International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters March 2003, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 57–90 Context is All. A Holistic Reformulation of the Tonkin Gulf Incident Simon A. Bennett Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order University of Leicester LE1 7QA, England
[email protected] Incidents and accidents are frequently ascribed to “opera- tor” or “human error.” Until recently accident investigators have focused more on the immediate or proximate causes of incidents and accidents than on such underlying or contextual factors as production imperatives, conditioning, expectation, peer pressure, ergonomics or the quality and currency of rules, procedures and training. Some theorists, however, have attempted to sensitize accident investigators to the potential impact on human perception and behavior of contextual fac- tors. As a consequence of the work of Job (1996), Reason (1995; 1997), Snook (2000) and others accident investigators now have the opportunity to apply a systems approach to acci- dent investigation. The primary purpose of this paper is to illustrate and then test the systems or “context” approach with reference to a major incident with significant outcomes. To this end the work of Job, Reason, Snook and others is used to frame, analyze and draw conclusions from a major incident—the clash between US and North Vietnamese naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin during the early stages of the Vietnam War. The paper’s secondary purpose is to deconstruct, illuminate and explain the incident with a view to adding to (if not correcting a part of) the historical record of the Vietnam War. 2004 marks the 40th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident, described by Wise (1968) as “The Pearl Harbor of the Vietnam War.” Following the alleged second attack on US naval forces by North Vietnamese warships President Johnson ordered a major esca- lation of the war against the Viet Cong.