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Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization

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Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization WORKING P A P E R A Future for the Young Options for helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization CHERYL BENARD WR-354 September 2005 RAND’s Initiative on Middle Eastern Youth This product is part of the RAND National Security Research Division working paper series. RAND working papers are intended to share researchers’ latest findings and to solicit informal peer review. They have been approved for circulation by the RAND National Security Research Division but have not been formally edited or peer reviewed. Unless otherwise indicated, working papers can be quoted and cited without permission of the author, provided the source is clearly referred to as a working paper. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. is a registered trademark. A Future for the Young Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization Sponsored by RAND’s Initiative on Middle Eastern Youth Working Paper component of prior RAND Conference September 22-23, 2005 This product is part of the RAND Corporation conference proceedings series. RAND conference proceedings present a collection of papers delivered at a conference or a summary of the conference. The material herein has been vetted by the conference attendees and both the introduction and the post- conference material have been reviewed and approved for publication by Center for Middle East Public Policy (CMEPP). iii Preface In the battle of ideas that has come to characterize the struggle against Jihadist terrorism, a sometimes-neglected dimension is the personal motivations of those drawn into the movement. RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy and the Initiative for Middle East Youth (IMEY) sponsored a workshop in late September of 2005 to address the issue of why young people enter into Jihadist groups and what might be done to prevent it or disengage members of such groups once they have joined. At the initiative of Dr. Cheryl Benard, Director of IMEY, specialists from the United States, Europe, Afghanistan and Iraq ere invited to attend and present and discuss their findings. RAND expresses its appreciation for their participation in what was a stimulating and thought-provoking meeting. These are the proceedings of that workshop. The RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy is part of International Programs at the RAND Corporation, which aims to improve public policy by providing decision makers and the public with rigorous, objective research on critical policy issues affecting the Middle East. For more information on the RAND Middle East Public Policy, contact the Director, David Aaron. He can be reached by e-mail at [email protected]; by phone at 310-393-0411, extension 7782; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138. More information the Initiative on Middle Eastern Youth please see www.rand.org/imey. Also you may contact Director Cheryl Benard at [email protected] or at 703-413-1100, extension 5791, or her Research Assistant, Kristen A. Cordell at [email protected], or 703-413-1100 extension 5331. iv Positive Options to Deter Youth Radicalism September 22-23, 2005 This working conference explored the hypothesis that youth recruitment into jihadist extremist groups can in part be viewed as a subset of broader youth vulnerability to fringe movements, such as left wing terrorism, the neo- Nazi movement, street gangs and cults. It surveyed some of the things we have learned about these other phenomena and considered their applicability to the case of jihadist recruitment. Specifically, it considered: What motivates young people to join radical fringe movements? Which kinds of young people seem especially vulnerable? What personal needs and hopes are addressed by such groups? Are there phases of membership during which attachment is stronger/weaker? What do we know about the composition and psychology of radical cells and groups? Under what circumstances does an individual’s loyalty to the extremist group falter? How can this process be encouraged and facilitated? What kinds of support do individuals need, once they decide to withdraw and return to mainstream society? What competitive alternatives might prevent young people from being drawn into these movements in the first place? In the minds of young people, what kinds of things diminish the appeal and glamour of radical engagement? In examining radical propaganda vehicles and recruitment messages, what inconsistencies do we find that can be expanded and exploited? In troubled social and political circumstances, what resources within families and communities can be mobilized to prevent the radicalization and support the healthy development/reintegration of its young people? v The presentations and the discussion focused on three contemporary cases: Diaspora radicalization, jihadist recruitment in the Islamic world, and the Iraqi insurgency. It drew on previous and additional cases, including inner city street gangs, the Baader Meinhof gang, the IRA and others. The conference concluded with two workshops, discussing: Future research directions: multidisciplinary issues, collaborative tools Policy implications: conclusions, suggested programs The presentations posted here will be made available shortly in a forthcoming print publication. vi Presenters and topics: Tore Bjørgo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Norwegian Police University College. Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Extremist Groups: The Case of Racist Sub-Cultures. Petter Nesser, Norwegian Defense Institute. Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe. Sharon Curcio, Military Intelligence Technician. The Dark Side of Jihad: How Young Men Detained at Guantanamo Assess their Experiences. John Horgan, University of St. Andrews, Scotland. Psychological Factors Related to Disengaging from Terrorism: Some Preliminary Assumptions and Assertions. Paul Dercon, AIVD. Dawa to Jihad: New Developments in Dutch Policy. Cheryl Benard, RAND. Cybermullahs and the Jihad – Radical Websites Fostering Estrangement and Hostility among Diaspora Muslims. Ed O’Connell, RAND, and Cheryl Benard, RAND. The Myth of Martyrdom: Young People and the Insurgency in Iraq. Jonathan Powers, War Kids Relief Project, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. Mounzer Fatfat, Ministry of the Interior, Iraq. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. Michael Taarnby, Ministry of Justice, Denmark. Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue: the Relativity of a Counter Terrorism Success. Aida B. Balsano, Tufts University, Eliot-Pearson Department of Child Development. The Role of Developmental Assets and Youth Engagement in Promoting Positive Development Among Youth. Susie Kay, Hoop Dreams. Hoop Dreams Scholarship Fund. Michael D. Wiatrowski, National Center for Education Statistics. Discussion leader: Working Groups 1 and 2. 1 1. REDUCING RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTING DISENGAGEMENT FROM EXTREMIST GROUPS: THE CASE OF RACIST SUB-CULTURES -- DR. TORE BJØRGO1 Neo-Nazi and other right-wing extremist groups are behind many instances of xenophobic violence, racist harassment, and extremist propaganda. It is therefore important to reduce the size of the neo-Nazi and racist youth scene as much as possible. This article will explain how this can be achieved by addressing processes of recruitment and disengagement. The size of the radical movement matters. With close to 3,000 participants, the Nazi scene in Sweden has reached a critical mass, and has become a social movement. Their activist scene also has a large number of sympathizers – several thousands – who may serve as a pool of recruits. These sympathizers also constitute a big and profitable ‘home market’ for White Power music, magazines, and other ‘nationalist’ products. There is a large pool of talent among the participants of the scene – including musicians, artists, writers, computer specialists, academics, university students, and others with a wide range of skills. This provides opportunities for specialization among a variety of interests and tasks within the movement. Through the last decade, an elaborate organizational, economical and media infrastructure has been built up by the Swedish neo-Nazis. To some young people, it is socially attractive to join the scene. Many stay on in the movement for many years, providing experience and stability. Although they mainly recruit among teenagers, the average age in the neo-Nazi scene is relatively high. It can no longer be described mainly as a youth scene. Many activists are in their 20s and 30s, and have been involved for ten years or more. Due to its size and numbers, the movement (or local group) is not as vulnerable if leaders are put in prison – there are several ____________ 1 The author of this article has received financial support from the Norwegian Non- fiction Literature Fund, from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI), and from the Research Council of Norway. An earlier version of this paper has been published (in German translation) in Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung, Vol. 4, Jan. 2002, pp. 5-31. 2 alternative leaders who could take over. The movement is also sufficiently strong and intimidating to provide some protection against outside enemies. In Norway, the situation is significantly different. There are 100–200 active participants concentrated in five to ten locations. Members are young and have relatively short careers in the movement – only a few continue to be active after they turn 20. Thus, the average age is lower than
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