Why Do Political Parties Compete Over Some Issues and Remain Silent About Others?

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Why Do Political Parties Compete Over Some Issues and Remain Silent About Others? Why Do Political Parties Compete Over Some Issues and Remain Silent About Others? Explaining Polity/Policy Issue Competition in the Electoral Arenas of Contemporary European Democracies Baiba Witajewska-Baltvilka Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, April 2016 2 European University Institute Department of Political and Social Sciences Why do political parties compete over some issues and remain silent about others? Explaining polity/policy issue competition in the electoral arenas of contemporary European democracies Baiba Witajewska-Baltvilka Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Examining Board Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute, Supervisor Prof. Stefano Bartolini, European University Institute Prof. Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Aarhus University Prof. Thomas Poguntke, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf © Baiba Witajewska-Baltvilka, 2016 No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author 4 Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme I Baiba Witajewska-Baltvilka certify that I am the author of the work Why Do Political Parties Compete Over Some Issues and Remain Silent About Others? I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others. I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications. I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297). The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that this work consists of 55045 words. Statement of language correction: This thesis has been corrected for linguistic and stylistic errors. I certify that I have checked and approved all language corrections, and that these have not affected the content of this work. Signature and date: 5 6 Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to Professor Hanspeter Kriesi for his support, encouragement, patience and trust in me, as well as all the valuable comments and suggestions he made to help improving my work. Not only is he a great scholar, but also an excellent supervisor – always constructive and having both very general and detailed ideas. Working with him was a great pleasure and privilege. I would also like to thank Professor Peter Mair (2051-2011), who assisted me in my seemingly never-ending search for ‘an interesting research question’, as well as Professor Zslot Enyedi for his valuable remarks and support during one of the most crucial stages of writing. I am also grateful to all my colleagues and participants at the EUI seminars for their constructive comments, which were among the sharpest and, therefore, very helpful. During my stay in Florence, I received a lot of support and good words from my EUI friends. I appreciate you all and am very happy you were present with me then. The final stage of writing-up would not be possible without help of my mum and my parents in law, who overtook my other duties so that I could fully focus on my work. Finally, to my Love, I have lost count of how many Steinways I owe. I will have to work a lot to earn for that. Thank you! 7 8 Abstract Political parties tend to compete over a wide range of issues in their electoral campaigns. Although the choice of issues that parties make can, to a great extent, be explained by several well-established theories (e.g. ownership, median voter), in recent decades the patterns of party issue competition in European democracies have become more complex. Current theories fall short of explaining fully why parties choose to compete over certain issues but not others, and what motivates them to follow issue strategies that either converge or diverge from that of their competitors. Approaching this question from the perspective of polity vs. policy issue competition, this thesis aims to identify the factors that increase the salience of polity issues and shape the patterns of convergence and divergence on polity/policy issue competition. I argue that institutional factors, such as party system competitiveness and left/right polarisation, along with dominant cultural values, the state of the economy, and a party’s position within the given party system all influence political parties' behavior in polity/policy issue competition. In order to test this hypothesis, I have conducted quantitative panel-data analysis (with the random effects and fixed effects models for the sample of 18 Western European countries between 1979 and 2013) and produced five case studies (pre-election campaigns in the United Kingdom in 1979, 1997 and 2010, and in Italy in 1979 and 2008). The results of this study suggest that, as predicted, in more competitive and polarised (along the left/right axis) party systems, political parties tend to emphasise polity-type issues, as well as to diverge more sharply on polity/policy issue competition. Equally strong results also appeared for the factor of the party’s position within the relevant party system – minor and non-governing parties compete over polity issues more fiercely than their counterparts in power. Finally, while economic factors proved likely to be the key driving force for the salience of polity issues in party competition, the results did not indicate that dominant cultural values produced any effect on polity/policy issue competition. 9 10 Content 1. Introduction 21 Polity/Policy Issue Competition in Europe: Questions and Hypothesis 21 State of Current Research 27 Research Method and Structure of the Thesis 30 2. Party Issue Competition at the Electoral Level 33 Issues, Issue Salience and Issue Competition 33 The Polity/Policy Dimension 39 Explaining Polity Issue Divergence and Salience from the Institutional Perspective 43 Explaining Polity Issue Salience from the Socio-Economic and Cultural Perspectives 48 3. Research Design 53 Key Method 53 Operationalisation and Sources of Data 54 Methods of Analysis 62 Sample and Time Period 65 4. Explaining Polity/Policy Issue Competition: Quantitative Study 69 Introduction 69 Party System Competitiveness and Polity/Policy Issue Salience and Divergence 70 Dominant Cultural Values and Polity/Policy Issue Salience 80 Socio-economic Factors and Polity/Policy Issue Salience 83 A Party’s Position in the Party System and Issue Divergence 87 Summary of Findings 91 11 5. Party Issue Competition in the United Kingdom 95 Introduction 95 General Characteristics of Parties and the Party System in the UK 95 Party Issue Competition between 1979 and 2010 98 Issue Competition in the 1979 General Elections 106 Issue Competition in the 1997 General Elections 115 Issue Competition in the 2010 General Elections 124 Comparison of Issue Competition in All Elections 130 Summary of Findings 131 6. Explaining Party Issue Competition: Qualitative Study of Party Issue Competition in Italy 135 Introduction 135 General Characteristics of Parties and the Party System in Italy 135 Party Issue Competition between 1979 and 2008 146 Party Issue Competition in the 1979 Elections 150 Party Issue Competition in the 2008 Elections 156 Comparison of Issue Competition in both Elections 163 Summary of Findings 165 7. Comparison of Electoral Issue Competition between the United Kingdom and Italy 169 8. Conclusion 171 12 Bibliography 177 Appendices 189 13 14 Abbreviations and Acronyms AD – Alleanza Democratica/Democratic Alliance AN – National Alliance Conservatives – Conservative Party in the United Kingdom Daisy – Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita/Democracy is the Freedom - Daisy DC – Democrazia Cristiana/Christian Democratic Party DS – Democratici di Sinistra/Democrats of the Left EU – European Union FI – Forza, Italia!/Go, Italy! IdV – Italia dei Valori/Italy of Values Labour – Labour Party in the United Kingdom LibDems/Liberals - Liberal Party in the United Kingdom LN – Lega Nord/Northern League M-DL - Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita/Democracy is the Freedom - Daisy M5S – Movimento Cinque Stele/Movement of Five Stars MSI or MSI-DN – Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale/Italian Social Movement – National Right PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano/Italian Communist Party PD – Partito Democratico/Democratic Party PDS – Partito Democratico della Sinistra/Democratic Party of the Left PdL or PDL – Il Popolo della Libertà/People of Freedom PDSI – Partito Democratico Sociale Italiano/Italian Democratic Socialist Party PLI – Partito Liberale Italiano/Italian Liberal Party PRC – Partito della Rifondazione Comunista/Communist Refoundation Party PR – Partito Radicale/Radical Party PRI – Partito Repubblicano Italiano/Italian Republican Party PPI – Partito Populare Italiano/Italian People’s Party PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano/Italian Socialist Party SC – Scelta Civica/Civic Choice 15 SDP – Social Democratic Party in the United Kingdom UdC or UDC
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