRACTOR TRAINING RESOURCES EXCHANGE COMMITTEE (TO BE KNOWN AS THE TRADE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE) IS TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS, TECH- NIQUES, AND RESOURCES FOR IMPROVING HUMAN RE- SOURCE DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE DOE CONTRACTOR COMMUNITY. THIS MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE FOLLOWING: - TRAINING RESOURCES INVENTORIES - CONFERENCE/WORKSHOPS , - PUBLICATIONS - TASK GROUPS"

HBO IS INVOLVED IN TRADE ACTIVITIES? The Department of Energy contractor system is comprised of over 70 laboratories and production facilities owned by DOE and operated by independent organizations under the pro- visions of the prime contract. Currently the DOE contractor network includes over 100,000 workers and capital invest- ments greater than $12 billion. Two-thirds of these facilities have participated in one or more TRADE activities within the last six years.

BOH IS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INVOLVED? The strength of TRADE rests with its emphasis on peer-to-peer exchange. TRADE activities are undertaken by DOE contractors for DOE contractors. Some TRADE activities have also proven to be beneficial to organizations outside of the DOE system, including other federal agencies and educational institutions. Representatives from the Office of Industrial Relations (OIR), DOE serve as advisors to the TRADE Committee. From the very beginning, OIR has supported TRADE as a mechanism for maintaining the effectiveness and quality of the contractor workforce. The Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS), DOE supports TRADE activities related to training systems development and nuclear safety training.

344 WHAT HAS BEQJ AGOCMPLISBED BY TRADE MEMBERS? The Eighth National TRADE Conference, to be held in the Richland, Washington area, on October 22-24, 1984, is one major TRADE activity. Sessions will concentrate on presenting "how-to" information and resources available for participants to take back to their facilities and put to immediate use. Repre- sentatives from the DOE contractor system will share information and resources about training technologies during the workshops and at the TRADEing Post exchange room. Videotapes, computer programs, texts, and other training resources will be available for viewing and sharing. In October 1979 the TRADE Committee compiled the first INVENTORY OF TECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAMS. The INVENTORY, which has been updated for the second time, describes course objectives and resources used by Department of Energy contractors in providing over 600 technical training courses to employees. The purpose of the INVENTORY is to facilitate a shared use of materials by contractors experiencing similar training needs. More than 35 training specialists in numerous technical areas participated in planning sessions for the 1983 update of the INVENTORY. It is the Committee's intention to continue to involve as many experts as possible in TRADE projects such as this to ensure that the resulting documents are useful to contractor personnel throughout the DOE system. The shared use of materials by a number of similar organizations will help verify material validity and reliability; effectiveness and relevance of the materials can be tested repeatedly in response to a variety of needs. As the materials are used more widely, they will become more precise. If they are found to prove useful in a variety of teaching environments, then contractor sharing of training technologies will have provided a preliminary step to the transfer of such technologies outside the DOE system. An INVENTORY OF NONTECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAMS as well as an INVENTORY OF MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAMS have also been completed (1982) and will be updated during the summer of 1984. On March 30, 1982, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between TRADE and the Federal Laboratories Consortium for Technology Transfer (FLC), a network of over 200 federal facilities dedicated to ensuring optimum utilization of the results of federally sponsored research and development. The agreement provides a means for TRADE and FLC members to exchange ideas, disseminate research findings and pursue joint projects. TRADE is also responsible for updating the DIRECTORY OF DOE AND CONTRACTOR HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL for the Office of Industrial Relations, DOE. This DIRECTORY provides the framework within which the exchanges of information take place. Additional TRADE activities include the shared development of actual training materials for use by several DOE contractors, an analysis of the supply and demand for health physics technicians throughout the system, an assessment of tuition aid programs administered by DOE contractors, a TRADE GUIDE TO COMPUTER-BASED TRAINING, developed by an ad hoc task force and the completion of a TRADE GUIDE FOR TRAINING THE OCCASIONAL TRAINER.

345 WHO SERVES ON THE TRADE EXECUTIVE OOmTETEE? Nine rotating members and one permanent ORAU member comprise the TRADE Executive Committee. The ORAU representative serves as TRADE Executive Director as well as a voting member of the Committee. The Office of Industrial Relations (OIR) serves in an advisory capacity. All members serve three year terms (members may repeat terms if they are renominated and selected). New members are nominated and selected at the Spring Comnittee Meeting. All members officially begin and end their terms of service at the appropriate Fall TRADE conferences. If a vacancy occurs between the Spring meeting and Fall conference, the Committee will fill the vacancy during the Committee meeting preceding the conference.

HOW ARE THE MEMBERS SELECTED? Three criteria are used for membership consideration: 1. Location of the organization represented by the individual (NOTE: location within the DOE contractor system is defined by geographic area and operations office). 2. Type of organization represented by the individual (NOTE: type is defined as production, R&D, or maintenance and support). 3. Area(s) in which the individual has specific expertise (e.g., management,, employee development, technical training). All individuals under consideration for membership shall be nominated by current Conunittee members and assessed against these criteria as reasonably as is feasible. In an effort to involve as many individuals as possible from the DOE system, the Committee tries to put only a minimal number of requirements on prospective members„ The Committee has determined that new members shall: - accept only with the support of their organization management. - agree to attend two (2) Committee meetings per year, - agree to participate in the annual Fall TRADE conference, - agree to provide input (verbal, written) on human resource development issues addressed by the TRADE Committee.

BOW ABE TRADE ACTIVITIES SELECTED? As the number of TRADE activities has increased, the Committee has taken action to ensure that all projects address TRADE objectives. The Committee has established two conditions: 1. TRADE will support only those projects which will benefit DOE contractors systemwide, 2. TRADE will not undertake any projects which require the use of classified information.

346 If an individual or organization is interested in completing a project under TRADE, the following steps should be taken: 1. A short, summarized description of the project in which those actions requested of the Committee are clearly identified should be sent to the Executive Director, who will send the description to every Committee member. 2. Committee members will inform the Chairman of their reactions to each project. 3. If Committee members have viewed the project favorably, the Chairman will designate a project liaison who will not be directly involved in project activities but will be responsible for ensuring that the project meets (and continues to meet) TRADE objectives. 4. The liaison will serve as the information source for that project and will report to the Committee as requested.

WHAT ARE TRADE'S OPERATING GOIDEUNES? In October 1983 the TRADE Executive Committee adopted the following guidelines to provide the framework for TRADE projects and activities: 1. TRADE activities shall be undertaken by DOE GOCO personnel to meet DOE GCCO concerns, 2. The Executive Committee shall be the decision-making body for all TRADE policies, projects ana project sponsors. The Executive Director shall have primary responsibility for implementing Committee decisions, 3. TRADE is not an advocacy organization, 4. TRADE shall not duplicate the resources of professional organizations in human resource development-related areas, 5. TRADE shall encourage the formation of special interest groups and training subgroups, 6. TRADE shall undertake activities in all areas of human resource development.

WHAT TRADE PUBLICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE?

1983. This directory lists personnel in DOE Headquarters, field operations offices, and contractors who are involved with training and ether aspects of human resource development. (Earlier editions issued Septenber 1982, June 1981, October 1979, and June 1978.) Technical Training Programs Inventory. December 1984. Almost 700 professional, skill, craft, and trade-level courses provided by DOE contractors are included in this inventory of technical training. The courses are divided by subject matter into one of five categories: 1) computer sciences, (2) crafts, 3) engineering, sciences, and technology, 4) health and safety, and 5) plant and systems operations. Each course is described in detail; all identify a contact person for further information and most provide program resources which are available for exchange. (Earlier editions issued in October 1981 and April 1978.)

347 Nontechnical Training Programs Inventory. September 1982. This inventory contains descriptions of 420 courses and programs provided by DOE contractors to their employees in nontechnical training areas. The courses are divided inco nontechnical courses for technical and professional staff, nontechnical courses for administrative and technical support staff, and nontechnical courses targeted for other segments of the workforce. The subject matter of the courses include such areas as technical writing, data and word processing, and safety training. Course descriptions provide details regarding means of implementation and evaluation, and contacts for further information. (Document will be updated in 1984).) Management and Supervisory Stills Training Programs Inventory. September 1982. Two hundred and thirty-two courses and programs provided by DOE contractors to their employees are described in this inventory. The courses are divided into two categories: management skills training and supervisory skills training. The subject matter of the courses include such areas as program administration, professional development, and communication. Course descriptions are detailed and include individuals to be contacted for further information. (Document will be updated in 1984.) Health Physics Technicians in the DOE Contractor System. October 1980. This report is an investigation of the Health Physics Technician (HPT) workforce needs of the DOE contractor system. Survey results regarding HPT manpower trends, turnover, job classification, wages, recruitment, and training are examined. Tuition—Aid Program? Q£ Department Of Energy Contractors with Conparison to U.S. Private Industry EfrThiCfition Assistance Programs. September 1982. This report presents a descriptive analysis of tuition-aid programs administered by DOE contractors. Survey results regarding r^-quirements for tuition-aid, allowable expenses, level of reimbursement, and other educational options are examined. With very few exceptions, DOE contractor and U.S. private industry tuition-aid programs were found to be comparable. the Occ3-?jiQP«l Trainerr October 1983. This manual is a resource for professional trainers to use to teach training fundamentals to managers and senior staff who occasionally are assigned training responsibilities. The course is written in a modular format and can be presented in whole (2 days) or in part (1 day or a half-day) . The manual includes lecture/discussion text, group exercises annd evaluation forms. A Guide to Computer-Based Training. March 1984. This guide is both an introduction to computer-based training (CBT), and an analysis of the factors which determine the feasibility and effectiveness of using CBT in various training scenarios. Information is presented on integrating CBT instruction with conventional training; determining the cost-effectiveness of a computer- based training program, CBT uses and limitations, and criteria for system selection, implementation, and evaluation. (Review edition issued September 1982.)

348 WOO IS ON THE 1984 TRADE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE?

JOHN POX C\RQL MINELLI, CHAIRMAN Training Office Croup Leader Manager, Special Projects Los Alamos National Laboratory Rockwell International P. 0. Box 1663, Mail Stop 589 P. 0. Box 464 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 Golden, Colorado 80401 Phone: 843-5247 Phone: 320-4047

EDWARD HANDBERG ALLAN mULSON Training Manager Manager, Employee and Organ. Dev. BG&G Energy Measurements Group Rockwell Hanford Operations 680 East Sunset Road, M/£ C-51 P. O. Box 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89125 Richland, Washington 99352 Phone: 548-0211 Phone: 440-2676

NANCY HERMAN ED TREAT Manager, Trng. and Man, Dev. OP Supervisor, Power Reactor Oper. Trng. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 808 P. O. Box 1625 Livermore, California 94550 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Phone: 532-9514 Phone: 583-4364 GEOR3E JOSEPH BILL WHITE Head, Personnel Development Training Supervisor Oak Ridge National laboratory Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. P. O. Box X Pantex Plant Oak Pidge, Tennessee 37830 P. 0. Box 30020 Phone: 626-4445 Amarillo, Texas 79177 Phone: 572-3725

LAVONNE LEWIS TINA MCKINLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Asst. Personnel Dept. Manager Research Associate REECo Oak Ridge Associated Universities P. O. Box 14400 P. 0. Box 117 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-0117 Phone: 575-2260 Phone: 626-3418

DOE REFRESENianVE: JAMES O'GWIN Director, Division of Contractor Personnel Management U.S. Department of Energy Forrestal Building, MS-4F-C94 Washington, D.C. 20585 Phone: 252-9016 ffiW CAN I FTM) GOT KORE ABOUT TRflDE?

Anyone interested in learning more about TRADE activities should contact Tina McKinley, TRADE Executive Director, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, FTS 626-3418, or commercial 615/576-3418.

349 REACTOR TRAINING COORDINATION PROGRAM

E.P. Treat EG&G Idaho, Inc. Idaho Falls, Idaho

ABSTRACT

The Reactor Training Coordination Program was recently established to assist the Office of Nuclear Safety in promoting improvements in the quality of Category A reactor operator training programs. This presentation provides the key points that are descriptive of the program; including the need for the program and i"he steps that led to the origin of the Reactor Training Coordination Program. The methods of approach and current f-asks are summarized to provide p description nf the cooperative efforts between contractor trainers that are inherent and necessary elements of this program.

351 REACTOR TRAINING COORDINATION PROGRAM

E. P. Treat EG&G Idaho, Inc. Idaho Falls, Idaho

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATION

The Reactor Training Coordination Program was established in June 1983 to assist the Office of Nuclear Safety in promoting improvements in the quality of Category A reactor operator training programs.

The program accomplishes its purpose through coordinated information exchange among contractors and by allowing joint development and consolidation of training program information, methods and materials. The guidance for program tasks comes from the input at semi-annual contractor training information meetings.

T\e Reactor Training Coordination Program is presently developing a Reactor Operator Fundamentals course package which consists of ten subject categories. Each subject category consists of an outline, learning objectives, an examination ba^k to test the learning objectives, and information source references. Other projects include: providing instructor training courses for reactor instructors, consolidation and dissemiration of training information, providing support to accomplish needed improvements in other areas of training programs, and providing short term support for specific needs identified by contractors or DOE-HQ.

The overhead projections which follow provide k-.'y points which are descriptive of the major aspects of the program. The purpose and background explain the need for the program and the step? that led to *"he origin of the program. The method of approach and current tasks describe the unique cooperative efForts between contractors that are inherent in this program.

352 Reactor Training Coordination Program

Presented by E. P. Treat, Manager Reactor Training Branch

Idaho, Inc.

IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING LABORATORY S4 9361 Presentation Outline

• Purpose

• Background • Approach

• Current Tasks

S4 9362 . w assist the Office of Nuclear Safety in promoting improvements in the quality ot Category A reactor operator training programs.

S4 9363 Category A Reactor

• Power level (20 WIW steady state) • Potential fissr ^ product inventory

« Experimental capability

S4 9364 Background

• DOE Order 5480.1 A issued

• Category A reactors developing improvement plans

® On-sste discussions with Category A training managers

® Coordinated approach supported by Office of Nuclear Safety

• June, 1983 meeting among ONS, field offices, and contractor training personnel • EG&G Idaho, under the direction of the Idaho Operations Office was requested to provide overall program support and assistance

S4 9366 Contractor Participants

Argonne National Laboratory

Brookhaven National Laboratory

E. I. DuPont

EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

United Nuclear Corporation

Westinghouse-Hanford S4 9365 Approach

Coordinated information exchange

Joint development and consolidation of training program information, methods and materials

Guidance from semi-annual training manager meetings on selection of program tasks

S4 9367 Current Tasks • Conduct training meetings • Develop Fundamentals course packages

• Summarize and support needed improvements in additional areas

• Fund and coordinate instructor training courses • Consolidate and disseminate training information

• Provide short term support for specific needs S4 9368 Training Manager Meetings

• Conducted at approximately six-month intervals

• Held at Category A reactor locations • Agenda developed based on contractor inputs

• Organized to discuss current problems and common needs

• Agree on specific tasks to accomplish

S4 9369 Fundamentals Packages

Subject areas include:

• Mathematics • Mechanical Science • Classical Physics • Instrumentation and • Nuclear Physics Control • Reactor Theory • Material Science • Electrical Science • Plant Chemistry • Heat Transfer, Fluid • Radiological Protection Flow, and Thermodynamics

S4 9372 Instructor Training • Utilizes 40-hour coursa developed and conducted by UNC

• Designed to provide formal training in instructional techniques for reactor instructors

• Based on INPO Guideline for Technical Instructor Training

» Coordinated through Reactor Training Coordination Program • Conducted two courses to date

• Two courses scheduled in FY'84 S4 9370 Remarks

• Although facilities ara unique, many training program elements are common

• Program promotes improvements in quality of training by providing: — A recognized method for effective communication — Support to assist in development of improved training methods and materials

• Other training programs could benefit from a similar approach S4 9371 OVERVIEW OF JOB AND TASK ANALYSIS

D. I. GERTMAN EG&G, IDAHO

During the past few years the nuclear industry has become concerned with predicting human performance in nuclear power plants. Along with this sensitivity has come the realization that humans respond quite differently from plant hardware and systems. The basic model for decision making includes a component for mediation. The model is stimulus (input) -through put (mediation) - response (output) as apposed to the hardware model of input/ output. People also tend to be less resistant to environmental stresses of temperature, noise, etc. It is also quite difficult to maintain quality assurance of personnel. Our data stores on hardware reliability are, in some cases, quite good. Human error data banks, to dc" e, are not of the same caliber. In addition, equipment either works or it doesn't - we refer to these instances as errors of omission because a relay doesn't trip or an annunciator fails to alarm. Operations personnel are capable of another type of error aside from omission- forgetting to follow a step in a procedure. We refer to this additional type of error as an error of commission. Errors of commission can often times aggravate a situation such as manually defeating a safety system that if left alone would have helped to minimize plant losses. One of the best means we have available to us at the present time to make sure that our training, procedures, job performance aids and plant hardware match the capabilities and limitations of our personnel is by performing a detailed analysis of the tasks required in each job position. The approved method for this type of analysis is referred to as job or task analysis. Job analysis is a broader type of analysis and is usually thought of in terms of establishing overall performance objectives, and in establishing a basis for position descriptions. Task analysis focuses on the building blocks of task performance- task elements and places them within the context of specific performance requirements including time to perform, feedback required, special tools used, and required systems knowledge. The use of task analysis in the nuclear industry has included training validation, preliminary risk screening, and procedures development. 3OB AND TASK ANALYSIS PROJECT AT BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY'S HIGH FLUX BEAM REACTOR

Lance Junker Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York ABSTRACT

The presenter discussed the Job and Task Analysis (JTA) project conducted at Brookhaven National Laboratory's High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR). The project's goal was tc provide 3TA guidelines for use by DOE contractors, then, using the guidelines conduct a JTA for the reactor operator and supervisor positions at the HFBR. Details of the job analysis and job description preparation as well as details of the task selection and task analysis were given, POSL JTA improvements to the HFBR training programs were covered. The presentation concluded with a listing of t.:e costs and impacts of the project.

368 PURPOSE

Discuss JTA Project at Brookhaven

Discuss Usefulness of JTA Output

Discuss Problems Encountered

369 JOB ANALYSIS & DESCRIPTJON

Develop Initial Job Description

Prepare Survey

Survey Administration

Data Analysis

Final Job Description

370 TASK ANALYSIS

Task Selection

Task Interviews & Analysis

QC & Validation

Taxonomy Generation

Data Entry

371 UTILIZATION

Fundamentals Training

OJT Checklists

Plant Description Manual

Retraining

Training Plan Justification

Procedures

372 IMPACT OF JTA

Intangible

Tangible

Long-Term

373 JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS

R. L. Moffitt UNC Nuclear Industries Richland, Washington

ABSTRACT

This presentation discusses the use of Job Performance Aids (JPAs) at N Reactor to assist relatively inexperienced personnel in operating plant support facilities in a safe and efficient manner. In the late 1970s N Reactor was facing a large influx of new inexperienced operators and craftsmen due to retirement of many of the veteran operators and craftsmen. To augment the stepped up training program a program was initiated to utilize Job Performance Aid techniques in upgrading plant operating procedures. These upgraded procedures were called JPAs. The format and specifications for the JPAs were distilled from military specifications for armed forces maintenance procedures and manuals. The results thus far are exceptional; to date approximately 250 JPAs have been produced and not a single operator error has resulted from the use of a JPA formatted procedure.

SUMMARY

Background

UNC Nuclear Industries (UNC) operates Hanford's N Reactor for the Department of Energy (DOE) at Richland, Washington. N Reactor is a dual purpose production reactor whose by-product steam is utilized by Washington Public Power Supply System to generate 860 MW of electricity.

During the early 1970s N Reactor was operated on short term, year to year, contracts from DOE. During this time there was a large conti- gent of experienced operators and craftsmen. Thus the need for training and procedure development were relatively low priority items, especially for the auxiliary operators. The experienced operators ran the auxiliary facilities based un previous training and personal plant knowledge. Training of the few new hires was performed on a one-on-one basis with the experienced personnel.

In the late 1970s the operating contracts for N Reactor were longer term (five years); however, many of the veteran auxiliary operators (approximately 80 percent) and craftmen were scheduled for retirement. This resulted in an immediate need for a responsive training and procedure development program. Adding to the problem was the uniqueness of N Reactor since experience gained at other nuclear facilities is not directly applicable.

The essence of UNC's problem was the need to safely and efficiently operate N Reactor with relatively inexperienced personnel.

Remedy - Job Performance Aids. The shortage of experienced personnel was addressed in two ways. The scope and formality of training were

375 stepped up. However, considering the time required for augmentation of staff, the time required for skilled trainers to become knowledgeable at N Reactor, and the need for development and refinement of course content, it was not realistic to expect measurable results within two years. As an additional remedy where immediate results were possible, UNC implemented a program to improve the quality and coverage of operating procedures. The improved procedures, called JPAs, were to have an increased level of detail to maximize the recording of information from prospective retirees. With the detailed procedures, relatively inexperienced operators would be able to perform complex tasks despite tne ab- sense of intensive classroom or on-the-job training. The format and content specification of JPAs are well suited to the needs of UNC. The specifications are distilled from milita.y specifications for armed forces maintenance procedures and manuals. Characteris- tics of JPAs are a follows: • Simplified, ..tandardized language to facilitate rapid comprehen- sion by the user. • Use of text-keyed illustrations to assist operator performance. 0 Brief, concise, explicit instructions to aid short-term memory. • Highlighted safety information to alert the use to hazards. • Up-front information to assist in effective job planning. The JPAs used at UNC represent the direct application of conclusions from Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences research. The format and content are designed to provide the user with enough information to plan the job and to perform it in a safe, efficient and effective manner. The development process is designed to ensure that the information presented is technically and functionally accurate. Conclusions As was anticipated by UNC, the use of JPAs has allowed relatively inexperienced personnel to operate plant support systems in a safe and efficient manner. An expanded training organization is now in place, but the JPAs are still in demand. Additional benefits observed are: • Increased safety and effectiveness; zero performance error history with JPAs. • Improved retention of procedure steps; operators can visualize procedure steps more readily and retain information longer. • Increased productivity; new hires can contribute to workload earl ier. f Increased morale among new hires; inexperienced personnal feel more confident that procedures are correct.

376 Job Performance Aids have fully met the need for which they were implemented. The user-oriented procedures have permitted more effective use of less experienced personnel without the normal lead time for formal training. Overall safety has been improved where JPAs are used. The safety record cannot be bettered.

377 50 WAYS TO DESCRIBE YOUR JOB OR JOB ANALYSIS AT ROCKY FLATS

Carol K. Minelli Rockwell International (Rocky Flats) Golden, Colorado

ABSTRACT

Rockwell International's Rocky Flats facility recently began a Task Analysis Program to analyze jobs performed by all hourly workers. Since the HRD staff lacked the detailed experience required to initiate this type of project, the firm of Career and Employment Consultants of Lansing, Michigan was chosen to develop the Program and continues to assist the staff in the analysis process.

The goals of the Task A'nlysis Program are (1) to develop valid job description, (2) to develop minimum job qualifications, and (3) tc develop performance objectives for training programs.

Preliminary results indicate that the Rocky Flats Task Analysis Program is successfully meeting the intended objectives. Although a great deal of progress has been made since the Program began in April 1983, there is still much work to be done. When the Task Analysis Program is completed, however, Rocky Flats will have all the necessary information to accurately describe hourly positions and job qualifications, plus the performance objectives on which to build a task-oriented training program.

Good afternoon 50 ways to describe your job what an understatement! What a challenge what a learning experience...-.

Rocky Flats is finding out just what that really means. We are engaged in a Job/Task Analysis Progrsm with the assistance and guidance of the people from Career and Employment Consultants in Lansing, Niichi gan.

WHY JOB ANALYSIS

Why did Rocky Flats decide to do such a project in the first place? There are several reasons; and to understand them, one needs to go back a few years. For the past 5-8 years, the Traininq department at Rocky Flats has been inundated with requests for training programs for employees ranging from "How to Handle Parts" to "Criticality Safety" to "Everything You Need to Know to Be an Effective Material Analyst."

379 Additionally, there were requests from individuals and/or their foremen wanting some tutoring on basic mathematics, actually arithmetic or grammar, or concern over an employee's ability to read and comprehend certain policies, procedures, and working documents. Our response was always the same "We really didn't look for those skills when we were hiring. Perhaps we can work with these employees and give them some tutoring."

Our job description^ at their best, said such things as must have a high school education and one year of chemistry or physical science or whatever. Were we, the Training department, supposed to be developing programs for job performance, or providing a school for adults on the 3 R's?

Our answer was to ask for the dollars and people to study our job descriptions.....our message was not clear, because year after year we were turned down.

OFF SITE TRAINING CENTER

Meanwhile, we had created an Off Site Training Center to train the un-employeci and under-employed in the community in some introductory skills for machining, chemical operations, pipefitting/welding, and word processing.

Although these people were not employees, a vital part of their curriculum was courses in math and English offered at the Center by a local community college. We began using these courses for employees but the obvious disadvantage was that it took too much time per day for too many days. We then introduced a testing and prescription program which allowed for individual differences, used the community college instructor as a resource/tutor, and allowed the student to progress at his or her own speed.

Again, more employees from the plant were sent to the Center for testing and tutoring in basic skills.

NEW EMPLOYEE TRAINING

In the past 16 months, we have implemented a New Employee Training Program at the Center for all new hires at the plant. Each week, new employees are introduced to the environmental uniqueness of Rocky Flats with basic safety and security training, sessions on attitude and work habits, tests on math and language skills, and for those who need it, given time and assistance to improve those skills.

The instances of our applying bandaids to problems of employees not able to perform in their jobs because of a lack of language or mathematical skills became more visible and led to some job disputes, and in a couple of cases, ended up in our Employee Relations department for resolution. The problem was growing, and we were not addressing the issue. 380 This negative visibility, plus the submission of yet another proposal this time for a formal job analysis finally got us the approval for a funded program on job/task analysis at Rocky Flats. At this point, it is important to understand what our specific objectives were PROGRAM OBJECTIVES First we wanted to have validated job descriptions tor all jobs at Rocky Flats. Our work to date had been dedicated to the hourly jobs. Second we wanted valid minimum qualifications for each of our jobs to assist us in our hiring efforts. Third we had many performance objectives for training to be used in reviewing current programs, as well as the development of new programs. We knew what we wanted to do, had the approval and funding to do it. selected the experts to teach and guide us but who were the us'es at Rocky Flats who would be our on site team? Since this program would benefit the plant overall, but specifically affect the groups within Personnel; team members were chosen from Employment, Employee Relations, Salary Administration, and of course the Training department. And, since we were going to be looking at the hourly jobs, we asked our primary Union, the Steel workers, for some representatives also. PILOT PROJECT We decided to pilot our Program on hourly jobs janitor, parts and tool attendant, material analyst, production machinist, electrician, and electrician technician. We created teams of 3-4 members assigned to each job; thereby creating a task group of around 20 people. METHODOLOGY How were we going to go about this job? First, the teams had to go out into the plant, gather all the information they could find about the job they were assigned to, interview employees, and write..... After writing and editing and re-writing and re-editing their lists, they had to go back to the employees they interviewed, plus those employees' foremen, and verify the tasks on the lists. Then we developed a technical inventory questionnaire or survey to sample a percentage of the population in each job to validate the task list, which then should become the job description, and to gather significant data about each of the tasks. The data would be collected, sorted, organized, analyzed, digested, and scrutinized.

381 Our primary sorts would concentrate on data for minimum qualifications, plus some performance requirements for training programs. PROBLEMS AND SUCCESSES When we began our Program, problems and successes became apparent immediately. First, as our task teams were being trained, and therefore acquiring a better understanding of their role, they began to feel overburdened with work as they all were maintaining their regular work load as well as the additional time doing research, scheduling team meetings, and interviewing employees. We spent some time meeting with their managers and our Personnel Director reinforcing the commitment to the project and working with the team members on work loads and scheduling. We still have to monitor this and work with individual team members from time to time. Secondly, our Union President decided that his representatives should not participate in the Program. The Union team members, however, thought the Program yery worthwhile and wanted to continue, so for a while we said employees who wished to assist in the Program would be welcome to do so, therefore allowing the Union team members to participate purely as employees and not necessarily as Union representatives. Letters were sent and meetings were held back and forth between the Company, the local Union President, and District and National Union representatives. Ultinately we were not able to achieve the support we needed, and the teams proceeded without Union representation. This reduced our original group by 6 and left some teams with 2 members, and therefore more work to do. We have managed to add 3 or 4 more people, but it has been difficult for them since they have not been "on board" from the beginning. We have not had any problems with employees as a result of the Union situation. On the contrary, the cooperation has been outstanding. SUPPORT When we started formating our survey questionnaire and discussing data sorts, we kept calling on different departments on the plant for information and assistance. It became obvious we needed coordination and cooperation from several departments if we were going to succeed. A support group now consists of employees from Word Processing, Industrial Graphics, the Statistics Lab, the Computer Center, and the Purchasing department to assist us. Meetings with these people are on a regular and frequent basis. We don't feel these problems are unusual, and our consultants warned us in advance to plan ahead and we thought we had but until you walk through a program step-by-step you cannot avoid a certain number of pitfalls and problems, and I'm sure we will encounter more before we are finished.

382 PHASE II

We are now completing data collection on the first 6 pilot job classifications and are proceeding into the second phase of the project.

- Phase II will concentrate on detailing interpretive data suiranaries from the 6 jobs identified in Phase I.

- Minimum job qualifications and job descriptions will be drafted.

- Data summaries via written narrative reports> graphs, and charts will be reviewed in depth for application to training program development or modification.

- Even now task lists on basic skills are being correlated with a Basic Skills Assessment instrument we are using with selected new hires at the Training Center.

- Physical skills lists are being reviewed and compared to a system that will help us assess such skills as eye-hand and eye-hand-foot coordination, finger dexterity, and color activity, as well as lifting, pushing, bending, and reaching abilities. GENFRAL GOALS

In January 1984 we met to reaffirm the Plant's commitment to the project and establish goals relative to anticipated outcomes.

- Improved quality, quantity, and timeliness of production is of paramount importance and directly relates to at least 2 of the Plant's goals.

- Improved employee relations are already visible through the participation and cooperation of those employees in the pilot job classifications.

LONG-TERM COST EFFECTIVENESS

Long-term anticipated cost effectiveness is an item of constant and continuing discussion.

- The ability to select mo^e appropriate personnel will help to lower recruiting costs„

- If we have the ability to target specific training needs, training co*ts will decrease.

383 - Many employee grievances concern jurisdictional disputes - articulated job descriptions should result in fewer grievances and less downtime for resolution of grievances that are received. - And fourth, more appropriate job placement based on alidated minimum qualifications should contribute to both lower training costs and lower production costs. Fifty ways to describe your job will turn into more ways to assess your potential, more ways to increase productivity, and the best way for you to advance your career.

384 Abstract

ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES

William R. Hamel

Instrumentation and Controls Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory* Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

An overview of robotics technology is presented which covers: (1)terminology, (2)baaic technical concepts, (3>applications in manufacturing automation, (4)applications in non-manufacturing automation, and (5)projections of the future development of the technology.

The basic technical features of robotic systems are discussed through descriptions of the fundamental mechancial and electronics aspects of typical systems. Various kinematic configurations used in the mechanical design of robot manipulators are summarized, and the different types of robot automatic control in popular use are presented.

The principal use of robots is in manufacturing automation. The development history, commercial products, and typical applications are discussed- The market economics and key technical limitations of industrial robots are highlighted.

The rudiments of industrial robotics actually grew from research and development in other areas such as space, undersea and nuclear systems. These applications are predominantly man-in-the-loop operations, but much of the basic technology is identical to that used in automatic industrial systems. Recent work around the world in advanced remote teleoperated-manipulatora for nuclear applications is summarized with particular emphasis on work at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the US-DOE Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program. Progress in force- reflecting electronic servomanipulatora is presented.

Future research in robotics systems will concentrate on the achievement of autonomous operation. As discussed, research will emphasize sensory feedback, artificial intelligence, mobility, and improved mechanical designs. The major limitations for the future will be qualified research personnel and the operating speed of state of the art microprocessors.

•Operated by Union Carbide Corporation under contract W- 7405-eng-26 for the U.S. Department of Energy

385 ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES

William R. Hamel Robotics and Electromechanics Group Instrumentation and Controls Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory

DOE NUGLME BEAfCTOE AND FJ

FEBRUASY 29, 1984

386 I. Terminology II. Robotic Basics III. Robotics = Manufacturing Automation IV. Robotics F Manufacturing Automation V. Future Projections

387 ROBOT INSTITUTE OF AMERICA (ria) definition

" A robot is a reprogrammable multi-f uneikmai manipulator designed to move material, parts, tools, or specialized devices through variable programmed motions for the performance of a variety of tasks."

388 "Japanese robots include ... according to JIRA

Clj. Manual Manipulator — directly operated by human control (2). Sequence Robot — functions automatically according to prescribed steps (2a). fixed sequence robots — steps not easily changed (2b). variable sequence — steps readily changed

(3). Playback Robot — continuously controlled motion; motion sequence defined through teaching; automatic repetition

(4). NC Robot — same, but motion programming in computerHDased media.

(5). Intelligent Robot — NC robot with sensors and decision making capabilities for adaptation and interaction with work environment

389 or What mad© of ?

BASIC ELEMENTS

KINEMATIC CONFIGURATIONS

CONTROL CONCEPTS

390 AND

typical for each joint \ir \

(t each/playback)

(microprocessing)

391 ROBOT KINEMATICS "TRANSFORM" ACTUATOR MOTION TO COMPLEX SPATIAL END-EFFECTOR MOTION

CARTESIAN COORDINATES CYLINDRICAL COORDINATE*

POLAH COORDINATES HEVOLUTE COORDINATES

MANIPULATOR ARM: (SHCULDESJSLBOVO -• WRIST (X,Y,Z)

WRIST: WEUSTC3DOF) T-fc> END-EFFECTOR ORIENTATION

392 ROBOT CONTROL SOPHISTICATION VARIES A GREAT DEAL (with cost ) ...

NONSERVO-CONTROLLED (open loop) sequencing between mech/elec stops

SERVO-CONTROLLED (closed-loop; position,velocity) point-to-point contol -each joint controlled independently -teach/playback -sequential jiint execution -uncoordinated joint execution -terminally coordinated joint execution continuous path control -intermediate path important -interpolation -coordinated joint execution

cartesian motion control -(x,y,z) of end-effector in work space

393 digital electronics provides programmability (flexibility) servo-precision & { jigs#f ixtures } permit complex tasks sensory feedback (vision, tactile) will provide adaptability

394 STATE OF THE ART: Robots = Manufacturing Automation

* History

* Commercia/•••« l Robots - characteristics

- examples

Current Uses

The Robot Market

Key Problems

395 ROBOTICS DEVELOPMENT HAS FOLLWED MICROELECTRONICS ADVANCEMENTS

1950 Goertz at ANL — 1st electric manipulator 1954 Devol's "universal automation" patent 1962 GM installs first UNIMATE 1970 Scheinman design's Standford arm 1974 CM T3; microprocessor controlled in cartesian frames 1978 First PUMA — assembly 1980+ Commerical vision systems appear

396 WITH MfUQfflOM THRUST

TYPE WEIGHT CAPACITY MAX TIP SPEED REPEATIBILITY $K

MATERIAL 5000 1b 1001b 50 ips 0.050 in 80 HANDLING

WELDING 4000 70 25 0.010 in 90

65 ASSEMBLY I 980 14 40 0.006 in

SPRAY | 1300 33 48 0.8 cm 110 I PAINTING

397 ROBOT POPULATION BY APPUCATIONS AS OF 1982

NUMBER OF ROBOTS 14,651 TOTAL = 57,427

13,104 ,555 i £~-

!-:• : 1^ ri • '' ' L". .'-. 1 - ' [':• - i k..;.:.. t- •' L- K- •• i 2,853 [i 2,193 | i.- - -

n \: '

WELDING PAINTING ASSEMBLY CASTING MATERIAL HANDLING

398 ROBOT PRODUCTION REPRESENTS DOLLARS AND IMPORTS ISSUE

31, 400 77, 970

994 58, 600

NUMBEE OF J —123, 800 ROBOTS PER YEAE 1 LJ 24, 000 ' • • • 23, 300 1 20 900 18, 600 i i

i • 1 •

[ i t us

•

i • I

I 1 4500 i __- _ I 1

3400 1 • i2400 USi r-- I US US __l 1 LJ 1 83 84 85 90 ($4. 4B) YEAR

JAPANESE DOMINATION FOR LONG TIME 399 KEY PROBLEMS

Japanese market dominance Manpower resources Labor relations

i Computer vision Programming time Force control Mechanical system cost

400 ROBOTS = MANUFACTURING AUTOMATION ... NUCLEAR ROOTS CONTINUE

SPACE

NUCLEAR

MAN-IN-THE-LOOP OPERATION

401 NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS... being fueled by microelectronics advances also

COMMERCIAL ROBOTICS APPLICATIONS weapons fab & assembly repetitious high-dose problems

NEW REMOTE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY teleoperation + robotics force-reflection (see & feel) France, Japan, LASL, ORNL

402 EXAMPLES:

*CRL Model M2 Maintenance System (all digital controls; 32 micros)

"Advanced Servomanipulator

403 FUTURE PROJECTIONS ... Robotics research will focus on elements of autonomous operation

* SENSORY FEEDBACK -3D VISION -TACTILE SENSING -OTHER (chem, thermal, etc.) -FORCE CONTROL

"MECHANICAL DESIGN -OPTIMIZATION (load/wt) -flexibility -plastics, composites

"AUTONOMOUS DECISION MAKING -artificial intelligence -task decomp, planning -anomally recovery

"MOBILITY (Odex-I)

"LIMITATIONS -people & compute power

404 405 406 407 ORNL'-CWG 81-10606

STATION I STATION 2

SYSTEM MONITOR •MONITOR 4 • Z80- 4MHi TERMINAL] • BASIC JACK . DISK STORAGE • SI00 COMPATIBLE FOR T/0 EXPANSION X TOUCH PANEL- -CAMERA S AUXILIARY CONTROLS SERIAL LEFT ARM CONTROL RS-232 RIGHT ARM CONTROL

HIGH SPEED INTER -HIGH SPEED INTER JC-I PROCESSOR SERIAL JC-I PROCESSOR SERIAL LINKS LINKS «=^ JC-2 JC-2 JC-3 JC-3 JC-4 JC-4 JC-5 JC-6 _J C_-G_ JC-7 JC-7 o SERIAL SERIAL 00 SERIAL TAP TAP SERIAL SWITCHER TC TC SWITCHER

OUT OF CELL (MASTER) IN CELL(SLAVE) SERIAL SERIAL TAP TAP SERIAL SERIAL TC 1 TC SWITCHER SWITCHER

JC-I JC-I JC-2 JC-2 JC-3 JC-3 JC-4 JC-4_ JC-5 JC-5 JC-6 JC-6 JC-7 JC-7 CC-I CC-I

TC-TRAFFIC CONTROLLER CC-CAMERA ARM CONTROLLER JC - JOINT CONTROLLER I C +- X

409 ADVANCED SERVO MANIPULATOR

SHOULDER ROLL

MOTOR MODULE

TONG MODULE SST PLATES. UNTREATED FASTENERS • WIRE HARNESS MODULE

ROLL SLEEVE MODULE

WRIST MODULE

GEAR POD MODULE ELBOW MODULE SHOULDER MODULE (UPPER PORTION)

SHOULDER MODULE (LOWER PORTION)

SHOULDER PITCH

WRIST PITCH

TONG

ELBOW PITCH WRIST ROLL

410 411 THE FIRST FUNCTIONOID ODEX I

412 MAN-MACHINE INTEGRATION AT ER-II

Richard W. Lindsay Argonne National Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho

ABSTRACT

The EBR-II Project has now included both R&D and testing of advanced MMI concepts as part of the plant operational mission. The EBR-II provides a utility-like operational environment plus nearly 20 years of operating experience against which to judge the MMI improvements. The major area of focus for MMI work at EBR-II is presently in the plant control protection areas.

SUMMARY

Testing and R&D in Man-Machine Integration (MMI) is now included as one of the operational missions of EBR-II. The long histroy of operational coupled with the flexibility of plant operations and a synergistic effect from concurrent operational missions provides a desirable testing environment.

The EBR-II staff is providing coordination of testing efforts from outside the Project as well as performing R&D. Organizations who will be testing or participating in tests at EBR-II include W-AESD, G-E ANTO, EG&G, EGR-II, M&CSD (ANL), RAS (ANL), MIT, and others. Work with CSDL has already been successfully completed in sensor validation and analytic redundancy.

Not only is the EBR-II interested in MMI from a testing/program- matic viewpoint, but promising MMI concepts in the plant control and protection area are important to EBR-II from an operational standpoint. There are specific needs for improvement in primary system flow, fuel handling, and reactor power control areas that the present MMI work can address.

As new concepts are developed, tested and proven, it is expected that such improvements will be incorporated into the EBR-II plant control and protection systems for long-term use. This approach provides an obvious and orderly transition from R&D to final testing prior to incorporation into new plant designs or commercial backfitting.

It is envisioned that the end result of the MMI efforts at EBR-II and other locations will be a plant control and protection system for which safety credit can be taken in the licensing process.

413 E3R-I!

Richard Lindsay February 28, 1984

414 EXPERIMENTAL BREEDER REACTOR II

SINCE 1964

% WEST ov

415 PERFORMS A VARIETY OF OPERATIONAL MISSIONS e IRRADIATIONS

• RUN BEYOND CLADDING BREACH

• TRANSIENT TESTING - Power and flow

• THERMAL HYDRAULICS TESTING

• MAN-MACHINE INTEGRATION

MMI FITS IN BECAUSE-

416 THE OTHER OPERATIONAL MISSIONS SUPPORT MMI

AND

THE PLANT HAS A 20 YEAR OPERATIONAL HISTORY PROVIDING ONE OF THE LONGEST EXPERIENCE DATA BASES IN THE BUSINESS

AT 70% PLANT-FACTOR, AND PUTTING POWER ON THE GRID, OPERATION IS VERY SIMILAR TO UTILITY PLANT OPERATION

IMPROVED REACTOR PLANT CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS ENHANCE OPERATIONS

417 EBR-II NEEDS

ADDRESS PLANT NEEDS

FUEL HANDLING

PRIMARY SYSTEM FLOW

• REACTOR POWER

SPIN OFF RESULTS TO NEW INITIATIVES IN PLANT DESIGN

e LMFBR's

m LWR's

418 MMI AT EBR-II

ESR-IE ROLE

• DEVELOP AND TEST NEW CONCEPTS IN MMI (PC&P)

• ASSESS RESULTS

• INTEGRATE PROMISING CONCEPTS INTO SYSTEM

419 IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EBR-II WILL BE THE FIRST POWER PRODUCING REACTOR IN THE U.S. UNDER FULLY AUTOMATIC CONTROL

The reactor has the inherent safety features necessary

Developing advanced MMI concepts appear to move toward more computerized control

420 • THE EBR-II STRATEGY 8S

To try out advanced concepts on a small system first

To utilize proven concepts in the plant where appropriate

HOW IS THE STRATEGY ACCOMPLISHED?

421 A SMALL SYSTEM (THE ARGON COOLING SYSTEM) USED IN FUEL HANDLING HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS THE TEST-BED

- The ACS is being highly instrumented

- The signals are sent to the plant data acquisition system (DAS)

- The DAS computer will provide the real-time signals to the MMI development work station computers

THE ARGON COOLING SYSTEM PROVIDES SUFFICENT COMPONENTS, COMPLEXITY AND REDUNDANCY TO ALLOW MEANINGFUL TESTS

PROMISING CONCEPTS CAN THEN BE MOVED TO LARGER PLANT SYSTEMS OR THE ENTIRE PLANT WHERE APPROPRIATE.

422 TO AID IN DEVELOPMENT

A MODEL OF THE ACS IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE (DSNP)

A MODEL OF THE ENTIRE PLANT IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE (DSNP)

REAL-TIME TAPES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE

423 A VARIETY OF TESTS OF ADVANCED CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE RUN

- Participants include

W-AESD

CSDL

GE-ANTO

ANL - EBF-.U, MCSD, RAS

MIT

EG&G

Possibly others

424 TESTS INCLUDE

DICON -An expert systems based diagnostics program (by W-AESD)

CCCS -A computerized system for plant maintenance tagging and validating the state of the component and system (by EBR-II)

FAFTRCS -Initially providing V&V of fault tolerant & computer hardware for use in reactor safety and control systems (by EBR-II & others)

SENSOR VALIDATION & ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY -Applied initially to primary sodium flow problem - to be adapted to other systems (CSDL-ESR-H)

425 ALARM HANDLING -Check-out of concepts (by GE)

SAFETY DISPLAYS -Determination of proper SPDS for LMFBR'S (by GE)

AND OTHER ACTIVITIES POSSIBLE • ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS STUDIES (NUREG 3331)

• MAINTENANCE "DIAGNOSTICIAN"

• COMPUTER PROMPTED PROCEDURE WRITING

426 RELATED ACTIVITIES AT EBRHi

• INSTALLATION OF COMPUTER DRIVEN AUTOMATIC CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM (ACRDS)

• DIGITAL CONTROL OF STEAM DRUM LEVEL (4 ELEMENTS)

• PROPOSED AUTOMATIC SECONDARY SODIUM SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL

• UPGRADE OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS - New DAS (Replacement) - New MMI DWS

427 WHY ALL THIS?

> TO "BUILD" A PLANT CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR WHICH SAFETY CREDIT CAN BE TAKEN IN THE LICENSING PROCESS

-Taking advantage of new technology including "artifical intelligence" capabilities

> TO PROVIDE A STATE-OF-THE-ART PLANT CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR THE NEXT GENERATION POWER PLANT (AS WELL AS BACKFIT WHERE APPROPRIATE)

428 HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF DOE FACILITIES L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California

ABSTRACT The Nu'lear Systems Safety Program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is providing technical assisstance in human factors engineering to the DOE Office of Nuclear Safety. LLNL made six survey visits to DOE nuclear facilities to obtain information on the diversity in the design and operating missions of DOE nuclear reactors and nuclear facilities, to observe the application of human factors technology and knowledge at various facilities, and to evaluate what aspects of human factors engineering could best be applied to improve the safety of operation of DOE owned reactors and nuclear facilities. Observations about the applications of human factors technology at DOE nuclear facilities made during these survey visits are reviewed.

429 HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF DOE FACILITIES L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California

DOE - ONS HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM The Nuclear Systems Safety Program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is Drovidinq technical assisstance in human factors engineering to the DOE Office of Nuclear Safety. As part of this project, personnel from LLNL and their subcontractor made survey visits to six DOE owned nuclear facilities durinq FY82 and FY83. HUMAN FACTORS SURVEY VISITS Human factors survey visits were made to obtain information on the diversity in the design and operating missions of DOE nuclear reactors and nuclear facilities, to observe the application of human factors technology and knowledge at various facilities, and to evaluate what aspects of human factors engineering could best be applied to improve the safety of operation of DOE owned reactors and nuclear facilities. SURVEY TOPICS Human factors aspects of the following topics were reviewed durinq the site survey visits to the extent that they were applicable to the facility being visited: Control Rooms Controls and Displays Outside the Control Room Fuel Handling/Waste Handling Maintenance Communications Experiment Stations Procedures Unusual Occurrence Reports (UORs) & Incident Reports Task Analysis Health and Safety HUMAN FACTORS SURVEY OBSERVATIONS This presentation reviews some of the observations about the applications of human factors technology at DOE nuclear facilities that were made during the human factors survey visits.

430 Nvaem SVST&US sftrerv PBOGRRM

HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF DOE FACILITIES

L. ROLF PETERSON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA nssp • NUCUflfl SVSTQVGB SSflfCTI V PflOGRflM

GOAL OF HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING IS THE GOOD DESIGN OF MAN - SYSTEMS INTERFACES FOR SYSTEMS OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE. - MURPHY IS HUMAN — ALL SYSTEMS ERRORS ARE HUMAN ERRORS - MINIMIZE THE OCCURRENCE OF HUMAN ERROR - PREVENT HUMAN ERROR Do NOT INDUCE HUMAN ERROR - MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ERROR RECOVERY WITHOUT INTERRUPTION RECOVERY WITH MINIMUM INTERRUPTION FAIL SOFT FAIL SAFF • NUC16RR SVST€MS Sflf€TV PROGRRM

LLNL HUMAN FACTORS SURVEY TEAMS VISITED DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT SIX LOCATIONS

HFBR BNL, UPTON, NY N REACTOR UNC, RICHLAND, WA HFIR ORNL, OAK RIDGE, TN FFTF HEDL, RICHLAND, WA ACRR SNLA, ALBUQUERQUE, NM SPR II & III REACTOR EXPERIMENT HOT CELL/GLOVE BOXES C PRODUCTION REACTOR SRP/SRL, AIKEN, SC F CANYON SEPARATION FACILITY HB LINE PUFF FACILITY SRL COMPUTER CONTROL DEVELOPMENT LAB Nuaefifl svsre/ws soferv PROGRAM

HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE REVIEWED DURING THE SITE SURVEY VISITS

CONTROL ROOMS CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM FUEL HANDLING / WASTE HANDLING MAINTENANCE COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT STATIONS PROCEDURES UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE REPORTS (UORS) & INCIDENT REPORTS TASK ANALYSIS HEALTH AND SAFETY NOTEWORTHY HUMAN FACTORS ACTIVITIES WERE OBSERVED AT DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

HUMAN FACTORS REVIEWS OF CONTROL ROOMS JOB TASK ANALYSES / FUNCTIONAL TASK ANALYSES PROCEDURES FORMAT IMPROVEMENTS / PROCEDURES REVISION JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS IN MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

.t- QUALITY CIRCLE FOR HUMAN FACTORS 0U1) - COMPUTER BASED REACTOR OPERATIONS WARNING SYSTEMS COMPUTER BASED DIAGNOSTIC AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS OF OPERATING INCIDENTS / FAILURES SHIELDING DEVICES FOR MAINTENANCE WORK TRAINING DEVICES REACTOR CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR REMOTE HANDLING EQUIPMENT / MANIPULATOR PRACTICE FACILITIES

GENERAL OBSERVATION: LARGER FACILITIES HAVE GREATER RESOURCES TO SPEND ON HUMAN FACTORS AND HAVE DONE MORE THAN SMALL FACILITIES CAN DO WITH THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES. NUCL6fifl SVSTGVB SflFCTV PflOGRflM

ALL DOE FACILITIES HAVE DEVIATIONS FROM GOOD HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA — HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HEDs). - CONTROL ROOMS AND SYSTEMS CONTROL PANELS GENERALLY INCORPORATE ACCEPTABLE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING - MINOR HEDS - SUBSYSTEMS CONTROL PANELS AND LOCAL CONTROLS - MORE HEDS MORE SERIOUS HEDS GENERAL OBSERVATION: THE QUALITY OF HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DECREASES AS DISTANCE FROM THE CONTROL ROOM INCREASES, SVST6MS Sflf€TV PROOflfWl

LABELS AND LOCATION AIDS ARE THE MOST COMMON TYPES OF HEDs. CONSISTENT STANDARDS AMD PRACTICES SHOULD BE USED THROUGHOUT A FACILITY. - COMMON LABEL HEDs LABELS MISSING LABELS DIFFICULT TO READ POOR COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION LABELS POOR COMPONENT FUNCTION LABELS LACK OF STANDARD NOMENCLATURE, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMNS - COMMON LOCATION AIDS HEDs LACK OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS GROUPS INCONSISTENT USE OF COLOR CODES CONFUSING MIMICS ENHANCEMENT METHODS CAN PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING IMPROVEMENTS WITH LOW COS'S -- PAINT, LABEL, AMD TAPE ENHANCEMENTS ARE PRACTICAL. - LABELS OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS HIERARCHICAL LABELING OF SYSTEMS AND SUBSYSTEMS IDENTIFICATION LABELS - FUNCTION LABELS WARNING LABELS INSTRUCTION LABELS - DEMARCATION - LOCATION AIDS COLOR CODING SHAPE CODING MIMICS FACILITIES SHOULD DETERMINE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WHERE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING WILL BE MOST LIKELY TO PROVIDE SAFFTY AMD OPERATIONAL BENEFITS. EXAMPLE - REFUELING AND HOT FUEL HANDLING OPERATIONS ARE REQUIRED REGULARLY

OJ AT SOME REACTOR FACILITIES - REQUIRE HIGH WORKLOAD OF OPERATOR ACTIONS PERFORMED MANUALLY BY OPERATORS CONTROLLED MANUALLY BY OPERATORS

- REQUIRE OPERATORS TO WORK UNDER ADVERSE AMBIENT CONDITIONS PROTECTIVE CLOTHING POOR VISIBILITY POOR COMMUNICATIONS PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT RADIATION EXPOSURE NUCl€RR SVST€MS SRF€TV PROGRHM

SELECTIVE REVIEW OF OPERATIONS AND APPLICATION OF HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING TO REDUCE HUMAN ERROR IN JOBS PERFORMED FREQUENTLY CAN IMPROVE SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY.

- DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS BETTER TOOLS TO PERFORM OPERATIONS UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS - BETTER INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS TO PERFORM REMOTE OPERATIONS BETTER AMBIENT WORKING CONDITIONS TO PERFORM WORK

- COST EFFECTIVE REDUCE TIME SPENT CORRECTING ERRORS REDUCE COSTS OF MISTAKES EQUIPMENT DAMAGE COSTS REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT COSTS SYSTEM DOWNTIME COSTS • NUCLCflfl SVST6MS Sflf€TV PHOGfiflM

OPERATOR AND MAINTAINER INPUT IN DESIGN OF MAN - SYSTEMS INTERFACES IS NEEDED TO OBTAIN GOOD HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING RESULTS. DESIGNERS DESIGN FOR THEIR OWN CONVENIENCE NEED OPERATOR / MAINTAINER INPUT TO SYSTEMS DESIGN NEED OPERATOR / MAINTAINER EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS DESIGN -P- .P- SHOULD BE ITERATIVE PROCESS WITH USER FEEDBACK SflF€TV PROGRHM

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ERROR AT DOE FACILITIES ARE DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE QUANTITATIVELY ON A COST - BENEFIT BASIS. - LOW RISK TO PUBLIC SAFETY REDUNDANT SAFETY DEFENSES IN SYSTEMS HIGH LEVEL OF SAFETY AWARENESS AMONG PERSONNEL

.e- - SOME SAFETY RISK TO FACILITY PERSONNEL PROXIMITY TO HAZARDOUS MATERIALS - ADVERSE OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES MORE LIKELY OPERATIONAL INTERRUPTIONS LOWER OPERATING EFFICIENCY INCREASED OPERATING COSTS REPAIR COSTS PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AT THE IDAHO CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT

William L. Scott Exxon Nuclear Idaho Co. Idaho Falls, Idaho

Editor, W. L. Slagle

443 ABSTRACT

A Preventive Maintenance inservice inspection program was introduced at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in 1979. The program progressed from a manual card system to the present more efficient database computerized program. The Preventive Maintenance software was developed "in house" with many additions and enhancements over the last two years. The program is separated into three distinct areas: mechanical, electrical and instrumentation. Preventive Main- tenance instructions are scheduled by the computer and sent to the crafts for performance. The engineers evaluate the test equipment required for the program, prove it in the field, and assist in the training of those using the equipment.

444 The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (1CPP) he«an receiving and processing fuel from nucl-.'.ir reactors, to recover the unfissioned uranium, in 1952 In 1960, the Waste Calcining Facility (WCF) began converting the highly radioactive acidic liquid wastes containing the fission products to a granular solid During the last 10 years, other major facilities and projects (primarily, a larger calcining facility and the Fluorinel and Storage project) have caused the tripling of the ICPP operation in both overall facility size and staff

The Preventive Maintenance group was incorporated into the ICPP Production Department in 1979 and has grown steadily with the growth of the ICPP. In 1982, a Hewlett-Packard 3000 computer was obtained to support preventive maintenance activities, primarily in scheduling and record- keeping. Software was not procured initially; rather, basic programs were written, enhanced, modified, and expanded as needed.

Development of software on an as-needed basis is, at times, tedious and cumbersome; however, the advantage of being able to design the programs to the user's specific needs and applications is considered significant. Although certain commercially-available programs are promoted as being "user-friendly", it may be found, after they are obtained, that they cannot be readily modified to accommodate user-specific data; they may require entry of much of data of little value to the user and may not be readily adaptable to incorporation of Department of Energy security requirements for unclassified programs.

Modern test equipment includes a wide range of new items from very expensive to quite reasonable. ICPP experience with the new infrared sensing devices has been favorable in that these units are ruggedly-built and stand the stresses of field use well.

Evolvements and improvements in the instrumentation field hove been so rapid and extensive in the past ten years that a major task has been to keep personnel who perform field work and inspections currently trained in those developments. For example, engineers and craftsmen with several years experience initially became familiar with pneumatics as a basic approach to plant process control systems. During the late 1970s, the use of solid state process controls was introduced on a broad scale, but before this method became thoroughly established, systems using the microprocessor as the central control mode were being installed. Among engineers and craftsmen, this evolvement has resulted in "stratification" of knowledge, depending on the point at which these personnel entered the field of instrumentation as applied to preventive maintenance.

The ICPP preventive maintenance program emphasizes three major areas to assure that the latest technology is effectively utilized1 (1) carefully written, management-approved and field-tested inspection procedures, (2) use of modern,field-proven, state-of-the-technology test equipment, and (j) application of a balanced technician training program involving both intensive classroom instruction in theory, and "hands-on" field instruction and practice under the guidance of engineers who have evaluated the test equipment.

445 446 00 0) a, O o (0

447 1. Fuel Storage

2. Fuel Processing

-p- 00 3. Waste Processing

4. Support Operations Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

Preventive Maintenance Program

EXXON NUCLEAR IDAHO COMPANY, INC.

449 a a u

ddOl IV luauidinog JO

450 1. Develop Technical Requirements & p- Schedules To Perform PM on SCPP Equipment. 2. Develop A Viable Spare Parts Program For The ICPP. 3. Provide Maintenance Craft Training As Needed.

ICPP-S-6029 COMPUTER PROGRAM

Program Users Program Engsneering Maintenance Operations CaL Vr*^ TechnicaS Program r*\ /f Projects Q.A. /i / \4 'Spare Partsl J / \ /[ I Instrument •Drift Program)

ICPP-S-8B72 453 454 455 :,-.^a5s-i-2iT*a?^K9RKffiSll

456 457 CALIBRATION HISTORY As Left

Error <5 As Found (Absolute value) Limit #2 Calibration I Error

Drill /I Recallbratlon /I /i T

Limit U1 i/ +1 ' \i !/ !' y 0 3 mo 6 f ' 1 i f mo. 9 mo. 12 mo.... Time -1 Y -2 Action #1 Action #2 (More Frequent Calibration If Limit # / Is Exceeded) • Drift is characteristic with - overall instrument performance - instrument maintainability for a given environment and operational conditions

• Drift is "instrument aging 1. Comprehensive Written Instructions 1. Comprehensive Written Instructions

Modern Test Equipment 1. Comprehensive Written Instructions

2. Modern Test Equipment

3. Well f rained Crafts 5481.1A - THE CARE AND FEEDING THEREOF

Robert J. Clouse Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant* Union Carbide Corporation - Nuclear Division Oak Ridj.e, Tennessee

ABSTRACT

Privately owned nuclear reactor plants have for decades been required to scrupulously analyze their facilities for hazards and risks of operation, and tc document those analyses thoroughly. DOE Order 548.1.1A now applies the same requirements to publicly owned non-reactor facilities. Procedures have been established at DOE's Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge to subject each existing, new, and modified facility to such rigorous analysis. Once, the analysis is made and documented, by a specially constituted safety analysis team, it is incumbent on the facility operators co keep procedures and equipment, which are carefully stipulated in the analysis, current and up to date. A program of multi-level review and audit surveys has been established to ensure that both the spirit and the letter of 5481.1A are being carried out, and that the resultant operating "contract" between the owner (DOE) and the operator (UCC-ND) remains valid and in force.

INTRODUCTION

The Documentation Program

5481.1A. It has a certain ring to it, doesn't it? A certain feeling, a certain substance, a certain jargonese. Reminds one of the guys who used to tell all their jokes by number only, because they'd all heard them so many times. Not that 5481.1A is a joke - far from it. But there may be certain resemblances.

5481.1A, as all of us here in this room know and as most people in Y-12 are sure finding out, is a DOE regulation that requires publicly owned non-reactor nuclear installations to do the same kinds of things that privately owned nuclear reactor installations have been required to do for decades: prepare thoroughly documented safety analysis reviews of all existing, new, and modified facilities. These reviews center around the hazards or risks of operation, and the impact that operation may have on people, both inside and outside the facility or installation, and on the. environment. The extent and level of documentation of ^.his review is specified in 5481.1A, and culminates in a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and an Operating Safety Requirements (OSR) document. For a new or modified facility, the FSAR and OSR may be preceded by a Safecy Assessment (SA) that's completed after facility conceptualization and a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) that's completed during or after design, but before construction begins. The FSAR and the OSR muL.t be completed (by the contractor) ?vd approved (by DOE, the owner) before operation begins.

* Operated for the U.S. Departrnp^c of Energy by Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division, under Contract W-7405-eng-26.

463 The FSAR and the OSR

The FSAR systematically identifies any hazards associated with the operation of the particular process or facility. It then describes and analyzes the adequacy of measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate those identified hazards, and further analyzes and evaluates potential accidents that still might happen, and their associated risks. The OSR, on the other hand, constitutes, in effect, a binding agreement between the operating contractor and DOE that identifies safety systems, engineered features, and administrative controls, and the conditions and limits thereof, that are required to assure the safe operation of the process or facility and under which the contractor agrees to operate. In addition, it documents a specific understanding between the operator and the owner that the specified safety systems, engineered features, and administrative controls will noi: be changed without prior mutual consent and agreement.

So we find that the safety analysis procedure is very valuable: we look at the process with new eyes, up-to-date drawings ar>' prepared, the FSAR is a state-of-the-art report and an excellent training manual, and the system is maintained as changes are made.

Operator Responsibilities

My primary thrust today deals with the operator's activities to make sure that the contract (the OSR) between the owner and the user is not broken. It is therefore the responsibility of the operator to keep all operating procedures updated, to keep personnel trained and informed, and to reach new understandings and agreements with DOE any time requirements detailed in the OSR must be changed. To do this, the operator must have certain checks and balances in place to be sure that the contract (the OSR) is being adhered to. In the Y-12 Plant we have created internal Y-12 audit teams to help in this job. The teams are appointed by the plant manager, and show up on a yearly basis at each facility with an OSR in place to see that both the spirit and letter of the OSR "contract" are being fulfilled. This audit includes such things as: Are safety systems properly identified and maintained? Are administrative controls and operating procedures in place and up-to-date? Are personnel properly trained and qualified? Are operating personnel fully familiar with all safety systems? Are copies of the OSR available to operating personnel and supervisors, and do they understand them? Are required surveillances made at proper intervals?

Audit Teams

Moreover, to make sure that Y-12 is really doing its job, higher-level UCC-ND audit teams, made up of Nuclear Division staff representatives and Safety Analysis and Industrial Safety personnel from installations other than the one being audited, review the installation facilities that have OSRs in place in a manner similar to the one used by the Y-12 internal audit team. On top of that, the owner (DOE-ORO) has an audit team, made up of members of the Facilities Safety Branch

464 working separately or with an audit team from the Environmental Protection Branch, that will visit Y-12, again basically on an annual basis, to make sure that we are efficiently policing ourselves: Was the internal audit indeed carried out? Did the audit team make reasonable and appropriate recommendations? Did the subject facility act positively on those recommendations? The Y-12 audit team is made up primarily of micdle managers from several different disciplines, including Safety, Criticality, various Operating disciplines, and so on. They are independent of, and are not involved with, the particular facility being audited. Their findings are reported informally to the manager of the division in which the audited facility is located, and then formally to the plant manager as a documented report. The report includes an evaluation of what the team saw, recommendations for any necessary correctiors, and a general summary of the results of the appraisal. While making this appraisal, the team uses this review and appraisal checklist as a basic guide to allow the team manager and its members to maintain consistency with other teams and other audits.

The OSR Contract

Now let me elaborate a bit on a point I made earlier in the discussion to the effect that "the OSR is a contract that must be fulfilled, and one of the contractual requirements is that all facility safety systems be identified and maintained." The identification and maintenance of safety systems therefore becomes essential, because whether or not the facility works depends on those safety systems. Identification is very important because when people work on a safety system, they must know they are working on a safety system. Further, those safety systems must always be functional or the facility must be shut down. For safety systems to be functional, they require a certain amount of extraordinary attention. They must be calibrated periodically, and the calibration and operating history of each system is computerized in a "recall" program so that each system is automatically called up when it's time for maintenance and recalibration. The decision on when each system or instrument should be calibrated is generally made in concert by maintenance people who have experience with that type of equipment, operating personnel who have experience with the facility in which the equipment is located, and engineering personnel who have the background to help make the decision.

Safety System Identification and Maintenance

The identification of safety systems in the field is fairly simple and straightforward; they are identified bv a paper or metal placard with a red star. Individual components of the system are identified, by number, by a plastic transfer that is color coded to designate a safety system component. If the system is in a corrosive or other damaging area, the component is identified by a stainless steel tag. We just want to make sure the safety system can be spotted under any foreseeable conditions, and to be sure people can recognize it. In addition,

465 maintenance personnel arc trained on what a safety system is, and how it works and why; they have calibration procedures for each and every numbered safety system and component that include both drawings and detailed, step-by-steo methods on how that system is calibrated. Once Maintenance is alerted that a certain system has been recalled for calibration and maintenance, they have all the requisite data at their immediate disposal. A typical drawing of a safety system, marked with a star, as it might appear in the maintenance log or the maintenance procedure manual, looks like this.

The A-Recall Program

All of the safety systems in the plant are included in the "A-Recall" program, which is the recall program that deals with safety systems. (There is also a |:B-Recall" program that is for Quality Assurance systems and a "C-Recall" program for various other systems.) This IBM printout, which tells which system needs to be calibrated and when, is typical output from that program. When Maintenance goes to the facility to calibrate that system, they go by the procedure and fill out a data sheet as the instrument is being calibrated, indicating that a certain procedure and certain equipment are used. These data are then included on the IBM card used to update the "A-Recall': program. The card also carries information about the condition of the system when it was calibrated: the system was in tolerance, it WEs In tolerance but needed to be adjusted, it was out of tolerance, or there was gross error. In the latter two cases the operating and maintenance superintendents must be notified immediately. They must decide what action is appropriate, whether i should be reported as an "unusual occurrence," and if so at what level or what action should be taken.

System Calibration

All of the instruments that are used in safety system calibration are themselves calibrated against National Bureau of Standards specifications at regular intervals. Further, the recall program itself is included in a separate audit program that is conducted primarily by Maintenance middle and upper management to be sure that the recall program is functioning properly. The findings of that audit are given to the Maintenance Division superintendent and shared with the UCC-ND staff, who in turn integrate them into their general report to DOE on how well the overall safety documentation program is working in Y-12.

SUMMARY

So there you have it.

We analyze all Y-12 facilities and processes to determine any hazards of operation; we document those findings and identify any safety systems, engineered features, and administrative controls; we specify operating conditions in a contract - called an OSR - between the operator and the owner; we make sure that operating personnel can find

466 their safety systems, and that all safety systems are properly and periodically maintained; and we are subject to policing procedures, both internal and external, to make sure that we continue to operate as safely and efficiently as possible.

That's what 5481.1A means to us, and how we live by it. And this is 1984.

467 Y-WS 84-1873

5481.1A THE CARE AND FEEDING THEREOF

DOE NUCLEAR REACTOR AND FACILITY SAFETY CONFERENCE ROCKVILLE,MD FEBRUARY 27-MARCH 1, 1984

00 ROBERT J.CLOUSE Y-12 SAFETY ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE

Oak Ridge Y-1 2 Plant Operated by Union Carbide Corporation — Nuclear Division for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract W-7405-eng-26 Y-WS 84-1874

DOE ORDER 5481.1 A hEQUIRES PUBLICLY OWNED NON-REACTOR NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS TO PREPARE SAFETY-ANALYSIS REVIEWS OF ALL EXISTING, NEW, OR MODIFIED FACILITIES THAT DOCUMENT

• THE POTENTIAL RISKS OR HAZARDS OF OPERATION, AND

• THE IMPACT THAT OPERATION MAY HAVE - ON WORKERS INSIDE THE INSTALLATION, - ON THE PUBLIC OUTSIDE THE INSTALLATION, OR - ON THE ENVIRONMENT. Y-WS 84-1875 THE EXTENT AND LEVEL OF THE REVIEW

IS SPECIFIED IN DOE OR 5481.1A, AND CULMINATES IN - A FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) - AN OPERATING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS (OSR) DOCUMENT Y-DWG 83-756 SCHEDULE INTERLOCKS - DESIGN AND SAFETY ANALYSIS

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL I BUDGET REVIEW

LU AE o PLANNING, UJ SELECTION

z g UJ Q

NEW AND MODIFIED

Z o SAFETY ASSESSMENT s ID u o Q

UJ < CO MAINTENANCE

RELATIVE TIMELINE (NO SCALE) Y-WS 83-524 THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR)

• SYSTEMATICALLY IDENTIFIES THE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION OF A PROCESS OR FACILITY;

• DESCRIBES AND ANALYZES THE ADEQUACY OF THE MEASURES TAKEN TO ELIMINATE, CONTROL, OR MITIGATE IDENTIFIED HAZARDS; AND

• ANALYZES AND EVALUATES POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS AND THE ASSOCIATED RISKS. Y-WS 83-525A THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS (OSR)

• CONSTITUTES A BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OPERA- TING CONTRACTOR (UCC-ND, Y-12) AND DOE THAT DEFINES -CONDITIONS,

- LIMITATIONS,

- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, AND

-THE BASES THEREFOR

• REQUIRED TO ASSURE SAFE OPERATION OF A PROCESS OR OF A FACILITY, AND

• DOCUMENTS A SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OPERA- TOR AND OWNER THAT SAFETY SYSTEMS, ENGINEERING FEATURES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS WILL NOT BE CHANGED. Y-WS 83-526A THE SAFETY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE IS OF GREAT VALUE TO Y-12

• MEMBERS OF THE TEAM PREPARE IN CONCERT AN ACCURATE AND EFFECTIVE PROCESS DESCRIPTION.

UP-TO-DATE DRAWINGS ARE PREPARED, WITH ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS MARKED WITH STARS.

• WHEN AN FSAR AND AN OSR ARE COMPLETED, A DOCUMENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS ESTABLISHED TO iSSUE REVISED SECTIONS AS CHANGES ARE MADE. CM co

O < z o o

DC CO O LLJ X Y-WS 83-941R THE PROCESS DOESN'T END WITH THE OSR, HOWEVER; THERE'S MORE

IT'S THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPERATING UNIT TO KEEP OPERATING PROCEDURES UPDATED, TO KEEP PERSONNEL TRAINED AND INFORMED, AND TO REACH NEW UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS WITH DOE WHEN REQUIREMENTS DETAILED IN THE OSR MUST BE CHANGED.

AN INTERNAL Y-12 AUDIT TEAM, APPOINTED BY THE PLANT MANAGER, WILL SHOW UP - ON ROUGHLY A YEARLY BASIS - TO SEE THAT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE OSR "CONTRACT" ARE BEING FULFILLED. - ARE ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND MAIN- TAINED? - ARE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES IN PLACE AND UP TO DATE? ARE PERSONNEL PROPERLY TRAINED AND QUALIFIED? ARE OPERATING PERSONNEL FULLY FAMILIAR WITH ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS? - ARE COPIES OF THE OSR AVAILABLE TO OPERATORS AND SUPER- VISORS? DO THEY UNDERSTAND IT? ARE REQUIRED SURVEIL- LANCES MADE AT THE PROPER INTER 7ALS? Y-WS 83-94 2 R THERE'S MORE (CONTINUED)

• A UCC-ND AUDIT TEAM, MADE UP OF A UCC-ND STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, A SAFETY ANALYSIS STAFF MEMBER, AND AN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STAFF MEMBER (FROM PLANTS OTHER THAN THE ONE BEING AUDITED), REVIEWS THE FACILITY IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THE ONE TAKEN BY THE Y-12 INTERNAL AUDIT TEAM.

• A DOE AUDIT TEAM, MADE UP OF MEMBERS OF THE FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS SAFETY BRANCH, AND WORKING EITHER SEPARATELY OR WITH AN AUDIT TEAM FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BRANCH, WILL VISIT Y-12 - AGAIN ON AN ANNUAL BASIS - TO MAKE SURE THE FACILITY IS EFFECTIVELY POLICING ITSELF: - WAS THE REQUIRED INTERNAL AUDIT CARRIED OUT? - DID THE AUDIT TEAM MAKE REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS? - DID THE SUBJECT FACILITY ACT POSITIVELY ON THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS? Y-WS 84-1876

IMPARTIAL MANAGERS MAKE UP THE Y-12 AUDIT TEAM

• THEY'RE MIDDLE MANAGERS FROM SAFETY, CRITICALITY, VARIOUS OPERATING DIVISIONS, AND OTHER CONCERNED DISCIPLINES

• THEY'RE NOT INVOLVED WITH THE PARTICULAR FACILITY BEING AUDITED

• THEIR FINDINGS ARE REPORTED - *j - INFORMALLY TO THE MANAGER OF THE DIVISION INVOLVED - FORMALLY TO THE PLANT MANAGER AS A DOCUMENTED REPORT

• THE REPORT INCLUDES - AN EVALUATION OF FINDINGS - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANY NECESSARY CORRECTIONS - RESULTS OF THE APPRAISAL Y-WS 84-1879

THE TEAM USES A CHECKLIST AS A GUIDE THE OSR IS A SIMPLE, STRAIGHT-FORWARD

TABLE .

00 O

Signed by the Contracting Parties - Y-WS 83-773R THESE FACTORS, WHICH WE HAVE AGREED WITH DOE TO HOLD INVIOLATE, ARE DEFINED IN 5481.1A AND IN SPP-D-5-29

SAFETY SYSTEMS - "EQUIPMENT OR HARDWARE USED TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE ACCIDENTS TO ASSURE THAT THE OPERATION OF A. FACILITY WILL NOT CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE SAFETY AND HEALTH OF THE EMPLOYEES AND THE PUBLIC."

TO QUALIFY AS A SAFETY SYSTEM, A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT MUST THEREFORE BE ABLE TO DETECT AN OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION AND TAKE ACTION - WITHOUT OUTSIDE MANIPULATION - TO STOP OR PREVENT A HAZARD OR MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES.

00 Y-WS 84-1880

READY IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY SYSTEMS SS ESSENTIAL

• IF THE SAFETY SYSTEM DOESN'T WORK, THE FACILITY DOESN'T WORK

• SAFETY SYSTEMS NEED EXTRAORDINARY ATTENTION

• SAFETY SYSTEMS MUST BE EASILY SEEN SO THEY CAN BE PROPERLY MAINTAINED

• SAFETY SYSTEM HISTORY IS IN A COMPUTERIZED "RECALL" PROGRAM FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

• SCHEDULE FREQUENCY IS DECIDED BY KNOWLEDGABLE PERSONNEL Y-WS 84-1877

IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY SYSTEMS IN THE FIELD IS STRAIGHTFORWARD

SAFETY SYSTEM

SEE FOREMAN BEFORE PERFORMING ANY MODIFICATIONS OR REPAIRS. YWS 84-1878 EACH SYSTEM COMPONENT IS FURTHER IDENTIFIED BY A NUMBERED COLOR-CODED STICKER

MAINTENANCE DIVISION RECALL PROGRAM A

This label is placed on Life Safety, Health, Environmental, and Security equipment or equipment which deals with the safety of personnel and requires either calibration or maintenance on a periodic basis.

This label may be affixed by either Physical and Electrical Standards Laboratory personnel or field personnel. Y-WS 84-19C0

IF THE ATMOSPHERE IS INHOSPITABLE, A SS TAG IS ATTACHED Y-WS 84-1681 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ARE FULLY TRAINED ON SAFETY SYSTEMS

• WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, AND WHY

• CALIBRATION PROCEDURES FOR EACH NUMBERED SYSTEM OR COMPONENT ARE AVAILABLE 00 • ENGINEERING DRAWINGS, MARKED WITH A STAR, LOCATE EACH SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Y-WS 84-1882

A TYPICAL DRAWING, IN A MAINTENANCE LOG OR PROCEDURE MANUAL, LOOKS LIKE THIS

'.'.rm No. - Destructive Distillation Unft afely >Uen - DDU Over-Trposure Relief afpty Sy^trn - Over Procure Relief Vent Flange afety Systrn location - ^uHJino 921? LradViu'.e (R.-n. ?6)

1 j •! : i 1(-—j UR OH CiriiDt CD»PDr*llO»- RUCIUI D'VllrOM Safety System-9212 .,

1 •-•* 1 "" I 1

1 r t YWS 84-1886 RECALL PROGRAMS PROVIDE COMPUTERIZED REMINDERS WHEN IT IS TIME TO PERFORM CERTAIN TASKS

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489 Y-WS 84-1887 THIS IBM CARD IS USED TO UPDATE RECALL PROGRAMS, COLLECT CALIBRATION STATUS DATA, AND RECORD TRACEABILITY

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL PROGRAM FORCE GAGE ZOOS LBS Sklr.&JzSLl S-°°509-00 N XH • *»«„»• INSCRIPTION •••••••• NEW M NO. RF-CAL DATE WORK ORDER GRP KEV

S20V-2 WS-0297 Hl-0105 26 29722 7-29-60 1-27-S1 FCP-28 BUILDING STATION APP-REF INT N NO. CAL.OATE EXP.DATE PROCEOURE

•- 1 SCALE 01V +- 2 SCALE OIV 0-500 PSIG FORCE ACCURACY OR TOLERANCE ••#•• GROSS EPROR ••••• •••••• CERT RANGE •••»•*

5759-17 ,6 21 H 2 R-00 6P3-AB REPEAT NUMBER EST.HOURS CRAFT •HAN-CODE AS FOUND ••• HMR NUMBER •••

CIRCLE CONDITION INSTr Q IN TOLERANCE' ALIBRATED USING STANDARDS •••••••• 2. IN TOLERfiMC 3. OUT OF TOLERANCE M <». GROSS ERR0R-N3TIFIE0 USt

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL PROGRAP Y-WS 84-1885

IF THE SYSTEM'S OUT OF TOLERANCE OR IN ERROR

• MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION DIVISION MANAGERS MUST BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY

• AN "UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE" REPORT MAY BE FILED

• THE FACILITY MAY BE SHUT DOWN Y-WS 84-1888

THE RECALL PROGRAM ALSO PROVIDES STEP-BY-STEP TRACEABILITY TO NBS

QUALITY PRODUCT

10 Y-WS 84-1883 THAT'S OUR PROGRAM OF CARE AND FEEDING

• WE ANALYZE Y-12 FACILITIES FOR OPERATING HAZARDS

• WE DOCUMENT THAT ANALYSIS, AND IDENTIFY SAFETY SYSTEMS, ENGINEERED FEATURES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

® WE SPECIFY OPERATING CONDITIONS IN A CONTRACT (THE OSR)

• WE MAKE SURE SAFETY SYSTEMS CAN BE FOUND, AND THAT THEY'RE MAINTAINED

• WE'RE SUBJECTED TO PERIODIC AUDITS oo 00 4 00 00 I

494 FFTF IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM Quincey L. Baird Westinghouse Hanford Company Richland, Washington

ABSTRACT A brief description is provided o the program in place at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) for assuring compliance with the Technical Specifi- cation requirements for maintenance and calibration of the reactor shutdown and containment isolation systems. The use of computerized data bases for support of this effort is emphasized. The independent review process is also discussed. SUMMARY The Plant Technical Specifications define the limits/operating envelope within which the FFTF must be maintained. The Reactor Shutdown System (RSS) provides protective functions to assure the integrity of the three barriers designed to prevent significant radioactive releases. The oper- ability (functional capability and calibration) of the RSS is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity identified as available in the facility design for the protection against, and mit- igation of, accident and transient conditions. The surveillance requirements specified for the systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the specified frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate the capability. At FFTF the in-service inspection to maintain the RSS is accomplished by the integrated performance of a compliance program implemented through System Compliance Procedures (SCs) and a Protective Maintenance Program implemented through Preventive Maintenance Procedures (PMPs) and Loop and Device Calibration Procedures (LCPs and DCPs). The Instruments used to calibrate other instruments and loops are classed and controlled as standards in a hierarchy traceable to the National Bureau of Standards. The control and performance of the appropriate procedures required during in operating cycle is accomplished with the assistance of three independent computerized data base systems (Each of the systems utilize the UNI VAC 100 computer). \ special purpose data base provides the information for scheduling the 'erformance of SCs during the reactor cycle. An independent Instrument alibration and Recall data base provides similar information for the rotective Maintenance System procedures as well as providing for the torage of calibration data records for the SCs, PMPs, DCPs and LCPs. he performance of the work in the plant is facilitated by use of the aste/ Information and Data Acquisition System (MIDAS), a data base

495 management system that provides real-time information to operations, engineering and maintenance personnel on plant equipment and work pack- aye status. Utilizing three sub-system data bases of the MIDAS, work items can be tracked from initiation through preplanning, work performance, retest and closeout. During this process, work status and resources are integrated. A very recent additional sub-system provides information for automated production of scheduling information for plan- of-the-day activities. Information from the MIDAS system may be obtained through one of many multiple terminals located around the FFTF Plant and work site. Queries and input are accomplished via video monitors, however, printed reports are available from on-site printers. Independent review of the overall Technical Specification compliance activity is provided by the Reactor Safety organization. In addition to approval of all compliance procedures and the post review of the in-service inspection data, the System Safety Cognizant Engineers review the Technical Specification Monitoring Logs atid participate in special emphasis appraisals throughout the year.

496 FFTF PPS IN-SERVSCE INSPECTION

SENSOR TRIP 2/3 TRIP SCRAM CHANNEL COMPARATOR LOGIC LOGIC A CHANNEL B CHANNEL C

ISOLATION BUFFER COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

PLANT PLANT MONITORING CONTROL DATA INSTRUMENTS SYSTEMS SYSTEMS

HEOL 8402-190.4 PPS INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE

SIGNAL CONDITIONERS s D W M A

FLUX CAL

PRESSURE CAL SOURCE CIS DETECTORS (G-M TUBES) CHECK

FLOW CAL FUNC- 00 TIONAL PPS CHANNELS M<3N TEST CAL REFERENCE INSTRUMENTATION

CAL *VENTURS FLOWMETERS MON ELECT.

**SECONDARY LOOP RTDs MON

PRIMARY LOOP RTDs MON

*VENTURI FLOWMETERS ARE CALIBRATED BY "PULSED NEUTRON ACTIVATION" (PNA) TECHNIQUES ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS. **THE SECONDARY LOOP RTDs ARE CALIBRATED AT THREE YEAR INTERVALS. HEDL B402-190.3 COMPLIANCE PROGRAM COMPUTER DATA BASE-

TECH.SPECS. SC SCHEDULED SC PERFORMED SURVEILLANCE (SO FOR PERFORMANCE PER PROCEDURE COMES DUE

MANUAL BACKUP-

SOM OR DELEGATE OPS ANALYSIS COMPLETION REVIEWS SC POST REVIEWS SC ENTERED INTO FOR ADEQUACY FOR ADEQUACY TRACKING SYSTEM

SC ENTERED INTO SC DATA AVAILABLE RECORD RETENTION FOR FUTURE SYSTEM REFERENCE

MANUAL/HARD COPY FILES COMPUTER/PROTECTIVE MAINTENANCE HEDL 8402-190.5 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

COMPUTER DATA BASE

INSTRUMENT WORK PACKAGES CALIBRATION PREPARED AND WORK PERFORMED COMES DUE WORK SCHEDULED

o o

DATA AVAILABLE RETEST AS DATA BASES Ha* FOR REFERENCE AND UPDATED REQUIRED DUE LIST" GENERATION

DATA FROM COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

HEDL 8402-190.6 MIDAS DATA BASES

COMPONENT PLANT WORK AUTOMATED INDEX TRACKING CONTROL DAILY 54,001 ITEMS SYSTEM LOG SCHEDULING

2 • IDENTIFICATION • WORK TYPE • DATA ON WORK DOCUMENTS • WORK ITEMS SORTED AND PLANT EQUIPMENT BY COMPONENT • LOCATION • DOCUMENT STATUS • STATUS OF TAGGED OUT • COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES • POWER DISCONNECTS ® MATERIAL STATUS EQUIPMENT EFFECTED BY WORK • PREVENTATIVE • RELATED CRITICAL SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE

• TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EFFECTED

HEDL 8402-190.1 INDEPENDENT REVIEW

ANNUAL APPRAISAL

TOPICAL APPRAISAL - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPLIANCE

REVIEW/APPROVAL OF COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

O SELECTIVE POST REVIEW OF RESULTS

• COGNIZANT SAFETY SYSTEM ENGINEER

• READINESS REVIEW PROCESS

HEn 8402-190.2 PHILOSOPHY OF OPERATION AT EBR-II TO ENSURE SAFE CONDITIONS AND MAINTENANCE/CALIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTATION DURING A NORMAL REACTOR RUN

Wayne E. Kiwble Argonne National Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho

ABSTRACT

The Experimental Breeder Reactor No. II (EBR-II) is a uranium- plutonium fueled liquid-metal-cooled fast breeder reactor operated by Argonne National Laboratory at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

PHILOSOPHY OF OPERATION

EBR-II operates with essentially seven levels of protection to ensure safety for personnel and property, both on and off the ANL-W Site.

Safety Limits

These are process variables that are continually observable and measurable (flow, power, and coolant temperature) that protect the integrity of barriers to uncontrolled radiation release.

Limiting-Safety-System Settings

They are established at values that ensure adherence to safety limits both during normal and transient reactor operations. They are established within bounds that allow for calibration uncertainty, instrument inaccuracy, and safety-system response time in the event of reactor transients.

Limiting Conditions for Facility Operations

They ensure that plant conditions important to reactor safety are satisfied for reactor startup and power operation. This includes conditions of equipment, systems, components, and technical characteristics of the plant required to ensure safe facility operation. There are 35 plant conditions that must be satisfied prior to startup.

Reactor Interlock Checksheets

The interlock check consists of determining that The interlock is operable (functioning properly) and that the trip setpoint is correct in accordance with values set down in the list of operating setpoints.

Reactor Run Plan and Authorization

This document must be approved by the Manager, Plant Operations, prior to reactor operation. It specifies the purpose of the run and such items at. the reactor loading status, rod raise sequence, tests and experiments, special instructions and authorization for any circuit bypasses.

503 ft Startup and Approach-to-Power Checksheets

These checksheets are completed concurrently with reactor startup and approach to authorized power.

Operating Checksheets

These checksheets are used to verify all plant conditions remain within specified limits during a normal reactor run.

MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTATION DURING OPERATION

Work Requests

All plant work must be covered by a Critical Systems Maintenance work request. Exceptions to this rule exist only during emergency conditions or for minor or routine work such as adjustment, lubrication, repair, etc., as long as there is no change in function and replacement is accomplished with identical or approved equal parts.

Work requests are submitted to the on-crew shift supervisor to determine if existing plant conditions are compatible with those required for the work to be performed. In addition, the supervisor determines if proper and approved procedures are available and if all safety requirements have been recognized and addressed.

The shift supervisor approves and directs the implementation of all operations, maintenance, modification, experimental and testing activities concerned with EBR-II plant facilities.

Maintenance on Sensitive Systems

Sensitive systems are defined as:

Reactivity Control Systems. These are the active systems which control the vertical motion of the control or safety rods.

Design Features. This applies to those aspects of basic plant design that are important to safety such as primary coolant system, reactor core, reactor building containment, etc.

Reactor Shutdown System. Those groups of safety-system evices, including the actuators, that are provided for reactivity reduction by down- ward motion of the control and/or safety rods.

Engineered Safety Features. These are active and passive devices whose function is necessary to prevent unacceptable release or spread of radioactive materials. These include the auxiliary pump, the primary purification system syphon break, reactor building containment isolation system, and the shutdown coolers.

All sensitive systems are identified with a green sensitive system tag SENSITIVE l°cated on or immediately adjacent to an individual sensitive system component. SYSTEM DRAWING NO.

504 •'.'.• ",^r.'-"< '-' "• ITEM NO. All drawings have been marked to identify components that comprise the EBR-II sensitive systems. These drawings are maintained in the control room.

Work on sensitive systems is segregated into three categories: routine maintenance, nonroutine maintenance, and troubleshooting.

Routine Maintenance. Such as replacing plug-in modules, balancing motors and miscellaneous components up to, but not including, the input range module can be performed at any time.

Nonroutine Maintenance. Can only be performed on sensitive systems during reactor operation if authorized by the Manager, Plant Operations, and if specified limiting plant conditions are met. The limiting conditions are defined in the "Guidelines for Nonroutine Maintenance on Sensitive Systems". All other nonroutine sensitive-system component maintenance not covered by the Guidelines must be authorized by the Associate Director. If an instrument channel is to be replaced or dis- abled, the trip functions associated with that channel shall be placed in the tripped condition. If redundancy does not exist, the reactor will be shut down prior to implementing work on the system.

Troubleshooting. Troubleshooting of sensitive-system instrument channels or components during reactor operation, except for minor items such as replacing plug-in modules, etc., will be considered nonroutine maintenance and is authorized by the Manager, Plant Operations. Test instrumentation connected during reactor operation may require buffering through an approved buffering device at the option of the Manager, Plant Operations. If a buffer is required, it will be considered part of the sensitive system.

Plant Modifications

No modifications to the plant may be made using the work request as the sole authorizing document. If a change in instrumentation is required which may change the function3 affect reactor safety or involve a sensitive system, additional approved procedures are required.

Instrument Calibration Intervals

The calibration interval for all instrumentation except for radiation monitoring has been set at one calendar year. Radiation instrument calibration is required semi-annually. When a calibration period is due to expire and a required plant condition is not available, a grace period of 60 days is considered acceptable.

REFERENCES

EBR-II Technical Specifications

EBR-II Operations Departmental Procedures

EBR-II Operating Instructions

505 SECONDARY — 'Q SODIUM O

COOLING WATER ' PRIMARY TANH PUMP

T/P-G-60033-C

EBR-H FLUID SYSTEMS (SIMPLIFIED) H

PHILOSOPHY OF OPERATION

TO ENSURE SAFE OPERATING CONDITIONS

DURING A NORMAL REACTOR RU

507 SEVEN LEVELS OF PROTECTION

1. SAFETY LIMITS PROTECT BARRIERS TO UNCONTROLLED RADIATION RELEASE

2. LIMITING-SAFETY-SYSTEM SETTINGS ENSURE SAFETY LIMITS ARE NOT REACHED

3. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR FACILITY OPERATIONS 35 PLANT CONDITIONS SATISFIED PRIOR TO REACTOR STARTUP

4. REACTOR INTERLOCK CHECKSHEETS ENSURE ALL INTERLOCKS ARE OPERABLE

5. REACTOR RUN PLAN AND AUTHORIZATION SPECIFIES PURPOSE OF RUN, TESTS, CIRCUIT BYPASSES, ETC.

6. STARTUP AND APPROACH-TO-POWER CHECKSHEETS

COMPLETED PRIOR TO AND CONCURRENTLY WITH REACTOR STARTUP

7. OPERATING CHECKSHEETS COMPLETED FROM EVERY HOUR TO EVERY FOUR HOURS DURING OPERATION

508 MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION

OF INSTRUMENTATION

DURING A REACTOR RUN

509 1. WORK REQUESTS A. REQUIRED FOR ALL WORK EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCIES AND MINOR ROUTINE WORK B. SUBMITTED TO SUPERVISOR FOR APPROVAL c. SUPERVISOR APPROVES AND DIRECTS ALL WORK

2. SENSITIVE SYSTEMS

© REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS • DESIGN FEATURES • REACTOR SHUTDOWN SYSTEM • ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 2.1 SENSITIVE SYSTEMS IDENTIFIED WITH TAG 2.2 SENSITIVE SYSTEMS DRAWINGS IDENTIFIED AND MAINTAINED IN CONTROL ROOM 2.3 SENSITIVE SYSTEM CATEGORIES 2.3.1 ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 2.3.2 NONROUTINE MAINTENANCE 2.3.3 TROUBLESHOOTING

3. PLANT MODIFICATIONS REQUIRE MORE THAN JUST WORK REQUEST

14. INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION INTERVALS REQUIRED EVERY YEAR; EVERY SIX MONTHS FOR RADIATION INSTRUMENTS

510 THURSDAY, MARCH 1 , 1984 DOE HEADQUARTERS AND OPERATIONS OFFICE STAFF MEETING

ONS Organization & Activities

Field Office Safety Issues

GEN-12 and Generic Threat Criteria

Closing Remarks

513 CONFERENCE ATTENDEES CONFERENCE ATTENDEES

Frank Aimeter General Engineer Defense Programs, DP-13.1 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3783 Commercial (301) 353-3783

John Anderson Nuclear Safety Engineer Savannah River Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box A Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FTS 239-1446 Commercial (803) 725-1446

George R. Archibald Nuclear Engineer Idaho Operations Office U.S. Department of Energy 550 Second Street Idaho Falls, ID 83401 FTS 583-0675 Commercial (208) 526-0675 ID

Quincey Baird Manager, Reactor Safety, Fast Flux Test Reactor Hanford Engineerying Development Laboratory P. 0. Box 1970 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 444-0423 Commercial (509) 376-0423

Juris Balodis Safety Officer U.S. Department of Energy Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory P. 0. Box 102 Princeton, NJ FTS 340-3709 Commercial (609) 683-3709 CH

517 Robert W. Barber Acting Director Nuclear Facilities Safety Division Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, MS C-103 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3548 Commercial (301) 353-3548 HQ

Armin Behr Human Resource Development Branch Office of Industrial Relations U.S. Department of Energy Forrestal Building, MS 4F-094 Washington, D.C. 20585 FTS 252-9035 HQ Marsha L. Bell Manager, Safety Analysis Rockwell Hanford Operations P. 0. Box 800 Richland, WA 99352 FTS 4i4O-3931 Commercial (509) 353-3931 RI Hal Bernaru Project Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DL/SSPB MS-340 Washington. D.C. 20555 FTS 492-97»9 Commercial (301) 492-9799 HQ

George Bidinger Senior Nuclear Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop SS396 Washington, D.C. 20555 FTS 427-4510 Commercial (202) 427-4510 HQ

518 Lawrence A. Booth [ Division Leader I Los Alamos National Laboratory | Mail Stop F-606 I P. 0. Box 1663 | Los Alamos, NM 87545 i- | FTS 843-4567 t \ Commercial (505) 667-4567 ' AL Lor in. C. Brinkerhoff Reactor Safety Branch Chief U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety Germantown, MS EP-34 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5631 Commercial (301) 353-5631 HQ

Michael Brooks Plant Manager, Reactor Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York 11973 FTS 666-4414 Commercial (516) 282-4414 CH Blake P. Brown Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, MS G-104 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3133 Commercial (301) 353-3133 HQ

W. J. Brynda Group Leader Brookhaven National Laboratory Building 703 Upton, NY 11973 FTS 666-4413 Commercial (516) 282-4413 CH

519 G. Howard Burger Director, Operational Safety Union Carbide, Nuclear Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory P. 0. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 624-4339 Commercial (615) 574-4339 OR

T. F. Burns, Jr. Env. Team Leader NPR Project Office 270 Corporate Center Germantown, Maryland 20874 FTS 233-56 95 Commercial (301) 583-56 95

Harold Burton Manager, Technical Integration Office TM1 2 EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 88 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 FTS 590-1010 Commercial (717) 948-1010 ID

Harold M. Busey Physical Scientist Defense Programs U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, DP-226.1 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3291 Commercial (301) 353-3291 HQ

Michael A. Butler Safety Specialist Brookhaven Area Office U.S. Department of Energy 53 Bell Avenue Upton, NTt 11973 FTS 666-3430 Commercial (516) 345-3430 CH

520 Donald M. Carlson Physical Protection Analyst U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 FTS 427-4181 Commercial (202) 427-4181 HQ

Paul A. Carlson Manager, Safety Assessment & Analysis UNC Nucler Industries. Inc. Building 1105, 100-N Area P. 0. Box 490 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 373-1428 Commercial (509) 942-1428 RI

Margaret M. Carroll Safety Engineer Sandia National Laboratories P. 0. Box 5800 Albuquerque, NM 87187 FTS 844-1462 Commercial (505) 844-1462 AL

Carl Caves Leader, Safety Analysis Group 00S Office of Operational Safety U.S. Department of Energy 00S EP322 J117 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5606 Commercial (301) 353-5606 HQ

George K. Cederberg Supervisor, Safety Analysis Group Exxon Nuclear Idaho Co., Inc. P. 0. Box 2800 Idaho Falls, ID 83401 FTS 583-1372 Commercial (208) 526-1372 ID

Jack L. Clark Manager, Health & Safety EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 FTS 583-1327 Commercial (208) 526-1327 ID

521 A. Thomas Clark, Jr. Senior Chemical Engineer Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 FTS 427-4205 Commercial (202) 427-4205 HQ Robert J. Clouse Department Head Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division P. 0. Box Y Building 9201-5, MS 003 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 624-3695 Commercial (615) 574-36 95 OR

Jerry Combs Emergency Preparedness Specialist Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5635 Commercial (301) 353-56 35 HQ

Raymond Cooperstein Nuclear Facility Safety Engineer DOE, Office of Nuclear Safety Germantown, MS PE-221 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3639 Commercial (301) 353-3639 Mayme R. Crowell Research Associate Oak Ridge Associated Universities P.O. Box 117 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37 831-0117 FTS 626-3411 Conmercial (615) 576-3411 OR

g. 522 i Tom Dahl Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory- Building 3042, MS 202 P. 0. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 624-7230 Commercial (615) 574-7230 OR

Robert Davies Deputy Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety and Health U.S. Department of Ennergy, PE-20 Washington, D.C. 20585 FTS 252-2407 Commercial (202) 252-2407 HQ

Peter J. Davis U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, NE-74 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4693 Commercial (301) 353-4693 HQ L. Joe Deal Acting Director Radiological Controls Division Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, MS PE-222 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4093 Commercial (301) 353-4093 HQ

James T. Denovan Manager, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Section Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory P. 0. Box 999 Richland, WA 99352 FTS 444-1187 Commercial (509) 376-1187 RI ;

Tom Devlin Lab Staff Sandia National Labs Livermore, CA 94550 FTS 532-2384 Commercial (415) 422-23 84 AL

523 Isidore Di Biase Principal Engineer UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. F. 0. Box 409 Richland, WA 99352 FTS 444-1348 Commercial (509) 373-1348 HI

Fred L. DiLorenzc Manager of Operations, HFEF Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, ID 83101 FTS 583-71^9 Commercial (208) 526-7149 CH

William S, Durant Research Associate E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. Savannah River Laboratory Aiken, SC 29808 FTS 239-1358 Commercial (803) 725-1358 SR

Lee Durney Section Chief EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 FTS 583-1745 Commercial (208) 526-1745 ID

J. Dykstra Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Divis: K-25 Plant, Mail Stop 414 P. 0. Eox P Oak Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 626-2872 Commercial (615) 576-2872 OR Jchn C. Elder Staff Member Los Alamos National Laboratory Mail Stop P-229 P. 0. Box 1663 Los Alamos, NM 87545 FTS 843-3366 Commercial (505) 667-3366 AL

524 Kennth E. Elliott Chief, Reactor and Criticality Safety Branch Albuquerque Operations Office U.S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 5400 Albuquerque, NM 87115 FTS 846-1319 Commercial (505) 264-1319 AL H. C. Field Technical Advisor to the Director Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, PE-22 Washington, D.c, 20545 FTS 233-5629 Commercial (301) 353-5629 HQ

Robert H. Finley Site QA Coordinator E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. Savannah River Plant Aiken, South Carolina 29808 FTS 239-3520 Commercial (803) 725-3520

J. G. Fowke Project Engineer Savannah River Plant U.S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box A Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FTS 239-3897 Commercial (803) 725-3897 SR David I. Gertman SNR Scientist Human Factors Engineering Group EG&G, Idaho P. 0. Box 1625 TSB Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 FTS 583-9608

Richard N. Glover Office of Quality Assurance and Standards U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5607 Commercial (301) 353-5607 HQ

525 Joseph M. Graf Staff Member Los Alamos National Laboratory P. 0. Box 1663 Los Alamos, NM 87545 FTS 843-3847 Commercial (505) 667-8060 AL

Arthur W. Graves Department Manager Safety Integration U.S. Department of Energy Rockwell Hanford Operations P. 0. Box 800 Richland, WA 99352 FTS 440-2080 Commercial 509/373-2080 RI

William R. Hamel Group Leader Oak Ridge National Laboratory UCC-ND Building 3500, MS 001 P. 0. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37 830 FTS 624-7152 Commercial (615) 574-7152 OR

Lawrence J. Harrison TREAT Facility Manager Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, ID 83401 FTS 526-7242 Commeroial (208) 526-7242 CH

Harry K. Hasegawa Engineer University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Mail Stop L-442 P. 0. Box 5505 Livermore, CA 94550 FTS 532-3175 Commercial (415) 422-3175 SF

526 Sean C. Hawley Development Engineer -attelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory P. 0. Box 999 Richland, WA 99352 FTS 444-1042 Commercial (509) 376-1042 R..

Joel B. Heineman Assistant Program Manager/In-Pile Experiments Argonne National Laboratory 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60'439 FTS 972-4625 Commercial (312) 972-4625 CH

Margaret F. Hickey Safety Analysis Manager Rockwell International Rocky Flats Plant P. 0. Box 464 Golden, CO 80401 FTS 320-7000 Commercial (303) 430-2840 AL

James Hill Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy Germantown, PE-222 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5626 Commercial (301) 353-5626 HQ

James L. Hooper Assistant Director Nuclear Safety Chicago Operations Office U.S. Department of Energy 9800 South Cass Avenue Argonne, IL 60439 FTS 972-2264 Commercial (312) 972-2264 CH

527 Hillard H. Howard Staff Member Los Alamos National Lab. Mail Stop P-229 P. 0. Box 1663 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 FTS 843-3363 Commercial 505/667-3363 George Huff Senior Member of Technical Staff Ralph M. Parsons Company 100 West Walnut Pasadena, California 91124 Commercial (818) 440-4464

William H. Hutchin Manager, Heavy Element Facility Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Mail Stop L-378 P. 0. Box 808 Livermore, California 94550 FTS 532-0451 Commercial (415) 422-0451

Edward Hylsky Operations Engineer Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 FTS 583-7601 Commercial (208) 526-7601

H. Duane Hymer Operations Specialist EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 FTS 583-4247 Commercial (208) 526-4247

David S. Ingle Safety Manager Dayton Area Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 66 Miamisburg, Ohio 45342 FTS 774-3597 Commercial (513)865-3597

528 Robert Jacobs Safety Analysis Group Rockwell Hanford Operations Richland, Washington 992?:"- FTS 440-2073 Commercial (509) 373-2073

William D. Jensen Chief, Nuclear Safety Branch Idaho Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy 550 Second Street Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 FTS 583-1387 Commercial (208) 526-1387 Wiley A. Johnson Chief, Facilities & System Safety Branch Oak Ridge Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. EDX E Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 FTS 624-0852 Commercial (615) 576-0852

Lance L. Junker Training & Procedures Group Leader, Reactor Division Brookhaven National Laboratory Building 703 Upton, New York 11973 FTS 666-4416 Commercial (516) 282-4416

Norman Ketzlach Senior Scientist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 FTS 427-4510 Commercial (301) 427-4510

Ehsan Khan Nuclear Engineer/Space Reactors U. S. Department of Energy NE-54 Office of Space Reactor Projects Washington, D.C. 20874 FTS 233-3748 Commercial (301) 353-3748

529 Wayne Kimble Reactor Shift Supervisor Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 FTS 583-7512 Commercial (208)526-7512

Gerald C. Kinne Manager, Reactor Division Brookhaven National Laboratory Building 703 Upton, New York 11973 FTS 666-4061 Commercial (516) 282-4061

William W. Kinney Nuclear Engineer U. S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety, PE-221 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3548 Commercial (301) 353-3548

Norm Klug Manager, Operational Safety NE-74 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-2875 Commercial (301) 353-2875

Bruce E. Knight Director, Health, Safety & Environment Rockwell Hanford Operations Box 800 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 440-2032 Commercial (509) 373-2032

Jerry Koelling Staff Member, Q-DO Los Alamos National Laboratory MS E561 P. 0. Box 1663 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 FTS 233-56 53 Commercial 301/353-56 53

530 0. Clinton Kolar Head, Criticality Safety Office University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory L-303 P. 0. Box 808 Livermore, California 9^550 FTS 543-0673 Commercial (415) 423-0673

Joseph J. Krupar, Jr. Chief, Operations Branch (FFTF) Richland Operations Office U.S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 550 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 444-5532 Commercial 509/376-5532

Sidney Langer Senior Tech. Spec. EG&G, Inc. NPR/PO 20010 Century Blvd. Germantovm, Maryland 20874 FTS 233-5699 Commercial (301) 353-5699 Dick Lindsay Systems Engineer Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, ID 83403 FTS 583-7754 Commercial (208) 526-7754 CH

Joe Lopez Manager, Safety Analysis & Exp. Saf. Office of Operational Safety PE-242 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4114 Commercial (301) 353-4114

Donna E. Lucas Senior Development Engineer Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory P. 0. Box 999 Richland, Washington 99352 Commercial (509) 376-1331

531 Steven Ludwig Nuclear Safety Engineer Chicago Operations Office 0. S. Department of Energy 9800 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60439 Commercial (312) 972-2262

Ted Luera Supervisor, Reactor Applications Sandia National Laboratories Organization 6451, P. 0. Box 5800 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 FTS 264-0049 Commercial (505) 264-0049

A. R. Lyle Reactor Manager Los Alamos National Laboratory P. 0. Box 1663 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 FTS 843-4151 Commercial 505/667-4152 Joseph R. Maher, Director Office of Nuclear Safety, PE-22 U. S. Deparment of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4435 Commercial (301) 353-4435

Jan W. Mares Assistant Secretary for Policy, Safety and Environment PE-1 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 FTS 252-5325 Commercial (202) 252-5325

David R. Mason Chief, Nuclear Safety Branch Savannah River Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box A Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FTS 239-3972 Commercial (803) 450-3972

532 Stephen Matovich Director, Safety & Quality Assurance DP-13.1 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D. C. 20545 FTS 233-4231 Commercial (301) 353-4231 Paul 0. Matthews Office of Military Application Division of Safety, Environment, and Emergency Actions DP-226 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3503 Commercial (301) 353-3503

J, D. McCarthy Manager, Nuclear & Facility Safety Rockwell International Rocky Flats Plant P. 0. Box 464 Golden, Colorado 80401 FTS 320-2412 Commercial (303) 497-2412

Ted Mclntosh Nuclear Engineer NE-23 U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3589 Commercial (301) 353-3589 George McRae Staff Engineer UCC-ND K-25 Plant Building 0502-3, MS 004 P. 0. Box P Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 FTS 624-9004 Commercial (615) 574-9004

Carol Minelli Special Projects Manager Rockwell International Rocky Flats Plant P. 0. Box 464 Golden, Colorado 80401 FTS 320-4047 Commercial (303) 497-4047

533 Robert L. Moffitt Manager, Nuclear Safety UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. 100-N Area/1100 Building P. 0. Box 490 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 1(40-1591

David C. Montgomery Senior Research Scientist Center for Nuclear Studies Memphis State University Memphis, Tennessee 38152 Commercial (901) 454-26 87

Jeanne Moody Administrative Assistant UCC-ND, Y-12 Plant P. 0. Box Y, 9212, MS-2 CK Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 624-2116 Commercial (615^ 574-2116 OR

James L. Morse Safety Analysis Group Leader University of California Lawrence Livermore National Lab. Mail Stop L-386 P. 0. Box 808 Livermore, California 94550 FTS 543-8798 Commercial (415) 422-8798

William Mott Office of Operational Safety PE-24 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3016 Commercial (301) 353-3016

Marvin P. Norin Deputy Director Division of Safety, Quality Assurance, & Safeguards NE-74 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4518 Commercial (301)-353-4518

534 h William C, Perkins Research Staff Chemist E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. Savannah River Plant Aiken, South Carolina 29808 FTS 239-1361 Commercial (803) 450-1361

Roger S. Perkins Quality Assiirance Specialist UCC-ND, Y-12 Plant P. 0. Box Y Oak Ridge, TN 37830 FTS 624-0997 Commercial (615) 574-0997 OR

L. Rolf Peterson Project Engineer, Human Factors Engr. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. P. 0. Box 808 Livermore, California 94550 FTS 543-0952 Commercial (415) 423-0952

Benjamin F. Pierce Engineer, Reactor Safety Westinghouse Hanford Company P. 0. Box 1970 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 444-8600 Commercial (509) 942-8600

Gil Pitcher Reactor Inst. Group Leader HFBR - Bldg. No.750 Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York 11973 FTS 666-4043 Commercial (516) 282-4043

Albert Queirolo Shift Supervisory - High Flux Beam Reactor Building 750 Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York 11973 FTS 666-4442 Commercial (516) 282-4442

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535 Brent Rankin Research Supervisor Savannah River Plant E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FTS 239-2607 Commercial (803) 725-26 07

Eugene F. Redden Nuolear Safety Engineer DP-13.1 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3846 Commercial (301) 353-3846 Jon Reuscher Department Manager Sandia National Laboratories Department 6450 Albuquerque, NM 87185 FTS 844-7123 Commercial (505) 844-7123 AL

Wade Richards Physicist Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 FTS 972-7663 Commercial (208) 526-7663 Cliff R. Richey Manager, Laboratory Safety Department Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories ?. 0. Box 999 Richland, Washington 99352 Commercial (509) 376-1926

H. F. Ring Technical Specialist E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. Montchanin-6600 Wilmington, Delaware 19898 Commercial (302) 774-2787

Kitty Rising Nuclear Engineer Richland Operations Office U. S. Dspartment of Energy Richiand, Washington 99352 FTS 444-1064 Commercial (509) 376-1064

536 Carlyle J. Roberts Manager, Safety & Environ. Assessment Dames & Moore c/o West Valley Nuclear Services P. 0. Box 191 West Valley, New York 14171 Commercial (716) 942-3235

Roger D. Rollins Engineer Savannah River Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box A Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FIS 239-3785 Commercial (803) 725-3785 Henry B. Rosenthal Sr. Nuclear Safety Engineer Office of Nuclear Safety PE-221 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5641 Commercial (301) 353-5641

Carol Rossomondo Plant Protection Analyst U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 FTS 492-7131

H. R. Saffell Senior Member of Technical Staff Ralph M. Parsons Company 100 West Walnut Street Pasadena, California 91124 Commercial (813) 440-2525

Rama Sastry Statistician Office of Operational Safety U. S. Department of Energy PE-24 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-4664 Commercial (301) 353-4664

537 Pam Saxman Nuclear Engineer Albuquerque Operations Office U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 5400 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87158 FTS 846-1325 Commercial (505) 264-1325

Arlen R. Schade Manager, Facility Safety Westinghouse Hanford Company P. 0. Box 1970 Richland, Washington 99352 FTS 444-1522 Commercial (509) 376-1522

Thomas G. Schleiter Nuclear Engineer U. S. Department cf Energy NE-74 Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-3074 Commercial (301) 353-3074

Boyd G. Schultz Project Leader, ONS Assessment & Field Support Prograa Oak Ridge Associated Universities P. 0. Box 117 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-0117 FTS 626-3406 Commercial (615) 576-3406

William L. Scott Sub-Section Manager, Preventive Maintenance Exxon Nuclear Idaho Co., Inc. Mail Stop CPP-663 P. 0. Box 2800 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 FTS 583-3584 Commercial (208) 526-3584

Jim Seay Staff Manager Westinghouse Hanford Co. NE-23 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-2684 Commercial 301/353-2684

538 Charles W. Solbrig Nuclear Safety Engineer Argonne National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-2528 FTS 583-7064 Commercial (208) 526-7064

James G. Stearns Chief, Safety & Environmental Branch Rocky Flats Area Office IT. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 928 Golden, Colorado 80401 FTS 320-4865 Commercial (303) 497-4865 James C. Stone Reactor Safety Engineer Office of Nuclear Safety PE-221 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5632 Commercial (301) 353-56 32

Richard B. Stump Health Physicist Sandia National Laboratories Division 3312 P. 0. Box 5800 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 FTS 844-1502 Commercial (505) 844-1502

J. H. Swanks Director, Operations Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory P. 0. Box X Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 FTS 624-7040 Commercial (615) 574-7040

J. H. Talboy Nuclear Engineer Argonne National Laboratory 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60439 FTS 972-3060 Commercial (312) 972-3060

539 Joe T. Thomas Senior Research Staff UCC-ND,Bldg. 6002-D Oak Ridge National Laboratory P. 0. Box X Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 FTS 624-5261 Commercial (615) 574-5261

Edward P. Treat Manager, Reactor Training EG&G Idaho, Inc. P. 0. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 FTS 583-4364 Commercial (208) 526-4364

Jan Trice Research Associate Oak Ridge Associated Universities Assessment and. Field Support Program P. 0. Box 117 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117 FTS 626-3310 Commercial (615) 576-3310 OR

Jan B. Van Erp Nuclear Engineer Argonne National Laboratory Building 208 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60439 FTS 972-3381 Commercial (312) 972-3381

Clarence E. Walker Staff Engineer Savannah River Plant U. S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box A Aiken, South Carolina 29801 FTS 239-7995 Commercial (803) 648-7995

Warren W. Warner Health Physicist San Francisco Operations Office D. S. Department of Energy 1333 Broadway Oakland, California 94612 FTS 536-6442 Commercial (415) 273-6442

540 Arnold A. Weintraub Acting Director, SEAD PE-242 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5610 Commercial 301/353-5610

Lida Whitaker ES&H Specialist NE-33 U» S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 233-5575 Commercial (301) 353-5575 Fred Witmer Sr. Nuclear Chemical Engineer PE-221 Office of Nuclear Safety U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FIS 233-5517 Commercial (301) 353-5517

Charles York Engineer 6012 Kingsford Road Bethesda, Maryland 20817 Commercial (301) 530-8113

Harold H. Young Program Manager ER-44 U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 FTS 252-6833

Michael J. Zamorski Program Engineer Richland Operations Office U.S. Department of Energy P. 0. Box 550 Richland, Washington 99320 FTS 444-5349 Commercial (509) 376-6349

541 Henriks J. Zeile Manager, NPR Support Office EG&G Idaho DP-13 U. S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 205*15 FTS 233-2891 Commercial (301) 353-2891

542