116 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

POLISH CRISIS 1993). Jaruzelski, Kania, Kiszczak, and Stephen Engelberg, “Jaruzelski, Defending continued from page 1 Rakowski were all top officials in in Record, Says His Rule Saved Poland,” The 1980-81 crisis, though from a quite differ- 1980-81; Gribkov was the chief of staff of New York Times, 20 May 1992, A-9; and ent angle, will be included in my Working the Pact; and Pavlov was the KGB John Darnton, “Jaruzelski Is Now Sorry He Paper on “The , Jaruzelski, and station chief in Warsaw. Gribkov’s and Ordered Martial Law,” The New York Times, the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” which is Pavlov’s accounts make an intriguing con- 4 March 1993, A-12. For two key interviews scheduled to be issued by the Cold War trast with the views offered by Jaruzelski, with , who was a full International History Project later this year. Kania, et al., as will be discussed below. member of the CPSU Politburo in 1980-81, Appendices to the Working Paper will fea- A plethora of shorter first-hand accounts see “Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w ture many other documents I have translated and interviews with key participants have Polsce: Jaruzelski postapil from the Russian, Polish, Czech, and Ger- appeared as well. For a sample of the count- prawidlowo,” Trybuna (Warsaw), 9 Novem- man archives. Soon thereafter, I will be less interviews with and commentaries by ber 1992, 2; and “Wywiad z Michailem putting together a book-length study and General Jaruzelski, see Novoe vremya (Mos- Gorbaczowem: ‘Jestem inny, niz probuja collection of new materials pertaining to the cow) 38 (September 1991), 26-30; “Jaruzelski mnie przedstawic’,” Rzeczpospolita, 23 Oc- Polish crisis. obrazony: Wyrok w mojej sprawie juz tober 1992, 9. Shorter interviews with Vitalii zapadl—napisal general w liscie do Pavlov, whose memoirs are cited above, Overview of New Sources przewodniczacego komisji, posla Rzepki,” include “Dostep do wszystkiego,” Polityka Since 1989, a huge quantity of docu- Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 13 January 1993, (Warsaw), 8 (20 February 1993), 15; “Byly ments and memoirs about the Soviet Union’s 5; “Katastrofa byla nieuchronna,” Gazeta rezydent KGB w Warszawie: ZSRR nie role in the 1980-81 crisis have become avail- wyborcza (Warsaw), 3 December 1992, 13; chcial interwencji,” Rzeczpospolita, 10 Feb- able. An invaluable account, which ap- “Rozmawiac bez nienawisci: Wywiad ruary 1993, 7; and Leon Bojko, “A wejsc nie peared even before the Communist regime generala Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z Adamem chcieli?” Gazeta wyborcza, 10 February in Warsaw had collapsed, is the interview Michnikem,” Gazeta wyborcza , 25-26 April 1993, 6. with the former Polish colonel Ryszard 1992, 8-11; “Oswiadczenia i przeskody Most of the top Polish officials from Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od formalne: Rozliczanie stanu wojennego,” 1980-1981, including Jaruzelski and srodka,” Kultura () 4/475 (April 1987), Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 25 November Kiszczak, have given testimony before the pp. 3-57. Kuklinski was one of five senior 1992, 2; “Ironiczny prymas historii,” Prawo Commission on Constitutional Oversight of officers on the Polish General Staff who i zycie (Warsaw), 49 (December 1992), 11; the Polish Sejm (Parliament). The hearings were responsible for drawing up plans for martial law in 1980-81. During that time he DECLASSIFIED SOVIET was also a spy for the U.S. Central Intelli- DOCUMENTS ON THE POLISH In regard to the situation in the Polish People’s gence Agency, and he was able to provide CRISIS Republic. the United States with unparalleled access 1. To endorse Comrade L. I. Brezhnev’s to all the military secrets of the Warsaw Pact Translated and annotated information about the situation unfolding in the until November 1981, when he was forced by Mark Kramer to flee. He now lives under an assumed Polish People’s Republic. name in the United States. Other indispens- CPSU CC Politburo Decision Setting Up 2. To establish a CC Politburo Commission able memoirs and first-hand accounts in- Suslov Commission, 25 August 1980 composed of: clude , Stan wojenny Comrades M. A. Suslov (chairman), A. A. dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Proletarians of all countries, unite! Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Chernenko, M. V. Zimyanin, I. V. Arkhipov, L. Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac Communist Party of the Soviet Union M. Zamyatin, O. B. Rakhmanin. konfrontacje (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991); Gen- CENTRAL COMMITTEE eral Kiszczak mowie . . .: Prawie wszystko To instruct the Commission to pay close TOP SECRET . . ., ed. by Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas attention to the situation unfolding in the PPR and (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); Mieczylaw to keep the Politburo systematically informed No. P210/P about the state of affairs in the PPR and about Rakowski, Jak to sie stalo (Warsaw: BGW, possible measures on our part. Suggestions in the 1991); the first interview with Rakowski in To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, event of necessity are to be brought before the Zanim stane przed Truybunalem: Z Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, CPSU CC Politburo. Mieczyslawem Rakowskim rozmawie Tikhonov, Ustinov, Zimyanin, Rusakov, Dariusz Szymczycha (Warsaw: BGW, Arkhipov, Kornienko, Zamyatin, Rakhmanin. 1992); Army-General A. I. Gribkov, CPSU CC POLITBURO “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis Extract from Protocol No. 210 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo nachala 80-kh godov,” Voenno-istoricheskii * * * * * on 25 August 1980 zhurnal () 9 (September 1992), 46- CPSU CC Politburo Report “On Theses for 57; and Vitalii Pavlov, Wspomnienia ______the discussion with representatives of the rezydenta KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, POLISH CRISIS, 1980-81 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 117 began in September 1992, and six sessions “Tainy ‘temnoi komnaty’,” Moskovskie Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarnosc,” 1980- were convened in 1992 and the first half of novosti 14 (5 April 1992), 17; and “Vladislav 1981 (London: Aneks, 1992). Yet another 1993. The transcripts of these initial hear- Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto invaluable source is a multi-volume collec- ings were published, along with supporting nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil,” Segodnya tion of documents culled from the former documentation, in Sad nad autorami stanu (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. References East German Communist party and Stasi wojennego przed Komisja Odpowied- to other items of this sort can be found in my archives, which is being put out by a team zialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: BGW, forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper. led by Manfred Wilke at the Free University 1993), Vol. 1: Oskarzenia wyjasnienia Of the vast number of Soviet and East of under the title SED-Politburo und obrona. Additional volumes cover the sub- European documents that have been released, polnische Krise 1980/1982. The first vol- sequent hearings, which for the most part including many transcripts of CPSU Polit- ume, Band 1: 1980, Working Paper No. 3 went over similar ground. Especially valu- buro meetings during the crisis, only a rela- (Berlin: Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, able are the documents collected and re- tively small number have been published, 1993) covers events through the end of 1980.2 leased by the Commission. but these have been of great importance. Another extremely useful volume, Die SED Important interviews with, and articles Two of the most valuable sets of documents, contra Polen: Die Planung der SED- by, high-ranking Soviet and East European including selected transcripts of CPSU Po- Fuhrung zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion in military officers who were involved in the litburo meetings, top-secret communications Polen 1980/81, was published by Akademie preparations for an in- between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, internal Verlag for the same research institute in clude “Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z CPSU CC documents, and other items, were 1994. Valuable citations from Bulgarian generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka published in Polish in 1992 and 1993: documents can be found in “Eventualna rozmawia Leszek Mazan,” Polityka 37 (15 “Dokumenty ‘Komisji Suslowa’,” interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e mozhela da September 1990), 13; “Generalmajor S. Rzeczpospolita, 26 August 1993, 1, 19-20; stane ‘vtori kurvav Afganistan’,” Duma Prochazka z vojenske obrody rika: ‘Meli and “Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3. jsme okupovat Polsko’,” Zemedelske noviny Gazeta wyborcza, 12-13 December 1992, Unpublished Soviet and East European (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1; “Misja 10-11.1 Another source of comparable sig- documents pertaining to the 1980-81 crisis skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem nificance is the 660-page collection of tran- vastly outnumber the ones that have been Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR scripts of all the relevant Polish Politburo published. In Warsaw, some of the most w Polsce,” Gazeta wyborcza, 14-15 March meetings during the crisis: Zbigniew valuable unpublished materials are readily 1992, 8-9; Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura available in the main Archive of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych), which Polish leadership,” 3 September 1980 To endorse the theses for the discussion contains both Party and governmental docu- with representatives of the Polish leadership ments. Many other items, however, are still To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (see attached). in the possession of the Commission to In- (General Department, 1st sector) vestigate Documents Pertaining to Martial Proletarians of all countries, unite! Law (Komisja resortowej badajacej CC SECRETARY dokumentacje zwiazana ze stanem Communist Party of the Soviet Union wojennym). Unfortunately, almost all the CENTRAL COMMITTEE Regarding point 38 of Prot. No. 213 files of the Polish Defense Ministry and TOP SECRET Internal Affairs Ministry from 1980-81 are still sealed off. In Moscow, many vital SPECIAL DOSSIER To be transmitted by the KGB in encrypted unpublished items, including numerous EYES ONLY form to the designated point. CPSU Politburo transcripts that were not published in either of the two Polish-lan- 1. To give a precise evaluation of and guage collections cited above, are available No. P/213/38 take a clear position on the agreement with the in Fond 89 at the Center for Storage of so-called “United Strike Committees” (ZKS) Contemporary Documentation (Tsentr To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, in Gdansk and Szczecin. Gromyko, Rakhmanin Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii, or The agreement concluded by the PPR TsKhSD). Many of these transcripts are Extract from Protocol No. 213 of the session of government, and endorsed by the plenum of cited below. Other items at TsKhSD, in the CPSU CC Politburo the PZPR CC, exacts a high political and Fond 5, Opis’ 84, as well as at the Presiden- on 3 September 1980 economic price for the “regulation” it achieves. tial Archive (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi ______We, of course, understand the circumstances Federatsii, or APRF), the foreign intelli- in which you had to make this onerous deci- gence archive, and the military archives, are sion. The agreement, in essence, signifies the now off-limits. The documents in the Presi- On theses for the discussion with representatives legalization of the anti-socialist opposition. dential Archive, foreign intelligence archive, of the Polish leadership. An organization has emerged that aims to spread its political influence through the entire and military archives have never been acces- sible to the public, but at TsKhSD I did have continued on page 129 an opportunity to pore through many items 118 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN in Fond 5, Opis’ 84 in late 1992 and early relevant archives were opened, major differ- the turmoil was having on Polish foreign 1993. (Unfortunately, that access was ences of interpretation would persist. Never- policy and Poland’s role in the Warsaw Pact. abruptly terminated in April 1993 for rea- theless, it is clear that the profusion of docu- Brezhnev and his colleagues repeatedly con- sons discussed in my article on archival ments and memoirs since 1989 has shed far demned Solidarity for allegedly “inflaming research in CWIHP Bulletin No. 3.) Al- greater light on the Polish crisis than one ever malevolent nationalist passions” and spur- though I was not able to receive photocopies could have hoped for just five to six years ring a “dangerous rise in anti-Sovietism in of materials from Fond 5, Opis’ 84 (because ago. Poland.”5 A report prepared for the CPSU of a bureaucratic glitch), I translated verba- Politburo in mid-1981 by the Soviet ambas- tim or took extensive notes on all items I sador in Warsaw, Boris Aristov, warned that consulted. The Crisis and the Soviet Response the “powerful streams of anti-Soviet rheto- In , the most important docu- ric” in Poland and the “increasing efforts by ments from the former East German Social- the West to subvert Polish socialism” would ist Unity Party (SED) archives (the Stiftung The Polish crisis started out modestly inevitably induce major changes in Poland’s Archiv der Parteien und Massen- enough, as a wave of protests against higher foreign alignments.6 Aristov acknowledged organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, meat prices announced in July 1980; but it that “the anti-socialist forces backing Soli- Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED), the former soon posed graver complications for Soviet darity claim they do not want to change GDR State Security Ministry (Stasi) ar- policy than any event had since the late Poland’s international obligations and alli- chives (Bundesbeauftragte fur die 1940s. The formation of Solidarity, an inde- ances,” but he insisted that such changes Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes pendent and popularly-based trade union that would be carried out nonetheless, albeit “sub- der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen soon rivaled the Communist party for politi- tly, without a frontal attack.” He empha- Republik, Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit cal power and that represented the interests sized that “the mood of anti-Sovietism is Zentralarchiv), and the military archive in of the very same working class in whose growing, especially in the ranks of Solidar- Potsdam (Militarisches Zwischenarchiv), name the party had always purported to rule, ity,” and that the “hostile, anti-Soviet forces” are being published in the series mentioned posed a fundamental challenge to Poland’s both inside and outside Solidarity “are argu- above. In addition, a large number of un- Communist system. Once the magnitude of ing that democratization in Poland is incom- published documents are worth consulting that challenge had become apparent to So- patible with membership in the Warsaw at all three of these archives, especially the viet officials, they reacted with unremitting Pact.”7 Aristov’s prediction that the crisis in first two. In the Czech Republic, two major hostility toward Solidarity. Soviet leaders Poland would bring “fundamental changes archives hold numerous documents relevant were equally dismayed by the growing po- in Polish-Soviet relations” gained wider and to the 1980-81 crisis: the Central State litical influence of Poland’s Catholic church, wider acceptance among Soviet leaders as Archive (Statni ustredni archiv), which which they regarded as “one of the most time wore on. houses a vast collection of items left from dangerous forces in Polish society” and a Because of Poland’s location in the heart the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak fount of “anti-socialist” and “hostile” ele- of Europe, its communications and logisti- Communist Party and from the Czechoslo- ments.3 cal links with the Group of Soviet Forces in vak government, and the Military Historical As the crisis intensified and Solidarity’s Germany, its projected contributions to the Archive (Vojensky historicky archiv), which strength continued to grow, Moscow’s con- “first strategic echelon” of the Warsaw Pact, contains files from the Czechoslovak Gen- demnations of the Polish trade union became and its numerous storage sites for Soviet eral Staff and Ministry of Defense. The more strident, both publicly and in behind- tactical nuclear warheads, the prospect of Czech/Czechoslovak foreign ministry the-scenes deliberations. The thrust of the having a non-Communist government come archive also contains some pertinent docu- Soviet criticisms was that Solidarity and the to power in Warsaw or of a drastic change in ments, but access for now is more sporadic. church had joined ranks with “like-minded Polish foreign policy generated alarm in The materials in Berlin and Prague amply counterrevolutionary forces” to wage “an Moscow. Soviet foreign minister Andrei confirm that the top East German and openly counterrevolutionary struggle for the Gromyko spoke for all his colleagues when Czechoslovak leaders in 1980-81—Gustav liquidation of socialism” in Poland.4 Soviet he declared at a CPSU Politburo meeting in Husak and —both hoped to officials also accused Solidarity of attempt- October 1980 that “we simply cannot and bring a prompt and decisive end to the crisis ing to “seize power from the PZPR” by must not lose Poland” under any circum- through external military intervention. fomenting “economic chaos” in the country stances.8 Although Nikita Khrushchev had As even this brief review shows, the and by embarking on a wide range of other been willing in October 1956 to reach a quantity and quality of new East-bloc sources “provocative and counterrevolutionary ac- modus vivendi with the Polish leader on the 1980-81 crisis are remarkable. Highly tions.” The whole course of events, they Wladyslaw Gomulka, the situation in 1980- sensitive items are more readily available in warned, was leading toward “the collapse of 81 was totally different. Gomulka, despite this case than for any of the earlier Soviet- Polish socialism and the headlong disinte- all his heterodoxies, was a devoted Commu- East European confrontations. This is not to gration of the PZPR,” an outcome that would nist, and Khrushchev could be confident that say, however, that the task of analyzing the leave “Solidarity extremists in full control.” socialism in Poland and the Polish-Soviet Polish crisis is easy. Many aspects of the Throughout the crisis, Soviet leaders “fraternal relationship” would continue and crisis are still obscure because of insuffi- were concerned not only about the internal even thrive under Gomulka’s leadership. cient documentation; and even if all the situation in Poland, but also about the effects Brezhnev and his colleagues had no such COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 119 assurances about Poland in 1980-81. “work stoppages and other negative inci- Poland: Moreover, quite apart from the situa- dents” had “substantially increased” since tion in Poland itself, Soviet officials sus- August both in frequency and in size at It is now absolutely clear that without a pected—with good reason—that the crisis factories all around the Soviet Union, pre- vigorous struggle against the class en- would have destabilizing repercussions in sumably as a direct result of the Polish emy, it will be impossible to save social- other Warsaw Pact countries. Soon after the events.14 Similar reports continued flowing ism in Poland. The question is not historic Gdansk accords were signed in Au- into Moscow throughout 1981. The impli- whether there will be a confrontation, gust 1980, senior commentators in Moscow cations of this spill-over from Poland seemed but who will start it, what means will be began asserting that Solidarity’s “strategy of all the more dire after Solidarity publicly used to wage it, and who will gain the permanent chaos” would inspire similar de- declared its support in September 1981 for initiative. . . . The leaders of the anti- velopments elsewhere that would “threaten other “working people of Eastern Europe” socialist forces, who long ago emerged not just Poland but the whole of peace and and “all the nations of the Soviet Union” from underground into full public view stability in Europe.”9 Equally stern pro- who were seeking to establish their own and are now openly preparing to launch nouncements emanated from the chief So- independent trade unions.15 Thus, it comes a decisive onslaught, are hoping to de- viet ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, who claimed as little surprise that long before martial law lay their final push until they have that “any deviation from our revolutionary was imposed on 13 December 1981, top achieved overwhelming preponderance. teachings” in one socialist country “will Soviet officials were referring to the events . . . This means that if you fail to take entail ruinous consequences for the whole in Poland both publicly and privately as tough measures right away against the socialist world.”10 Much as Soviet and “counterrevolution and anarchy” that not counterrevolution, you will lose the only hard-line East European leaders in 1968 had only “threatened the destruction of the opportunity you still have.20 feared that the Prague Spring would be “con- country’s socialist order and alliance obliga- tagious,” so now they believed that tions,” but also posed “a direct threat to the The extent of the Soviet Union’s deter- Solidarity’s rise would set a crucial prece- security of the USSR and its allies.”16 mination to crush Solidarity via the imposi- dent and spark “anti-socialist” ferment else- By stirring Soviet anxieties about the tion of martial law is clearly evident from the where, most notably in the Soviet Union potential loss of a key member of the War- newly released transcripts of nearly two itself. In response, officials in Moscow and saw Pact and about the spread of political dozen CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980- most of the other Warsaw Pact capitals instability throughout Eastern Europe, the 81. At those sessions, Brezhnev and his promptly took steps to control and even halt Polish crisis demonstrated, as the events of colleagues repeatedly complained that Kania the dissemination of Polish newspapers and 1953, 1956, and 1968 had previously, the and Jaruzelski were proving to be “weak,” journals in their countries. Such steps had degree of “acceptable” change in the Soviet “indecisive,” “insufficiently bold,” “untrust- been recommended in a top-secret report bloc. The crisis in Poland was more pro- worthy,” and “unwilling to resort to extraor- approved by the CPSU Secretariat in De- tracted than those earlier upheavals, but the dinary measures despite our recommenda- cember 1980, which warned that “undesir- leeway for genuine change was, if anything, tions.”21 The same theme emerges from able materials” of an “anti-socialist and anti- narrower than before. Plans for the imposi- other recently opened Soviet documents, in Soviet nature” were streaming into the So- tion of martial law began almost from the which Soviet officials castigated the Polish viet Union from Poland.11 very first day of the crisis.17 Although the authorities for their “unconscionable vacil- Even more worrisome from Moscow’s plans were drafted by the Polish General lation and indecisiveness” in the face of “an perspective was the growing evidence that Staff, the whole process was supervised and open struggle for power by forces hostile to turmoil in Poland was spilling over into the moved along by the Soviet Union. The the PZPR.”22 Soviet officials were con- union republics of the USSR, especially the constant pressure that Soviet political and vinced that “the backers of Solidarity simply three Baltic states and , where pro- military leaders exerted on top Polish offi- do not believe that the PZPR leadership will tests and demonstrations in support of Soli- cials thwarted any hope that Stanislaw Kania, adopt harsh measures to put an end to their darity had begun as early as August 1980.12 the PZPR first secretary until October 1981, anti-socialist activity,” and that this was In the Russian Republic, too, there were might have had of reaching a genuine com- enabling “the counterrevolutionary forces disturbing indications of a surge of labor promise with Solidarity and the Catholic to operate with impunity in their plans to unrest inspired—directly or indirectly—by church.18 From the Soviet Politburo’s per- liquidate socialism in Poland.” It comes as the crisis in Poland. The KGB had harshly spective, any such compromise would have little surprise, then, that in private meetings suppressed three separate attempts by labor been, at best, a useless diversion or, at worst, with Polish leaders, Brezhnev and other top activists to set up an independent trade union a form of outright capitulation to “hostile” CPSU officials demanded that the Poles in in the late 1970s, and ever since forces and a “sell-out to the enemies of “put an end to the strikes and disorder once then the CPSU leadership had been inordi- socialism.”19 As Brezhnev emphasized to and for all” and “rebuff the counterrevolu- nately sensitive and hostile to anything that Kania’s successor, General Wojciech tionary elements with deeds, not just with might give renewed impetus to an unofficial Jaruzelski, in November 1981, the only thing words.”23 workers’ movement.13 For that reason, the the Soviet leadership wanted was for “deci- Although the Soviet Union’s over- members of the CPSU Secretariat expressed sive measures” to be implemented as soon as whelming preference was to resolve the cri- “utter dismay” when they received a top- possible against the “blatantly anti-socialist sis through an “internal solution” rather than secret report in late 1980 which found that and counterrevolutionary opposition” in through direct Soviet military intervention, 120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

be most suitable for invading forces, espe- crackdown.31 Soviet military planners took the option of invading Poland was necessar- cially for the Soviet airborne units that would for granted that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces ily on the agenda in Moscow and most of the have to seize major buildings, transportation would have to intervene against the Polish East European capitals. Elaborate plans for networks, and communications facilities in army. Although Brezhnev and his colleagues a large-scale military intervention were Warsaw.28 The reconnaissance they gath- trusted the highest-ranking Polish officers drafted by the Soviet General Staff, with ered proved crucial when the Soviet General and were willing to rely on certain elite units input from Soviet officers on the Main Staff Staff modified its plans in late 1980 and of the Polish army, they were under no of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. The 1981. Most of the revisions began just after illusions that Polish conscripts would obey operation was to be spearheaded by an ini- the “Soyuz-81” maneuvers in April 1981, orders to shoot at their fellow citizens. The tial contingent of fifteen Soviet tank and when a comprehensive new “action plan” dominant view in Moscow was that Polish motorized-infantry divisions moving in from was drafted. The final adjustments were soldiers who had been drafted in 1980 or the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, made by mid-November. From that point on, 1981 were already “under Solidarity’s sway” Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Dis- the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German and would “refuse to carry out their duties tricts.24 These troops were to be accompa- forces simply “waited for a signal from Mos- and even go over to the side of the anti- nied by three Czechoslovak and East Ger- cow to move in”—a signal that never ar- socialist forces if the situation deteriorates.”32 man divisions, with at least another dozen rived.29 Soviet officials also assumed that the reli- Soviet divisions as reinforcements. The The revised planning and preparations ability of the Polish officer corps might itself Soviet Union wanted to provide a veneer of were thoroughly tested in fourteen joint mili- be problematic: multilateralism for any prospective inter- tary exercises held during the crisis, includ- vention in Poland, as was done with the ing seven bilateral maneuvers of Soviet and Some of the younger commanders and invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Polish troops. The maneuvers were designed officers [in Poland] have discussed participation of two divisions from Czecho- in part to exert pressure on the Polish leader- whether they should obey all combat slovakia and one from was ship and population and to divert Solidarity’s orders, even those calling for mass ac- deemed sufficient for that purpose. The attention from the buildup of the ZOMO tions, or should instead refuse to carry political complexities of involving troops security forces, but they also enabled Soviet out orders that would “betray the whole from either Romania or Hungary would commanders to gauge how quickly the Pol- Polish nation.” In connection with this, have been too great. Despite the harsh ish army could be “neutralized” by incoming it is clear that none of the members of criticism that Romanian and Hungarian lead- Warsaw Pact troops.30 The large number of the [Polish] command staff with whom ers had been expressing about Solidarity, bilateral exercises and meetings in 1980-81 we spoke can confidently say on whose neither country was likely to be enthusiastic was a notable contrast to 1968, when the side the [Polish] army and navy will be about an invasion. In the case of Bulgaria, Soviet Union tended to emphasize multilat- if tensions reach a climax.33 the difficulty was logistical rather than po- eral negotiations and maneuvers. This dis- litical. The authorities in Sofia strongly parity was attributable in part to the greater It is not surprising, then, that Soviet com- endorsed the plans for an invasion, but were confidence that Soviet leaders had when manders regarded the Polish army as one of not asked to contribute troops because “the dealing with Jaruzelski than they ever had in the first targets to be “neutralized” if an northward movement [of Bulgarian forces] their dealings with Alexander Dubcek. The invasion proved necessary. Nor is it surpris- would have been too conspicuous,” tipping “joint” leverage that was deemed necessary ing that Soviet leaders wanted to minimize off both the Poles and the West.25 in 1968 was of much less relevance in 1980- the Polish army’s role in the imposition of The plans for an invasion soon gave 81. Furthermore, in 1968 the Soviet Union martial law. Although top-ranking Polish rise to a number of concrete military prepa- did not yet have a permanent “Group of officers were responsible for planning the rations. As early as August 1980 the Soviet Soviet Forces” stationed on Czechoslovak martial-law operation, and although some Army was ordered to “requisition up to territory, whereas in Poland in 1980-81 the elite units from the Polish army helped carry 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 ve- Soviet Union already had a long-standing it out, most of the implementation was left to hicles from the civilian economy” and to troop presence. The USSR’s Northern Group the ZOMO and other security units. The place all regular units in military districts of Forces in Poland provided a convenient concerns that prompted Soviet leaders to and Groups of Forces adjoining Poland on focus during the crisis for both military plan- exclude Polish troops from a prospective “full combat alert.”26 Some units were ning and coercive diplomacy. invading force also meant that the army was taken off alert in February 1981, but most The Soviet Union’s efforts to maintain given only a very limited role in the martial- remained fully mobilized until the crisis close bilateral ties with the Polish army went law crackdown. was over. They were linked together by a only so far, however. Despite Jaruzelski’s vast communications network, which was persistent requests that Polish troops be in- Internal Versus External Options secretly put into place during the “Com- cluded as an integral part of an invading rade-in-Arms-80” and “Soyuz-81” exer- force (and that East German forces be ex- The fact that detailed plans for an inva- cises.27 The exercises also permitted Soviet cluded, for obvious historical reasons), offi- sion existed does not conclusively mean that commanders and military intelligence of- cials in Moscow decided early on that the Soviet troops would have intervened if the ficers to acquire detailed information about Polish army as a whole was too unpredict- Polish authorities had been unable or unwill- the routes and targets in Poland that would able to be used in a “joint” Warsaw Pact ing to impose martial law, but the evidence COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 121 suggests that at least some top officials in terparts, Gustav Husak and Todor Zhivkov, of how difficult and costly a prospective Moscow were willing to resort to force if in emphasizing that a failure to undertake invasion would be. When the issue came up necessary. As early as November 1980, decisive military action against the “coun- at a Soviet Politburo meeting in late October Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov terrevolutionary forces in People’s Poland” 1981, even hard-liners such as Ustinov and had become so disenchanted that he openly would lead to “the death of socialism in the KGB chairman, Yurii Andropov, had to questioned whether “constant pressure on Poland” and pose a burgeoning threat to the concede that “it would be impossible now the Polish leadership” would ever be suffi- whole socialist commonwealth.36 At the for us to send troops into Poland.” They and cient, and he urged that military exercises be meeting itself, Honecker offered further de- their colleagues agreed that the Soviet Union increased “to make clear that we have forces nunciations of the events in Poland, and “must steadfastly adhere to [its] line not to ready” to move in at short notice.34 Avid Husak repeatedly likened the situation to the send in troops.”39 The same position was support of a military solution also came “counterrevolutionary intrigues” in Czecho- expressed by all the members of the Soviet from Soviet allies in East Germany, Czecho- slovakia in 1968. Although these warnings Politburo on 10 December 1981, according slovakia, and Bulgaria. Documents from the had little effect on the Soviet participants— to the available transcript of the meeting, former East German and Czechoslovak ar- who still believed that the Polish authorities just three days before martial law was im- chives attest to the vigorous efforts that should be given more time “to rectify the posed. Although Andropov and Ustinov hard-line East European leaders made to situation on their own and to normalize it”— affirmed that the Soviet Union “must fortify convince the Soviet Politburo of the neces- Honecker and Husak were hardly about to [its] military garrisons in Poland” and “do sity of military intervention in Poland. In give in.37 In February 1981 they persuaded something to protect the lines of communi- particular, the East German Communist party the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, to support cation between the USSR and the GDR” if leader, Erich Honecker, repeatedly drew par- their calls for a joint military operation to circumstances so warranted, no one at the allels with the crises of 1953, 1956, and “thwart the Polish counterrevolution once meeting dissented from Mikhail Suslov’s 1968, arguing that “the situation in Poland is and for all,” and they issued many similar view that “there can be no consideration at much worse and more dangerous” than those appeals over the next several months.38 all of sending in troops” because such a step earlier episodes.35 Shortly before an emer- Despite this aggressive campaign by “would be a catastrophe.”40 Suslov’s posi- gency meeting in Moscow of Warsaw Pact the East European proponents of military tion on this matter carried particular weight leaders in early December 1980, he joined intervention, Brezhnev and the other mem- because he was the head of a special Polit- with his Czechoslovak and Bulgarian coun- bers of the CPSU Politburo were well aware buro commission set up in late August 1980

THE SED POLITBURO the 1980s can be regarded as a prelude to the government on 30 August 1980. This AND THE POLISH CRISIS end of the whole . SED offi- agreement was regarded by the SED by the SED-State Research Group cials recognized this danger and did every- Politburo to be a product of counterrevo- (translated by Mark Kramer) thing in their power to forestall such a devel- lution. As seen by Honecker and his opment. Moreover, they pushed for inter- closest associates, the leadership of the Manfred Wilke, Peter Erier, Martin vention by the Warsaw Pact states in the PZPR had capitulated to the striking Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, same way that step was taken during the workers. The SED leaders began to and Hans-Peter Muller, The SED Polit- Prague crisis of 1968. question whether and and to what extent buro and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, With the publication of “The SED Po- the PZPR could enforce its leading role Volume I: 1980. SED-State Research litburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, in Poland (cf.: Central Party Archives Group Working Paper No. 3/1993. Ber- Volume I: 1980,” which Prof. Dr. Manfred [ZPA] J IV 2/2 A - 2346.) The decision lin, 1993. Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin Goerner, Michael to allow freer trade unions and the right Kubina, Horst Laude, and Dr. Hans-Peter to strike was unacceptable to the Polit- During a state visit by the president of Muller compiled in 1992 at the Free Univer- buro of the SED CC: “To construe strikes the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa, to sity of Berlin under the auspices of the as an expression of ‘workers’ genuine the Federal Republic of Germany in early “SED-State Research Group,” documents interests’ is impermissible in our view. 1992, federal [German] president Richard are now available showing how the SED No one other than the Party itself, with von Weizscker lauded the gains that the Politburo wanted to suppress the Polish the aid of scientific socialism, can ex- Polish people and the Polish head-of-state people’s struggle for national self-determi- press and realize the class interests of the had made for the cause of freedom in nation and democratization. The materials, Party.” (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.) Europe. “As the head of a trade union you which have never been released before, come At the end of September 1980, the overcame despotism, regained freedom for the most part from holdings of the “Polit- International Department of the SED CC for your own people, and made a decisive buro” collection in the formerly secret ar- carried out a detailed analysis of the contribution to the European revolution of chives of the SED Central Committee (CC). situation in Poland, which included, freedom.” (Press and Information Office For the SED, the drama of the “Polish among other things, a “comparative as- of the Federal Government, Bulletin No. crisis” began with the signing of the Gdansk sessment of the programs and stated de- 34, Bonn, 2 April 1992, p. 325.) In retro- Accords between the heads of the Inter- mands of the anti-socialist forces in the spect, the Polish crisis at the beginning of Factory Strike Committee and the Polish continued on page 127 122 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN to “keep a close watch on the unfolding lar information flowing into Moscow from was that no one in Moscow was certain situation in Poland.”41 Soviet intelligence agents, were crucial when whether Jaruzelski would actually follow The lack of any overt disagreement on Polish and Soviet leaders settled on the final through in the end and, if so, “what direction the question of military intervention does options for martial law in November and the events in Poland will take.” Andropov, not necessarily mean that the apparent con- early December 1981. By that point, the for example, said there were “very disturb- sensus emerged easily or spontaneously. sentiment in Moscow was so strongly in ing signs” that Jaruzelski “is abandoning the The transcript may not tell the full story. A favor of proceeding with the imposition of idea of carrying out this step” and trying “to number of former senior members of the martial law, and the plans and preparations find some way to extricate himself.” CPSU Politburo—Egor Ligachev, Nikolai were so far advanced, that it is doubtful Gromyko likewise expressed dismay that Ryzhkov, and Vadim Medvedev, among whether any gestures or concessions on “Jaruzelski is now vacillating again” and others—have recently disclosed that Soviet Solidarity’s part, no matter how dramatic, that “the Polish leadership . . . is continuing leaders sometimes gathered informally be- could have averted the crackdown.45 to relinquish its positions by failing to adopt fore Politburo sessions to iron out their As elaborate as all these preparations decisive measures.” Others at the meeting different views of highly controversial is- were, there was always some risk that the complained that Jaruzelski was in a “highly sues.42 As a rule, these informal meetings “internal solution” would encounter unex- agitated state [and] has been transformed (referred to obliquely as “exchanges of opin- pected problems. Had that been the case, it into a man who is extremely neurotic and ions”) were not included in the final tran- is far from clear what would have happened. diffident about his abilities.” These sorts of scripts of official Politburo sessions. Hence, There is no indication that the Soviet Polit- comments hardly imply great optimism. it is eminently conceivable that an unre- buro ever arrived at a final decision in 1981 At the same time, the transcript and corded preliminary meeting on 10 Decem- on whether to invade Poland if “Operation other documents confirm that Soviet leaders ber 1981 featured at least some give-and- X” (the code-name for the martial-law op- had not given up all hope as of December 10; take regarding Soviet military options vis- eration) collapsed. Most political leaders far from it. They were confident enough a-vis Poland. Nevertheless, even if that is and collective bodies tend to put off onerous about the prospects for an “internal solu- the case, it does not change the basic fact decisions until the last possible moment. tion” that they saw no need to give Jaruzelski that the consensus by the time of the formal That was certainly true of the CPSU Polit- a direct military guarantee as a hedge against Politburo session on December 10 was in buro under Brezhnev, and all evidence sug- the possible collapse of “Operation X.” There full accord with Suslov’s non-intervention- gests that the members of that body were is ample evidence, both in the Politburo’s ist stance. The outcome in this case is of inclined to defer a final decision about mili- documents and in recent first-hand accounts greater interest than the process that may tary intervention in Poland as long as pos- by senior participants, that Jaruzelski tried have led up to it. sible.46 There is no doubt that the Soviet to obtain such a guarantee but was rebuffed.49 Having set out all along to resolve the Union had serious contingency plans to “en- Jaruzelski himself has now claimed that he crisis through martial law rather than through ter and occupy Polish territory” and “neutral- did not ask for a Soviet military guarantee in direct military intervention, Soviet leaders ize the Polish army” on 13 or 14 December the lead-up to “Operation X,” but even if that did everything they could to ensure that an 1981 if the martial-law operation went disas- is so, the evidence clearly suggests that the “internal solution” would succeed. The trously awry, but there is equal reason to members of the CPSU Politburo believed he rapid expansion of Poland’s ZOMO forces believe that no decision was ever made on wanted a guarantee and that they felt they during the crisis went largely unnoticed whether those plans should be implemented.47 had to “dispel any notions that Jaruzelski thanks to the distractions provided by a long The postponement of any final decision and other top officials in Poland may have” succession of Warsaw Pact military exer- would have made perfect sense if Soviet about receiving military assistance.50 The cises and by the buildup of Soviet and allied leaders had been highly confident in Decem- Soviet leadership’s unwillingness to pro- troops along Poland’s borders. Equally ber 1981 that Jaruzelski would successfully vide Jaruzelski with a military guarantee important, Soviet military officials care- impose martial law and resolve the whole was due in part to concern that any such fully assessed the reliability of elite Polish crisis without external help; but, interest- promise might become a crutch that would army units who would eventually be re- ingly enough, the transcript from the CPSU cause the Polish leader to refrain from imple- sponsible, along with the ZOMO and other Politburo’s meeting on 10 December 1981 menting martial law as forcefully as he security forces, for carrying out the martial- suggests that no such confidence existed.48 should. “If [the Polish authorities] show any law operation. At one point, this involved a The outlook in Moscow just three days be- sign of wavering during the struggle against tour of the whole country by eighteen Soviet fore “Operation X” began was far more som- the counterrevolution or afterwards,” generals who asked detailed questions at ber than one might have expected. The Gromyko warned, “nothing will remain of each military garrison about the readiness of problem was not that Soviet leaders doubted socialist Poland.”51 Even more important, Polish commanders to perform their duty the soundness of the plans and preparations however, was the Soviet Politburo’s collec- against “counterrevolution.”43 Similarly, for martial law, which they had helped super- tive desire to avoid any decisions about diplomats at the Soviet embassy and consu- vise. On the contrary, Gromyko assured his military intervention unless events in Po- lates in Poland were ordered to monitor and fellow Politburo members that “we can ex- land unexpectedly took a disastrous turn. report back on the reliability of Polish troops pect positive results if the measures that [the This collective desire to put off a deci- and security forces in their vicinity.44 These Polish authorities] intend to carry out are sion outweighed whatever benefits the So- constantly updated assessments, and simi- indeed implemented.” The problem, instead, viet Union might have gained by extending COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 123 a military guarantee. Because serious doubts officials drew up plans for a full-scale inva- dable resistance against Soviet troops had persisted about Jaruzelski’s resolve, Soviet sion (as discussed above), but these plans been enough to deter Khrushchev in 1956, leaders might have tried to spur him into were to be implemented only if the Polish and the same calculation would have bedev- action by providing a guarantee. The fact authorities failed to restore order on their iled Soviet military commanders in 1981. that they declined to do so suggests that they own. Preparations for the imposition of Furthermore, even if Soviet forces could did not yet want to consider how they should martial law began well before Soviet mili- have subdued the country and overcome all respond in a worst-case scenario. It also tary officials started laying the groundwork resistance, they would have been faced with suggests that they had a fall-back option in for an invasion, and the “internal” option the daunting task of reviving the Polish case Jaruzelski let them down and failed to was deemed throughout to be vastly prefer- economy and political system. In the wake pursue “Operation X.” The exact nature of able to direct “fraternal assistance” from of a bloody invasion, it is inconceivable that this fall-back option was not specified at the outside. Only in a worst-case scenario, in the Polish population would have assisted or meeting on December 10, but a top aide to which the martial law operation collapsed complied with attempts at “normalization.” Jaruzelski in 1980-81, Colonel Ryszard and full-scale civil war erupted in Poland, The likely result, instead, would have been Kuklinski, and the Polish defense minister at does it seem at all likely that the Soviet an outright collapse of the formal Polish the time, Army-General Florian Siwicki, Union would have shifted toward the “exter- economy, with Soviet troops left to manage have both revealed that Soviet officials in- nal” option. factories virtually on their own. The Soviet tended, if necessary, to remove Jaruzelski In most respects, then, the Soviet Union would have been forced to embark on (just as they earlier removed Kania) and to Union’s response to the 1980-81 Polish cri- a long-term military occupation of Poland, replace him with Army-General Eugeniusz sis was very much in line with its responses with no guarantee that stability would be Molczyk, Army-General Wlodzimierz to previous East European crises. In each restored in the end. Sawczuk, a civilian like Tadeusz Grabski, or case Soviet leaders sought to effect an “in- Nevertheless, despite all these prob- some other ultra-hardline figure who would ternal solution” before taking the extreme lems and the overwhelming reluctance of have been willing to implement a full-scale step of ordering an invasion. What was Soviet leaders to undertake a costly invasion crackdown.52 Soviet leaders still preferred different about the 1980-81 case is that the at a time when they were already bogged to rely on Jaruzelski, for it would have been “internal” option proved successful and, down in Afghanistan, it still seems hard to very difficult to replace him, and a new moreover, that this success was so crucial to believe that the CPSU Politburo would have regime under a hardline successor would Soviet policy. After all, the resort to military refrained from sending in troops if the Polish probably have come under severe challenge force against Hungary and Czechoslovakia, authorities had been unwilling or unable to at home. Gromyko, Suslov, and Andropov though undertaken as a last-ditch measure sustain martial law.55 Although Andropov all expressed serious reservations about after other options had failed, did permit the claimed at the Politburo’s meeting on 10 “forcing [the Poles] to adopt one course or reestablishment and consolidation of Soviet December 1981 that the Soviet Union would another” or “pushing them too hard to adopt control over those countries, paving the way “not send in troops . . . even if Poland falls decisive measures.”53 Nevertheless, if for intensive periods of “normalization.” By under the control of Solidarity,” this state- Jaruzelski had continued to “vacillate and contrast, a Soviet invasion of Poland in De- ment was clearly an anomaly (and it is not lose his nerve” indefinitely (as Gromyko put cember 1981 would most likely have exac- apparent what Andropov’s motivations were it), the Soviet authorities planned to bring in erbated, rather than resolved, the crisis. in making it).56 At no other point during the someone else who would implement “Op- Unlike in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, crisis did Brezhnev or any top Soviet official eration X” once and for all. where Soviet troops intervened primarily display the slightest inclination to accept the The Soviet leadership’s pursuit of an against wayward Communist party leaders, permanent “loss” of Poland or to stand by if “internal solution” to the Polish crisis was the top levels of the PZPR and the highest- the martial-law operation collapsed and civil by no means a departure from its responses ranking Polish military commanders re- war broke out.57 On the contrary, the state- to previous crises in Eastern Europe. In mained loyal to Moscow throughout the 18- ment by Gromyko cited above—that the Hungary and Poland in 1956 and Czechoslo- month crisis.54 An invasion in 1981 would Soviet Union must hold onto Poland no vakia in 1968, the Soviet Union applied therefore have had to be directed against the matter what the cost—summed up the pre- pressures short of direct intervention and whole Polish population, and not merely vailing mood in Moscow very well. As one sought to work out an “internal solution” against a well-defined target at the top. The of the other members of the CPSU Politburo that would preclude the need for an invasion. prospect of encountering armed resistance in 1980-81 later recalled, “the Soviet leader- In each case, Soviet officials viewed mili- among the populace and among lower- and ship [during the crisis] believed that under tary action as a last-ditch option, to be used middle-ranking segments of the Polish mili- no circumstances must Poland be allowed to only after all other measures had failed. In tary (a la Hungary in 1956) would have leave the Warsaw Pact.”58 Brezhnev and his Poland in 1956 an internal solution that left severely complicated any Soviet invasion colleagues repeatedly affirmed that they Gomulka in power did prove feasible, plans. Poland’s population in 1981 was four would “not leave fraternal socialist Poland whereas in Hungary and later in Czechoslo- times the size of Hungary’s in 1956 and 2.5 in the lurch” and that “the socialist common- vakia all attempts to reassert Soviet control times the size of Czechoslovakia’s in 1968; wealth is indissoluble and its defense is a “from within” proved futile, leading in the and the Poles, unlike the Czechs, had a long matter not only for individual states but for end to direct Soviet military intervention. tradition of taking up arms against foreign the socialist coalition as a whole.”59 The During the 1980-81 Polish crisis, Soviet invaders. Poland’s ability to put up formi- exact same phrases were used about Czecho- 124 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE clared that “counterrevolutionary” forces POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-81: would gain an ever greater hold in Poland Honecker’s Call for Military Intervention unless the “healthy” Polish comrades re- Enclosure # 2 to Protocol #49 from 28.11.1980 ceived “collective assistance” from their 26 November 1980 Translated and Introduced by Mark Warsaw Pact allies. Any delay in acting, he Kramer warned, would mean “the death of socialist To the General Secretary of the CPSU CC Poland.” Honecker indicated that his plea Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev The following letter, dated 26 Novem- for an urgent meeting was supported by the ber 1980, comes from the archive of the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Communist Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich! Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the former party leaders, Gustv Husk and Todor Zhivkov. In the Politburo of the SED CC we have German Democratic Republic (DDR). It is Although Honecker expressed a willingness discussed the current situation in the People’s one of many valuable documents pertaining to intervene in support of Kania, he also Republic of Poland, and have unanimously con- to the 1980-81 Polish crisis that have been seemed to have in mind the formation of an cluded that there is an urgent necessity to convene a meeting of the General and First Secretaries of collected from the East German archives by alternative group of Polish leaders who would the Communist Parties of our community of a group of researchers at the Free University be willing to carry out the harsh crackdown states. We believe that the situation developing of Berlin. These documents are now being that Soviet officials had been demanding. in the People’s Republic of Poland should be published (in the original German) in a No doubt, Honecker was aware that the So- discussed with Comrade S. Kania in order to multi-volume collection entitled SED-Po- viet Union had already begun encouraging work out collective measures to assist the Polish litburo und polnische Krise 1980/1982. The the formation of just such an alternative, friends in overcoming the crisis, which, as you item translated below is included in the first hard-line regime in Warsaw. know, has been intensifying day after day. volume (Band 1: 1980), which was pub- The sentiments expressed in the letter Unfortunately, one can already say that the lished in January 1993. Volumes covering hardly come as a surprise. East German Polish comrades’ stopover in Moscow, and the timely counsel that you gave, had no decisive 1981 and 1982 are currently in preparation. officials had been denouncing Solidarity from influence on the situation in Poland, which we The letter below was sent by Erich the moment it was formed, and Honecker had all been hoping for. Honecker, the SED General Secretary, to had never tried to conceal his desire to see the According to information we have received the General Secretary of the Soviet Com- PZPR reassert its authority by any means through various channels, counterrevolutionary munist Party, , during a necessary. When the Polish authorities de- forces in the People’s Republic of Poland are on tense phase of the 17-month crisis in Po- ferred taking harsh action against Solidarity, the constant offensive, and any delay in acting land. At the time, the First Secretary of the the East German leader resorted to conspicu- against them would mean death — the death of Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), ous measures of his own to spur Kania into socialist Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts Stanisaw Kania, was coming under intense action and prevent a “spill-over” of the tur- may perhaps have been premature; today they are essential; and tomorrow they would already be pressure both at home and abroad as strikes moil into the DDR. The East German media too late. escalated and the unofficial trade union launched vehement attacks against Solidar- It would obviously be appropriate if we Solidarity posed an ever greater political ity throughout the fall of 1980, and in late meet together in Moscow for a day right after the challenge to the PZPR. For the previous October the DDR imposed tight restrictions plenum of the PZPR CC, the decisions of which, three months, Brezhnev and his colleagues on travel to and from Poland. By the time in our view, will not be able to change the course had been urging the Polish authorities to Honecker sent his letter to Brezhnev in late of events in Poland in any fundamental way. take “extraordinary measures” against the November, he had ordered the whole East So far as I know, Comrades Husak and “anti-socialist opposition forces,” but Kania German border with Poland to be sealed off, Zhivkov also have been expressing their desire gave little indication that he could resort to a process that was completed by November for us to convene on an urgent basis to discuss this question. It would be best to do so next week. We such steps anytime soon. As the crisis 30. In addition, he had ordered East German believe that offering collective advice and pos- deepened and the Polish authorities failed to army units and border guards to be put on sible assistance from the fraternal countries to act, frustration and alarm in Moscow and high combat alert so they would be ready to Comrade Kania would only be to his benefit. the other East-bloc capitals, especially East take part in any “joint” actions that the War- We ask you, esteemed Leonid Ilyich, to Berlin and Prague, steadily increased. saw Pact might pursue. Honecker’s unre- understand our extraordinary fears about the situ- The extent of East Germany’s concern lenting campaign to persuade the Soviet ation in Poland. We know that you also share about the situation in Poland is immediately Union to lend “fraternal assistance” to Po- these fears. apparent from both the tone and the content land was reminiscent of the efforts that his of Honecker’s letter. The letter expresses predecessor, , had made in With Communist greetings, “extraordinary fear” about the situation in 1968 to promote armed intervention in E. Honecker Poland and urges the Soviet Union to con- Czechoslovakia. Unlike in 1968, however, General Secretary of the SED CC vene an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact an “internal solution” ultimately proved fea- leaders to consider the possibility of “frater- sible in Poland and thus eliminated the need nal” military intervention. Honecker de- for external military action. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 125 slovakia in August 1968. in my forthcoming Working Paper. ation of Workers,” lasted longer than the other two, No one can ever be truly certain, how- 2. See my translation of a key November 1980 Honecker- from October 1978 until it was crushed in the spring of to-Brezhnev letter and highlights from other East Ger- 1980. For further details, see Betty Gidwitz, “Labor ever, what would have happened if “Opera- man documents gathered by the Free University group Unrest in the Soviet Union,” Problems of Communism, tion X” had collapsed amid widespread vio- in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 31:6 (November-December 1982), 25-42; “The Inde- lence and the Soviet Politburo had been 3. “O prazdnovanii pervogo maya i godovshchiny so pendent Trade-Union Movement in the Soviet Union,” forced to decide whether to send in troops. dnya prinyatiya konstitutsii 3 maya (Politicheskaya Radio Liberty Research, RL 304/79 (11 October 1979); zapiska),” Cable No. 68 (SECRET), 4 May 1981, from and Karl Schogel, Opposition sowjetischer Arbeiter The difficulty of carrying out an invasion of N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in heute (Koln: Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche Poland and of coping with its aftermath TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 6-12; “Vneshnyaya und internationale Studien, 1981). would have been so great that it would have politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis’mo),” 9 14. “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunist- changed the course of Soviet policy in East- July 1981, Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET) from B. I. icheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O nekotorykh Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, negativnykh proyavleniyakh, svyazannykh s ern Europe for many years to come. As it Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34; and “Ob ideino-politicheskikh nedostatkami v organizatsii v oplate truda rabochikh i was, the success of Jaruzelski’s “internal kontseptsiyakh ‘reformatorskogo kryla’ v PORP sluzhashchikh,” St-233/8s (TOP SECRET), 24 Octo- solution” precluded any test of Moscow’s (Spravka),” Cable No. 531 (SECRET) 22 June 1981, ber 1980, with attached documents, in TsKhSD, F. 89, restraint and restored conformity to the So- from V. Mutskii, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Op. 13, D. 37, Ll. 1-12. Quoted passages are from ll. 4 Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 116-121. and 9. viet bloc at relatively low cost. The surpris- 4. “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. 15. “Poslanie do ludzi pracy w Europie Wschodniej,” ingly smooth imposition of martial law (“stan 596 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw) 25 (18 September wojenny”) in Poland also helped prevent any Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin 1981), 6. further disruption in Soviet-East European Rusakov, head of the CPSU CC Department for intra- 16. See, e.g., Dmitrii Ustinov, “Protiv gonki vooruzhenii bloc affairs, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53. i ugrozy voiny,” Pravda, 25 July 1981, p. 4; relations during the last year of Brezhnev’s 5. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro “Soveshchanie sekretarei tsentral’nykh komitetov rule and the next two-and-a-half years under TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda: O prieme v kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii Andropov and Chernenko. SSSR partiino-gosudarstvennoi delegatsii PNR i ustnom sotsialisticheskikh stran,” Pravda, 5 November 1981, The lack of any major political turmoil poslanii t. Brezhneva L. I. t. V. Yaruzel’skomu,” No. 4; and “Vysokoe prizvanie i otvetsvennost’: Rech’ P37/21 (TOP SECRET), 21 November 1981, in tovarishcha M. A. Suslova,” Pravda, 15 October 1981, in Eastern Europe between 1982 and 1985 TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 27, L. 3. 2. seems especially surprising at first glance, 6. “Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape 17. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” for this was a period of great uncertainty not (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET), 9 July 6-7, 17-19. only because of the post-Brezhnev succes- 1981, from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, 18. For ample first-hand evidence of this pressure, see in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34. “Dokumenty ‘Komisji Suslowa’,” 19-20; “Scisle tajne: sion in Moscow, but also because of the 7. Ibid., l. 27. See also “Voprosy vneshnei politiki na KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 10-11; “O nekotorykh impending successions in most of the other IX S”ezde PORP (Informatsiya),” Cable No. 652 (SE- momentakh po vnutripoliticheskoi i ekonomicheskoi Warsaw Pact countries. The last time the CRET), 10 August 1981, from Yu. Ivanov, counselor at obstanovke v Pil’skom voevodstve (Politicheskaya Soviet Union had experienced a prolonged the Soviet embassy in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, zapiska),” Cable No. 18 (TOP SECRET), 20 January D. 598, Ll. 170-176. 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in leadership transition, between 1953 and 8. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya Szczecin, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 1-5; 1957, numerous crises arose in the Eastern 1980 goda: Materialy k druzhestvennomu rabochemu Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala bloc: in Plzen, Czechoslovakia and in East vizitu v SSSR pol’skikh rukovoditelei,” 29 October 80-kh godov,” 53-55; Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Germany in June 1953, in Poznan in June 1980 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 31, L. Biura Politycznego, 102-107, 317-318, 451-454, and 3. 497-511; and Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje, esp. 73- 1956, and in Poland and Hungary in Octo- 9. Vladimir Lomeiko, “Kto zhe dolbit dyry v pol’skoi 118, 231-243. ber-November 1956. Moreover, during the lodke,” Literaturnaya gazeta (Moscow) 3 (21 January 19. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro 1953-56 period, all the East European coun- 1981), 14. TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda,” L. 5. tries underwent one or more changes in their 10. “Rech’ tovarishcha M. A. Suslova,” Pravda (Mos- 20. Ibid., Ll. 5-6. cow), 13 April 1981, 4. 21. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 9 aprelya 1981 Communist party leadership, just as the So- 11. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 242/61gs Sekretariata goda: 3. Ob itogakh vstrechi t.t. Andropova Yu. V. i viet Union did. By contrast, no such upheav- TsK: O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po Ustinova, D. F. s pol’skimi druz’yami,” 9 April 1981 als or leadership changes occurred in East- kontrolyu za rasprostraneniem pol’skoi pechati v SSSR,” (TOP SECRET), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 40, Ll. ern Europe between 1982 and 1985. This No. St-242/61gs (TOP SECRET), 22 December 1980, 2-9. See also a number of other transcripts in “Scisle with attached reports, in TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 46, D. 81, tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 11. unusual placidity cannot be attributed to any Ll. 1-26. Quoted passages are from ll. 1 and 6. 22. “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. single factor, but the martial law crackdown 12. V. Stanley Vardys, “Polish Echoes in the Baltic,” 857 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. of December 1981 and the invasions of 1956 Problems of Communism 33:4 (July-August 1983), 21- Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin and 1968 are probably a large part of the 34, and Jean Pennar, “Demonstrations and Dissent in Rusakov of the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. Estonia,” Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 384/80 (17 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53. explanation. After Stalin’s death in 1953, October 1980). 23. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 the limits of what could be changed in East- 13. “K voprosu o t.n. ‘nezavisimom profsoyuze’,” goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhneva L. I. s Pervym ern Europe were still unknown, but by the Report No. 655-L (SECRET), 5 April 1978, from Yu. sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 early 1980s the Soviet Union had evinced its V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU CC April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. Politburo, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 18, D. 73, L. 1. The 41, Ll. 2-3. willingness and ability to use extreme mea- first attempt, in January 1978, was made by a long-time 24. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” sures, when necessary, to prevent or reverse activist and mining engineer, Vladimir Klebanov, whose 21-22. “deviations from socialism.” “Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers” was 25. “Eventualna interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e forcefully disbanded less than two weeks after it was mozhela da stane ‘vtori kurvav Afganistan’,” Duma founded. The second attempt, in April 1978, was by (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3. 1. See my translations of these documents in this issue Vsevolod Kuvakin, who set up a short-lived “Indepen- 26. “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 682-OP (SPE- of the CWIHP Bulletin. I have translated other pub- dent Trade Union of Workers.” The third attempt, by a CIAL DOSSIER—TOP SECRET), 28 August 1980, lished and unpublished documents for the appendices group known as the “Free Interprofessional Amalgam- from M. A. Suslov, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, 126 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

D. F. Ustinov, and K. Yu. Chernenko to the CPSU otnosheniya, 1994), 175, 312. In a typical comment on 53. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya Politburo, in APRF/Osobaya Papka. this matter, Ligachev reported (p. 215) that “it was a 1981 goda,” Ll. 5-7. 27. Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis normal working practice of the highest Party leadership 54. Jan B. de Weydenthal, “Martial Law and the nachala 80-kh godov,” 54. to hold special [ekstrennye] working meetings for the Reliability of the Polish Military,” in Daniel N. Nelson, 28. “Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto members of the Politburo and the CC Secretaries on ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of nikto nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil,” Nezavisimaya different contentious matters that came up. Usually Reliability (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984), gazeta (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. such meetings were convened by the General Secretary 239-240. See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. 29. Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, “Tainy ‘temnoi himself or by someone whom he authorized to do so. In Porter, and Kevin Devlin, The Polish Drama: 1980- komnaty’,” Moskovskie novosti 14 (5 April 1992), 17; the absence of the General Secretary, the meetings were 1982 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), esp. and “Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem led by whoever had been designated to ‘mind the store.’ 109, 112-13, and 138-39. majorem Stanislawem Prochazka, rozmawia Leszek Such meetings differed from official sessions of the 55. Kuklinski is adamant on this point (“Wojna z Mazan,” Polityka (Warsaw) 37 (15 September 1990), Politburo in that they were not empowered to adopt narodem widziana od srodka,” 4), but it should be 13. See also “Generalmajor S. Prochazka z vojenske decrees, but would only work out recommendations that emphasized that he was no longer in Warsaw in Decem- obrody rika: ‘Meli jsme okupovat Polsko’,” Zemedelske would be affirmed later on. This practice began decades ber 1981, when Soviet leaders would have had to decide noviny (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1. ago.” whether to intervene if martial law failed. Moreover, 30. “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov 43. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” Kuklinski also believes that Jaruzelski (or some other podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, 31. leader) could have deterred a Soviet invasion by mobi- dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” 44. “O nekotorykh aspektakh raboty Pol’skikh organov lizing the army and population as Gomulka did in 1956. Cable No. 183 (TOP SECRET), 14 June 1981, from V. gosbezopasnosti po presecheniyu podryvnoi The question of whether the Soviet Union would have Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, deyatel’nosti oppozitsii (Informatsiya na osnove besed invaded has been a source of intense controversy both F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19. s rabotnikami gosbezopasnosti PNR),” Cable No. 931 inside and outside Poland; for sharply conflicting views, 31. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” (TOP SECRET), 30 November 1981, from A. Kovalev, see the items cited in the first part of this essay pertain- 22-24. first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in ing to Jaruzelski, Kania, Rakowski, Pavlov, Gribkov, 32. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 29-31; “O Dubynin, Prochazka, Gorbachev, Dudnik, and Achalov. TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda,” L. 6; and “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii 56. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya 1981 goda,” L. 4. Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” Ll. 17-19; “O politicheskoi 57. The emphasis here is on the permanency of the na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” L. 18. situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo “loss.” Even Andropov’s statement suggests no more 33. “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov regiona PNR (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 179 (TOP SE- than a willingness to accept a temporary “loss.” podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, CRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet 58. Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, in “Gorbaczow dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” L. consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil 19. TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22; and “O prawidlowo,” Trybuna, 9 November 1992, 2. 34. “Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 10. trevozhnykh faktakh dal’neishego davleniya na organy 59. “Sovetsko-pol’skaya vstrecha,” Pravda, 5 March 35. See, e.g., “Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Narodnoi militsii (MO),” Cable No. 94 (SECRET), 27 1981, 1. Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden May 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Mark Kramer, a scholar affiliated with the Center for des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. Foreign Policy Development at Brown University Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politburos und Sekretar 84, D. 611, Ll. 2-3. and the Russian Research Center at Harvard des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei,” 20 45. Komisja resortowej badajacej dokumentacje University, writes frequently on Cold War history. November 1980, in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2 A/2363. zwiazana ze stanem wojennym, “O planach 36. “Anlage Nr. 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 48 vom wprowadzenia stanu wojennego,” (Warsaw: unpub- 28.11.1980,” in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5. lished report, December 1990), pp. 15-47. RUSSIAN ARCHIVE SERIES 37. For the Soviet Politburo’s assessment of the 46. For a general discussion of Soviet decision-making meeting, see “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 during the Brezhnev era, see Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev The Russian Publications Project at the Center dekabrya 1980 goda: 1. Ob itogakh vstrechi Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: for Russian and East European Studies at the rukovodyashchikh deyatelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Cornell University Press, 1984). University of Pittsburgh in cooperation with the State Varshavskogo Dogovora, sostoyavsheisya v Moskve 5 47. On the contingency plans, see the comments of Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), headed dekabrya 1980 goda,” 11 December 1980, Rabochaya senior officers involved in the planning: Gribkov, by S.V. Mironenko, is publishing a series of zapis’ (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 59, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh annotated archival guides to materials in GARF. Ll. 1-3. godov,” 54-55; Dudnik, “Tainy ‘temnoi komnaty’,” 17; Published volumes include Vol. 1, Stalin’s “Special 38. “‘Wir Bruderlander stehen fest’,” and “Misja skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem Files” [Osobaya Papka], 1944-1953, which contains (Hamburg) 42 (19 October 1992), 95, 97, 99. Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR w Polsce,” descriptions of 2,237 files to Stalin from the 39. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya Gazeta wyborcza, 14-15 March 1992, 8-9. Dubynin Secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh poezdki t. Rusakova K. V. v offered similar, though less detailed, comments in a (MVD); and Vol. 2, Molotov’s “Special Files,” GDR, ChSSR, VNR i NRB,” 22 October 1981 (Top subsequent interview with Novoe vremya 27 (July 1992), 1944-1955, describing 1,720 documents to Molotov Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, esp. L. 5. 26-27. from the MVD Secretariat. 40. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 48. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya Future planned volumes include: Vol. 3, 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 Khrushchev’s “Special Files,” 1944-1959, 2,936 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, documents; Vol. 4, Malenkov’s “Special Files,” 66, D. 6, Ll. 1-11. D. 6, Ll. 1-11. 1944-1955, 6,000 documents; Vol. 5, Beria’s Special 41. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya 49. The highly controversial question of whether Files,” 1944-1953; and Vol. 6, Guide to Correspon- Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K Jaruzelski sought a military guarantee in December dence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respublike,” 1981 is discussed in much greater detail in my forthcom- the Foreign Ministry, 1944-1959, 3,000 documents. No. P210/P (TOP SECRET), 25 August 1980, in ing CWIHP Working Paper. For further information contact: TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 42, D. 22. 50. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 42. E. K. Ligachev, Zagadka Gorbacheva (Novosibirsk: 1981 goda,” L. 5. Russian Publications Project Interbuk, 1992), 215; N. V. Ryzhkov, Perestroika i 51. Ibid. Center for Russian and East European Studies istoriya predatel’stv (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 78-79; 52. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” 4G12 FQ V. A. Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad 4-5; and Wojciech Zaluska, “Strach generalow: Siwicki University of Pittsburgh iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 107-108; and V. A. przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej,” Pittsburgh, PA Medvedev, Raspad: Kak on nazreval v “mirovoi Gazeta wyborcza, 13 May 1994, 2. Jaruzelski, too, has Tel.: (412) 648-7403/7407 sisteme sotsializma” (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye argued this point; see his Stan wojenny, 252. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 127

SED EVIDENCE count on us, on our aid, on every form of dent Carter warned Brezhnev, in a personal continued from page 121 assistance.” (Ibid.) letter on 3 December, to avoid “forcing a People’s Republic of Poland and in the CSSR On 25 November [1980] the SED Polit- solution from outside on the Polish nation.” in 1968”: “In both their essence and their buro decided to distribute “internal party Similar warnings came from other NATO goals, and also partly in their methods, there materials” on the Polish crisis. This “infor- governments and from the European Com- is a striking congruity. The only differences mation” for the district and county party munity. Even so, the press secretary for the are in the priority of demands, the concrete leaders and for the heads of the SED CC PZPR CC, Josef Klasa, explained on 4 De- plan of attack, and the timetable for the departments was clearly intended to provide cember that the “. . . Polish communists have counterrevolutionary offensive.” (ZPA J IV guidelines for agitation and propaganda in the right and the duty to ask the Soviet Union 2/2/1859, Bl. 56.) The SED was convinced case intervention was decided upon. (ZPA J and other countries for help in combatting that the opposition in Poland was seeking IV 2/2/1867, Bl. 6-16.) On 26 November, counterrevolution.” (Europa-Archiv. Se- not only reform, but the outright elimination Honecker finally appealed to Brezhnev with ries 1981, p. Z6.) of socialism. the urgent request “. . . to devise measures of On 5 December the party and state lead- This direct comparison with Prague in collective assistance for the Polish friends to ers of the Eastern military coalition gathered 1968 was the basis on which the SED Polit- permit them to surmount the crisis.” (ZPA J for their conference in Moscow. They voted buro would act thereafter, both publicly and IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.) In the process, Honecker against intervention in Poland at that time. privately, in its policy toward its eastern pleaded with Brezhnev for a solution to the The Polish leadership’s willingness to resort neighbors. On 30 September 1980 the SED Polish crisis from outside via the Warsaw to martial law to overcome the “counter- Politburo, backed by Brezhnev, urged the Pact states: “According to information we revolution” played a crucial role in the avoid- convocation of a meeting of the party leaders have received through various channels, ance of a military attack from outside. The of the Warsaw Pact states to consider the counterrevolutionary forces in the People’s Polish party leader Kania suggested the Polish question. (Ibid., Bl. 2.) In so doing Republic of Poland are on the constant of- imposition of a “state of war” as a solution the SED wanted to set in motion the Warsaw fensive, and any delay in acting against them to the Polish crisis: “. . . a staff set up by the Pact’s consultative mechanism according to would mean death — the death of socialist Politburo is working under the supervision the model of Prague 1968. Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts of the premier, and this staff is preparing a The Polish Supreme Court’s decision may perhaps have been premature; today full range of different measures. These on 11 November 1980 to accept the exist- they are essential; and tomorrow they would include, among other things, the question of ence of the trade union “Solidarity” in War- already be too late It would obviously be introducing a state of war in Poland. . . . saw without requiring the “PZPR’s leading appropriate if we meet together in Moscow Preparations are also under way for an op- role” to be upheld within the trade union for a day right after the plenum of the PZPR eration to arrest the most active supporters was, for the SED leadership, the point at CC, the decisions of which, in our view, will of the counterrevolution. . . . We will set up which the “capitulation” of the PZPR lead- not be able to change the course of events in special groups of the most reliable party ership had gone so far that intervention from Poland in any fundamental way.” (Ibid.) members who will, if necessary, be equipped outside could no longer be avoided. On 20 After Brezhnev reacted positively to with firearms. We have already selected November Honecker expressed his disap- Honecker’s proposal, the SED Politburo met 19,000 such party members, and we believe pointment regarding the weak behavior of on 28 November in a special session in that by the end of December there will be the PZPR leadership to the acting Polish Strausberg—the site of the GDR Defense around 30,000. . . .” (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.) ambassador in the GDR, Olszowski, in the Ministry—and authorized the sending of the Even though the assembled party lead- following way: “Without a doubt this com- letter and, hence, Honecker’s suggestions. ers agreed to pursue an internal Polish solu- promise was an immense setback for every- In a session on 2 December the same body tion, the threat of intervention remained in one who was still hoping that you could decided on the composition of the SED place. As Bulgarian party leader [Todor] resolve your problems on your own.” (ZPA delegation for the meeting: Erich Honecker, Zhivkov explained: “. . . Poland must act J IV 2/2 A/2363.) From the SED Politburo’s Willi Stoph, Hermann Axen, Heinz decisively and must rely on both peaceful point of view, the situation in Poland in the Hoffmann, and Erich Mielke. In addition, and non-peaceful measures. . . . If that does fall of 1980 was already more dire than in the the outline of the General Secretary’s speech not happen, . . . then the Polish comrades will CSSR in 1968 under Dubcek. When speak- was approved at this session, and Honecker have no alternative but to appeal for help ing with Olszowski, Honecker left no doubt was given general plenipotentiary authority. from their allies. We, too, will have no about the aggressive stance of the SED: “We (ZPA J IV 2/2/1896, Bl. 2.) alternative, neither they nor we. . . .” (Ibid.) do not favor bloodshed. That is only a last Before the meeting of the leaders of the In his Moscow speech Erich Honecker resort. But even this last resort must be Warsaw Pact states on 5 December in Mos- reaffirmed the SED’s willingness to cooper- applied at certain times. . . . That was our cow, the situation in and around Poland had ate in crushing the independent trade union experience in 1953, and it was also the case come to a dramatic head. Western observers and democratic movement in Poland: “. . . during the 1956 crisis in Hungary and again expected that an intervention by the Soviet We also have a responsibility to our own in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Our point of Union or by the whole Warsaw Pact would people and to our friends all over the world. departure is that . . . we cannot be indifferent take place on 8 December 1980. Massive They count on us to give help to the Polish to the fate of the People’s Republic of Po- troop movements and concentrations could comrades in prevailing over the counter- land. We will act accordingly. You can be observed all around Poland. U.S. Presi- revolution.” (Ibid.) In addition, he recom- 128 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mended the violent suppression of the Pol- ish opposition analogous to the crises of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL 1953, 1956, and 1968. HISTORY PROJECT Referring to economic and military in- PUBLICATIONS terests, Brezhnev emphasized in his sum- mary report that “the situation in Poland and the danger hanging over Poland are not Publications of the Cold War International COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT just Polish concerns. They are the concern History Project are available free of charge WORKING PAPERS of us all.” In accord with the doctrine named upon request. Requests can be sent to CWIHP, after him, he further declared that neither Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; faxed to CWIHP Poland’s own communists nor the friends at (202) 357-4439; or e-mailed to #1 Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alli- and allies of Poland would permit Poland to [email protected] ance and China’s Entry into the Korean be torn from the socialist community. “Po- War” land was and will remain an inviolable mem- Contents of back issues of the CWIHP ber of the . . . system of socialism.” (Ibid.) Bulletin include: #2 P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research The decision of the Warsaw Pact states on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw” not to intervene in Poland in December * Issue 1 (Spring 1992), 32 pages: 1980 was of course accepted by the SED Reports on Soviet and East European #3 James Richter, “Reexamining So- leadership, but this decision did not corre- archives, Chinese sources, and Havana viet Policy Towards Germany during the spond with the SED’s appraisal of the situ- conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis; Beria Interregnum” ation in Poland. As is evident from docu- reviews of memoirs of Novikov and ments that have been uncovered, the SED Molotov; #4 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intel- Politburo mistrusted the Polish communists ligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-53” and no longer believed the Polish leaders * Issue 2 (Fall 1992), 40 pages: Csaba were capable of a forcible solution to the Bekes presents new evidence on the 1956 #5 Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and Polish crisis. The SED leaders favored a Hungarian revolution and Mark Kramer the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evi- solution analogous to what was done in asseses new sources on the 1968 Soviet dence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East Czechoslovakia in 1968, and they did ev- invasion of Czechoslovakia; the FRG German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, erything they could to gain support for that reports from the East German military 1958-1961” option in the CPSU, which retained final archives, Hope Harrison’s diary from the decision-making authority on whether to SED archives, and William Burr on newly- #6 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)” pursue such a step. The option of having the declassified evidence on the Berlin Crisis; Warsaw Pact states violently suppress the Polish opposition was what appealed to the #7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. * Issue 3 (Fall 1993), 80 pages: Mark Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and SED leadership, who kept the option alive. Kramer reports on the Russian archives Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Along with materials on the SED and new findings on the 1968 Soviet Two Reports” Politburo’s position vis-a-vis the “Polish crushing of the Prague Spring; Kathryn crisis,” the documentation also contains ex- Weathersby offers new Russian evidence #8 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims tensive archives on intra-German relations, on the Korean War; Mark Kramer and in Korea and the Origins of the Korean on the SED’s policy toward the church, and James G. Blight et al. debate Soviet War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives” on the mounting economic problems in the tactical nuclear weapons and the Cuban GDR. Missile Crisis; and a selection of translated The publication of corresponding docu- #9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. documents from the Russian archives; Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet ments from the years 1981/82 is currently Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: being prepared by scholars from the “SED- * Issue 4 (Fall 1994), 100 pages: Two Reports” State Research Group.” Reports on Soviet nuclear history, includ- ing David Holloway on sources for Stalin #10 Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know and the Bomb, Yuri Smirnov and Everything and To Report Everything Vladislav Zubok on nuclear weapons after Worth Knowing’: Building the East Ger- man Police State, 1945-1949” Stalin’s death, and William Burr on using declassified history, plus evidence on Niels #11 Christian F. Ostermann, “The United Bohr and the Sudoplatov controversy; States, the East German Uprising of 1953, Zubok goes inside the covert Cold War; and the Limits of Rollback” reports on new Eastern evidence on Germany and the Cold War; and more #12 Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold translated Russian documents. War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery” COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 129

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON POLAND mittee as soon as possible in order to work out a strengthening of the socialist legal order. continued from page 117 detailed, positive program specifying the main —Pay greater attention to the army and country. The complexity of the struggle against policy directions. The program must, in particu- devote special attention to the military-political it stems, in particular, from the fact that the lar, undercut the significance of the demands of preparation of soldiers. Use the opportunity to members of the opposition disguise themselves the strike committees in Gdansk and Szczecin as attract army command personnel to perform party- as defenders of the working class and as laborers. much as possible in the eyes of the workers. In economic work as well. The agreement does not eliminate the un- accordance with materials from the CC plenum, —Adopt necessary measures to expose the derlying causes of the crisis events; and what is convene expanded plenary sessions of PZPR political nature and designs of the ringleaders of more, the urgent problems of the Polish economy provincial, city, and county committees, sessions the opposition. and Polish society are now becoming more com- of the party aktiv [core members and activists— plicated. ed.], and party meetings at enterprises. 6. In the sphere of the mass media and Because the opposition intends to continue —Consider the possibility of convening a propaganda, concentrate efforts on the further the struggle to achieve its aims, and the healthy party congress, at which a full-scale program of strengthening of party leadership and supervi- forces of the party and society cannot acquiesce action for the party would be worked out, new sion over these organs. This is especially neces- in regressive movement by Polish society, the directives for the five-year plan would be af- sary when in practice the question has arisen of compromise that has been achieved will be only firmed, and necessary changes in the leading the “limitation of censorship” and the expansion temporary in nature. One must bear in mind that organs would be introduced. of access for the anti-socialist forces and the the opposition is expecting, not without reason, —An increase in the combativeness of the Church to the mass media. that help will be forthcoming from outside. party in rural locations will require the compre- —In these circumstances it is necessary to hensive organizational strengthening of the PZPR provide an elaborate definition of what is permis- 2. Under the pressure of anti-socialist forces, county committees, which since the administra- sible, having openly declared that the law on the who have succeeded in leading astray a signifi- tive reforms of 1975 have been serving in the role press forbids any statements against socialism. cant portion of the working class, the PZPR had of regional committees. —Adopt necessary measures to put an end to go on the defensive. Now the problem is how —Consider the direction for the leading to the wide circulation of anti-Communist publi- to prepare a counterattack and reclaim the posi- work in party organs carried out by experienced cations, films, and television productions in the tions that have been lost among the working class political workers of the Polish Army. PPR, and to maintain strict control over the sources and the people. of information emanating from Poland, including In launching this counterattack, it would be 4. The reestablishment of the severed link the activity of bourgeois journalists. advisable to use all the capabilities afforded by between the party and the working class will Strengthen party control over the work of the ruling party and its strong, healthy core, by require a fundamental renewal of the activity of the central and local press, over the leaders of the state apparatus, and by mass social organiza- the trade unions. Do everything necessary to editorial collectives, and above all over the tele- tions, while showing political flexibility. These prevent the dissolution or disintegration of the vision and radio. institutions will provide necessary support to the existing trade unions (CRZZ) and their organiza- Using the mass media, show that the events vanguard ranks of the working class. In the event tions. Convene as soon as possible the regular 9th in Poland have been caused not by any shortcom- of necessity, it would be advisable to use the Congress of the trade unions of Poland, where the ings of the socialist system per se, but by mistakes contemplated administrative means. foremost task will be to move the trade unions as and oversights, and also by some objective fac- The party must give a principled political close as possible to the workers and to earn their tors (natural calamities, etc.). Through the mass evaluation of the August events and must also full confidence. media, actively and broadly counteract the anti- accelerate the formulation of its own program of —Put up a defense of the basic principles of Polish and anti-Soviet attacks of hostile propa- action, which will include steps to improve the the trade union movement in the conditions of a ganda. life of workers. socialist society. Abide by certain provisions in Objectively depict the economic advantages the agreement with the ZKS and at the same time Poland derives from broad cooperation with the 3. It is necessary to give overriding signifi- adopt all measures to limit and neutralize the USSR and other fraternal countries. Refute the cance to the consolidation of the leading role of effect of the most dangerous articles in the agree- widely circulated slander that one of the reasons the party in society. ment. Come forward with bold initiatives of a for the current difficulties in supplying the popu- social character, which would bolster the author- lation of the PPR with consumer goods is the The current political crisis has sharply weak- ity of the trade unions. shipment of such goods to the countries of social- ened the influence and authority of the party —Raise the quality of personnel in trade ism. among the working class. In such circumstances union organizations by bringing in advanced, * * * * * one must adopt all necessary measures for its trustworthy workers. Carry out elections of trade After expressing a number of points about organizational and ideological cohesion and for union activists before this is done in the so-called the critical situation that has emerged in the PPR, the reestablishment of its influence and author- “self-managed” trade unions. we would like once again to draw the attention of ity. —Seek to limit the activity and influence of our Polish friends to the recommendations and Among some concrete recommendations, the so-called “self-managed” trade unions among suggestions that were offered by Comrade L. I. one might list the following: the masses, a task that will be accomplished Brezhnev during the discussions in the Crimea —On an urgent basis, carry out measures to predominantly by mobilizing public opinion. with E. Gierek both in 1979 and especially on 31 raise the combativeness of all party organiza- Move actively in infiltrating the so-called “self- July 1980, as well as to the letter of 21 August tions, taking account of the lessons of the politi- managed” trade unions with people devoted to 1980 addressed to the PZPR CC. cal crisis. Act decisively in removing people the party. Of particular importance in today’s situa- who are clearly alien to the party, while conform- tion are the following suggestions offered by ing with the specific conditions existing right 5. In light of the danger created by the Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 31 July 1980: now in the country. activity of the anti-socialist forces, use state struc- —carry out, along a wide front, work aimed —Convene a plenum of the Central Com- tures to carry out necessary measures for the at fostering socialist internationalism, while de- 130 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN cisively rebuffing all attempts to use nationalism zational and ideological strengthening of the party “Solidarity” as a whole and its separate links in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-So- (see attached). are preparing their next attempt to blackmail the viet sentiments, as well as all attempts to misrep- authorities by setting forth various demands of an resent the history of Soviet-Polish relations and CC SECRETARY overwhelmingly political nature. Signs of a strati- the nature of cooperation between the USSR and fication in the leadership of this trade union the PPR; On point VII of Prot. No. 7 organization do not yet provide any basis for —launch relentless counterpropaganda expecting fundamental changes in its general against the efforts to water down the class content Top Secret orientation. Even if there were to be a schism of socialist patriotism under the slogan of “All SPECIAL DOSSIER between Walesa and the extremists from KOR- Poles in the world are brothers,” as well as the To the CPSU CC KOS, Walesa himself and the Catholic clergy efforts to idealize the pre-revolutionary past of who back him have not the slightest intention of Poland; and On the Development of the Situation in Poland easing the pressure on the PZPR. One also cannot —in the political struggle against anti-so- and Certain Steps on Our Part exclude the possibility that the extremists will cialist elements, carry out the appropriate attacks seize control over “Solidarity,” with all the con- against them, rather than merely going on the The internal political crisis in Poland is of a sequences that would ensue. defensive. prolonged nature. To a significant degree the Recently, a new tactical arrangement has PZPR has lost control over the processes under been emerging ever more clearly, around which 3 September 1980 way in society. At the same time, “Solidarity” has the diverse opposition forces are uniting. Despite been transformed into an organized political force, realizing that Poland’s geopolitical situation de- * * * * * which is able to paralyze the activity of the party prives them of the opportunity to obstruct the and state organs and take de facto power into its country’s participation in the Warsaw Treaty CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), 23 own hands. If the opposition has not yet done that, Organization or to encroach on the principle of April 1981; CPSU CC Politburo Commission then that is primarily because of its fear that Soviet the leading role of the Communist party, these Report, “On the Development of the Situation troops would be introduced and because of its forces have clearly decided to undermine the in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part,” 16 hopes that it can achieve its aims without blood- PZPR from within, to bring about the party’s April 1981; and CPSU CC-Approved Plan of shed and by means of a creeping counterrevolu- rebirth, and thus to seize power “on a legal basis.” “Measures to Assist the PZPR [Polish United tion.1 As the work of the IX plenum of the PZPR Workers’ Party] in the Organization and Ideo- At the session of the Sejm [Parliament—ed.] CC showed, the opportunistic elements have al- logical Strengthening of the Party” on 10 April, the Polish leadership did not dare to ready succeeded in taking control of local party raise the matter of decisive actions against the organizations of the PZPR and, with their help, To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC anti-socialist forces. The leadership clearly is beginning to apply pressure on the leadership of (General Department, 1st sector) unable and does not want to depart from the line the party. They will undoubtedly be continuing Proletarians of all countries, unite! adopted to overcome the crisis with the aid of this subversive work, having sought to transform political means. the upcoming IX Congress into a central arena for Communist Party of the Soviet Union True, in the report to the Sejm by Comrade their struggle for power. CENTRAL COMMITTEE Jaruzelski there were a number of provisions in In these circumstances, the need has arisen the spirit of the recommendations continually once again to assess our view of the Polish TOP SECRET expressed to the Polish comrades by our side. leadership’s policy and to determine more pre- SPECIAL DOSSIER However, they were put forth not in the form of cisely which forces we can rely on in the end to orders, but merely as appeals and suggestions. safeguard the gains of socialism in Poland. No. P7/VII The compromise nature of the report is also abun- On the right flank in the PZPR CC are dantly evident from the fact that it was received officials of a revisionist bent: Fiszbach, Werblan, To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, calmly and did not provoke a confrontation of the Rakowski, Jablonski, etc. Ideologically, they are Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, sort that our friends had feared. close to some of the leaders of “Solidarity” in Chernenko, Ponomarev, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Looking upon the results of the Sejm as a their support for a transformation of the socioeco- Rusakov, Arkhipov, Zamyatin, and Rakhmanin modest but initial success, Comrade Kania and his nomic structure of Poland along the lines of the — whole package; Afanas’ev, V., Lapin, Losev, colleagues now are somewhat stepping up their Yugoslav model. In the political sphere they Pastukhov, Shibaev, Pegov, Tyazhel’nikov, and actions to bolster the authority of the party. They support a “partnership” of various political forces, Shauro — pt. 2 have given speeches at a number of large indus- a position coinciding with the “Eurocommunists” trial enterprises and have held a meeting with and the social-democratic ideas of pluralism. Extract from Protocol No. 7 of the session of the workers and peasants and members of the PZPR These officials rely on the support of the CPSU CC Politburo CC. On 25 April a regular plenum of the CC is to party organizations that have fallen under the on 23 April 1981 be held. The preparation of documents is under influence of “Solidarity.” One cannot exclude ______way for the IX Congress of the PZPR, which must the possibility that under present conditions they be held by 20 July of this year. Certain steps are will be able to bring many of their supporters into On the development of the situation in Poland and being taken by the government with the aim of the PZPR Congress and exert fundamental influ- certain steps on our part. somehow rectifying the situation in the economy. ence on the formation of the leading organs of the Despite this it is obvious to everyone that the party. They, apparently, are trying to achieve 1. To approve the ideas put forth in the note lull following the session of the Sejm is ephem- conspicuous changes in the PZPR leadership of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the eral. The opponent has gone along with it purely even as soon as the PZPR CC plenum. Polish question (see attached). out of tactical considerations, while continuing to The left flank is represented by such Com- 2. To affirm a plan of measures to lend mount his forces for the infliction of new strikes munists as Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, assistance to the PZPR leadership in the organi- against the party. Kociolek, and others. The positions adopted by COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 131 these comrades in the ideological sphere are decisive actions to overcome the crisis and pre- additional measures to assist the PZPR leader- closest to our own. They express the sentiments serve Poland as a socialist country friendly to the ship in strengthening the party both organization- of the members of the party who consistently Soviet Union. ally and ideologically. support socialism and friendship with the Soviet —Strongly recommend to our friends that in Union, and who oppose revisionist excesses and the first instance they must achieve unity and K. Chernenko demand resolute action against “Solidarity.” stability in the leadership of the PZPR, defending Yu. Andropov Overall they are backed by the old members of the comrades who have become the main targets A. Gromyko the party, who were brought up in the school of of attack by the opposition and by the enemies of D. Ustinov war and in the class struggle that marked the first socialism (Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, K. Rusakov stages of the establishment of People’s Poland. Kociolek, et al.). In turn, help these comrades I. Arkhipov Unfortunately, representatives of this point recognize the necessity of supporting Comrades L. Zamyatin of view are now far from a majority. One gets the Kania and Jaruzelski, of behaving more flexibly, impression that they believe the solution to the and of not openly opposing slogans of “socialist 16 April 1981 crisis will come only through a frontal attack on renewal.” It is important that they strike at the “Solidarity,” without taking account of the cur- enemies of socialism without implying that “Soli- ______rent correlation of forces. In espousing this view, darity” as a whole is identical to the hostile forces they do not believe there is a possibility of that exist within the organization. Regarding point VII of Prot. No. 7 rectifying the situation without the introduction —Direct the attention of Polish leaders to of Soviet troops. Such a position is objectively the necessity of carefully preparing for the IX Top Secret leading them to become more and more isolated PZPR Congress. Get them to struggle for an in both the party and the country. Substantial ample contingent of healthy forces at the Con- SET OF MEASURES TO ASSIST THE PZPR efforts will be required (if indeed they are still gress and to take an active role in this regard with LEADERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL possible) to get them elected to the Congress and the party organizations of large state enterprises. AND IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING have them join the leading organs. —Recommend to the Polish comrades that OF THE PARTY In effect, Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski they bind “Solidarity” in every way possible to occupy a centrist position. In the difficult situa- the resolution of productive matters, while limit- Dispatch a working group from the CPSU tion that emerged after August of last year, they ing its political activity. To this end, they should CC Department for Organizational-Party Work turned out to be proponents of the sentiments that accelerate the adoption of laws on economic to the PPR in May and June 1981 for consulta- gained sway in the party and the country in favor reform and trade unions. tions on matters concerning preparations for the of resolving the ongoing acute problems by means —Actively exploit the discernible fragmen- Extraordinary IX Congress of the PZPR. of dialogue and an agreement with “Solidarity.” tation among the leaders of “Solidarity,” disrupt The CPSU CC Department, and the depart- The subsequent period showed that Kania and the anti-socialist and anti-national activity of ments for organizational-party work, propaganda, Jaruzelski, while referring to the necessity of KOS-KOR and its leaders, and bring about the and foreign policy propaganda of the CPSU CC, protecting the gains of socialism in Poland, pur- isolation of these counterrevolutionaries. Adopt are to analyze the draft theses for the PZPR sued this course passively and hesitantly, mak- decisive measures against attempts to stir up a Congress, the draft PZPR statutes, and the drafts ing numerous concessions in favor of “Solidar- wave of anti-Sovietism in the country. of other documents, as well as the status of ity.” They have displayed insufficient firmness Induce the Polish leadership to maintain organizational preparations for the Congress, and and steadfastness in the struggle against the constant watch over the state of the army and should relay appropriate recommendations to the counterrevolutionary forces. In their view, de- Internal Affairs Ministry organs, including their CPSU CC. votion to socialism is compatible with the na- morale, political stability, and readiness to fulfill Receive a delegation from the PZPR CC tionalist idea that was circulated during Gierek’s their duty in defense of socialism. It is essential Organizational Department in April-May 1981, time, namely, that “a Pole can always reach to support the Internal Affairs Ministry leader- as provided for under the plan for interparty ties agreement with other Poles.” This has led not ship, and Milewski personally, and to avoid any in 1981. only to an unjustified policy of concessions to the let-up in the actions carried out by the police to Prepare invitations to working groups of top demands of “Solidarity,” but also to a panic- preserve public order. officials from PZPR CC departments to come to ridden fear of confronting “Solidarity” and a —As a deterrent to counterrevolution, maxi- the USSR for consultations, which the Polish deep-rooted anxiety that Soviet troops will be mally exploit the fears of internal reactionaries comrades are very interested in holding. sent in. and international imperialism that the Soviet In accordance with the desire of the Polish At the same time, Kania and Jaruzelski Union might send its troops into Poland. In leadership, party officials representing local party want to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union foreign policy statements, emphasize what was organs will be sent to Poland in May and June and to uphold Poland’s obligations to the War- said by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the XXVI 1981. The initial delegations will be sent from the saw Pact. Both of them, especially Jaruzelski, CPSU Congress about our resolve to stick up for Leningrad, Ivanovo, Smolensk, Donetsk, enjoy authority in the country. At present, there Poland and not to leave it in the lurch. Zaporozhe, Lvov, Kharkov, Cherkassk, are in fact no other officials who might take over —Given the exceptionally difficult eco- Grodnensk, and Mogilev oblast party commit- the party and state leadership. nomic situation in the PPR, continue to extend tees. In light of all that has just been said, it is timely assistance while simultaneously doing In the event of confirmation of an appropri- imperative to pursue the following course of everything possible to step up propaganda about ate request from the PZPR CC, give further action in the immediate future: this matter so that every Pole will know how consideration to the question of accepting middle- —Continue to offer political support to much his country depends on Soviet help and and lower-ranking PZPR officials (up to 500 of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, who, despite support. them) at the CPSU CC Academy of Social Sci- their well-known waffling, are in favor of de- Along with these general recommendations, ences and also at the Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, fending socialism. At the same time, constantly we are, in accordance with our instructions (P1/ and Minsk higher party schools. demand that they pursue more significant and VIII from 12 March 1981), presenting a plan of The CPSU CC Department for organiza- 132 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tional-party work and the CPSU CC Department October of this year. believed so. We long ago spoke about this to our are to hold a conference in May-June 1981 for friends. representatives from corresponding oblast and L. BREZHNEV W. JARUZELSKI. And for that reason I municipal committees of the CPSU to discuss consented. I will do all I can, Leonid Ilyich, both urgent questions of ties between local party or- 19 October 1981 as a Communist and as a soldier, to improve gans of the CPSU and PZPR. things and to achieve a turnaround in the situation By agreement with the PZPR CC, send to ______in the country and in our party. I understand and Poland in May-June 1981 a group of senior fully agree with you that one of the crucial things officials from the central council of the branch Secret right now is the selection of leadership both in the trade unions headed by the secretary of the All- party and in the government. And for that reason Union Central Trade Union Council, who will NOTES FROM A TELEPHONE I deferred any final resolution of personnel mat- familiarize themselves with the state of affairs in CONVERSATION ters until the next plenum, which we will be the Polish trade union movement and make on- between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Comrade holding within several days. This way, I can site studies of the opportunities for political sup- W. Jaruzelski think carefully about these matters and consult port of the branch trade unions and for increased with others, ending up with a comprehensive cooperation between them and the Soviet trade 19 October 1981 decision and not simply scattered personnel unions. changes. Instruct the CPSU Komsomol CC to present The Kremlin L. I. BREZHNEV. Personnel matters are a set of measures by 5 May 1981 on ways to very important both at the center and in the strengthen our influence within the youth move- L. I. BREZHNEV. Hello, Wojciech. outlying regions. ment in Poland. W. JARUZELSKI. Hello, my dear, deeply W. JARUZELSKI. This issue will be re- The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship esteemed Leonid Ilyich. solved in the outlying regions as well. Of course and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the L. I. BREZHNEV. Dear Wojciech, we al- this must occur in parallel with the strengthening Soviet Veterans’ Committee, and the Committee ready sent you an official greeting, but I wanted to of the party in the spirit of a stepped-up struggle. of Soviet Women are to continue pursuing the set congratulate you personally on your election to In the appropriate situation we must apply deci- of measures agreed on with the native Polish the post of First Secretary of the PZPR CC. sive actions in order to wage battle where we are organizations and to offer them the necessary It was appropriate of you to give your con- confident of achieving success. help. sent to such a decision. In the PZPR right now I’m now heading over to a session of the Taking account of the complex situation in there is no other individual whose authority is Military Council of the Armed Forces at the the creative unions of the PPR, the Unions of equal to yours; this is evident from the results of Ministry of Defense. There I will also be putting Writers, Journalists, Composers, Artists, and Film- the vote at the plenum. We understand that very forth appropriate tasks. We will broadly include makers of the USSR are to carry out exchanges difficult tasks now stand before you. But we are the army in all spheres of the life of the country. with them via party organizations. convinced that you will cope with them and will Yesterday, after the plenum, I held a meet- Send a group from the USSR State Commit- do everything to overcome the severe ailments ing with the first secretaries of the provincial tee on Television and Radio (headed by the chair- afflicting your country. committees and said that they should not take man of the committee, Comrade Lapin) to the I think, right now, as it seems to me, the most umbrage at the fact that we will be including PPR in May 1981 for consultations regarding important thing is for you to gather around your- people from the armed forces in the implementa- Soviet broadcasts to the PPR and the refinement self some reliable assistants from the ranks of tion of certain processes and will be expanding of plans for cooperation in 1981. committed and worthy Communists and to rally meetings between the officer corps and the work- In April-May 1981 the editors of the news- them, spurring the whole party into action and ing class in order to exert direct influence on the papers “Pravda,” “Izvestiya,” and “Trud” are to instilling it with the spirit of struggle. This, in the workers and shield them from the influence of send a group of publicists (1 or more) to Poland literal sense of the word, is the key to success. “Solidarity.” Of course, we are not changing our to prepare materials, including exposés and de- And, of course, it is important, without wast- general direction in the sense that we are strug- nunciations, about the activity of anti-socialist ing time, to take the decisive measures you intend gling to win back to our side the healthy forces of forces. to use against the counterrevolution. We hope the nation who have gone astray and joined “Soli- that everyone now, both in Poland and abroad, darity,” and simultaneously we will be combat- * * * * * will sense that things in your country will move ting the adversary and, of course, doing so in such along differently. a way that it will produce results. Brezhnev-Jaruzelski Telephone We wish you good health and success! Today I am meeting with your ambassador. Conversation, 19 October 1981 W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you very much, I will try to go over certain questions with him in dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all greater detail and will be asking for your sugges- To be returned Distributed to the members for the confidence you have in me. I want to tell tions on some questions which he, no doubt, will to the CPSU CC of the CPSU CC Politburo, you frankly that I had some inner misgivings convey to you.2 (General Depart- members of the CPSU CC about accepting this post and agreed to do so only In keeping you informed of all the decisions ment, 1st sector) Politburo, and CPSU CC because I knew that you support me and that you we reach, we will simultaneously let you know No. P1942 secretaries were in favor of this decision. If this had not been what has motivated our decision-making in par- so, I never would have agreed to it. This is a very ticular cases. ______burdensome and very difficult task in such a Right now the greatest complications in our complicated situation in the country, in which I country arise from the situation at the market. In To the CPSU CC now find myself both as prime minister and as connection with this we have been experiencing minister of defense. But I understand that this is many strikes and protests, some organized by I am conveying notes from a telephone con- proper and necessary if you personally believe so. “Solidarity” and others that are simply elemental. versation with Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 19 L. I. BREZHNEV. Wojciech, we long ago This very much complicates efforts to carry out COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 133 measures that must be implemented and compli- The CPSU CC Department and the USSR you agreed that you needed to choose reliable cates our work, since the mood in society is Foreign Ministry are to set forth recommenda- assistants from among the ranks of staunch and indifferent. But we will be trying to do every- tions concerning organizational measures con- devoted Communists and to spur the whole party thing possible to improve the situation. nected with the reception of a Polish delegation in into motion, having instilled it with the spirit of This is what I wanted initially to convey to the USSR. struggle and then, without losing any time, resort- you and to keep you informed about. ing to active measures against the counterrevolu- Once again I want to thank you very much CC SECRETARY tion. for your kind words. ______“It’s obvious that the fundamental question L. I. BREZHNEV. I again wish you, now is the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Wojciech, the best of health and the best of Regarding point 21 of Prot. No. 37 masses. However, one gets the impression that a success. turnaround on this matter has so far not been W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you. Good-bye. Secret achieved. The anti-socialist forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enter- * * * * * WARSAW prises, but are also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and SOVIET AMBASSADOR population. Worse yet, the leaders of ‘Solidarity’ Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to and the counterrevolutionaries are still appearing Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981 Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, before various audiences and making openly in- citing your instructions, transmit to him the fol- flammatory speeches aimed at stirring up nation- To be returned within 3 days to the lowing oral message from Comrade L. I. alist passions and directed against the PZPR and CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector) Brezhnev: against socialism. The direct consequence of this Proletarians of all countries, unite! “Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski! hostile activity is the dangerous growth of anti- “We have attentively considered your pro- Sovietism in Poland. Communist Party of the Soviet Union posal to visit Moscow at the head of a party-state “It seems to us that you now must mobilize CENTRAL COMMITTEE delegation that would include the heads of the the entire party in the struggle to win the hearts TOP SECRET parties allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. and minds of people by coming forth with a No. P37/21 As far as the timeframe is concerned, the visit precise and clear program for resolving the crisis, might take place on 14-15 December, assuming a program that will convince everyone of its To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, of course that this is suitable for you. appropriateness. In other words, you must seek Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov, “In the meantime, because several weeks anew to gain the confidence of ordinary workers, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, still remain before the meeting, I decided to as was done by the Communists during the years Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov. transmit to you through Comrade Aristov some of the founding of popular rule. Of great impor- thoughts about urgent matters pertaining to the tance in this effort will be regular meetings by Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the situation in Poland, which remains a cause of leading officials from the PZPR aktiv with labor CPSU CC Politburo serious anxiety for us. collectives, especially collectives at large state on 21 November 1981 “I am revealing no secrets when I say that we enterprises, which the enemy has succeeded in ______greeted your election as PZPR CC First Secretary transforming into its bastions. This is so not just with great hopes. We were aware that earlier in in the capital. And, of course, the struggle for the On the reception in the USSR of a party-state the struggle against the anti-socialist forces you, hearts and minds of the masses will not achieve delegation from the PPR and an oral message as the chairman of the Council of Ministers, were the necessary results if the current party leader- from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W. inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the ship is not supported by the mass media and if the Jaruzelski. party leadership. Now this obstacle has been adversary, as before, is given unhindered oppor- eliminated. The 4th plenum of the PZPR CC tunity to disseminate his hostile propaganda. 1. To affirm the text of an oral message directly linked the decision to change the First “I’d now like to broach another matter. from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who instructed the Secretary with the necessity for urgent measures Recently in Poland a lot has been written about Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to to salvage socialism in Poland. your meeting with Glemp and Walesa. Some call Comrade W. Jaruzelski (see attached). “When I congratulated you over the phone, it historic and see in it the beginning of a turn 2. To acknowledge the desirability of re- I was pleased to hear that one of the reasons you away from chaos toward social tranquility. As ceiving in the USSR a party-state delegation had agreed to take on the responsible post of we know, the results of the meeting were posi- from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski PZPR leader at such a critical juncture was the tively evaluated by the Politburo and the PPR on 14-15 December 1981. confidence you felt we had in you. I mentioned government.3 To affirm the composition of the Soviet this to my comrades, and our hope strengthened “We understand, of course, that by propos- delegation at the talks with the Polish delegation: even more that in you we had finally found ing at this meeting, in the form of a critical Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delega- someone who thinks as we do and who will be an question, the creation of a ‘Front of National tion), M. A. Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. ally in one of the most trying phases of the Accord,’ you are pursuing a number of tactical Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. struggle against imperialism, as is now occurring objectives, above all the widening of public sup- Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov. in Poland. port for the regime and the fragmentation of the 3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Depart- “You’ll recall that during the phone conver- top levels of ‘Solidarity.’ But how far can one ment, the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Defense sation I expressed my hope that people now, both really go with such agreements without the threat Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR Gosplan in Poland and abroad, would sense that things in of losing control over the situation? Indeed, are to prepare all necessary materials for the talks your country were finally headed on a different aren’t the class enemies trying to instill the ‘Front with the Polish party-state delegations, includ- course. We spoke then about the essential pre- of National Accord’ with political content that ing a draft communiqué for the press. conditions for a turnabout in the situation, and would bolster their idea of, at a minimum, attain- 134 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ing a division of power among the PZPR, ‘Soli- places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, personnel. I am convinced that by working with darity,’ and the church, with the result that social- are now seeking to time it for the moment when your comrades who are oriented toward the “left- ism would collapse. It is also clear that they are they will have an overwhelming advantage. In ists,” and by giving them your support, you will exploiting their current influence among the particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact find that it is precisely these people who provide masses to establish a huge advantage in the up- that a new group of recruits will be entering the a sound basis for the struggle to overcome the coming elections for the national councils, thus army who have been worked on by ‘Solidarity.’5 crisis. continuing their path toward the legal seizure of Doesn’t this suggest to you that a failure to take “Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! power in the country. harsh measures against the counterrevolution right Having raised, for your benefit, several matters “This, it seems to me, implies that it will be away will cost you invaluable time? that are troubling us, and having offered you my fundamentally important for the leading role of “The key question is how to isolate the sworn views, I naturally have left aside a number of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the ‘Front enemies of socialism. Until that is done, nothing problems that can be considered during a face-to- of National Accord,’ as well as for the partici- will change. Moreover, such an overtly counter- face meeting.6 pants in the Front to recognize the PPR Constitu- revolutionary organization as the ‘Confederation tion, socialism, and Poland’s international alli- for an Independent Poland’ (KPN) is enlisting L. BREZHNEV” ances. Will these things be done in the Statutes new supporters and is able to function legally. It’s and other documents of the Front, and more obvious that this has been possible because the Confirm transmittal by telegram. important will they be guaranteed in practice? party is in fact losing control over the judicial What do you propose to do about the elections for organs, as is evident from the whole episode with * * * * * local organs of power, bearing in mind the risk of the trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of the party’s destruction? KPN. CPSU CC Politburo transcript, “In this connection another urgent matter “I want to share with you some thoughts 10 December 1981 arises. During many of our discussions we have about one further matter of great urgency. It’s emphasized the same theme over and over: We obvious that any actions in defense of socialism Top Secret are not opposed to agreements. But such agree- demand in the first instance a vigorous struggle Single Copy ments must not make concessions to the enemies for the Marxist-Leninist character of the PZPR (Working Notes) of socialism. And the key thing is that the and an increase in its combat readiness. After the agreements must not become ends in themselves. 4th plenum of the PZPR CC, signs began to SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO Along with measures you take to gain support appear that the party organizations were springing among the popular masses and the different po- back to life. It is important to step up this work and 10 December 1981 litical forces, you must also take decisive actions to prevent the local Communists from falling against the sworn enemies of the popular order. back into their state of passivity and hopelessness. Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV. You agreed with this way of framing the question And for this what is needed most of all is for the and spoke yourself about your intention of strug- members of the party to be able to believe that Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. gling for the hearts and minds of the workers words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. while at the same time attacking the class enemy. the leadership is intent on firmly and consistently Ya. Pel’she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. “But now the impression emerges that you’re implementing decisions that have been adopted. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, focusing only on the first part of this two-part “The strengthening of the PZPR depends M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, formula. We know that there are still people in also on a clear-cut line with regard to different K. V. Rusakov. the leadership of your party who are still pinning currents of thought among its ranks. In your all their hopes on a continuation of the bankrupt country some have argued that there now exist I. On the question of the situation in Poland course of Kania. It would be dangerous to suc- three basic directions in the party—the left, the cumb to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear right, and the center—and they have recommended BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on that without a resolute struggle against the class the severance of all ties with the leftists and our agenda. But I think that the session of the enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we Poland. The essential question is not whether force of the blows. This is a dangerous recom- have specially dispatched Comrades [Head of there will be a confrontation or not, but who will mendation. Who is it, after all, that is being Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw Pact begin it and by what means it will be carried out, branded “leftists” or “hardliners”? Why, the Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov as well as who will seize the initiative. Communists who have long been supportive of to Poland to meet with the Polish comrades and “I’d like to emphasize that when we speak Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dis- go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On about a confrontation, we believe it is contingent missing the need to rectify mistakes and distor- 8 December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR tions that have been committed. And who are the information about the discussions he held in the workers and toiling masses who have fallen so-called rightists? These are the people who Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade under the influence of ‘Solidarity’ and who now espouse revisionist views and ultimately become Baibakov communicated from Warsaw that he occupy a passive position and bide their time, members of ‘Solidarity.’ It is clear that any sort of had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. waiting for things to sort themselves out at the actions against staunch Communists would be From these meetings and subsequent discussions top.4 suicide for the PZPR as a Communist party. And held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent that the “You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have it is just as clear that until you get rid of the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 both experienced war and we know that the revisionists, including the ones in the party lead- billion dollars’ worth of additional supplies and strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the ership who are trying to uphold the previous materials from the USSR and other socialist coun- question of time. This is directly related to the capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a tries in the first quarter of the coming year.7 This adverse situation that has now emerged in Po- heavy burden. will include iron ore, non-ferrous metals, fertil- land. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who “I believe these considerations provide the izer, oil, tires, grain, etc. long ago were already gradually, and in some key to a solution of the mounting problems with In making this request, as you see, the Polish COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 135 comrades have in mind that shipments of goods farm produce.8 rectly described the situation regarding the Polish from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be main- If we speak, for example, about reserves of economy. What, then, should we be doing now? tained at the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov grain, then Poland this year has accumulated It seems to me that we should deliver to Poland assured his interlocutors that all their requests more than 2 million tons. The population is not the goods provided for under the economic agree- would be considered in Moscow. going hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the ments, but that these deliveries should not exceed Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct markets and buy up all they products they need. the quantity of goods we delivered in the first Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, And there are ample supplies of them. quarter of last year. Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying As is known, by the Politburo’s decision and this matter, taking account of the exchange of at the request of the Polish comrades, we are BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this opinions, but without waiting for a final agree- providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 much now? ment. thousand tons of meat. Of these promised 30 And now let’s hear what Comrade Baibakov thousand tons, 15 thousand have already been BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given has to say. shipped abroad. It should be added that the only by drawing on state reserves or at the ex- produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in pense of deliveries to the internal market. BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to Politburo’s instructions, I traveled to Warsaw. I transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they met there with all the comrades whom it was During the transport of this produce to the Polish had a conference of secretaries from the provin- necessary for me to see about the matters speci- stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. cial committees. As Comrade Aristov9 reported, fied in my instructions. Poles have been expressing highly obscene com- the secretaries of the provincial committees are First of all I had a discussion with the deputy ments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet completely baffled by Jaruzelski’s speech, which chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, did not present a clear, straightforward line. No Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish etc. One couldn’t even begin to keep count of all one knows what will happen over the next few comrades raised the question of economic assis- the insults that have been directed against us. days. There was a conversation about “Operation tance. I sent an encrypted cable back here outlin- Viewing the situation from the standpoint of X.” At first, they said it would be on the night of ing the Polish request. the balance of payments, the Poles want to intro- 11-12 December, and then this was changed to One must say that the list of goods included duce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to the night of 12-13. And now they’re already in the assistance from us to the PPR comes to 350 Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, saying it won’t be until around the 20th. What is items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This in- then all Polish vessels in the waters of other states envisaged is that the chairman of the State Coun- cludes such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the cil, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand tons of iron countries to which Poland owes debts, will be and declare the introduction of martial law. At ore, and many other goods. The requests made seized. For this reason the Poles have given the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on the by the Polish comrades, combined with what we instructions to the captains of ships to refrain introduction of martial law can be implemented had already been thinking about giving Poland in from entering ports and to stay in neutral waters. only after it is considered by the Sejm, and the 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish Now I will offer several words about my next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15 People’s Republic will be approximately 4.4 discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. He reaf- December. Thus, everything has become very billion rubles. firmed the request made earlier by Obodowski complicated. The agenda of the Sejm has already The time is now approaching when Poland regarding the delivery of goods. Then in the been published, and it makes no mention of the will have to pay for its credits from West Euro- evening I again went to Jaruzelski’s office, ac- introduction of martial law. But even if the pean countries. For this, Poland will be required companied by our ambassador and Comrade government does intend to introduce martial law, to pay a minimum of 2.8 million rubles’ worth of Kulikov. Also taking part in this discussion were “Solidarity” knows this very well and, for its part, hard currency. When I was told by the Polish Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who has been preparing all necessary measures to comrades that they are requesting the amount handles these matters. Jaruzelski was in a highly cope with that. that all this assistance comes to, I raised the agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to question of how to establish mutual economic disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish deliver an address to the Polish nation. But in his ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as is address he won’t be speaking about the party. Polish industry is not even coming close to known, promised to declare a holy war against Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist senti- fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the the Polish authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly ments. Jaruzelski has talked about the need to country’s basic means of earning hard currency, responded that in the event of untoward activities proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that has been severely disrupted, and remedial mea- by “Solidarity,” they will detain all hostile ele- existed under Pilsudski.10 He indicated that the sures have not been implemented as strikes con- ments. Poles will accept this more readily than some- tinue. And even now, when there are no strikes, As far as the party organizations are con- thing else. the mining of coal remains at a very low level. cerned, they are ruined and inactive in the outly- As far as officials like Olszowski are con- Or, for example, let’s say that production is ing regions. And with regard to the party as a cerned, they recently have begun to act more going on among the peasantry, with grain, meat whole, Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer decisively; and one might add that at the session products, vegetables, etc. But they aren’t giving exists. The country is being destroyed, and the of the Politburo where the decision was made to any of it to the state; they’re just playing a waiting outlying regions are not receiving any sort of introduce martial law and adopt more resolute game. At the private markets the level of agricul- reinforcement, because the Central Committee measures against extremist figures in “Solidar- tural trade is sufficiently high and is being car- and government are not giving firm and clear-cut ity,” the vote was unanimous and no one ex- ried out at very inflated prices. instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been trans- pressed a word of opposition.11 At the same time, I said directly to the Polish comrades that formed into a man who is extremely neurotic and Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about they must adopt more decisive measures if such diffident about his abilities. this matter with his allies. He says that if the a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch Polish forces are unable to cope with the resis- something in the nature of a requisitioning of RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has cor- tance put up by “Solidarity,” the Polish comrades 136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN hope to receive assistance from other countries, would say even more than that, he is raising the ited review of the situation in Poland. You might up to and including the introduction of armed question, albeit indirectly, of receiving military even say this review was more spirited than any forces on the territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is assistance as well. we’ve had before. This is because at the moment basing this hope on the speech by Comrade Now, if you look at the list of goods we are we ourselves don’t know what direction the events Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and providing to the Polish comrades, we can can- in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself other socialist countries would indeed give assis- didly say that serious doubts arise about the senses that power is slipping from its grasp. tance to Poland with their armed forces. How- necessity of supplying these products. For ex- Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their ever, as far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not ample, what is the connection between the suc- ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no say this directly, but merely repeated the words cess of “Operation X” and the delivery of fertil- such opportunity, there are no longer any neutrals. voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our deter- izer and certain other goods? In connection with The position is defined sufficiently clearly: “Soli- mination not to leave Poland in the lurch. this I would say that our position, as it was darity” has proven to be a patently counterrevo- If we consider what is going on in the prov- formulated earlier during the previous session of lutionary organization which aspires to come to inces, one must candidly say that the strength of the Politburo and was expressed even earlier on power and which has openly declared its inten- the party organizations there has been completely several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely tion to seize power. The Polish leadership must dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative correct, and we must not depart from it at all.12 In decide the question: Either it relinquishes its apparatus there is still functioning, but in effect other words, we support the position of interna- positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, all power has now been transferred to the hands of tionalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the or it adopts decisive measures by introducing “Solidarity.” In his recent statements, Jaruzelski situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as “Op- martial law, isolating the extremists of “Solidar- is apparently trying to pull the wool over our eyes, eration X” is concerned, that must entirely and ity,” and restoring public order. There is no other because his words fail to reflect a proper analysis. unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades alternative. If the Polish comrades don’t quickly get orga- themselves. Whatever they decide is what will What should our position be toward the nized, prepare themselves, and resist the on- be. We will not insist on any specific course, and Polish events? I fully agree with what was slaught of “Solidarity,” they will have no success we will not dissuade them from pursuing what already said here by the comrades. We can say to at all in improving the situation in Poland. they decide. the Poles that we view the Polish events with As far as economic assistance is concerned, understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for ANDROPOV. From the discussions with it will of course be difficult for us to undertake us to alter this measured formulation in any way. Jaruzelski it’s clear that they have not yet reached anything of the scale and nature of what has been At the same time we must somehow try to dispel a firm consensus about the introduction of martial proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in law. Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR But again I want to say that the mere posing of the Poland have about the introduction of troops. CC Politburo on the need to introduce martial question of the apportionment of goods supplied There cannot be any introduction of troops into law, we still haven’t seen concrete measures on as economic assistance is an insolent way to Poland. I think we can give instructions about the part of the leadership. The extremists in approach things, and it is being done purely so this to our ambassador, asking him to visit “Solidarity” are attacking the Polish leadership that if we refrain from delivering something or Jaruzelski and communicate this to him. by the throat. The Church in recent days has also other, they’ll be able to lay all the blame on us. If Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of clearly expressed its position, which in essence is Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about the the PZPR CC Politburo with regard to the intro- now completely supportive of “Solidarity.” introduction of troops, then I believe he did this duction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to Of course in these circumstances the Polish incorrectly. We can’t risk such a step. We don’t his vacillating position. At first he had somewhat comrades must act swiftly in launching “Opera- intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the stiffened his spine, but now, once again, he’s tion X” and carrying it out. At the same time, proper position, and we must adhere to it until the begun to soften. Everything is still in force that Jaruzelski declares that we will resort to “Opera- end. I don’t know how things will turn out in was said to them previously. If in the struggle tion X” when “Solidarity” forces us to do so. This Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control against counterrevolution and afterwards they is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the of “Solidarity,” that’s the way it will be. And if show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist latest session of the PZPR CC Politburo and the the capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Poland will remain. The introduction of martial decision it adopted to introduce martial law had Union, and you know they have already reached law, of course, would be the best way to convey suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act agreement on a variety of economic and political the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the more decisively. All the members of the Polit- sanctions, that will be very burdensome for us. counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they buro expressed support for decisive action. This We must be concerned above all with our own intend to carry out are indeed implemented, then decision put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now country and about the strengthening of the Soviet I think we could expect positive results. compelled to find some way of extricating him- Union. That is our main line. Now, with regard to the creation of a new self. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked In general, it seems to me that our position party, as Jaruzelski proposed, I think we must him what measures they intended and when it on the situation in Poland was formulated by directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to would be done. He replied that he simply doesn’t Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the create any sort of new party, since this would know about “Operation X” and about the con- resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thor- merely signal a retreat on the part of the Polish crete timeframe in which it would be carried out. ough exchange of opinions has taken place dur- leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is ing the session of the Politburo. All of this must is in fact not a militant political organization, but concealing from his comrades the plan of con- serve as the basis of the policy we must uphold simply an organization that has committed mis- crete action, or he is simply abandoning the idea vis-a-vis Poland. takes. It would underscore the very weakness of of carrying out this step. As concerns the lines of communication the party and would play into the hands of the I’d now like to mention that Jaruzelski has between the Soviet Union and the GDR that run “Solidarity” extremists. Then even the popula- been more than persistent in setting forth eco- through Poland, then we of course must do some- tion of Poland, which retains definite sympathy nomic demands from us and has made the imple- thing to provide for their safekeeping. for the PZPR as a guiding force, would be com- mentation of “Operation X” contingent on our pletely disabused of such sentiments. willingness to offer economic assistance; and I GROMYKO. Today we’ve had a very spir- I believe that we must not now permit any COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 137 sort of harsh instructions, which would force prolonged stretch of events in Poland, we have them to adopt one course or another. I think we displayed steadfastness and composure. Leonid SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the have chosen the correct position here: The Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. intrigues of “Solidarity” and other counterrevo- restoration of order in Poland is a matter for the We said this in public to our people, and our lutionary forces. Polish United Workers’ Party, its Central Com- people supported the policy of the Communist mittee, and its Politburo. We already said to our Party. CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the Polish friends and will say again in the future that We’ve done a great deal of work for peace, comrades have said here. It is clear that the line they must pursue a steadfast course without and it is now impossible for us to change our of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the slackening in the least. position. World public opinion will not permit us Polish events, as formulated in the speeches of Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to to do so. We have carried out via the UN such Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the decisions of “Solidarity,” the West in all likelihood will not momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of give them credits and will not offer any other peace. What a great effect we have had from the change. kind of help. They are aware of this, and this visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG and from many I believe that today we could adopt the obviously is something that we, too, have to bear other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This following decision: in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was has enabled all peace-loving countries to under- 1. Take under advisement the information pro- correct in proposing that we instruct a group of stand that the Soviet Union staunchly and consis- vided by Comrade Baibakov. comrades to examine this question, taking ac- tently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is 2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, count of our capabilities to extend substantial now impossible for us to change the position we abide by the general political line on this matter economic assistance to the PPR. have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of themselves determine what actions they must December 1981 and the exchange of opinions course, is very bad. The situation is worsening pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push that occurred at the CC Politburo’s session on 10 day by day. Among the leadership, especially in them toward more decisive actions. But we will, December 1981. the Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard their 3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, all of this has taken its toll on the state of affairs. actions with understanding. Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a studying questions of economic assistance to was a decision unanimously approved to intro- certain degree of slyness. He wants to make Poland, taking account of the exchange of opin- duce martial law. And now all hopes are riding excuses for himself by coming forth with re- ions at the session of the CC Politburo. on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying quests, which he presents to the Soviet Union. out this decision? As yet, no one can openly These requests, naturally, are beyond our physi- BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We just cal capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: about this? don’t know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. well, look here, I turned to the Soviet Union and He candidly said that even we [the Poles] don’t requested help, but didn’t receive it. EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man At the same time, the Poles say directly that properly formulated all the proposals, and now it who has been effectively responsible for dis- they are opposed to the introduction of troops. If is time to adopt them. charging the duties of the Polish defense minister troops are introduced, that will mean a catastro- doesn’t know what will happen and what sort of phe. I think we have reached a unanimous view The decree is adopted. actions will be taken by the chairman of the here on this matter, and there can be no consider- Council of Ministers and minister. ation at all of introducing troops. * * * * * With regard to what Comrade Kulikov al- As far as the provision of assistance to legedly said about the introduction of troops into Poland is concerned, we have given that country CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), Poland, I can say in full responsbility that Kulikov more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we “On Information about the Polish question never said this. He simply repeated what was adopted a decision to ship 30 thousand tons of for the leaders of the fraternal countries,” said by us and by Leonid Ilyich that we would not meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons have 13 December 1981 leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well already been delivered. I don’t know whether knows that the Poles themselves requested us not we’ll be able to ship the full 30 thousand tons, but Proletarians of all countries, unite! to introduce troops. in any event we apparently are obliged by this As far as our garrisons in Poland are con- decision to give a further definite number of tons Communist Party of the Soviet Union cerned, we are fortifying them. I myself am also of meat as assistance. CENTRAL COMMITTEE inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on With regard to the PZPR and the creation of TOP SECRET a confrontation and only if, perhaps, “Solidarity” a new party to replace it, I believe it would be seizes them by the throat will they come forth. inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who No. P40/26 The problem is that the Polish leaders do not spoke here were correct in arguing that this would appear resolute. As was rightly said here by the be a completely unhelpful action. TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, comrades, we must not force them to adopt any Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, specific decisions; we will simply carry out the GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is get- Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamyatin policy on which we have agreed. For our part, we ting steadily worse. The line of our party toward must be ready ourselves and must not display any the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the sort of actions not provided for by our decisions. to the proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR CPSU CC Politburo and create a new party, one cannot agree with on 13 December 1981 SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the that. There can be no talk at all of introducing ______other comrades’ speeches, we all have the same troops. We will have to look at economic ques- view of the situation in Poland. During the whole tions and at what can be given to the Poles. On Information about the Polish question for the economic assistance. The Soviet leadership, as experience in struggling against counterrevolu- leaders of the fraternal countries. previously, will act on the Polish question in close tion. contact with the fraternal countries.” All of us clearly understand that the decisive To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet Confirm transmittal by telegram. precondition for the full stabilization of things in ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland is a revival of the economy. In Czechoslo- Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, * * * * * vakia after 1968 political efforts made headway Vietnam, and Laos (see attached). precisely because the counterrevolution had not CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), affected the economic sphere. In Poland just the CC SECRETARY 14 January 1982 opposite is true. In this connection a difficult question stands Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40 SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO before us. We already are stretched to the limit in ______14 January 1982 our capacity to help the Poles, and they are making still more requests. Perhaps we can do a Secret Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV. bit more, but we certainly can’t give a lot more. Still, we must of course answer SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, Also taking part: C[omra]des. Yu. V. Andropov, Jaruzelski’s letter,15 explaining in a comradely PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, way what we can and cannot do. By all means we A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel’she, M. A. Suslov, N. must precisely carry out our agreed deliveries in SOVIET AMBASSADOR A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, most difficult winter months. CC: WARSAW — SOVIET AMBASSADOR V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov Quite another matter are projects for political prestige, which should not impose great Pay a call on T. Zhivkov (J. Kadar, E. 2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the strains on our economy. For example, we can Honecker, Yu. Tsedenbal, G. Husak, F. Castro, PZPR CC Politburo Member and Minister of lend assistance in building the Warsaw subway. Li Duan, K. Phomvihan) and, referring to the Foreign Affairs of the Polish People’s Republic We should meet this request, having made our CPSU CC’s instructions, transmit the following: Cde. J. Czyrek participation a matter of public knowledge. “As our friends know, the Polish leadership Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is has introduced martial law in the country, an- BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that not so bad. There is enough bread in the country, nounced the formation of a Military Council of Mikhail Andreevich [Suslov]’s and Andrei and they must find a way to motivate the peasasntry National Salvation, and detained the most ex- Andreevich [Gromyko]’s discussions with Cde. and to get them to work, arranging, as we some- tremist elements of ‘Solidarity,’ the ‘Confedera- Czyrek were useful. Western officials, especially times say, a merger of the city and village. tion for an Independent Poland,’ and other anti- the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure The Polish leadership continues to count on socialist groups. on Poland. In such circumstances, it is important help from the West. Well, in principle we can’t “A good impression has been created by W. to offer constant political support for our friends be against that, although, to be honest, it’s doubt- Jaruzelski’s address to the people, in which, in and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit ful that Western countries are about to start pro- our view, all the basic questions were given their spirits to sag or to allow them to relinquish viding material assistance to a military regime. appropriate emphasis. In particular, what is espe- what they have achieved with such difficulty. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, cially important is that the address reaffirmed the Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a which means we must be especially vigilant. leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of month. As Jaruzelski says, the counterrevolution Jaruzelski is raising another question, of the PPR to the socialist obligations stipulated by is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are whether he should accept help from the Chinese. the Warsaw Pact. more complicated. Well, why not? In the process China will be “To ensure the success of the operation, the After introducing relative stability in the disassociating itself from the USA and its eco- Polish comrades observed strict secrecy. Only a country, the Polish comrades must now, one might nomic sanctions. narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew about the say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do In conclusion, one might say that the Polish action.13 Thanks to this our friends have suc- with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, question will be at the center of international ceeded in catching the enemy completely un- how to change the consciousness of the masses, politics for a long time to come. That is why our awares, and the operation so far has been imple- etc. Polish commission has continued to work as mented satisfactorily. The most important question is the situation actively as it has been up to now. “On the very eve of implementation of the in the PZPR. Our friends are trying to find a projected operation, W. Jaruzelski communicated solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to * * * * * about it to Moscow.14 We informed him that the disband the party or to change its name, but he can Soviet leadership looked with understanding upon exploit martial law to carry out a sweeping purge. CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to the decision of the Polish comrades. In so doing This might yield good results. Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982 we ensured that the Polish comrades would re- In general one gets the impression that the solve these matters solely by internal means. general as a political actor is very strong and is SPECIAL DOSSIER “In our preliminary evaluation, the mea- able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions. Secret16 sures taken by the Polish friends are an active step Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts to repulse counterrevolution, and in this sense more often than necessary with an eye to the West I N F O R M A T I O N they correspond with the general line of all the and the Church. But in the current situation such fraternal countries. gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely con- “In these circumstances the question arises hardline measures on matters of principle, one vertible currency in 1980-1981* about offering political and moral support to the also needs flexibility and circumspection. It’s Polish friends and also about giving additional good that Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian I. Credits Provided Millions of $ CMEA countries. surname as Arestov. The error was corrected in Decision of the CPSU CC on the Polish translation. 1. For the purchase of sugar 30 28 November 1980 10. Translator’s Note: Marshal Josef By order of the USSR Council No. P227/21 Pilsudski was the military ruler of Poland during of Ministers on 1 August 1980 ______the interwar period, presiding over a regime that No. 1518 rs (P207 from 1.8.1980) Total 2,934 became increasingly tyrannical. 2. For the settlement of accounts 250 ______11. Translator’s Note: The Russian word with capitalist countries. *) According to data from USSR Gosplan Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous vote, By order of the USSR Council of edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, Ministers on 23 August 1980, No. TRANSLATOR’S NOTES edinodushno, which also is translated as “unani- 1192-rs (P201/30 from 23.VI.80) 1. Translator’s Note: The notion of a “creep- mous.” Rusakov’s statement indicates that no 3. For the establishment of a consor- 70 ing counterrevolution” was first devised by East abstentions or dissenting votes were cast. It tium of banks to help the PPR. German and Soviet officials during the 1968 should be noted, however, that most subsequent Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June crisis over the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the 1980. No. P199/2 2. Translator’s Note: Notes from this meet- word edinodushno when referring to the PZPR 4. For the settlement of accounts 150 ing are available in both Russian and Polish Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno. with capitalist countries archives; see, e.g., Fond (F.) No. 5, Opis’ (Op.) 12. Translator’s Note: The transcript of By order of the USSR Council of No. 84, Delo (D.) No. 596, Listy (Ll.) 33-35, “the previous session of the Politburo” (appar- Ministers on 11 November 1980 Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii ently of 8 December) has not yet been released. No. 1019-247 (P224/70 (TsKhSD). 13. Translator’s Note: This statement is from 11.XI.1980) 3. Translator’s Note: Brezhnev presumably confirmed by the lack of concrete discussion of 5. For the purchase of grain 190 refers here to the PZPR Politburo. the matter at PZPR Politburo meetings through- and food stuffs. 4. Translator’s Note: A page was missing at out the crisis; see the transcripts in Zbigniew By order of the USSR Council this point in the documents originally supplied to Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura of Ministers the Polish government and published in Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarnosc,” 1980-1981 No. 1019-347 (P224/70 Rzeczpospolita. Fortunately, the missing page (London: Aneks, 1992). The extreme secrecy of from 11.XI.1980) (no. 5 in the document) was included in the copy the planning also is emphasized in the interview ______of the document stored in the Moscow archives. with Ryszard Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem Total 690 5. Translator’s Note: Misgivings about the widziana od srodka,” Kultura (Paris) 4/475 (April influence of Solidarity on the new group of Polish 1987), esp. 11-13, 33-35. II. Deferred Payments army draftees were expressed frequently in 1981 14. Translator’s Note: The text of this in top-secret Soviet assessments of the reliability communication (by most accountsa phone con- 1. Deferral of payments to 219 of the Polish army. See, e.g., “O nastroeniyakh versation Jaruzelski had with Suslov and/or Soviet banks. Decision of the sredi soldat i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Brezhnev) reportedly exists in the Russian Presi- CPSU CC on 6 June 1980 Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya dential Archive, but has not yet been released. (P199/II from 6.6.1980) na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” Cable No. 183 (Top 15. Translator’s Note: Brezhnev later in the 2. Deferral of payments to 280 Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet meeting described Jaruzelski’s letter of 3 January Soviet banks. By order of the consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 1982: “...Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for USSR Council of Ministers on 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19; and also “O politicheskoi the fraternal help provided by the Soviet Union to 11 September 1980 situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo the Polish People’s Republic. At the same time, No. 1840 rs (P214/XI regiona PNR (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 179 (TOP he requests that the Soviet side reaffirm the vol- from 11.XI.1980) SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, ume of deliveries for 1982 contained in the draft 3. Deferral of payments to 280 Soviet consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU protocol on the coordination of both sides’ plans Soviet banks. By order of the Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. for 1981-1985 for oil, gasoline, and oil products. USSR Council of Ministers on 13-22. The volume of oil deliveries in 1982 are being 11 November 1980 6. Translator’s Note: It is not wholly clear kept at the level of 13 million tons, and oil No. 1019-347 (P224/70 what Brezhnev had in mind here, but he may have products at 2.94 million tons; and deliveries of from 11.XI.1980) been alluding to some of the preparations for combustibles are being retained at the maximum 4. Deferral of payments on the basic debt martial law. level in the first quarter of 1982. up to 1,000 7. Translator’s Note: It is curious why in “Further on Cde. Jaruzelski informs us from all credits extended previously. this secret forum Brezhnev used dollars (instead that he appealed to the General Secretaries of By order of the USSR Council of Ministers of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for mea- the Communist Party Central Committees of on 16 August 1981. suring the size of Poland’s request. Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, and No. 1630 rs (P23/14 from 16.8.81) 8. Translator’s Note: The term Baibakov Czechoslovakia with a request to provide ______uses here, prodrazverstka (a contraction of Poland with basic agricultural and industrial Total 1,779 prodovol’stvennaya razverstka), refers to the goods.” policy introduced by Lenin during the period of 16. Translator’s Note: The classification III. Grant Aid “War Communism” to force peasants to turn over was upgraded to “top secret” (sovershenno their produce to the state. The policy led to great sekretno) by a handwritten notation of sov. next 1. Joint grant aid from the USSR, 465 bloodshed, upheaval, and starvation. to the original sekretno. A stamped imprint just Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, 9. Translator’s Note: Either because of a under the classification said that this was CPSU and Czechoslovakia supplied via a mistake by Rusakov or because of a typographi- CC Document No. 2931, prepared on 23 Septem- reduction of oil deliveries to the cal error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov’s ber 1982, and that it should be returned to the CPSU CC General Department. 140 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN THE CARTER-

THE CARTER-BREZHNEV PROJECT retary of State Cyrus Vance, former National Security previously declassified in Moscow), all belong to a U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Detente Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of De- group specially declassified by the Russian Foreign in the Late 1970s: What Went Wrong? fense Harold Brown, and former Director of Central Ministry in early 1994 for use at the Musgrove confer- Intelligence Stansfield Turner, and on the Soviet/Rus- ence, which centered on the distrust and acrimony Ed. note: With this issue, the CWIHP Bulletin sian side, former First Deputy Foreign Ministry Georgy surrounding the March 1977 visit to Moscow of Secre- begins to publish findings from the Carter-Brezhnev M. Kornienko, former ambassadors Anatoly Dobrynin tary of State Vance. They include a complete set of the Project, an exploration of U.S.-Soviet relations and the and Oleg Troyanovsky, and former Warsaw Pact com- correspondence between President Carter and Gen- collapse of superpower detente in the late 1970s. The mander Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. Project activities so far eral Secretary Brezhnev from the time of Carter’s project gathers former government officials, scholars, have included a planning meeting, held at Pocantico, inauguration on 20 January 1977 until shortly before and newly-declassified documents at a series of con- New York, in October 1992; a conference on “SALT II Vance’s departure; cables from Dobrynin describing ferences intended to produce a deeper understanding and the Growth of Mistrust,” on 6-9 May 1994 at the two important conversations, a 1 December 1976 meet- of the troubles that bedeviled relations between Wash- Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia; a ing during the transition period with unofficial Carter ington and Moscow between 1976 and 1981, in the small oral history session on Soviet Policy in the Third emissary Averell Harriman and a 21 March 1977 hope that the results will enhance public and scholarly World, in which Kornienko and former CPSU Central discussion with Vance in which the U.S. proposals at analyses of those historical events and at the same time Committee (CC) International Department official Karen Moscow were previewed (unfortunately, Dobrynin’s contribute to present and future U.S.-Russian rela- N. Brutents participated, held at Lysebu, Norway, in record of his first conversation with Carter, on 1 tions. It has been organized by an international col- October 1994; and a conference on “Global Competi- February 1977, which appears to have had an impor- laboration of institutions and individuals spearheaded tion and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, tant influence on Soviet perceptions of the new presi- by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy 1977-1980,” on 23-26 March 1995 in Ft. Lauderdale, dent, has not yet been made available); also included is Development (CFPD) of the Thomas J. Watson Insti- Florida; an additional conference, focussing on the the aforementioned CPSU CC Politburo directive as an tute for International Studies, Brown University. (Blight Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the collapse of illustration of the rising tensions between Washington and his collaborators previously organized the series detente in 1979-80, is planned for Oslo, Norway. (A and Moscow during this period on the human rights of five oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile related workshop on the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, is being issue. Crisis between 1987 and 1992 that brought together organized by NSA and CWIHP in conjunction with the Georgy Markovich Kornienko, the former senior U.S., Soviet (and then Russian), and Cuban former Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sci- Soviet diplomat and CPSU CC Politburo member, officials and scholars and resulted in a series of pub- ences, Warsaw.) contributes an introduction to and interpretation of the lications.) Other supporting institutions include the For each conference, an effort is made to open and documents and the issues they illuminate, adapted and Carter Center of Emory University, the National Secu- declassify new U.S. and Russian archival documents for translated from his Russian-langauge memoirs, which rity Archive (NSA), the Cold War International History the dual purpose of contributing to the conference have not as yet appeared in English. Introducing Project (CWIHP), the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and discussion--which is subsequently transcribed and pub- Kornienko’s analysis, in turn, is Mark Garrison, who several Russian archival organizations, including lished--and to scholarly research and publications. The during the Carter Administration served as deputy Rosarkhiv, the Center for the Storage of Contemporary declassified documents are generally available at the chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Documentation, and the Foreign Ministry archives. appropriate archival repository, and are also available who, based at CFPD, has been actively involved in the In the effort to support this historical enterprise and at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. Carter-Brezhnev Project. to open up new sources, former President Carter has In the case of the Russian documents printed below The CWIHP Bulletin plans to publish additional lent his support to the project, as have such prominent beginning on page 144 (with one exception, the 18 materials emerging from the Carter-Brezhnev Project former officials as, on the American side, former Sec- February 1977 CPSU CC directive, which had been and related research in future issues.

Hopes Raised and Dashed— tion, came in February and March 1977. Watson Institute). It is possible to see how the Carter, Brezhnev, and SALT II: Brezhnev felt strongly that negotiations on Soviets convinced themselves that Carter was An Introduction to G.M. Kornienko’s SALT II should proceed within the framework signaling, without actually saying so, that he Commentary he had agreed with Ford at Vladivostok in late was willing to start from Vladivostok, and why 1974; he had overridden opposition from his they were therefore incensed by his February by Mark Garrison own military to achieve that framework, and 14 letter that did not even mention Vladivostok For the last decade or more of the Brezhnev considered it a personal achievement. Early but urged moving on immediately to a grander era, Georgy Markovich Kornienko was the signals from Carter, conveyed through Averell vision. The stage was thus set for a rude rebuff principal Americanist in the Soviet Foreign Harriman prior to the inauguration, led the to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance when he Ministry (not counting Gromyko, who con- Soviet side to expect that Carter was prepared came to Moscow at the end of March bearing sidered himself an expert in dealing with to start with Vladivostok before moving on to Carter’s deep-cuts proposal. Although SALT Americans), rising to the rank of First Deputy deeper cuts. (Contrary to the charge by some II was completed and signed over two years Minister and membership in the Party’s Cen- Carter Administration officials that the Soviets later, the hope on both sides that rapid progress tral Committee. Korniyenko’s recollections should have known better than to listen to an on strategic arms might lead to a new era in about the hopes for U.S.-Soviet relations gen- allegedly self-appointed intermediary, U.S.-Soviet relations was frustrated. erated in Moscow by Jimmy Carter’s election Harriman’s papers in the Library of Congress Korniyenko believes a deep-cuts SALT III in 1976, and about the dashing of those hopes, contain clear evidence that prior to the election could have been worked out by the end of explains the title of his article (and the chapter he was acting on explicit instructions from Carter’s term absent the opening contretemps of the book from which it is drawn). Although Carter.) Soviet hopes were encouraged by over Vladivostok. Korniyenko places the blame not a document from the archives, it provides Carter’s first letter to Brezhnev after taking squarely on the Carter administration; without an insight into Soviet thinking, or at least office, dated January 26, 1977. But Carter’s saying so (he is not given to psychological thinking in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, not next letter, dated February 14, was a rude interpretations), he implies that Brezhnev’s available in documents. awakening in Moscow. attachment to Vladivostok was emotional as What mattered most in the U.S.-Soviet Korniyenko’s commentary illuminates the well as political and that the U.S. side should relationship, in Korniyenko’s view, was the dry texts of exchanges between the govern- have taken that into account. He acknowl- negotiation of a strategic nuclear arms treaty. ments at the time, including the Carter-Brezhnev edges no misgivings that at the crucial point in He believes that the defining moments on that correspondence (which Russian Foreign Min- early 1977 the Soviet side did not summon up issue, and for relations between the two coun- istry released in 1994 for the Carter-Brezhnev even that degree of flexibility that eventually tries during the rest of the Carter Administra- project, organized by Brown University’s led to the conclusion of SALT II. BREZHNEV PROJECT COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 141

A “MISSED OPPORTUNITY”—CARTER, BREZHNEV, SALT II, AND THE VANCE MISSION TO MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 1976-MARCH 1977 by G.M. Korniyenko

The fact that, toward the end of the Ford and also thought it useful to organize in the nuclear first strike; presidency, Soviet-American relations future such meetings “on a regular basis, —the aim of the Soviet Union is only seemed to have been set back, meant that the perhaps once a year.” Carter stipulated that the creation of a defensive capability Soviet leadership would be particularly in- he had also had requests from the leaders of sufficient to deter aggression against it terested in his opponent in the 1976 elec- England, the FRG and France, and expressed by any potential opponent. tions, Jimmy Carter. And although he was the hope that it would be understood in In other words, in Brezhnev’s speech at a political figure who was completely un- Moscow that a Soviet-American summit Tula in January 1977 the principle of mili- known in the USSR, and although his meeting would take place after his meeting tary sufficiency, which was further devel- pre-election statements, as Moscow fully with his allies.2 oped ten years later, was formulated for the realized, did not necessarily reflect his real After a short time, on November 17, first time. views, many of his statements favorably Harriman (whom Carter authorized to act as These positions were formulated by rep- influenced the mood of the Soviet leader- an unofficial channel between him and resentatives of the USSR Ministry of For- ship. These included his critical view of Brezhnev in the period before he took of- eign Affairs (specifically by me and L.I. Ford’s refusal to use the term “détente,” his fice), conveyed Carter’s readiness for an Mendelevich) in a group that prepared the criticism of Ford for putting on ice the exchange of views on matters of mutual draft Brezhnev speech. I cleared them with negotiations to conclude SALT-2 on the interest even during the transition period. It the then Chief of the General Staff of the basis of the 1974 Vladivostok accords, and was also stated that he could not yet enter USSR armed forces, V.G. Kulikov, without his statements in favor of non-proliferation into specific discussions. First, because he any difficulty, since these positions reflected of nuclear weapons and a complete ban on could not undercut the sitting President, and the actual state of affairs, although the lan- testing, and supporting a reductions in second, because he did not yet have his staff guage sounded a little “American.” For that nuclear weapons and their abolition. A of advisers and he did not consider it pos- reason alone, and not because of disagree- positive impression on the Soviet leader- sible to “improvise.”3 Nevertheless, the ment over their content, they evoked doubt, ship was produced by the fact that Carter not exchange of several oral communications at a certain stage of work on the draft speech, only publicly but also privately, through A. between Brezhnev and Carter before 20 Janu- on the part of the party internationalists Harriman during a visit to Moscow in Sep- ary 1977 promised a constructive develop- headed by Boris Ponomarev, but their doubts tember 1976,1 gave assurances that if elected ment of the Soviet-American dialogue—at disappeared after the draft was read to President he would take steps toward the least on questions of limitations on strategic Brezhnev, who accepted them without hesi- rapid conclusion and signing of the SALT-2 weapons—after Carter took office. It is true tation. They did not evoke any opposition by Treaty, and then would be ready to continue that we in Moscow were a little put on guard other members of the Politburo, including negotiations on an agreement on substantial by the remark in Carter’s message of 1 Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, to whom reductions in strategic weapons. December 1976 that he “could not, of course, the draft speech was sent for review in accor- Of course, not everything Carter said in be bound by previous negotiations on limit- dance with established procedure. the election campaign pleased Moscow, in ing strategic weapons”; this was a bad omen, Since it was important that Washington particular the stress he put on human rights which was, unfortunately, soon to be more correctly understand the signal from Mos- internationally, first of all regarding the than borne out.4 But at that time we wanted cow contained in Brezhnev’s Tula speech, Soviet Union. But with regard to his state- to hope for the best. Mendelevich and I supplied TASS and APN ments on arms control and disarmament, I The Soviet side did not simply hope for in advance with an accurate English transla- repeat, they gave cause for hope. the best, but for its part tried to create condi- tion of the relevant section of the speech. In any case, there were no regrets in tions as favorable as possible for the suc- The first letter from President Carter Moscow over Ford’s defeat and Carter’s cessful development of a dialogue with Presi- after assuming office, dated 26 January 1977, victory in the elections on 2 November dent Carter after his taking office. One of the was taken in Moscow as reinforcement of 1976. In congratulating the latter on his important steps in this regard was the inclu- the hope for successful development of a victory, L.I. Brezhnev immediately ex- sion of a series of important formulations Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament pressed the hope for an early meeting. Carter regarding Soviet military policy in a speech issues. [This letter, and the rest of the Carter- was not slow in replying. Already on No- in Tula, on the occasion of its designation as Brezhnev correspondence described here, vember 4, Harriman sent through the Soviet Hero-city, given by Brezhnev on 18 January are printed beginning on page 144--ed.] Ambassador in Washington an oral com- 1977, two days before Carter’s inaugura- Carter first of all noted as extremely impor- munication for Brezhnev from Carter, say- tion. The essence was the following: tant Brezhnev’s speech in Tula and specifi- ing that the newly elected President consid- —there is no basis whatsoever for cally the position that the USSR does not ered it important to have a personal meeting attributing to the Soviet Union a striving strive for superiority in armaments and that with Brezhnev “with the aim of preserving for superiority in armaments with the it only needs defenses sufficient to deter any and supporting peace throughout the world,” aim of achieving the capability for a potential opponent. Reaffirming his cam- 142 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN paign statements that the final aim in disar- only because of the unacceptable nature of Therefore it could be foreseen that the mament must be the abolition of all nuclear the new American proposals but also as an Vance mission to Moscow at the end of weapons on our planet, Carter characterized antagonistic act toward him personally. Con- March, as regards the SALT-2 Treaty, was as a “critically important first step” on the sequently, Brezhnev’s response was marked destined for failure. And in fact the new road to this aim the “achievement of the by a hard, and in places sharp, tone. American proposals presented by Vance sig- SALT-2 Treaty without delay” and agree- A similar tone was maintained in Carter’s naled an obvious retreat from everything ment after that on movement toward further message to Brezhnev of March 4, which achieved in negotiations on SALT-2 under limitations and reductions of strategic weap- arrived in Moscow not through the usual Nixon and Ford and were immediately re- ons. In the context of previous public and diplomatic channels but via the “hot line” jected by the Soviet side without discussion private statements by Carter, these formula- between the White House and the Kremlin, and without putting forward counterpropos- tions were understood in Moscow as signi- which was reserved for use in emergency als; our previous positions, based on the fying his readiness first to quickly conclude situations. As Carter’s national security ad- Vladivostok accords, were simply reaf- and sign the SALT-2 Treaty, based on the viser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in his mem- firmed. Vladivostok accords of 1974 and made con- oirs,5 this was done at his initiative, in order It should be noted that, unlike many crete in subsequent negotiations still under that the President’s message would go im- other occasions, this time there was com- Ford. Such an approach was fully in accord mediately to Brezhnev, bypassing the For- plete unanimity regarding the new Ameri- with the intentions of the Soviet leadership, eign Ministry. But the result turned out can proposals not only at “the top” in the as was the proposal of the President to send worse, since at the Moscow end of the “hot Soviet leadership, but also among profes- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow line,” maintained by the KGB, translators sionals working on these problems. And not at an early date to discuss these questions. were on duty who were far from highly because we were all against significant re- Consequently, Brezhnev’s reply of Febru- qualified, and were moreover unfamiliar with ductions in offensive strategic weapons. Not ary 4 to Carter maintained an extremely the subject matter of the strategic arms nego- at all. But we considered it absolutely illogi- positive tone. tiations. Therefore their translation of Carter’s cal, lacking any common sense, to throw out But the following letter from Carter message was marred by many inaccuracies the results of five years of joint work in a dated February 14 not only puzzled Brezhnev and rough spots, which did not exactly facili- substantially already finished SALT-2 and his colleagues but aroused their indig- tate its good reception by Soviet leaders. Treaty, and to begin what amounted to new nation. In his letter, while as before calling Brezhnev’s response of March 15 was negotiations requiring new conceptual deci- for the rapid conclusion of work on the formulated in calmer tones. But the posi- sions and prolonged working out of many SALT-2 Treaty, Carter at the same time tions of the sides before Vance’s visit to practical, including technical, questions. The made it clear that he did not at all have in Moscow scheduled for the end of March illogic of such a mode of action seemed so mind that treaty whose framework was were basically divergent. While the Soviet obvious that even if Carter’s proposals for worked out at Vladivostok and in subse- side firmly maintained the necessity of com- “deep cuts” were in their content more bal- quent negotiations. In the first place, Carter pleting work on the SALT-2 Treaty on the anced and in the final analysis acceptable to proposed to anticipate already in this treaty, basis of the Vladivostok accords, the Ameri- the USSR, at that moment I nevertheless rather than in the next one, a “significant can side was attempting to transform the think they would not have met a positive reduction” in strategic weapons, and sec- Vladivostok accords into something com- response. The operating principle would ondly he proposed (also contrary to the pletely different, unacceptable to the Soviet have been “better a titmouse in hand than a Vladivostok accords) to leave out of the leadership from the purely military-strategic crane in the sky.” If you take into account SALT-2 Treaty, for later negotiations, long- as well as the political and psychological that the new American proposals were clearly range cruise missiles, that is to give a free point of view. And as the time for the Vance directed at attaining unilateral advantage for hand to a strategic arms race in those direc- visit approached, it became more and more the USA, then they could not be accepted by tions where the USA, as in most other cases, clear—from Carter’s public statements, from the Soviet leadership as a serious initiative, was at that time ahead of the USSR. controlled “leaks” in the American press, and called for a sharply negative reaction. In Carter’s letter there were also other and then in Vance’s conversations with So- It should be said that for Vance and Paul elements that caused irritation among So- viet Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin— Warnke, the director of the U.S. Arms Con- viet leaders, in particular his declared intent that Vance was coming to Moscow with trol and Disarmament Agency who accom- to take a public position on human rights in positions having nothing in common with panied him, such a reaction by the Soviet the USSR. Added to this was the public Vladivostok, but instead with so-called “com- side likewise appeared to be not unexpected. letter from Carter to A.D. Sakharov. But prehensive proposals” envisaging “deep cuts” It was felt that they themselves were not these irritating elements were not the main in offensive strategic weapons, with reduc- convinced of the reasonableness of those things that concerned Moscow. The princi- tions advantageous for the USA. The very positions with which they arrived in Mos- pal disappointment was the clear departure fact of publicizing the basic content of the cow. This feeling was fully confirmed sub- by the new President from Vladivostok. In American proposals before Vance presented sequently, with the appearance of the mem- view of the internal collisions that Brezhnev them to the Soviet leadership was taken in oirs of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski and had had to endure to achieve agreement Moscow as an indication that Carter’s inten- monographs of American scholars of this with Ford in Vladivostok, such a turn by tions were not serious, that he was merely period, from which it is clear that inside the Carter was extremely painful to him not trying to achieve a propaganda victory. Administration including between Vance COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 143 and Brzezinski, there were noticeable differ- Incidentally, knowing well the mood of would have been quicker and simpler. There- ences regarding the American position on the Soviet leaders at that time, I can with fore if you consider that the main motive of strategic offensive weapons. The transfor- confidence say that if Carter, as he originally Carter in the rash decision in March 1977 mation of Carter’s position—from willing- promised, had in March 1977 shown a will- was his sincere desire for quicker and more ness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the ingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on radical steps in disarmament, then this is one basis of the Vladivostok accords to ambi- the basis of Vladivostok, and his proposal of those cases to which applies the Russian tious “deep cuts”—can be explained by a regarding “deep cuts” had been presented as saying “the best is the enemy of the good.” A series of factors. First, a sincere desire of the an aim for subsequent negotiations, then the good impulse led to an opposite result. President himself to move as rapidly as SALT-2 Treaty, with approximately the same possible to radical reductions in strategic content as was signed in 1979, could have 1. [Ed. note: Documentation of Harriman’s 20 Septem- weapons. Second, a desire by the Pentagon, been completed at the end of 1977 or begin- ber 1976 conversation with Brezhnev can be found in supported by Brzezinski, to utilize this ro- ning of 1978. And it is not excluded that the the Harriman Papers, Library of Congress (LC), Wash- ington, D.C.] mantic breakthrough by Carter to signifi- following SALT-3 Treaty, encompassing 2. [Ed. note: For Harriman’s version of this meeting, cantly alter what was done in strategic arms significant reductions in strategic weapons, see “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador limitations under Nixon and Ford, that is, to could have been worked out already before Dobrynin at my House in Washington on the Evening alter it for the unilateral advantage of the the end of Carter’s term as President. How- of November 4, 1976,” Harriman Papers, LC.] 3. [Ed. note: See “Memorandum of Telephone Conver- USA. Third, the influence on the President ever, the possibility for such a favorable sation—WAH and President-Elect Jimmy Carter, Tues- of Senator Henry Jackson and those who development of events was lost and the day, November 16, 1976,” Harriman, LC]. shared his views, who conditioned their sup- process of preparing the SALT-2 Treaty was 4. [Ed. note: Additional documentation on Carter- port for a possible SALT-2 Treaty with much longer and more difficult. Brezhnev oral communications during the transition period can be found in the Harriman Papers, LC, includ- demands regarding its content such that put- For Carter’s March 1977 initiative on ing Harriman’s record of the 1 December 1976 conver- ting such demands forward by the American “deep cuts” meant not only the loss of two or sation. A translation of Dobrynin’s declassified report side could prevent the attainment of a treaty, three months in a mechanical sense. After of the meeting is reprinted below.] which in fact is what they wanted. Fourth, the propaganda noise accompanying the 5. [Ed. note: See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, although Vance, Warnke and those who March initiative, returning to the 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), shared their views considered it preferable “Vladivostok track” for Carter himself was 161.] to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis a very difficult matter because of prestige of the Vladivostok accords, they apparently and political considerations, since it looked did not fully realize, and in any case did not like a defeat and retreat. This caused many Georgiy M. Kornienko was First Deputy Foreign Min- ister of the Soviet Union; this article is drawn from a succeed in making Carter aware, what a additional difficulties in the subsequent ne- chapter of his Russian-language memoirs, The Cold psychological shock for Brezhnev was his gotiations, without which the process of War: Testimony of a Participant (Moscow: Interna- [Carter’s] rejection of Vladivostok. working out the SALT-2 Treaty probably tional Relations, 1994).

CLINTON SIGNS FIRST POST-COLD classification of historical materials are reprinted be- Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject WAR EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DE- low:] to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of CLASSIFICATION this order, all classified information contained in records EXECUTIVE ORDER that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been [Ed. note: On 17 April 1995, after two years of 12958 determined to have permanent historical value under public hearings, private lobbying, interagency wran- CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically gling, and several revised (and leaked) drafts, U.S. INFORMATION declassified whether or not the records have been re- President Bill Clinton signed the first post-Cold War viewed. Subsequently, all classified information in presidential executive ordering modifying the country’s such records shall be automatically declassified no This order prescribes a uniform system for classi- declassification system. longer than 25 yeras from the date of its original fying, safeguarding, and declassifying national secu- Amid concerns by scholars that the order would classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), rity information. Our democratic principles require be too restrictive and fears in some government quarters below. that the American people be informed of the activities that the rules would be too lax, Clinton’s order, replac- (b) An agency may exempt from automatic de- of their Government. Also, our Nation’s progress ing one signed by Ronald Reagan in April 1982 (E.O. classification under paragraph (a), above, specific in- depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, 12356), stretched in an effort to satisfy both constituen- formation, the release of which should be expected to: throughout our history, the national interest has re- cies. The order pleased historians by instituting for the (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human quired that certain information be maintained in confi- first time a system of bulk (rather than expensive and source, or reveal information about the application of dence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic time-consuming page-by-page) declassification of most an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity institutions, and our participation within the commu- historical records more than 25 years old, and by of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized nity of nations. Protecting information critical to our mandating a mere ten-year classification status for most disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstra- Nation’s security remains a priority. In recent years, newly-created documents. But at the same time, the bly damage the national security interests of the United however, dramatic changes have altered, though not order responded to the concerns of secrecy-conscious States; eliminated, the national security threats that we con- government agencies by including a broad range of (2) reveal information that would assist in the front. These changes provide a greater opportunity to exemptions and grace periods through which informa- development or use of weapons of mass destruction; emphasize our commitment to open Government.... tion can be kept secret. (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. The full text of Executive Order (EO) 12958, cryptologic systems or activities; “Classified National Security Information,” runs 39 [omitted sections concern legal definitions and (4) reveal information that would impair the appli- procedures for classification and declassification of legal-sized, double-spaced pages. Excerpts from the continued on page 160 introduction and some of the sections dealing with de- current and future government-generated materials] 144 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE PATH TO DISAGREEMENT: U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS LEADING TO VANCE’S MARCH 1977 TRIP TO MOSCOW

Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin’s Conversation areas to which Mr. Brezhnev had referred. With tions, I inquired of Harriman whether he could with Averell Harriman, December 1, 1976 good will on both sides, President-elect Carter not in a more detailed way set forth Carter’s believes, progress can be made in the matter of position on that question. In particular, I asked Embassy of the USSR in the USA cooperation between the USA and the USSR, him what, concretely, did Carter have in mind Washington, D.C. which will strengthen peace in the whole world. when he publicly offered a proposal for a “freeze” Top secret Harriman said further—continuing to read— in strategic weapons: within what temporal, quan- Copy No. 1 that Carter is very satisfied with the tone of the titative, or qualitative framework was he operat- General Secretary’s message. Noting that before ing. From the Journal he assumes the post of President he is not in a Harriman said that he had asked that type of of DOBRYNIN, A.F. position to conduct negotiations, Carter at the question in his conversation with Carter. How- same time declared that when he receives the ever, Carter had answered him that for the time RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION authority, he will quickly and insistently act to being he had on that issue only ideas and convic- achieve an agreement on the limitation of strate- tions of a general character which seemed impor- with A. HARRIMAN gic weapons. Carter added that he would like to tant to him, but he still had not precisely formu- be sure that limitations will be mutually advanta- lated comprehensive, integrated positions. December 1, 1976 geous and that the relative power of the two sides He intends to formulate such a position will not be changed during the process of reduc- when he names his chosen candidates to the posts On December 1 Harriman came to visit me. tions. In addition he stressed that a means must be of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and I. He said that he had met with J. Carter on found to assure our peoples that the agreement Aide to the President for National Security Af- Monday, November 29, at his (i.e. Carter’s) will be fulfilled. fairs, whom he would, as one of his highest home in the city of Plains (state of Georgia). As The current problems in the negotiations on priorities, instruct to work out this position, which had been agreed, he, Harriman, had brought to the limitation of nuclear weapons are too techni- would encompass the complex political and tech- Carter’s attention the messages which had been cal for him to comment on at the present time, and nical aspects of the entire problem. brought from Moscow on behalf of L.I. he, Carter, cannot, it goes without saying, be I directed Harriman’s attention to that point Brezhnev,1 as well as other messages which the bound by the past negotiations. At the same time in the thoughts of Carter which he had transmitted Soviet Ambassador had expressed to him, he fully will take into account the work that has today where (Carter) had said that he could not be Harriman, in accordance with the instruction to been done over the past two years. bound by past strategic arms limitation negotia- bring this information to Carter’s attention. Further Harriman said that Carter hopes that tions. I said that an approach like that is incom- The “President-elect” (Carter’s current title) the negotiations on limiting strategic weapons prehensible, if it is fraught with serious complica- has authorized Harriman to convey the following will be concluded at a summit meeting, i.e. at a tions for future negotiations. All previous nego- answer for transmission to L.I. Brezhnev personal meeting between him, Carter, and L.I. tiations had been conducted on behalf of the (Harriman read further from the text which he Brezhnev. United States, of the country as a whole and the was holding): Carter thinks that the negotiations which arrival of a new President should not mean break- Carter received the message from General will begin after he assumes the post of President ing off everything positive that had been achieved Secretary L.I. Brezhnev and was grateful for the would be accelerated if it would be possible to before him. I reminded Harriman that I had sentiments expressed in it. Personally, he highly maintain the practice, which had justified itself in pointed this out to him at our previous meeting, values the fact that he received an expression of the past, of dispatching at the decisive moment in when, in accordance with instructions certain the views of the General Secretary. Although he the negotiations a special trusted representative considerations from Moscow had been expounded does not have the possibility to conduct negotia- of the President to set forth the President’s pro- to him for transmittal to Carter. tions before assuming his position, he would like posals and thoughts personally to General Secre- Harriman said that he had recalled this when to declare that he shares the aspiration of the tary L.I. Brezhnev. he was speaking to Carter, and had specially General Secretary for an improvement in rela- Harriman further reported in confidence that directed his attention to that circumstance. tions between our two countries. He also recog- Carter had asked him whether L.I. Brezhnev Carter had answered him, Harriman, that he nizes the importance of mutual limitations in would accept an invitation if he, Carter, invites understands this point, and that he had therefore nuclear weapons and of bringing the arms race to the General Secretary to come to the United included in his responding thoughts to L.I. a halt. States for the final stage of the negotiations and Brezhnev the comment that he will take the work Mr. Carter often expressed these sentiments the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation that has been done at the SALT negotiations over during the recent presidential election campaign, of strategic weapons. the last two years fully into account. However, at and he thinks that the majority of Americans Harriman, in his words, had expressed to the same time, he, Carter, would like to reserve agree with his desire to limit the nuclear weapons Carter his own opinion to the effect that he hopes for himself the right to express certain possible in our two countries and to stop further prolifera- that L.I. Brezhnev will accept such an invitation, new thoughts or correctives which might occur to tion of nuclear capability among other countries. insofar as there is already established a definite him in the context of finishing up a final agree- He notes with satisfaction that Mr. Brezhnev order of visits of the countries’ leaders to each ment, especially if they might promote the reso- shares his point of view on the importance of other for summit meetings, and it was now the lution of the remaining disputed issues. In prin- cooperation between our two countries in the President’s turn to invite the General Secretary to ciple he wants to reserve for himself such a matter of taking measures against the prolifera- the United States. possibility. tion of nuclear weapons. 2. During the conversation with Harriman, 3. During the conversation Harriman under- President-elect Carter expects as well the in relation to his comments about J. Carter’s lined that Carter is very interested in the question establishment of constructive relations in other attitude about strategic arms limitation negotia- of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 145 along with the question of limitation of strategic I want to express my gratitude for the unof- greater and greater extent demands collective arms will be a priority in his plans regarding ficial letters which I recieved from you, and in answers to the main human questions, and I hope negotiations with the Soviet Union after he as- this connection I want to confirm that my aim is that our countries can cooperate more closely in sumes the post of President. to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the order to promote the development, better diet and He, Carter, is very worried by the spread of basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and advan- more substantive life for less advantaged part of nuclear technology around the world. And al- tage. I will pay close personal attention to this mankind. though many chances had already over the past goal, as will Secretary of State Vance. I look forward to a meeting with you and to years been missed, there is still, in his opinion, I read your public statements with great discussing at this meeting both our different and time to take certain joint measures to put a brake interest and they make me believe that we share our common interests. In the mean time I suggest on this process. As on the question of limitation a common aspiration for strengthening and pre- both of us should do everything in our power to of strategic weapons, so far Carter has no more serving the perspectives for stable peace. promote Soviet-American relations. I suggested concrete thoughts on this issue. In Harriman’s As I understand your highly important speech to Secretary of State Vance to prepare for a words, Carter himself said that the details of his in Tula, the Soviet Union will not strive for meeting with you in the spring, if you wish, for a position still need to be worked out. superiority in arms, it will stand against such a review of the progress we have made and to conception, and that it will require only a defense discuss the key problems which remain unsolved. Ambassador of the USSR in the USA which is strong enough to deter any potential Both of us at that time also would like to exchange [signature] enemy. The United States does not want any- opinions about the next meeting between you and thing less or more for itself either. Therefore, our me. /A. DOBRYNIN/ two countries, with consistency and wisdom, Any concrete ideas, on these or any other should be able to avoid a new arms race. I questions, which you might like to relate to me [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, declared to the American people that the elimina- will be very welcomed and thoroughly studied. Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] tion of all nuclear weapons is my firm goal. There are three areas in which progress can With best regards, * * * * * be made on the way to this goal. The most Sincerely, President Carter’s Letter to General important first step must be the urgent achieve- Secretary Brezhnev, January 26, 1977 ment of an agreement on the second stage strate- Jimmy Carter gic weapons limitation, and also an agreement to Top secret move on in the direction of additional limitations January 26, 1977 Copy 1 and reductions in the sphere of strategic weapons. White House Moreover, I hope that we will soon be able to Washington, D.C. [...] Embassy of the USSR in the USA conclude a properly verifiable agreement on the Washington, D.C. universal banning of all nuclear tests, and that we The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA also will strive to achieve more openness regard- From the diary ing the strategic policy of our countries. It is also [signature] A. Dobrynin of DOBRYNIN A.F. important to renew the efforts to make progress at the negotiations on balanced reduction of mili- /A. DOBRYNIN/ RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION tary forces in Central Europe. We also have a responsibility to carry out a [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, with the USA Secretary of State policy directed at preventing explosions, which Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] could lead to dangerous conflicts, in tense re- C. VANCE gions of the world. The United States will work * * * * * to support a peaceful settlement in the Near East January 26, 1977 on the basis of the applicable resolutions of the Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, United Nations. In the same way, in the South of February 4, 1977 Secretary of State Vance today transmitted the Africa we encourage all sides to start negotiations following letter of President Carter to L.I. toward a peaceful settlement which could lead to TOP SECRET Brezhnev: security and justice for all. Copy No. 1 I believe that the USSR can assist in the “Confidential achievement of progress toward peace in both of The USSR Embassy in the USA these critical regions. Washington, D.C. To His Excellency My Administration gives much importance Leonid I. Brezhnev to improving of our bilateral economic relations From the journal The General Secretary on the basis of mutual and equal advantage for the of DOBRYNIN A.F. of the Central Committee peoples of both our two great countries. At the of the Communist Party same time we can not be indifferent to the fate of RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION of the Soviet Union freedom and individual human rights. Moscow, Kremlin We represent different social systems, and with the U.S. Secretary of State our countries differ from each other in their C. VANCE Dear Mr. General Secretary, history and experience. A competition in ideals and ideas is inevitable between our societies. Yet February 4, 1977 Having assumed the position of President this must not interfere with common efforts to- of the United States, I want to share with you my wards formation of a more peaceful, just and I visited Secretary of State Vance and refer- views about relations between our two countries. humane world. We live in the world, which to a ring to my delegated task, handed him the text of 146 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Presi- development of Soviet-American relations in Moreover, we are convinced that if in our dent J. Carter: general. approach to the Near East problem we soberly We believe that it is these questions of and objectively take into account all the lawful “To His Excellency limitation of strategic weapons that will occupy rights and interests of all sides—both Arabs, James E. Carter the main place in the conversations with Secre- including the Palestinians, and Israel—then the The President of the United States of America tary of State C. Vance when he comes to Mos- reliable elimination of this permanent source of cow. international conflicts is quite possible. Finding Dear Mister President, In our opinion, without further delay we the necessary understanding between the USA have to put into practice Soviet-American Trea- and the USSR on this question, in particular I want on my own behalf and on behalf of my ties on limitation of underground tests of nuclear relating to the reconvening of the Geneva confer- colleagues in the leadership to congratulate you weapons and on explosions for peaceful pur- ence, will undoubtedly make success possible on once more on your assumption of the position of poses. At the same time we have to—and we are the great matter of achieving a political settle- the President of the United States. ready to cooperate with the USA on this issue— ment in the Near East. I attentively familiarized myself with your intensify our efforts directed at a total and univer- Cooperation between our two countries letter of January 26, and find it in general con- sal ban on nuclear weapons tests and at preven- would also be vitally important, we believe, on structive and hope inspiring. We accepted with tion of nuclear proliferation. other international questions—whether it is fur- satisfaction confirmation of the fact that the goal We want to bring about a shift in the ther steps toward strengthening European secu- of your policy is improvement of relations with negotiations on reduction of armed forces and rity on the basis of decisions adopted in , the Soviet Union, and also your intention to pay weapons in Central Europe. We would like the strict observance of the Four-Power treaty on attention to this. This coincides with our basic new American government to treat with attention Western Berlin, or, say, a settlement on Cyprus. approach, which I expressed again in public not the proposals which were introduced there by the In your letter you, Mr. President, mention long ago. I want to stress now that we are ready countries of the Warsaw Treaty last year. the problem of the south of Africa. Our prin- to realize by mutual efforts a new major shift in There are other questions of limitation of cipled position on this question is very well the relations between two our countries. weapons and of disarmament which are waiting known: we are united with the struggle of the As far as I understand we are establishing to be solved. The Soviet Union has put forward South African peoples for their freedom and with you a business-like, trustful dialogue. concrete proposals on many of them, and we hope independence. We recognize the right of nobody It is important, of course, that from the very that your government approach this review con- but these peoples themselves to determine their beginning of our contact we have clarity and structively. fate. Despite what is sometimes said about this, mutual understanding of principle questions. Of course, under conditions when it is still the USSR does not look for any benefits for itself The most important thing here—and it is not possible yet to achieve a halt to the arms race in this region, and the rivalry with the United confirmed by past experience—is the necessity in the world, we can not but take care about States there does not interest it either. to strictly observe the basic principles of equality, security of our country and our allies. Our defen- Noting the great significance, which you, mutual consideration of lawful interests, mutual sive potential must be sufficient so that nobody Mr. President, give to improving trade-economic benefit and non-interference into the internal will risk to attack us or threaten us with attack. In relations, on my own behalf I would like to stress affairs of the other side. With this, and only this this respect, using your expression, we do not that we did and still do want our relations in this approach from both sides, in complete accord want anything more or less for ourselves. sphere to develop consistently and to acquire a with the “Fundamentals of Mutual Relations” Yet I want to stress once more with all more and more broad-scale character, leading to between our countries signed in 1972, can a determination that the Soviet Union does not mutual—I stress, mutual benefit for both sides. stable, progressive development of relations be- strive for superiority in weapons. We are deeply But it is necessary for this that they be freed of all tween the USSR and the USA, and the potential convinced that genuine security for all countries kinds of discriminatory limitations and artifi- to find mutually acceptable solutions to emerging and for each of them in particular is based not on cially created obstacles. Without this, without issues, be provided. competition in the sphere of weapons, but in the rejection of attempts to somehow or other link For objective reasons, at the present time the sphere of disarmament, and in the elimination of trade with questions relating to the domestic central sphere of relations between the USA and the material foundation for war. Our future competence of governments, not only will eco- USSR really is to ensure cooperation between our efforts also will be directed at achieving this goal. nomic contacts suffer, but overall relations be- two countries with the goal of stopping the arms I will touch briefly on some other questions. tween our countries will also suffer a blow. race and of disarmament. Only in this way can the An important direction of joint or parallel I hope, Mr. President, that with good will main task of our peoples, as well as that of all efforts of our countries, because of their objective and sincere readiness for constructive coopera- other peoples—elimination of the threat of war, role and responsibility in world affairs, is assis- tion between us you and I will be able to make a first of all, of course, nuclear-missile war—be tance in solution of problems, which cause inter- good contribution towards solving the problems completed. national tension. In our opinion the task here is to that we have. Some of these, including the As you also recognize, we have to finish the remove the original reasons which cause these problem of strategic weapons limitation, appar- development of a new agreement on limitation of problems. ently will be the subject of an exchange of opin- strategic offensive weapons without delays. We The primary meaning in this respect, as you, ions soon during Mr. Vance’s visit to Moscow. believe that this task is completely manageable. Mr. President correctly note too, is the establish- In conclusion, I want to stress that I, like Because the main parameters of the agreement ment of a strong and just peace in the Near East. you, place special emphasis on our personal meet- are, in fact, already determined on the basis of the Almost 10 years has passed since the war of 1967. ing. I will be ready to consider questions relating agreement which was reached in Vladivostok. This “jubilee” with all its sharpness reminds us to the conduct of such a meeting with Mr. Vance, The successful conduct of this exclusively im- not only of the time we have simply lost in the who you wrote, will be entrusted with this task. portant and necessary affair to its conclusion matter of settling the Near East conflict, but also would allow us to start hard work on more far- of a possibility of new dangerous explosions—as With my best wishes and respect. going measures in this area and, undoubtedly, happened in October 1973 and just recently in would give a new impulse for a constructive Lebanon. L. BREZHNEV COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 147

consideration of the central questions of univer- tions on cruise missiles and “Backfire” from the February 4, 1977 sal peace. Our two great countries share a special second stage of the SALT negotiations. We responsibility not only for doing everything pos- could return to these questions right away during In Vance’s own opinion, it is a good letter. It will sible for the lessening of tension, but also for the following negotiations. If we have ambitious be given to the President today. working out a series of mutual understandings enough aims and in particular if we want to which can lead to a more reliable and less danger- achieve real disarmament leaving only the mini- Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ous political climate in the world. mum level of armaments sufficient to provide [signature] I know the history of your country and security to both sides, then, it evidently would be admire it. As a child I developed my literary taste easier for us to deal with the technical problems, /A. DOBRYNIN/ reading your classics. I also know how much which now seem very significant and compli- suffering your people endure very recently, dur- cated, later. [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ing the last war. I know about your own role in I hope that our additional private exchanges Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] this war and about the losses suffered by each of opinion and the negotiations of Secretary of Soviet family. That is why I believe that we both State Vance in Moscow will cover the broadest * * * * * are sincere in our declarations about our devotion possible range of possibilities. I can assure you to peace, and that gives me hope for the future. that in the analysis of our arms control policy Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev, The question is how we can turn this devo- which I am carrying out at the present time, all February 14, 1977 tion into reality. How can we start a process applicable proposals will be considered. As I said which could widen our cooperation and simulta- during a conversation with your Ambassador, I TOP SECRET neously restrain and finally limit our rivalry. This hope that we can consider not only the question of Copy No. 1 rivalry—it is real, extremely expensive, and un- possible sharp reductions of the total quantity of deniable—can at any moment become very dan- nuclear weapons, i.e. the question of the mini- THE USSR EMBASSY IN THE USA gerous, which is why we must not allow it to mum number of missiles which would allow Washington, D.C. develop without restraint. In my opinion, this every country to feel secure from a first blow, but demands, at least, first, work to widen where also the question of restrictions on throw weights, From the journal possible our coordinated efforts, especially in the of the possibility of a ban on all mobile missiles, of DOBRYNIN, A.F. area of limitation of nuclear weapons; and sec- of refusal to take any long-term preparatory mea- ond, to demonstrate highly deliberate restraint sures in the field of civil defense, and also of such RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION towards those unstable regions of the world where additional confidence building measures as pre- direct confrontation could arise between us. liminary warning of all missile tests and achiev- with Assistant to the President I especially welcome your desire to develop ing an agreement on the non-arming of satellites Z. Brzezinski cooperation with the idea of stopping the arms and an agreement to reject development of capa- race, and to achieve without delay concrete agree- bility to destroy observation satellites. We also February 15, 1977 ments on disarmament. have to study practical means to satisfy our mu- It is precisely in the sphere of arms limita- tual desire that our agreements be observed. Such Today Brzezinski, Assistant to the Presi- tion that we must, in my opinion, put the main measures as on-site inspection and uninterrupted dent, called me. He said that President Carter had emphasis. I will as always give it my personal observation from space must the subject of incor- just written a letter in response to L.I. Brezhnev. attention and I can assure you that the officials in rect interpretation. These are the means, which Since the White House is preoccupied with my administration who are responsible for these can be used to achieve progress, and to win meetings with the President of Mexico, he, matters will consider any and all of your propos- society’s support and understanding of our ef- Brzezinski, asked acting Secretary of State [War- als in the most careful way and with the most forts. ren] Christopher, who was with him at the mo- positive attitude. In all these areas our final goal must be to do ment, to give me that letter. It goes without saying that we must have more than that, as our specialists in technology Brzezinski said that he would be ready, mutual security from successful attack, and we say, which is perhaps expedient now. If we bear should I have any questions, to discuss various have to use our role as the most mighty states to this very far-reaching aim in mind, we will be aspects of this letter in a couple of days during start a significant reduction of the level of con- able to change significantly the level of threat for our next unofficial meeting (we had a previous ventional and nuclear arms. We have no definite us and for the rest of the world. arrangement with Brzezinski to meet for break- time limits as such, but it is really necessary for us An attempt of one side to gain an advantage fast this coming Friday, i.e. on February 18). to achieve some maximum progress without de- over the other during negotiations will yield the An hour later Christopher handed me a lay. opposite result. We will be striving to carry out letter to L.I. Brezhnev, signed by President Carter: I agree that in our exchanges of opinion and consultations without tricks or unnecessary de- in the conversations which Secretary of State lays, but also without pressure and unjustifiable “To his Excellency Vance will have in Moscow at the end of March haste. Leonid I. Brezhnev, we must concentrate mainly on the question of I welcome your readiness to direct your the General Secretary of the Central achieving an agreement on the second stage of efforts at achieving the agreement on a universal Committee of the Communist Party strategic arms limitation, possibly including some test ban. I realize that problems remain regarding of the Soviet Union significant reductions of the level of forces. Maybe other countries which continue to conduct testing Moscow, Kremlin we could bring these negotiations to a successful programs and the possible use of peaceful nuclear conclusion if we agree that this is only the first explosions in mining industry or construction, Dear Mr. General Secretary, step in the process which could lead to bigger but I believe that there are satisfactory ways to reductions in our respective nuclear arsenals. consider these problems. I intend to ask the I am very pleased to note that our first Regarding this, I wonder if it wouldn’t be useful Congress to ratify two agreements which have exchange of letters has brought us at once to to study the possibility of separating the ques- already been concluded between our two govern- 148 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ments, but I treat them only as steps on the way to ments reached in Helsinki relating to human White House the common goal of bringing a total halt to rights. As I said to Ambassador Dobrynin, we Washington nuclear testing. Until then our government will hope that all aspects of these agreements can be February 14, 1977” observe these unratified agreements. realized. It is not our intention to interfere in the As far as I know there were proposals in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not wish past to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, and these to create problems with the Soviet Union, but it Christopher could not comment on this let- proposals were not seriously studied. I asked my will be necessary for our Administration from ter at all, referring to the fact that it was prepared colleagues to study the the Indian Ocean question time to time to publicly express the sincere and in the White House by the President himself. thoroughly, so that we will be ready to speak deep feelings which our people and I feel. Our more specifically about the possibility of reach- obligation to help promote human rights will not Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ing an agreement, which could promote universal be expressed in an extreme form or by means not peace. I ask you to inform me of your concrete proportional to achieving reasonable results. We (signature) ideas on this matter. I presume that in such a would also welcome, of course, personal, confi- A. Dobrynin situation it makes sense to pay particular atten- dential exchanges of views on these delicate tion to the military activity of both countries in questions. /A. Dobrynin/ this region. This, as it seems, is that obvious case I noted your response to my previous obser- where mutual profit calls for a balanced agree- vations relating to the importance of improving [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ment leading to a general reduction of military trade and economic relations. Your open re- Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] efforts in the whole region. marks on this issue correspond to a spirit of As you know from my public statements, I directness which I admire, but we have to do * * * * * intend energetically to continue attempts to re- something practical in order to remove barriers. duce the sale and transfer of conventional weap- From my side, I intend to do everything that I can CPSU Central Committee Politbuto ons to countries of the third world and I hope that to achieve mutually beneficial trade, but you are Decision “About the instruction to the Soviet you will join these efforts. It seems to me a aware of certain restrictions improsed by Con- Ambassador in Washington for his conver- senseless competition and we, as the main suppli- gress, which I must take into account. sation with Vance on the question of ‘human ers, are particularly responsible for placing a Permit me to say a few words about our rights’” and text of instruction, limit to such transfers. Obviously other providers efforts to improve the situation in other areas, February 18, 1977 should also be involved in these efforts, and we where there exists disagreements and potential will widen the discussion of the question to conflicts. In the Near East, we intend to begin Proletariats of the World unite! include them. direct negotiations with the sides in that region, I also welcome your aspiration to move the and I hope to energetically develop a process of COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces achieving a fair and solid settlement. Mr. Vance UNION and weapons in Central Europe forward more will be happy to have the opportunity in his CENTRAL COMMITTEE energetically until they are at the minimum ac- conversations at the end of March to learn your ceptable levels. We are very concerned about view on this question, including aspects which Top secret what seems to be an extreme increase of your reflect our direct interest as co-sponsors of the military power in East Europe. At the present Geneva conference. No P46/X time we are reviewing our positions on this issue In southern Africa, we believe that the Afri- and at the same time are instructing our delega- cans should solve their problems without outside To: comrades Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, tion to continue to study the data which have been interference. It is with this goal in mind that we Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, presented by both sides. support a peaceful solution, which corresponds to Ponomarev, Zamiatin. These are the questions, which, I hope, Mr. the will of the majority, and have limited actions Vance will be able to discuss in more detail after whch could increase the potential for violence. Extract from protocol No 46 of the meeting of CC we complete our own analysis. We will, of We took steps toward opening a dialogue CPSU Politburo course, consult with our NATO allies about ev- with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with the on February 18, 1977 erything while we conduct this concrete analysis. goal of creating the foundation for normal rela- ______I would like to make one observation re- tions with that country. In other regions as well garding the four-power agreement. As you know, we will be guided by our devotion to genuine About the instructions to the Soviet Ambassador we think that this agreement applies to all of freedom, self-determination, and economic in Washington for his conversation with Vance Berlin, and not just to . For us, the progress. on the question of “human rights”. observation of both the letter and the spirit of this I hope that we can continue these exchanges agreement is very important. We make every of letters in order to have a clear statement of our The draft of the instructions to the Soviet Ambas- effort to avoid sensitive issues, but we must insist views and to undertake the broadest possible sador in Washington this question is to be ap- that this agreement, which is so vital to our ability review of issues which have such fundamental proved. (The draft is attached.) to develop peaceful relations in Europe, is ob- importance for our two peoples and for peace on served in full. Recently, it seems, there has been earth. From these candid letters we can build a observed a growing inclination to create new clear and precise basis for the preparation of our SECRETARY OF THE CC aggravations and limits in Berlin, which could personal meeting, which I anticipate with great upset the delicate political balance which exists hopes. [Along left-hand margin] there. I hope that you will cooperate in eliminat- With the best personal wishes and respect, Must be returned within 7 days to the ing these tense situations. CC CPSU (General Department, 1st sector) We expect cooperation in the realization of Jimmy Carter further steps toward the fulfillment of the agree- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 149

moral principles, had tried to link the develop- And when, for the violation of the law by the ment of our inter-state relations with the USA or USSR citizen, the Soviet authorities take actions On the point X of the protocol No 46 other capitalist countries with such actually exist- in accordance with the Soviet law, actions which ing problems in these countries as multi-million are the prerogative of any state, then this is used Secret unemployment, deprivation of rights of ethnic by the American side thereby harming our mutual minorities, race discrimination, unequal rights relations. WASHINGTON for women, the violation of citizens rights by the Besides, it is known that the representatives state organs, the persecution of people with pro- of the American Embassy in Moscow secretly TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR gressive convictions and so on. meet with [Andrei] Sakharov, who knows the By the way, if one speaks about the concerns state secrets related to the national defence. The FIRST. Meet with Vance and tell him that regarding human rights, how should one view the last such meeting by the Embassy’s initiative you have instructions to inform President Carter systematic support by the USA of dictatorial, took place on February 8. This is an extremely and his Secretary of State of the following: anti-populist regimes in some countries, where unusual fact and no reference to the human rights Raising by the Americans in Moscow of the constantly and violently the most basic human cannot hide that this is a direct act of the Ameri- question of freeing [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, a So- rights and liberties are violated. can intelligence services against the USSR and viet citizen, convicted for his actions punishable If we had begun to raise all these questions against the Soviet social system. As for the by law in accordance with our criminal code, as a part of our inter-state relations then, appar- references to American public opinion, the senti- aroused the utmost bewilderment.2 ently, the result would have been the aggravation ments in the USA Congress, etc., one should not The fact that such an interference into our of all the relations between ourselves and other forget that in the Soviet Union there also is its domestic affairs is being done in the name of countries. It would have detracted us from the own public opinion, and it decisively rejects all concern over “human rights” does not change the solution of those problems, which could and attempts to impose on us the values which are essence of the matter. should be the goals of interactions and coopera- incongruent with social democracy and legality. Obviously, everybody has a right to have tion of our states. All the efforts for guaranteeing one’s own view on different issues including the the rights of human beings to live in a world free SECOND. After the conversation the following liberties and rights of people in any country. And from wars and burden of arms race, to live in the kind of announcement should be sent to Moscow we too have our own view of these problems and environment of security and friendly relations via the TASS channel: their current situation in the USA. between the peoples would also have been jeop- “On February” “ the USSR Ambassador in But it is another matter to bring these views ardized. the USA A.F. Dobrynin visited Secretary of State into the sphere of inter-state relations and thereby We firmly believe, therefore, that the ques- S. Vance and drew his attention to some state- to complicate them. How else can one see the tions of domestic development that reflect the ments and actions of the American side, which position of the representatives of the USA ad- differences in ideologies and social political sys- are in disagreement with the goals of positive ministration, when they are trying to make the tems should not be the subject of inter-state development of the Soviet-American relations. questions, thoroughly under the jurisdiction of relations. In this regard it has been emphasized that the the Soviet state, a matter of discussion? It touches It is not accidental that precisely this prin- Soviet side resolutely rejects all the attempts to upon the basic principles of our mutual relations. ciple, together with other fundamental principles, interfere in the Soviet domestic affairs, into the It must be a complete clarity on this problem was clearly expressed in the “Fundamentals of problems related to the prerogatives of other from the very beginning. Such a position of the mutual relations between the USSR and the USA” governments, using the pretext of “the protection USA is categorically unacceptable to us. signed in 1972. One also should be reminded that of human rights.” You and we are aware that we have differ- during the establishment of diplomatic relations The Soviet side could have also said - and it ent ideologies and social political systems. Cer- in 1933 our countries obliged to absolutely has firm grounds for it—some things regarding tainly, due to this fact we have different ap- respect unquestionable right of each other to the guarantee of human rights in the USA, like proaches to different questions. build its own life as they see fit and refrain in any unemployment of millions of people, race dis- We, in the Soviet Union, are proud that the way from interference into the domestic affairs of crimination, unequal rights for women, violation socialist revolution and our system not only the other partner. of personal liberties of citizens, the rising wave of proclaimed but also provided in reality the right Not always, however, and not in all respects crimes, etc. It must be clear, however, that all the for work, education, social security, free medical are American statements and actions in agree- attempts to impose one’s own views upon the assistance, and retirement to all Soviet citizens. ment with this. In actuality, the statements about other side, to bring such questions into inter-state And we really guarantee these rights. “concern” over “human rights in the USSR” relations, would only aggravate and make more At the same time the Soviet laws guard our serve the purpose of the support and even out- difficult to resolve those problems which should people from antisocial tendencies such as the right instigation for some persons, who separate be the subject of interaction and cooperation of propaganda of war in any form, the dissemina- themselves from the Soviet society. It is not just both countries. tion of the ideas of race inequality and national a demonstrative approving attitude of the (USA) The relations of peaceful co-existence and divisiveness or from the attempts of moral cor- administration toward the activity in the Soviet constructive cooperation between the USSR and ruption of people. In our country nobody has the Union of some American journalists, whose only the USA in the interests of both peoples can right to break the law that is equally obligatory to interest is to find and publicize the so-called fruitfully develop only when they are guided by everybody. “dissidents.” Some people from the USA Em- the mutual respect of principles of sovereignty We do not try to impose our understanding bassy personnel in Moscow are directly involved and non-interference into the domestic affairs of of rights and liberties of man on anybody, al- in it. We could specifically name who we have in each other, as it is stated in the basic though much of what is going on under the mind. Soviet-American documents.” conditions of another social system seems unac- Telegraph the fulfillment. ceptable to our people. (For the Soviet Ambassador: If the inter- It is not difficult to imagine what would locutor asks who exactly we are talking about, [Source: Fond 89, Perechen 25, Dokument 44, have happened if we, proceeding from our own you could name the First secretary Pressel [sic]) Center for the Storage of Contemporary Docu- 150 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation by which was agreed in Vladivostok. The basic on in Vladivostok, I would like to remind you that Mark H. Doctoroff.] parameters of the agreement which were fixed we also did and do stand for stopping of the arms there, as well as additional explanatory state- race, including the reduction of strategic forces. * * * * * ments which were agreed on during subsequent This can be proved by the agreement achieved in negotiations, were the result of tremendous work. Vladivostok, which implies for the USSR a uni- Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, In many cases it was necessary to make difficult lateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. February 25, 1977 decisions in order to find mutually acceptable This, not only in words by also in fact actually is solutions to an apparently deadlocked situation. a striving for arms reduction. Embassy of the USSR in the USA And to the extent that this agreement has already We are in favor of the results which were TOP SECRET been worked out, it is all interconnected—you achieved in Vladivostok being consolidated in an Copy No. 1 can not withdraw one important element without agreement without further delays, and that we Washington, D.C destroying the whole foundation. want to move further ahead. As already men- For example, it is enough to recall that—and tioned, we are ready to start negotiations on next From the Journal you, Mr. President should know this from the steps, including the question of possible future of DOBRYNIN, A.F. documents from the negotiations—that the reductions, straight after the current agreement method of counting MIRVed missiles was pre- will be concluded. cisely determined by the achievement of agree- Yet, we want to make it clear: any steps of RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ment on the whole complex of cruise missiles. this kind must first of all completely satisfy the The American side not only agreed to this in principle of equality and equal security of the with the USA Secretary of State principle, but in January of last year a concrete sides. It seems to us, Mr. President, that nobody formula for counting ALCM (trans. “air to can argue with our right to pose the question this C. VANCE ground”) cruise missiles within the ceilings for way. strategic weapons was practically agreed. All How does the idea of a dramatic reduction in February 26, 1977 that was left was to agree on concrete formulas the nuclear-missile forces of the USA and the for sea- and land-based cruise missiles. True, the USSR look in this light? In your letter it is put American side later tried to propose the removal forward in isolation from all other aspects of the I met with Secretary of State Vance and asked of the issue of sea- and land-based cruise missiles present situation. At the same time it is evident him to pass on as directed the letter of L.I. from the main agreement, [but] we categorically that in this case the following factors would have Brezhnev of February 25, 1977 to President Carter. rejected such an attempt to break from an already- immeasurably grown in importance to the unilat- achieved agreement. eral advantage of the USA: the difference in “Dear Mr. President, Now it is proposed to us to withdraw the geographic positions of the sides, the presence of whole question of cruise missiles from the agree- American nuclear means of forward basing and I attentively studied your letter of February ment. How should we understand this return to a missile-carrying aviation near the territory of the 14 of this year. I want to talk sincerely about the stage which we moved beyond long ago, and USSR, the fact that the USA NATO allies possess impression and the ideas which it provoked here being forced to face this absolutely hopeless nuclear weapons and other circumstances, which in our country. As I understand, you welcome proposal? To agree to this proposal would have can not but be taken into consideration. such direct conversation. meant that blocking one channel of the strategic The fact that it is impossible to ignore all The general remarks in favor of peace and arms race we open another channel at the same these facts while considering the question of curtailment of the arms race which were con- time. And does it really matter to people the type reduction of nuclear-missile forces of the USSR tained in the letter, of course, coincide with our of missile by which they will perish—a cruise or and the USA is so obvious that we can not but ask own aspirations. We are definitely for the ulti- a non-cruise one? Nor are there grounds to a question: what is the real purpose of putting mate liquidation of nuclear weapons and, more- believe that it will be easier to solve the question forward such proposals, which may be superfi- over, for universal and total disarmament under on cruise missiles later, when the sides start to cially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact effective international control. deploy them, than now, while they are still being is directed at gaining unilateral advantages. You However, advancement forward toward developed. We know from experience that it is yourself justly pointed out that attempts of one these elevated goals will not be accelerated, but, not so. side to gain advantage over the other can produce on the contrary, will be slowed down, if we first The aspiration to maintain artificial urgency only negative results. of all do not value what we already managed to about the issue of the Soviet intermediate bomber The same one-sidedness reveals itself in accomplish in this area over the last few years, called “Backfire” in the USA (which is still the proposals on banning of all mobile missiles ( i.e. and, second, if we abandon a responsible, realis- case as we understand from your letter), is in no including intermediate range missiles, which have tic approach to determining further concrete steps way consistent with an agreement. Let there be nothing to do with the subject of Soviet-Ameri- in favor of introducing proposals which are known no doubts in this respect: we firmly reject such an can negotiation), limits on throw weights, on-site to be unacceptable. approach as being inconsistent with the subject of inspection. Reviewing the ideas which you expressed the negotiations and having only one goal—to You of course know better why all these from this particular angle, we unfortunately did make the conclusion of the agreement more com- questions are put in such an unconstructive man- not find in many of them a desire for a construc- plicated or maybe even impossible. ner. We want to conduct the conversation in a tive approach, or readiness to look for mutually Does the United States really have less of an business-like manner from the very beginning, to acceptable solutions to the problems which are interest in this agreement than the Soviet Union? search for mutually acceptable—I stress, mutu- the subject of exchanges of opinions between us. We do not believe so, and if someone has a ally acceptable agreements. The Soviet Union As I already wrote to you, we firmly believe different opinion—it is a serious mistake. will continue to firmly protect its interests; at the that in the first place it is necessary to complete In connection with the question you raised same time a constructive and realistic approach the drafting of a new agreement on limitation of about the possibility of a significant reduction of of the American side will always find on our side strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of that the levels of strategic forces, which were agreed support and readiness to achieve an agreement. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 151

We hope to see exactly this kind of a responsible believe that the Four-power treaty should be speaking language of the General Secretary. Our approach when the Secretary of State Vance strictly and faultlessly observed by all interested President still approaches certain international comes to Moscow. sides, and we will in every way strive to avoid problems too lightly. For example, I told him This refers to the problem of strategic weap- returning to the period when Western Berlin was several times, referring to the conversation with ons limitation as well as to other questions, a constant source of dangerous friction and con- you (the Soviet Ambassador) and to the history of connected with stopping the arms race. We flicts. negotiations on the whole, that the Soviet govern- definitely are counting on the American side Without going into details, I will say that ment gives very much importance to solving of supporting our proposals, including the proposal your letter does not indicate any changes in the the question on cruise missiles. He doesn’t pay to ban creation of new kinds and systems of USA approach to such questions as settlement in much attention, in his striving to conclude an weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical the Near East or improvement in the sphere of agreement without long negotiations on remain- weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non- trade-economic relations between our countries, ing contradictory questions, thinking that these use of force. Our proposals on this and some which could bear witness to an intention to move questions can be put off for “later.” I told him that other questions, including that of the Indian to their successful settlement. it is not so, but... (Vance waved his hands to Ocean, were presented many times and con- And finally. In the letter the question of so indicate that he did not manage to persuade the cretely, in particular, in the United Nations. called “human rights” is raised again. Our quali- President that he was right). Keeping in mind the interests of international fication of the essence of this matter and of the I hope that the direct letter from L.I. security and strengthening of peace, we could behavior of American Administration in this re- Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the Presi- also discuss questions raised in your letter, such spect has just been reported through our Ambas- dent look at the situation in a somewhat different as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of sador. This is our principle position. We have no way. selling and supply of conventional weapons to intention to enforce our customs on your country I, of course, do not fully agree with what is the “third world” countries, and others. or other countries, but we will not allow interfer- written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind We give much importance to the agreement ence in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of of letter that the President needs to receive on reduction of armed forces and weapons in pseudo-humane pretence is used for the purpose. now.”4(...) Central Europe without prejudice to the security We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind. of any of the sides. And how should we treat such a situation, The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA Yet a one-sided approach is evident as far as when the President of the USA sends a letter to (signature) your letter and negotiations in Vienna are con- the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the cerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, same time starts the correspondence with a ren- /A. Dobrynin/ the statements that the American side views its egade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations the Soviet State and who stands against normal, [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, with the air of some kind of “concern with good relations between the USSR and the USA?3 Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] excessive increase” of military power in East We would not like our patience to be tested while Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of dealing with any matters of foreign policy, in- * * * * * the real situation missing here, but also the con- cluding the questions of Soviet-American rela- structive proposals, which were put forward by tions. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev, March 4, 1977 the USSR and other countries-participants in the like that. negotiations and directed at achieving progress These are the thoughts, Mr.President, which Embassy of the USSR in the USA at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ig- my colleagues and I had in connection with your Top secret nored. We are ready now and in the future for a letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though Copy No. 1 search for solutions and outcomes, a search which they might have been more pleasant. The things Washington, D.C. does not imply that someone will receive unilat- we talk about are too serious to leave space for eral advantages. But if we are expected to any kind of ambiguity or reticence. From the Journal unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities My letter is a product of sincere concern of DOBRYNIN, A.F. and thus put ourselves and our allies into an about the present and future of our relations, and unequal position, such expectations will lead it is this main idea that I want with all directness nowhere. and trust to bring to you. RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION It is impossible to agree with the evaluation I hope that with an understanding of the of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four- elevated responsibility which is placed on the with Z. BRZEZINSKI power agreement which is given in the letter. leadership of our two countries we will be able to The USSR never encroached and does not en- provide the forward development of Soviet- croach now on the special status of Western American relations along the way of peace, in the March 5, 1977 Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting ten- interests of our and all other people. sion in that region is directed to the wrong This morning Brzezinski handed me (Vance was address. The fact that complications still arise With respect, away) the text of President Carter’s letter to L.I. there is connected with the completely definite Brezhnev of March 4, 1977. policy carried out by the FRG with the conniv- L. Brezhnev ance of three western states, and is which is “To His Excellency practically directed at dissolving the Four-pow- February 25, 1977” Leonid I. Brezhnev ers treaty and its cornerstone resolution—that General Secretary West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and Vance read the text of the letter attentively of the Central Committee cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to twice and then said the following. of the Communist Party break this resolution are a very slippery path of the Soviet Union leading to aggravation of the situation. We “Personally I welcome such direct, plain- Moscow, Kremlin 152 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

c) a resolution on mutually satisfactory verifica- letter to be “positive.” “Is it not?”—he asked. Dear Mr. General Secretary, tion; I answered, speaking for myself, that the d) advance warning of missile tests; first impression after a brief reading of such a Your letter of February 25 raised in me some e) a universal test ban, including a temporary letter is that it does not much move us forward concern because of its moderately sharp tone, resolution regarding the completion of the cur- towards solving that question, which, as L.I. because in it there was no recognition of my own rent peaceful programs; Brezhnev has written to the President recently, is good intentions, and because it did not contain f) an agreement not to arm satellites and not to of primary significance, namely—concluding the any positive answer to the concrete proposals develop a capability to eliminate or damage the working out of a new agreement on strategic which were set forth in my previous letter. Dif- satellites; offensive weapons limitation on the basis of ferences between our countries are deep enough g) demilitarization of the Indian ocean; Vladivostok agreement. In the President’s letter, and I hope that you and I will never aggravate h) a limitation on civil defense measures; in fact, our positions on “Backfire” and on cruise them with doubts regarding our respective per- i) mutual restraint in selling weapons to third missiles are left out; as far as the latter are sonal motives. world countries; concerned, the impression is that the USA wants The fact is that neither in Vladivostok, nor j) a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic mis- to have a free hand in both their production and during the subsequent negotiations, was any final siles. deployment, instead of making them a part of agreement achieved on the question of cruise agreement. At the same time some issues are missiles and the bomber “Backfire”. I am sure Of course, the above list is not a complete raised, which, though perhaps important, have no that such agreements can be achieved in the one, and other relatively non-controversial ques- direct connection to the mentioned agreement, future, and I am committed to achieving them. I tions could easily be added to it. The main thing which thus acquires—in the President’s letter— understand your concern about postponing these is to move forward without delay on those ques- a vague outline, willfully or not leading away questions until future negotiations, yet I believe tions on which we can reach an agreement, thus from the essence of the issue which is key at the that we will gain a definite benefit in that we will creating the impulse necessary to get down to present stage. I can not but mention also that a give an impulse toward a quicker resolution of an work on the more intractable issues straight after number of Soviet proposals in the sphere of agreement, and I want to stress that postpone- that. disarmament are avoided by silence in the ment of these two controversial questions would We are working on these problems with President’s answer, as are some other questions be aimed only at expediting a quicker agreement, maximum energy, preparing for Secretary of which were raised in the letter of the General with all its positive political consequences. I am State Vance’s talks with you in Moscow. Secretary of the CC CPSU. also sure that with a mutual demonstration of I hope that you will not base our next corre- Brzezinski said in this regard that he was not good will we should be able to reach an agree- spondence on the mistaken belief that we lack ready at that moment to concretely consider the ment on such questions as conventional weapons, sincerity, honesty or the willpower needed to various proposals in the President’s letter. [...] tactical nuclear arms and throw weight. achieve quick progress towards mutually benefi- Not for a minute do I allow myself to under- cial agreements. I do not underestimate the Ambassador of the USSR in the USA estimate the difficulties which stand in our way. difficulties connected with substantive problems Solving these problems will demand determina- or technical details, but I am firmly committed to (signature) A. Dobrynin tion, patience and decisiveness. Keeping pre- achieving success in the process of creating a cisely this in mind, I wanted to make two more foundation for stable and peaceful relations be- suggestions, and both of which aim at resolving tween our two countries. We do not seek any sort /A. DOBRYNIN/ the disagreements between us. of unilateral advantages. First of all, I think it would be extremely I do not see our letters as official documents [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, useful, if you shared with us your own views on of negotiation, but if we exchange them in private Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] a significant reduction of strategic forces levels and on a strictly confidential basis, they can very which we could achieve in the next four or five well help us both to gain the necessary under- * * * * * years. During previous negotiations on strategic standing of the direction of historic development. weapons limitation, we were inclined to take It was in this spirit that this correspondence was Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, March 15, 1977 small steps in the direction of a vague future; I started and I want you to know that adherence to propose that instead of this we now strive to weapons reduction is the matter of personal faith Embassy of the USSR in the USA define a concrete, longer-term goal, towards which for me, which at the same time reflects the aspi- Secret we later could advance step by step with a greater rations of the people of my country. I hope and Copy No. 1 guarantee of success. believe that you and your people are devoted to Washington, D.C. Second, the quick conclusion of official the same idea. agreement between us regarding the problems on From the Journal which, as it seems, both sides are inclined to agree Sincerely, of DOBRYNIN, A.F. would facilitate our search for stable mutual understanding. We should use the fact that we Jimmy Carter have an agreement, or could achieve quick agree- RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ment on such questions as: White House Washington, D.C. with the USA Secretary of State C. VANCE a) limiting the number of strategic delivery March 4, 1977". vehicles to 2400 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level); Brzezinski said that the letter had been trans- March 16, 1977 b) limiting the number of launchers equipped mitted to Moscow at night over a direct line so with MIRV to the level of 1320 items (or a that it would be received there during the day.5 I. I visited Vance and transmitted through mutually acceptable lower level); Brzezinski remarked that they consider the him to President Carter the following letter from COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 153

L.I. Brezhnev. of more than 2500 km. will be banned com- out on those questions where we note a chance of pletely; the equipping with cruise missiles with a finding a mutually acceptable solution. Should Dear Mr. President, range of between 600 km. and 2500 km. of other we make some progress, corresponding agree- types of flying apparatus besides heavy bombers ments could be signed simultaneously with the Having become acquainted with your letter will likewise be forbidden. agreement on strategic weapons limitation. of March 4, I would like once again to set forth —all cruise missiles based at sea or on land In conclusion, I would like to point out, Mr. the essence of our understanding of the situation with a range of more than 600 km. also should be President, that I do not quite understand the regarding the preparation of the agreement (for entirely banned. meaning of your statement about the tone of my the period until 1985) on limitation of offensive letter of February 25. Its tone is usual —business- strategic weapons and in more detail to explain Once again, I would like also to remind you like and respectful. If you mean the directness our position on the concrete questions which so that our agreement to count under the ceiling for and openness, with which our views are ex- far remain unresolved. MIRVed missiles (1320 items) all missiles of pressed in it, my reasons were and are that this Let me start with several general consider- those types, of which at least one missile was very character of our dialogue coincides with the ations. We, it goes without saying, are in favor tested with MIRV, was and remains conditional interests of the matter. But if you mean our of concluding an agreement as quickly as pos- on achieving final agreement on the issues related principle attitude to the attempts to raise ques- sible, without delay. But an effort to do that on to cruise missiles. tions which go beyond the limits of interstate the basis of some sort of artificial, simplified As for the Soviet intermediate bomber which relations,—there can be no different reaction variant will hardly accelerate the matter, if we you call “Backfire,” we provided official data from our side. have in mind the goal which we have posed for about the range of this plane (2200 km.) and I believe that our private correspondence ourselves, that is: to genuinely limit strategic expressed readiness to reflect in the negotiating will serve the interests of constructive develop- weapons, guided by the principle of not inflicting record this data as well as our intention not to ment of relations between our countries. any loss on either of the contracting sides. In provide this plane with the capability to cover exactly the same way, the preparation of an intercontinental distances—all this under the con- With respect, L. Brezhnev, March 15, 1977". agreement would not be accelerated if while dition that the question of “Backfire” once and for setting aside those questions on which a lot of ever will be completely withdrawn from further Vance said that it [the letter] will be reported work had been done, we took up some sort of new negotiations. We continue to maintain this posi- to the President. questions, particularly those which have no di- tion. rect relation to the subject of the given agree- The question of mobile launchers for ballis- The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ment. tic missiles of intercontinental range, naturally, (signature) The conclusion of a new strategic arms must find its solution in the current agreement. limitation agreement between our countries, of Earlier we proposed an agreement by which dur- /A. DOBRYNIN/ course, would have great political significance ing the period covered by this agreement the sides both for Soviet-American relations and in a wider should restrain from deployment of mobile launch- [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, context. However, this will become possible ers for ground-based ICBMs. Our approach to Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff] only in the event that the agreement represents a the question of possible further strategic forces genuine step towards limiting strategic weapons. reductions by the USSR and the USA is laid out * * * * * In the contrary event, there would be an opposite in my letter of February 25 of this year. I repeat, effect. we will be ready to start discussing this question Dobrynin’s Conversation with Secretary of And so it would be if the issue of cruise immediately following the signing of the agree- State Cyrus Vance, March 21, 1977 missiles was left outside the agreement. This ment. Yet in that case we must take into consid- question is not only tied to the heart of a new eration factors about which I have already written Top Secret agreement, but, and this is vitally important, to you on February 25, such as: the difference in Copy No. 1 much has already been worked out. Even certain the geographic positions of the sides, presence of concrete formulas have already been agreed. To American means of nuclear forward basing and Embassy of the USSR in the USA propose now to leave cruise missiles outside the an operation of air-based delivery vehicles near Washington framework of the agreement would not only the territory of the USSR, the fact that the USA mean returning to initial positions but would also NATO allies nuclear weapons and other circum- From the Journal of leave open the path for the development of the stances, which must not be ignored. Dobrynin, A.F. arms race in a new and dangerous direction. Taking into consideration the facts and ideas I don’t think that this is in any way conso- laid out above regarding cruise missiles, it could RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION nant with the goals of a quick conclusion of a be possible for the sides not only to limit the level with the Secretary of State of the USA strategic arms limitation agreement. Therefore of strategic nuclear means delivery vehicles (2400 C. Vance we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole and 1320), but also to discuss the number of such complex of cruise missiles, including: vehicles, which are subject to reduction even March 21, 1977 before expiration date of the current agreement. —to view heavy bombers equipped with Ideas, expressed above, represent our offi- cruise missiles with a range of 600 km. to 2500 cial position, which we intend to maintain during I met with Vance on his invitation. km. as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRV the coming negotiations with Secretary of State The Secretary of State said that in view of with individual placements, and accordingly to Vance. It goes without saying that the additional my forthcoming departure for Moscow on the eve count them under the ceiling (depending on the questions, which you, Mr. President, mentioned of his arrival there he would like in the most type of heavy bomber) established for that type in your letter also demand attention. We will be general terms to describe their approach to a new of delivery vehicle—1320 items; cruise missiles ready to set forth our preliminary ideas on these agreement with the Soviet Union on the limita- ALCM (trans. i.e. “Air to Ground”) with a range questions. Special negotiations would be carried tion of strategic weapons. In this regard he 154 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN underlined several times that the observations the cruise missiles and “Backfire”) to the next, the new administration does not consider itself which he would make continue to be subject to third stage of SALT negotiations—could serve. completely committed to the approach of the review by the President, that they are still not set, After I heard what Vance had to say, I told former administration and that the Carter govern- and that they may be susceptible to certain changes. him that if I may speak frankly, none of these ment strives toward a real, and not just a superfi- This applies also to numerical data, which also American proposals give a real basis for achiev- cial reduction in strategic weapons. does not reflect the final position of the USA. ing a mutually acceptable agreement in Moscow. I noted in this regard in conducting such Vance said that in their opinion, two vari- I said further that upon first consideration important negotiations we start from the fact that ants of an agreement on the second stage of SALT the “comprehensive” variant actually looks even we are dealing with the government of the USA, are possible: one is comprehensive, which they worse than the limited variant, the shortcoming and that the reevaluation by every new adminis- prefer, another is more limited and will be intro- of which was convincingly shown in L.I. tration of agreements reached by its predecessor duced in case the first one is not agreed on. Brezhnev’s last letter to the President. The fact does not strengthen the basis for international The first variant—the more complete agree- that American side is striving, judging by the agreements. ment, according to Vance—could consist of the expressed considerations, toward a one-sided Overall, I said, in my personal opinion both following parts. advantage, is completely obvious. I asked Vance, of the proposed variants are not only not directed what, in the opinion of the administration, the toward achieving a mutually advantageous SALT 1. The American side believes that it would Soviet Union would get in exchange for all that. agreement, but to the contrary significantly be good already at this stage to agree on certain If I may summarize, in the subsequent dis- weaken the chances for a quick conclusion of the reductions from the levels of strategic arms estab- cussion Vance, justified the American position second stage of negotiations. I appealed to Vance lished in Vladivostok. This would reflect the with the following: to take into account everything that had already intention of the sides to begin real arms reduction, A decrease in the overall level of been said by the Soviet side, especially the points instead of merely adapting to the approximate delivery vehicles from 2400 to 2000 made in the letters from the General Secretary of actual levels of weapons which [the sides] have or would impact, in his words, not only the the CC CPSU about the possible paths to resolu- plan to have. In this context, in their opinion, the Soviet Union, but also the USA, which tion of the problems of strategic arms limitation, limitation of the levels could have the following currently has 2150 strategic delivery during the final review of their positions. character: vehicles. Although he had to recognize Vance said that the position he had ex- — up to 2000 total strategic delivery vehicles; that the reduction would have a stronger pressed is not final, but that their position “also — up to 1200 MIRVed launchers. impact on the Soviet side, he added that must be understood”—the USA cannot consider a reduction in MIRVed launchers would accepting in full a Soviet approach according to 2. The Soviet side, taking into consideration have more of an impact on the USA than which, in his words, the American side should its advantage in throw weight, must agree to a on the USSR, since the USA had moved accept in full the Soviet position on remaining certain limit on launchers for heavy interconti- far ahead in the MIRVing of rockets. questions instead of a search for mutual compro- nental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which it is build- mise. ing or reequipping to accommodate the kind of The inclusion of their suggested limits on our I repeated to Vance that in my view the missiles called “SS-18” in the USA. (He com- heavy rockets—as a reflection of the problem of considerations he had expressed in no way can mented in this regard that it would be desirable to the Soviet advantage in throw-weight which has serve as a basis for the compromise he had men- have, say, 150 missiles of this kind instead of long worried them—Vance argued that the USA, tioned. 300.) in its turn will be prepared not to develop and not Vance said that most probably the President 3. Both sides agree to a freeze in the creation to manufacture M-X, its own new heavy mobile will convene two more sessions of the National and deployment of new types of ICBM, with a ICBM with increased accuracy. This, in his Security Council to work out the final American corresponding limit on the number of atmospheric opinion, would be, from the point of view of the position for the negotiations in Moscow. tests of missiles. future, sufficient compensation for the Soviet In conclusion, Vance requested that I con- 4. Creation and deployment of mobile side in the context of a compromise decision on vey to the Soviet leadership that he is coming to ICBMs are prohibited. In this regard the United the problem of throw-weight. Moscow with a serious task from President Carter States would take an obligation to stop develop- Speaking about the elimination of cruise to try and come to an agreement on the central ment and deployment of its mighty mobile ICBM missiles with a range of more than 2500 km, issue of his trips, and that if necessary he will be “M-X”. Vance asserted that the remaining missiles (i.e. prepared, to stay over for a day or two to finish a 5. All cruise missiles with a range of more those with a range of less than 2.5 thousand km) detailed consideration of possibilities for the than 2500 km are banned. are medium range rather than intercontinental. In quickest conclusion of a new agreement on the In the event that the Soviet side agrees to this this regard, he tried to make an analogy with our limitation of strategic weapons. proposal the American side will be ready to Backfire, which has a range of 2200 km and is accept the Soviet position concerning the “Back- therefore characterized by the Soviet side as a Ambassador of the USSR in the USA fire” bomber, by agreeing not to ascribe intercon- tactical, rather than strategic type of weapon. tinental capability to this plane. The USA will be I made points consistent with our proposed (signature) also ready to take into consideration Soviet data agreement on the second stage of SALT, using /A. Dobrynin/ about the radius of operation of this bomber. arguments contained in the communications of This, said Vance, is, in general, the structure L.I. Brezhnev and our position in previous nego- [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, of the possible first variant of the agreement. tiations with the Americans. Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] As an alternative to this agreement (if it is In reply to my observation that the prepara- not achieved), Vance continued, President Carter’s tion of an agreement cannot be accelerated if we * * * * * already well-known proposal—to conclude a lim- set aside issues which had already been jointly ited Vladivostok agreement, including into it all worked out, and begin to consider some new [Ed. note: Despite Dobrynin’s clear warn- items on which the sides had reached agreement, questions which hinder the achievement of an ing of the chilly reception it would receive, Vance but deferring unresolved questions (i.e. first of all agreement, Vance characteristically retorted that continued on page 160 R E S P O NC OLDS W EAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 155

THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY:

The Authors of SPECIAL TASKS Respond to Critics

[Ed. note: The previous issue of the Sudoplatov’s character are not substantive dismissal of the Bohr documents without an CWIHP Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994) con- rebuttal. It is rather curious that David equal side-by-side explanation from physi- tained several articles that expressed criti- Holloway, who at great length explains the cists who have affirmed the intelligence cisms of a book by former KGB officer Pavel difficulties of meshing the sources of his value of the answers Bohr gave to the ques- Sudoplatov—Special Tasks: The Memoirs scholarship, refuses to listen to the one liv- tions prepared by Soviet intelligence in No- of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet ing participant who, because of the senior vember 1945. Holloway’s contention that Spymaster, by Pavel and Anatolii Sudoplatov role he played, has a unique perspective on Bohr did not go beyond the Smythe report in with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (Bos- how the parts of the story fit together. his replies to Terletsky has been seriously ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994)—par- The publication of SPECIAL TASKS contested by physicists who examined the ticularly its assertion that several leading brought forth a latent and angry battle in documents (See Sunday Times [London], scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, Moscow over who should take credit for the June 26, 1994). The claim that Bohr was including Enrico Fermi, J. Robert success of the Soviet atomic bomb. Lining only a theoretician and could not have com- Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr, up against Sudoplatov and his co-workers mented on engineering problems is belied knowingly and improperly provided secret were scientists who feared that they would by Margaret Gowing, an author who wrote atomic information to Soviet espionage. At lose the honors and credit they received for about the British bomb program and who is the time, the Bulletin invited Sudoplatov or their contribution. Yuri Smirnov is the leader highly praised by Holloway. his co-authors to respond in the next issue, of this group. Standing beside them are Smirnov and Zubok can hardly be and they do so below, in letters from the present day Russian intelligence officers, counted disinterested critics, since each is Schecters, from Pavel Sudoplatov (for the successors to the KGB, who had their own transmitting the position of his constitu- paperback edition of Special Tasks), and publishing contract to tell the atomic espio- ency. from Stanford University professor Robert nage story and were under pressure to pro- A few of the recent affirmations of Conquest, who contributed the foreward to duce documentation on their alleged super- Sudoplatov’s story are worthy of note: Special Tasks. As before, the Bulletin wel- spy Perseus. On Sudoplatov’s side, able to # According to Yuri I. Drozdov, former comes contributions from anyone wishing verify pieces of the story, were elderly intel- chief of KGB Illegal Operations 1980 to to contribute evidence to the debate, or to ligence veterans, fearful of coming forward 1991, and who served in the New York respond to statements contained in the let- because of threats to their pensions. residency of the KGB from 1975 to 1979, ters below, in future issues.] This angry debate spilled over into the “Sudoplatov’s information on the coopera- American media. Writers like Holloway tion of outstanding American physicists with April 21, 1995 and Richard Rhodes, who had done signifi- Soviet intelligence is quite reliable.” cant research among scientists, but were Drozdov’s statement was solicited and TO THE EDITOR: unable to come up with primary sources on quoted by the editorial board of Juridical Soviet atomic espionage, acted as surro- Gazette, a Moscow publication, in a foot- A year after the publication of SPE- gates for the scientists and attacked note to a book review of “Special Tasks” in CIAL TASKS by Pavel A. Sudoplatov, and Sudoplatov. Holloway relies heavily on the March, 1995. the media uproar it evoked, not one of point of view of surviving scientist Yuli The review, written by Leonid Sudoplatov’s critics has shown him to be Khariton, whose interest is not to give credit Vladimirovich Shebarshin, head of the First mistaken in any significant aspect of his to the contributions of the hated Soviet intel- Chief Directorate (foreign operations) of the revelation of how Soviet atomic espionage ligence apparatus. Sudoplatov, contrary to KGB from 1988 to 1991, reads in part: was conducted. claims by Smirnov and Zubok, has been “The book SPECIAL TASKS is very In the CWIHP Bulletin, fall 1994, three evenhanded in giving credit to both scien- attractive and in its totality appears to be critics were given extensive space to attack tists and intelligence officers. reliable. If there were legends in the intelli- the validity of Sudoplatov’s account with- We helped Sudoplatov tell his story by gence service Pavel A. Sudoplatov would out providing any opportunity for opposing organizing the chronology and translating have been the hero, but the traditions of the views to be stated examining the validity of his words into readable English. We did not intelligence service are not to reminisce. their criticisms. There was no presentation alter accounts of poisoning, terrorism, es- The more important the case the narrower from those who consider Sudoplatov’s oral pionage and perversions of ideology that the list of people who know about it, and history a major contribution to understand- made him an unwanted witness in Russia these people are accustomed to keep silence. ing the Stalin period and atomic espionage. and an NKVD monster in the West. He “Now (fifty years later) the archives are David Holloway, Yuri Smirnov and Vlad remains a Stalinist with few regrets. We did stolen and the enemies of Russia exploit the Zubok, each with their own unstated agenda, not soften his tone nor did we enhance his secrets of the country in their interests. Here dismiss both Sudoplatov’s account of So- account. comes a remarkable and surprising event in viet atomic espionage and the Bohr docu- It was professionally irresponsible for the midst of these unjust judgments, where ments that verify a part of it. Attacks on the Bulletin to print Smirnov’s and Zubok’s false witnesses dominate the scene and where 156 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the judges pursue their own goals. Here Oppenheimer’s circle, was Zoya Zarubin’s One, the intelligence arm of the Council of comes a witness who is alive and tries to stepmother. Ministers, which I formally headed from speak the truth about the events of many In his own letter, which will appear in 1945 to 1946, had direct close cooperation years ago.” the forthcoming paperback edition of SPE- with Academicians Kurchatov, Kapitsa, # The director of the Russian State CIAL TASKS, Pavel Sudoplatov offers more Kikoin, Alikhanov and Ioffe and contrib- Archives, Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko, details on Soviet atomic espionage opera- uted substantial material to speed up the affirmed that Sudoplatov’s account of So- tions. He has requested that the Bulletin solution of the atomic problem in the USSR. viet atomic espionage was “correct in essen- publish his letter. Some journalists (Sergei Leskov and tial points” according to documents of the Vladimir Nadeine of Izvestia) and historians NKVD from 1944 to 1953, which were Sincerely yours, of science in Russia (Yuri Smirnov of the released in June 1994. (See Moscow News Jerrold L. Schecter Kurchatov Institute) who, I was told by my #23, 1994). They include the documents on Leona P. Schecter former colleagues, rose in their careers Terletsky’s mission to Niels Bohr and the through KGB connections, strongly sup- formal establishment of the committee ported those in the Russian scientific and headed by Sudoplatov to coordinate atomic The following letter will appear in the pa- intelligence establishment who found rev- espionage. “The main sensation is not this perback edition of SPECIAL TASKS to be elations in SPECIAL TASKS detrimental to but what we learned about the system. We published by Little, Brown and Company on their prestige. They deliberately distorted therefore are confronted with the necessity June 1, 1995 the material I presented. For example, I of looking into other documents,” said never wrote that Oppenheimer, Fermi, Mironenko, who urged that the Presidential Writing memoirs, especially for the un- Szilard and Bohr were agents of Soviet intel- archives and the security ministry archives wanted witness, is always risky. The events ligence. They cooperated, but we never open their files. one describes have already been interpreted recruited them. It is noteworthy that Klaus # Former KGB officer Vladimir by interests in power whose version influ- Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo never signed Barkovsky (who handled agents in England) ences prominent historians and scientists any formal recruitment obligations despite has affirmed Sudoplatov’s account that and becomes “history.” I am reminded that their regular clandestine contacts with Rus- Donald Maclean was the first to warn the Tacitus began his Annals by writing that sian intelligence officers and agents in the Soviets that the British were seriously in- “The histories of Tiberius, Caligula and Nero, USA and Britain. vestigating the possibility of constructing while they were in power, were falsified One has to remember that all scientific an atomic weapon. British critics of through terror and after their death were giants had a different perspective in the Sudoplatov were in error in attributing the written under a fresh hatred.” 1930s, 1940s and 1950s before the Cold War early report to John Cairncross. The tragic events of the period from the hardened their views. At the end of the # The presence of intelligence officer 1930s to 1953 covered in my book SPE- 1930s and from 1940 to 1945, leading scien- Kosoy, a TASS correspondent under cover CIAL TASKS, including the beginning of tists of the international scientific commu- in Sweden, confirmed a triangular link the Cold War and the myth of Klaus Fuchs as nity agreed to informally share nuclear se- among Sweden, the U.S. and the Soviet the principal figure who passed atomic se- crets among all anti-fascist scientists. Ini- Union as a path for espionage information. crets to Soviet Intelligence, had already been tially they were driven by fear that Nazi # Soviet intelligence officer Arkady told and established as the framework ac- Germany would get the bomb first; later Rylov, who handled incoming espionage cepted by all interested parties. In fact, there they believed that sharing secrets would be documents for Sudoplatov, stated on Rus- were many more sources of atomic secrets the means of controlling nuclear weapons. sian TV that Semyon (Sam) Semyonov, a besides Fuchs. Our intelligence officers in the United States, Soviet intelligence officer instrumental in Harsh attacks on me and my book— Gregory Kheifitz and Elizabeth Zarubin, acquiring atomic secrets in the United States, without debating the principal facts—were encouraged this attitude of sharing in their told him the sources of the material were concentrated in one direction: to discredit contacts with Oppenheimer; Pontecorvo Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard. me by calling me a terrorist and to hide from worked on Fermi. # Zoya Zarubin, who was a young trans- public knowledge that two independent in- Reluctantly, the Russian military news- lator working for Sudoplatov in the early telligence centers in which I worked—the paper, Red Star, on April 28, 1994 admitted 1940s, stated in a videotaped interview that Administration of Special Tasks and the that “Soviet intelligence agents took advan- she worked closely with Igor Kurchatov Foreign Intelligence Directorate—existed in tage of an international plot of scientists to (director of the Soviet atomic bomb pro- the Soviet state security system. The public share nuclear secrets with each other.” The gram) to translate the first espionage docu- relations office of the Russian Foreign Intel- Western press, especially the American press, ments into workable Russian. She said that ligence Service has alleged that there was no neglected to notice this statement by KGB Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Rybkina, direct cooperation between intelligence and historian E. Sharapov and R. Mustafin, which for whom she also worked, proudly told her senior Soviet scientists in developing our for the first time acknowledged the exist- that she was in contact with Niels Bohr on first atomic bomb. This statement is incor- ence of the “atomic team headed by important information. Elizabeth Zarubin, rect and was made with the ulterior motive Sudoplatov” and its role in the Soviet Union’s the intelligence officer whom Sudoplatov of discrediting my account. Department S of war effort. said was successful in penetrating the Special Committee on Problem Number Since my memoirs appeared I have met COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 157 with former colleagues who worked with me in reward for their services to the Soviet Ribkina, received the cooperation of Niels and they reminded me that in 1949 top level Union while abroad. Bohr. Back in Moscow she told Zoya American nuclear scientists turned down the The other line was traditional espionage Zarubina, who translated atomic documents, approach of our illegals in the United States, tradecraft, handled from 1944 to 1946 by that “this is a very important enterprise we’re led by Colonel Rudolf Abel, to resume coop- officers such as Anatoli Yatskov and doing together with the biggest scientists in eration “with the international anti-fascist Aleksandr Feklisov. America and the world. We are trying to be scientific community.” By that time the The recently published documents of as strong as any other country would be. I Cold War was on and the Americans knew the meeting of Professor Yakov Terletsky am happy I am instrumental in putting this we had our own bomb. with Neils Bohr in November 1945 not only together with Europe, with Niels Bohr.” Certainly, I do not pretend to know confirm my account, but provide additional Ribkina spoke freely with Zoya because she everything about Soviet intelligence opera- details. There were three meetings with is the stepdaughter of Liza Zarubina, the tions during the period 1930 to 1953, but as Bohr in November 1945. Contrary to at- intelligence officer who performed so well chief of one of the main intelligence services tacks by historians, Bohr did comment on for us in America working with I must stress that from 1941 atomic issues the drawings (graphs) in the Smythe report. Oppenheimer’s wife. Zoya met in her office were discussed in my presence at the regular The operation was top secret and even the a number of times with Academician meetings of the four chiefs of Russian mili- director of NKVD Foreign Intelligence Pavel Kurchatov to clarify the meaning of the new tary and NKVD intelligence headed by Beria. M. Fitin was not informed. The British vocabulary of atomic physics. Kurchatov At first the purpose was to assess the possi- physicist Dr. John Hassard, of London’s urged her to probe the possible variants of bility that the Germans might develop a Imperial College confirmed the importance meaning in the documents; he barely con- weapon similar to the British-American of the secret information revealed to trolled his excitement over the new informa- project. In 1944 I was assigned coordinating Terletsky by Bohr (Sunday Times [London], tion. “Come on girl,” Kurchatov told Zoya, functions to gather atomic intelligence and June 26, 1994). This was not reported by then 25, “try that sentence another way. in 1945 I took all formal responsibility for either the American or Russian press. Bohr Remember your physics. Is there any other atomic intelligence in the USSR when I was confirmed the validity of the Smythe report meaning we missed?” appointed director of the second (intelli- and resolved stormy debates among Russian The information that Enrico Fermi had gence) bureau of the special committee of scientists over how to approach construction put into operation the first nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union Council of Ministers. I am of a nuclear reactor (whether to use heavy December 1942 was initially provided in a the only living witness from the Center to water or graphite) and the test of samples of very general form to Kurchatov in January know how all top secret information was uranium and plutonium provided by Soviet 1943. Fermi’s success was at first not fully received and processed in 1941-46 from the intelligence. Bohr’s answers to Terletsky’s understood by our scientists. Therefore it USA, Great Britain and Canada. carefully prepared questions helped to verify triggered Kurchatov’s letter of March 22, We received top secret information on scientific papers of Oppenheimer, Szilard 1943 to deputy prime minister Pervukhin the atomic bomb from two directions. One and Fermi and others which were obtained asking him “to instruct intelligence bodies to line was to indoctrinate scientists to cooper- by our intelligence and made available for find out about what has been done in America ate in open discussions and the other was to our scientists. In fact, before the State Archive in regard to the direction in question,” and bring in top secret documents and informa- of the Russian Federation released the Bohr naming seven American laboratories as tar- tion on the atomic bomb. Elizabeth (Liza) documents, the Federal Intelligence Service gets. Several months later, in July 1943, Zarubina and Sam Semyonov were the first asked me to help reconstruct the mission Kurchatov again asked for clarification of to establish friendly contacts with the Ameri- because it did not have the documents in its the data in his memorandum. can scientific community and influence them files. Our scientists were at first skeptical of to cooperate with anti-fascist scientists. Liza We were aware of Bohr’s contacts with Fermi’s accomplishment, and until Febru- Zarubina and her colleague, the Soviet vice- British intelligence, but he played both with ary 1945, when full mobilization was or- counsel in New York, Pastelniak, (whose us and the Western special services. My dered, only a few in influential scientific and code name was Mikheev) handled our vet- colleagues reminded me that when Bohr government circles believed that the cre- eran agent Margareta Konenkova, (code escaped to Sweden in 1943 he asked the ation of a new super weapon was realistic. name Lukas), the wife of the famous Rus- Swedish physicist H.Anfeld to approach The progress of the atomic project was sian sculptor Sergei Konenkov, who was Soviet representatives and inform them that retarded by the lack of resources during the working in Princeton on a bust of Einstein, to the possibility of making an atomic bomb early war years. In 1941 it was the intelli- influence Oppenheimer and other promi- was being discussed in the German scien- gence reports from Donald Maclean of nent American scientists whom she fre- tific community. Anfeld met the TASS progress in the British program, recently quently met in Princeton from 1943-1945. correspondent in Sweden, M. Kosoy, a So- confirmed by Vladimir Barkovsky, that There are photographs of Margareta with viet intelligence officer, who promptly in- pushed us to initiate our efforts in 1942. Oppenheimer and Einstein in the Konenkov’s formed Moscow. On the basis of this news Both the Soviet and the American gov- family museum in Moscow. When they the NKVD initiated the famous letter from ernments did not fully believe in the possi- returned from the USA to Russia in Decem- Kapitsa to Bohr, inviting him to come and bility of nuclear weapons before the first ber 1945 the Konenkovs were granted spe- work in the Soviet Union. explosive test in July 1945. My colleagues cial privileges by a government enactment In Sweden our intelligence officer, Zoya reminded me recently that apart from scien- 158 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tific information provided by senior scien- Special Tasks I have described can be denied Bohr’s providing of information, Sudoplatov tific personnel of the Manhattan Project we simply because they have never before been was already on record in July 1982. Again, also channeled to our government reports revealed. That something has not been told one comment, by Smirnov, faults Sudoplatov about security rules in Los Alamos and code before does not mean it is not true. for “shoddy research” in getting wrong a names used in internal U.S. government highly peripheral detail (on the dates and correspondence on the matter of atomic signed/ Pavel A.Sudoplatov reasons for Bohr’s trip to Russia). But research. My colleagues recalled that in “research” is not the point of such memoirs. 1946, under direct orders from Beria and * * * * * Look at, for example, Khrushchev Remem- Vannikov, I transferred from Lefortovo and bers, where the “original material” (Strobe Lubyanka all technical intelligence infor- 6 February 1995 Talbott tells us in his Editor-Translator’s mation on the atomic problem to the admin- note) was “quite disorganized” when it came istration of the Special Government Com- To the Editor: into his hands; and which is full of mittee on Atomic Energy. The sources of misremembered (and uncorrected) detail— that information were very closely held un- Your treatment of the Bohr document muddling up different plenums, confusing der Beria’s direct personal control and when [in CWIHP Bulletin #4], highly interesting Lominadze’s suicide with that of he was arrested in 1953 his files were moved in many respects, nevertheless is peculiar in Ordzhonikidze three years later, etc., etc., to the Kremlin under Malenkov’s orders. others. Most of your contributors are con- while remaining, in Talbott’s words “devas- Beria’s intelligence records, which contain cerned to defend Niels Bohr’s moral integ- tating and authoritative.” (As to such dis- the names of sources of secret atomic bomb rity. But this is not at issue, though his crepancies, we may note them in highly information, have not been released and political attitudes may be. Whatever infor- reputable or accepted sources: for example, their location remains uncertain. Beria’s mation he did or did not give was certainly in the very venue of the wartime Bohr- atomic intelligence materials are not in the accord with his principles. The question is Heisenberg meeting is disputed. And inci- Enormous File of the Federal Intelligence merely a factual one. Some of your con- dentally it seems odd that the Bohr-Terletsky Service. Perhaps the most secret parts of the tributors say he did not have any secrets, so meeting is not referred to all at in Abraham Enormous file are in Beria’s personal file in could not give any to the Soviets; others that Pais’ massive biography of Bohr.) the Ministry of Security archives from that he had some, but would not have given them. With all its errors it seems clear that on period. The Bohr documents were not found And did he only say what was already in the the substance of the Bohr incident—the fact in the Enormous File, which contains the Smythe Report? Yuri Smirnov puts it that of and the organization of the physicist’s atomic espionage materials, but in the Rus- “practically” everything he told was in the meetings and discourse with a Soviet repre- sian State Archives files of the Interior Min- Report. Kurchatov’s comment says that two sentative—Sudoplatov’s previously much- istry. points were of use. A British and an Ameri- challenged account has been confirmed by My story is based on what I remember. can physicist are lately on record to the the document. There is more to be said. I had no direct access to archives which in effect that his replies were clearly helpful. A And, given a reasonably critical attitude, small details may be more or less correct layman, while thus noting that professional more remains to be discovered in support or than my memory. However, the thrust and opinion is by no means as one-sided as refutation of our present imperfect under- important facts of my story are irrefutable implied in your pages, is not in a position to standing of this and similar matters. and it was my duty to reveal the hidden judge. (Even a layman can indeed note Your “update” (p. 93) is also unsatisfac- motives of tragic events in Soviet history. I remarks—for example on the vast number tory, citing some but omitting other letters am glad that my explanation of the death of of spectrographs—which are not in the Re- on the subject in leading U.S. journals, and Raoul Wallenberg in Special Tasks will be port, though perhaps not of great use.) In any failing to mention major reviews in Le included in the proceedings of the Russian- case, the NKVD feared it was being misled Monde, The (London) Times, etc. Swedish Commission on the Wallenberg by the Smythe Report, as Feklisov (as quoted Affair, which met in Moscow in 1994. by Zubok) noted: so at least from an intelli- Yours sincerely, There are those in the former KGB and gence point of view, even mere confirma- the scientific community who want to direct tion was welcome. The question remains far Robert Conquest the public not to believe me because my less clear cut than your contributors imply. story interferes with their book contracts or The other concern of most of these detracts from their scientific honors. Some contributors is to attack Sudoplatov. March 19, 1995 would like to erase the record of combat and Sudoplatov certainly misunderstood, terrorist operations in the Stalin years. To- misremembered, or exaggerated, much of To the Editor: day Russian and Western clandestine spe- the significance of the Bohr interview. But cial operations continue in the Middle East some of the criticisms make no sense. David In the CWIHP Bulletin, Issue #4, 1994, against Syria, Iraq and Iran, described as Holloway doubtless wrote in jest when he one of the Soviet-era documents caught my criminal and terrorist governments, and said that since Sudoplatov had co-authors it eye because it appears to be an example of against nationalities seeking their indepen- was impossible to know which wrote what. and raises questions about a more general dence from Russia. These facts of interna- There are dozens of books of the same type. issue that has been suggested in the writings tional life still exist. Neither they nor the In any case, on the main point at issue, of several former Soviet officials on other COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 159 occasions. one had been in operation, and had contrib- MIKOYAN-CUBAN TALKS The document is the record of the Polit- uted to the death of a president of a neighbor- continued from page 109 buro meeting of October 22, 1986, which ing country. still a poor country. There will come a time when appears on page 85. The second item on the There is of course no way to reconcile we will show our enemies. But we do not want to agenda of that meeting deals with the 1986 the assessment of the Mozambican Board of die beautifully. Socialism must live. Excuse the crash in South African territory of the air- Inquiry with Gorbachev’s statement to the rhetoric. If you are not against it, let us continue craft, piloted by Soviet military personnel, Soviet Politburo that the aircraft was “...shot our conversation tomorrow. carrying the Mozambican President Samora down.” The latter now appears in an official Machel. While sitting as Chairman, General Soviet document and becomes recorded for DORTICOS. We can meet, but we would Secretary Gorbachev states: “The last report posterity in that form. If one accepts the like to know the opinion of the Soviet govern- of our pilot was: ‘We have been shot down.’” conclusion of the Mozambican panel, then ment and Comrade Mikoyan about what we will The event in question is certainly not a Gorbachev’s statement in the text of an do about the agreement on military assistance. major one in Cold War political history, but official Soviet document raises all the prob- A.I. MIKOYAN. Let’s consider that. Think the Gorbachev quotation raises the problem lems indicated above, either regarding the about a program of future work. I am free. I am of the accuracy of Soviet documents, and in nature and accuracy of information that prepared to visit you. this case, at the very highest level: Was reached the Politburo’s staff or its presenta- information that reached the most senior tion to the Politburo’s members, or some DORTICOS. Thank you. Tomorrow we Soviet leadership “doctored” in some cases combination of both. will set the conditions with the ambassador. in advance? If so, at what level? By intelli- gence or administrative agencies? If it was Sincerely yours, A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree. not, was the Politburo nevertheless purpose- Ambassador A. Alekseev attended the conversa- fully misinformed on certain occasions? Milton Leitenberg tion. Following the aircraft crash which re- sulted in their President’s death, the Recorded by: [signature] V. Tikhmenev Mozambican government established a * * * * * Board of Inquiry, which carried out an in- Com. Mikoyan A.I. has not looked over the vestigation of the crash. The possibility that January 9, 1995 transcript of the conversation. the aircraft was shot down was eliminated in the very early days of their investigation. To the Editor: [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, copy There was no mention of the plane being provided by National Security Archive, Washing- ton, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] “shot down” on the tape of the aircraft’s In the Fall 1994 issue of the Bulletin cockpit voice recorder. Instead, there was there is an exchange of letters between Adam * * * * * substantial evidence that the crash was acci- Ulam and Kathryn Weathersby. Ulam’s dental. The basic cause of the accident was views, as an experienced Cold War Warrior, [Ed. note: For an English translation of the a laxity in routine operational precautions at evince no surprise but Ms. Weathersby’s meeting between Mikoyan and Castro on 12 several points. In particular, the aircraft had comment, “This distinction does not negate November 1962, in which the Soviet envoy con- taken off for a return flight to the Mozambican Soviet responsibility for the bloodshed that veyed Moscow’s decision to acquiesce to capital with the minimum fuel needed to followed,” certainly does. Just whose army Kennedy’s demand to withdraw the Soviet IL-28 reach its destination. It therefore had no was it that napalm bombed the Koreans, or bombers from Cuba (provoking an angry re- sponse from Castro), see the Soviet minutes of the leeway for any unexpected contingency. The used delayed fused bombs and further, re- meeting (and Mikoyan’s ciphered telegram re- aircraft was off-course at nighttime when sorted to bombing the dams in order to starve porting on it to the CC CPSU) in appendices to fuel ran out, which the flight crew perceived, the people? Was Stalin to be held respon- Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. and it crashed when the fuel was exhausted. sible for the atomic bomb threats and plans Smith, OPERATION ANADYR: U.S. and So- It was impossible to resolve the ques- directed against the Korean people by viet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis tion of whether a South African decoy bea- Truman, MacArthur, Ridgeway, and last but (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 189-99. con had contributed to the plane being off not least by Eisenhower? Shortly before this issue of the CWIHP Bul- course, since the South African government Now that the Cold War is over (al- letin went to press, the Cuban government de- did not make the records of its military, though one would never know it looking at classified several of its memoranda of the Mikoyan -Cuban negotiations. A report on these materi- intelligence or air traffic control agencies the current military budget and the plans to als, and the divergences between them and the available to Mozambique. The South Afri- increase it) it is time we get back to History, Soviet records, will appear in a future issue.] can government instituted a National Board not as propaganda, not as political expedi- of Inquiry of its own, and closed it with a ency. declaration that the cause of the crash was accidental. However, given the date— Sincerely yours, 1986—substantial skepticism can be per- mitted as to whether South Africa would Ephraim Schulman have disclosed the operation of a beacon if 160 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT “LESSONS” CLINTON EXECUTIVE ORDER CARTER-BREZHNEV continued from page 115 continued from page 143 continued from page 154 Stenografische Niederschrift,” February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 27/208/85. cation of state of the art technology within a presented the dual American proposal in his talks 42. “Oplot mira i sotsializma,” Krasnaya zvezda, 14 U.S. weapon system; in Moscow with Soviet leaders, in particular May 1966, 5. (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, on 28-30 43. “La Roumanie n’a formule aucune demande en ce that remain in effect; March 1977. The Soviet side flatly rejected both qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du (6) reveal information that would seriously variants in the American initiative, insisting on ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest,” strict adherence to the Vladivostok framework L’Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, 3. and demonstrably impair relations between the 44. “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender United States and a foreign government, or and refusing to table a counter-proposal. Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing The dispute quickly broke into public view in Vertrages,” July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, diplomatic activities of the United States; a series of dueling press conferences. On March IV 2/202/431. (7) reveal information that would clearly 30, Vance told reporters in Moscow that “the 45. “Komplexny material: Cvicenie ‘VLTAVA’,” in and demonstrably impair the current ability of Soviets told us they had examined our two pro- VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and United States Government officials to protect posals and did not find either acceptable. They “Vyhodnotenie cvicenia ‘VLTAVA’.” VHA Praha, F. the President, Vice President, or other officials proposed nothing new on their side.” In Wash- Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2. ington the same day, Carter defended the propos- 46. Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiska for whom protections services, in the interest of strategicheskogo naznacheniya, 125-126. national security, are authorized; als as a “fair, balanced” route to a “substantial 47. See, e.g., ibid., 125-126. See also “Razvitie voennogo (8) reveal information that would seriously reduction” in nuclear arms. Next, in his own, iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny and demonstrably impair current national unusual press conference, Gromyko angrily de- po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 325-334. security emergency preparedness plans; or nounced the proposals Vance delivered as a 48. See ibid., 330-336 and passim. (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international “cheap and shady maneuver” to seek U.S. nuclear agreement. superiority, described as “basically false” Mark Kramer is a research associate at Brown Carter’s claim that Vance had presented a “broad University’s Center for Foreign Policy Development [Ed. note: For the full text of E.O. 12958, see disarmament program,” and complained, “One and Harvard University’s Russian Research Center. the Federal Register, 20 April 1995 (60 cannot talk about stability when a new leadership An earlier version of this article was presented at a Federal Register, pp. 19825-19843).] conference on “The Cuban Missile Crisis in Light of arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved New Archival Documents,” co-sponsored by the Rus- before.” sian State Archival Service and the U.S. Naval Acad- Those interested in additional information emy, in Moscow, 27-29 September 1994. on this acrimonious episode in U.S.-Soviet rela- tions and the SALT II negotiations may wish to COLD WAR consult, in addition to the memoirs of former INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT officials (including Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Kornienko, et al.), the accounts by Strobe Talbott, The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson Interna- Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New tional Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. York: Harper & Row, 1979; Raymond L. Garthoff, MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Wash- on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “ the other side”—the former ington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The 883-94; and forthcoming publications emerging project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and from the Carter-Brezhnev Project.] consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (U. of Maryland/Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio U./Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington U.). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, 1. [Ed. note: The texts of those messages, as well as and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters, and Update Harriman’s related records of conversation with Carter, items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Con- gress, Washington, D.C.] views. Copies are available free upon request. 2. [Ed. note: The State Department had protested the arrest on February 3 of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a promi- Cold War International History Project Bulletin nent dissident, for alleged currency violations.] Issue 5 (Spring 1995) 3. [Ed. note: Evidently an allusion to Carter’s support- Woodrow Wilson Center ive letter to Andrei Sakharov, disclosed on February 17, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. 1977.] Washington, D.C. 20560 4. [Ed. note: When shown this translation by the editor Tel.: (202) 357-2967; Fax: (202) 357-4439 of the CWIHP Bulletin during an informal discussion at the May 1977 Carter-Brezhnev conference in Georgia, e-mail (editorial inquiries): [email protected] Vance denied the accuracy of the comments attributed e-mail (requests for copies ONLY): [email protected] to him here by Dobrynin, saying that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had exaggerated his response.] Editor: James G. Hershberg 5. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to the use of the “hot Associate Editors: P.J. Simmons, Bonnie Terrell line” for this letter noted by G. M. Kornienko in his Researchers: Mark Doctoroff, Michelle King, Stephen Connors, Helen Christakos, Daniel Rozas introduction.]

“CWIHP: Helping to Change the Objective Correlation of Sources.”