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PDF Hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen The following full text is a publisher's version. For additional information about this publication click this link. http://hdl.handle.net/2066/98661 Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to change. 1 Fighting Spirit Kampfgruppe Chill and the German recovery in the West between 4 September and 9 November 1944, a case study Jack Didden ©Jack Didden, 2012 No part of this thesis may be reproduced in any form or by any means without written permission from the author. ISBN 978 90 800393 08 2 Fighting Spirit Kampfgruppe Chill and the German recovery in the West between 4 September and 9 November 1944, a case study Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann volgens besluit van het college van decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 1 oktober 2012 om 13.30 uur precies door Jacobus Maria Cornelis Didden geboren op 23 juli 1952 te Waalwijk 3 Promotoren: Prof. dr. R. Aerts Prof. dr. W. Klinkert (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Manuscriptcommissie: Prof. dr. T.L.M. Engelen Prof. dr. R. Moore (University of Sheffield) Prof. dr. B. Schoenmaker (Universiteit Leiden) Paranimfen: Johan van Doorn Maarten Swarts 4 Contents Introduction 5 The main questions 6 The time frame 9 Sources 10 Outline 11 Geographical names 12 Personal names 13 Nomenclature 13 Part One The theoretical framework 14 1.1.1 Strategic, operational and tactical levels, definitions 14 1.1.2 Bridgehead strategy 18 1.1.3 Command and Auftragstaktik 19 1.2 The Wehrmacht in the West, 1944-1945, an overview 22 1.3.1 Kampfgruppen 34 1.3.2 Kampfgruppen in the West, 1944-1945 36 Part Two Crisis and Opportunity 39 2.1. The Western Front at the end of August 1944 39 2.2 Allied strategy until 4 September 1944 41 2.3 German Strategy until 4 September 1944 44 2.4 Chill and the 85. Infanterie-Division until 4 September 1944 46 2.5 The picture 4-5 September 1944 53 Part Three The Fighting 71 3.1. Albert Canal (6-13 September 1944) 71 3.2. Geel (7-13 September 1944) 123 3.3. Ten Aard (13-20 September 1944) 142 3.4. Market Garden (11-26 September 1944) 155 3.5. Goirle (27 September – 10 October 1944) 204 3.6. Woensdrecht (24 September – 19 October 1944) 230 3.7. Western Brabant (21 October – 9 November 1944) 261 Part Four The Western Front on 9 November 1944 324 4.1 The military situation 324 4.2 The German and Allied strategic positions 325 4.3 Postscript for Kampfgruppe Chill et al 327 Part Five Conclusions 330 5.1 Achievements 330 5.2 Analysis 334 5.2.1 The Physical Component 334 5.2.1.1 Size 334 5.2.1.2 Armour 335 5.2.1.3 Elite Troops 336 5.2.2 The Conceptual Component 339 5.2.3 The Moral Component 341 5.2.3.1 Morale 341 5.2.3.2 Leadership 347 5.2.3.3 Organisation 349 5.3. Kampfgruppe Chill as a case study 349 5.3.1 Kampfgruppe Chill as a Kampfgruppe 350 5.3.2 Kampfgruppe Chill as a Wehrmacht unit 352 5.3.3 Final conclusions 354 5.4 Postscripts 356 5.4.1 The Royal Air Force 356 5.4.2 The Kriegsmarine 358 5.4.3 Communications 359 5.4.4 War Crimes 360 5.5 A Final thought 361 Appendix 1: Structure 85. Infanterie-Division 31.07.44 362 Appendix 2: Structure Kampfgruppe Chill 363 Appendix 3: Kampfgruppe Chill, a chronology 364 Appendix 4: Casualties 5 September – 9 November 1944 365 Samenvatting 366 Acknowledgements 370 Bibliography 371 Maps 388 About the author 394 Index of personal names 395 5 Introduction ‘Der endgültige Zusammenbruch im Westen, ja das Ende des Krieges schien unmittelbar bevorzustehen. Doch es kam anders.’1 ‘One reaches the conclusion that these six short weeks saw one of the most successful advances of any British army – indeed of any army ever formed.’2 ‘The movements of great states are often directed by as slender springs as those of individuals.’3 ‘Geschichte ist immer das Ergebnis konstruktiver Reflexion.’4 One day in the late summer of 1944 the Allied armies were thundering across Northern France and Belgium, sweeping aside all German resistance and leaving dazed enemy units in the wake of their advance, almost literally the next they faced the same dogged defence they had such a tough time cracking in Normandy. It was an amazing feat, because, ‘Retreat does not build a strong fighting spirit in a unit…’5 This book is the result of seven years’ research into a particular Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) that played a key role during the final stage of the Second World War in Western Europe. The background is the result of a long time fascination on the author’s part with events during the first weeks of September 1944. For a time the Allied troops were surging forward across France and Belgium, seemingly invincible, covering 250 miles in six days, then the situation was back to what it had been in Normandy, a slow, grinding and costly advance. The men at the top certainly believed the end was nigh. The SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) Intelligence Summary at the end of August stated that, ‘the enemy in the West has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach.’6 Barely two weeks later the Allies were back to the bloody slugging match they had just left behind them in Normandy. What had caused this sudden turn of events? Was it indeed because of a crisis in logistics on the Allied side, or is Van Creveld right and were logistics merely used as an excuse post facto?7 This sudden reversal of fortunes is also reflected in the findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee’s (JIC) report of 5 September 1944.8 It reads ‘However, whatever action Hitler may now take it will be too late to affect the issue in the West 1 Joachim Ludewig, Der deutsche Rückzug aus Frankreich 1944, Freiburg 1994, 333. 2 Peter Rostron, The Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC, Monty’s Army Commander, Barnsley 2010, 128. 3 David Hume, History of England, 427, quoted in Eelco Runia, De Pathologie van de Veldslag, Geschiedenis en geschiedschrijving in Tolstoj’s Oorlog en Vrede, Rotterdam 1995, 119. 4 Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, München 2007, 21. 5 Robert R. Rush, A Different Perspective: Cohesion, Morale, and Operational Effectiveness in the German Army, Fall 1944, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 25 (1999), No.3, 477-508. 6 SHAEF IS 23 and 24, 26.08.44, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, The European Theater of Operations, The Supreme Command, Washington 1954, 244-5. 7 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, New York 1977, 227. 8 Quoted in full in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy Vol V, London 1956, 399-401. 6 where organised German resistance will gradually disintegrate under our attack…’ The JIC felt that ‘Germany has suffered further catastrophic disasters. The process of final military defeat leading to the cessation of organised resistance has begun in the West.’ They were right in concluding that in this theatre of operations ‘the German front (…) virtually ceased to exist’ as between Antwerp and Maastricht there was no continuous front as such. In effect the JIC were predicting the end of the war in the foreseeable future, although –wisely- they did not specify a date. Their German counterparts shared this sentiment in early September and German commanders were amazed that the seemingly inevitable collapse did not happen after all. After the war they told Basil Liddell Hart, the well-known British military theoretician, that ‘das Alliierte Oberkommando eine grosse Gelegenheit versäumt hatte, den Krieg im Herbst 1944 zu beenden.’9 In fact, at the time, they considered what happened nothing short of a miracle. For example, Generalleutnant Karl Sievers, the commanding officer of the 719. Infanterie-Division, who was despatched from the Netherlands to stem the Allied avalanche, afterwards wrote that ‘Das schier Unmoegliche gelang.’10 Likewise, Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Chef des Generalstabes des Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), named the chapter dealing with this period ‘Das zweite “Wunder am Westwall’’.11 Another historian, Peter Lieb, in his groundbreaking study of the Wehrmacht in France, also called this sudden reversal of fortune the ‘Wunder im Westen’.12 This so-called miracle, this sudden reversal of fortunes, is all the more astonishing since the rout in Normandy was one of the major blows to German morale during the Second World War. A recent study about the German army concluded, ‘die (…) heillose Flucht der Truppen aus Frankreich war psychologisch nach Stalingrad zweiffellos der zweite grosse Einschnitt in der Kriegswahrnehmung der deutschen Soldaten. Die Normandie war das Verdun des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Nirgendwo sonst sind mehr Menschen in so kurzer Zeit, nämlich in zwölf Wochen, auf so engen Raum getötet und verwundet worden.’13 To bounce back from this was indeed nothing short of miraculous. But how was this possible? Was it indeed just a case of the Allies not seizing the opportunity? Trying to answer this question was the starting point of this study.
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