William James on Free Will: a Personal Response to the Dilemma of Determinism

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William James on Free Will: a Personal Response to the Dilemma of Determinism Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1962 William James on Free Will: A Personal Response to the Dilemma of Determinism Robert Michael Buren Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Buren, Robert Michael, "William James on Free Will: A Personal Response to the Dilemma of Determinism" (1962). Master's Theses. 1753. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1753 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1962 Robert Michael Buren - W 01 $e' - r1m' mas ••' .' wttT.IAM JAMFS ON FREE WILL. A PERSONAL RESPONSE '1'0 THE DILEMMA (!! DEl'ERMINISM by R. Michael Buren, S.J. A Thes!. Submitted to the Faculty or the Graduate School or Loyola University in Partial P'ul!ullment or the Requirements tor the Degree of Master or Arts June 1962 ,'" ..........'---------- ...--_ .... -- .._-- .....-- ...•••.•" .... 1.. '.' ... ·....... '. ". .Ji..Iip$I_"la&,~ ~'i LIFE Robert Michael Buren, S.J., 'was born in Louisville, Kentucky, September 13, 1936. He completed. his elementary education at St. George Grammar School in that city. His secondary education was received at St. Mary's College High School, St. Mary, Kentucky, and he was graduated in May, 1954. The following September he returned to St. Mary's College and completed two years or study there. The author entered the Society of Jesus in September, 1956 at Mil!ord Nov.1- tiate of the Sacred Heart, Millord, Ohio. During his three years at Millord he was registered as an undergraduate in the College of Arts and Sciences in Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. In August, 1959 he began the atud;y or Philosophy and Science at West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, and was enrolled in Loyola University, whence he received the Bachelor of Al-ts degree in June, 1960. Since that time he has pursued graduate studies in Philosophy in Loyola University. r' iii ... ez' k • • 'm - TABLE CF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 Purpose of the thesis--Unity and consistency of James' philosophic views--The particular problem of this thesis as seen in the pro­ gress of thought throughout its chapterss (1) James' general phil­ osophic view of lit'e; (2) His will-theory ih the Principles and his refusal to handle the free-will problem; (3) The application of his general outlook to the problem in his philosophical writ­ ings; (4) Remarks. II. JANES' PHILOSOPHICAL VIEVI OF LIFEs THE CIRCUMSTANCES NECESSARY FOR SATISFTING A PffiSONAt NEID •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 James' philosophic views are primarily subjectivistic, determined by the man--The man, his early years--His increasing neurasthenic condition accompanied by the approach of a spiritual crisis--For­ tunate outcome--James' debt to Renouvier--The meaning of James' victory over the crisis of l870--Specific quality needed to com­ bat spiritual sickness then upon him--The fact that it was re­ solved by a philosophical insight--How James arrived at his dis­ tinctive philosophical approach--~~at it was--His need for the vigorous exercise of his internal faculties--"Circumstancesll necessary were his philosophical views--Interdependence of dif­ ferent facets of his philosophy with the option for free will; pluralism, radical empiricism, meliorism, pragmatism, novelty-­ Final recapitulation of thesis of this chapter--Evidences of the centrality in James' philosophy of his belief in the freedom of the will. In. THE ffiINCIPLES, MECHANISM VS. INDETERMINISM, A DILEHMA • • • • • • 26 Predominance of will-theory in tne Prlnciplcs--Sources of James' theory--Plan of this Chapter, its eight parts--Preliminary def­ inition of IlwiUII--Relationahip of psychology and philosophy in the Princip~s--(l) Instinctual movements of the will--J~~es' explosion of the "feeling of innervation" theory-(2) Ideo-motor action--() Action after deliberation--~ive types of decision-- . Importance of fifth type to the free-will controversy--(4) States of the will--(5) Pleasure and pain as springs of action--(6) iv - • ' ,we j • M$ t Me r. r Will-proper, the importance of attention--(7) ~uestion of free wi11--Strong case is made in favor or deterrninism--Evidence equally strong is given for the other side of the argument-- A dilemma--Freedom vs. determinism controversy cannot be han­ dled within the Bcope of psycho10gy--P1ace of other references throughout the Principles to the two key chapters--James' statement of his philosophical views concerning the controversy can be found in the Principles. IT. THE vJILL TO BELIEVE: A MCRAL SOLUTION TO THE ffiOBLEM . 61 James' shift of interest to phi10Bophy--The 90's--The Will to Believe--Be1ief and its relationship to the will must ~lear- 1y understood--Doctrine of the will to believe--Two cases where the will can legitimately determine belief--This is not willful subjectivism: conditions for a valid use of the will to believe --A "tender-minded pragmatic theory of meaning--The "faith1adder" of A Pluralistic Universe--"The Dilemma of Determinism"--Its context, p1ura1ism--A systematic study or it--Two suppositions --Determinism--Indeterminism--"Postulates of Reality" will de­ termine the victor--Pessimism and human feelings of regret-­ Subjectivism--The true dilemma: Pessimism vs.subjectivism-­ James' vigorous option of indeterminism--Action--A second argu­ ment--Two objections answered--Other writings--1876--1882-­ Talks to Teachers--The Philosophy 3 Syl1abUS'--Essays in Radical EmpiriCIsm--Pragmatism--Meaning of Truth--Some :~oblems Of Philosophy--Summaryof texts. -- - V. REMARKS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 94 James' consideration of freedom solely within a larger context of subjectivity--Fundarnenta1 freedom--The norm of "conscious awareness"--Janv3s' refusal to use it to arrive at freedom--Psy­ chology of automatism vs. philosophy of freedom in the Prinei­ ples--Resort to will when intellect could carry on--Two theories of meaning make for a split phil080phy--Conclusion. BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lOS ) Ph t p ,.) • - $" ? ':te r . ' CHAPrER ONE ... - INTRODUCTION The purpose or this thesis is an exposition or Will.1am James' views con­ cerning the free-w1l1 controversy. An err art will be made to see how the prob­ lem arose for him, the m&rmer in whioh he viewed it, and the way that, after many years or personal difficulty and intellectual struggle, he ultimately re- solved the problem. Before beginning these matters, however, a word about the unity and consistency of James' philosophic views is in order. James has often been taunted, posthumously, with the accusation that he is nunsystematic.tt If by a system of phnosop~ is meant fitting everything in the universe into its proper logical.l.y demarcated compartment, James has no sys­ tem of philosophy. In fact he would rebel against the thought of such a system, both in himself' or in others. He hated system, in thill sense, and his own pic- ture or the world leaves it full of loose ends and uncompleted processes. He considered this the only true description of' the wcrld as we find it. On the other hand, 1£ one means by a system or phUosop~ the answering of a wide varietyof' questions in the light of a ffIW basic principles, then James is systematic; and, his philosophic views are unified and oonsistent. James' writings and lestures cover a span of over thirty-tive years, arxi the • S' un 51' Z'P 7 '2 un 12' 2 clear example or this, it is obvious to anyone who has read more than a little or James, that his theory of truth, his views on ethics, hi. radical empiricism, his cosmology and his philosophy or religion, are all based on h18 distinctive pragmatic theory or meaning. It'is hoped that this thesis will also illustrate thill same unity and consistency with regard to James' handling or the problem of free will. Because James' philosophical views were so prof'use and varied, and because he wrote in the popular style of the lecturer, it is necessary before begin­ ning to show clearly where the matter of this thesis fits into the complex pattern of' his thought. Also, James had a distinctive way of viewing the op­ erations of the human c:rganlsm, and the psychological terms that are or partic- ular concern here, "will," "free-will," "will to believe," and "belief," must be clearly explained so as to avoid confusion; however, this can be done in the proper place in following chapters. The best way to situate the particular ". problem of this thesis is to show briefly the sweep of the thought here as it progresses through this and succeeding chapters. In the following ohapter the concern is with James' general philosophical. approach to lit e. We will show what he understands philosophy to be, and how this understanding or his clearly illustrates the stance that he takes in grap­ pling with the problems to come. It is part of' the thesis or this chapter that James' personal. psychological make-up has a lot to do with his view or life and, therefore, with his philosophy. Just as hil!l personal. make-up can tell us something about his advocacy of' pluralism over monism,
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