Kuwait's Post-Arab Spring Islamist Landscape

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ISSUE BRIEF 08.08.18 Kuwait’s Post-Arab Spring Islamist Landscape: The End of Ideology?

Courtney Freer, Ph.D., London School of Economics

groups meanwhile remain politically active THE ARAB SPRING IN KUWAIT: and pragmatic, largely by maintaining PRIORITIZING POLITICAL REFORM a rather reliably loyalist position with By the time the Arab Spring came to Kuwait, government policies. the country was already undergoing serious From 2010 to 2011, members of the political debates about the prevalence cross-ideological opposition, including of state corruption. Indeed, the need for the Muslim Brotherhood, some Salafi accountable governance was a common groups, and secular political blocs, called theme of protests throughout the region. In for the questioning of Prime Minister Kuwait, such concerns came to overshadow Shaykh Nasser Mohammad al-Sabah on the more social and ideological agendas that charges of inappropriate use of public had previously been the focus of Islamists, finances for a second time, leading to the such as gender segregation in schools and largest demonstrations in Kuwaiti history the proclamation of sharia as the rather in September 2011. In this atmosphere, than a primary source of legislation. The the opposition also increasingly began Muslim Brotherhood, as Kuwait’s oldest agitating for electing prime ministers and and most organized Islamist organisation, other cabinet members, all of whom are appointed by the emir, as a means of While cross-ideological, having been established in 1951, tended pro-reform movements to voice support for such policies both enhancing public oversight of governance inside and out of parliament. This Sunni and diminishing corruption. uniting members of the group created a dedicated political arm, In the midst of protests in late 2011, Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the cabinet resigned and parliament was secular political actors dissolved, leading to elections in February in 1991 to manage the Brotherhood’s crumbled elsewhere in electoral participation. In recent years, and 2012. In these polls, the public elected a particularly since the Arab Spring, the ICM decidedly pro-opposition parliament, with the Middle East, they has come to focus its agenda more urgently 34 out of 50 seats going to members of the have persisted in Kuwait on agitating for political reform rather than broad-based opposition, and with Salafi and even expanded to the promotion of social policies often linked and Brotherhood blocs each winning all four seats they contested. After only four months, include increasingly to Islamist blocs. While cross-ideological, politically pragmatic pro-reform movements uniting members however, the pro-opposition parliament of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular was dissolved, with the Constitutional Court Salafi blocs. political actors crumbled elsewhere in the declaring the dissolution of the prior 2009 Middle East, I argue that they have in fact parliament unconstitutional and reinstating persisted in Kuwait and even expanded to that decidedly loyalist legislature. This action, include increasingly politically pragmatic a rare foray of the judiciary into political (or Ikhwanized) Salafi blocs. Shiite Islamist life in Kuwait, galvanized members of the RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.08.18

opposition from varying ideological strands, for insulting the emir from contesting including the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, parliamentary elections,1 as well as a law and secular blocs, to form the National mandating DNA testing for all citizens Front for the Protection of the Constitution (which has since been overturned).2 in September 2012. Such cross-ideological Such policies, in addition to widespread coalitions originally emerged as early as the suspicions of government corruption in 1990s, helping the ICM earn more seats in Kuwait, galvanized the opposition blocs Sunni Islamist parliament, but tended to fall apart largely that had previously boycotted the elections representation, due to disagreements between secular and to resume participating in electoral politics comprised of both Islamist blocs about the urgency of social in 2016. At the time, it was thought that reform legislation. In the 2000s, however, these opposition groups could block the the Muslim Brotherhood such coalitions have dissolved largely due to most objectionable policies from within and Salafi groups, changes in legislative law introduced by the parliament at the very least, and at most, was the most drastically government that have spurred political blocs they could enact reforms to enhance affected by the change to reorganize their campaigns. public participation in government. The In October 2012, Emir Shaykh Sabah opposition’s return to the polls in November in electoral law. al-Ahmad al-Sabah, warning of threats to 2016 predictably altered parliament’s national unity, persuaded the cabinet to composition: 60 percent of seats changed change electoral law ahead of the December hands, amid 70 percent voter turnout—quite 2012 polls. This move granted each voter an indictment of the previous assembly. one rather than four votes, a measure Throughout the post-Arab Spring era, both expected to strengthen the representation Sunni and Shiite Islamists have been active of traditionally loyalist tribal groups at the participants in Kuwait’s political system, expense of ideological political blocs. This though, broadly speaking, Sunni Islamists decision ultimately led to an opposition- have become more involved with the cross- The government’s wide boycott of the polls. As a result of the ideological opposition and Shias have been sentencing of 67 cross-opposition boycott, parliament was associated with a loyalist position. opposition activists dominated by a blend of liberal and tribal blocs, with independent pro-government to harsh prison MPs holding 30 out of 50 seats. Within THE POST-ARAB SPRING ISLAMIST sentences in December the opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood’s LANDSCAPE political bloc was entirely absent from the 2017 for having stormed The Muslim Brotherhood parliament in 2011 legislature for the first time since its creation in 1991 because it refused to participate in After the Arab Spring, and because of only strengthened the election. Sunni Islamist representation, the change to electoral law that granted cross-ideological comprised of both the Muslim Brotherhood each Kuwaiti citizen one rather than four opposition unity. and Salafi groups, was therefore the votes each in 2012, the Kuwaiti Muslim most drastically affected by the change Brotherhood, through its political bloc the in electoral law, as their number of seats ICM, removed itself from institutionalized decreased from 23 MPs to four. Several political life. In the words of one former MP popular Salafi blocs joined the election from the ICM, the bloc hoped to demonstrate boycott, leaving Salafis independent of these that “[t]he more we stay away, the more blocs to win seats. Elections in June 2013 we show it’s the government that cannot yielded very similar results, as the opposition perform.”3 Ahead of the November 2016 boycott continued. polls, however, the ICM became one of the While loyalist parliaments, which served first opposition groups to determine that from December 2012 to October 2016, political participation would be worthwhile sought to stave off the implementation despite its reservations about the new of vastly unpopular austerity measures electoral system. as low oil prices persisted, they passed Leaders of the ICM believed that the several controversial laws, including a Brotherhood enjoyed enough popular law barring those who had been jailed support to garner seats in parliament.

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Indeed, upon its return to parliamentary outreach. Salafi organizations, increasingly life in 2016, the ICM won three seats, interested in supporting political reform, do though a fourth is informally under its not benefit from this structural division, and control in the current legislature, meaning as Salafi groups in Kuwait have become that a fourth MP reliably votes alongside increasingly politicized, they have splintered the ICM in the legislature. Although off from the country’s traditionally quietist members of the ICM do not always vote organizations, as explained below. in line with each other in parliament, as a whole, they have become part of Salafis the opposition movement, though they Kuwait’s Salafis first became politically previously enjoyed closer relations with organized in 1981 as the Society for the the government, particularly before the Revival of the Islamic Heritage (RIHS), Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The government’s inspired by the ideology of Egyptian Shaykh sentencing of 67 opposition activists, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, who including ICM MP Jamaan al-Harbash, to approved of Salafi participation in politics harsh prison sentences in December 2017 despite objections from the quietist Salafi for having stormed parliament in 2011 only clerics.7 The RIHS participated in the 1981 strengthened cross-ideological opposition polls—marking the first time anywhere unity. Although the accused were quickly in the world that Salafis participated in released from custody, the final result from parliamentary elections—and impressively Throughout the the Court of Cassation released in July 2018 won two seats in parliament.8 Following post-Arab Spring era, upheld shorter sentences of three years for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, however, both Sunni and Shiite al-Harbash, as well as two other current the RIHS became more politically aligned Islamists have been MPs and the opposition figure Musallam with the government, with many members 4 active participants al-Barrak. having been granted government positions, The issue of corruption, which drove especially in the Ministry of Awqaf (religious in Kuwait’s political protests during the Arab Spring, continues endowments) and Islamic Affairs.9 system, though to unite the cross-ideological opposition and Kuwait’s Salafi landscape became Sunni Islamists have encourage the political pragmatism of Sunni divided after the Iraqi invasion and become more involved Islamists. Indeed, the latest parliamentary occupation in 1990-1991: one branch questioning of the prime minister in May became politically active because of its with the cross- 2018, filed by one member of the secular objections to the government’s handling ideological opposition opposition and one Salafi, largely focused of the crisis, and the other remained and Shias have been on reasons behind Kuwait’s decline in the politically inactive and loyal to the regime associated with a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published at all costs. The Islamic Salafi Association by Transparency International to rank (ISA) formed in 1991 in response to the loyalist position. perceived levels of corruption around the perceived co-optation of the RIHS by the world, as well as the government’s laxity in government and has subsequently become implementing legislation meant to target the largest Salafi bloc in parliament. The 5 financial crimes like bribery and graft. ISA’s agenda primarily emphasizes social The Muslim Brotherhood, as I have morality and loyalty to the government. The 6 argued elsewhere, has been on a trajectory Salafi Movement, created as an offshoot towards increasing politicization since of the ISA in 1996, openly promotes the 1991, when it created the ICM. Because the implementation of political reform. This Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood is divided into movement has become one of the most a distinct political branch (hizb) and social outspoken Salafi blocs in voicing a desire movement branch (haraka), it is well- to increase popular political participation. It positioned to balance pragmatic political has also become increasingly oppositional concerns with spiritual and ideological ones. towards the government.10 The Umma Thus, electoral issues are the purview of the Party, established in 2005 as an offshoot political branch, while the social movement of the Salafi Movement, is the only more branch handles more informal social

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oppositional Salafi bloc. Furthermore, even to win only one seat. Neither of these though political parties are illegal in Kuwait, blocs participated in the opposition’s the Umma Party was established as a self- parliamentary boycott, and the NIA actually proclaimed political party. The Umma Party benefitted the most from the decreased is most similar in priority and structure to competition during the boycotted elections. the Muslim Brotherhood, as it mainly calls for Indeed, in the first post-boycott election, enhanced participation in government.11 Over the NIA had more seats in parliament than time, Kuwait’s activist Salafis have become any other single bloc, at five.14 more Ikhwanized, generally privileging While not experiencing Ikhwanization political agendas over social reforms. in terms of working with political blocs In the 2016 election, while the pro- of different ideologies to effect political government blocs had a poor showing, change, the Shiite movements are acting independent Salafis won four seats. This pragmatically to maintain freedom to form result signals a shift in the Salafi landscape political blocs, as are Sunni Islamist groups, In the 2016 election, towards the opposition and away from suggesting the limits to Islamist ideological while the pro- previously organized political blocs. The influence within the parliamentary system. government blocs rise in independent Salafi candidates, and Since the scandal of the Imad Mughniyeh now MPs, further suggests frustration with affair in 2008 and increasingly in the past had a poor showing, bloc policies of boycotting and an inability decade, Kuwait’s Shiite Islamist movements independent Salafis to unite Salafis from different blocs. It have come to be identified with regime won four seats. This may also signal a new strategy of running positions, in this way maintaining their result signals a shift independently as a means to circumvent safety and position within political life. the 2012 electoral law, which many Kuwaitis in the Salafi landscape believe was implemented to erode support towards the opposition bases of organized blocs by decreasing the LOOKING FORWARD and away from number of votes per person from four to Broadly speaking, since the Arab Spring, previously organized one. Logically, then, activist Salafis and the we have not seen a targeted governmental Muslim Brotherhood have sought greater political blocs. campaign against Islamists or the Muslim cooperation through the Kuwaiti League Brotherhood in Kuwait, as has occurred of Preachers, which has granted ulama, a elsewhere in the region. Rather, it seems space for speaking about political reform, that the government is more concerned although it has not led to any formal about efforts that unite secular and Islamist 12 unification of political agendas. political blocs since such campaigns were successful in restoring parliament in 1992 Shiite Islamists and adopting five electoral districts in The National Islamic Alliance (NIA), 2006. As Bjorn Olav Utvik argues, while founded in 1979, is Kuwait’s primary Shiite politically active Sunni Islamists often begin Islamist political bloc, tracing its origins with a “moral watchdog approach” to gain to Hezbollah of Kuwait. The organization followers, their supporters subsequently follows the teaching of ‘Ali Khamenei yet expect the organization to gain more has been careful not to adhere too closely influence over government policies, in turn to pro-Iranian political stances. After the pushing Sunni Islamists to enter politics.15 Kuwaiti government summoned 1,500 Having gained a following by opposing Shias for mourning the death of Hezbollah the Muslim Brotherhood’s politicization, commander Imad Mughniyeh in 2008, the increasingly vocal politically active Salafis NIA has been particularly careful to maintain have come to resemble the Brotherhood good relations with the Kuwaiti government. in order to maintain political relevance Meanwhile the Justice and Peace Assembly in post-Arab Spring Kuwait, where (JPA) primarily comprises followers of the corruption has become a key issue. In Shirazi school13 and has a reputation of fact, the anti-corruption agenda has even being a reliably pro-government force in been increasingly resonant with Kuwait’s the National Assembly, though it tends traditionally loyalist tribal populations. 4 KUWAIT’S POST-ARAB SPRING ISLAMIST LANDSCAPE: THE END OF IDEOLOGY?

Sunni Islamist groups in Kuwait have 6. Courtney Freer, “Exclusion- learned the lessons of Islamist groups Moderation in the Gulf Context: Tracing elsewhere about overreaching in terms of the Development of Pragmatic Islamism in running too many candidates and of the Kuwait,” Middle Eastern Studies 54, no. 1 need for working across ideological lines to (2018): 1-21, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263 advance political reform, rather than trying 206.2017.1357031. to achieve it alone. Meanwhile Shiite Islamist 7. Bjorn Olav Utvik, “The Ikhwanization groups have also acted pragmatically to of the Salafis: Piety in the Politics of Egypt maintain their ability to act in political and Kuwait,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 1 blocs. Both Sunni and Shiite blocs in Kuwait, (April 2014): 23. then, have understood how the Arab Spring 8. Zoltan Pall, “Kuwaiti Salafism and its revealed the fragility of Islamist groups. In Growing Influence in the Levant,” Carnegie such an environment, the traditional Sunni Endowment for International Peace, Islamist focus on social policies and ideology last modified May 7, 2014, 12, https:// will also likely continue to diminish, with carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/ increasing focus on sweeping political kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growing- reform and less focus on serving as a influence-in-levant-pub-55514. so-called “sharia lobby.”16 9. Pall, “Kuwaiti Salafism,” 6-7. 10. Pall, “Kuwaiti Salafism,” 8. 11. Utvik, “Ikhwanization,” 23. ENDNOTES 12. Zoltan Pall, “Kuwaiti Salafism after 1. B. Izzak, “National Assembly the Arab Uprisings: The Reconfiguration of Approves Amendment to Election Law – the Power Balance,” Middle East Insights New Election Law Bars Those who Insult 125 (April 15, 2015): 4, https://mei.nus. God, Prophets, Amir,” Kuwait Times, June edu.sg/publication/insight-124-kuwaiti- 22, 2016, http://news.kuwaittimes.net/ salafism-after-the-arab-uprisings-the- website/national-assembly-approves- reconfiguration-of-the-power-balance/. amendment-election-law/. 13. Toby Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hiaz: 2. Hanan al-Saadoun, “Kuwait Set to A History of the Most Radical Saudi Shia Enforce DNA Testing Law on All – Officials Opposition Group,” Middle East Journal Reassure Tests Won’t be Used to Determine 64, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 182. The Shirazi Genealogy,” Kuwait Times, January 23, 2016, School follows the teachings of the Shiite http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/ author and political leader Ayatollah Sayed kuwait-to-enforce-dna-testing-law-on- Mohammad al-Shirazi, rather than those of citizens-expats-visitors-tests-wont-be- Ayatollah Khomeini, with whom he had a used-to-determine-genealogy-affect- power struggle in post-1979 Iran. Al-Shirazi, freedoms/. unlike al-Khomeini, favoured the rule of a 3. Interview with former ICM MP, Kuwait council of religious scholars, rather than a City, November 21, 2013. single cleric, within the Islamic state and so 4. Sara al-Shurafa, “Kuwait’s Highest expected to be more involved in government Court Sentences Lawmakers to Prison,” following the Iranian revolution. “Iran arrests Gulf News, July 8, 2018, https://gulfnews. son of Shirazi cleric after calling Khamenei com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-s- a pharaoh,” Al Arabiya, February 6, 2018, highest-court-sentences-lawmakers-to- http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/ prison-1.2248078. middle-east/2018/02/06/Iran-arrests-son- 5. Habib Toumi, “Third Grilling Motion of-Shirazi-cleric-after-calling-Khamenei- Filed in One Week against Kuwaiti Ministers,” a-pharaoh.html. Supporters of the Shirazi Gulf News, April 23, 2018, https://gulfnews. school have in recent years been outspoken com/news/gulf/kuwait/third-grilling- critics of the Iranian regime and its policies. motion-filed-in-one-week-against- 14. Sharmaake Sabrie and Pekka Hakala, kuwaiti-ministers-1.2210019. Policy Briefing: Kuwait’s Political Crisis Deepens (Belgium: European Union, 2013), 6.

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15. Utvik, “Ikhwanization,” 23. 16. Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47. This issue brief is part of a two-year research AUTHOR project on pluralism in the Middle East after Courtney Freer, Ph.D., is a research fellow the Arab uprisings. at the Kuwait Programme, LSE Middle East Centre, and a former research assistant at The project is generously the Brookings Doha Center. She holds a supported by a grant doctorate from the University of Oxford, a from the Carnegie master’s degree in Middle Eastern studies Corporation of New York. from George Washington University, and a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University. Her research interests focus on domestic politics in the Gulf states, with particular emphasis on Islamism and tribalism.

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Cite as: Freer, Courtney. 2018. Kuwait’s Post-Arab Spring Islamist Landscape: The End of Ideology? Issue brief no. 08.08.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.