commentary

Secretary of Defense many responding to urgent questions from higher competent military personnel reporting directly in Robert McNamara commands and officials in Washington. One of their areas of expertise and duty. delivers a late-night Herrick’s early messages reported that the two In the past decade, the Gulf of Tonkin has again Pentagon briefing on ships were under “continuous torpedo attack,” but commanded attention with the declassification by the Gulf of Tonkin after further review he suggested “complete the (NSA) of more than incident Aug. 4, 1964. evaluation before any further action taken.” After 140 formerly top-secret documents – including Hours later, President further evaluation with both commanding officers, signals intelligence (SIGINT) reports – pertaining Lyndon Johnson spoke to the American Herrick sent a clarifying message: “Certain that to Aug. 4. There may be convincing arguments people by radio, original ambush was bona fide. Details of action from a SIGINT perspective that there was no describing an attack following present a confusing picture ... Own evidence of North Vietnamese torpedo-boat by North Vietnamese ship’s screw noises or rudders may have accounted attacks, but there is also dismissal of the value of vessels on two U.S. for some. At present cannot even estimate the the human testimony. “Without the signals intel- Navy destroyers. Corbis number of boats involved.” ligence information, the administration had only Critics and historians make much of Herrick’s the confused and conflicting testimony and earlier message expressing doubt, but they down- evidence of the men and equipment involved in the play his final message. At hearings conducted by incident.” NSA historian Robert Hanyok concluded. the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in This is myopic reasoning at best. ‘An attack took place’ subsequent interviews, he reaffirmed that he had In 2005, after the declassification of documents, no doubt an attack occurred. Louis Giles, NSA’s director of policy and records, Evaluations of the Tonkin Gulf incident continue to ignore eyewitness testimony. said, “The COMINT (communications intelligence) By Lloyd R. ”Joe” Vasey Creation of a myth The events occurred on a does not prove that an attack did or did not occur.” dark, moonless, overcast night, so some uncertain- All operational commanders in the Pacific prominent conspiracy scenario alleges that initiated in 1962 off the coast of North . ty existed as to precise details. But the convincing involved in Tonkin were convinced that an attack top government figures – including President The destroyer USS Maddox commenced a DESOTO A statements of eyewitnesses make clear that an took place – but only after they and their staffs had Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert patrol on July 31, 1964, and as in previous patrols attack took place. Numerous personnel reported thoroughly assessed all available evidence. The McNamara – were less than forthright or entirely was ordered to avoid provocative actions and sighting torpedo wakes, multiple lights and locus of confusion seems to have been in Washing- honest about what led to increased U.S. involve- remain in international waters. On Aug. 2, while silhouettes of boats; one target was taken under ton, which suggests that whoever briefed national ment in Vietnam, particularly the Gulf of Tonkin Maddox was 28 miles from the coast and heading fire by Turner Joy. Hits were observed and it leadership failed to place in clear perspective, or incident. During the August l964 attacks, I was away, it was suddenly attacked in broad daylight disappeared from all radars. even consider, the value of the professional testi- very much in the operations and intelligence loop by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Maddox Soon afterwards, a legal officer was helicoptered monies. As for insinuations that Johnson deliber- as chief of staff for Vice Adm. Roy Johnson, avoided the torpedoes, and together with aircraft to Maddox to collect logs, plots and track charts. ately misled the American public to start a war, my commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, and I’d like to from USS Ticonderoga sank or damaged the He described later that when he and ship person- readings and research found no proof to support demolish some of the myths. attacking boats. Critics called this patrol “provoca- nel constructed a composite chart of the event, it such a claim. He did, after all, send out a protest tive,” claiming it was conducted in support of a proved remarkably consistent between the two rather than an airstrike after the first attack. Bona fide ambush President Johnson inherited a Plan 34A raid. But McNamara testified before the ships, and indicated that the contacts matched Meanwhile, researchers have overlooked the commitment, established in 1947 by the Truman Senate that Maddox was at least 130 miles to the characteristics of torpedo boats. probable role of China in the attacks. Chinese administration, to a strategy of containing aggres- southeast and had not started its patrol during the McNamara sent two senior DoD civilian officials naval vessels were known to be based on nearby sive communist expansion throughout the world. Plan 34A operation. Rather than a reprisal air- to Subic Bay, Philippines, to interview key enlisted Hainan Island and operating in the area. It is This had strong support from Congress and the strike, Washington dispatched a note of protest, and officer witnesses from the destroyers. I was possible that some of the early radar contacts were American public, in whose minds the memories of and Johnson authorized the DESOTO patrol to requested to sit in at these interviews. Our sailors in fact Chinese Swatow patrol boats vectoring World War II were still fresh. In May l959, the continue with Maddox accompanied by another and young officers were impressive and convinc- Vietnamese P-4s. During that period, China’s top Communist Politburo of North Vietnam made a destroyer, USS Turner Joy. ing, and essentially provided verbal confirmation leadership was very supportive of North Vietnam. decision to “liberate” through On the evening of Aug. 4, while the ships were on supporting the official reports. The official mes- In early 1965, with the commitment of major U.S. political subversion and infiltration by guerrilla patrol approximately 60 miles from the North sage report to McNamara concluded with a state- ground forces to the Vietnam struggle and the fighters and supplies. Johnson’s predecessor, John Vietnamese coast, task group commander Capt. ment to the effect that attacks against our destroy- start of a sustained bombing campaign against F. Kennedy, expanded the U.S. military presence in John Herrick observed on radar at least five contacts ers the night of Aug. 4 had occurred, although the selected North Vietnamese targets, U.S. casualties Vietnam, and no roars of protest went up. that he evaluated as probable torpedo boats. The details required further data refinement. mounted – as did public and congressional opposi- In late 1963, North Vietnam decided to accelerate ships increased speed and changed course. About Sadly, in critiques and articles on Tonkin in the tion to the war. The myths about the Gulf of its efforts. The National Security Council approved an hour later, both destroyers held radar contacts years since, scant if any credibility is given to the Tonkin incident were cast in iron, deceiving CIA support for South Vietnamese covert opera- approximately 14 miles off on a course and speed sailors and officers who provided evidence of the generations to come. tions, known as “Plan 34A,” against North Viet- indicating rapid closure. Soon after, Maddox torpedo-boat attacks. As with eyewitnesses any- nam. Meanwhile, mounting U.S. casualties were reported that an attack appeared imminent. where, one or two or even three could have been Lloyd R. “Joe” Vasey is a retired Navy rear admiral. taking a toll on public and congressional support. A flurry of messages followed with supporting partly in error – but not all 18 of them on every- A longer version of this article appeared in the Intelligence-gathering DESOTO patrols had been details – some ambiguous, some conflicting, and thing. These were highly trained, experienced and August 2010 issue of Proceedings.

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