Decentralizing hydraulic society Actor responses to institutional arrangements in Vietnam
Pham Thi Bich Ngoc
Linköping Studies in Arts and Science No. 577 Department of Water and Environment Studies Linköping University Linköping 2013
Linköping Studies in Arts and Science No. 577
Within the Falculty of Arts and Science at Linköping University, research and doctoral training is carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments, doctoral studies mainly in research institutes. Together they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from the Department of Water and Environmental Studies at the Tema Institute.
Distributed by: Department of Water and Environmental Studies Linköping University SE - 581 83 Linköping Sweden
Pham Thi Bich Ngoc Decentralizing hydraulic society - Actor responses to institutional arrangements in Vietnam
Cover design by Dao Thi Ngoc Bich
Edition 1:1 ISBN 978-91-7519-669-5 ISSN 0282-9800
©Pham Thi Bich Ngoc Department of Water and Environmental Studies 2013
Printed by LiU – Tryck, Linköping, 2013
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Abstract
Irrigation decentralization has been launched worldwide with high expectations of improved governance, efficiency, and productivity through democratic processes. However, there is widespread recognition that decentralization is, in reality, unlikely to bring about these positive outcomes. Poor implementation is widely blamed for these failures, but the current study argues that this is only partially true. Decentralization is usually treated as a technical way of power transfer that can be evaluated through quantitative indicators. Much attention goes to searching solutions to constraints during implementation while less emphasis is on understanding of contexts, processes and the consequences of institutional changes. The common approach mainly focuses on local water users’ organizations but gives insufficient attention to the cross-level interactions between involved actors, their responses to reforms, and power relationships. This approach answers the question: what should be done, but not: why do constraints/limitations occur and why are such contradictory results obtained? In this way the approach itself diffuses some of the challenges in reality and the root of problems leading to surprise consequences and failures during implementation.
In this study, two irrigation systems in Vietnam were selected to examine the emerging decentralization processes, actors’ responses to the institutional changes, as well as the main options, challenges and constraints to decentralization. My ambition is also to further understand why constraints occur and have counter-productive effects. A mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods, and cross-case analysis are applied. The database was built systematically, based on previous experience in this field, and participatory fieldwork. Decentralization is regarded as a power-laden process involving not just local organizations, but also state agencies, local authorities at different levels, state irrigation companies (IDMCs), and farmers. The study describes how institutional arrangements for decentralization have effects on the dynamics and relations of power between actors in multi-level governance, resulting in impacts on autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of involved actors.
The analysis shows that the legal framework and several well-intended efforts for decentralization have been launched. However, outcomes in terms of power transfer and actors’ performance are not those expected. The current institutional arrangements have created major constraints: (i) imbalanced power relations, (ii) new resource allocation mechanisms creating dependency among actors, (iii) passiveness, vested interest and privilege within state agencies and IDMCs, and (iv) free-riding behavior and distrust among farmers. Prevailing conditions defy policy intentions by finding a new version of a centralized power structure at provincial level, in which power of state agencies and IDMCs are reinforced. Unexpected effects emerge on the autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of all involved actors.
Decentralization of irrigation systems is a complex process, not merely a technical transfer of power. It is hard to achieve even with policy in place. All the complexities and implications of irrigation need to be thoroughly considered, with the dynamics in society included. Evaluations of decentralization based on production and economic terms are not enough. Impacts of institutional arrangements on power relations between actors, on their incentives, maneuver room in multi-level governance, and ability to comprehend and influence processes, need to be assessed thoroughly. Essential roles remain for central government when irrigation management is decentralized.
Key words: accountability, actors, autonomy, incentives, institutional arrangements, irrigation management, participation, power relations, Vietnam.
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Sammanfattning
Decentralisering av bevattningsjordbruk har lanserats över hela världen med höga förväntningar på förbättrad styrning, effektivitet och produktivitet genom demokratiska processer. Men det är allmänt erkänt att decentralisering i själva verket knappast är tillräckligt för att åstadkomma dessa positiva resultat. Dåligt genomförande har allmänt fått bära skulden för svårigheterna, men den aktuella studien hävdar att detta bara delvis är sant. Decentralisering behandlas vanligtvis som ett tekniskt sätt för maktöverföring som kan utvärderas genom kvantitativa indikatorer. Mycket uppmärksamhet går då att söka lösningar på begränsningar under genomförandet medan mindre tonvikt ligger på förståelse av sammanhang, processer och konsekvenser av institutionella reformer. Fokus är främst på lokala vattenanvändarnas organisationer så att alltför lite uppmärksamhet riktas till gränsöverskridande samspel mellan berörda aktörer, deras anpassningar till reformer och maktrelationer. Detta tillvägagångssätt svarar på frågan: vad som bör göras, men inte: varför restriktioner/begränsningar uppstår och varför sådana motstridiga resultat uppnås? På så vis skymmer själva tillvägagångssättet några av de utmaningar som i verkligheten utgör grunder för de problem som leder till överraskande konsekvenser och misslyckanden under genomförandet av decentralisering.
I denna studie har två bevattningssystem i Vietnam valts ut för att undersöka framväxande decentraliseringsprocesser, aktörernas svar på de institutionella förändringar, liksom de huvudsakliga alternativ, utmaningar och hinder som finns för decentralisering. Min ambition är också att ytterligare förstå varför begränsningar förekommer och har kontraproduktiva effekter. En blandad strategi som kombinerar kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder används för att studera gemensamma drag i fallstudierna. Databasen byggdes systematiskt, utifrån tidigare erfarenheter på detta område, och deltagande fältarbete. Decentralisering betraktas som en maktrelaterad process som involverar inte bara lokala organisationer, men också statliga myndigheter, lokala myndigheter på olika nivåer, statliga bevattningsbolag (IDMCs), och bönder. Studien beskriver hur institutionella arrangemang för decentralisering har effekter på dynamik och maktförhållanden mellan aktörer inom flernivåstyre, något som resulterar i att autonomi, ansvarsutkrävande, deltagande, och incitament för de berörda aktörerna påverkas.
Analysen visar att det rättsliga ramverket och flera välmenande insatser för decentralisering har lanserats. Men utfallet, vare sig i termer av maktöverföring eller aktörernas prestationer, är inte de förväntade. De nuvarande institutionella arrangemangen har skapat stora begränsningar: (i) obalanserade maktförhållanden, (ii) nya resursfördelningmekanismer som leder till nya beroendeformer mellan aktörer, (iii) passivitet, egenintresse och privilegier inom statliga myndigheter och IDMCs, och (iv) snålskjutsbeteende (”free-riding”) och misstro bland jordbrukarna. Rådande förhållanden går emot politiska intentioner genom att en ny version av en centraliserad maktstruktur på provinsiell nivå skapas genom att makten hos statliga myndigheter och IDMCs förstärks. Oväntade effekter uppstår då för autonomi, ansvar, delaktighet och incitament för alla inblandade aktörer.
Decentralisering av bevattningssystem är en komplex process, inte bara en teknisk överföring av makt. Den är svår att uppnå även med policy på plats. Alla komplikationer och konsekvenser av bevattning för den dynamik som ingår i samhället måste noga övervägas. Utvärderingar av decentralisering som bygger på produktion och ekonomiska termer är inte tillräckligt. Konsekvenser av institutionella arrangemang för maktrelationer mellan aktörer, för deras incitament, manöverutrymme inom ett flernivåstyre, och förmåga att förstå och påverka processer, måste bedömas noggrant. Viktiga roller återstår för staten när bevattningsjordbruk decentraliseras.
Nyckelord: aktörer, ansvar, delaktighet, decentralisering, incitament, institutionella arrangemang, konstbevattning, maktrelationer, självständighet, Vietnam.
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Acknowledgements
First of all, I gratefully acknowledge the funding support from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Vietnam and its Agricultural Science and Technology project (AST). I also thank my employers in Vietnam; the Vietnam Academy for Water Resources and its Centre for Participatory Irrigation Management for providing me support during the last four years.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Hans Holmén at the Department of Water and Environment Studies (Tema V), Linköping University and my co-supervisor, Prof. Magnus Jirström at the Department of Human Geography, Lund University. Thank you both deeply for your supervision and encouragement during my study period. I would like to thank Prof. Lotta Andersson, Dr. Hans Bertil Wittgren, Dr. Anna Jonsson, Dr. Anna Bohman at Tema V, and Dr. Håkan Tropp at the Stockholm International Water Institute for their helpful suggestions on the draft thesis. My special gratitude goes to Dr. Anne Jerneck in Lund University for her thoughtful comments in my final seminar.
I greatly appreciated spending my study at Tema V, Linköping University because of its special interdisciplinary and academic environment. Thank you to all staff and doctoral students at Tema V for your friendship and support over the last four years. Many thanks go to Dr. Åsa Danielsson, Susanne Eriksson, Kerstin Sonesson, and Ian Dickson for all administrative arrangements and logistic support. I am also grateful to staff of AST project in Vietnam, especially director Nguyen The Hinh, and accountant Nguyen Ha Linh for their administrative arrangements in Vietnam. Huge thanks go to Michele Evelyn Steele for her highly professional editing and proof- reading of the thesis text.
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I would like to thank colleagues, friends and stakeholders in Vietnam who have supported me, participated in the interviews, and provided valuable inputs to this research. I would not least like to express my gratitude to Mr. Nguyen Xuan Tiep who spent time and assisted me in field surveys. My special thanks are for the irrigation and drainage management companies in Tay Ninh and in Quang Tri provinces; the irrigation and drainage management enterprises in Nam Thach Han, Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts; the cooperatives and farmers in four districts; Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh), Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts (Quang Tri).
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their sweet encouragements and great support over the years. I could not complete my doctoral study without their support. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my father - Pham Ngoc Tam, my mother - Nguyen Thi Tram, and my sister Ha and brother Hien for supporting me in spirit. I am especially grateful to my husband, Anders Hjort-af-Ornäs and my daughter, Dao Thi Ngoc Bich who have stayed next to me in the whole journey. Anders, thank you so much for your patience and the great support in all aspects of life. You are a person I always come to talk with and test my ideas. Your intellectual challenges and comments are valuable contributions to this thesis. Thank you, Bich for your help with layout, graphics, and computer problems. I am particularly indebted to her for the cover page.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract...... iii Sammanfattning...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v List of figures ...... x List of tables ...... xii Acronyms and abbreviations ...... xiii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...... 1 1.1 Solutions, understandings, and dynamics in water institutional reforms ...... 1 1.1.1 Institutional reforms as solutions to water crises...... 1 1.1.2 Debates around institutional reforms: solutions and understanding...... 3 1.1.3 The central arguments in this study ...... 6 1.2 Objectives and research questions...... 8 1.3 Scope of study...... 9 1.4 Outline of study...... 11 CHAPTER 2: POWER TRANSFER AS A PROCESS: INTENTIONS, APPROACHES, AND RESPONSES ...... 13 2.1 Good governance as a means for decentralization...... 14 2.1.1 Driving forces of decentralization...... 14 2.1.2 Forms and definitions of decentralization ...... 16 2.1.3 Debate about conceptual definitions and assumptions of decentralization ...... 18 2.1.4 Governance and “good” governance ...... 20 2.2 Irrigation decentralization: forms, complexities and implications ...... 23 2.2.1 Community-based irrigation management ...... 25 2.2.2 The private sector and privatization...... 27 2.2.3 States’ roles in irrigation management...... 28 2.2.4 Dynamic process and powers in a co-management form...... 33 2.2.5 Decentralization from polycentric perspectives...... 35 2.3 Decentralization’s outcomes and assessment methods...... 37 2.3.1 Disappointing outcomes and risks of decentralization ...... 37 2.3.2 Poor implementation and a cause of failures ...... 39 2.3.3 Quantitative assessments...... 42 2.4 Conceptual framework for assessing irrigation decentralization...... 45 2.4.1 Institutional analysis ...... 48 2.4.2 Incentive and capabilities in responding ...... 50 2.4.3 Power exercise and power relations ...... 53 2.4.4 Accountability and transparency...... 57 2.4.5 Stakeholder participation and interaction ...... 61 2.5 The analytical framework...... 64
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, DATA FORMATION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES ...... 69 3.1 Designing research methods...... 69 3.1.1 A mixed methods approach with a multiple case study ...... 69 3.1.2 Selection of case studies...... 72 3.2 Framework and methods to collect data ...... 75 3.2.1 Data sources ...... 75 3.2.2 The resource base available for the study on interactions...... 78 3.2.3 Secondary data and the legal documents...... 81 3.2.4 The interviews...... 82 3.2.5 In-depth interviews with key informants...... 88 3.2.6 Target group discussions ...... 89 3.2.7 Participant observations...... 91 3.3 Procedures in organizing and processing data ...... 92 CHAPTER 4: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT...... 95 4.1 Irrigation for productivity and food security...... 96 4.1.1 Irrigation investmentand its contributions to agricultural productivity...... 96 4.1.2 Water challenges and the sector development strategies...... 101 4.2 Multi-level irrigation governance ...... 105 4.2.1 State management agencies...... 107 4.2.2 State-owned irrigation and drainage management companies ...... 110 4.2.3 Local irrigation management organizations...... 113 4.3 Irrigation management in two selected cases ...... 120 4.3.1 Nam Thach Han irrigation system...... 120 4.3.2 Tay Ninh irrigation system...... 126 CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE IRRIGATION SECTOR ...... 131 5.1 Vietnam’s transition in Doi Moi process...... 132 5.2 Public administrative reforms and decentralization in irrigation...... 136 5.3 Democracy, participation and decentralization of irrigation services...... 139 5.4 Financing irrigation...... 147 5.5 Renovation of state-owned irrigation management enterprises...... 151 5.5.1 The equitization process ...... 151 5.5.2 Financial mechanisms...... 154 5.6 Summary...... 157 CHAPTER 6: POWER RELATIONS AND ACTORS’ DECISION MAKING ...... 161 6.1 Cross-level interactions between state management agencies...... 162 6.1.1 Coordination in inconsistent and overlapping mandates...... 163 6.1.2 Institutional setting and capacity at district and commune levels ...... 171 6.1.3 Power at district- and commune-level state agencies...... 173 6.2 Interactions between the state management agencies and state irrigation companies...... 177 6.2.1 Mobilization and use of resources...... 178 6.2.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems...... 179 6.3 Interactions between the state management agencies and cooperatives...... 182 6.3.1 Organization and personnel management ...... 182 6.3.2 Mobilization of financial resources ...... 184 6.4 Interactions between state irrigation companies and cooperatives ...... 185
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6.4.1 Mobilization and use of resources...... 186 6.4.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems...... 188 6.5 Interactions between cooperatives and farmers...... 192 6.6 Power and the dynamics of decentralization...... 194 CHAPTER 7: ACTORS’ AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND PARTICIPATION ...... 199 7.1 Financial autonomy...... 199 7.1.1 Irrigation and Drainage Management Companies ...... 200 7.1.2 Cooperatives ...... 209 7.2 Accountability and transparency ...... 212 7.2.1 State irrigation management companies...... 213 7.2.2 Cooperatives ...... 215 7.2.3 Mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing accountability...... 219 7.3 Farmers’ participation in decision-making...... 222 7.3.1 Dominating patterns of interaction ...... 227 7.3.2 Communication, information sharing and transparency...... 228 7.3.3 Motivation of farmers in participation...... 230 7.3.4 Culture and passive attitudes...... 231 7.4 Reflections on the assessment of actor performance...... 233 CHAPTER 8: ACTORS’ RESPONSES - INCENTIVES, WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY...... 237 8.1 Trade-off between decentralization and contradictory interests...... 237 8.2 Privileges and vested interest in the new transformed companies...... 241 8.2.1 Organizational adjustments bring internal power concentration...... 241 8.2.2 Attitude and incentives in the mechanism for public utility...... 243 8.3 Resources, capabilities, scales affecting incentives and accountability ...... 244 8.3.1 Economics of scales, income, incentives and accountability ...... 246 8.3.2 Capability to mobilize and access resources ...... 251 8.4 Linking up: Responding to decentralization ...... 257 CHAPTER 9: DECENTRALIZATION POLICY CONTEXTUALIZED – CHALLENGES FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT...... 259 9.1 The study issues in the global debate context ...... 259 9.2 Study findings reflecting on research questions ...... 261 9.3 Reflecting the research findings to theoretical approaches ...... 267 9.4 Study’s implications for implementing decentralization...... 269 9.5 The study implications for future study...... 273 REFERENCES...... 275 APPENDIXES...... 297 Appendix 1. Questionnaire forms...... 297 Appendix 2. Stakeholder interviews ...... 305 Appendix 3. Organizing and processing data collected...... 307 Appendix 4. List of policies...... 312 Appendix 5. Mandates and authorities of key actors in irrigation management...... 316
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List of figures
Figure 2.1. Simple framework for assessing irrigation decentralization 47 Figure 2.2. Detailed framework for assessing irrigation decentralization 64 Figure 2.3. An analytical framework for cross-case analysis of irrigation 66 decentralization
Figure 3.1. Locations of two case studies in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri 74 province, Vietnam Figure 3.2. Framework for collecting data 75
Figure 3.3. Triangulation of data from a multiple source 76 Figure 3.4. The fieldwork process to collect data 77 Figure 3.5. Target group discussions with participatory techniques 90 Figure 3.6. Study of legal documents for analyzing irrigation 93 decentralization Figure 4.1. Yields of paddy rice in six regions of Vietnam and three 100 cropping seasons Figure 4.2. Cross-level interactions in irrigation management 106 Figure 4.3. Cross-level interplay among state management agencies 108 Figure 4.4. Typical model of irrigation co-management between 110 IDMCs, IMEs and local organizations
Figure 4.5. The typical structure of agricultural service cooperatives 116 Figure 4.6. General layout of the Nam Thach Han irrigation system 121 Figure 4.7. Organizational structure of Quang Tri IDMC 123 Figure 4.8. Proportions between two financial sources in cooperatives in 125 Nam Thach Han
Figure 4.9. General layout: Dau Tieng reservoir and irrigation canals in Tay 127 Ninh
Figure 4.10. The organizational structure of Tay Ninh IDMC 128 Figure 5.1. The implementation of water fees policies in the past and at 149 present
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Figure 5.2. Driving forces for irrigation institutional reforms 158 Figure 6.1. Relations between involved actors 161 Figure 6.2. Participation and influences of cooperatives in Tay Ninh and 189 Quang Tri Figure 6.3. Irrigation infrastructure in the Tay Ninh system 190 Figure 6.4. Positions of actors under the existing institutional 195 arrangements Figure 7.1. Increased revenues of IDMCs for the period 2007-2010 201 Figure 7.2. The change of irrigated area in the studied IDMCs 203 Figure 7.3. Proportions of expenditures of IDMCs 205 Figure 7.4. The state budgets for subsidizing water fees in 2009, 2010 and 208 2011 during a period 2008-2010 Figure 7.5 Proportion of expenditures for irrigation service in Nam Thach 211 Han Figure 7.6. The performance of IDMC’s staff is assessed by interviewed 214 farmers and cooperatives Figure 7.7. Institutional capacity and performance of the cooperatives are 216 assessed by the cooperatives themselves Figure 7.8. The performance of the cooperatives is assessed by farmers 217 Figure 7.9. The participation by farmers: Views from farmers and local 226 organizations Figure 7.10. Farmers’ attitudes about participation 232 Figure 8.1. Number of households joining cooperatives in Tay Ninh 251
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List of tables
Table 2.1. Different types of irrigation decentralization 24 Table 2.2. Expected outcomes and impacts of irrigation 42 decentralization Table 2.3. Groups of indicators for assessing outcomes of IMT 43 Table 2.4. Approaches for assessing decentralization from three 46 different processes Table 2.5. Power exercise by actors 56 Table 3.1. The number of questionnaire interviews 84 Table 3.2 Main contents in the three sets of questionnaires 86 Table 3.3. Key informants and key information discussed 88 Table 4.1. State-owned irrigation companies at different regions 112 Table 4.2. Main characteristics of each type of local organizations 115 Table 5.1. Grassroots Democratization in Vietnam 141 Table 5.2. Water fees regulated in three different policies in Quang Tri 150 and Tay Ninh provinces Table 6.1. Mandates and authority of the state management agencies in 166 legal documents Table 6.2. Structure of cooperative management boards in Chau Thanh 183 district Table 7.1. Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 13 210 cooperatives in Nam Thach Han irrigation system, Quang Tri province Table 7.2 Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 21 210 cooperatives in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts, Tay Ninh province Table 7.3. The previous assessments on main outcomes and impacts of 234 irrigation decentralization in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han Table 8.1. Organizational structure of cooperatives in Nam Thach Han 247 Table 8.2. Organizational structure of Cooperatives in Tay Ninh 247
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Acronyms and abbreviations
AC Agricultural Cooperative ADB Asian Development Bank AFTA Asian Free Trade Area ASIAN Association of South East Asian Nations APEC Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resources Management CDD Community-Driven Development CECODES Centre for Community Support and Development Studies CIEM Central Institute for Economic Development CPC Commune People’s Committee CPR Common Pool Resources CPP Commission on People’s Petitions of the Standing Committee for the National Assembly of Viet Nam CSO Civil Society Organization DANIDA Danish development assistance programmes DARD Department of Agricultural and Rural Development DFID Department for International Development of the United Kingdom DONRE Department of Natural Resources and Environment DOF Department of Finance DOLISA Department of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs DPI Department of Planning and Investment DPC District People’s Committee DWR Department of Water Resources ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility FR The Front Review of the Central Committee for the Viet Nam Fatherland Front ICWE Dublin Conference on Water and Environment IDMC Irrigation and Drainage Management Company IME Irrigation Management Enterprise IMF International Monetary Fund IMT Irrigation Management Transfer IPSARP Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development IT Irrigation Team (Irrigation Groups) IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management JICA Japan International Cooperation Program GDP Gross Domestic Production GoV Government of Vietnam GSO General Statistics Office
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GMS Greater Mekong Sub-region FAO Food and Agriculture Organization MARD Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment MOF Ministry of Finance MOLISA Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment NGO Non-Government Organization NWRC National Water Resources Council NRM Natural Resources Management ODA Overseas Development Agency O&M Operation and Maintenance PAR Public Administration Reform PIM Participatory Irrigation Management PPC Provincial People’s Committee PPP Public-Private Partnership SAC Structural Adjustment Credit SEDS Socio-Economic Development Strategy SOE State-owned Enterprise UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization US United States VAWR Vietnam Academy for Water Resources VFF Vietnam Fatherland Front VND Vietnam Dong VN GWP Vietnam Global Water Partnership VWRAP Vietnam Water Resources Assistance Project WB World Bank WCED World Commission on Environmental and Development WGF Water Governance Facility WUA/WUO Water Users’ Association/Organization WTO World Trade Organization WWAP United Nations World Water Assessment Programme 1 sao = 500 m2 1 USD = 20,000 VND (October 2012)
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Solutions, understandings, and dynamics in water institutional reforms
1.1.1 Institutional reforms as solutions to water crises
Water crises have become a major global concern because the world’s water resources are under pressure in many places. Water scarcity generally emerges for several reasons with two dominating changes building pressure: limited availability of water sources due to ecological changes with environmental causes, and dramatic increases in water demand due to significant increases in the world’s population, urbanization, and new human activities for economic development (FAO, 2005; Shivakotti et al., 2005; Sachs, 2008). The water crises have been lifted to the fore in much of the international debates as a consequence of ineffective management and investment, inappropriate institutions, and limited capacity (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; UNDP WGF, 2013). These criticisms have been associated with the “patronage” management paradigm that highlights supply-driven approach, technical solutions and infrastructure investment, and centralized management. The main concerns referred to the shortcomings of government bureaucracies in monitoring and enforcement, in accessing information at local level, and in conflict resolution. An overly bureaucratic hierarchy generated high cost for management and monitoring, in combination with top-down management that led to ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and inequity in water allocation and management (Shivakoti et al., 2005). As a net result, widespread problems, such as poor performance, low return on investment, an inadequate and degraded infrastructure, and insufficient state budgets, have been major unsolved issues in the water sector in many countries (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004).
1 An outcome from the search for improved solutions of water crises is a new paradigm with demand-based approaches that shifted attention more to economic solutions, and decentralized management (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007). Water reforms have then been launched on a worldwide scale since the 1990s as a response to the international initiatives on water1 and to the pressure from international lending banks and many bilateral and multi-lateral donors (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004; Molle et al., 2009). This is when key issues in water sector reforms came to include policy and institutional reforms, integrated water resources management (IWRM) at river basin scale, public participation, and decentralization (Perret et al., 2006). Water governance, emerging as one concern from the broad governance concept introduced after the Washington Consensus, gives an emphasis on linkages, partnerships, and processes between and within state and non-state entities such as private sector, civil society at all levels (e.g. farm, system, and basis levels) in decision-making (Tropp, 2007). Efficiency, autonomy, participation, accountability, transparency, integrity, and equity in water management are all treated as general principles for “good” governance (Roger & Hall, 2003).
A corresponding paradigm shift in irrigated agriculture, a dominating water use sector in many agriculture-based countries, has followed. Among the major challenges relating to water shortage is an increasing demand for improved agricultural productivity and food security for a growing population (FAO, 2005)2. Agricultural diversification, modernization and market-orientated crop cultivation in the situation of globalization and
1 The concept of “Sustainable Development” was raised at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Conference) in 1972 in response to the concerns about the degradation of the human environment, over-exploitation of natural resources and the consequences for economic and social development. It was re-launched by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, realizing that environment and development are intertwined and highlighting development should “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations” (WCED, 1987). Water reforms towards Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) have been embarked as a response to the key international initiatives: the Dublin Conference on Water and Environment in 1992 (ICWE 1992), the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio with the Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992), the Second inter-ministerial World Water Forum at the Hague in 2000 2 Population in the world is estimated to increase by about 50% over the next 50 years. Therefore, food production needs to increase double (GWP website). Irrigated areas in Asia account for about 60% of the world’s area. About 82% of a total water source is used for agriculture. The population accounts for about 50% of the world’s population. Recently, irrigation systems in the region provide water for about 41% of the total cultivated areas (FAO, 2012: 47)
2 high international market competition add to these pressures (WB, 2008). The whole irrigation farming practice has been brought policy-makers under pressure to deliver reforms that improve efficiency and productivity. Following the consequential policy changes that move power from central bureaucratic agencies to lower-level government or non-state entities, decentralization of irrigation management has been launched globally to transfer responsibilities in management and finance in irrigation systems from a state irrigation agency to water users’ organizations or private sector. The primary aims are to bring decision-making in irrigation management closer to water users and to shift payments in operation and maintenance (O&M) to water users (Molle et al., 2009). As a result, expected outcomes emerge on improved irrigation performance, increased cost recovery, and reduced the state financial budget (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007).
1.1.2 Debates around institutional reforms: solutions and understanding
The shift of power and the forms for exercising it at local water users’ organizations are known as the concepts of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), respectively. The transfer responsibility of water allocation and management to private companies/enterprises (e.g. in England, Australia) or to farmers (e.g. in Argentina, New Zealand) is also implemented under a form of privatization (Saleth & Dinar, 2006). The processes are combined and have been adopted worldwide as cornerstones for the decentralization efforts in the irrigation sector (including Vietnam). In spite of having a long list of benefits and expectations in theory, decentralization in practice does not achieve the expected goals (Merrey et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009b). Earlier experience and empirical studies underscore how difficult it is to make decentralization work in practice. The processes are assessed as incomplete (Vemillions, 1997), and their outcomes are very mixed (Mukherji et al., 2009a). In fact, many established water users’ organizations (WUOs) under the IMT/PIM process ceased to function as soon as the external support from donor-funded projects closed (Bandaragoda, 2006). None of the tested forms of decentralization (i.e. the devolution, privatization, decentralization, partnership) have brought about the expected outcomes (Meinzen-Dick, 2007).
3 In many instances, water institutional reforms have even been seen as the “ceremonial and cosmetic” processes because they have been implemented in incomplete and fragmented institutions, and at policy level only (Saleth & Dinar, 2006). One area of controversy in the literature is around the concern why many cases have failed. But no comprehensive conclusion has as yet been drawn from these debates (Callejo & Cossio, 2009). In much of the previous research (cf. Burman, 2001; Saleth & Dina, 2004; Sengupta 2005; Barker & Molle, 2005; Bandaragoda, 2006; Garces-Restrepo et al. 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a), poor implementations are often seen as a main cause for reforms’ failures. Examples include poor preparation and an improper legal framework, a lack of capacity and limited participation of stakeholders, strong interventions of donors, a lack of political commitments, and resistance of the powerful actors. Policy recommendations for achieving effective decentralization, therefore, put the emphasis on enabling legal frameworks to empower and enhance capacity within local organizations, and to set up a mechanism for public participation (WB, 2008).
However, with experience from limited outcomes in many donor-funded projects (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004), the question of what should be done to maintain long-term success with decentralization, and even how it should be implemented, seems to remain unanswered. In actual fact, there is also no consensus among the researcher and donor communities about the proper form of water governance (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007). A widespread application of decentralization in public sectors and natural resources management today is associated with the ambition to achieve good governance, efficiency, and development. This representation of decentralization as intrinsically good has become a global mantra over the last decades. However, this concept needs to be challenged since decentralization in practice does not always achieve the expected goals and is not always efficient in affecting economic of scale and overall coordination even through having a long list of benefits and expectations in theory (cf. Litvack et al., 1998; Campos & Hellman, 2005; WB, 2008).
In a broader debate around water reforms than irrigated agriculture, the concepts of decentralization and governance have been heavily criticized
4 with regards to their inconsistent definitions, misleading assumptions and shortcomings in applications (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007). Governance is associated with a critique of ideological presumption of neoliberal economic policies about democracy and development based on a free market economy and private sectors as a means of achieving economic growth (cf. Gunnarsson & Holmén, 1995; Mehrotra, 2006). In spite of emphasizing partnerships between state and non-state entities, and processes in social, economic, political domains, two application consequences of governance have been questioned—a lack of socio-political context and an over-emphasis of legal arrangements. “A social engineering approach” and a widespread application of blueprint models in many donor-funded projects focus more on administrative and technical aspects than social and political contexts (Merrey et al., 2007). Institutional reforms place an emphasis on formal institutions and legal frameworks (i.e. laws, policies, and organizational restructure), but informal organizations and institutions (i.e. customary behavior, norms, incentives of actors, social relations, traditions and the process of cultural changes) are usually ignored (Sokile et al., 2005; Saleth, 2005; Molle et al., 2009). There is also a widespread lack of attention to the dynamics in institutional evolution and power structure in multi-level interaction processes (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; Clement 2010; 2013). Consequently, these limitations create a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of social organizations and incentives of actors in collective actions (Cleaver 2002).
In my reading of the literature, this has brought research communities and donors to focus on global reform trends with prime attention to searching solutions to constraints during implementation and less emphasis on understanding contexts, dynamic processes, and the consequences of institutional changes. In my opinion, the main focus of many researchers, practitioners, and donors is on what should be done but not on why constraints/limitations occur and why such contradictory results are obtained. It would be a reason why there is a lack of critical evaluations by many donors of the applications of blueprint models (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007) and of the failures of many cases (Mollinga & Bolning, 2004). As for its research focus, the current study is intended to illustrate how necessary both aspects; solutions and understandings are to the implementation of sustainable decentralization. My suggestion is that
5 devolution (IMT), privatization or partnership (PIM) cannot become a blueprint for solutions for effective decentralization. Understanding needs to reach beyond structural reforms into the interactive processes of the involved actors. It is useful to shed light on the implications and complexities of irrigation decentralization, and identify the root of problem leading to surprise consequences and failures of decentralization. If this is not achieved, institutional reforms run the risk to come up with premature solutions proposals, or even false assumptions, for sustainable development of irrigation decentralization.
1.1.3 The central arguments in this study
Bring these debates into this study, I argue that constraints during implementation that are considered as the main cause of failures of many cases actually only partially reflect the complexities of irrigation decentralization in practice. There are shortcomings in the framework for assessing irrigation decentralization. It appears from the literature that the current policy approach mainly focuses on local water users’ organizations3 with a concern over what responsibility is ascribed, what rights should be transferred from state irrigation companies to local organizations, and how to enhance local capacity and stakeholder participation. However, there is a widespread lack of attention to the cross- level interactions between all involved actors, power relationships between them, and their responses to reforms. These lead to a limited understanding of how the reform processes and institutional arrangements have facilitated dynamics and created changes in power relationships, as well as the ways in which, and the extent to which, actors exercise power and perform in new institutional arrangements. The broad search for solutions thus calls for an in-depth understanding of power relations between involved actors in the cross-level interactions. To date, the decentralization process has been seen from the views of many donors and scholars as a technical way of power transfer either from central to sub-
3 When the term “local organizations” or “local water users’ organizations” appears in this research, it refers to the specific category: local organizations that are involved in irrigation service management at on-farm level. They can be organizations with legal status; for example, cooperatives, water users organizations, or can be informal organizations without legal status, for example, self- governed groups, irrigation teams (more detail in Chapter 4)
6 national level bureaucracies, or from a state irrigation agency or company to local water users’ organizations that can be evaluated through quantitative indicators. The relationship between local organizations and state irrigation companies is raised in the existing studies as providing weak links and tension because of the resistance to transfer power. This tension impedes the decentralization process but it can be removed through reforms of public-sector irrigation agencies (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). Local organizations are also assumed to be willing and are capable of change to such an extent that they can follow policy intentions and establish new institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 1990). I argue that the discussions of resistance and power relations in the literature relating to decentralized irrigation management are insufficient. Categories of relevant actors may be listed, but their changed roles and powers, plus the emergence of informal institutions, are decentralization consequences that are rarely accounted for. At best the literature indicates that power and involvement by stakeholders is an issue, but there is little effort to explain what is at the root of the power struggles.
The common approach with limiting attention to a “local” scope, in combination with too much emphasis on quantitative assessments based on indicators relating to the performance of water users’ organizations, irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity, does not have the capacity to reflect the dynamic process emerging and its consequences on power relations and responses of involved actors at different levels. An understanding of the dynamics is replaced by “snap-shots” of the process, seen from viewpoints already defined through the selection of indicators. In this way the framework itself diffuses some of the challenges in reality. The big risk is that the search for readymade solutions dominates and becomes based on a short-term understanding of some key descriptive indicators without sufficient entry into specific underlying causes.
To overcome such limitations, I draw attention to a need to understand power related processes in institutional changes. Decentralization is in the current study seen as a power-laden process in which a host of categories of actors at multiple levels interact dynamically during the intended transitions towards decentralization. Unlike the current dominating approach with its main focus on local water users’ organizations and to
7 some extent on relations between these organizations and state-owned irrigation companies, this study includes also other actors such as administrations, state agencies, and farmers. I aim to show how this approach would provide a deeper understanding of the dynamic decentralization processes in the structural and institutional changes. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the study seeks to specify formal and informal institutions; how they transform and what consequences they have for decentralization of irrigation management.
1.2 Objectives and research questions
This study concerns the dynamic processes emerging from decentralization of irrigation management and the consequences these processes have when decentralization is implemented in large- and medium-scale irrigation systems. Using irrigation systems in Vietnam as an example, the objective of this study is to assess how irrigation decentralization is implemented within centralized post-reform countries like Vietnam, and the complexities and thresholds of the process. The research questions of the study can be formulated as follows:
• How can the actors respond to institutional arrangements for decentralization? • What are the main options, challenges and constraints to irrigation decentralization? • Why do these challenges and constraints occur and have counterproductive effects?
The study demonstrates how institutional arrangements for decentralization have effects on the dynamics and relations of power between actors in multi-level governance, resulting in impacts on actors’ performance (i.e. power exercise, autonomy, accountability, participation), as well as their incentives and attitudes. Institutional arrangements refer to both formal and informal institutions, organizational structure, processes, mechanisms and procedures for decision-making, coordination, negotiations, and planning in irrigation management. With formal institutions, I mean legal framework (laws, policies, regulations, and
8 organizational structures). With informal institutions I refer to attitudes, incentives, networks, roles, capacities of actors, as well as procedures and rules at local levels. The findings and implications of the study are expected to apply not only to irrigation decentralization in Vietnam, but also to similar decentralization processes in other countries.
1.3 Scope of study
The study highlights two irrigation systems in Vietnam (Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han) as a combined case study. Their backgrounds are different, one being located in the Central area and one in the South. The two irrigation systems provide an in-depth understanding of the dynamic relations among the actors involved in irrigation systems. The Tay Ninh and the Nam Thach Han experiences can reveal more generally about key concerns with decentralization. The reason why Vietnam is selected for this study, beyond the fact that I have long experience of irrigation processes there, is that the worldwide pressure to decentralize management in irrigation farming practice in order to increase productivity is highly visible in agricultural- based countries such as Vietnam. The decentralization involved is based on a general political goal in Vietnam to bring about more effective natural- resources management within a sustainability framework.
Another reason is that analysis of irrigation decentralization in Vietnam reveals several complications. The co-existed governance has been observed. Decentralization in Vietnam involves the release of control from an extremely centralized system. On the one hand, a strive towards decentralization of the water/irrigation sector is in the same spirit as the national reforms toward decentralization and democracy that have been launched since the 1980s. But the centralized management style has its inherent path existing even in the decentralized reforms. On the other hand, decentralization of water/irrigation is ongoing, with internal efforts from the government and external support from international funding institutions. Under decentralization policies designed by different driving forces, IMT and PIM have been launched in many provinces with the understanding that farmers should partly bear expenses for investment, operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, both to increase their
9 incentive in effective water use and to reduce the state’s financial burden. But as irrigation is considered to be a public service, the state’s intervention is still very strong in monitoring service quantities and prices. In parallel with the decentralization policies on state management and on service management, several policies on the exemption of water fees for irrigation services, and renovation of state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies, have recently been implemented. These policies have been issued and modified several times in a short-time period. The concern of this study is whether or not the current legal framework and the institutional changes have created more challenges to the implementation of irrigation decentralization. In transition towards decentralization, the situation of Vietnam’s irrigation shows that there are struggles between different actors with different political agendas for decentralization in the irrigation sector. They may cause complications in the formulation of appropriate institutional arrangements for effective decentralization. I shall examine and analyze all these types of challenges in this study.
Being one part of the whole integral reform effort in administrative, economic, financial, and political aspects, there are many lessons to be learnt from the experience of decentralizing irrigation management. Some key achievements have resulted from these reforms, but the reform process remains incomplete. The faltering implementation process is a particular concern when seeking to understand processes of decentralization in a wide sense. For this, the study provides a penetrating example of the potential and constraints for implementing a decentralization process in the country. Economic and institutional reforms are driving forces for the decentralization process in natural resources management in general, and in the water/irrigation sector in particular. Lessons learnt and challenges not yet met in the decentralization process in Vietnam prove to be useful for the analysis and assessment of decentralization in the irrigation sector. Since there is a huge body of literature on public administrative reforms in Vietnam (PAR program), the current study does not assess in detail the decentralization of state management and performance of the state agencies. In addition, using the findings from decentralized irrigation to evaluate the entire socio-political decentralization process within the country at present falls outside the scope of my study.
10 1.4 Outline of study
The study is structured into nine chapters. The introduction, Chapter 1 gives the background to decentralized irrigation and the main arguments that provide the direction for the current study. Aims, objectives, research questions and the scope of the study are presented.
Chapter 2 sets the conceptual framework. The complexity and implication of the concept of decentralization are discussed; in the different processes: in public sectors and in natural resources management with an emphasis on irrigation. A conceptual framework and an analysis framework for assessing irrigation decentralization are developed at the end of this chapter.
Chapter 3 concerns the methodology for the study including the methods applied for collecting, and procedures for organizing and processing data.
Chapter 4 provides an overall picture of irrigation development and management in Vietnam. The organizational structures and management mechanisms in the irrigation sector are described along with the actors involved in cross-level interaction. This introduces actors’ specific roles, mandates, and dynamic linkages to the different sides of irrigation management. In addition, a description of the irrigation management in two selected case studies is given.
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the reform process including the institutional arrangements toward decentralization and democracy in Vietnam. The legal framework of irrigation management, mechanism and processes of irrigation management are conceptualized in this context.
Chapter 6 analyzes changes in the positions, dynamics, and power relations among involved actors under the impacts of institutional arrangements. It examines how actors at all levels exercise power in the decision-making process.
11 Chapter 7 assesses the performance of actors in terms of autonomy, accountability and participation.
Chapter 8 focuses on how the interests, incentives and capabilities of actors lead them to respond to new situations.
Chapter 9 to summarizes the main findings of the current study and draws conclusions on the main challenges and constraints for decentralized irrigation in Vietnam. Implications drawn from the findings are given.
12 CHAPTER 2: POWER TRANSFER AS A PROCESS: INTENTIONS, APPROACHES, AND RESPONSES
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the current study. The first purpose is to shed light on the complexity and implications of irrigation decentralization by learning the experience of decentralization of public sectors and of natural resources management with an emphasis on irrigation management. The second purpose is to develop a conceptual framework for assessing the decentralization of irrigation management. The chapter, which is divided into five sections, begins in Section 2.1 with a review of the literature relevant to the decentralization concept; driving forces, forms, definitions, and assumptions. The review opens up recent debate around this concept in the association with “good” governance.
Section 2.2 discusses different forms of irrigation decentralization that have been applied as blueprint in different places. The discussion indicates that a thorough consideration of all complexities and implications of decentralization is needed when designing decentralization for irrigation to avoid failures caused by blueprint applications. A message is delivered: While the currently fashionable idea of devolution or privatization is advocated as the panacea to achieve good governance, efficiency, and development, there remain essential roles for government when irrigation management is decentralized. The concept of polycentricity is presented at the end of this section to explain why and how it is applicable in the current study.
In Section 2.3, a review of disappointing outcomes of decentralization in both public sectors and irrigation management reveals that decentralization is, in reality, unlikely to bring about the expected outcomes. While the existing literature often considers constraints during implementation as main causes of the failures, the discussion in this section
13 leads to an argument about the shortcomings in the current approach for assessing the decentralization of irrigation management.
Section 2.4 presents the conceptual framework for assessing irrigation decentralization in this study. Five key elements relating to decentralization that are also applicable to irrigation are identified; (i) institutional arrangements, (ii) incentives and capabilities of actors, (iii) power exercise and power relations, (iv) accountability and transparency, and (v) stakeholder participation and interaction. Each key element is discussed further in order to understand what each of them means, which factors have an impact on these key elements, and how they can be applied in this study. The last Section 2.5 illustrates the framework for analyzing the empirical studies in the coming chapters.
2.1 Good governance as a means for decentralization
2.1.1 Driving forces of decentralization
Started in the early 1960s with the focus mainly on the roles and relationships of local administrative authorities within a centrally managed government (Cohen & Peterson, 1997), the concept of decentralization has then been launched on a worldwide scale since the 1980s. Concerning the question what are the main forces driving this global trend, several documents argue that decentralization is a political and economic processes responding to globalization, global environmental changes, and democratization. Interdependence and global linkages are increasing due to economic growth towards market liberalization and international trade, information technologies and communications, and changes in the global environment (WB, 2005; FAO, 2006; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Consequently, the monocentric system where all decisions are made by states becomes inappropriate in the new context. The initiatives and actions should also come from non-state actors at different levels of polycentric system (Ostrom, 2010).
Furthermore, neoliberal reform policies during the 1980s are raised as another important driving force for decentralization. Neo-liberalism and its
14 dominant economic policies focusing on economic liberalization and privatization have brought the roles of states and private sectors into the debate. In contrast to the development strategies that highlighted the strong and effective roles of governments during the period 1950s-1960s, the 1970s-1980s was associated with a heavy critique of the ineffective performance of states in public service delivery and natural resources management (Gunnarsson & Holmén, 1995; WB, 2008). The roles of states have been a departure point for questions about what the state should and should not do, and how to enhance their performance (Koh et al., 2009). Supporting a tendency of neo-liberal policies to minimize state interventions and encourage the private sectors and privatization as a means of achieving development, powerful banks such as the IMF and the WB, and other donors have launched the huge financial loans to impose national reforms in connection with decentralization in many developing countries during the 1980s – 1990s (Tan, 2012; Narsiah & Ahmed, 2012). The tendency was to transfer power from central downwards to lower- level governments and non-state entities to improve efficiency and equity in public services delivery and natural resources management (Cheema & Maguire, 2001).
The decentralization strategies imposed by donors during the 1990s, was shifted from enhanced participation of poor people in rural development projects in the early period to specific reforms, generally associated with the structural adjustment programs and civil service retrenchment. The highest priority was privatization and community–based management of natural resources and the environment (Cohen & Peterson, 1997). Decentralization in the linkages with “free-market” economic reforms and privatization is supposed to be a generally suitable approach to achieving macro economic stability and development, and poverty reduction (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Litvack et al., 1998; WB, 2005; Batterbury & Fernando, 2006). Democratic decentralization has emerged since the early 1990s, making wide use of the governance concept. This emphasizes participation and voices of multi-stakeholders (government, civil society organization, and private sectors, local communities) in decision-making. The links between decentralization and good governance that is defined as efficiency, public participation, democracy, accountability, and transparency have been become firmly established (Cheema & Rondinelli 2007).
15 In the water sector, irrigation decentralization has been launched in the context of the global water reforms under the pressure to improve efficiency and productivity. It can be observed that the policy intentions with decentralization are not primarily concerned with political power shifts but are centered on improving irrigation performance and lowering the financial burden on the state budget for O&M. Achievement of both goals is expected to occur as a result of deeper involvement of empowered local water users’ organizations in different activities within irrigation management (Aheeyar, 2002; Mukherji et al., 2009a). With these expectations, the paradigm of irrigation management transfer may be seen as a suitable approach that combines three different concepts, democratization, decentralization and privatization (Mukherji et al., 2009a). Decentralization, therefore, is implemented with different targets; improved food production with a democratic political goal to enhance public involvement in making crucial decisions and contributing finance.
2.1.2 Forms and definitions of decentralization
From the banks’ point of view, decentralization is the necessary condition to have “significant repercussions for resource mobilization and allocation, and ultimately macroeconomic stability, service delivery, and equity” (Litvack et al. 1998: 1), and achieve “both the pace and quality of economic growth” (WB, 2005: 2). Decentralization is also a tool to meet “development goals in ways that respond to the needs of local communities” (WB, 2000:160, quoted in Sundar, 2001:2008). In consequence, decentralization has often been implemented using a mixture of four types that link to “statecraft” in connection with national administrative, economic, and political reforms (Ribot, 2002b). Depending on the political structure and administrative issues of each country, emphasis is placed on: (1) administrative, (2) political, (3) fiscal, and (4) economic decentralization4. Different definitions of decentralization have been formulated in different writings5. Two UNDP documents (UNDP, 1998; 1999) provide comprehensive compilations of different definitions.
4 Some documents use privatization or market decentralization, or divestment 5 Some examples; UNDP, 1998; UNDP, 1999; Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004; Fforde, 2003; Shah, 1998; Work, 2002; Oxhorn et al., 2004; FAO, 2006; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Benjamin, 2008; Bene et al., 2009, http://go.worldbank.org/WM37RM8600
16 Learning from these sources, decentralization is synthesized in this study to be a process to transfer authority and responsibility in planning, management, and resource mobilization and allocation, from a central government to lower-level governments or non-state entities. Decentralization can also be understood in broader socio-cultural terms as the restructuring of authorities so that a system of co-responsibilities develops between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels (cf. UNDP, 1998; Holmén, 2010:113).
Specifically, (1) Administrative decentralization refers to “reform of hierarchical and functional distribution of powers and functions between central and non-central government units” (Cohen & Peterson, 1997:10). De-concentration is the lowest degree of administrative decentralization, referring to a shift in specified functions and responsibilities from central ministries to their branches at lower local levels, but where decisions are still made by the central administration. Another form of administrative decentralization is delegation of central authority and responsibility to semi-autonomous organizations agents of the state, state enterprises, or other public authorities not wholly controlled by, but legally accountable to, the central government (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Work, 2002).
There are other situations in which full authority over decision-making and resources has been transferred from central to lower-level governments or other entities. (2) Political decentralization or democratic decentralization is also known as devolution. Devolution is the most complete form of decentralization, as it gives discretionary power and autonomy in service delivery to sub-national governments, citizens or their elected representatives who are downwardly accountable to the population. They are therefore able to influence local policy making and prioritize choices relevant to local people’s lives (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002b). (3) A third form is fiscal decentralization, which refers to a transfer of authority in public financial mobilization and allocation to sub-national governments. (4) The final form is Economic decentralization, which refers to the transfer of power and resources to the private sector or NGOs. Privatization, market liberalization, and public-private partnerships are other forms of economic decentralization (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).
17 2.1.3 Debate about conceptual definitions and assumptions of decentralization
Some scholars argue that the concept of decentralization has been used descriptively and inconsistently (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Cheema & Rondinell, 2007). Cohen & Peterson highlight careless use of conceptual definitions and terms of decentralization, confusing and linear assumptions, and unrealistic expectations of decentralization. According to them, academics and professionals have not reached a consensus on the definition of decentralization because they have different linguistic preferences and different understandings of this concept. This has led to inconsistency and confusion in policy formation and implementation (ibid., 1997).
Regarding decentralization’s assumptions, as I see it, the ambitious expectations of decentralization are based some the presumptive assumptions. The first one assumes that local units perform better than central bureaucracies due to their physical proximity. Sub-national governments have better information about the needs and preferences of a local population. They would, therefore, be more effective, less bureaucratic, and more accountable in their public service delivery (Azfar et al., 2001; Campos & Hellman, 2005). Meaningful decisions made by sub-national governments are assumed to reflect better local needs and users’ willingness to pay. This is considered to be a crucial condition for sub- national governments to increase cost recovery and improve financial autonomy (Faguet, 1997; Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004). They would thereby increase incentive and accountability of sub-national governments. Increased competition among local levels would also improve incentive of sub-national governments and increase cost effectiveness in service provision (Campos & Hellman, 2005). One consequence is improved efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation and utilization of resources, in service delivery, and in resource management. Thereby decentralization contributes to economic development and poverty reduction (Litvack et al., 1998).
The second assumption refers to public participation and empowerment at local levels as a precondition for democracy and efficiency. Accessing
18 information and resources in transparent ways would help stakeholders to understand and exercise their influence on the government’s activities, in policy formulation, resource management and service provision. Since decision-making power and resource allocation have been transferred closer to the population in society, the thinking is that autonomy, democracy, and empowerment are enhanced. Stakeholder involvement and contribution are assumed to improve efficiency and sustainability in service delivery as well as to make local governments more accountable (WB, 2005; FAO, 2006). Therefore, much of the research suggests that the devolution of functions to local governance is an essential condition for achieving effective decentralization, as are accountability, and democracy (Faguet, 1997; WB, 2001; Ribot, 2002a; FAO, 2006; WB, 2005; Haque, 2008; Utomo, 2009).
In contrast, Cohen & Peterson argue that decentralization’s advocates have simplified the decentralization concept. This simplification may be seen in the assumptions made, the approaches to implementation, and the ways for assessing the impacts of decentralization. The expected outcomes become blurred when the decentralization concept is built on these linear assumptions. It is misleading to assume that decentralization would increase accountability, decrease bureaucracy, and enhance the effectiveness of local governments (ibid.). For instance, it is unclear if the increased competitions between administrative levels can improve accountability and efficiency (Campos & Hellman, 2005). Azfar et al. (2001:33) also challenge the assumption on proximity by commenting, “proximity does not guarantee that sub-national governments have the needed information unless they make an effort to elicit it”. They also claim that; it is too simplistic to assume that all stakeholders would be willing to participate in the process for the sake of enhancing the efficiency of services or improving the performance of lower-level governments (loc.cit.).
A similar argument about decentralization of irrigation management is found in the study of Mukherji et al. (2009a). According to them, the IMT/PIM6 paradigm is “a conceptual fault”. Incorporating three different
6 IMT – Irrigation Management Transfer, PIM – Participatory Irrigation Management
19 concepts, democratization, decentralization and privatization into one single concept called IMT/PIM is not viable. It leads to some faulty assumptions: that water user groups and farmers are willing to participate and contribute in operation and maintenance; that self-governing institutions of farmers perform better than incompetent and bureaucratic irrigation agencies; that poor performance of state irrigation agencies causes low cost recovery; and thereby that maintenance is poor and irrigation performance is low (ibid.).
2.1.4 Governance and “good” governance
The concept of governance is a basis for decentralization design. However, governance remains an unclear concept even though it has been used widely since the 1990s (Cleaver & Franks, 2005). There is no universal definition of this concept since different definitions of governance are found in many sources such as in the documents of the international organizations (cf. ADB, 1995; Work, 2002; WB, 1992; UNDP, 1998; UNDP, 1999; Cheema & Maguire, 2001; WB, 2007). Different institutions have their own definitions that relate to their respective activities (Parthasarathy, 2005). Governance in the documents of UNDP is defined as the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the state and non-state entities such as civil society and the private sector can interact and exercise their power in decision-making processes related to political, economic, social, political issues (UNDP, 2004). The concept also refers to networks, relationships, and interface between formal and informal institutions through which actors can exercise their power (Tropp, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). Governance, however, as used by the WB and the ADB, refers to “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. It refers to the institutional environment involving the public and the private sectors, and links directly to the country’s economic and social resources for development, privatization and market liberalization (WB, 1992:1; ADB, 1995: 3)7.
7 Similarly, from the views of the Vietnamese government “the idea of governance is restricted to ways that state management can be reformed for economic development and public stability, particularly through the use of mediating groups like the mass organizations.” (UNDP, 2006:4)
20 Coming closer to the definition by UNDP, water governance is defined by the Global Water Partnership (GWP) as “the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (Rogers & Hall, 2003: 9) or more specific is to “determine who gets what water, when and how, and decide who has the right to water and related services and their benefits” (UNESCO- WWAP, 2006: 47). Even though “adaptive, multilevel, collaborative governance” has been considered decisive in water reforms (Molle et al., 2009), water governance has in effect been “highly fragmented and lacks coherent unifying framework and agenda for action” (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007: 7). There is a lack of an effective framework for interaction among stakeholders at multiple levels (Merrey et al., 2007). The governance frameworks have been designed and implemented in different ways based on different understandings of the concept without considering thoroughly implications and contexts. In consequence, many suggestions and proposals have become “an end in themselves” (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007). The governance frameworks introduced by many international donors have been assessed to be too limited since there is “a general lack of understanding of the way local interactions shape and influence governance processes” (Cleaver & Franks, 2005: 2). The main focuses are instead associated with technical and administrative aspects, and formal institutions. The processes, mechanisms of governance, and social structures are often neglected (Cleaver, 2002; Parthasarathy, 2005).
“Good” governance has been presented as a goal of decentralization but there is insufficient empirical evident to prove causal relations between decentralization and good governance as argued in literature on public sectors (cf. Azfar et al., 2001; Campos & Helman, 2005; Cheema & Rondinell, 2007). Good governance implies different styles and different contents, depending on who drives the process. Each donor introduces its own set of principles of good governance (Cleaver & Franks, 2005). Since the way to define good governance is seen differently in the documents of different bilateral and multi-lateral donors, there are also differences in how its manifestations are perceived. For example, “good governance” in the WB and the ADB, concerns specific issues: authorities, activities, effectiveness, capacity and performance of public officials and institutions
21 in shaping public policy for the development and delivery of effective public goods and services for a purpose of economic development (WB, 1992; ADB, 1995). The main foci, therefore, are the performance of officials in order to identify the enabling factors for increasing authority, improving accountability and transparency, and enhancing participation and capacity8. In the water sector, three key elements of governance; accountability, transparency, and participation, have been used to explain the relationship between good governance and IWRM. But these elements are not “by themselves sufficient to support IWRM unless the governance regime address the access points between them” (Allan & Rieu-Clarke, 2010: 247).
As I see it, the concept of governance has been defined in different terms, resulting in inconsistent and uncritical applications among donors. The labor “good governance” in a loose way denotes success for water reforms and decentralization. I have in the study observed, however, that the notion has different definitions and easily lands into a field of ideologically colored perceptions of what “good governance” stands for. My understanding is that there is no one stringent definition of its meaning; efforts lead to the results of a political process as indicators of what good governance has been, rather than to a prescriptive understanding of it. The elements of good governance are usually described in general and prescriptive terms in policy recommendations. The emphasis is put on institutional arrangements to ensure that meaningful power and responsibility are transferred to local government, and to strengthen capacity of local government to perform their functions. An accountability mechanism and transparent information are established so the communities can monitor, and the politicians and officials have an incentive to be responsible. A participatory mechanism is set up to increase incentives for people to become involved in the design and implementation of public projects (ADB, 1995; UN, 2006; WB; FAO, 20069). There is a widespread lack of guidelines,
8 The WB recommends four key elements of good governance; public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, and transparency and information (WB, 1992). The ADB identifies four other elements; accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency (ADB, 1995). The UNDP selects the same elements; participation, predictability, transparency, and adds some more elements; rule of law, responsiveness, consensus orientation, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and strategic vision (UNDP, 1997). 9 http://go.worldbank.org/WM37RM8600
22 be it about what should be done to improve good governance, how to do it, and how local variations would be accounted for. Stakeholder participation is emphasized but the dynamics in institutional changes and power relationships between stakeholders are not mentioned in policy recommendations. This could easily lead to misleading assessments because interactions between relevant stakeholders who have different interests, incentives and influences are excluded from the analysis.
In short, the decentralization advocates argue that decentralization is an unavoidable process due to inevitable responding to economic, political, social, and environmental driving forces. They also challenge the competence of the state, citing shortcomings and deficiencies in public service delivery and in natural resources management. Therefore, in many instances, decentralization has been imposed towards a trend of “the rolling back the state”. Policy formation today exhibits a normative side: decentralization is associated with a general ambition towards good governance. In actual fact, both the concepts of decentralization and governance are understood in inconsistent and general ways with different implications. They are built on several linear assumptions, which has led to the unrealistic expectations. The next section, I shall discuss decentralization of irrigation management as well as its complexities and implications.
2.2 Irrigation decentralization: forms, complexities and implications
The emphasis on the roles of private sectors and civil society organizations has generated different decentralization forms. As donors, researchers and policy makers approach irrigation from different points of view, they would suggest different types of decentralization and require the involvement of different categories of actors.
As Table 2.1 shows, decentralization is defined as (i) devolution when irrigation is a common-pool resource, (ii) privatization when irrigation is treated as a private service, (iii) centralization in large-scale hydraulic systems. De-concentration would be included in this category since only
23 specific functions are delegated to lower levels while decisions are still taken at central level, and (iv) co-management/partnership when the roles of state are highlighted and irrigation is featured as a public good or commodity, essential for life, food security and livelihoods.
Table 2.1. Different types of irrigation decentralization
Different types of Irrigation is seen from Involved actors for decentralization different views achieving efficiency and sustainability Devolution Common-pool resources - Local communities - Irrigation Management with characteristics of - Water users’ Transfer excludability and organizations - Common-Pool Resources subtractability that lead to - Local users’ groups Management collective actions problems - Community-based irrigation management
Privatization Economic goods requiring - Private sector full cost recovery - Enterprises - Individuals Centralization Large-scale hydraulic State/Central water De-concentration systems control
Co-management - Public goods with market - States’ interventions to failures due to excludability, some extent (regulation, Public-Private externalities institutional development, Partnership - Commodity essential for investment, planning etc. life, food security, livelihoods - Other non-state entities - Large-scale hydraulic systems
(Source: Created for this research)
Different forms of decentralization also reveal a fact that there are complexities and implications when decentralization has been applied for specific circumstances in different scales of irrigation systems. For reasons to be explained below, it is more difficult to apply decentralization to water (in irrigation) than to other natural resources such as forestry and fishery. Irrigation decentralization needs to be assessed thoroughly. A blueprint cannot be applied to all cases.
24 2.2.1 Community-based irrigation management
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) has been followed worldwide in development projects within the frame of community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) or common-pool resources management (CPRs) (Sundar, 2001; Shackleton et al., 2002). The much-propagated direction is devolution at the lowest level (i.e. local communities or local groups) without the states’ interventions. The devolution has been seen as a panacea to improve efficiency and equity in resource allocation, and to enhance the voices and active participation of different stakeholders in decision-making processes (WB, 2000 in Sundar, 2001; FAO, 2006; Larson & Soto, 2008). The donors’ call has been, at project level in particular, to seek stakeholder involvement in management as a blueprint to set up a constructive process toward empowerment.
According to the Common Pool Resources (CPRs) theories, irrigation provides ample illustration of one of CPRs10 and it is subject to collective action problems11 due to its characteristics of excludability (the high costs for exclusion of potential users from using the resources) and subtractability (the amount of a given resource used by an individual can affect others when the total quantity available for use is limited. For instance, it is difficult to exclude farmers who want to access water illegally from an irrigation system. These may be farmers at the head-end of the system who might want to take as much water as they can, or farmers who may want to get water but do not want to contribute labor in maintenance (free-riding). Yet one more type of difficulty is with those individual farmers who use water in irrigation canals, and in so doing, create water shortages for others. Such problems impact directly due to the asymmetric position of head-end and tail-end plots in irrigation systems. This would in turn indirectly affect the behavior and incentive of many more water users, so that the motivation to pay water fees decreases (Ostrom et al., 1994).
10 A common pool resource (e.g. forestry, fisheries, grazing, irrigation, etc. is “a natural or human- made resource from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, and one person’s consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others” (Ostrom et al., 1994) 11 Collective action problems in CPRs theory refer to problems caused by actions taken individually but which can affect others (Ostrom, 2010)
25 In these situations, the development of local water users’ organizations is seen more and more as a route to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” syndrome, given that they are endowed with certain rights, notably ownership that furnishes the stakeholders with power (Finger et al., 2006). CPR studies argue that local communities would cooperate and govern irrigation management better than bureaucratic agencies because people in the same group are better able to cooperate due to social norms of trust and reciprocity (Uphoff, 2005). They have access to local knowledge of the physical characteristics of resources, and on local, social and cultural attitudes, and are able to set up their organizations and the rules for implementation and monitoring at a low cost (cf. Tang, 1992; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Lam, 1998; Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002; Agrawal, 2002). By comparing irrigation performance in selected government-managed and farmer-managed irrigation systems12, many studies of CPRs theory indicate that farmer-managed systems perform better than those under government management (Tang, 1992; Benjamin et al., 1994; Pham, 2003; Tran, 2005; Araral, 2011).
Conclusions from CPRs studies on the superior performance of self- governing organizations, as mentioned above, have been, however, heavily criticized because they are drawn from very simple cases in small- scale irrigation systems and do not take into consideration the process of institutional changes (e.g. changes in norms and actors’ behaviors) (cf. Agrawal, 2002; Harrison, 2003; Iván & Vladimir, 2009). The CPR researchers usually narrow their focuses on collective actions at community level and give little attention to higher institutional levels as well as political-economic context and power relations (Clement, 2010; 2013). They are also based on the unrealistic assumptions that (i) individuals are ascribed with rational behavior, and (ii) rules in self- governing institutions are defined and enforced by individuals in institutions without external influences from authorities or state agencies (Harrison, 2003). In contrast, the scholars of collective action theory claim that individuals use CPRs in different ways to maximize their own interests/profits and do not care about others (i.e. non-cooperation). This
12 Farmer-managed irrigation systems are operated and managed by local communities without external assistance (including indigenous systems and systems which have been transferred from irrigation agencies) (Aheeyar, 2002). They also are called self-governing organizations
26 situation potentially leads to the “tragedy of the commons”. State control, therefore, is necessary in order to avoid an institutionally destructive mechanism in the face of over-exploitation of resources (Hardin, 1968).
2.2.2 The private sector and privatization
With neo-liberalism came, privatization of public services emerged in the early 1980s and expanded in the 1990s. From donors’ viewpoints, the private sectors are more effective than the state in the provision of water infrastructure and services (Wilder & Lankao, 2006). Privatization is expected to increase incentives and efficiency (Tan, 2012; Narsiah & Ahmed, 2012). Water reforms on a worldwide scale have emphasized that water should be treated as an economic good (GWP, 2000). In consequence, different initiatives of privatization have been launched for improving water allocation efficiency (e.g. private property rights, water markets), increasing finance for investment (e.g. water pricing, decreased subsidies), and enhancing water performance (e.g. public sector reforms, transfer of water management to private enterprises) (Furlong, 2010).
Services are delivered based on the principle of “partly-funded user pay”, instead of “pure-state funded” in order to reduce the state budget (Koh et al., 2009). Water users should provide some of the finance for investment, operation and maintenance of irrigation systems. The idea is to increase users’ incentive in water saving and to reduce the state’s financial burden by mobilizing finance from users. Irrigation service agencies are under pressure to perform, as state sub-ordinates, effectively, efficiently and autonomously from the market mechanism. Even though private enterprises are assumed to bring about effectiveness and efficiency, experience from privatized irrigation management, for example in Mexico, provides a general observation that privatization has improved both democracy and participation by water users but the role of the state is still needed to ensure accountability, transparency, equity and sustainability (Wilder & Lankao, 2006). The monitoring and controlling of government standards and prices are also needed since irrigation is considered to be a public service and the cost level is not defined by the market. In reality, a privatization approach has limited application for irrigation services for several reasons. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have been established
27 between farmers, government and the private sectors (e.g. enterprises, individuals or even state-owned enterprises) but the states still own the irrigation systems (state ownership). These “monopoly features”, according to Tan (2012), create a significant difficulty in the privatization of irrigation systems because the involved actors do not have an incentive to improve efficiency when they do not own properties. Moveover, they cannot operate efficiently in a situation of imperfect and asymmetric information, and limited capacities (ibid.: 2554 ). State irrigation companies are slow to adapt to new mechanisms and speedy socio- economic change, because of both their capacity and their motivation.
Another obstacle when applying privatization is that the infrastructure should be designed for this purpose (e.g. pipe systems with the equipment to control water quantity and flow). In reality, not many irrigation systems in Asia meet this condition: the characteristic infrastructure is open canals and facilities operated manually without any measurements. Therefore, many comments about the applicability of PPP for irrigation management suggest that privatization is not appropriate in most Asian countries (Mukherji et al., 2009a). Even more important is the fact that the private sectors are not interested in becoming involved when the costs for investment in and maintenance of the infrastructure are very high and profits are low. The private enterprises cannot afford to make a large investment, and take significant risks in design, construction, and operation (Tan, 2012).
2.2.3 States’ roles in irrigation management
One of the most important points drawn from the empirical studies is that decentralization is not a panacea and it is not an alternative option that could automatically replace centralization (cf. UNDP, 1998, UNDP, 1999; Wong & Guggenheim, 2005; FAO, 2006). Whichever forms a decentralization process may ultimately take, interactions that combine decentralization and centralization are involved, at least temporarily. In general, the roles of the state are prerequisites for all institutional arrangements, decentralization or not. Whether failures of decentralization are due to poor implementation or a conceptual fault, they reveal as a fact that the roles of states are still essential in both decentralization and
28 centralization policies (FAO, 2006; Fritzen & Lim, 2006). This can be seen in how new governance systems in public service delivery and natural resources management develop new types of partnerships between states and non-state entities today (FAO, 2006; Cheena & Rondinell, 2007). In water sector, a paradigm shift towards co-management in irrigation management that emphasizes the sharing of authority, responsibility and finance between the state, the private sector and civil social organizations has been observed (Shivakoti et al., 2005). States’ interventions may become essential, not only because of irrigation’s status as a public service with a high potential for market failures, but also because of the large scale of irrigation systems. The arguments are as follows;
Public services, market failures, and political bargaining
The general suggestion of economists is that the state is responsible for providing public goods and services in situations of market failure, which occur as a consequence of power monopoly, externalities, non- excludability, or information asymmetry. However, if states interfere too much, their own shortcomings and deficiencies (“government failures”) will limit efficiency and development (WB, 2008). A concern is that if the state’s roles are necessary to solve market failures because the private sectors cannot afford or are unwilling to take over the initiative, then what are suitable roles for the states in both overcoming market failure and avoiding government failures?
Irrigation with typical features of costly excludability and externalities is highly likely to fail on the free market. State intervention therefore is needed in irrigation investment and management, but it must not be forgotten that irrigation water is a commodity essential for life, food security and livelihood in rural areas. Irrigation service delivery and the government’s subsidy become aspects of social life and politics linked to “political bargaining and exchange” (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Larson & Soto, 2008). In fact, irrigation is considered as a self-evident “public service”13 in
13 (Koh et al., 2009:267) define two terms of “public service” in Vietnam. The first type relates to the administrative tasks that the state performs such as registration of births and deaths. The second type of service is the provision of material needed (e.g. water, electricity). In this case the government sells the service directly or mandates commercial entities to do so
29 many agriculture-based countries such as Vietnam. A major political concern is, therefore, what state irrigation agencies can do to ensure that service is delivered effectively to farmers, at reasonable prices. It is a cornerstone of political goals to improve livelihood as well as food security. Therefore, even though public service delivery has been delegated to sub- national government or commercial entities, as in Vietnam, the state still plays an important role as to monitor policy implementation in order to ensure that “such services are provided at a fee that is reasonable and no market failure should be allowed to disadvantage any member of the population” (Koh et al., 2009: 264).
Competence, resources, and coordination in large-scale domains
States play an important role in water management in large domains because of the state’s competence in dealing with technical issues and coordination (Ostrom, 2010). Their roles in the regulation, planning, coordination and management of water resources at regional level, in river basins (national and trans-boundary), and in large-scale hydraulic systems are important since local organizations with limited capacity and resources cannot deal with complexities both in technology and in conflict resolution (Barker & Molle, 2004; Mukherji et al., 2009a). The state may also be seen as a powerful external actor which provides resources, coordinates cross- sectors and cross-levels (Shivakoti et al., 2005), and balances the different interests of individuals and collective groups to achieve optimal use (Haggett, 2001).
This argument emerges in the study of Wittfogel (1957): efficiency and sustainability are achieved in hydraulic systems due to central water control. His study concerning the extreme centralization of hydraulic systems is basically still appropriate for today’s situation, were it without context. Wittfogel claims that “hydraulic monopoly” or “hydraulic empire” existed in ancient societies such as Ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China and Pre-Colombian Mexico and Peru. These are regions where the expansion and intensification of agriculture depend on large-scale hydraulic works for irrigation and flood control. Based on his analysis of the relationships and characteristics of hydraulic production and agro- managerial despotism in hydraulic civilizations, Wittfogel concludes that
30 large-scale irrigation management under hydraulic civilizations has created centralized political authority (hydraulic monopoly). The complex bureaucratic structure in hydraulic societies provides a way for powerful actors to maintain their power in the societies but it is still necessary to mobilize the huge labor force required to work, deliver water and maintain the systems. The social structure in a hydraulic society is categorized into two main classes: “superior and privileged persons” and “inferior and underprivileged persons”. Officials/ state representatives (such as peace chiefs, war leaders, priests, priest-chiefs, or hydraulic officials etc.) are persons who have political power on a national level. Because of this, they can both control water distribution and force people to work under directives issued at a national level, not just under those derived from within local boundaries. According to Wittfogel, labor division for water distribution, maintenance and conflict resolutions vary in different hydraulic societies but all systems operate in a sustainable manner thanks to the cooperation and integration of the people under the “water master” who provides a balance between water allocation and maintenance of hydraulic works in each subarea.
In the same line with Wittfogel’s argument, Harris (1978) argues that when top/down implementation of a decentralization policy breaks central control, the system becomes much less effective, leading to an increase in problems with hunger and social conflicts. New control mechanisms emerge, which immediately turn to re-centralization in order to restore sustainability, productivity and state legitimacy. This is what Harris calls the “hydraulic trap”. According to Harris, re-centralization that increases the state’s control over hydraulic works is seen as the only way to overcome the dilemma of ineffective bureaucracy and inefficiency in irrigation management (ibid.).
Wittfogel’s and Harris’ findings seem to contradict the purpose of decentralization which is to transfer power to local levels in order to improve efficiency and sustainability in irrigation management. They also contradict the conclusions and findings of the scholarly works on CBNRM and CPRs as well as those of many donors, who claim that efficiency and sustainability may be achieved when private sector, local communities, and self-governing users groups involve in water management. However, these
31 contradictions can be explained by the difference in the scale of the irrigation systems. There is a need for a better understanding of the implications and particular challenges in the decentralization of large- and medium-scale irrigation systems. Devolution may work in very small-scale irrigation systems as indicated in the studies by the scholars of CPRs theory but may face many difficulties in large- and medium-scale irrigation systems without back-up from the states. The involvement of local communities in irrigation management is decisive – without local/domestic demands for it, decentralization is less likely to be successful. But implementation of a decentralization policy must be more than merely setting up a demand-driven process. True, a built-in intention in decentralization policy is to facilitate a participatory process by promoting initiatives from local stakeholders, but such initiatives need to be harmonized and integrated with national development strategies and plans. Problems and risk should be anticipated as much and early as possible. Obstacles may look different in various cases, but without the coordination and intervention of the central government, the decentralization process could fail, or an acute conflict might build up.
Multilateral organizations and international development agencies, notably the WB, which support neoliberal policies, have suggested that states should neither directly provide some public services nor manage natural resources because the private sector and society’s organizations can deliver more effectively. States’ roles should be only in “regulation, institutional development, investment in public goods, and transfer” (WB, 2008: 247). Irrigation decentralization therefore refers to a transformation of the roles of state, from a direct deliverer of services to a regulator that monitors the performance and standard of service delivery to ensure efficiency and equity (Merrey et al., 2007). The state is also a provider of human, technical and fiscal resources, and a coordinator/negotiator between national/regional and local levels, and between multiple stakeholders, to balance different interests and resolve conflicts, with minimum cost (Shivakoti et al., 2005). Irrigation agencies are, therefore, to develop strategy, share information, and provide communication, maintenance and rehabilitation of irrigation system, and to provide assistance to WUOs (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007).
32 2.2.4 Dynamic process and powers in a co-management form
This review delivers a message: there is seemingly no single best solution to achieve effective irrigation management, even though different institutional arrangements have been applied for more than 50 years. Neither decentralization nor any one of the alternatives (devolution, centralization, and privatization) is a panacea (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). The devolution and privatization approaches imposed by many donors as blueprint needs to be challenged. Decentralization should be designed properly in the each context, considering all relevant factors including scales of irrigation systems, capacity, institutional arrangements, infrastructure, and so on. The appropriate solution is one that fits local conditions, not necessarily complete decentralization or centralization (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008).
It is hard to say what the best institutional arrangement for effective and sustainable irrigation management is because the circumstances vary. There is no blueprint for an optimal level of irrigation decentralization. All outcomes depend on factors such as scales and types of irrigation systems, and the capacity and incentives of the actors involved in the process. The current study is concerned with key variations in the interaction pattern within irrigation that has been decentralized. It does not discuss whether decentralization is a good or bad solution, nor does it search for an optimal level for decentralization in irrigation management. But it highlights that the concept of decentralization and its complexities need to be analyzed, along with the implications of irrigation decentralization. Thus, it would be dangerous to believe that the devolution of responsibility in management and finance of irrigation systems to local communities, civil society organizations, private enterprises without state’s interventions would succeed in any case. It is essential when capacity and legitimacy of these actors are widely questioned (Tropp, 2007).
If a new type of partnership between states and non-state entities is required, what, then, is a balance in this partnership to achieving effective and sustainable irrigation management? It requires proper institutional arrangements that define enforceable commitments between actors in decision-making and promote incentives for co-management. Clear
33 divisions and networks that tie relations between actors will create synergy for the relationships, thereby bringing efficiency into public service delivery (Lam, 2005; Vermillion, 2005). This approach comes close to the concept of polycentricity and will be discussed in the next section. The current study will follow this approach and looks at decentralization through the cross-level interactions and dynamics between actors in a form of co-management. It gives ample evidence of both the significance of the partnership and the many different forms the interactions may take.
With reference to a balance between decentralization and centralization, one school of thought seeks resilience in existing systems. Kauzya (n.d.) suggests adapting decentralization in a deliberate process to identify the “mid-point equilibrium”, where two forces – “centripetal forces” (towards centralization) and “centrifugal forces” (towards the periphery) – meet each other. Such equilibrium is assumed to be “a stable and predictable structure arrangement” of decentralized governance. It implies a power balance between the actors involved (ibid: 9). However, this deliberate process is a theoretical approach. Conducting such a process is not easy in the management of natural resources such as water. Values and priorities change in tune with for example globalization, population growth, environmental change, skills and capacity development. As time goes by, therefore, the equilibrium between centralization and decentralization has to adapt. This can be achieved through a deliberate process where negotiations take place step-by-step between stakeholders. Decentralization relies on trial and error experimentation for improvement (Cheema & Rondinell, 2007).
The outcomes of a deliberate process would change over time since the interaction process between stakeholders is dynamic. External impacts also affect and make this process more dynamic (Cash et al., 2006). However, the differentials in power and interest of stakeholders may distort the equilibrium. Powerful actors might prefer “centripetal forces” to maintain their interest and power as described in practice (Adger et al., 2005; Larson & Sato, 2008; Bene et al., 2009). Stakeholders might also search for something they feel is good and fair although it may not be clear why they are searching or they may not be able to formulate what they are searching. Therefore, the identified equilibrium may not reflect “a stable
34 and predictable structure arrangement” as Kauzya claims. The current study is confined to demonstrate the shortcomings inherent in the equilibrium approach, especially when assessing the practice of decentralizing a centralized system. It reinforces my argument about the need to pay attention to power relations in the dynamic processes. This comes closer to the concept of polycentricity that gives an emphasis on how relationships between actors create incentive, information capacity and conditions for interactive learning in cross-level interactions.
2.2.5 Decentralization from polycentric perspectives
The concept of polycentricity, originally introduced by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren in 1961, puts the spotlight on how the political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area can interact with “consistent and predictable patterns” to mobilize resources and solve potential conflicts (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961: 831-832). The institutional theory of polycentricity has been raised to the fore as the effective way to manage natural resources with an emphasis on multi-level institutional arrangements, where relationships among actors appear as multi-level governance with overlapping authorities and responsibilities (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). The argument for the application of polycentricity to natural resources management is that this approach can address uncertainty around dynamics and complexities in a comprehensive manner by highlighting interdependencies (Dietz et al., 2003). While the common approach that has been applied in many of the existing studies of decentralization mainly focus on the actors at local levels such as local governments and local users groups, the polycentric governance approach concerns different categories of actors at different levels. Actors in nested multi-level governance (networks) are actively involved with each other, thereby creating opportunities for communication, and information and knowledge sharing (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). Such a process is proactive in dealing with conflict resolution through mutual monitoring (Vermillion, 1997).
The effect is fragmentation, in the sense that information sharing may involve new actors and new ways to coordinate activities that are more complicated but also more democratic. A whole sequence of contacts
35 suggests that more active involvement by more partners requires capacity building at all levels. In polycentric systems actors need to have the capability to draw on available network structures to develop new temporary structures and to take action in new power situations. Action itself becomes decisive in polycentric decision-making systems. These systems become operational when initiatives encourage dynamic mobilization of the actors. The dynamics might relate to policy reform or other political goals. Access to information, sharing knowledge, and active involvement in collective (but not obviously balanced) decision-making and problem-solving create platforms for all parties to participate and exercise their power within authority spheres for specific areas based on competence and knowledge, rather than physical proximity (Ostrom, 2010). Based on these concerns and assumptions, the polycentric approach makes it possible to analyze how relationships create incentives, information capacities and conditions for interactive learning between the actors involved. Such an approach is not confined to the dominant key elements used to assess the accountability, finance and human capacity of actors as is the cases in decentralization literature (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). This is valuable as these are the factors that affect the outcomes of decentralization. Unfortunately, they are given insufficient attention in decentralization literature.
The current study follows the evolution of polycentricity and elaborates a perspective on multi-level dynamics in the case of Vietnamese irrigation systems. However, this study challenges such an argument by assuming that power relations would change dramatically, while actors would not change quickly and adapt automatically during the interaction. By applying polycentric system, I will evaluate obstacles to decentralization through a better understanding of how relationships and power sharing among actors affect performance, and how this creates incentives and the capability for interactive learning among those involved in the system’s dynamics. This approach is significantly more complicated than that usually applied in existing studies because it looks beyond institutional forms and assesses relations, incentives, and actions of actors in multi-level governance.
36 2.3 Decentralization’s outcomes and assessment methods
2.3.1 Disappointing outcomes and risks of decentralization
In spite of having high expectations on good governance, efficiency, and development, many donors and policy makers recognize that decentralization is, in reality, unlikely to bring about the positive outcomes outlined in the theory. It is not always efficient in affecting economy of scale and overall coordination. The WB’s document, Rethinking about decentralization (Litvack et al., 1998) assesses the impacts of decentralization:
“Many people hold strong beliefs about various aspects of decentralization; its intrinsic political and economic merits, its potential problems, and its effects on static and dynamic allocative efficiency, income distribution, macroeconomic stability, institutions demands on local capacity, potential for corruption, governance, and so on. But the actual empirical evidence on these propositions is either nonexistence or conflicting” (ibid.,1998:7).
Many empirical studies reveal that decentralization is associated with many risks. The delivery of public services retains problems such as unequal distribution and poor quality (WB, 2005). Transferring power to local governments might allow development of tendencies towards “elite capture” (Batterbury & Fernando, 2006; Cheema & Rondinell, 2007), i.e. powerful local actors could opt to draw up rules based on their own agendas and interests. Such local asymmetric power distribution would affect incentives aimed at ensuring the accountability of politicians, service providers, and citizens (Campos & Hellman, 2005; FAO, 2006; Fritzen & Lim, 2006). It may create potential problems such as corruption and bribery (Fisman & Gatti, 2000; Azfar et al., 2001; Fritzen, 2005). Decentralization rarely results in a positive impact on pro-poor outcomes and equity (Crook, 2003). Among known reasons for this are the strong influences of powerful local actors, and weak accountability mechanisms (Larson & Soto, 2008).
37 The empirical trend that local elites capture a decentralization process may result in a form of recentralization at local level. This may be a risk if empowered local governments take their own decisions beyond the control of central government (White & Smoke, 2005). For example, central governments have difficulties in controlling deficits and local government budget inflation (WB, 2005). In another example, the central government of Vietnam lost overall control of forestry areas in many communities along the border between Vietnam and China because decentralized provincial authorities signed contracts to lease the land to a Chinese company during 201014.
Similarly, a number of empirical studies show that irrigation decentralization has generated seemingly positive effects such as improved productivity and food security, improved water management and maintenance, improved system design and infrastructure, increased participation and contribution of farmers, and effective coordination of agricultural services and farming practices (Aheeyar, 2002; Garces- Restrepo et al., 2007). In spite of this, the results of IMT/PIM implementation have not always met expectations in many countries (Vermillion, 1997). It has also been difficult to scale-up results derived from pilot projects15. The number of failed cases is more than that of successful cases (Bandaragoda, 2006; Mukherji et al., 2009a). For example, the findings from the earliest study of 108 cases in 20 Asian countries by Mukherji et al. (2009a) show that less than half of the studied IMT/PIM cases (43 out of 108 cases) have been successful, but of these, 16 have only been subjected to short-term evaluations and only 15 have been assessed as outstanding successes (ibid.: 38).
14 Information was published in Vietnam news, August 2010. During 2010, a Chinese company— Innov Green—signed a series of contracts with provincial authorities to lease forestry in many communities along the border between Vietnam and China. However, when the government requested an investigation, different state agencies (provincial authorities, MARD, national assembly) came up with inconsistent figures in their reports (i.e. numbers of provinces, areas of forest already leased) 15 Several studies have been conducted in different countries, for instance, Vermillion, 1997; Barker & Molle, 2004; Sengupta, 2005; Bandaragoda, 2006; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a. Vermillion (1997) conducted the assessment in 29 cases. Garces-Restrepo et al. (2007) give a comprehensive review by FAO and IWMI of 43 cases selected in 34 countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, the US, New Zealand, Australia). Mukherji et al. (2009a) provide another comprehensive review by IWMI in 2009 of 108 cases in 20 Asia countries
38 2.3.2 Poor implementation and a cause of failures
With respect to the factors that impede the expected outcomes, poor implementation is often blamed as a cause of failures in many empirical studies (Larson & Soto, 2008). For instance, three factors are raised as the main obstacles to East Asian decentralization: unclear responsibility and authorities in organizational structure, limited accountability and capacity, and weak financial mechanisms (WB, 2005). Possible causes of the failures include the improper design of decentralization and the institutional arrangements for its implementation (Litvack et al., 1998; WB, 2001). States may fail to fulfill their responsibility to monitor and evaluate the performance of sub-national governments in decentralization due to limited capacity and ineffectiveness (Fritzen & Lim, 2006). Discretionary power has been transferred to local governments and users groups, but this transfer has not been as extensive as that outlined in the policy intentions. The reason for this is assumed to be resistance to power transfer among the more powerful actors (cf. Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Adger et al., 2005; Ribot et al., 2006; Batterbury & Fernando, 2006; Larson & Soto, 2008; Bene et al., 2009). Central governments are, in many cases, reluctant to transfer power because they have different interests and want to maintain their power (Cheema & Rondinell, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). The delayed process of fiscal decentralization in Vietnam is one of many examples, showing that some central ministries do not want to reduce their power in financial allocation and management to sub-national departments (Fritzen, 2006).
The limited authority and capacity of local governments with respect to skills, processes, financial resources, and management systems affects accountability, flexibility, and service quality (WB, 2001; Campos & Hellman, 2005). For example, the assessment of public administrative reform in Vietnam in 2010 reveals that the limited capacity of staff, especially in public financial management, and a weak institutional setting at district and commune administrations, combine to produce a situation in which staff are overworked. A small number of staff with limited professional capacity has to take responsibility for a wide range of duties in a way that becomes a major constraint affecting staff performance and service quality at sub-national levels (Anderson et al., 2009). In numerous
39 cases, the capacity of local government is limited, stakeholder participation is designed improperly, and the legal framework is not completed. Consequently the implementation of decentralization in response to external pressure from donors does not deliver reliable outcomes (Batterbury & Ferdando, 2006; Holmén, 2010).
As with debates in the literature on decentralization in public sectors, it has been widely argued that poor implementation is the main reason for the limitations and failures of irrigation decentralization (Mukherji et al., 2009a). Several significant constraints related to local stakeholders have been noted. WUOs have limited capacity in O&M and lack initiative (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). Stakeholders participate passively in decision-making while donors, consultants, and governments play a dominant role (Bandaragoda, 2006). IMT/PIM programs have been implemented worldwide as a blueprint with the support of many international lending institutions and assistance donors (Vermillion, 1997). In many cases there is, however, a lack of thorough assessment by both donors and governments of the compatibility of reforms and fixed models introduced by donors (Barker & Molle, 2004). The measures of “modern democratic institutions”, “greater coordination”, or “improved governance and management performance” have been shown to be unsuitable for application in many Asian countries (Bandaragoda, 2006).
In addition, there is resistance to power transfer from local governments and state irrigation agencies. A lack of political will and support in policy formulation are seen as impediments to the process (cf. Barker, 2002; Sengupta, 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a). While some scholars claim that state irrigation agencies are hesitant to change because they want to retain their power to intervene as in the case of the central ministries in Indonesia who delayed issuing regulations (Yonariza, 2008), others think that limited capacity, passiveness, and a lack of awareness of local governance are responsible for the resistance to change (Bandaragoda, 2006). They are reluctant to change and share power with local organizations because they worry about losing jobs, having a lower budget, and having less decision-making power due to changing roles and functions (Merrey, 1996; Aheeyar, 2004; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). There was a lack of political support and leadership for reform in the
40 Philippines in mid-1980s (Barker & Molle, 2004), whilst in Sri Lanka, neither the government agencies nor local stakeholders were willing to implement reform (Bandaragoda, 2006).
The intention with decentralization in many Asian countries including Vietnam is to transfer power and functions from central to provincial level, but the process is as yet incomplete because power still stays at provincial levels and top-down management still exists (WB, 2004; Bandaragoda, 2006). The relationship between local organizations and state irrigation companies is raised as providing weak links and tension, which lead to inefficient irrigation performance, low accountability, and low incentives for irrigation officers (Merrey, 1996; Jayathilleke, 2002). But such tension is only considered as a cause of the agency’s resistance. It is considered as just one of the barriers to IMT implementation (Mukherij et al., 2009a) which can be removed through for example organizational restructuring of public-sector irrigation agencies, and redefinition of their roles and tasks to change attitude and improve performance (cf. Aheeyar, 2004; Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007).
In brief, the shortcomings in the concept of decentralization and governance as discussed in the previous section have been addressed in detail in the current section. With attention to local organizations, it is not suitable in the study of large-scale irrigation systems where there are several stakeholder categories involved at different administrative levels. In addition, power relationships are not given much attention because there is an assumption that such actors are capable of change and will adapt to the new institutional arrangements. Constraints during implementation such as an improper legal framework, low capacity, limited participation, and resistance are considered as the main causes of the failures. These limitations bring misleading way to search solutions to deal with such contraints but give insufficient attention to the dynamic interaction process of actors at different levels in existing institional settings. Evaluations, therefore, give an emphasis on quantitative indicators. But this approach reveals several shortcomings as discussed in the next section.
41 2.3.3 Quantitative assessments
Recently, the most common approaches that have been applied by many researchers are to assess impacts of irrigation decentralization through improvements in irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity, quality of O&M, financial performance, and environmental sustainability. The main purpose is to draw conclusions about impacts of transfer programs and identify conditions for success (Vermillion, 1997). The methods usually used are “before-after” or “with-without” (Giordano et al., 2006). Table 2.2 presents some examples of the key outcome indicators that are used in several studies.
Table 2.2. Expected outcomes and impacts of irrigation decentralization
Studies Outcomes Impacts Tang (1992) in 47 - adequacy of water supply irrigation systems - level of maintenance in Taiwan. - degree of rule conformance among farmers Benjamin et al. - cropping intensity (1994) in 127 - technical efficacy of infrastructure irrigation systems - water availability in Nepal (Vermillion, - Financial and managerial performance - Agricultural and 1997) in 29 cases - Physical sustainability economic productivity (Garces-Restrepo - Performance of WUAs - Irrigated area et al., 2007) in 43 - O&M cost - Crop yield cases in 34 - Quality of maintenance - Farm income countries - Rate of water fee collection - Soil salinity and - Timelines and equity of water delivery water logging (Mukherji et al., - Rate of water fee collection - Cropping-related 2009a) in 108 - Financial viability of WUOs impacts cases in 20 - Condition of irrigation infrastructure - Livelihoods impacts countries in Asia - Service quality (reliability, adequacy, equity) - Awareness and participation - Conflict resolution
(Source: Tang, 1992; Benjamin et al., 1994; Vermillion, 1997; Garces- Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a)
We can see that these researchers have used four key groups of indicators (Table 2.3).
42 Table 2.3. Groups of indicators for assessing outcomes of IMT
Groups of indicators Indicators Irrigation efficiency Irrigation services (reliability, adequacy, timelines, equity) Physical sustainability of infrastructure Quality of maintenance Agricultural productivity Cropping yields, cropping intensity, irrigated area Performance of local Financial viability, O&M cost, water fees collection, organizations conflict resolution Improvements at communities Farmer participation, livelihoods impacts, farm income
(Source: Tang, 1992; Benjamin et al., 1994; Vermillion, 1997; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a)
The current study argues that the method using these has several limitations. These indicators are solely quantitative. Qualitative indicators such as incentive, attitude, and capability of actors to respond to structural changes, accountability, participation and autonomy are not covered. Furthermore, other problems need to be discussed such as the selection of indicators, and quality of assessment results. There is no agreement among researchers over which universal indicators should be used for the assessment, and recently, the indicators have been applied differently in different cases (Merrey, 1996). The findings from the previous studies (cf. Vermillion, 1997; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a) indicate that it is difficult to draw a rigid conclusion as to the effects of transfer programs.
There are many factors other than decentralization that may bring changes. For example, the improvements in cropping yields, irrigation service quality, irrigated area, and income from other factors are strongly affected by infrastructure rehabilitation. Vermillion (1997) observes that the IMT process has brought about changes in financial considerations, managerial performance, but the impacts on productivity and the environment are difficult to measure because there are many potential determinants. Garces-Restrepo et al. (2007) reveal that there is no clear conclusion as to whether the introduction of IMT would increase or decrease the rate of water fees collection. Compared with the situation before IMT, in general,
43 maintenance has improved, the government’s fund for O&M has decreased, water delivery timing has been better regulated, and the equity of the irrigation service has been enhanced. However, it is impossible to draw any conclusion about the effects of IMT on increased irrigated area, crop yield, and farm income because there are many other factors that may induce change. The results from the assessment of indicators are mixed, or unclear, as in the case of rates of collected water fees. Therefore, these performance indicators are not sufficient for assessing the IMT process (ibid.: 42). According to the study by Mukherji et al. (2009a), the impacts of IMT on the rate of water fees collection, financial viability of WUOs, and irrigation service quality are mixed (some are improved and some are unchanged). Positive improvements in crop-related indicators, awareness and participation have been found in many cases, but the authors argue that this improvement is usually linked to upgrading of the system rather than the impacts of reform (ibid.: 21). Surprisingly, the findings reveal that there is little evidence of the impact of IMT on improved irrigation productivity or on increased collection of water fees and better system maintenance. Improved service fee collection and better maintenance have been mentioned in only 35 and 33 cases, respectively (ibid: 38).
The most difficult studies to interpret are those which either lack data or are of very short duration (Tang, 1992; Vermillion, 1997; Mukherji et al., 2009a). For instance, in the study by Mukherji et al., (2009a), data for assessing the impacts of IMT on livelihood, the financial viability of WUOs, and frequency of conflict is missing in more than 50 percent of the cases studied. The impacts on rates of water fees collection, infrastructure, service quality, awareness and participation are missing in more than 20- 30 percent of the cases (ibid.). Thus, using quantitative indicators for the assessment of outcomes of irrigation decentralization does not give reliable results. This approach is also inadequate for analyzing the dynamic processes and their mechanisms as a means to understand the consequences of the decentralization processes. The intention of the current study is to capture trends, not to come up with quantified results. In this case, the qualitative assessments are asked for in order to find the answer to the questions: why do so many failures occur with decentralization, and how do they appear?
44 2.4 Conceptual framework for assessing irrigation decentralization
In the previous sections, the three different decentralization processes have been reviewed: decentralization of public sectors, decentralization of irrigation, and decentralization with a polycentric perspective, are summarized in Table 2.4. Information for each process is presented in the first four columns. The information in the last column shows what I have learnt from these processes and how I shall apply them in the current study.
This table shows that local actors are the main focus in the decentralization of both public sectors and irrigation. Outcomes of decentralization are assessed through a set of quantitative indicators that relate to efficiency and effectiveness in the decentralization of public sectors and irrigation. Polycentricity has a broader view of multi-level governance, dynamic interactions among actors, and actors’ incentives and capabilities in learning to change and adapt. One critical point drawn from the literature is that power relations among actors are not given much attention in any one of the three processes. Resistance or reluctance is mentioned as a constraint that impedes actors’ incentives and the outcomes of the process. This is a typical assumption; actors are capable of balancing power, changing their incentives, adjusting their behavior, and adapting to new contexts.
In this study, I employ the approach of multi-level governance with an emphasis on relationships and incentives suggested by polycentric systems. It notes cross-level relations between actors and also apprehends their dynamics based on the issues of institutional change and learning capacity. The main focus of this approach is to analyze how actors interact with other each, and how these relationships create the incentive for change. But in this study I also pay attention to power relations between actors. Understanding how actors exercise power, and how power dynamics and relationships affect the exercise of power, is necessary for an exploration of the underlying processes.
45 Table 2.4. Approaches for assessing decentralization from three different processes
DECENTRALIZATION PUBLIC IRRIGATION DECENTRALIZATION FROM APPROACHES IN THIS STUDY SECTORS DECENTRALIZATION POLYCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE
Interaction Between central and lower- Between an state Multi-level Multi-level governance level governments irrigation agency and relations/networks between local water users different categories of actors organizations Scope and Local governments Local water users Actors at different levels - Interactions between state agencies, focus in organizations state irrigation companies, local analysis authorities, local organizations, farmers - Provincial, district, commune levels Power - Resistance of powerful - Resistance Power balanced through Study on how institutional
46 relations actors. - Assume that it can be learning-by-doing process arrangements affect power relations - Assume that it can be removed through reforms and adaptive capacity of removed through reforms actors
Incentives, - Change via structure - Change via Actors in relationships Study on how institutional Capability adjustments and organizational reforms - build capacity through arrangements affect actors’ organizational reforms - Empowerment and learning-by-doing incentives and capabilities - Empowerment and capacity capacity building - learn action from others building - High adaptability of local - adjust behavior organizations - build resilience/adaptation Indicators Performance of state officers - Irrigation efficiency - Relationship - Power exercise/autonomy for - Legal framework - Agricultural productivity - Incentives - Accountability assessing - Power and responsibility - Performance of local - Information capacity - Participation outcomes - Accountability & organizations - Conditions for learning to - Incentives, capabilities to change transparency - Community impacts change and adapt - Institutional arrangements (legal - Capacity frameworks, informal institutions, - Participation process, mechanism - Efficiency/effectiveness
I demonstrate how institutional arrangements create changes in the positions and power relations between actors, as expressed in their daily interactions. The institutional arrangements refer to both formal institutions (laws, regulations, etc.) and informal institutions (local rules, norms, social capital, etc.) as well as to processes and mechanisms. As the power of some actors is strengthened while that of others is weakened, a sequence of imbalances occurs in power relations. My intention is to assess how and why these imbalances affect the ways, and extent to which, actors exercise their power in irrigation decentralization (using Vietnam as an example). But the most important thing is to understand how actors respond to each part of the decentralization process. By actors’ responses, I mean their autonomy, accountability, participation, incentives and capabilities to change. The framework for assessing irrigation decentralization is turned into a model with five elements as in Figure 2.1.
Institutional arrangement for decentralization
Dynamics and relations of power in cross-level interaction
Power Incentive/ exercise Accountability Participation Capability to Autonomy change
Figure 2.1. Simple framework for assessing irrigation decentralization (Source: Created for this research)
The five elements are Institutional arrangements, Power relations and Power exercise; Accountability and Transparency; Participation; Incentive and Capability to change. In the framework, power relations and dynamics are considered as a cross-cutting theme. The arrows show how elements relate to each other. The following sections, from 2.4.1 to 2.4.5, will discuss each element in more detail, with the focus on several issues: what does the element mean, how can it be measured, what are the impacting factors, and how can the current study apply it?
47 2.4.1 Institutional analysis
Definitions of water institutions
The term “institution” has been understood in a much broader sense than “organization” (Jütting et al., 2007). Institution is defined by North (1990: 3) as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Referring to rules and norms that can regulate behavior, and constrain or promote incentives of actors, institution is the foundation for actors to form their organizations, mobilize resources, and cooperate in collective actions (Merrey & Cook, 2012: 3). Institution is also defined as “working rules” or “rules-in-use” in the studies of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990).
Two forms of institutions have been presented in the literature; formal and informal ones. Formal institutions refer to laws, constitutions, policies, and regulations. By contrast, informal institutions link to society’s culture and are understood as “socially sanctioned norms of behavior” such as attitudes, customs, beliefs, conventions and traditions as well as relationship, networks, informal rules (Jütting et al., 2007). This understanding comes close to the term of social capital that is defined as the “roles, rules, precedents and procedures…that facilities mutually- beneficial collective action, complemented and reinforced by the public acceptance of norms and values, the prevalence of attitudes and belief” at different levels (Uphoff, 2005: 85) or “the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions” (UN, 2006). There is an emphasis that formal and informal institutions interact and strongly depend on each other. One type of institutions cannot achieve effectiveness without having another but one can also create tensions for another (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). In sprite of this, the linkages between these two types of institutions are given little attention in the institutional analyses including water institutions (Sokile et al, 2005; Merrey et al., 2007).
Transforming the term “institution” into the water sector, Saleth & Dinar (1999; 2004) develop water institutional structure with three pillars; water
48 law, water policy, and water organization. Water law concerns water rights, accountability, private sectors, inter-resource links, and conflict resolution. Water policies refer to use priority, cost recovery, water transfer, devolution, privatization, and technology. Water organization mentions government layer, administrative structure, water fees/prices, and capacity (ibid.). Following-up the suggestion by Saleth & Dinar (1999), water governance is defined by Bandaragoda (2000) as the above-mentioned three pillars along with operational procedures, mechanisms for incentive and accountability, norms, traditions, practices and customs (ibid.: 5). In my current study, institutional arrangements refer to both formal and informal institutions. The processes, mechanisms and procedures for decision-making at different levels are highlighted. I borrow the findings from Saleth & Dinar (1999) and Bandaragoda (2000) to analyze formal institutions via legal framework related to irrigation management in Vietnam (laws, policies, regulations) and organizational structure. For assessing informal institutions, I employ the findings on social capital by Uphoff (2005) by focusing on attitudes, incentives, networks, and roles of actors, as well as procedures and rules at local levels.
Features and factors influencing institutional changes
Institutions are embedded in socio-economic, cultural, political, and environmental contexts. Therefore there are no universal institutions that are applicable to all contexts. The changes in “endogenous factors” (e.g. water scarcity, degraded infrastructure, limited finance, structure and operation of water institutions) and “exogenous factors” (e.g. socio- economic development, demographic growth, political changes, environmental problems, external interventions) may create institutional changes (Saleth & Dinar, 2006). The changes over time of both exogenous and endogenous factors result in dynamics in institutional changes. These changes emerge from the different institutional components and at different levels due to the hierarchical/nested feature of institutions. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the dynamics of social and political context as well as power relationships are often given less attention in the institutional analyses (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; Cleaver & Franks, 2005). The CPRs studies have had the great efforts to search “the right institutional fit for a social-ecological system”. However, there is still a lack of attention to
49 “the mobilizing contextual factors”, “mechanisms” and “processes” that have the impacts on power dynamics and outcomes of institutional reforms (Clement, 2010; Clement & Amezaga, 2013).
Institutions usually are affected by the past history, culture, and experience (“path dependency”) (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). This feature becomes useful for predicting the path of institutional change. It also hinders the changes and affects the performance of institutions (Cleaver & Franks, 2005). Informal institutions can change but usually with difficulty and slower in comparison to formal institutions. The features of institutions’ “path dependency”, “stability” and “durability” can be reasons (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). In many cases, informal institutions remain and create conflicts while formal institutions already changed. The persistence of rent-seeking behavior, resistance of powerful actors that are inherited from the past can affect institutions (North, 1990). The study by Sehring (2009) demonstrates the mixed outcomes of water reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Central Asia). It shows clear trends both towards change and persistence at the same time under the co-existing governance structures; (1) path dependencies of administrative culture inherited from pre-Soviet regime have created actors’ resistance to change, (2) existing informal institutions and customary ways in water management, and (3) motivations to implement water reforms in order to access financial and technical resources from donors (ibid.). The current study looks into the quite similar situation in Vietnamese irrigation systems where water management has been transformed from extreme centralization to decentralization. The historical patterns of “patronage” management affected by hierarchal structure, poor coordination, administrative culture, passiveness, vested interest, lack of accountability and transparency in state management agencies would be the factors in the analysis. Differences in culture, attitudes, and perceptions of farmers in different regions of Vietnam would affect theit incentives to change.
2.4.2 Incentive and capabilities in responding
Institutions may affect incentives and behaviors of actors (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). The studies of common-pool resources management (CPRs’ management) have provided a big body of knowledge on how factors such
50 as institutional arrangements along with physical and technical characteristics, attributes of a local community, and external environment have consequences for incentives and behaviors of actors in collective actions (Ostrom et al., 2001). The authors argue that institutions with eight types of rules16 form a necessary condition to enforce actors’ behavior and achieving effective governance (Ostrom, 2005). Local communities and self-governing groups are assumed to have optimal adaptive capacity and flexibility because their institutions are developed at a local level, based on local knowledge of resources, and agreements among individuals in the same groups. As a consequence, these groups are flexible and able to change their rules and strategies in accordance with the external changes just as individuals understand and adapt their behaviors (Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1992; Benjamin et al., 1994; Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 2005; Araral, 2011). However, this argument has been criticized because of its unrealistic assumption about rational behavior of individuals (Agrawal, 2002; Harrison, 2003; Iván & Vladimir, 2009).
The same argument on optimal adaptive capacity can be found in many studies on the resilience and adaptive management of Social and Environmental Systems. That is, social actors in the networks of relationships can build their capacity through learning-by-doing, learn actions from each other, and adjust their behavior accordingly to adapt to new situations. Consequently, possibilities for conflicts and tensions are reduced (cf. Carlsson & Barkes, 2005; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). Involved actors will generate different choices, then test, evaluate, negotiate and adjust their relations, influence, positions and activities in a dynamic and iterative process based on the feedback from outcomes of the process (Berkes, 2002). The success of adaptive (co)-management therefore depends on the learning-by-doing process and adaptive capacity of actors, not necessarily on reaching the optimal level in power sharing. A target in the studies of resilience and adaptive management is to look beyond institutional forms and assess the adaptive capacity, and the institutional incentives of social groups and their institutions to build resilience under stress and uncertainty (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).
16 They include boundary rules, position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, payoff rules, and nested institutions (Ostrom, 2005)
51 In much of the previous studies, decentralization is assumed to create incentive for public officers to build their capacity to adapt to the new context (Litvack et al., 1998). Tension and resistance between actors can be resolved during restructural adjustments and tasks/responsibility of the involved actors are defined clearly through the accountability mechanism (Vermillion, 2005). An important requirement in achieving this is that the roles and rights of local water users’ organizations are defined clearly in legal frameworks, and that their capacity is enhanced before responsibilities and power are transferred (WB, 2008). It seems to me that studies of CPRs and adaptive (co)-management take the adapatability of social actors for granted. Other factors such as preferences, rent-seeking behavior, incentives, and attitudes of individuals may affect institutional changes. However, such factors are usually given less attention in the literature (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). Saleth suggests that actors would change their behavior and attitudes when they have their own evaluations and get “the information feedbacks and learning process experience” from institutions (Saleth, 2006: 12). It is “social learning” in the participatory process, but it usually takes time for stakeholders to change and adapt (Blomquist et al., 2010). Short-time plans in many donor-funded projects become a major constraint because stakeholders cannot change their attitudes and incentives immediately because of culture, experience, norms and traditions (informal institutions) (Saleth & Dinar, 2004).
In contrast to what is claimed in studies on CPRs and adaptive management, the punctuated approach in organizational theories suggests that organizations only change and adapt under specific conditions. This is contradictory to the continuous change approach that claims that organizations adjust and improve continuously (Håkonsson et al., 2009). The punctuated approach claims that an organization changes if it is subjected to external pressure that is stronger than the internal resistance of organization (defined as the “inertial” capacity of organization). An organization without external pressure will not change or adapt, even though there is capacity to change and increase responsiveness. Leadership of course is one of the major factors affecting the change process in organization (ibid.). Furthermore, Harrison (2003) mentions that the adaptability of an organization would increase if it has “flexibility and permissiveness”. The suggestion is that an organization in this situation can
52 change and respond quickly within its institutions and behaviors. “Openness” is another factor to increase the flexibility of an organization. This creates opportunities for the organization to learn, adapt and increase cooperation internally. Openness also improves the organization’s platform for communication, information sharing and knowledge exchange with other actors such as its customers, to ensure the provision of services that meet their needs. Harrison concludes that these changes and adaptations are positive since the institutions improve their accountability and responsiveness. These lines of argument will be followed up in the current study.
2.4.3 Power exercise and power relations
Decentralization is a process of power sharing or redistribution of power among actors (Larson & Soto, 2008). Power imbalance with the strong influences of powerful actors is a major constraint affecting the success of decentralization (Ribot, 2002; Wegerich, 2001; Young, 2006). Unequal distributions in power, benefits and resources may cause conflicts and affect patterns of interaction significantly. Power imbalance creates abuses of power from central to lower-level actors as well as conflicts among local- level actors (Bene et al., 2009). Linkages among actors are weakened in several ways due to a range of power imbalances (Adger et al., 2005). A common denominator is that the capacity to change and adapt to disturbances decreases (i.e. resilience/robustness decrease) under imbalanced forms for decentralization (Anderies et al., 2004). Thus, a cascade of power relations, interaction patterns, strength in linkages, and resilience/robustness all influence the outcomes of decentralization policy. Here the goal is to contextualize decentralization so that the whole set of complexities becomes integrated in a process view of decentralization. The assessment of what types of power and domain in which lower-level actors can exercise their powers is a necessary condition for the understanding of the nature of decentralization (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002b).
As mentioned in the previous sections, power relationships among actors are not given much attention in studies of common-pool resources management, adaptive (co)-management and resilience. By contrast, researchers who are concerned with power in transition studies, such as
53 Velino & Rotmans (2009), strongly indicate that powers are highly dynamic. They describe societal systems as the “complex adaptive systems” in which social actors “shape and influence the dynamics of the system”. The process of actor interaction and influence occur over time but it is specially clear during a transition period when a societal system transforms from an old dynamic equilibrium state into a new one (ibid.: 544). These authors claim that power struggles emerge between old/current and new actors, structures, and practices, resulting in power changes. For many reasons, powers are by nature very dynamic: “all types of power exercise can either enforce and enable or resist and prevent one another”. Actors’ strategies therefore can be described through an understanding of how they mobilize resources and exercise power (ibid.: 555). This is in line with Mannix (1993:2 as quoted by Kopelman et al., loc.cit.) who observed that rapid change leads to increased competition for new opportunities. According to that study, the effect is not necessarily increased efficiency but instead exclusion of individuals or categories – there is a significant role for egocentrism in the commons dilemma (Kopelman et al. 2002:129). This pattern is strikingly similar to what happens on an institutional scale with the oriental despotism syndrome described by Wittfogel (ibid., 1957).
As I see it, the study of power in the existing literature on decentralization on natural resources management is more associated with empowerment of the actors. The main focus is given to whether social actors have the opportunity to make choices, whether they actually use the opportunity to perform, and whether their performance brings about the desired outcomes (Alsop et al., 2006:17). Empowered local authorities are entities that can exercise their power in order to develop legitimacy and enhance capacity to operate independently (Ribot, 2002a). Local water users’ organizations are empowered if they can select what services they need, who their customers are, and in which ways they can provide services (Vermillion, 2005). From this it can be understood that power exercise is more concerned with the act of exercising power than with the effect of sustainable solutions to resource management concerns: the process is the key to dynamics, not the desired end result.
54 Power definitions vary with interpretation (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009). But since the focus of the current study is not on power itself, I will focus only on the definitions of power that I rely on. The major goal of decentralization refers to empowerment of actors, defined as the capacity of a group of individuals to mobilize resources, make choices and transform these choices into the effective outcomes they want (Alsop et al., 2006). In this study, I borrow the definition of power used by Avelino & Rotmans (2009). Defining power as the ability of actors to mobilize different resources such as physical, human, finance, natural resources and so on, these authors demonstrate five different types of power: innovative power, destructive power, constitutive power, transformative power, and systemic power. These types of power are defined as the capacity or ability of actors to “create new resources” (innovative power), to “destroy or annihilate existing resources” (destructive power), to “establish institutions and structures” (constitutive power), to “transform the distribution or redistributing of resources” (transformative power), to “mobilize resources for their survival” (systemic power) (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009: 553).
These authors deal with power exercise in dynamic processes. Their discussion of “power exercise” does not just address what types of power actors can exercise, but also how and to what extent actors exercise power. It means that power is studied during structural changes in which power dynamics and power relations are accounted for. Actors exercising power should be seen in two dimensions: “the different ways in which one can mobilize resources” and “the different levels at which one can do so” (ibid.: 552). They claim that if an actor succeeds in creating, destroying, mobilizing, accessing, distributing etc. any resources, it implies that this actor is exercising power. Power exercise is applied in my current study following this approach. The analysis will focus on types of resources, and how and to what extent actors can create, mobilize, access, distribute, and redistribute those resources. Considering the exercise of power within irrigation decentralization, I shall build on the approach of Agrawal & Ribot (1999)17 suggesting different types of power that should be transferred to
17 Agrawal & Ribot (1999:4) suggest that lower-local entities should be given four types of power over natural resources management. These include (i) the power of rule making to define who gets benefits, and how and to what extent they can access resources, (ii) the power of decision making on
55 lower-local entities in natural resources management and the activity categories of irrigation management that are demonstrated by Uphoff18 (2002). Table 2.5 shows how the current study relates to the types of power in terms of decision-making on mobilization and use of resources, and implementation, monitoring and enforcement.
Table 2.5. Power exercise by actors
ACTORS POWER EXERCISE 1. State management Influences over planning, budget allocation and agencies management, design, construction, monitoring and evaluation of irrigation systems within their 2. Local administrations boundaries 3. State-owned irrigation Participation and influence in making decisions related management to irrigation management such as - Water distribution, design, construction, operation 4. Cooperatives and maintenance of irrigation systems, - Mobilization and use of resources (finance, 5. Farmers information, labor etc.) - Monitoring and enforcement.
(Source: Created for this research)
From the view of actor-oriented theory, the implication is that power is a technique to exploit social interface. To understand power relations between service providers and users in problem solving and decision- making, all other factors affecting their behavior must also be understood (Long, 1999; Saunders, 2011). The assessment of actors’ social interface/interactions provides an understanding of how actors exercise influence over the distribution of resources through complex forms for decision-making (Arce & Long, 1992 cited in Adger at el., 2005). The registration of cross-level interaction, therefore, becomes decisive for an understanding of power relations. Mapping cross-level influences in actors’ interaction processes reveals how powerful decision-makers are. Documenting constraints is of particular importance: it is necessary to
the use of financial resources to become autonomous, (iii) the power of implementation, monitoring and enforcement, and (iv) the power to create/change rules 18 Irrigation service providers carry out four categories of activities in irrigation management; (i) decision-making on water distribution, design, construction, O&M of irrigation systems, (ii) resource mobilization and management (finance, information, labors etc.); (iii) communication and coordination; and (iv) conflict resolution (Uphoff, 2002:31)
56 know especially who the gate-keepers are at each level as far as cross- levels are concerned, and who the initiators are when it comes to their innovative measures. Understanding and navigating these involved cross- level interactions make it possible to address the dynamics behind them (Wegerich, 2001).
In this study, I employ the framework introduced by Avelino & Rotmans (2009) which becomes useful for a better understanding of the interaction patterns. These authors provide a conceptual frame to link the ways in which actors mobilize resources, and the extent to which they can exercise power to influence the interaction process. They define three types of power relation between actors A and B. Imbalanced power relations occur when (1) A exercises power “over” B because B depends on A’s resources, (2) A exercises “more” power in comparison with B because A can mobilize more resources, and they have different goals; and (3) A exercises a “different” power from B, which either disrupts or prevents B exercising power (ibid.: 556).
2.4.4 Accountability and transparency
Transferring power to actors who are accountable to their constituents is one necessary condition for achieving successful decentralization (Ribot, 2002). The accountability of local governments or non-state entities becomes very important in decentralization because improving the accountability and performance of these entities is a crucial factor for improving the quality and efficiency of service delivery. The concept of accountability does, however, actually have several meanings (cf. Mulgan, 2000). This is discussed specifically for the case of Vietnam by Peters (2007), who sees three partly overlapping definitions applicable to the country; (1) for an administration to provide an account for what has been done, (2) to ensure that officials are responsible and follow the law, and (3) to maintain a willingness of civil servants to respond to demands (ibid.:16). There are maybe two ideas behind Peters’ thinking, the way accountability is generally defined, and its appearance in social interaction. Also the development world presents criteria for the accountability of state officials, focusing on economic and political concerns. Ribot (2002) defines three required features of accountability; (1) as accountability for themselves,
57 (2) as accountability for superior authorities within a hierarchy, and (3) as accountability for their constituents (ibid.:10). Given the strong influence on the issue, of the WB, for example, these types of accountability have been widely used in the literature, mostly with respect to internal, upward and downward accountability (WB, 2004). In irrigation decentralization, the accountability of water users’ organizations is considered as the main factor affecting the success and sustainability of organizations. Accountability refers to the active participation and performance of these organizations in the delivery of irrigation services to meet users’ demands (Pasaribu & Routray, 2005). Local organizations are accountable when the members have suitable insight in their activities (Vermillion, 2005).
In general, the performance of organizations is evaluated through performance-based and result-based management. The accountability of an organization can then be assessed through some performance indicators, for example, outputs, efficiency (i.e. resources used and service produced), and outcomes (i.e. quality of service and objectives achieved). However, there are problems with the monitoring and evaluation of accountability this way. Accountability in public services such as basic education, health care, and water, may be particularly difficult to assess. For instance, it is hard to know whether an irrigation agency performs well or not because it conducts many tasks (water allocation for different water sectors, maintenance, etc.), and each task has different requirements. In addition, there is uncertainty associated with the subjective feelings and satisfaction of water users when they assess the quality of services, and with insufficient information (WB, 2004).
In this study the “accountability” element is associated with a performance and quality dimension. Accountability is assessed based on the satisfaction of water users with services but also on continuity in information access. With this approach, transparency and access to information are regarded as expressions of accountability: how information and communication are used to build trust and confidence among actors. The accountability of actors can then be expressed in terms of stakeholders’ experiences of the performance of other actors.
58 One concern is which factors affect accountability. The dynamics of accountability appear in interactions among actors relating to specific issues. Effective accountability is obtained when service providers have been delegated clear tasks and an ascribed financial source. Their performance should be monitored and enforced by policy makers, citizens and clients. “Clear tasks” means service providers should know to whom, for what, when, under what circumstances, etc. services should be provided. They should then perform in order to meet the needs and affordability of service users (WB, 2004: 47). The external pressure and enforcement from service users, citizens, and decision-makers is needed for improving the accountability of service providers (WB, 2004; Peters, 2007). However, when higher-level authorities apply top-down control with lower-local governments, one consequence is that officers are upwardly accountable to their superiors, not to their constituents (Ostrom et al., 1993). It reduces incentive and creates inefficient outcomes. In a study of the accountability of irrigation service agencies in large-scale irrigation systems, Merrey argues that if the finance and organization of irrigation agencies are dependent on higher-level authorities, both the incentive and accountability of these agencies, and sustainable management of irrigation systems, are adversely affected (Merrey, 1996).
Monitoring and evaluation by citizens is essential to create pressure on service providers. It is assumed that citizens/service users can access information about the actions and performance of local governments and/or service providers (i.e. what services, who are the service providers, how much the service costs, how to assess the quality of service), thereby increasing pressure for improved accountability among officers (FAO, 2006). Local water users’ organizations create pressure for reforms and the accountability of the irrigation agency already by design (Uphoff et al., 1991). Even diffuse responsibilities across institutions may generate competition and comparison, and thereby form mechanisms for self- regulation and cross-checks of accountability, so that institutional incentives to perform increase (FAO, 2006). The argument from the studies on polycentric governance and co-management is that accountability itself is improved through dynamic cross-level interplay among actors and institutions. The partnership among actors encourages trust and reciprocity among them (Ostrom, 2007). It can explain why fair and
59 competitive elections would bring opportunities to improve the accountability of representatives (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Receiving better information about people’s needs is a precondition for local governments to perform better under a decentralization process (Azfar et al., 2001; Campos & Hellman, 2005). Moreover, access to information in a transparent way is necessary for monitoring and evaluating the performance of service providers. Making accurate and timely information available has been tried with good results: increased transparency in government decision-making and public policy implementation, reduced uncertainty, increased compliance, lower transaction costs etc. (cf. Tietenberg, 2003: 215).
Success with such tasks also contributes to reduce uncertainty and corruption among civil servants. Rules and procedures must be understandable to avoid misinterpretations that may create chances for officers to abuse their discretionary powers (ADB, 1995). Linking accountability to information access has a benefit in the study since the difficulty with ensuring transparency is information control. Early access to sources, and understanding, may open up access to new knowledge. In terms of accountability, it is vital to strengthen the citizens’ right to information with a degree of legal enforceability. Transparency is used as a collective label for those processes concerning resource use dilemmas with conflicting pay-offs and uncertainty. It conceptualizes how knowledge and information control are important factors when seeking to understand the performance of organizations.
Learning from this knowledge, the current study has to reach beyond the registration of performance of tasks in statistical terms (water allocation for different water sectors, system maintenance, etc.). Such information is supplemented with surveys of the quality of services, expressed in terms of the satisfaction of water users. The focus will be on continuity in information access, given that transparency and accountability are key factors for building trust in the decentralization process. The accountability of irrigation service providers will be assessed through the following factors: clear tasks, financial autonomy, monitoring and enforcements by service users and external agencies, transparency to conceptualize knowledge and information control, and capacity of organizations.
60 2.4.5 Stakeholder participation and interaction
Popular participation is a common term in the decentralization policy literature. The principle of stakeholder processes is to bring all major stakeholders into communication and decision making, with the aim of improving democracy in terms of equity and accountability, transparency and participation. Stakeholders not only have opportunities to voice their needs through the interactive process, but also to monitor and put pressure on the officials to perform accountably. Therefore, participation is both a prerequisite for successful democratic decentralization on the one hand, and a process that facilitates decentralization on the other (FAO, 2006; WB, 2008). The degree of stakeholder involvement ranges from information consumption to real empowerment. The less influence there is, the less motivated are stakeholders to become involved. The concept “stakeholder participation” therefore also needs to include stakeholders’ perceptions of their involvement. Key questions include: how do they participate and influence decision-making, policy-making, implementation, enforcement and conflict resolution? And: How do these issues affect them? With reference to involvement in water resource management, McKay (2003:393) argues that an understanding of stakeholders in common pool resources calls for establishing an insight into their backgrounds; in particular “who they are, what they have done, and what they will do in relation to those common-pool resources and in relation to governance issues”.
When paying attention to the perceptions and backgrounds of stakeholders, it becomes important to identify the differentials in power, behavior, interest and incentive among them. It is also essential to understand how actors influence each other in the search for solutions and in making decisions so that potential conflicts can be minimized. Different categories of stakeholders may come up with different interests and demands in collective actions whether slight or comprehensive. There may be basic differences such as in knowledge base, worldview, gender, age, class, etc. Decision-makers disregarding this run the risk of being seen as one-sided and of having conflicting interests unless multi-layer communication is in place. Imbalances in power may emerge with potential conflicts among different stakeholders (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). This
61 problem is especially significant when dealing with the management of large-scale irrigation systems. Here the situation is complex due to the systems’ technical issues and to the large number of stakeholders with different interests involved (i.e. water users at different sectors, irrigation management agency, politicians, and donors) (Merrey, 1996). Assessment of stakeholder interactions are, therefore, key in the analysis of actors’ relation and power relations (Wegerich, 2001).
The degree of interaction across stakeholder boundaries has proven to be a disregarded issue in many development projects (cf. Pham& Hjort-af-Ornas 2008; 2010). This degree depends on several factors such as communication among stakeholders, the information and knowledge stakeholders have, the capacity of stakeholders, and the facilitation process. Administrative culture usually affects the methods of communication between stakeholders. For instance, a top-down administrative culture of state officers might create a passive attitude among local people, especially women and ethnic minority people. Lack of knowledge and limited access to transparent information might hinder communication. This allows other stakeholders with advance information and knowledge to dominate the interaction (Lotz-Sisitka & Burt, 2006).
The powerful actors may also generate passiveness among subordinate actors who obey to maintain good relations rather than challenging the dominant actors. Limited capacity affects stakeholders’ awareness and incentives, and may inspire other stakeholders to become pace setters in an opportune direction. Attitudes, incentives and communication among staff in irrigation agencies could affect farmers’ attitudes in the participatory process (Uphoff, 2002). Training and capacity building for local stakeholders is not enough because stakeholders also need trust and self-confidence to put empowerment into practice through joint decision- making (Uphoff, 2005). Not until such a process emerges, with its clear goal and need for cross-level interaction, will stakeholders be keen to understand how to apply it in reality.
Proper facilitation of a participation process will bring the different stakeholder categories together and mobilize the leadership effectively in the process. It has the capacity to break the ice and open two-way
62 communications. Indirect trust given to facilitation from local authorities may help to penetrate a top-down tradition and open for meaningful participation in joint-problem solving (Pham& Hjort-af-Ornas, 2010). Often however, outside facilitators (e.g. consultants, NGOs) have such limited knowledge about local context and stakeholders’ perceptions, that they might distort the participatory process indirectly towards their views or towards matching the agenda of donors (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Holmén, 2010). It has been documented in empirical studies that many interventions of the donors have been written off as failures in the development projects in general and in the water sector in particular (cf. Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Barker & Molle, 2004; Bandaragoda, 2006; Blaikie, 2006). The applications of the blueprint models did not work without a thorough study of the appropriateness of the reform proposal and a deep understanding of institutions in the particular circumstance (Barker & Molle, 2004; Bandaragoda, 2006). Such phenomena are registered also in the current study.
The time and energy available for stakeholders to contribute in an interaction process is a limiting issue that is often overlooked. Obviously, without the capacity of stakeholders to invest time and energy into management, there is no scope for decentralization or autonomy. In many cases it is not realistic to expect that stakeholders would be willing to participate in the process even for the sake of improved irrigation performance. In reality, farmers become involved in the process because of their concern to ensure water for their field and crop productivity (Mukherji et al., 2009a). A participatory process becomes a heavy burden for many in terms of time and energy lost for farmers (Merrey, 1996). Having noted how design of interaction processes, along with time and energy constraints, are key factors for stakeholder involvement in irrigation projects, decentralization is brought back to good governance. Leadership plays an important role in interaction and communication. If leaders are aware of the importance of decentralization and democratization, then the partnership between administration and farmers will turn to openness and transparency. It will create trust, confidence, and motivations for stakeholders in the interaction and communication. It has enhanced empowerment for both administrators and villagers in all stages of the decision-making process (Pham & Hjort-af-Ornas in Larsen ed.,
63 2010). In order to consider the shortcomings of a multi-stakeholder approach, actors’ different normative assumptions need to be understood and translated into interaction procedures. The methods for establishing cross-category stakeholder interaction have already been developed in a previous study (Pham & Hjort-af-Ornas, 2008; 2010; Pham et al., 2009). Building on these earlier experiences, the current study addresses gaps between decentralized and centralized thinking. It seeks to show how the two perspectives - top-down and bottom-up - can be negotiated. The assessment of stakeholder participation and interaction will focus on the following factors: interaction and communication between stakeholders, information and knowledge, attitudes and motivation, and external intervention.
2.5 The analytical framework
The discussions in Sections 2.4.1-2.4.5 bring all the key considerations into the detailed framework for assessing irrigation decentralization. The framework for assessing decentralization is presented in Figure 2.2.
Institutional arrangement for decentralization
Dynamics and relations of power in cross-level interactions
Power exercise Accountability Participation Incentive/ - Power of rule - Clear tasks - Interaction & Capability in making - Finance Communication responding - Power in autonomy - Information& - External resource - Monitoring & Knowledge pressure mobilizations & Enforcement - Attitudes, - Flexibility use (External motivation - Permissiveness -Power in pressure) - External - Openness implementation, - Information & intervention - Financial viability monitoring, Transparency - Competition enforcement - Capacity
Figure 2.2. Detailed framework for assessing decentralization in irrigation management (Source: Created for this research)
64 This study focuses on the decentralization process emerging, actors’ responses to the changes in institutional arrangements, and decentralization’s consequences. Understanding such a process is the key to learning why decentralization in irrigation farming in Vietnam to date has performed poorly. Both case studies in the current study involve large- and medium-scale irrigation systems, calling for an intricate stakeholder involvement in order to represent the various perspectives and consequences that emerge. Focus is, of course, on the participation process, but also on autonomy, accountability and effective service delivery in accordance with the ascribed role for those involved in the decentralization process. Attention goes primarily to actors’ responses to the decentralization process.
The analytical framework for the study outlined in Figure 2.3 is based on the conceptual framework. The analysis focuses on three main categories of actors: state management agencies (i.e. sub-national administrations and specialized agencies), state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs), and cooperatives (ACs). Cross-case analysis is conducted to determine how these actors at different levels perform, interact and react in response to the changes in the irrigation management process. Four cross-themes are analyzed for all three categories of actors; (i) power relations and power exercise/autonomy, (ii) accountability, (iii) participation, and (iv) incentives and capability to respond to the changes in the decentralized context.
The analysis characterizes Vietnam as a hydraulic society and starts with an overall presentation of irrigation development in Vietnam over the last fifty years (Chapter 4). As a consequence of the heavy investment in this sector, irrigation has contributed significantly to national productivity, economic growth, and poverty reduction. The study provides arguments as to why irrigation reforms aimed at increasing efficiency and sustainability necessarily need to consider today´s major constraints for the irrigation sector in Vietnam. This concerns primarily how the decentralization drive should be dealt with nowadays. The irrigation management mechanism in Vietnam is presented to show all relevant actors involved in the irrigation sector, from central to village level, and their roles and relationships both in vertical and horizontal dimensions. The management in the two studies
65 of irrigation systems is presented in the same section. The aim is to provide a clear understanding of the many patterns within irrigation management in Vietnam in order to specify the underlying mechanism.
Chapter 4 Multi-level irrigation Institutional arrangements Chapter 5 governance for decentralization
SAs IDMC ACs
Chapter 6 Power relations, power exercise/autonomy
Accountability, transparency Chapter 7
Participation
Chapter 8 Incentives, attitudes, capabilities
Legend: Actors SAs: State agencies Components IDMCs: state Having influences in the analysis irrigation companies ACs: cooperatives
Figure 2.3. An analytical framework for cross-case analysis of irrigation decentralization (Source: Created for this research)
Institutional environments for irrigation management are contextualized in the process through an analysis of the legal framework (Chapter 5). The target is to locate the institutional environment for irrigation management in the context of the whole reform process in Vietnam with its focus on decentralization. This will give the needed in-depth understanding of the current forms of irrigation decentralization with two foci: decentralization in state management and in service management. The analysis aims to indicate how irrigation decentralization has been shaped under the whole decentralization process in Vietnam, and how the corresponding policy changes have emerged in the irrigation sector.
66 A deeper analysis of actors’ responses to institutional arrangements is presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, based on the in-depth study of the two cases. The targets in Chapter 6 are to analyze how the existing institutional arrangements (presented in Chapter 5) affect actors’ power relations, and to assess the extent to which actors exercise their influence. In Chapter 7, the main concern is to address how involved actors perform in reality under the structural changes and what the gaps are between the policies’ intentions and the real consequences. Chapter 8 demonstrates the incentives, willingness and capability of the actors to respond to the changes in decentralization. The main constraints, the key factors affecting the performance and incentives of actors, within the decentralization process, are also analyzed in these chapters. The findings from the analytical Chapters 4-8 are aggregated and brought into Chapter 9 in order to draw conclusions about the outcomes of the decentralization of irrigation management in Vietnam and its the main challenges, obstacles, and options. The findings of this study will be reflected to the theoretical concepts. Some implications for implementing decentralization of large- and medium-scale irrigation systems are given.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, DATA FORMATION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
The current chapter addresses the methodology applied to the study objectives. This consists of three sections. Section 3.1 presents the research methods and why I chose them for the current study. A brief description of the two case studies is included. Section 3.2 concerns the design and techniques for collecting data. This section goes into further detail about which data were needed and how best to obtain the information, and the techniques used to collect quantitative and qualitative data through primary and secondary sources. There is a section on the qualitative surveys, the sampling methods, and how the semi-structured interviews were conducted. An account of the in-depth interviews with key informants and target-group discussions is also given, as is a description of my own role as a researcher and my earlier experiences as a consultant. The last Section 3.3 provides the procedures for organizing and processing data.
3.1 Designing research methods
3.1.1 A mixed methods approach with a multiple case study
The current study is based on application of a mixed methods approach (combining both qualitative and quantitative methods) to a multiple-case study. The arguments relating to why, when, and how to use Mixed Methods Research have been discussed in much of the existing literature (cf. Howe, 1988; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Morgan, 2007; Greene, 2007; Bryman, 2008; Morse & Niehaus, 2009). A message is given: there are fundamental differences between qualitative and quantitative methods in the sense that they stem from different assumptions about the nature of research, but the main argument is that there is no incompatibility between 69 qualitative and quantitative methods (Howe, 1988), so that researchers can safely stick to combining methods under the heading “what works”. The argument is that combining qualitative and quantitative methods bridges interpretivist and positivistic paradigms, and pragmatic and transformative perspectives, so that the researcher manipulates the result through drawing on each paradigm in an uncontrollable manner (Greene, 2007).
Mixed methods research is suggested in the above-mentioned literature in the sense that two methods can supplement each other to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each. Quantitative data with measureable evidence (statistics, figures, frequencies etc.) are usually used to examine hypotheses or theories, and to assess “know” patterns and phenomena, and establish cause and effect. Qualitative data are particularly useful for assessing processes and for exploring relationships between variables as well as for explaining why and how processes and results occur. In mixed methods research, data are triangulated. The one method may enrich the other by providing more comprehensive results that have the capacity to propose further ideas. For instance, qualitative assessments can illustrate the findings of quantitative assessments (Bryman, 2008).
I claim that a rigid frame is required so that data generated by means of the different methods can be combined. With this statement I fall into the category of pragmatic researchers who want to select mixed methods research because they can incorporate the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods to address the research questions (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). In my study, the main aim is to assess the on-going irrigation decentralization process through addressing several why and how questions such as why imbalanced power relations among the social actors occur, how these actors respond, and why constraints occur and have counterproductive effects on irrigation decentralization. The attention is not only on features of decentralization policy but also on how decentralization has been assessed. I seek to offer more of an observational perspective, whereby data and performance can be interpreted in order to understand the processes and interplay between the actors/organizations, as well as their perceptions, incentives, and attitudes, rather than studying the organizations themselves (i.e. organizational structures, performance
70 through quantitative indicators). This kind of assessment calls for exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory (Yin, 2009). On its own, the quantitative method with one-dimensional technical data does not provide sufficient evidence to address these needs.
Based on these arguments, I have decided to use a mixed strategy combining quantitative and qualitative methods in a study of the two irrigation systems selected in Vietnam. I have employed the multiple-case research design that is suggested by Yin (2009). As mentioned above, the assessments in my study look into the interaction processes and relationships between the social actors/organization to address the research questions of why and how processes and outcomes occur. As indicated by Yin, the case research design is suitable for explaining the causal links, describing interventions and illustrating a certain topic. A multiple case would be good in the sense that it generates a better confidence in the findings and allows researchers to observe patterns, trends, relations, and differences in the different cases, triangulated with their perceptions (ibid.). I am strongly convinced that the mixed methods research approach is appropriate for addressing the underlying research questions in a multiple-case study. In the current study, I seek to move analysis and research conclusions forward and do not claim to establish a theoretical position or a paradigmatic conclusion for the method. When I draw on case studies, it is not done to probe into new theoretical elaborations and their implications for the method.
The quantitative and qualitative data were collected in two selected irrigation systems and analyzed in an integration form. The quantitative data (e.g. statistics, figures from secondary database) were used to review, describe, and assess the current situation of irrigation management in Vietnam (mostly discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). By contrast, the qualitative data generated from in-depth interviews and key group discussions provided the perspectives and perceptions of actors involved in the process. In other analytical chapters (Chapters 6, 7, and 8), the quantitative and qualitative data have been merged in the cross-case analyses: the quantitative results are presented, and the qualitative results are used to explain, support or disprove the quantitative results.
71
3.1.2 Selection of case studies
Due to the limitations of time and resources, the current study has been concentrated in two irrigation systems, one located in the centre and another located in the south. These have been selected for the in-depth empirical analysis and assessments. They are the Tay Ninh irrigation system in Tay Ninh province and the Nam Thach Han irrigation system in Quang Tri province (Figure 3.1, shows the locations of these two provinces). The focus areas in these systems have been selected for the current study in response to two ongoing projects in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri provinces. These projects have explored irrigation decentralization with the financial support of the WB and ADB19.
I have selected these irrigation systems for the current study because they exemplify cases of management of large- and medium-scale irrigation systems in Vietnam. They follow the typical model showing how both state- owned irrigation management companies or enterprises (IDMC or IMEs) and local organizations are involved in the operation and management of irrigation systems. IDMCs/IMEs are responsible for headwork and primary/secondary canals while local organizations responsible for on- farm canal networks (the cooperative is the most common type) . The relationship between IDMCs/IMEs and local organizations is one of my main concerns in this analysis. The intention of this study is not a direct comparison of the two irrigation systems selected; the differences between the physical systems are too great for that. Most significantly, the Nam Thach Han irrigation system is an independent system while the Tay Ninh irrigation system is a part of the Dau Tieng reservoir (the biggest one in Vietnam) which is under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Furthermore, the area that is served by the Tay Ninh irrigation system is much larger than that served by the Nam Thach Han
19 The Vietnam Water Resource Assistance Project (VWARP) – loan to GoV from the WB - was implemented during the period 2004-2011 to improve/modernize irrigation infrastructures and Capacity building and institutional strengthening in six large-irrigation systems; Causon Camson, Yenlap, Kego, Phuninh, Daban and Dautieng The Central water resources project, 223 VIE (SF) was implemented during the period 2007-2011 to improve the irrigation management system and upgrade the irrigation infrastructure in six sub- projects belonging to six provinces in the central region; Thanh Hoa, Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh 72 system (about 27,000 ha in comparison with 9,000 ha each cropping season). My purpose is to understand the decentralization process and its different aspects (i.e. power relations, autonomy, accountability, incentives, abilities) by looking into the differences in management mechanisms within the two cases. Compare and contrast analysis of these shows how different mechanisms and policies have had different impacts in the two cases.
The Tay Ninh state-owned irrigation management company (Tay Ninh IDMC) directly manages canal systems inside the Tay Ninh province but its water allocation and management need to be linked with the whole Dau Tieng reservoir system. In short, the Tay Ninh IDMC is the independent company (in terms of finance) but decisions relating to water allocation strongly depend on the Dau Tieng IDMC at the headwork (the Dau Tieng IDMC is controlled directly by MARD). The Nam Thach Han irrigation system is an independent system, managed by the Nam Thach Han irrigation management enterprise (Nam Thach Han IME). Differing from the first case, the Nam Thach Han IME belongs to the Quang Tri IDMC (a sub-unit with financial dependence) but the IME take its own decisions relating to system operation and management. The two cases bring into focus the two dominant kinds of dependence for in system operation and finance. In this way, I can establish which power processes are at work here, and then establish the differences in their forms. An in-depth study like this is necessary for the analysis of internal relationships, power relations within IDMCs, and the relationships between IDMCs and local organizations and state agencies. Another concern is the difference in the types of cooperatives and their activities, illustrated through these two systems. In Nam Thach Han, the agricultural service cooperatives have existed in a traditional form for many years. These cooperatives provide different services for agricultural production, such as irrigation, seeds, fertilizers, agricultural extensions, credits etc.. In Tay Ninh, in contrast, 21 irrigation service cooperatives have only operated since 2009 under the WB project while more than 300 irrigation teams still co-exist. They only provide irrigation services. By analyzing these two different types, it becomes possible to make generalizations about the options and obstacles that may affect the operation and sustainability of the cooperatives under decentralization. 73
Figure 3.1. Locations of two case studies in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri province, QUANG TRI PROVINVE Vietnam VIETNAM
Study area
Quang Tri TAY NINH PROVINVE 74
Map of Vietnam: (Source: Adapted after an original map in Tay Ninh Journal of Statistics Education Volume 12, Number 2 (2004), www.amstat.org/publications/jse/v12n2/haughton.html)
Map of Quang Tri province: (Source: Adapted after an original map in http://www.investinvietnam.vn/report/parent- region/89/120/Quang-Tri.aspx)
Map of Tay Ninh province: (Source: Adapted after an original Study areas map in http://cafeland.vn/tin-tuc/tay-ninh-quy-hoach-su- dung-dat-den-nam-2020-32344.html)
3.2 Framework and methods to collect data
3.2.1 Data sources
The database for this study has been generated through extensive field research in the two studied cases combined with my previous experience of irrigation decentralization in different provinces of Vietnam. Quantitative and qualitative data have been sourced through both primary and secondary sources as illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows the types of data needed (in the upper box) and the different sources drawn upon for data collection.
Institutional arrangements for irrigation decentralization Power relations in cross-level Autonomy Accountability Participation Incentives and capability to changeinteractions
Semi-structured Key informant Key group Secondary interviews interviews discussions data (questionnaires) (open-ended (participatory Legal questions) techniques) document s
rs
ACs
IDMCs
Farme
commune in IMEs Cooperatives rrigation teams and researchers I
Decision makers in Officers MARD Officers (DARDs, DOFs) Staff at district sections,
Leaders of cooperatives
Figure 3.2. Framework for collecting data (Source: Created for this research)
Secondary data have been derived from a literature search and a study of peer-reviewed articles and conference papers, official reports, conference presentations and papers, the existing studies relate to the research topics of the current study, and the media (print, official websites). Legal
75 framework studies are also included: laws, policies, and regulations relating to decentralization and water/irrigation management in Vietnam. Primary data have been gathered from semi-structured interviews with farmers, representatives of cooperatives (ACs), and staff of irrigation companies (IDMCs). In-depth interviews have been carried out with key informants. They include the decision makers at MARD and researchers in Hanoi as well as officials at the departments of agriculture and rural development (DARDs) and officials at the departments of finance (DOF) in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri, staff at district sections, district irrigation enterprises (IMEs), and representatives of commune and cooperatives. Key group discussions with cooperatives have been conducted in parallel with the interviews. Data have been collected from a variety of sources using a variety of approaches for the purpose of data triangulation (Figure 3.3).
Semi-structured Interviews
Secondary data: Scientific papers/reports/media
Legal framework (laws, policies, regulations,
In-depth etc.) Target group
interviews discussions
Figure 3.3. Triangulation of data from a multiple source (Source: Created for this research)
Primary data (both quantitative and qualitative data) collected from three ways have been triangulated. As for design, each type of semi-structured interview provided information about each actor but also information for triangulation of the data. This means that in the questionnaire, each actor was asked to assess the other actors. For example, in the questionnaire for farmers, farmers were asked for information about the level of their own participation. Similar questions were also given to the representatives of local organizations, and staff of IDMCs. Thus, information about the level of participation of farmers has been collected from all three types of questionnaires. With this design, results from one interview have been
76 cross-checked with others. Different results from the interviews were then discussed with the target groups and with the key informants for both triangulation and more explanation. Furthermore, some key issues raised in the semi-structured interviews were also brought to the target groups of the cooperatives’ representatives and key informants for further discussion.
The process of data collection started prior to the current study with my work as a researcher at the Vietnam Academy for Water Resources (VAWR). In this capacity, consultancy was one aspect of my job description (part-time 25%). The field sites selected for this study formed part of that work. The intensive fieldwork research in the current study was divided into three rounds; in June-July 2009, June-July 2010, and September- October 2011. The main activities in each round are displayed in Figure 3.4.
June-July 2009 Sept-Oct 2011 Before 2008 June-July 2010
- Interviews with Data - Target-group - Target-group farmers, IDMCs, and discussions collection, discussions
assessments cooperatives
in Tay Ninh
(under - In-depth interviews - In-depth - In-depth VWRAP interviews with key informants interviews project) informants
Figure 3.4. The fieldwork process to collect data (Source: Created for this research)
Fieldwork during June-July 2009 focused on the semi-structured interviews. I carried out interviews with 120 farmers, 81 local organizations, and 55 staff of irrigation management companies. In-depth interviews were conducted at MARD and researchers in Hanoi and officials at the provincial departments (DARDs, DOF) in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri (one official in each department in each province). The same type of interview was continued in the second and the third rounds.
77 During June-July 2010 my important tasks were to discuss further with the key informants and the target groups the key issues/results obtained from the semi-structured interviews in the first round. These issues were discussed in two separate groups in Tay Ninh; in the Chau Thanh district (12 persons) and the Trang Bang district (9 persons). These meetings involved a mixture of participants: leaders of cooperatives, staff from irrigation stations, and farmers. After that, two other group discussions with representatives of cooperatives were also carried out in the Nam Thach Han system (10 persons each). In-depth interviews are carried out at district and commune levels in order to get information for assessing the performance of these actors, and their relationships and influences. In this round, officials working in district agriculture sections, leaders and workers in district irrigation enterprises, and leaders of cooperatives were participated.
The last round of fieldwork was conducted during September - November 2011 with the main focus on communes and cooperatives. Three group meetings with the leaders of agricultural cooperatives were conducted: one meeting in Trieu Phong district in Quang Tri (13 persons); and two meetings in the Chau Thanh district (12 persons) and in the Trang Bang district (16 persons). These discussions focused more on the assessments of their institutional capacity, their level of participation, their relations with other actors, and their influence in making decisions. Moreover, in- depth discussions were carried out with staff working in commune people’s committees, representatives of cooperatives, and workers within the IDMCs who are responsible for the operation at irrigation stations. The main purposes were to follow up on the issues I had discussed with other key informants during the second round, and cross-check information obtained from the target group discussions.
3.2.2 The resource base available for the study on interactions
To begin with I need to give an account of the relevant resource base in the form of my long experience within decentralization of irrigation management. This study is a continuation of my earlier work, and is built on the observations made, lessons learnt and experience gained during fifteen years spent working in the field of decentralization (i.e.
78 participatory irrigation management, and stakeholder interactions in the development projects relating to irrigation management, water supply and sanitation, resettlement) in different provinces throughout the country20. Work in the past in different positions (researcher and consultant) has given me opportunities to meet and improve my skills at interacting with all the different categories of stakeholders (administrators, officers working in state agencies, staff/workers of IDMCs, researchers, NGOs, villagers etc.) at river basin, sub-basin, provincial, district, commune and village levels. The interactions with stakeholders were based not only on the formal forms of survey or training programs, but also on informal daily interactions.
In my earlier work I paid attention to the ways in which stakeholders participate in decision-making, noting their voices and influences in the processes from the broad context of the Red river basin, down to the sub- catchment context, and finally the village level. In practice, I have observed a top-down approach from authorities and state agencies, and passive participation in the decision-making process among local people. It taught me to have a better understanding of what the social actors do, what the constraints are in their complex relations, and what influence and power the actors can mobilize. The topic and design for this study were formulated gradually at that time. In this study my own observations, experiences, data and information about other irrigation systems in Vietnam are also used for both the assessments and the contextualization. They provide a reference frame that allows me to integrate views expressed over a decade in the discussions and analysis when called for.
The consultancy experience from my earlier work links perfectly with my current research project because I had already done some fieldwork surveys before I began the work towards my PhD thesis. The first round of data was collected during the period (2007-2008) when I worked as consultant for the Vietnam Water Resources Assistance project (VWRAP). I was part of consultant team conducting a series of workshops at local level
20 I consulted stakeholders at the Red river basin project in 25 provinces in the northern Vietnam. I conducted fieldwork in the Northern mountainous tracts (Lao Cai, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Bac Can, Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen), in Red river delta (Bac Giang), in Central Vietnam (Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Thanh Hoa, Quang Nam, Quang Tri), in the South (Khanh Hoa, Tay Ninh, Tien Giang) etc.
79 (commune, sub-project) and national level. The aim was to work with key stakeholders to develop institutional capacity building and improve participatory irrigation management (PIM) in six large-scale irrigation systems of Vietnam (Tay Ninh being one of the sites under the project). At that time, some key issues had been discussed with different stakeholders (IDMC, IMEs, district and commune administrative authorities, cooperatives, irrigation teams, NGOs etc.). For example, how IDMC works in partnership with local organizations to improve irrigation services to the farmers, what the incentives and dis-incentives of this partnership are, why local organizations are needed, and what would happen if there were no local organizations. The assessments already covered the organization structure of IDMCs, the current situation in irrigation management at localities, the training-needs capacity of irrigation companies and local organizations, and which current policies relate to decentralization at the provincial level. Some of these issues have been transformed into my current study.
What I learnt from my previous work as well as from the literature is that the major consultancy findings concerning the difficulties with the implementation of decentralization were built on evaluations founded on an assumption that the purpose of the decentralization of irrigation management is to increase efficiency and productivity through a democratic process. With such a perception, success is measured in the short-term as increased off-take or as diversification of farm outputs. This approach offers an obvious potential for quantitative data to assess the technical indicators of irrigation systems, irrigation delivery performance, and agricultural productivity statistics. There is, however, a shortage of information concerning qualitative factors, which can tell more about livelihood, actors’ perceptions, long-term sustainability, and quality of life at local level. I am well aware that it is possible to collect some quantitative data either from the archives of the two on-going projects in these areas or from irrigation companies and cooperatives, but the qualitative data required to address my underlying research questions are not available (e.g. perceptions and incentives of actors, power relations). It was this I had to find in my fieldwork.
80 3.2.3 Secondary data and the legal documents
Relevant material has been gathered for reviewing the literature for the study’s theoretical framework. The references that were sought were scientific articles in international journals, books and reports which relate to the topics: (i) decentralization in public sectors, natural resources management, irrigation management in Asia and in Vietnam; (ii) studies on good governance, (iii) cross-scale and cross-level interactions applied to polycentric governance and adaptive co-management studies in social and environmental systems. Secondary quantitative data have been collected from government reports, the database at the general department of hydraulic works (MARD), the offices of statistics, line ministry agencies in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri provinces such as the departments of agricultural and rural development, the department of finance, state-owned irrigation companies/enterprises and district enterprises, and cooperatives in the study areas.
Analysis of the institutional arrangements for decentralization in Vietnam in general and for water/irrigation management in particular is one of the components in the current study. To do so, I have gathered about 100 legal documents in various forms of laws, ordinance, resolutions, decrees, decisions, and circulars issued by the government of Vietnam, by ministries, and by provincial authorities. The legal documents have been downloaded from a variety of sources21. The documents issued at provincial level have been collected from the provincial departments. A detailed list is given in Appendix 4.
Usually, collecting secondary data for the purpose of research is not easy in Vietnam since the top/down administrative culture makes it necessary to receive authorization from the top before information can be released. Moreover, many people are not willing to share information and knowledge. In fact, I have experienced many blockages even to access basic information in Hanoi but it is not as difficult at local levels. I have failed with several efforts to access secondary data such as previous studies
21 These are all official websites http://vanban.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban, http://thuvienphapluat.vn/, http://www.luatvietnam.vn/VL/trang-chu/, http://www.vietlaw.gov.vn/LAWNET/
81 through the formal channels in the libraries and in the department of science and technology under MARD. Reports have neither been available nor systematically stored in collective places for public access22. The reports are usually kept on the bookshelf of the researchers themselves, but some of my colleagues even refused to share them, giving different reasons for their refusals. Luckily I received the significant support from some key individuals at MARD and from those at provincial levels. I have developed a widespread contact network in IDMCs, provinces, districts, communes, and cooperatives from the previous work, these contacts have proven very useful for me during fieldwork. They are open to two-way communication and informal discussions between all stakeholders and myself. Being “part of the system”, I have benefitted from being able to find informal ways to obtain existing information. This has in particular made it possible to access unpublished and even public material out of circulation for my study object. I have been able to get access to supplementary data (both primary and secondary data) via email and telephone throughout the research process. The data collection, therefore, has in this sense formed itself into a process with follow-up interaction over time.
3.2.4 The interviews
Most of qualitative data were collected through a participatory interactive process in three ways: semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions, in-depth interviews with key informants, and target group discussions. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with three categories of actors; farmers, representatives of local organizations, and staff of IDMCs. These interviews aim to (i) assess the relationships and influence of these actors in decision-making, (ii) evaluate the performance of these actors in terms of accountability, autonomy, and participation, and (iii) obtain the incentives/perceptions of these actors on irrigation decentralization.
It must be highlighted again that the interviews to gather these sets of data have formed continuous interaction processes with local stakeholders at provincial, district, commune and village levels. Interaction has been two-
22 Even though MARD’s regulation indicates that all researchers need to submit their reports to the MARD’s libraries and department of science and technology
82 way, involving follow-ups and feedback and even occasionally advice on matters of importance when that has been needed. This process is best summarized as mutual learning. It has continued also after fieldwork periods. In the following sections I present the methodologies for sampling, designing questionnaires, and conducting interviews in detail.
Sampling
Before selecting samples for the interviews, transect walks have been carried out and rough maps of irrigation systems have been drawn up with support from IDMC staff and representatives of the cooperatives. These preparations have been very necessary for an understanding of the layout and infrastructure of irrigation systems (e.g. headwork and canal networks) and water sources. Such overviews and direct observations of the irrigation systems aim at identifying key problems, for example the possibilities for farmers to access water from different canals, which areas have water scarcity, reasons why problems of scarcity occur, and quality of maintenance.
I have employed an approach similar to that suggested by Bryman (2008) using a technique of purposive sampling to select farmers, representatives of local organizations, and staff from IDMCs for semi-structured interviews. This technique is suitable for my study because the sites, respondents, and organizations have been selected for the interviews based on their relevance to my research questions. Among the many approaches listed by Bryman (ibid.), I have in effect applied the following approaches: typical case sampling (i.e. samples represent a broad category of farmers in the study area) and opportunistic sampling (i.e. certain respondents are selected because they can provide valuable information for my study). The interviews were conducted with contributions from 120 farmers, 81 local organizations, and 55 staff from irrigation management companies in the two studied irrigation systems (as summarized in Table 3.1).
Representatives from local organizations are typically cooperative leaders, accountants, and persons in charge of irrigation delivery at on-farm level. Each of them can provide specific information. Leaders of cooperatives provide overall information about operation, plans and strategies of their
83 cooperatives. Accountants of cooperatives provide financial information. Irrigation teams, who directly conduct water and repair canals, have very good knowledge about the irrigation situation at the on-farm level. Among the 81 selected local organizations, 42 agricultural cooperatives in the Nam Thach Han system were involved in the ADB project, and 21 irrigation cooperatives in Tay Ninh were establishedunder the WB project, as mentioned in previous section. The remaining participants were irrigation teams in Tay Ninh.
Table 3.1. The number of questionnaire interviews
Irrigation Cooperatives, Staff of systems/Districts Farmers irrigation teams IDMCs/IMEs Tay Ninh irrigation system 5 Chau Thanh district 30 21 15 Trang Bang district 30 18 15 Nam Thach Han irrigation system 20 Trieu Phong district 30 19 Hai Lang district 30 23 TOTAL 120 81 55
Staff from the Nam Thach Han IME and the Tay Ninh IDMCs who participated in the interviews are staff working in the sections of administrative, financial, and technical. Different groups of staff provided different information for assessing the performance of the IDMCs. Quantitative data concerning organizational structure, personnel management, financial evaluation reports, and technical indicators of irrigation systems have been collected. Irrigation workers who operate directly at the headwork, main and secondary canals at district irrigation stations were selected because they all know details about different irrigation situations around each canal under their management.
One hundred and twenty farmers were selected for interviews in two districts in Tay Ninh province (Chau Thanh and Trang Bang), and in two districts in Quang Tri province (Trieu Phong and Hai Lang)23. The purpose
23 These districts have been selected as the pilots under the WB and ADB projects (see footnote 19)
84 of this survey was to get the opinions and views of farmers experiencing different conditions (easy / difficult) with respect to access to irrigation. For the “typical case sampling”, the principles were as follows. Selected farmers should be persons who have plots located in different locations; head-end, middle-end or tail-end of irrigation canals. Selected individuals should exemplify a broad category of farmers in similar contexts along the selected canals. For instance, I avoided selecting farmers who cannot access water from canals on the basis that their plots are located at higher level than the canals, farmers who have moved from paddy rice to other crops such as rubber, hot chili; and outsiders who have rented large cultivated areas in the villages. The farmers should be men and women in the age range 30-50 years, who are working directly in the field and therefore can give me relevant information on irrigation management.
To do the sampling, I first personally selected canals in the systems in which I wanted to conduct interviews, based on (i) previous assessments of the existing irrigation situations at the localities, (ii) maps of irrigation systems, and (iii) my direct observations through transect walks. On this basis, I then sought advice from irrigation workers, who were working at district irrigation stations, and from representatives of cooperatives, who have first-hand knowledge of the irrigation situations at various localities. These consultations were conducted separately in order to avoid bias. This approach was also done for the purpose of triangulation of information. Since the interviews of staff from local organizations and IDMCs were not difficult to arrange, I carried out the semi-structured interviews with them before conducting the interviews with the farmers. Consultations with local informants were also conducted during these interviews. At the end of this process, I decided samples of farmers and conducted the interviews. Appendix 3 provides a list of communes I conducted the interviews.
Design questionnaires
Three sets of the questionnaire were designed for semi-structured interviews; the first one was used for farmers, the second one with the representatives of local organizations, and the last one with the staff of IDMCs (detailed information is found in Appendix 1). The main contents in each questionnaire are summarized in Table 3.2.
85 Table 3.2. Main contents in the three sets of questionnaires
RESPONDENTS MAIN CONTENTS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE • Level of participation and influence of farmers in decision making in different stages of irrigation management (planning, design and budgeting, construction, management, operation and Farmers maintenance, monitoring and evaluation) • Ways to access information, level of understanding • Perceptions of farmers of irrigation decentralization (farmers’ awareness, concerns about consequences and uncertainty, perceptions of issues relating to power/status and information/communication) • Assessment of accountability of local organizations, IDMCs/IMEs, local authorities in irrigation services delivery. • Satisfaction of farmers with service quality and maintenance • Cooperatives’ views on participation, influence, knowledge, and attitudes of farmers in irrigation decentralization Representatives • Cooperatives’ participation and influence in decision making of local • Cooperatives’ constraints related to autonomy, accountability, organizations effectiveness • Responsibilities, power relations, and influences over decision making • Assessment of accountability and performance of IDMCs • Perceptions of cooperatives in irrigation decentralization • Major changes of IDMCs after renovation Staff of state • Levels of accountability, flexibility, autonomy, effectiveness, irrigation coordination of IDMCs companies • IDMC’s views on the factors/constraints affecting sustainability and autonomy of cooperatives • IDMC’s views on level of participation and influences of farmers
A short paragraph was written at the beginning of each questionnaire in order to introduce the main objectives of the interview and to confirm that the respondent’s answers would remain strictly confidential and that the data treatment would be anonymous. Respondents’ names have not appeared in the questionnaires. The questionnaires have been designed with open-ended questions such as "Do you think that..." or "how do you assess…." in order to invite respondents to provide more explanation and knowledge. Scaled questions were also included in the questionnaires in order to assess the attitudes, perceptions, incentives, and satisfaction of respondents. The questions were posed using clear and simple language so that all interviewees, even farmers, would understand.
86 Methods to conduct interviews
All three questionnaires were pre-tested with some appropriate respondents before the interviews were conducted. The purpose was to check whether or not the respondents had the requisite knowledge to answer all the questions. One assistant and I conducted the interviews directly in two selected irrigation systems. My fieldwork plans were arranged quickly and smoothly since I was able to avoid the vertical bureaucratic procedures from provincial level that most researchers would have to face. For instance, a researcher must first come to the line ministry agencies (DARDs) to present the official recommendation letter before them would arrange meetings with the IDMCs and local organizations. In my situation, I could contact the leaders of the studied IDMCs directly to fix time schedules with the IDMCs and local organizations. Staff of the IDMCs provided reliable assistance in making appointments for meetings with farmers and cooperatives, and in providing facilities for the group discussions.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face with the respondents individually, without the presence of other actors, in order to avoid top/down interventions. As mentioned previously, stakeholder involvement and interaction is given great attention in the current study. I have, over the years, been deeply involved in facilitation processes at project levels. The skills I have learnt and applied in the processes have been very useful in the establishment of good pathways for interaction, dialogue and effective communication across stakeholder categories. This is my strength in intensive field research. The interviews were conducted as informal discussions, even with the officials of state agencies. Respondents were therefore able to express their own opinions.
Farmers were successfully encouraged to speak out openly because I created a friendly environment when I explained that I had come to visit them and wanted to listen to them in my role as researcher, rather than as a central officer whose role was to investigate problems. I could take field notes during the interviews but I have avoided using a recorder because I noticed that local people hesitated to talk freely when I recorded. After a working day, my assistant and I had a short discussion in the evening in
87 order to review findings as succinctly as possible. I maintained contact after the fieldwork, and collected supplementary information via telephone from Sweden when needed. The results from the interviews were also provided as feedback to respondents in the next round of the field survey.
3.2.5 In-depth interviews with key informants
Key informants were selected for in-depth interviews from among the decision makers at Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development (MARD), researchers, officers working in department of Agricultural and Rural Development (DARDs) in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri, staff in district agriculture sections, staff in district irrigation enterprises (IMEs), officers in communes (CPCs), and leaders of local organizations. The list of key informants and key issues, and information gathered during the interviews, is given in Table 3.3 (more detailed information in Appendix 3).
Table 3.3. Key informants and key information discussed
KEY KEY ISSUES/INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE INTERVIEWS INFORMANTS 1. Progress, achievements, strategies and incentives of MARD on Decision makers transfer of irrigation management from central to local levels at MARD and 2. Organizational structure, mandates, authorities, linkages, researchers (5 coordination between of state agencies (MARD, PPC, DARDs, DPC, persons, in 2009 CPCs) in irrigation management & 2010) 1. Progress, achievements, strategies and incentives of provinces Officers working on transfer of irrigation management from provincial to district in DARDs (4 and commune levels persons) and 2. Organizational structure, mandates, authorities, linkages, coordination of and between line ministry agencies at provincial DOFs (4 levels (i.e. PPCs, DARDs, DOFs, DONREs, DOLISAs) persons) in 2009 3. PIM/IMT implementation in two provinces, Tay Ninh and & 2011) Quang Tri: responsibility, empowerment, involvement of local organizations/farmers in decision making
88 1. Incentives of district on transfer of irrigation management from Staff in District district to commune levels agricuture 2. Organizational structure, duties, mandates, responsibilities, section (4 authorities, linkages, coordination with IDMCs, CPCs, local persons, in organizations 2010) 3. PIM/IMT implementation at district level: responsibility, empowerment, involvement of local organizations/farmers in Staff in IMEs (8 decision making persons, in 2010 4. Incentives and perceptions of IDMCs on the implementation of & 2011) water fees policy, enterprise innovation
1. Incentives of commune on transfer of irrigation management Officers in CPCs 2. Division of responsibilities, power, linkages, coordination (5 persons in between local organizations, IDMCs, CPCs 2009, & 2011) 3. Involvement, empowerment of local organizations and farmers in decision making in irrigation management: Leaders of 4. Perceptions and incentives of farmers on participation, fairness, cooperatives (10 voice cooperatives per 5. Perceptions, incentives and performance of local organizations system in 2010 (accountability, autonomy, transparency, effectiveness, & 2011) partnerships and networking).
(Source: Created for this research)
My existing contact networks has enabled me to conduct informal interviews with some individuals who hold key positions within MARD, DARD, IDMCs, and IMEs in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri. These discussions have provided much inside information of value for my analysis. This approach is defined as opportunistic sampling (Bryman, 2008).
3.2.6 Target group discussions
Target group discussions were carried out during June 2010 and September 2011 with irrigation services cooperatives in Tay Ninh and with agricultural cooperatives in Nam Thach Han. The aim was to understand how farmers and cooperatives are involved in decision-making processes, what tasks are, and to what extent they can exercise power. The following key topics were discussed: (i) Participation and influences of cooperatives and farmers in decision-making, (ii) Power relations between cooperatives and other actors (IDMCs, local authorities, and farmers), (iii) Capacity and
89 perfomance of cooperatives in terms of accountability, transparency, autonomy, efficiency, collaboration), (iv) Options and constraints affecting the sustainability of cooperatives, and (v) Incentives of local authorities and cooperatives in decentralized irrigation management.
Discussion with the leaders of cooperatives Discussion with the leaders of cooperatives in Chau Thanh district, Tay Ninh in Trang Bang district, Tay Ninh
Assessments of the Cooperatives in Chau Assessments of the Cooperatives in Trieu Thanh district, in Tay Ninh system Phuoc district, in Nam Thach Han system
Figure 3.5. Target group discussions with participatory techniques (Source: Field survey 2010 and 2011)
Playing a role as a facilitator the discussions with the groups, I used some participatory techniques: Problem trees, SWOT analysis, Spider Diagrams, and Venn diagrams. Problem trees allowed the participants to brainstorm
90 around their challenges and constraints. The results from the problem trees were used by groups in SWOT analyses (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats). SWOT analyses assisted the leaders of local organizations in analyzing their internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as the external opportunities and threats that local organizations face. Spider diagrams were used in the group efforts to analyze and provide a visual summary of the institutional capacity, level of participation and influences of local organizations in decision-making. Venn Diagrams helped to analyze relationships between key actors: the relative power/influence of local organizations and the relative strength of the interaction between local organizations with other actors such as IDMCs/IMEs, local authorities and farmers. The key issues highlighted in the interviews were brought to these meetings for discussion. The intention is to seek the answers to questions such as why and how such problems arose, why there are differences, and to what extent these exist.
3.2.7 Participant observations
Participant observation is a methodology based on direct observations by the researcher in the field whilst listening to the conversations of the actors, reading the documents produced by the organizations, and asking people questions (Silverman, 2011; Carey, 2012). Having the role of facilitator in the target group discussions, I could also observe actors’ behaviors and actions. By asking questions and facilitating discussions, I tried to understand why there are differences between what actors express in the interviews and what they do in reality.
I was also invited to participate as an observer in several internal meetings: (i) one meeting between the Tay Ninh IDMC, the leaders of all the district irrigation enterprises, and the leaders of all the district people’s committees (in 2009), (ii) two meetings between the provincial project management unit and all involved cooperatives and the leaders of communes in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts (in 2009), and (iii) three meetings with the board of directors of Tay Ninh IDMC and Nam Thach Han IME (in 2010 and 2011). I was able to observe how different actors interact and influence each other in these meetings.
91 3.3 Procedures in organizing and processing data
As illustrated in the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the current study begins with a presentation of the mechanisms of irrigation management in Vietnam (Chapter 4). From here it moves to an assessment of the institutional arrangements for irrigation decentralization (Chapter 5). The intention is to provide a better understanding of how irrigation decentralization has been shaped in the whole decentralization process in Vietnam and how corresponding policy changes have emerged in irrigation decentralization. A main concern is to analyze the unforeseen effects of policy changes within the existing institutional arrangements on power relations between actors (i.e. state management agencies, IDMCs, and cooperatives) and their performance, attitudes and incentives (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The performance of these actors refers to the extent to which actors exercise power (autonomy), accountability and participation.
Following this analysis framework, qualitative and quantitative data collected in each irrigation system were organized in six themes of data relating to (i) development and management of the irrigation sector in Vietnam, (ii) legal frameworks for decentralization, (iii) power relations and power exercise, (iv) autonomy, (v) accountability, and (vi) incentives/attitudes/capability of actors. Most of data relating to irrigation development and management in Vietnam (theme i) were secondary data. They included statistics on irrigated area, productivity, and cropping yields in irrigated agriculture, and information about investment and the management of irrigation systems. These types of data were displayed in forms of diagrams and tables for analyzing in Chapter 4.
Data relating to legal frameworks (theme ii) consisted of legal documents that were used for a comprehensive review of institutional frameworks in Chapter 5. More than 100 legal documents were sorted into four categories as shown in the first column of Figure 3.6. Each category was used to analyze single aspects of the institutional arrangements for irrigation; (1) state management of hydraulic works, (2) irrigation service management, (3) irrigation finance, and (4) reforms of state-owned irrigation companies (see the arrows in the figure).
92
CATEGORIES THEMES Legal documents relating to public administration reforms, decentralization, democracy, State management Regulations relating to organizational structure, decentralization mandates and authority in irrigation management
Regulations relating to decentralized irrigation Service management, PIM/IT (issued by the government management and by different provinces) decentralization
Regulations on budgetary and financial allocation- Water fees policies Financial decentralization Legal documents on reforms of state-owned enterprise Regulations relating to enterprises producing and Renovation of providing public goods/ services (including IDMCs IDMCs)
Figure 3.6. Study of legal documents for analyzing irrigation decentralization (Source: Created for this research)
I apply a technique of cross-case analysis as introduced by Yin (2009) and illustrated in Figure 2.3. Data relating to power relations and power exercise, autonomy accountability, and incentives, attitudes and capability of actors (themes (iii) to (vi)) were obtained from the questionnaires, in- depth interviews and key group discussions. Information from the questionnaires was put into excel files for each theme, for each type of actor (farmers, cooperatives/irrigation teams, IDMCs, and state agencies) in each irrigation system. Appendix 2 shows in detail how the answers of interviewees were coded and how data were organized in excel tables and matrices.
93
94 CHAPTER 4: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
The development of irrigation for agricultural production has been a prime target in Vietnam ever since the country became an agriculture- based country. This chapter gives an overall picture of the development and management mechanisms in the irrigation sector in Vietnam. Section 4.1 shows that the heavy investment in irrigation infrastructure over the last fifty years has had a significant impact on agricultural productivity, food security and poverty in Vietnam. However, the irrigation sector nowadays faces several challenges. Apart from the major concern of poor performance in almost all irrigation systems, water stress occurs in many river basins, as demands and competition among water uses are increasing. Along with these problems, more food is also required for a growing population. Increased efficiency is needed in irrigation systems because the opportunities to increase levels of cultivated land are limited by increased urbanization and industrialization. While soft measures relating to irrigation management and institutional reforms intended to improve irrigation efficiency are given more attention by the international donors, policy makers, and practitioners, the key points of the strategies and plans of the government of Vietnam in irrigation development and management should be recognized.
Section 4.2 briefly describes multi-level irrigation governance in irrigation management in Vietnam. The intention is to map all involved actors at different levels and show inter-linkages among them. The roles and mandates of the actors are presented as well as their interactions in different circumstances. Section 4.3 describes irrigation management in the two studied irrigation systems in order to provide a deeper understanding of the irrigation management, as described in Section 4.2.
95 4.1 Irrigation for productivity and food security
4.1.1 Irrigation investmentand its contributions to agricultural productivity
The development of hydraulic works24 in Vietnam has links to the agricultural activities of the Vietnamese in the early history. The Viet groups who settled in the North in the Red River delta thousands of years ago dredged canal networks for cultivation of paddy rice and maintained systems of dikes for regular flood control. Many large-scale hydraulic works have been developed in the northern region since the 11th century for irrigation, drainage, transportation and flood protection. Irrigation in the southern region was developed between the mid-15th and the 19th century and was linked with the immigration movement and agricultural extension (Porter, 1993; Doan T.L, 2004; Dao T.T., 2007; Evers & Benedikter, 2009).
After this period, the irrigation development of Vietnam followed the same pattern as in other Asian countries in the Colonial Era (1850-1940) and the Cold War Era (1950-1989) when many countries invested heavily in infrastructure for large-scale water management projects. Since infrastructure investment was prioritized, many large dams, reservoirs and canals were built in the early 20th century (Barker & Molle, 2005). The irrigation development in Vietnam during the French colonial period (from the mid-19th century till the early 1940s) was concentrated in the Mekong delta where most of the fertile agricultural areas could be maximally exploited. The irrigated area in the southern region, therefore, increased dramatically during the fifty-year period between 1879 and 1929, from 349 thousand hectares to 2.4 million hectares. While the irrigated area here increased almost eight fold, the amount of paddy rice transported to France grew about five fold in the same period, from 360 thousand tons in
24 “Hydraulic works” are defined in Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation System No. 32/2001/PL-UBTVQH10, dated 04/4/2001 as infrastructure supplying water for different purposes; irrigation and drainage, flood control, rural water supply and sanitation, hydropower, tourism etc. Since irrigation and drainage are the primary purpose in most hydraulic works in Vietnam, the term “hydraulic works” is often replaced by the more limited “irrigation and drainage systems”. In the current study, “hydraulic works”, “hydraulic systems”, and “irrigation systems” are interchangeable
96 1879 to 1,454 thousand tons in 1929 (Doan T.L., 2004: 33). The irrigation systems developed by the French were located where construction was most easy so as to generate as much short-term economic profit as possible. Although the irrigation development in the northern and central regions was not given much attention during the French era, several large and medium-scale irrigation systems were constructed. These remained in operation until recently. Some of the main ones are the Cau Son-Song Cau, the Lien Son, the Bac Thai Binh and the Nam Thai Binh systems inBac Giang, Vinh Phuc and Thai Binh provinces, respectively. All are located in the Red river delta. Some others were constructed in central Vietnam such as Song Chu, Bai Thuong (Thanh Hoa), the Do Luong pumping station (Nghe An), the Linh Cam (Ha Tinh), and the Dong Cam system (Phu Yen) (Nguyen X.T., 2002).
In the period after 1945 (when Vietnam became an independent country) high priority was given by the state to investment in large-scale irrigation systems, to extend the irrigated areas and thereby increase agricultural productivity and reduce starvation in the country. A large proportion of the state’s budget was allocated to the irrigation infrastructure in northern Vietnam during the period 1955- 1965, and to the southern part after 1975 (To, 2001; Nguyen X.T., 2002). Investment peaked in the period 1961-196525. The estimated direct investment in the irrigation infrastructure was about 80% of total investment for the agricultural sector during this period (Fontenelle et al., 2007). It was increased notably every year. In comparison with 1960, the budget for irrigation investment doubled in 1961, increased three fold in 1962-1963, and six fold during 1964-1965 (Nguyen X.T., 2002). Heavy investment by the state combined with an intensive mobilization of all people involved in the construction of hydraulic works led to a marked increase in the number of irrigation systems and the amount of irrigated areas in Vietnam. Before 1955, there were 13 irrigation systems in the whole country. By 1965, 83 large-scale hydraulic systems and 2,830 medium-scale systems had been constructed, providing irrigation for about 450 thousand ha and drainage for 200 thousand ha of cultivated area (To, 2001:100).
25 The period 1961-1965 was the first five-year plan for Vietnam
97 The construction of large-scale irrigation systems26 during the period 1985-1990 created a significant increase in irrigated areas in the country, especially in the Mekong river delta. The national average increase in irrigated area was 2.9% per year during 1980-1987 and 4.6% per year during 1988-1994 (FAO, 2012:479). New hydraulic infrastructure (such as canals, dykes, sluices, water flow regulations etc.) were built by the state in the Mekong river delta after 197527 has been important contributors in the transformation of millions of hectares of land from natural farming to modern intensive farming (To, 2001; Evers & Benedikter; 2009). About two-thirds of the increased irrigated area in Vietnam during the 1990s was located in this region (Berkers et al., 2004).
After these years of investment and development, the total number of hydraulic works in 2008 included 75 large and medium-scale hydraulic works, and 1,957 reservoirs with a capacity greater than 200 thousand m3. Of these, 79 have a capacity greater than 10 billion m3. In addition there are 1,370 dams, 5,000 irrigation culverts and drainage sewers and ten thousands of large and medium pumping stations. All these installations serve 126 thousand km of canal networks of which 1,000 km are main canals and tens thousand of facilities installed in the canals (VAWR, 2009a: 21). Most large- and medium-scale irrigation systems have been developed in the Red river delta, on the north central coast, and in the southeast regions, while small-scale irrigation systems have been constructed in the mountainous and central highland areas. For instance, in the Red river delta, there are 55 large- and medium-scale irrigation systems including 500 sluices, 1,700 pumping stations, 35 thousand small-scale pumping stations, over 50 thousand km of main canals, and 35 reservoirs (capacity varies from 0.5 to 230M m3). This set-up provides irrigation for in all about 85 thousand ha (ibid.)
In contrast, 80-90% of the irrigation systems in the northern mountainous area are small-scale with a range in size from a few ha to 150 ha. Most of the irrigated areas served are smaller than 50 ha. Almost all big capacity
26 Criteria for categorizing scales of irrigation systems in Vietnam are as follows: (i) small-scale irrigation systems serve irrigated area of <5,000 ha, (ii) medium-scale systems serve irrigated area of > 5,000 ha and < 50,000 ha, (iii) large-scale irrigation systems serve area of > 50,000 ha 27 When the country had been reunified after the American war
98 pumping stations are located in the Red river delta. In the Mekong river delta, in contrast, tens of thousands of small pumps are used for irrigation (with a capacity that is less than 0.5 ha). Several large and medium-scale irrigation systems are located in the South East region, such as the Tri An reservoir in Dong Nai river, Thac Mo in Be river, Dau Tieng in Sai Gon river (inter-province system), Ham Thuan Mi, Nha Trinh dam, Song Quao reservoir, and the Da Ban, Da Ton and Song May reservoirs (VWAR, 2009).
This overview shows that the irrigation infrastructure in Vietnam has developed remarkably well in quantity over the past fifty years due to the state’s heavy investments as well as the people’s intensive contributions (hard work). These two factors have contributed significantly to the increased agricultural productivity of irrigated areas, along with cropping yields, and further cropping intensity for all crops, especially paddy rice. Irrigated area was 400 thousand ha during the 1950s (To, 2001). By 2010 the corresponding area irrigated by hydraulic works in the country had reached 6.92 million ha of paddy rice per year (in which 3.04 million ha of spring paddy, 2.06 million ha of autumn paddy, and 1.82 million ha of winter paddy), 1.5 million ha of vegetables and short-term industrial trees (VAWR, 2009a). Cropping intensity increased between 1.4 and 2.3 fold in the Red river delta during 1975-2005. Furthermore, irrigation systems also supply about 5.6 billion m3 water per year for domestic and industrial sectors, as well as drainage of about 1.7 million ha of agricultural land (MARD, 2010b).
Together with other factors, irrigation contributes partly to the increases in the yields of paddy rice in all different regions28. The analysis by Barker et al. (2004) shows that public and private investments (pumps) in irrigation contributed 28% and 6%, respectively to the increases in agricultural outputs in Vietnam during 1990s. Figure 4.1 shows that the average yields of paddy rice in all regions increased significantly during the period 2005- 2010.
28 General Statistic Office (GSO), 2010 assess data in six regions; Red river delta; northern midlands and mountainous areas; North central and central coastal area; Central Highlands; South East; and Mekong river delta. The three cropping seasons are Spring (vu lua dong xuan), Autumn (vu lua he thu), and Winter (vu lua mua). There is no autumn paddy rice in Red river delta and northern mountainous areas
99 The greatest increases in yields were 29% in the Central Highland, and 18% in the South East, especially for spring and winter paddy. The most significant increases were 39% in the spring paddy in Central Highland and about 20% in the winter paddy in both Central Highlands and South East Vietnam. The average increase was 8-10% in other regions. The increased yields in Mekong river delta were about 7-8% in each paddy season. The yields in Red river delta increased notably by about 20% in spring and only 2% in the winter paddy.
Average yields of paddy rice (tons/ha) Yield of spring paddy rice (tons/ha) 6.5 7.5
6.5 5.5 5.5
4.5 4.5
3.5 3.5 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Yields of winter rice (tons/ha) Yields of autumn paddy rice (tons/ha) Red river delta 5.5 5.5
Northern 5 midlands and 5 mountain areas 4.5 North Central & Central coastal 4.5 areas 4 Central Highlands
4 3.5 South East
3.5 3 Mekong river 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 delta 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 4.1. Yields of paddy rice in six regions of Vietnam and three paddy seasons (Source: GSO, 2010)
With the significant increases in the productivity of paddy rice, food security in Vietnam is not now the major concern that it was (more than) 20 years ago. Vietnam nowadays has become the second largest rice exporter in the world with a consistent amount of more than five million tons of paddy rice per year. However, the investment in the irrigation and
100 drainage sector in Vietnam is still on the increase. Typical ”hard measures” in irrigation projects such as rehabilitation and new construction of infrastructure are probably more attractive concerns than “soft measures” relating to irrigation management (Nguyen X.T., 2007).
The report of the Vietnam Global Water Partnership in 2011 reveals that the direct investment for the water sector increased from about 5.4 thousand billion VND during the period 1996-2000, to 12.7 thousand billion VND during the period 2001-2005, and to 29.7 thousand billion VND during the period 2006-2010. About 75% of the total investments have come from the state’s budget. The remainder has been funded by external agencies (72% of them are bilateral funds) (VN GWP, 2011:15). About 50- 55% of the state budget for the agricultural sector was spent for irrigation during the 1990s. This pattern seems contradictory with the trend in irrigation development in the new Era of Globalization in Asia (1990 – present) that has focused more on water management toward multiple uses and integrated water resource management (Barker & Molle, 2005).
The investment in many large- and medium-scale irrigation systems in Vietnam has created what is described by Evers & Benedikter (2009) as “a modern hydraulic society”. Their study notes that this pattern has shaped the country with the features of “hydraulic societies” as described in Wiffogel’s book (1957). This pattern has followed an historical path: the hydraulic society established centralized irrigation management in the early history of Vietnam that was used to operate dikes and canals for flood control and cultivation during the Ly (1009-1224) and Tran (1225-1400) dynasties (ibid.).
4.1.2 Water challenges and the sector development strategies
As mentioned in the previous section, the investment in and development of hydraulic works over the last five decades have contributed significantly to the improvement of agricultural productivity, food security, and poverty reduction in Vietnam. It has also played an important role in the shift of Vietnam from a rice-importing country into the world’s second-largest rice exporter. In spite of this, as in other agriculture-based countries, the irrigation sector in Vietnam nowadays is under pressure to improve its
101 efficiency in order to meet the crucial target of food security and hunger alleviation (Barker et al., 2004). This target becomes more difficult because of water shortage in some basins, poor performance of almost all irrigation systems, and limited possibilities to extend the cultivated area.
Food consumption in Vietnam will increase with an anticipated growth in the population over the next decades. The estimated population grows by 1.4% per year suggesting that rice consumption will increase by up to 2% per year (ADB, 2009: 49). Vietnam’s population is currently approaching about 90 million persons and is expected to reach about 100 million in 2020, and 130 million in 2030. Therefore, an estimated 38-41 million tons of rice per year is needed for domestic consumption29. The surplus of more five million tons per year today would be needed for domestic consumption in the next 10 or 12 years instead of for export (ADB, 2009: 49). Dealing with food security and hunger alleviation in a situation of increasing population will eventually become an issue for the government.
The total cultivated area of paddy rice per year in the whole country has fluctuated between 7.3 million and 7.5 million ha during the period 2005- 2010 (GSO, 2010)30. The prospect of an increased cultivated area also seems poor because of the rapid change to urban modernization and industrialization. The amount of cultivated land available for paddy rice has been decreasing31. An estimated 60 thousand ha of paddy rice has been lost every year because the land is used for housing areas, infrastructure, trade, and industrial zones. In addition, the cultivated area of paddy rice in two big river basins in Vietnam, the Red river and Mekong river deltas, has been flooded due to the increased sea level caused by the impact of climate change (VN GWP, 2011). Paddy rice production to ensure food security is a crucial task of the government. The hydraulic development strategy in
29 Online newspaper http://tuanvietnam.vietnamnet.vn/ published on 3rd October 2012 - ”Approach on food security needed to be changed”, from the research “Policy analysis for the development of land policies for socio-economic development in Vietnam” (Phân tích chính sách nhằm xây dựng chính sách đất đai cho phát triển kinh tế - xã hội tại Việt Nam) of authors Ho Dang Hoa, Le Thi Quynh Tram, Pham Duy Nghia, McPherson M.F 30 The statistics of General Statistics Office (GSO) in 2010 show that the cultivated area increased from 7.329 million hectares in 2005 to 7.514 million in 2010. The area decreased slightly to 7.193 million and increased again to about 7.4 million hectares in 2007 and 2008 (GSO, 2010; MARD, 2010b) 31 See footnote 29 above
102 Vietnam32 has as a target that hydraulic works should provide enough water for 3.8 million ha of paddy rice by 2020 of which 3.3 million ha will be completely irrigated in two cropping seasons. Apart from that, hydraulic works should also supply water for about 80% of the aquaculture area, for domestic use in rural areas (everyone should be able to access a minimum of 80l/person/day), and for industrial use, with a target of 50-100 m3/day/ha. The strategy of MARD for the period 2010-2015 is to further increase the irrigated area by 410 thousand ha and the drainage area by 200 thousand ha in order to reach the targets in the socio-economic development plan (MARD, 2010b).
Achieving MARD’s targets under these constraints is a great challenge. At present the performance of irrigation systems is assessed as operating at below 50% of the designed capacity, even lower in some systems (FAO, 2012:479). This poor performance is caused by a series of chronic problems relating to technology and management, such as incomplete infrastructure, and degraded systems due to inadequate rehabilitation and maintenance (Doan T.L., 2001; Nguyen D.N., 2008, Nguyen X.T., 2007; VAWR, 2009a). The crux is how to increase irrigation performance and how to use irrigation water more effectively to increase food productivity. However, the designated approaches (both investment and management) to achieve this target are not clearly defined in the Vietnam hydraulic development strategy up to 2020, especially in the context of water stress33.
The Vietnam Water Sector Review34 (ADB, 2009) and the country report on water resources management (VN GWP, 2011) document that the annual water resources of Vietnam are about 830 billion m³ of surface water and about 60 billion m³ of groundwater. However, about 60% of the water source originates from outside the country’s boundary (China, Laos, and Cambodia). Therefore, Vietnam’s access to water resources strongly depends on water uses in upstream countries. Water consumption is at
32 Vietnam hydraulic development strategy up to 2020 issued with the government’s decision No. 1590 QD-TTg dated 09/10/2009 33 This strategy proposes a list of hydraulic works that are planned for upgrading, rehabilitation or new construction in each region 34 TA4903-VIE Water sector review project prepared for the office of the National Water Resources Council in 2009
103 present about 80 billion m³ per year but is expected to increase to 120 billion m³ by 2020. This increase is due to growth in water consumption in irrigation (30%), industry (190%), urban use (150%), and aquaculture (90%). Irrigation for agricultural production is at present the largest water user, accounting for about 66 billion m³ per year or 82% of the total water- use volume. The future proportion for irrigation is expected to be reduced from 82% to 72% by 2020, corresponding to an overall increase, of about 86 billion m³ per year due to increased demands (ADB, 2009). This report also stresses that water shortage is alarming in some areas in Vietnam, especially during dry seasons. In some river basins such as Dong Nai, Red, Ma, Kone, Huong and other rivers in the south east region, over 50% and even 70-80% of annual discharge are exploited at present (ibid., 2009). The demand for water has increased drastically due to a growing population, and with improved living standards in terms of food consumption and water use. Water consumption for other purposes, domestic use, industry use, aquaculture and others, is also increasing. By contrast, the decreased water availability due to climate and hydrological effects, uneven distribution of river networks in the country, and unequal distribution of rainfall between different seasons in different regions, has resulted in water shortage in many areas (VN GWP, 2011).
Furthermore, Vietnam is one of the countries that would be drastically affected by climate change. Climate change could raise sea-water levels by about 4 mm per year, increase temperature by 0.2-0.7°C, and decrease rainfall by 2%. Water availability is affected by the unpredictable natural disasters that have occurred more intensely and more frequently during the last ten years (2000-2010); flash floods, typhoons with higher intensity, and continuous drought periods are related phenomena (ibid.:11). But the concern is not only with quantity. Water quality is a critical issue due to heavy pollution caused by the residual chemical fertilizers in agricultural and aquaculture production, and to untreated wastewater discharge from the industrial zones and urban cities. Over-exploitation of the groundwater has affected land subsidence and salinity intrusion in many areas in the Mekong river delta (ADB, 2009). Water stress has become such a conspicuous problem that sustainable water management is already required.
104 Improved performance by irrigation systems is therefore essential to meet the combined targets to increase both the irrigated area and its food productivity. The irrigated agriculture sector aims to solve the projected increase in food consumption by a growing population in this way. The irrigation reforms toward decentralization are intended to increase productivity of water in agriculture production and governance in the context of IWRM on a river basin scale have been highlighted by the government as well as funded by the external donors. These initiatives are taken along with the technical measures relating to investment, rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation systems (VN GWP, 2011).
This approach is in line with the institutional reforms in Asian irrigated agriculture to improve irrigation performance, enhance demand-oriented water service, and use water more efficiently (Shivakoti et al, 2005; FAO, 2006; Bandaragoda, 2006). One side to the decentralization process within the country, is that the irrigation reforms in Vietnam are implemented in a context of shifting focus from an agriculture-based economy to an industrialized country by 2020. According to the Socio-Economic Development Strategy of Vietnam (SEDS) for the period of 2011-2020, the basic economic structure has to change; the contribution from the agricultural sector (including forestry and fisheries) to the GDP is expected to reduce from 40% to 20%, while that from the industrial sector (including construction) is expected to go up from 20% to 40%. The service and trade sectors contribute around 40% of the GDP 35. The labor force in the agricultural sector is expected to drop from 60% at present to about 30% in 2020 (GSO, 2009).
4.2 Multi-level irrigation governance
The management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic systems in Vietnam involve many actors at different levels. The cross-level linkages among the actors are illustrated in Figure 4.2. The linkages between administrative authorities at central, provincial, district, and commune levels are shown in the vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension shows the linkages between the actors at the same administrative level.
35 The Socio-economic Development Strategy of Vietnam for the period of 2011-2020
105
GOV Other MARD Inter province minist- GDHW IDMCs ries
PPCs Other DARD IDMCs depart- DHW ments
DPCs Economic IMEs divisions
CPCs A person in Local charge organizations
Villages Irrigation teams
Farmers
Administrative Specialized Irrigation service levels agencies providers
Abbreviations: GoV Government of Vietnam DARD Department of Agricultural & Rural Development MARD Ministry of Agricultural and Rural DHW Department of hydraulic works Development GDHW General Department of Hydraulic Works IDMC Irrigation & Drainage Management Company PPC Provincial People’s Committee IME Sub unit of IDMC at district level DPC District People’s Committee CPC Commune People’s Committee
Figure 4.2. Cross-level interactions in irrigation management (Source: Adapted from Nguyen X.T., 2007; VAWR, 2009a)
The actors are grouped into two categories for analysis in this study: those responsible for state management functions of varying kinds (they are called state management agencies in the text), and those responsible for irrigation service provision and system management (called irrigation service providers). State management agencies include administrative
106 authorities and specialized agencies. The concept of irrigation service providers refers to state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) and local organizations. Organizational structure, main roles and tasks of these actors are presented in the following text. Same- levels and different-levels interactions will be discussed in detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, especially how actors influence each other in decision- making in irrigation management.
4.2.1 State management agencies
The administrative system has been organized from national downward to provincial, district, commune and village levels in accordance with the Vietnamese constitution36. The Figure 4.3 presents this organizational structure in detail by showing how all actors at different levels have direct and indirect influence each other. A specialized agency (co quan quan ly nha nuoc) is set up at each administrative level with the task of assisting the respective administrative authority to implement the state management functions of hydraulic works within the administrative boundaries. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is the central node, responsible for the overall state management of hydraulic works in the country including the construction and management of hydraulic works, rural water supply, dikes management and flood control. The General Department of Hydraulic Works (GDHW)37 within MARD is the specialized agency assisting MARD to conduct its state-management functions at national level.
The mandates of the state management actors include the promulgation of policies, plans, guidelines, norms/standards; and provision of guidance and supervision of the implementation. All these concerns relate to the construction, exploitation, management, and protection of hydraulic works.
36 According to the Vietnamese constitution, each administrative level has a People’s Council and a People’s Committee. The People’s Council makes decisions and monitors the implementation of local development plans, budgetary and financial allocation, and policies. The People’s Committee is the executive agency implementing decisions made by People’s Council. It is charged with maintaining law, order within its jurisdiction, forwarding budget requests to higher levels, reviewing plans for socioeconomic development, executing the budget, and undertaking duties as assigned by higher levels of administration (Rosario et al., 2008) 37 The general department of hydraulic works established in 2010 was based on the former department of water resources and hydraulic works management
107 There are also other relevant central ministries and provincial departments who have indirect responsibilities for the state management of hydraulic works. It is up to MARD at national level to cooperate with other ministries on relevant issues. For instance, MARD has to work with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) on issues concerning water resources management (i.e. surface, groundwater and seawater). Other ministerial relations are with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in connection with incurrent expenditures, and with Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) over investment planning and budget allocation.
GoV MARD MONRE MOF MPI MOLISA
DARD
IDMCs
DONRE PPC
DOF
DPI
DOLISA
DPC Section of Section of Section of finance & economics resources investment Section of environ- agriculture ment IMEs
CPC A staff
Figure 4.3. Cross-level interplay among state management agencies (Source: Created for this research)
At sub-national levels, the People’s Committees are responsible for the state management functions of hydraulic works within their administrative boundaries. In particular at provincial level, the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and its unit, department of hydraulic works (chi cuc thuy loi) are the specialized agencies that assist the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) to conduct state-management
108 functions of hydraulic works. The Department of Finance (DOF) is responsible for the allocation and management of the state budget for construction, management of irrigation systems inside the province, and, at the same time, for allocation and finalization of water fees subsidized from the state budget for IDMCs. The Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) is responsible for the investment planning and budget allocation for new investment and rehabilitation of irrigation systems. The Department of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs (DOLISA) has to approve the IDMC annual business plan in terms of the number of people employed and their salaries.
At district and commune levels, the structure becomes much more simple. One section (phong), namely the Section of Agricultural Development or Section of Economics38, which belongs to the District People’s Committee (DPC) and one staff of the communal authority (Commune People’s Committee, CPC)39 have been assigned for these tasks. The state irrigation management is one of many duties they are responsible for along with several others, such as socioeconomic planning, transportation, rural water and sanitation, irrigation, agricultural extension, forestry, aquaculture, and salt production. At district level the functions of several ministries/departments are combined into one section. For example, financial and investment management within a district boundary is conducted by the district Section of Finance and Investment.
The common design in governance is that each actor in the structure is placed under the control and management of People’s Committees at the same administrative level as they belong to (horizontal relations), and, in addition, they have to relate to their line agencies at the upper level (vertical relations). The horizontal control is mostly connected to organizational and personnel matters. Vertical control is exercised on technical specializations. For example, DARD is under the control and supervision of the MARD on technical matters, operation and maintenance of hydraulic works, but also comes under the PPC for their mandates and
38 Sections of economic are established in the urban districts. Sections of agriculture and rural development are established in the rural districts. Their mandates and functions, therefore, are modified accordingly. 39 Law on the organization of the CPCs in 2003 and Decree 121/2003/ND-CP date 21/10/2003
109 organizational management. The district section of Agricultural Development is controlled directly by DPC with regards to staff, duties and performance, but gets technical supervision from DARD. This pattern is called “double subordination” and applies for all actors at all levels (Kerkvliet & Marr, 2004:7). The discussions on this design and its complexities that relate to decentralization of state irrigation management will be returned to in Chapter 6.
4.2.2 State-owned irrigation and drainage management companies
In most large and medium-scale irrigation systems, state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) and local organizations share responsibilities for water delivery and maintenance of infrastructure. These relationships are tied by contracts and financial payments. IDMCs are responsible for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of large-and medium-scale irrigation systems that are technically complicated and supply water services crossing administrative boundaries.
Headwork IDMCs
Main canal
Primary canal IMEs (sub-units of Secondary canal IDMCs)
Tertiary canals
District, commune On-farm canals authorities Local irrigation organizations
Figure 4.4. Typical model of irrigation co-management between IDMCs, IMEs and local organizations (Source: Created for this research)
Typical for most irrigation systems is that IDMCs and their sub-units at district level (called irrigation stations or irrigation management enterprises, IMEs) conduct O&M of headwork, main and secondary canals.
110 Local organizations deliver water and maintain tertiary canals (in some cases also secondary canals) downward to on-farm canals (see an illustration in Figure 4.4). Recently, all IDMCs together with more than 10,000 local organizations have managed about 91% of the irrigation systems serving approximately 80% of the total irrigated area of the country. 9% of small-scale independent irrigation systems are managed by approximately 1,500 local organizations, serving 20% of remaining irrigated area (DWR, 2007; VAWR, 2009a). There are currently 95 IDMCs with a total staff of 22,569 employees in the whole country (VAWR, 2009). Three of the IDMCs are directly managed by MARD because of the inter- province irrigation systems (Bac Hung Hai and Bac Nam Ha in Red River Delta; Dau Tieng in South East region). The typical pattern is that there are several irrigation companies/ enterprises in one province operating within one district or across inter-district across boundaries.
Table 4.1 shows a number of IDMCs located in different regions of the country40. It reveals that a large number of IDMCs is found in three regions: the Red River Delta (32 IDMCs in 10 provinces), in North Central (20 IDMCs in 6 provinces), and in the Northern mountain (20 IDMCs in 15 provinces). The number of employees in these three rigions forms about 80% of the total number of employees in the whole country (VAWR, 2009a). In contrast to this picture, the number of IDMCs in other regions is much smaller. There is one IDMC on average in each province of the Central Highlands and South East regions. There are five provincial IDMCs in 13 provinces in the Mekong River Delta. In some provinces there are not IDMCs in some provinces. Instead, state agencies have dual roles; both state management and irrigation service delivery, resulting in many overlaps between state and service management of irrigation systems (to be discussed further in Chapter 6). Specifically, they are the provincial departments of hydraulic works (e.g. Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Can Tho, and Ca Mau provinces), centers of hydraulic work management (Cua Dat, Lam Dong, Ba Ria- Vung Tau, Long An, and Bac Lieu provinces), provincial management boards of hydraulic systems (e.g. Tuyen Quang and Kon Tum
40 Vietnam is devided into six socio-economic regions; (1) Red River Delta, (2) Northern midland and mountain areas, (3) North Central area and Central coastal area, (4) Central Highlands, (5) South East, and (6) Mekong River Delta. In table 4.1, noth central and central coastal are combined into a region (3)
111 provinces), and management boards belonging to district authorities (in mountainous areas). The key informant at MARD said that the water situation is unproblematic in many provinces in the Cuu long river delta, so there is less need for the establishment of IDMCs to take charge of irrigation service delivery. In many mountainous provinces (e.g. Ha Giang, Lao Cai, Tuyen Quang), IDMCs are considered to be unnecessary as most of the irrigation systems are small-scale systems.
Table 4.1. State-owned irrigation companies at different regions
Numbers of Number of No Areas IDMCs/total province employees (persons) 1 Northern mountain area 20/15 2,333 2 Red River Delta 32/10 11,764 3 North Central area 20/6 4,253 4 Central Coastal area 7/6 1,432 5 Central Highlands 3/5 472 6 South East 8/8 1,547 7 Mekong River Delta 5/13 768 Sum 95 22,569 (Source: VAWR, 2009a: 24)
The operations of IDMCs are guided by a set of legal documents41 defining their three main tasks; water management, infrastructure management, and organizational/economic management. In particular, IDMCs’ responsibilities include ensuring that water delivery is performed effectively to different water users, that O&M of hydraulic systems is in accordance with plans and technical norms/standards approved by the specialized agencies, and that resources are effectively managed (capital, financial budgets, human resources). Pursuant to the 2005 Enterprise Law, IDMC’s revenues are generated from the provision of irrigation and drainage services for agricultural production, along with a number of other water-related services, such as water supply for domestic use, for industry, for aquaculture, tourism etc.. Also other support tasks are carried out, such as business services (e.g. consultancy design and construction, financial
41 Water Resources Law 1998, the Ordinance of management and exploitation of hydraulic works (2001), Decree 115 (2008), Circular 65 (2009), Law of Enterprise 2005
112 service, supply and installation of hydraulic electric equipments) and flood control, environmental improvement. Since 2008 water fees for irrigation have been paid from the state budget directly to IDMCs. IDMCs are defined as state public-utility enterprises and are therefore they are also entitled to the state subsidy when there are deficits caused by natural disasters (flooding, drought). IDMCs have been under the renovation process toward improved autonomy, efficiency and performance (Section 5.5).
4.2.3 Local irrigation management organizations
According to the assessment made by MARD in 2006, there were at the time more than 10,000 local organizations involved in the delivery of irrigation services at on-farm levels. An exact figure is not possible to give since many are very small-scale groups established and operated on a voluntary basis, and thus not registered as legal independent entities. Many of them are even individuals and groups involving a few individual farmers only. Duties, responsibilities and rights of local organizations defined in Ordinance 2001 including water distribution at an on-farm level to fulfill the contracts signed with farmer households, and operation and maintenance of irrigation systems.
Local organizations have the right to collect on-farm fees at local level, and to receive state financial support in specific situations (drought, flooding) or in situations of financial deficit caused by natural disasters. They also have the right to formulate and be involved in the development of operation rules as well as to request local authorities to mobilize local labor for the maintenance and protection of irrigation works. For local organizations that share irrigation management with IDMCs, revenue from the irrigation service is generated mainly from on-farm fees (phi noi dong) collected from water users.
On-farm fees are decided in each local organization, based on negotiations between local organizations and farmers. However, they cannot be higher than the ceiling rates regulated by provincial authorities. Local organizations that manage the independent state-invested irrigation systems, apart from on-farm fees collected from farmers, are also allowed to claim the subsidy on the basis of current policy on the remission of
113 water fees. This revenue is used to cover the expenses relating to O&M activities inside the irrigated area managed by them.
Local organizations involved in the provision of irrigation services are formed in several ways; Cooperatives, Water User Organizations/Groups, Irrigation management boards, Village self-management groups, and Individuals. The proportions of the different types, seen for the whole country, are that 42% of the local organizations are formed as cooperatives, 24% are water-users organizations, 28% are village-self management groups, and 6% are irrigation management boards (MARD, 2006). The category Individuals is not given due to a lack of data.
Agricultural cooperatives are very common in different regions but exist mostly in Red River Delta, North Central area and Central coastal area. In other regions, there are various types of local organizations, such as agricultural cooperatives, irrigation service cooperatives, and water users’ organizations. In the Mekong River Delta, the farmers’ do not favor agricultural cooperatives. Instead, other types such as water user organizations, irrigation groups or irrigation teams, and private individuals are quite common. These differences suggest that the agricultural collectivization in Vietnam during the period 1950 – 1960s appeals more readily to farmers in the Red river delta in comparison with other regions, especially in the South.
One ambition of the current study is to interpret this point with a departure from two different models of cooperatives in two selected irrigation systems. In order to generalize the implications for irrigation management in Vietnam, a brief description of each local organization type in the following sections is necessary. It not only provides a good illustration of irrigation management in the country, but also specifies key concerns reaching beyond the two selected cases. To begin with, Table 4.2 summarizes the main characteristics of each type. The following sections provide more information on each type of local organizations.
114 Table 4.2. Main characteristics of each type of local organizations
Types of local Legal status Forms Where organizations Cooperatives - Pursuant to the - Agricultural More common in the Cooperative Law service Red river delta, - Legally registered cooperatives Northern at administrative - Irrigation service mountainous and authorities cooperatives North Central Coast regions Water Users - Pursuant to the Water Users More common in the Organizations Civil Law Associations/ Southern part - Legally registered Organizations/ (Mekong river delta) at administrative Groups authorities Commune Commune/village Absent Small-scale irrigation administrative administrative systems, not under authorities authorities manage management of the systems directly IDMCs or local organizations Village self- Farmers form Village self- Small-scale irrigation governing organizations and management systems (Northern groups manage systems in groups, production mountainous region) voluntary basis, groups, collective no legal status groups Private No legal status - Small collective - The Southern part enterprises/ groups - Very small-scale individuals - Individuals systems
(Source: Created for this research)
Agricultural and irrigation service cooperatives
Agricultural Cooperatives (ACs) have been in existence since the period of agricultural collectivization. The number of ACs reached a peak of 13,782 during this period, but fell to 8.322 in 2005 (Nguyen V.N., 2006). The statistics from 2011 reveal that there are 6,072 cooperatives, unequally distributed in different regions: 50% of them are in the Red River Delta, 31% are in the North Central and Central Coastal area. In the Mekong River Delta and Northern midland and Mountain areas, cooperatives account for under 10% each. Only about 2% are located in the Central Highlands and the South East (GSO, 2011:90). ACs have usually been established within administrative boundaries covering one commune or several villages, or even only one village. It is quite common for a commune to have 2 - 9 ACs.
115 Depending on local conditions and capacities, each cooperative can provide either one or several services (irrigation & drainage, agricultural extension, electricity supply, credits, inputs for agricultural production such as seeds, plant protection, fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, etc.). But irrigation service remains the main activity provided by more than 80% of the cooperatives (Nguyen V.N., 2006). Irrigation teams established by ACs become the arms of IDMCs reaching to on-farm canal networks. They are responsible for water delivery, canal maintenance, and collection of water fees among other types of local taxes and fees. As a result of the economic reforms in 1986 and the agricultural management reforms, the roles of ACs have become more flexible to provide services and take better account of farmers’ demands. This continued until many of them were broken up during 1988-1989 because of low effectiveness and low productivity in agricultural production. This feature constituted the old style ACs in Vietnamese (hop tac xa kieu cu). The number of ACs, therefore, was decreased dramatically after this period. However ACs are still the most common form of local organizations in the country, especially since they involve delivery of irrigation services at local level (Nguyen V.N., 2006).
Cooperative Members’ Congress
Cooperative Management Controlling Board Board (2-3 persons) (1-2 persons)
Accounting Section Specialized Sections
(2-3 persons) - irrigation and drainage: irrigation teams - Accountants - agricultural extension - Cashier - electricity, petrol, inputs for agricultural production
Figure 4.5. The typical structure of an agricultural service cooperative (Source: Created for this research)
The 1996 Cooperative Law was the foundation for the reform of ACs into the new style ACs (hop tac xa kieu moi), still collective but with more efficient service organizations operating under a market mechanism. Under
116 the Cooperative Laws (1996, revised 2003 and 201242), ACs are recognized as economic autonomous entities made up of farmer households who join voluntarily to share the common needs and interests. They are legally registered at administrative authorities (DPCs or CPCs) and local banks. Decisions are made at the cooperative members’ congress through voting (dai hoi xa vien). The elected management board of a cooperative (ban quan tri hop tac xa) is responsible for the implementation of decisions.
The typical organizational structure of an agricultural cooperative (Figure 4.5) includes a Cooperative Management Board (2-3 persons), Controlling Board (1-2 persons), Accounting Section (1-3 persons), and specialized sections for each service that is provided by the cooperative (for example, irrigation teams for irrigation services). In tune with the reform process and decentralization in water management, the ACs and the irrigation teams play an important role in irrigation management at the grass roots level. In the current study, the analysis of two types of services cooperatives; agricultural service cooperatives (in Nam Thach Han system) and irrigation service cooperatives (in Tay Ninh system) will bring out the differences in their operation, incentives and attitudes.
Water User Organizations
The terminology of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) has been applied in the country since 1995. Water User Organizations (WUOs) have been established in many provinces. Almost all are linked to the specific projects funded by international lending institutions, donors, and international NGOs. WUOs account for about 12% of the total number of local organizations. They are highly developed in the Mekong River delta (about 34%) in comparison with those in the Red River delta (about 2%) (Nguyen X.T., 2007). Pursuant to the Civil Law43, WUOs have been set up under different forms: Water Users Associations (hiep hoi dung nuoc), Water Users Organizations (to chuc dung nuoc), and Water Users Cooperative Groups (to hop tac dung nuoc).
42 The cooperative law No. 23/2012/QH13 was approved on 20th November 2012, announced on 3rd December 2012, valid from 1st July 2013 43 Circular 75 (2007)
117 WUOs have been encouraged to develop under PIM projects following the worldwide trend of IMT/PIM imposed by the international lending institutions, notably the WB, ADB and other donors. The spotlight is on active participation by water users in irrigation management, in the selection of leaders, in development of the charter and regulation, and in making financial management more transparent. WUOs operate on the basis of hydraulic boundaries in design and not administrative boundaries. This is expected to result in water management becoming more effective and equitable. In actual fact, WUOs have been given a positive assessment by the stakeholders in some pilots, but many have failed when the projects ended. The reasons for this are quite similar to those revealed in the assessment of IMT/PIM in other Asian countries (mentioned in Chapter 2); linked with the formation of WUOs, a lack of legal status, limited capacity, etc. (Nguyen X.T., 2007; VAWR, 2009a).
Commune administrative authorities
It is commonplace that commune administrative authorities are involved directly with irrigation service delivery in several provinces. CPCs undertake to manage irrigation schemes and sign service contracts with IDMCs (e.g. in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Nam). Since CPCs cannot manage the systems directly, they usually delegate that activity to the heads of villages/hamlets. This is done through signed contracts with farmers to deliver water and collect water fees. The roles of CPCs are as “middle men” to certify the water contracts and to get the commission from IDMCs (VAWR, 2007). In other cases a section of CPC44 directly control and interfere with the activities of ACs such as the financial management. For example, the Water Management Boards in Lao Cai have been established with a structure to include three members: Chairman, Vice chairman and an Accountant of CPC. These Boards sign hiring contracts with villages or the society organizations (Youth Unions, Women Unions, etc.), not with the individuals who are to conduct the actual activities of water delivery, collection of water fees, or maintenance. For the commune and inter- commune canals in Tuyen Quang, DPCs and CPCs assign their leaders in the Irrigation Management Boards together with the heads of benefitting ACs
44 This section is called the Water Management Boards (ban thuy loi xa) or the Water and Transportation Boards (ban giao thong va thuy loi xa)
118 (Pham, 2003). In neither situation can CPCs perform well in terms of service management because overlapping functions occur between administrative management and service management. The evidence in some cases is that the intervention of local authorities leads to limitations in farmers’ involvement. Project design and implementation is experienced as top-down management (VAWR, 2007). In spite of such complications, IDMCs still seek to involve CPCs because CPCs can authorize water contracts and are powerful in the local mobilization in maintenance, and construction. The analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will go further on the roles’ limitations, along with influences from local authorities in the process of decentralized irrigation management.
Village self-management groups
Village self-management groups are quite common in small-scale irrigation schemes. Farmers in mountainous areas form their own organizations and manage irrigation services by themselves due to the high demand on water. These organizations are given different names; “village self-management groups” (nhom tu quan thon ban) or “production groups” (to san xuat) or “cooperative groups” (nhom hop tac dung nuoc). Many have been set up on a voluntary basis by mobilizing village resources. These types of groups usually have no legal status or charter. Operators are selected among villagers during the cropping seasons. The payments for them may be changed after every cropping season. It becomes difficult to uphold an autonomous and sustainable operation under such circumstances; small scale, limitations in financial budgets, lack of legal status, and limited capacity in technical and management skills (Pham, 2003 and 2008).
Individuals and private enterprises
A model of individuals’ and private enterprises’ management has emerged in recent years, especially in the southern part (e.g. Long An and Tien Giang provinces). One individual, or a small collective group, makes a private investment in pumping stations, small reservoirs, canals etc. because of local needs. Some experience has shown that such local organizations could operate flexibly and effectively. However, this model functions on a very small-scale only. Almost all of the individual and private enterprises face
119 many difficulties in the operation because there are no guided instructions on how to establish a group, and furthermore, they meet with a lack of support from IDMCs and local authorities.
To sum up, the emerging picture of irrigation management in Vietnam shows that many actors are involved in the management, exploitation, and protection of irrigation systems. The account so far of actors and their relations already brings out a highly complex web of horizontal and vertical influences. Two categories of actors are grouped in the current study; actors responsible for state management of irrigation systems (administrative authorities and specialized agencies at each level), and actors responsible for irrigation services delivery (state irrigation companies and local water user organizations). Adding decentralization into this web calls for good insight into both general and specific features of the involved bureaucracies. In fact, different types and scales of actors have different ways of interacting and influencing. The detailed description of the two studied irrigation systems in the next section stand out as important examples to describe the differences and similarities in irrigation management at two cases. Two types of local organizations are analyzed; the first one is the agricultural cooperative with multiple services for agricultural production and the latter one is the irrigation cooperative with only irrigation service. The issues that come forth relating to implementation of the decentralization policy are several and widely applicable beyond the two cases. Such issues will be further detailed in Chapters 6-8.
4.3 Irrigation management in two selected cases
4.3.1 Nam Thach Han irrigation system
The Nam Thach Han irrigation system is the largest system in Quang Tri province located in the central region of Vietnam (Figure 4.6). This system has been in operation since 1980 with a designated area of 16,969 ha (16,000 ha of paddy rice and 969 ha of vegetables) in 13 communes in the Trieu Phong district, 12 communes in the Hai Lang district, and two wards in Quang Tri town. The number of persons benefitting from this system is
120 about 136,000, living in 28,515 households. The system also provides two thousand m3 of domestic water and supplies 250 thousand m3 for the industrial sector and 99 ha of aquaculture.
Canal N3
Canal N1
Canal N6
Canal N4
Canal N2B Main canal
Canal N2A
Headwork
Figure 4.6. General layout of the Nam Thach Han irrigation system (Source: The Nam Thach Han IME)
The whole system consists of two dams, 130 reservoirs, 14 pumping stations with a total capacity of 1,000 KW/h, and one dam for salinity protection. The irrigation canal network consists of 16.4 km of main canals, 65.24 km of six primary canals, namely N1, N2A, N2B, N3, N4, N6; and 228
121 km of 204 secondary canals. There are also 405 km of 1,100 tertiary canals and on-farm canals. The report on the Nam Thach Han IME in 2011 reveals that the system achieves about 60% of its designed capacity which corresponds in reality to an irrigated area of about 14,300 ha. A major issue is that water needs to be pumped to about 1,500 ha, mostly located in the tail-ends of canals N4, N6, N1.
The main source is the Thach Han river, but there are also other supplementary sources (such as the Vinh Dinh river) where farmers and the cooperatives can use their pumps to get water to their plots. According to the evaluation of the enterprise, the main reasons why irrigation performance is low are incomplete construction and poor quality of infrastructure due to inadequate maintenance. Overall management of the Nam Thach Han system is carried out by the state-owned IDMC of Quang Tri province. The direct responsibility for the exploitation, operation, protection, and management of this system is assigned to one sub-unit of the IDMC - the Nam Thach Han irrigation management enterprise (IME). The Quang Tri IDMC was transformed to a form of one-member limited liability company with 100% state ownership45 in 2007 as a consequence of the national policies to reform state-owned companies.
Figure 4.7 shows the organizational structure of Quang Tri IDMC and how the Nam Thach Han IME links to the Quang Tri IDMC. It involves four enterprises: the Nam Thach Han IME together with Gio Cam Ha, Vinh Linh, and an enterprise for investment and construction. The Nam Thach Han IME consists of 95 staff, of which 18 have a university education, and 50 have a high school education. The system is managed as follows: the Nam Thach Han IME manages headwork, main canals, primary canals and secondary canals. The technician of the IME operates headwork and intakes in the main canal. The staff of the nine irrigation stations is responsible for water delivery in the primary canals. From outlets in secondary canals downward to on-farm canal networks, the IME have contracts with 113 Agricultural Cooperatives (ACs). ACs are responsible for water delivery and canal maintenance from tertiary to on-farm canals.
45 This terminology in Vietnamese is Công ty trách nhiệm hữu hạn một thành viên nhà nước sở hữu 100% vốn
122 They have legal status, bank accounts and charters in accordance with the 2003 Cooperative Law. Information from IMEs reveals that almost all ACs are small-scale units. 94% of the agricultural cooperatives are operating on a one-village scale providing irrigation services for an irrigated area ranging from 10 to 100 hectares. There is only one cooperative that operates on a commune scale. Only four cooperatives provide irrigation services for an irrigated area of more than 200 hectares. This means that almost all cooperatives operate within the administrative boundary, not the hydraulic boundary. The operation of almost all ACs follows the Charters of cooperatives but Regulations for irrigation and drainage management activities are missing.
Director Board of Quang Tri IDMC
Administration Accountant Dept. Dept. economic & Dept technical
Nam Thach Gio Cam Ha Vinh Linh IME Enterprise of Han IME IME investment & construction
9 stations 5 stations 3 stations
Agricultural Cooperatives
Figure 4.7. Organizational structure of Quang Tri IDMC (Source: The QuangTri IDMC)
The field survey at cooperatives in two districts; Hai Lang and Trieu Phong, finds a common pattern in the operation of cooperatives in irrigation service. This can be described as follows: the cooperative signs a contract with the Nam Thach Han IME to provide irrigation services within the borders of the cooperative. The main tasks of the AC are to collect water fees, deliver water to the fields, and conduct minor maintenance (e.g. dredging and grass cutting along canals) on average twice per year. The
123 ACs employ irrigation teams to carry out these tasks through bidding every year. Irrigation teams with the lowest bids are selected because many cooperatives want to keep their expenses as low as possible, with a limited set by what is acceptable to the farmers. Irrigation teams get a lump-sum payment based on the size of irrigated areas served each season.
Cooperative and irrigation teams follow irrigation schedules fixed by IDMC or IME in line with cropping schedules set up by the DPCs. The irrigation schedule applied in this system is about 15-16 irrigation times per cropping season and water is kept in for about five days each time. However, according to ACs, the schedules can be modified according to irrigation requirements based on actual weather conditions in a specific area. In some areas where water cannot reach the on-farm level, ACs usually operate their own pumps. The water source for pumping comes from either canals managed by IME or the river.
Maintenance work is shared between the cooperatives and IME; from headwork to secondary canals it is conducted by IME, and from tertiary to on-farm canals it is done by cooperatives. Cooperatives usually limit their input to 3-4 times per year (or twice per cropping season on average) due to limited budgets for maintenance. The kinds of maintenance that are undertaken relate to canal dredging, grass cutting in the bank of canals, and oiling of pumping stations. Farmers also have an obligation to provide labor for maintenance work but the interviews’ result reveals that their contributions seem very small: 2-3 days per year. The budgets for the maintenance of irrigation pumps in almost all cooperatives are very limited. Most work is done by members of the irrigation teams in order to save money on the small budget of about 5-6 million VDD/year (or ≈250- 300 USD/year).
The total revenues of ACs are derived from 6-10 different services (e.g. irrigation, plant protection, agricultural extension, materials for agricultural production, land preparation, paddy seeds, veterinary, forestry, electricity provision, credit). Irrigation service delivery appears as a main activity of all ACs. Farmers pay on-farm fees to the ACs. The survey shows that fees vary widely depending on how difficult it is to provide
124 irrigation services. They vary from 2-5 kg/sao46/season at head-end to 5- 16 kg/sao/season at the tail-end of the irrigation system, but cannot be higher than 80,000 VND/ha according to the provincial regulation.
Moreover, some cooperatives have another financial source from irrigation service delivery. ACs that operate their own pumps to supply water to such cultivated areas that IME canals cannot reach, receive an extra payment from the IME. It means that the IME receives a water fees subsidy from the state budget for the whole area of which 60% will go to cooperatives in areas in need of pumping. In this case the ACs have access to two financial sources: on-farm fees and the payment from the IME. These payments are made by IME twice per cropping season (before and after each cropping season). Since the payment from the IME is between about 20 and 80 million VND for each cooperative, the main financial source for irrigation is still on-farm fees. The examples of eight cooperatives (Figure 4.8) show that on-farm fees account for about 80%-100% of the revenues for almost all of them.
100 80
60
40
20
0 Tien Trung Da Nghi An Hung Thuan Ta Huu Phuong Thi Ong Phong Don Nhon Hai Dong From on-farm fees Shared by IME
Figure 4.8. Proportions (%) between two financial sources in the studied cooperatives in Nam Thach Han (Source: Interviews with selected cooperatives in Quang Tri, 2011)
Nam Thach Han system is set up under a project funded by the Asian Development Bank47 during 2009-2010. Although one of the objectives is
46 sao is a unit to measure cultivated area at localities. 1 sao = 500 m2 in the central and the southeast regions
125 to establish water user organizations based on hydraulic boundaries, only one new water user cooperative and four water user associations (lien hiep hoi dung nuoc) had been established for this purpose, while the existing 47 cooperatives had been retained and strengthened. The four water user associations are those that were established in inter-commune canals N4C and N61 (in Trieu Son and Trieu Trung communes), canals N1 and A1 (in Trieu Dong and Trieu Tai communes), canals N1-8 (in Trieu Hoa and Trieu Long communes), and inter-village canals N4-B2 (in Trieu Trung commune). These water user associations have been designed to cooperate with the existing ACs in water delivery and maintenance of inter-commune secondary canals.
4.3.2 Tay Ninh irrigation system
The construction of the Dau Tieng reservoir was started in 1979, and completed in 1989. It is one of the three large-scale hydraulic systems that are under the direct management of MARD. With a capacity of 1,580 million m3, and an irrigation command area of 117,100 ha, the potential irrigated area is 135,893 ha. The Dau Tieng reservoir system (Figure 4.9) is a system which covers four provinces; Ho Chi Minh city, Binh Duong, Long An, and Tay Ninh. Headwork is located in the Sai Gon river. Three primary canals provide irrigation water and domestic water for two provinces; Ho Chi Minh city and Tay Ninh. The East Canal system provides water for the Go Dau and Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh province) and Cu Chi district (Ho Chi Minh city). The West Canal System supplies irrigation water for the Duong Minh Chau, Hoa Thanh and Chau Thanh districts, and Tay Ninh town (Tay Ninh). Tan Hung Canal System supplies irrigation water for the Tan Bien and Tan Chau districts (Tay Ninh). The designated irrigated area (58,788 ha) in Tay Ninh province is provided with water from these three primary canals. According to report of the Tay Ninh IDMC in 2011, the system supplied water for about 35,000 ha in the autumn and winter paddy, and about 50,000 ha in the spring paddy.
47 The central water resources project, 223 VIE (SF), on an Asian Development Bank loan, has been implemented during the period 2007-2011 to improve irrigation management system and upgrading irrigation infrastructure in six sub-projects belong to six provinces in the central region; Thanh Hoa, Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh
126 Figure 4.9. General layout: Dau Tieng reservoir and irrigation canals in Tay Ninh (Source: Adapted after an original map, VWRAP project) 127
There are several reasons that may explain the difference between the designed and actual irrigated area. These include a lack of about 80% of the on-farm canals that serve areas below 50 ha, earth canals, unreasonable water distribution, and a lack of facilities for proper operation and maintenance. The exploitation and management of the Dau Tieng reservoir system are shared between three IDMCs. The headwork and main canals of this system are under the management of the Dau Tieng IDMC (directly controlled by MARD). Two other IDMCs, Tay Ninh, and Cu Chi have managed the three above-mentioned primary canals48. The Tay Ninh IDMCs were established in 1998 and transformed to the Tay Ninh one- member limited liability company with 100% State ownership in 2008. The total staff of 220 persons in 2008 was reduced to 210 persons after this transformation. The organizational structure is displayed in Figure 4.10.
Dau Tieng IDMC
Tay Ninh IDMC Cu Chi IDMC
Members’ council Director board Controller (3 persons) (3 persons) (1 person)
Administration Technical Accountings Hydraulic work
Inter-district station 7 district irrigation Maintenance team Consultancy, design enterprises team
Chau Thanh IME Trang Bang IME
12 cooperatives+ 47 9 cooperatives+ 48 irrigation teams irrigation teams
Figure 4.10. The organizational structure of the Tay Ninh IDMC (Source: The interviews at the Tay Ninh IDMC)
48 The Tay Ninh IDMC and the Cu Chi IDMC come under the control of Tay Ninh and Ho Chi Minh provincial people’s committee, respecitively 128
The highest body in the organization of the Tay Ninh IDMC is the Members’ Council. The chairman of the Member’s Council holds another position as the General Director. Included are also the controller and two vice general directors. In addition there are four administrative and professional sections, one inter-district canals management station, a Design and Construction team, an Infrastructure Maintenance team, and seven irrigation management enterprises operated at district level (IMEs). The Chau Thanh IME and the Trang Bang IME are two out of seven district irrigation enterprises that come under the Tay Ninh IDMC. They are responsible for managing irrigation in the two districts, Chau Thanh and Trang Bang49. The Chau Thanh IME with 21 staff is responsible for irrigation service provision in 81 secondary canals and 150 tertiary canals. The irrigated area managed by this IME is 9,600 ha and covers eight communes (Thanh Dien, An Binh, Dong Khoi, Thai Binh, Tri Binh, An Co, Hao Duoc, and Tra Vong). This IME share the duties of water delivery and maintenance with 12 irrigation service cooperatives and 47 irrigation teams. The Trang Bang IME with 27 staff is responsible for an irrigated area of 3,950 ha in five communes: Loc Hung, Gia Loc, Gia Binh, An Hoa, and Trang Bang town. Water delivery and maintenance is shared between the Trang Bang IME with 9 new cooperatives and 48 irrigation teams50.
The Tay Ninh IDMC shares responsibilities for water delivery and system maintenance with 340 Irrigation Teams (ITs) that are involved in water delivery and maintenance from tertiary to on-farm canals. Each IT serves an average irrigation area of from 10 to 200 ha of irrigated area. An IT usually has only 1-2 persons operating without legal status and charter/operating regulations. The field survey reveals a fact that in many cases, members of ITs have been chosen by the CPCs and/or IMEs. These persons usually have administrative positions at commune or village levels. Under VWRAP project 21 irrigation cooperatives are established as the pilots in canals N17 (12 cooperatives) and N20 (9 cooperatives).
49 Two canals; TN17 in Chau Thanh district and N20 in Trang Bang district were two pilots of the Vietnam Water Resource Assistance Project (VWARP) (Cr.3880-VN). This project, financed by a World Bank’s loan to the government of Vietnam, has been implemented during the period 2004-2011 to improve irrigation management in six large-scale irrigation systems; Yen Lap, Cau Son, Ke Go, Phu Ninh, Da Ban, Dau Tieng 50 Nine cooperatives were established under the VWRAP project, 48 irrigation teams are the old form
129 Financial resources for the ITs and cooperatives come from the Tay Ninh IDMC. It is the only source available. Before 2008, 45-50% of revenue of the Tay Ninh IDMC was generated from water fee collection. Collected water fees were divided into four parts: 20% of the actual irrigation fee collected was set aside for the irrigation teams, 5% went to the Commune People’s Committees in the command area, 20% was paid to the Dau Tieng IDMC at the headwork, and the remaining 55% stayed in the Tay Ninh IDMC to be used for operation, management and maintenance.
Since 2008, onwards the remission of water fees has been applied to all IDMCs in the country. The Tay Ninh IDMC receives water fees subsidized from the state budget instead of through the collection of water fees from farmers. Of this amount, 20% is paid to the inter-province Dau Tieng IDMC as before. Farmers do not have to pay on-farm fees for local organizations at all under the provincial policy of Tay Ninh. Recently, Tay Ninh IDMC paid 8% of the total water fees they received from the State budget to the irrigation teams and newly established cooperatives. Another 1% has gone to the CPCs. This is the only financial source for the irrigation teams and the cooperatives in Tay Ninh. The amount paid by the IDMC is intended to ensure that cooperative/irrigation teams carry out four duties; water delivery, grass cutting, canal dredging, and signing contracts with water users. Payments to cooperatives/irrigation teams will be lowered if the IDMC is not satisfied with their performance.
In short, the two types of cooperative exhibit several differences. While agricultural cooperatives in the Nam Thach Han system (Quang Tri) provide a range of services, cooperatives in Tay Ninh give only an irrigation service. The cooperatives in Nam Thach Han generate their revenues from the irrigation service by collecting on-farm fees from farmers, by receiving an extra amount from the IME in case pumping is needed. Revenues of cooperatives in Tay Ninh are generated from the payment (8%) from Tay Ninh IDMC on the condition that cooperatives and irrigation teams perform well. It is not acceptable to collect on-farm fees in Tay Ninh according to the regulation of the provincial authority.
130
CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE IRRIGATION SECTOR
This chapter continues to discuss the institutional arrangements for decentralization from the background of irrigation management mechanisms described in last chapter. The discussion will now focus on how institutional arrangements for the decentralization of irrigation management have been shaped as an integral part of the overall reform process in Vietnam that began in the 1980s. In the first section, I give a snapshot of the changes in Vietnam during the renovation process (Doi moi). I do not intend to assess the entire reform process implemented in the country over a period of more than twenty years or its achievements and constraints. Through reviewing some key institutional reforms (first column in the table below) that have a prime focus on decentralization, I shall analyze how these key reforms have laid the ground for decentralization policies in the irrigation sector (second column). The links between them are summarized as follows:
Institutional reforms and Institutional reforms in the decentralization under doi irrigation sector moi Administrative decentralization State management decentralization of irrigation systems Fiscal decentralization Irrigation financing Democratization Irrigation service decentralization: PIM/IMT Renovation of state-owned Renovations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs)
131 The discussion in the Sections from 5.2 to 5.5 also highlights the policy implications in the current irrigation reforms as well as gaps and inconsistencies in the legal documents. The chapter’s outcome thereby provides the necessary background for the analysis in the next Chapters 6- 8 concerning how the institutional arrangements have an effect on power relations, and the performance and incentives of actors involved in decentralization.
5.1 Vietnam’s transition in Doi Moi process
Vietnam’s emergence as one of the fastest growing economies in Asia over the last two decades traces its origin to a series of reforms, known as Doi moi (renovation), initiated at the Sixth Party Congress of the Communist Party in 1986. The country’s economy has been transformed from traditional central planning to a socialist-oriented market economy. Following the trend of neoliberalism spreading widely in many developing countries in the early 1990s, the political and economic reforms in Vietnam were in line with the initiatives towards structural adjustments imposed by the powerful international money lending institutions, notably the IMF, WB, and ADB, in connection with the conditions in financial and monetary management. By 1995, Vietnam held a Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) from the World Bank and an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from the IMF (Hakkala et al., 2001; Hayton, 2010).
The period of the early 1990s also saw a flow of ODA programs, and of external assistance financed by the international multilateral financial institutions and donors supporting the development of different sectors (including the water sector). The establishment of international relations has created opportunities for Vietnam’s economy development in the form of regional and global economic integration (Hakkala et al., 2001). After the US decision to abolish its embargo in 1994, Vietnam joined the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1995, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). With its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) a further step could be taken in 2007, from regional to global cooperation. The integration process
132 into the global economy presents both opportunities and challenges but Vietnam’s prospects for short-term output growth remain generally positive in light of recent strong growth in private investment and further improvements in the business-enabling environment (WB, 2006).
In line with the neo-liberal reform policies imposed by the WB, IMF and many donors on a worldwide scale during the 1990s (mentioned in Chapter 2), several key reforms at the earlier stage of doi moi, such as abolishing subsidies, economic liberalization, inflation stabilization, and liberalization of foreign trade and investment immediately generated positive consequences for Vietnam’s economy in the first few years of transition (1990-1995): the average growth in annual gross domestic product (GDP) was about 8 percent per year. The budget deficit came under control. Reduced inflation contributed significantly to the stabilization of the economy (from 60% in 1990 to below 13% in 1995). International trade and direct foreign investment in Vietnam increased significantly (Hakkala et al., 2001:2). The economy grew steadily with a GDP growth of about 7% during the period 2006-2010. The GDP rate in the last two years slowed down to below 6%, partly affected by the world economic crisis51. In fact, the political and economic reforms have transformed Vietnam from the poor country (income per capita was 220 USD in 1994) to a lower middle-income country in 2009 (income per capita was 1,160 USD by the end of 2010) (VN VWP, 2011). Most indicators of welfare have improved. Vietnam has attained several targets in the Millennium Development Goals52.
Parallel to the achievements in economic development, poverty rates have decreased significantly, from 58% in 1993, to 19.5% in 2004, and to 12% in 2009 (Pham A.T., 2009). One of the targets in the Socio-Economic Development Strategy for the period of 2011-2015 is to decrease poverty
51 The GDP rate was 5.8% in 2011 and is expected to be about 5% in 2012 (country profile, WB website) 52 Viet Nam has made the impressive progress on several goals on (1) poverty reduction, (2) universal primary education, (3) gender equality relate to the increased labor force participation rate for women and increased girls’ participation in education at primary and secondary levels, (4) reduced under-five mortality and infant mortality rates, (5) declined maternal mortality, (6) improvements in the legal and policy framework related to HIV, (7) environmental sustainability, (8) developing global partnerships (source: http://www.undp.org.vn/mdgs/viet-nam-and-the-mdgs/)
133 rates to below 10% and to improve equity between rural-urban populations, ethnic minorities and other risk groups. The significant achievements in poverty reduction in Vietnam are evaluated as “one of the greatest success stories in economic development” (ADB et al., 2004). The remarkable efforts of government and its administrations to reach all communities with the implementation of the poverty reduction policy should also be highlighted (WB, 2006).
As a consequence of the reforms, the agriculture sector has undergone significant changes. Major changes began in 1981 when the Directive 10053 (Khoan 100) was issued. This policy was considered as a starting point for democratization in the economy because it created the changes in relations between farmer households and agricultural cooperatives in terms of ownership, management, and distribution. Instead of controlling all cultivated land as before, agricultural cooperatives now assigned land to the groups of farmers and individual farmers with the hope that farmers would become responsible for crop cultivation. Cultivation outputs still came under cooperatives’ control. At the end of the crop season, farmers were given income in kind based on the outputs that had been produced and in proportion to the labor the farmers contributed. This policy created a positive increase in agricultural production (6.3%) during the period 1981-1985 (Marsh et al., 2006). However, it was effective for just a few years. Unchanged attitudes among both cooperatives and farmers were the main constraint affecting the policy implementation. Agricultural cooperatives still kept the central planning attitudes. Many farmers did not trust the cooperatives, and, therefore, did not work at full capacity (Fontenelle, 1999).
The major reforms - decollectivization - in the agricultural sector came in 1988 when the Directive 1054 (Khoan 10) was issued. It took reforms in the agricultural sector a further step forward. Land was now redistributed from the collective cooperatives to farmer households through long-term leases. For the first time since the 30-year collectivization period, the farm households were now recognized as autonomous economic units in
53 Directive 100-CT/TW in 1981 on contracting agricultural products to the groups of farmers and individual farmers in agricultural cooperatives 54 Directive 10 dated 5/4/1988
134 agricultural production. Farmers were assigned agricultural lands on 10-15 year-term leases. All other production inputs, like buffaloes, cattle, and farming tools, were considered to be privately owned. Farmers became free to choose what crops to plant, where to buy inputs for cultivation and to sell their farm products in the open markets.
In addition, the stepwise land policy reforms, begun in 1981 and followed by the enforcement of Land Law of 1993, amended in 2001, have provided important legislation that contributes significantly to an increase in overall agricultural productivity. Social economic units, households, and individuals benefitted from long-term land-use rights that allowed for planning of agricultural production, forestry and aquaculture in a more decentralized way. Five types of land-use rights have been issued under the land law—the right to transfer, exchange, lease, inherit and mortgage land. In addition, it can be used as collateral for bank loans and joint ventures. Land-use rights now last 20 years for land used for annual crops and aquaculture, and 50 years for land used for perennial crops (FAO & MARD, 2001). The total agricultural output increased 6.7% annually during 1994- 1999 and about 4.6% during 2000-2003 (MARD, 2000; Marsh et al., 2006). The land-use rights and the market-oriented reforms were the driving forces for accelerating agricultural production in Vietnam (Barker et al., 2004; WB, 2011).
This is how Vietnam has moved from a highly closed and centralized system, to regional and global integration, with decentralization as one technique to develop a market-oriented economy and reduce poverty. The national reforms imposed by donors in the early 1990s focused on a market economy, privatization, and structure reforms by launching decentralization goals. The significant achievements of Vietnam in economic development over the last 25 years suggest that the approach during the 1990s and onwards has been successful in the sense that many development targets have been met. However, decentralization with the “incrementalist” approach in Vietnam has been limited since focus has been more on administrative and fiscal reforms rather than political reforms, and central actors still play the dominant roles (WB, 2004: 7).
135 The Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) for the period 2011- 2020 shows that the future implications for the continuous reforms in Vietnam still give attention to decentralization via structural reforms with foci on the development of human resources, markets, and infrastructure to address development, equity and sustainability. The institutional reforms and decentralization have been applied not only for public services such as education and health, but also for natural resources management such as forestry, domestic water supply, and irrigation. The following sections present the key institutional reforms of the country and the institutional arrangements for decentralization of irrigation.
5.2 Public administrative reforms and decentralization in irrigation
The Public Administrative Reform (PAR) was officially announced in 1996, while the reforms to simplify the organizational hierarchy had already been introduced during the period 1986-1995. There were two waves of organizational restructuring during two periods (1996-2000 and 2001- 2010). The main focus of PAR during the first period was on the structure readjustment of the administrations, including the government and its agencies, ministries, and ministerial-level agencies. With that followed a task to improve the procedures for formulation and issuance of legal normative documents.
The decentralization policy was subsequently further elaborated by focusing on the development of central-province relationships and the transfer of a number of public service delivery tasks (training and education, health care, sports etc.) from government administrative agencies to social organizations, NGOs, or the private sector55. It also refers to the responsibility of state and non-state actors in society to participate in and contribute to the delivery of public services under the state’s guidelines. This is known as the process of socialization (xa hoi hoa) of public services, aimed at improving the efficiency of the public services’ delivery and reducing the state’s financial budget.
55 The Resolution of the 8th Plenum, the Resolution of Party Congress VIII (1996)
136 The second PAR program for the period 2001-201056 has confirmed the Vietnamese government’s efforts to reinforce the public sector reforms. The key issues that have been shaped in the four reform areas are (i) institutional reform, (ii) reform of organizational structure of public administration, (iii) civil service reform, and (iv) public financial reform57. The institutional reform has to date focused on two things: reforming the process for developing and issuing normative legal documents58, and reforming administrative procedures so that they become simple, transparent, and convenient for the citizen. Public financial reform provides authority for the ministries, provincial departments, committees and sectors to make decisions on budgetary allocations for their subordinate bodies. The State Budget Law (1996, revised 2002) has provided an overall comprehensive and integrated legal framework for decentralizing financial and budgetary management. People’s Committees at sub-national levels have become more autonomous in the managing of revenues and expenditures (Acuña-Alfaro, 2009).
The prime task in organizational reform in the PAR program during the period 2005-2010 is to decentralize state management. This is designed to go hand-in-hand with public fiscal decentralization and reforms in organizational and personnel management. The aim is to increase the power, responsibility and accountability of sub-national level governments59. State management decentralization does not concern only the transfer of authorities and responsibilities in public service delivery from central to sub-national governments and non-state entities (vertical), but also among the different sub-national levels (horizontal). It is different from the PAR policy in the previous period that focused only on central and provincial relations. A significant degree of autonomy has been delegated to sub-national administrations within specific key areas: local planning and investment, local budget allocation and management, natural resource management, management of state-owned enterprises, management and
56 Attachment to the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 136/2001/QD/TTg on 17-9-2001 57 Decision 94 (2006) 58 There are 5 components in institutional reforms: to reform the system making legislative agendas, improve procedures for drafting and promulgating legal normative documents at central level, improve procedures for making legal normative documents of local governments, strengthen capacity of involved agencies, build a mechanism to ensure democracy in the process (ADB, 2005:29) 59 The Socio-Economic Development Plan for the period 2006-2010
137 delivery of public services, and personnel management of public officers and civil servants. People’s Committees of centrally affiliated cities and provinces (PPCs) have discretionary power to decide on the degree of decentralization and organize the implementation of decentralization at district and commune levels60.
Regarding state management of irrigation systems, both sub-national level administrations and the provincial specialized agencies have mandates in state management relating to (i) construction, exploitation, management and protection of medium and small-scale hydraulic works, and (ii) management of state-owned IDMCs and irrigation services. “State management” refers to the formulation and issuing of policies, plans, guidelines, and norms/standards. It also includes provision of guidance and supervision in the implementation. Planning and investment in the irrigation sector has been part of the socio-economic development plans that have been developed at each administrative level. The PPCs have been given the authority to select state-funded investment projects such as investment and rehabilitation of medium- and small-scale irrigation systems in accordance with the legal document in 200361.
This decentralized authority is further confirmed in the Law on Investment in 2006. The PPCs can decide on the allocation and management of the resources from the state budget (i.e. cost norms, criteria for how budget- funded expenses are allocated), water charges (fees, prices), and local contributions for rural infrastructure. Regarding organizational and personnel management, the PPCs have been delegated to set up, merge, dissolve, and decide on specific tasks and the power of the provincial specialized agencies and all state-owned enterprises within their administrative boundary. It includes recruitment, appointments, evaluations, grades of salary and allowances for civil servants and public officers which should be in line with the legal documents62.
60 Resolution 08/2004/NQCP (2004) 61 Decree 07/2003/ND-CP dated 30/01/2003 62 Law on the Organization of the People’s Councils and People’s Committees of 1994 and Ordinance on the Tasks and Authority of People’s Councils and People’s Committees
138 Structural readjustments have been continued through reforming structures further and redefining tasks in order to avoid overlapping among administrations and state agencies at all levels. The important targets are to separate state owned enterprises (SOEs) from the state- management agencies, and sort out public service delivery units from state- management agencies. In the irrigation sector, the renovation of IDMCs brings a new role for PPCs as the capital owner of IDMCs, aiming for separation of the tasks of state management conducted by DARDs from services management carried out by IDMCs63. The functions of the ministries and government agencies have been shifted from the provision of public services to policy making. As a result, the number of ministries has been reduced significantly from 33-37 ministries during the period 1976-1992 to 22 ministries in 2007 (Koh et al., 2009). The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is a product of structural adjustment in that three former ministries—the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries, and the Ministry of Forestry—were merged to form the MARD in 1995. The Ministry of Fisheries was added in 2008. The major changes brought about redefinition of mandates and authorities of the new MARD and its departments.
5.3 Democracy, participation and decentralization of irrigation services
As mentioned previously, the intention of decentralization under the public administration reforms is to transfer a number of public service delivery tasks from state bureaucratic agencies to the private sector, society organizations, or local communities. Decentralization of irrigation service delivery has been implemented with the main focus on facilitating the participatory process and empowering local organizations in the operation, maintenance, and delivery of irrigation services at the on-farm level. The main aim is to improve irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity through a democratic participatory process.
63 IDMCs: state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies. DARDs: the provincial agricultural and rural developments
139 The concepts Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) have appeared gradually in policy documents after the first initiative by MARD to promote PIM/IMT in 1997was presented at the first national workshop on PIM with support from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the international PIM network. However, bringing this initiative into policy formation and implementation took about seven years: MARD issued the Framework Strategy and Road Map on the development of PIM and the Guidelines on the Establishment, Strengthening and Development of water users’ organizations (WUOs)64 in 2004.
In reality, PIM/IMT has been implemented as a component of investment and rehabilitation projects that have been financed by international NGOs, and by international lending institutions such as the WB and ADB. Many of these projects have been conducted at pilot level and with limited possibilities for expansion. In fact, the achievements are still far off the expected targets in the Framework Strategy and Road Map on the development of Participatory Irrigation Management (Nguyen X.T., 2007).
The trend is to upgrade the significance of decentralization of irrigation PIM/IMT in line with the political reforms relating to Grassroots Democratization65. The intentions with the reforms are to promote the participation and creativeness of people at commune and village levels in planning, management and monitoring local public projects (Anderson et al., 2009). In an extension of Decision 29, Decree 79 has actually defined legal rights for people at commune and village levels to become involved in four major ways: the people need to be informed of the issues; the people need to discuss the issues; the people need to be able to comment on the issues but the decisions will be made by the commune administration; and the people will monitor and inspect the issues (see summary in Table 5.1).
64 The Framework Strategy and Road Map on the development of Participatory Irrigation Management and Circular 75/2004/TT-BNN issued in 2004 65 Decision 29 in 1998 on the democratization of communes, and Decree 79 in 2003 on the exercise of democracy in communes
140 Table 5.1. Grassroots Democratization in Vietnam
The state's policies and laws directly related to the rights and interests of the commune people The communes' long-term and annual socio-economic development plans (SEDPs), the land use planning and plans The commune annual budgets Estimated and settled revenues and expenditures, local contributions The issues that the The results of selection, priority and implementation people need to be The preliminary and final reviews of activities of the commune informed of Who: The commune administrations (CPC) coordinate with the Vietnam Fatherland Front Committees and Vietnam Fatherland Front's member organizations at commune (VFF), heads of village How: Public posting of written documents, using radio systems, organizing meetings, sending documents to households or heads of village Undertakings on, and levels of, contributions for the construction of infrastructure The implementation of resolutions of the commune People's Councils, The issues that decisions of the CPCs need to be The establishment of boards for supervision of construction works discussed and built with people's contributions decided directly by Who: CPC coordinate with VFF in collecting and mobilizing local the people contributions How: CPC formulate plans and programs; coordinate with VFF in directing and organizing the discussion, and making decisions (through the meetings, using poll cards to get opinions with the requirement that at least 50% of participants/voters in the meetings agree); in implementing affairs decided by the people; in collecting and mobilizing people’s contributions
The issues that Draft resolutions of the commune People's Councils need to be Draft planning, SEDPs and land use plan discussed and How: CPC draft documents and plans and coordinate with the VFF in commented by the organizing the collection of public opinions (meetings, cards for people, decided by comments, box for public comments) CPCs Activities of CPCs, local organizations in the communes The implementation of resolutions, decisions, and directives of CPCs Performance of the leaders and the civil servants The settlement of local citizens' complaints and denunciations Estimated and final commune budgets The construction and results of pre-acceptance tests, and final The issues will be settlement of projects monitored and The collection and spending of various funds/fees according to the inspected by the state regulations people Who: People do it by themselves or via representative organizations and people’s inspection boards How: attending the meetings, contributing opinions, evaluating the reports at the year-end final review meetings
(Source: Decree 79/2003/ND-CP promulgating the regulation on the exercise of democracy in communes)
141 From information in Table 5.1, the current study reads so: the key message from Grassroots Democratization policies is that local people have the right to be informed about those of the state’s policies and communes’ regulations that are directly in their interests, such as socio-economic development plans, commune budgetary arrangements, information about local programs/projects relating to estimated cost, local contribution, implementation results, and reviews of the CPC’s activities. Local people also have the right to comment on the drafts of commune regulations and the development plans, and to discuss measures for the implementation of resolutions/decisions made by the commune administrations. In spite of this policy, however, decisions are invariably taken by the commune administration without regular consultations.
With regard to activities such as construction, implementation, utilization and management of local infrastructure projects/programs, the stipulation is that local people should be informed about the selection criteria, how priorities are ranked, how revenues and expenditures are established, what local contributions are, and how the implementation is organized. Local people are informed about what commune administrations plan to do, but they are not directly involved in the decision-making process. It can be understood that local people cannot voice what they think or cannot discuss and/or comment and decide on project design, budgeting, operation, management, and maintenance. Regarding monitoring and evaluation, decisions are taken through the inspection boards for construction works so that people’s views are confined to such situations as when the infrastructure is built with people’s contributions. Grassroots Democratization policies, however, do not mention the rights of the people to monitor and inspect the project design, implementation and financial accounting.
There were efforts made in the early policies to increase the participation of local communities in irrigation management. For instance, all farmers were encouraged to contribute labor and materials in order to accelerate the construction of hydraulic works during 1950s-1960s66. The policy in
66 Decision 68 (1949)
142 196367 and the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965) suggested that the management of construction and maintenance of irrigation systems should be combined. Farmers were to manage small-scale irrigation systems while the state-owned enterprises would continue to manage large- and medium- scale systems. In fact, water management in large- and medium-scale irrigation systems was under centralized control with very limited participation of farmers, especially during the collectivization period (Fontenelle, 1999). Water investment and management was controlled by the state under the central planning economy. The Irrigation Management Boards (Ban quan tri nong giang) under provincial or district administrations were established in 1963 for the control and management of large- and medium-scale irrigation systems68. For inter-provincial irrigation systems, the Irrigation Management Councils (Hoi dong quan tri nong giang) were established alongside the Irrigation Management Boards. These boards were transformed into the provincial and district irrigation management enterprises for all inter-district and inter-commune irrigation systems, respectively, in 197069. Heavy infrastructure investment also brought strong interventions by the state and irrigation management companies at provincial and district levels (Fontenelle, 1999).
Collectivization was the major obstacle hindering the participation of farmers in agricultural production. The discussion of agricultural cooperatives in Chapter 4 shows that decisions concerning agricultural production were still taken by cooperatives through traditional central planning. For instance, the resources for agricultural activities by farmer households (e.g. seeds, cultivation plans, irrigation schedules) were under the control of agricultural cooperatives and district agricultural sections. With the reform process followed the legal framework and platform for the transfer of responsibilities for land and forest management to farming households. Water resource management, however, remained centralized and was maintained by state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs), and the communes or agricultural cooperatives. Hence, the decentralization of irrigation management at local levels lagged behind.
67 Decision 141-CP dated 26/09/1963 and Circular 31 dated 08/10/1963 68 Decree 141-CP dated 26/9/1963 69 Circular 13-TL dated 6/8/1970
143 After the water fees policy was enforced in 198470, the centralized style of government was slightly decreased as some management functions relating to flood control and medium- and small-scale irrigation systems were delegated to the provincial and district levels. Reforms during the 1990s had some effects on the decentralization of irrigation systems. Structural readjustments in public administration were the driving force for the restructuring of IDMCs. Irrigation systems with an irrigated area of less than 150 ha could be transferred to local communities or local authorities (Tran et al, 2005). In fact, IDMCs still played dominant roles in the management of hydraulic works, while agricultural cooperatives or commune authorities had little room for maneuver at the on-farm level (Cuddihy, 1994; Fontenelle, 1999). The centralized irrigation management style became hard to manage in a fully rational manner. This was a serious problem that had its roots in the centrally controlled budget allocation, based on approved annual plans and usually distributed on the basis of equal shares. It gave rise to dispersed investment in many irrigation infrastructure projects, which has left many of them incomplete (Nguyen X.T., 2002). The subsidy created passive attitudes as well as begging – giving mechanisms between the state management agencies and the IDMCs, which resulted in heavy intervention by line ministry agencies (Doan T.L., 2004).
Centralization remained unchallenged prior to 2001. The Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation Systems in 1994, only mentions the participation of and contributions by water users, organizations, and individuals in the protection and development of hydraulic works. By 2001, the revised Ordinance allowed local organizations, individuals and state enterprises to become involved in the management, exploitation and protection of state-invested hydraulic works in accordance with the scales, types of hydraulic works and actual conditions at the localities. However, this legal document requires local organizations and individuals to register as private enterprises that specialize in the exploitation and protection of hydraulic works and employ irrigation workers with technical competence. Such conditions became obstacles for both local organizations and individuals who were willing to be involved in the expectation and
70 The Directive 112/HDBT dated 25/8/1984
144 management of irrigation systems. The overall effect was that the anticipated initiatives did not materialize.
In consequence, the conditions have been revised in the newer policy issued in 201171. However, the same constraints remain for local organizations that wish to join with regard to limited capacity and legal status. According to the 2011 legal document, the individuals or local organizations are not directly qualified to register as enterprises. Instead, their organizations should be established as legal entities and approved by the district or commune authorities (DPCs or CPCs). They then have the right to be involved in the O&M of irrigation systems if they have the ability, and certified relevant capacity and experience in the management, exploitation and protection of irrigation systems. The local organizations in Quang Tri share their opinions that this policy appears to open a gate for them to participate but actually none of them can meet such conditions. In their province, only the Quang Tri IDMC is able to meet all the conditions.
The guideline by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) on the establishment and strengthening of water users’ cooperative organizations (to chuc hop tac dung nuoc) issued in 200472 and the guideline of Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) in 2007 on the activities of collective groups (to chuc hop tac)73 have provided a platform to establish and strengthen various types of local organizations such as cooperative groups. The legal conditions for the establishment of cooperative groups are quite simple. A group of more than three individuals, who are willing to join voluntarily to form a cooperative contract where they contribute assets and labor to conduct specific actions, operate on the principle of self-finance, and share profits and responsibilities, are qualified to form a cooperative group. These organizations have the right to open bank accounts, sign civil contracts, and participate in or implement socio-economic development and poverty reduction programs in the localities. They can also receive support from local authorities in establishing their group with respect to accessing information, consultation, training and skills etc.
71 Circular 40/2011/TT-BNNPTNT dated 27/05/2011 72 Circular 75/2004/TT-BNN issued in 2004 73 Decree 151/2007/ND-CP dated 10/10/2007
145 Flexibility in the establishment of the local irrigation management organizations sounds good for diversified forms of local organizations, but it is not easy for irrigation organizations to join due to the requirements to have legal status and qualifications as indicated above. Self-governing local groups in the mountainous areas especially have been inhibited by this constraint. In addition, these organizations have their own difficulties including limited capacities and resources, a lack of initiatives, and competition (to be discussed in Chapter 8). The main obstacles for local organizations in decentralization are legitimacy and limited capacity (Tropp, 2007; Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007).
The MARD regulation, Circular 65 published in 200974, has gone one step further in giving guidance for the implementation of decentralized irrigation management by suggesting the size of appropriate irrigated areas, and the types and scales of irrigation systems that can be transferred to local organizations or individuals in each region of the country. Following this, the management of irrigated areas of ≤ 50 ha in mountainous areas, ≤ 250 ha in the Red River delta, ≤ 400 ha in Mekong river delta and ≤ 200 ha in other regions can be transferred to local organizations. However, the GoV’s Circular has been in force for two years and as yet (2011) no provinces have issued regulations on decentralized irrigation management applicable for provincial conditions.
Reviewing the policies shows that the state’s intentions are to improve public participation, democracy, and empowerment of stakeholders in irrigation management. However, these policies seem to open for participation and democracy at a limited extent. The room for maneuver is still very limited. The roots of this problem lie in the centralized bureaucracy that actually existed in the administration system and in irrigation management for a long time (called “path dependency” (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; Sehring, 2009). The overall situation of Vietnam’s irrigation development and management described in Chapter 4 reveals the fact that the country has evolved in line with how a hydraulic society would be expected to perform. The state has played a strong role in investment in the irrigation infrastructure since the 1950s. Water management in large- and
74 Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT dated 12/10/2009
146 medium-scale irrigation systems has been under centralized control by state-owned irrigation companies, authorities and irrigation agencies, with very limited participation of farmers. This pattern is similar to Wittfogel’s (1957) claims; centralized irrigation management emerges readily during the development of the hydraulic society.
5.4 Financing irrigation
In line with the decentralization process to transfer authority and tasks in irrigation management to sub-national level governments and line ministry agencies, the state’s direction of the socialization of the irrigation service makes reference to the involvement of and financial contribution from non- state actors. The term socialization in irrigation management appeared in policies associated with the participation and contribution of farmers and local organizations to investment, exploitation, management, and protection of irrigation systems. The principle is “the state and people do together” in the investment and management of hydraulic works. There is still no standard form for implementing the socialization of irrigation services at provincial and project levels due to lack of a detailed guideline.
Usually, the state contributes 60-80% of total capital for the construction of headwork, main canals, and big canals. Local people provide the remainder through contributing labor and local materials to complete tertiary canals and on-farm canal networks (Nguyen X.T., 2007). To do so, local organizations can apply for partial finance for lining on-farm canal networks from the provincial budgets that are distributed by the district administration. For example, the cooperatives in Quang Tri province (Trieu Phong and Hai Lang district) and Tay Ninh province (Chau Thanh district) may apply to the DPCs for 60% of their needs from a financial fund for on- farm canal lining if they can prove that they can contribute the remaining 40% of a total budget.
However, these opportunities do not seem to be as positive for local organizations as it may seem. The budget allocation for the PPCs does not usually meet the real requirements in system maintenance and canal lining. This budget is usually spread out over many communes, so the amount
147 received is usually only enough to finance a small workload. The survey in the selected cooperatives in Quang Tri reveals that the budgets to which the cooperatives have access are about 100-200 million VND (≈ 5,000– 10,000 USD) and are available only once every six or seven years: this is only enough for lining of 200-300 meters of on-farm canals. In addition, it is hard for cooperatives to access these budgets for several reasons. It is important to have an informal good relationship with the local authorities in order to access the proper information and instructions for the applications. Cooperatives also have difficulties in raising the proportion of the total cost (40%) that is required from local authorities. The idea behind IMT/PIM, to shift financial responsibility in irrigation management from the state to water users (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007), seems to bring about increased burdens for farmers and local organizations.
Expenses for the operation and maintenance of irrigation systems have been mobilized from two sources. Those relating to the operation of IDMCs and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation infrastructure managed by IDMCs have been covered by water fees that have been stipulated by the government and PPCs. Expenses relating to O&M at on-farm level are obtained from farmers through on-farm fees that are defined based on negotiations between farmers and local organizations but not allowed to exceed a ceiling regulated by PPCs. In the past, water fees were collected from farmers in accordance with the water fees policies in 1962, 1984, and 200375. Farmers paid two types of fees for using irrigation services: water fees to IDMCs, and on-farm fees to local organizations. The local organizations signed contracts with IDMCs to deliver water and conduct maintenance of on-farm canals, collect water fees, and receive a commission of generally 3-5% from IDMCs after the harvesting seasons76.
Water fees for irrigated agriculture and salt production were, however, abolished in 2008. The IDMCs’ expenses for maintenance, operation and management of irrigation systems are now subsidized by the state budget
75 Decree 66-CP (05/06/1962), Decree 112/HDBT (25/8/1984), Decree 143/2003/ND-CP (28/11/2003) 76 Many local organizations usually had some extra income from irrigated areas that not included in the contracts with IME (i.e. they collected water fees from farmers in this area but did not pay IDMCs)
148 but farmers still have to pay on-farm fees to local organizations. The differences in the implementation of water fees policies in the past and at present are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
contract
Figure 5.1. The implementation of water fees policies in the past and at present (Source: Created for this research)
The policy of exemption of water fees has been changed three times during the short period 2008-2012. Decree 15477 in 2008 applied only to state- invested irrigation systems; irrigation systems invested in by other financial sources or self-financed by farmers were excluded. However, one year after implementation and after a lot of debate and criticism for unfair treatment from the state, Decree 154 was replaced by Decree 11578, which came in to force in January 2009. According to this policy, all irrigation systems are exempt from the payment of water fees, regardless of whether they were invested in by state or non-state entities. The latest one, Decree 6779, that comes in to force from January 2013, has adjusted the rates of water fees one more time.
Once concern is how water fees are determined. The rates have been applied in accordance with irrigation methods (gravity, pumping or combined gravity and pumping), cropping seasons, types of crop, and region. Each PPC then decides the appropriate rates within the ranges
77 Decree 154/2007/ND-CP (15/10/2007) 78 Decree 115/2008/ND-CP (14/11/2008) 79 Decree 67/2012/ND-CP (10/09/2012)
149 regulated by the government. The rates of water fees in Decree 115 (2008) and Decree (2012) are more than twice and thrice, respectively, as high as those established in Decree 143 (2003)80. An example of the rates of water fees applied in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh provinces under these three policies is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2. Water fees regulated in three different policies in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh provinces (Unit: thousand VND/ha/season)
In Quang Tri In Tay Ninh Decree 143 Decree Decree Decree 143 Decree Decree Irrigation methods (2003) 115 67 (2003) 115 67 (2008) (2012) (2008) (2012) Irrigation/drainage Rice S: 400 939 1,433 Rice S: 420 886 1,329 by pumping for Rice A: 430 Rice A: 390 paddy rice, Rice W: 390 Rice W: 340 Irrigation/drainage Rice S: 370 824 1,003 Rice S: 390 801 930 by gravity for Rice A: 400 Rice A: 360 paddy rice Rice W: 300 Rice W: 290 Irrigation/drainage Rice S: 385 866 1,218 Rice S: 405 839 1,130 combining gravity Rice A: 415 Rice A: 375 and pumping Rice W: 325 Rice W: 310 Irrigation for 30% - 50% 40% 40% 30% - 50% 40% 40% vegetables, of rates industrial plants applied for paddy rice Note: S: Spring paddy, A: Autumn paddy, W: Winter paddy (Source: Interviews at the Tay Ninh and Quang Tri IDMCs)
A problem has emerged: the applied rates of water fees are different in different provinces, resulting in big differences in the IDMCs’ budgets (see more in Chapter 7). Circular 65 of 200981 provides wide ranges in the scope for how big an irrigated area can be transferred to local organizations and how water fees are calculated for irrigated areas managed by IDMCs, notably what they will receive from the state’s subsidy. Many PPCs in reality select the lowest levels possible in order to allow for the increase in
80 Under Decree 143, many provinces (most of them are poor provinces) have decided to apply the lowest rates. Collected water fees can only cover partial expenses for depreciation, maintenance, labor cost and management, and materials (about 50-60%). These constraints have led to a chronic situation where O&M expenses have been inadequate and maintenance poor (Ipsard, 2008; VAWR, 2009; Nguyen X.T., 2011) 81 Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT (2009)
150 irrigated areas to be managed by IDMCs later. This has become a way to maximize water fees financing from the state budget. The maneuver seems to offer a win-win situation for the province and the IDMCs concerned. The IDMCs receive more subsidies from the State, and the PPC does not have to allocate the provincial budget for maintenance of the irrigation systems. For example, an irrigated area of ≤ 50 ha is funded in both Tay Ninh and Quang Tri while that for an area of ≤ 200 ha is guided by the regulations. Although Circular 65 provides a more concrete guideline for the implementation of decentralized irrigation management, this regulation and the remission of water fees have automatically created a new kind of situation: IDMCs can act with the intention to extend their control of irrigation systems downwards to local levels by maximizing the irrigated area served by them as a means of increasing their income. This point will be taken up again in Chapter 8 when incentives for IDMCs in decentralization are discussed.
5.5 Renovation of state-owned irrigation management enterprises
5.5.1 The equitization process
Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam began in the early 1990s in line with economic reforms and structural adjustments in the country. The intention has been to build a platform for SOEs where they can exercise their authority in an environment shaped by other types of enterprises in the private sector. The organizational restructuring and the reforms in management mechanisms of SOEs have created good conditions for these enterprises to become autonomous in their business and production. It is then their responsibility to improve the efficiency in planning, finance, and organizational and personnel management in response to market mechanisms as the state’s subsidies are eliminated (Mekong Economic, 2002).
The restructuring of SOEs has been conducted through different forms. The SOEs involved in key industries under the state’s control have been merged and strengthened. Many of the SOEs have been transformed into new
151 bodies with different forms for state ownership. Many SOEs have also been privatized when the state has withdrawn its ownership. A prime effect of this reform process is the large reduction in the number of SOEs during a short period; the number has decreased from more than 12,000 SOEs in 1991 when the reform process started, to about 6,000 SOEs in 1996, and 5,500 SOEs in 2000 (Hakkala & Kokko, 2007). A series of institutional reforms in the organizational structure have been implemented: the Law on SOEs in 1995 (revised in 2003), the Law on Enterprise in 2000 (revised in 2005), and the policies for accelerating SOEs reform82, and for improving financial management of SOEs83.
Equitization (co phan hoa) of SOEs has been one activity that has been conducted through issuing shares to mobilize capital, selling part or whole values of enterprises (Mekong Economic, 2002). This process has been implemented since 1992 when the first pilots were conducted. Its intention is to create a new type of enterprise where ownership and capital are shared between state, enterprise, and non-state entities, such as employees and outsider investors. In spite of the fact that the government has made efforts through policies and a legal framework aiming to create a platform for the operation of SOEs and accelerating the reform of SOEs, the process of equitization has been implemented at a slow pace, at least initially. Only five SOEs became equitized during 1992-1995 (ibid.). The small number was due to several constraints, such as lack of capital, complicated procedures for equitization, and the unwillingness of SOEs’ managers to follow the initiative (WB, 2006; Hakkala & Kokko, 2007). A series of policies has been issued to simplify the procedure for equitization and encourage SOEs to transform into new forms (e.g. joint-stock companies, one-member liability companies with state ownership)84 and follow the new financial management mechanisms85.
A new category of public-utility state enterprises (doanh nghiep nha nuoc hoat dong cong ich) was defined in 199686. According to this regulation,
82 Decree 28-CP (1996) 83 Decree 59/CP (1996), revised Decree 27 (1999) 84 Decree 28/CP (1996), Decree 44/1998/ND-CP (1998), Decree 64/2002/ND-CP (2002) 85 Decree 63 (2001), Decree 95/2006/ND-CP (8/9/2006), Decree 25/2010/ND-CP (26/4/2010), Decree 117/2010/TT-BTC (5/8/2010) 86 Decree 56/CP (02/10/1996)
152 public-utility enterprises should be SOEs that produce and provide public goods and services related to state-monopoly domains. They may also be associated with socio-economic development in rural and mountainous areas, national defense, and security purposes. The operations of these enterprises have followed the plans/orders and policies of the state within the price levels regulated by the state. In a revised regulation in 200587, public-utility enterprises have been defined in a broader way regardless of enterprise type and economic sector. It means that not only SOEs but also enterprises from other economic sectors and even cooperatives are allowed to become involved in producing and providing public goods and services. Since activities such as irrigation and drainage, dikes and flood control, and disaster prevention are included in a list of 28 different types of public goods and services, IDMCs have been classified as public utility enterprises.
The renovation in organizational structure and management mechanisms of the IDMCs has followed the reforms applied for SOEs and public utility enterprises. Organizational restructuring of IDMCs was conducted in 199888 following the government’s policies on the reorganization of SOEs providing public goods and services in 199689. As a consequence the number of IDMCs has decreased significantly. In 1991, 317 IDMCs in the country were restructured into four types: inter-province level, provincial level, inter-district level, district level irrigation and drainage management companies90. By 2007, there were 130 enterprises involved in the exploitation and management of irrigation works in the country. Three of these are inter-province IDMCs that came under the control of MARD (Bac Nam Ha, Bac Hung Hai, and Dau Tieng)91(VAWR, 2007b; Ipsard, 2008). IDMCs have been requested to transform in line with the government’s policies for the equitization of SOEs to improve their performance under autonomous and flexible conditions92. Up to 2010, about half of the 95
87 Decree 31/2005(ND-CP (11/3/2005) 88 Circular 06/1998/TT-BNN-TCCB (3/9/1998) 89 Decree 50/CP (28/8/1996) and Decree 56/CP (02/10/1996) 90 317 IDMCs in 1991, of which 39 are inter-provinces IDMCs, 14 inter-district IDMCs, 81 district- level IDMCs, 114 district irrigation stations, and 39 management boards (Rudec/Ipsard, 2008) 91 130 IDMCs in 2007, of which 31 are provincial-level IDMCs, 22 inter-district IDMCs, 43 district- level IDMCs, and 25 district irrigation enterprises (Rudec/Ipsard, 2008) 92 Decree 25/2010/ND-CP (24/4/2010), Circular 117/2010/TT-BTC (05/08/2010)
153 IDMCs had been transformed into a type of one-member limited liability company with 100% state ownership (VAWR, 2009a). They follow the Enterprise Law and the regulation for enterprises producing and providing public services (Decree 31, 2005). Some of the IDMCs are to remain as a state public-utility enterprise and follow the regulation for public-utility enterprises (Decree 43, 2006).
5.5.2 Financial mechanisms
The policies on organizational transformation and changes in financial mechanisms of IDMCs reflect the state’s intention to improve the autonomy of transformed IDMCs. In theory, IDMCs have the right to sign contracts. They are responsible for their own financial accounting, and for the delivery of water services. Allocation of labor, salary and income management is based on the quality and quantity of goods and services placed or assigned by the state rather than a fixed sum every year. One key feature in the management mechanism applied to these companies is that the state holds 100% of the capital and decides the organizational scale and financial mechanism to be applied for each type of public-utility state enterprise. Such decisions are based on their specific demands and tasks. The intention is to ensure that they can operate in situations in which revenues are not enough to cover expenditures under market mechanisms. In order to achieve this, the products and services of these enterprises have been regulated by the state with prices and fees also stipulated by the state.
Three main mechanisms are singled out depending on the nature of public goods and services: task assignment (giao ke hoach), order placement (dat hang), and bidding for services (dau thau). The tasks of IDMCs are to deliver irrigation and drainage services according to the task assignments or service orders with water fees stipulated by the authorized agencies93. IDMCs are entitled to state subsidies for expenses relating to O&M, rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation systems, as well as a supplement if their annual budget does not cover the increased costs for pumping, and systems’ repair in special situations such as drought and flooding.
93 Decree 143/2004/ND-CP (28/11/2003)
154 Following the current regulations94, specific mechanisms of task assignment and order placement are recommended for those large-scale hydraulic systems that provide services for several provinces and districts. Mechanisms of order placement and bidding of services are recommended for medium and small-scale hydraulic systems.
If an IDMC follows the mechanism of task assignment, it should prepare an annual plan for irrigation supply and a financial plan and submit them to line ministry agencies (i.e. DARD, DOF, DOLISA), and PPC to get their approval. The annual budget for the IDMC is then included in the provincial financial budget before submission to the ministry of finance and the government for reallocation at central level. The budget is transferred to the IDMC twice per year, in the first and fourth quarters. In addition to the IDMC’s results report, an evaluation of the performance of the IDMC by local organizations is required for an IDMC to request a subsidy.
If an IDMC follows the mechanism of order placement, the PPC makes the requests for the service provision that allow all potential service providers (e.g. IDMC within or outside the province, private enterprises) to be involved. The tenders have opportunities to offer and present their abilities, capacities, and options relating to the management, operation, maintenance, and financial management of irrigation systems. The PPC selects the service provider, then negotiates and signs the contracts. The budget is transferred three times per year; 50% of the budget is provided to the service provider after contract signing, 40% in the mid-year and 10% after finalizing the contract. This mechanism seems more advanced than the first one because of the bidding process, whereby the PPC may find a good choice of irrigation service provider. It also increases the incentive of the IDMCs to perform well.
However, in reality the first mechanism is applied in almost all of the IDMCs; the others are applied only in some pilots. The officers of the DARDs in the two cases claim that there is a lack of technical and economic standards and cost units for estimation, and that they cannot therefore
94 Decision 38/2007/QD-TTg (20/3/2007), Decision 256/2006/QD-TTg, Circular 11/2009/TT-BTC (21/01/2009), Circular 56/2010/TT-BNNPTNT (01/10/2010)
155 prepare the requests. The internal norms/standards95 in the Quang Tri IDMC, for instance, have been used for seven and eight years without updating. Therefore, the estimations of the amount of work and unit prices for O&M activities have become unrealistic. The lack of realistic economic and technical norms used in O&M of irrigation systems also creates difficulties for the state management agencies (PPCs, DARDs) to evaluate the performance of IDMCs. This situation is quite common in many provinces: norms/standards either do not exist or were established a long time ago, and have not been updated. Up to 2010, only 23 out of the 64 provinces had issued the economic and technical norms/standards that are applied to the management and operation of hydraulic works inside their provinces (VAWR, 2009a).
These mechanisms come very close to those applied in the former central planning period. PPCs and line ministry agencies are ascribed one role as state management agencies plus one operational, which means that they are deeply involved in the service management of IDMCs and/or local organizations. Irrigation supply plans and financial plans of IDMCs are approved and/or adjusted by these actors based on regulated norms, unit prices, and fees. As we have seen, the procedure to get the state subsidy for water fees is quite complicated, involving lengthy preparation, and requiring different levels of approval from the various state agencies.
Obviously, government policies concerning public goods and services, and public-utility enterprises, have given attention to the special treatment required from the state such as subsidies to cover the operational expenses of enterprises, and the assignment or placement of service provision by the state within the stipulated prices and fees. This policy seems contradictory to the main intention behind the reform of state-owned enterprises to achieve greater autonomy and efficiency. The concern over the roles of the state and how the state performs effectively in public service delivery was discussed in Chapter 2. The task is to find a balance that allows enterprises to perform and still leaves room for the state to control the quantity and quality of public services, such as irrigation and drainage services.
95 Norms for using electricity and fuel, norms for labor use and unit price of salary, norms of maintenance, norms for management etc.
156 5.6 Summary
As an integral part of the reform process in Vietnam that began in the 1980s, decentralization in public administrative and public financial management has been implemented to transfer authority and responsibility in public service delivery from the central ministries and government agencies to sub-national level governments and non-state entities. There are three key intentions that have been highlighted in the policy and legal framework for decentralization; (i) clear definitions of authority and tasks for state management agencies in order to avoid overlapping tasks among agencies; (ii) separation of the functions of state management agencies, administrative authorities and service delivery units; and (iii) decentralization of authorities and responsibilities in state management to sub-national level agencies. Figure 5.2 illustrates how institutional arrangements for irrigation decentralization have been shaped under the overall institutional reforms of the country. Two decentralization processes should be distinguished: state management decentralization and decentralization of irrigation services. State management decentralization in the irrigation sector refers to a process to transfer mandates and authority in state management of medium- and small-scale hydraulic works to sub-national level state agencies. These include the formulation and issuing of policies and plans; provision of guidance and norms/standards; and supervision of implementation in the construction, exploitation, management and protection of hydraulic works. In consequence of the reforms in public financial management, sub- national level authorities have also been given the power to allocate and manage the state budget. Decisions on water fees, water prices, on-farm fees and local contributions for hydraulic construction have been taken by the PPCs. The change in the roles of the provincial departments of agricultural and rural development (DARDs) and provincial people’s committees (PPCs) in charge of state-owned irrigation management companies (IDMCs) shows the intention to separate state management from service management. DARDs no longer supervise IDMCs. At present, PPCs, as the capital owners of IDMCs, manage IDMCs and irrigation service delivery through the mechanism of assignment of plan or placement of orders.
157 Institutional reforms, irrigation institutional reforms decentralization
Administrative decentralization State management decentralization + State management functions State management functions delegated to delegated to sub-national sub-national authorities authorities: - in exploitation, investment, - local socio-economic planning, rehalibitation, management of medium & - investment small-scale irrigation systems -management of resources, public - public service delivery management service delivery and SOEs (personnel & organization, plan - personnel & organizational assignment, placement of orders) management - Capital owner of transforned IDMCs + Regulating self-management system & self-responsibility in staf ing, adminitrative management expenses in state Irrigation Financing agencies - PPCs decide on local budget bugetaty, allocation and management - PPCs decide cost norms, prices, fees, Fiscal decentralization local contribution Public inanncial management - Water fees (Decree 115 (2008) delegated to sub-national subsidized from state or provincial authorities: budgets through mechanism of "assignment of plan" or "placement of - local budget bugetary, allocation orders" from PPC to IDMC and management - decide cost norms, prices, fees, local contribution
Political decentralization Decentralized irrigation, PIM/IMT Grassroot democratization (Decree - Decentralized irrigation management 29, 1998 & Decree 79, 2003) (Circular 65 (2009) - Strategy and development of PIM/IMT (2004) Reforms of SOEs - Equitization - Organizational restructure and transformation: + The State public utility enterprises (Decree 56, 1996), + Enterprises providing and producing public good and services (Decree 31, 2005, Decree 38, 2007) + A form of one-member limited Renovation of IDMCs liability companies (Decree 95, 2006, - Enterprise providing and producting Decree 25, 2010) public service - Regulating autonomy & self- - Tranformation one-member limited responsibility regime on performance, liability companies with 100% State persnel & organization, inanacial owneship management for public service - Organizational restructure delivery units (Decree 43, 2006) - Follow mechanism "Assignment of - Plan" or "Placement of orders"
Figure 5.2. Driving forces for irrigation institutional reforms (Source: Created for this research)
158 In parallel, decentralization of irrigation services aims to share power and responsibility in the management and finance of irrigation systems between IDMCs and local organizations. Reposonding to the reform of state-owned enterprises began in the early 1990s, IDMCs are in the process of being transformed into a new form (a one-member limited liability company with 100% state ownership), with provision of irrigation services through tasks or plans assigned or ordered by PPCs. Transformed IDMCs at present operate under the new organization structure, with remission of water fees (i.e. water fees are subsidized from the state), and new management mechanisms. The main purpose of this renovation is to create opportunities for IDMCs to operate in a more flexible manner, and become autonomous and accountable in performance.
The transition into decentralized irrigation management in Vietnam takes place with the background of centralization styles that have existed for a long time. The institutional reforms have gradually provided the required platform for non-state entities (local organizations, individuals, private enterprises) to become involved in the exploitation, protection and management of irrigation systems. This decentralization process is in tune with that of the democratization policy at grassroots levels that was issued in 1998. However, the legal frameworks for different types of reforms towards decentralization have not yet been created to full extent in that possibilities for local organizations and water users to participate and have influence in decision making are not fully exploited. There is still a gap between central government policies and local conditions for implementing decentralized irrigation management. In many provinces the detailed policies for decentralizing irrigation management at provincial level have not been completed.
As a result, progress has been slow and outcomes limited, confined to pilot scale studies and the external assistance of external donors. There are many shortcomings, but the main reasons for this problem are considered to be a lack of detailed guidelines from the central government, lack of a financial mechanism supporting local organizations, quick changes in policies with unclear implications, and fewer incentives for provincial authorities. Looking into both decentralization processes, the coming chapters (Chapters 6-8) will provide a detailed analysis of how the existing
159 institutional arrangements affect power relations among actors, the ways and extents to which actors exercise power, and their corresponding performance and incentives. The first purpose is to understand how irrigation decentralization has been implemented, what the main challenges and constraints are, and how these challenges and constraints affect actors’ performance. The second purpose is to further evaluate the theoretical literature on decentralization by means of applying the polycentric approach as an add-on approach.
160 CHAPTER 6: POWER RELATIONS AND ACTORS’ DECISION MAKING
The roles of, and linkages between, the involved actors under the existing institutional arrangements were presented in the section on irrigation multi-governance in Chapter 4. This chapter will go further in analyzing actors’ power relations by focusing on the interplay between them. The purpose is to assess the extent to which actors can participate in decision- making and how they can exercise their influence. Power relations between actors are analyzed by looking into the particular interaction situations. This is done in order to show what types of power each actor can exert, and what patterns of interaction and level of influence each actor can have with others. Focusing on three main categories of actors; state management agencies (i.e. sub-national level administrations and specialized agencies), irrigation services providers (i.e. state irrigation companies and cooperatives), and service users (i.e. farmers), I discuss five different types of interactions, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Provincial State-owned administration 2 irrigation & line ministry 1 management agencies company
4 District/Commune administrations 3
Cooperatives 5 Farmers
Figure 6.1. Relations between involved actors
These include (1) interactions between state management agencies at different administrative levels, (2) interactions between these state agencies and state-owned irrigation management agencies (IDMCs), (3) interactions between these state agencies and cooperatives, (4) 161 interactions between IDMCs and cooperatives; and (5) interaction between cooperatives and farmers. The exercise of power is assessed by looking at the ability of the actors and the extent to which they can mobilize resources and influence to fulfill their mandates and duties in their respective domains. This means specifically for state management agencies that I will consider their influences over their mandates in state management of irrigation systems. For IDMCs and cooperatives, the focus is on their influence on decision-making that relates to irrigation management such as water distribution, design, construction, operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, mobilization and use of resources. Included is also their capacity for monitoring and enforcement. When it comes to farmers, the concern is whether or not they can participate and exert influence at the different stages of irrigation management. Five types of interaction are discussed in the following sections in order to demonstrate the power relations and power exercise of all relevant actors involved in irrigation decentralization.
6.1 Cross-level interactions between state management agencies
State irrigation management agencies include administrative authorities and specialized agencies at provincial, district and commune levels. As indicated in Chapter 5, state management decentralization launched under the Public Administrative Reforms aims to take authority from central government downward to sub-national levels as well as to separate public service management and state management in these state agencies. An ambition of this section is to evaluate the outcomes of state management decentralization in the irrigation sector and indicate the main constraints that affect these outcomes. In the first part, I examine the interplay between these actors by assessing their communications and coordination, by analyzing their mandates as they are defined in the legal documents, and as they are operated in reality. In the two later parts, I assess the power relations between provincial and district / commune agencies, and how district/commune agencies can exercise their authority. The end purpose is to understand the implications of the shift of power for the decentralization of management of irrigation systems.
162 6.1.1 Coordination in inconsistent and overlapping mandates
Weak coordination and communication
Section 4.2 demonstrates the complicated design of the organizational structure within state management agencies (as illustrated in Figure 4.3). One issue is that many actors interact at different levels. Another one is the pattern of “double subordination” applied for all actors at all levels. Each actor is both “vertically” responsible to central government ministries, and “horizontally” responsible to those local authorities with which they are in daily contact. This design requires the involvement of many agencies, and therefore creates more control and shared responsibilities and risks among the many actors in the decision-making processes. It does, however, create confusion as soon as inconsistent policies and guidelines appear from different level agencies.
Decision-making processes then usually take longer because of bureaucracy in the many agencies through which they need to pass. In addition to delays due to bureaucracy, time is lost because cross-level and cross-sector communication and coordination among the actors is rather weak. The procedure for budgeting, revising budgets, and planning for the maintenance of irrigation systems calls for involvement and approval from many relevant departments at all administrative levels. The surveys in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri reveal the fact that the IDMCs need about 6-8 months every year for the procedure to obtain water fees from the state budget (usually starting in February to get approvals from all relevant state management agencies in August or September96). The financial approvals that allow the IDMCs and cooperatives to conduct rehabilitation or
96 More information is found in Section 5.2.2. In short, the IDMCs must get specific approval from the provincial line ministry departments. In particular, the provincial Department of Finance (DOF) is responsible for the allocation and management of the state budget and water fees subsidies. The department of planning and investment (DPI) is responsible for the investment planning and budget allocation for new investment and rehabilitation of irrigation systems. The Department of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs (DOLISA) approves the IDMC annual business plan (the numbers of employees and levels of salary). The Department of Agricultural and Rural Development (DARD) controls irrigation schedules and quantities. District and commune administrations approve the irrigated area that is registered in the contracts between cooperatives and IDMCs. Provincial People’s Community (PPC) makes a final decision
163 maintenance of irrigation systems usually take 6-10 months. Due to the long process time, maintenance is often conducted in the fourth quarter of a fiscal year when resources have become available. The practice creates stress and demands intensive work for a short time before the annual financial accounting is concluded.
A general lack of coordination and limited professional assistance between sectors and between administrative levels is indicated as one of major constraints affecting the outcomes of decentralization in Vietnam according to the UNDP review of Public Administrative Reforms (Acuña-Alfaro, 2009). Planning strategies, including action plans at national and provincial levels, are usually formulated by the specialized departments based on their own sector requirements without consulting other departments. Communication and consultation with other departments are also insufficient to address cross-sector objectives (Vasavakul et al., 2009). The survey of the two selected cases shows that policy formulation in the irrigation sector at provincial level has neither been linked to research nor has it involved proper consultation with other related specialized agencies. The departments of agricultural and rural development (DARDs) have mandates for policy formulation (regulations, decisions, directives, etc.), provision of guidelines for policy implementation, and technical assistance within provincial boundaries. Regulations are usually drafted by their sub- unit (section of hydraulic works) and then submitted solely to the leaders of DARDs and the provincial authorities for appraisal and promulgation. Consultation between DARDs and the provincial departments such as DOF, DONRE, DPI and district/commune administrations (DPCs/CPCs) is not given sufficient attention.
Beyond this limited coordination, there is also limited sharing of databases and other information between these departments. This is true, for instance, for the sharing of the database on water resources management between DARDs and DONREs, and the sharing of information on the budget allocation between DARDs and DOFs, and between DOFs and DPCs/CPCs. Those interviewed at DPCs/CPCs call for more dynamic coordination and consultations among the specialized agencies. Local influence on the decisions of the provincial authorities and the DARDs is rather weak. In
164 particular they note that technical assistance from the DARDs to IDMCs and from the IDMCs to local organizations is only provided at limited extent.
Inconsistencies and overlaps in tasks and mandates
In addition to weak communication and coordination between the state agencies, the current study demonstrates the fact that there are inconsistencies and overlaps in the tasks and mandates of state management agencies. These form another factor affecting the interplay between state agencies. On the whole, the tasks, responsibilities and authority of these agencies are presented in an inconsistent manner in different legal documents97.
As Table 6.1 suggests, provincial authorities (PPCs) are given mandates and authority in state irrigation management in almost all documents relating to the construction, exploitation, and protection of medium and small-scale irrigation systems within the provincial boundary. Under the regulations in 2008 and 2009 (Decree 115 and Circular 65), PPCs’ mandates have been extended to include irrigation decentralization, the IDMCs’ renovations, and the implementation of water fees’ subsidy. These changes reflect the PPCs’ strengthened position due to irrigation decentralization, which will be discussed later (Section 6.2). Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARDs), which are designed to be the specialized agencies that conduct the state management tasks at provincial levels, have seen their mandates and authority redefined in the last two regulations in 2008 and 2009 (Circular 61 and Circular 65). However, the role of PPCs is not mentioned at all in the 2008 regulation and is given in broad terms in the later one. District and commune administrations are responsible for state irrigation management at district and commune levels but their mandates and authorities are defined only in the MARD’s Circular 61 of 2008. The effect, in short, is that the mandates of state agencies are mentioned differently in the various documents. This brings inconsistency to the mandates and to the authority of the state agencies at all administrative levels.
97 This study examines the following legal documents: Ordinance 32/2001/PL-UBTVQH10 (04/04/2001), Decree 143/2004/ND-CP (28/11/2003), and Decree 115/2008/ND-CP (14/11/2008), Circular 61/2008 TTLT-BNN-BNV (2008), Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT (12/9/2009)
165 Table 6.1. Mandates and authority of the state management agencies in legal documents
Legal PPCs DARDs DPCs CPCs documents
Ordinance - Formulate, supervise the Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned (2001)98 implementation of strategies, plans; -Issue, guide, organize the Decree implementation of the policies, 143 norms/fees/permits/technical (2003)99 standards; - Decide on investment and rehabilitation;
166 - Issue, withdraw permits for wastewater discharge - Others (research, training, conflict resolving, international cooperation etc.).
Decree More mandates are added Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned 115 - Implement decentralized (2008)100 irrigation - Supervise the formulation of the norms - Organize rearrangement of IDMCs
98 Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation System No. 32/2001/PL-UBTVQH10 (04/04/2001) 99 Decree 143/2004/ND-CP (28/11/2003) 100 Decree 115/2008/ND-CP (14/11/2008)
- Decide management mechanisms for IDMCs - Subsidize water fees (budgetary, decisions on budget allocation, financial control, reporting
Circular Not mentioned - Draft & submit regulations, - Implement - Organize and 61 plans, programs decisions/plans, guide the (2008)101 - Guide, supervise the - Protection of implementation implementation of hydraulic works - Mobilize local decentralization; - Guide contributions - Guide, inspect, responsible for specializations to - Direct, inspect construction, exploitation, CPC, conflict water uses, small- protection of hydraulic systems resolution scale irrigation 167 - License water uses, systems wastewater discharge Circular Decision making on - Guide, supervise the Not mentioned Not mentioned 65 decentralization at provinces implementation of (2009)102 decentralization - Provide technical assistance in operation and maintenance of hydraulic works - Annual monitoring, training capacity
(Source: Ordinance (2001), Decree 143 (2003); Decree 115 (2008); Circular 61(2008); Circular 65(2009)
101 Circular 61/2008/TTLT-BNN-BNV 102 Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT (12/9/2009)
Furthermore, overlaps of mandates and functions between service management and state management of irrigation systems are also found both in legal documents and in practice. I perceive that the vague mandates and authority of the state agencies is one reason for the overlaps. The evidence for this is as follows. The full picture of the organizational structure shows that the water sector is split into a number of sub-sectors that come under the jurisdiction of different ministries (as described in Chapter 4). This fragmented situation, along with inconsistencies about mandates and authority for state agencies, easily lead to overlapping, especially since there is a lack of cross-sector coordination, not only at central level but all the way down to local levels where each ministry has its own agencies in the provinces (Vasavakul et al., 2009).
For instance, the Ministry of agricultural and rural development (MARD) was the state management agency at national level before 2002, responsible for managing water resources and hydraulic works. The establishment of the Ministry of natural resources and environment (MONRE) was an effort to distinguish the management of hydraulic works for delivering water services from that for water resources103. In spite of this clear intention, the mandates and duties of MARD and MONRE are mentioned differently in various legal documents, such as in the Law of water resource 1999 and in secondary water-related regulations. These differences result in conflicts over responsibilities and allocation of resources among the ministries. These problems are also responsible for the reluctance of state agencies to implement their mandates (Nguyen T.P.L., 2010). Since the Law on Water Resources104 has not yet been changed (up to 2012), there is confusion over MARD’s mandates as they are defined in the Law and over how these are applied in practice. Both ministries have tried to keep the state management functions of water resources management under their respective ministries, which has resulted in some kind of competition between these ministries that is reflected in capacity and in database sharing. Unclear roles and mandates for the two ministries have, over time, generated difficulties for the
103 MONRE has replaced MARD with respect to managing water resources at national level, but MARD still has mandates to address water resources in terms of management, irrigation and drainage, flood control, rural water supply and sanitation 104 Law on Water Resources (No. 08/1998/QH10) issued in 1998 is a foundational framework for managing the water sector in Vietnam
168 decentralization of state management functions to line ministry agencies at provincial level, DONRE and DARD (VN GWP, 2011).
Overlaps are also observed in the mix-up between administration management, state management and service management. These overlaps are found both in the legal documents and in practice. Several legal documents at provincial level show that district and commune authorities are given mandates to manage irrigation systems. For example, the Decision of the PPC in Lao Cai (2007)105 indicates that all infrastructures within communes have been handed over to CPCs for management, exploitation and protection after construction. In doing so, CPCs establish Commune Irrigation Management Boards that include CPCs’ leaders, technical staff, and commune accountants. All these receive extra salaries from provincial budgets. The Decision of the PPC in Tien Giang106 assigns management of irrigation systems to the staff of the DPC and the CPC. The management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works are delegated to the district section of agricultural and land management in Ninh Thuan107. Such design has caused district and commune administrative authorities to become involved in delivery of irrigation services.
I claim that overlaps emerge easily since administrative authorities (PPCs, DPCs, and CPCs) are assigned both to conduct the functions of administrative management and those of state management of irrigation systems in their administrative boundaries. In reality, DPCs and CPCs in many locations are directly involved in the delivery of irrigation services. In Quang Tri province, the staff within district sections of agriculture in Dac Krong and Huong Hoa districts is made up of the officials who have mandates to carry out state irrigation management. They allocate the state budget (water fees subsidies) to communes for the maintenance of irrigation systems, but they are also the staff of the district irrigation management boards that provide irrigation services with extra support from commune irrigation teams in the collection of on-farm fees from water users. At present, the Quang Tri DARD is developing a proposal in which district irrigation management boards would be established for
105 Decision 55, 2007 issued by the Provincial People’s Committee in Lao Cai province 106 Decision 01, 2006 issued by the Provincial People’s Committee in Tien Giang province 107 Decision 173, 2004 issued by the Provincial People’s Committee in Ninh Thuan province
169 managing inter-commune canals. These boards, consisting of representatives of all benefiting communes, have legal status under the control of district authorities. They have rights to sign contracts directly with IDMCs without the involvement of cooperatives within the communes. In addition, CPCs may establish their own organizations (e.g. Water Management Boards in Phu Ninh and in Tuyen Quang provinces) or assign their staff work as “middlemen” (e.g. in Ha Tinh province) (see more in Section 4.3.2). In this situation, CPCs interfere directly in both the operation and the maintenance of irrigation systems, as well as in financial management and selection of members by putting their staff onto management boards (Pham, 2003; VAWR, 2007a). In the two studied cases, CPCs’ intervention is also recognized. Although not directly involved in the provision of irrigation services, CPCs still have an influence through selection of personnel and organizational management of local organizations. This issue is discussed later in Section 6.3.
DPCs and CPCs are not the only agencies with a double influence; some provincial DARDs also have a dual function. They perform both as state management agencies and as service providers (Section 4.2.2). A common design in several provinces (e.g. Long An, Ca Mau, Kien Giang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, and Can Tho provinces) is one in which the departments of hydraulic works are involved in irrigation systems operation. In these instances some even go a step beyond service management by providing some planning and design consultancies. The provincial department of hydraulic works in Can Tho in southern Vietnam has established irrigation teams and mobilized irrigation stations, under the district office of economic and production teams (tổ hợp tác sản xuất) in the communes, in order to operate irrigation systems (VAWR, 2009a).
In short, horizontal and vertical interactions among state-management agencies are complicated since many actors are involved in, and carry out, the same duties at the same level. In spite of having the design of “double subordination”, cross-level and cross sector coordination, collaboration and technical assistance are still limited. The mandates and authority of the state management agencies are unclear, inconsistent and overlapping. These overlaps are still evident both in policy documents and in practice. Administrative authorities also have their tasks as state management
170 agencies, and the state management agencies are involved in service management. There is uncertainty regarding who does what and how to coordinate activities. Inconsistency about duties for the actors is reflected in the ways and different terms are mentioned inconsistently in different legal documents. This leads to overlapping of tasks among actors and creates opportunities for some powerful actors to interfere and maintain power. These findings provide clear evidence that state management decentralization has not addressed its intention to separate the functions of state management agencies, administrative authorities, and service delivery units. The main constraints are inconsistency, and unclear mandates and authority of the state agencies at all levels, which result in overlaps.
6.1.2 Institutional setting and capacity at district and commune levels
Beyond the complicated interaction caused by inconsistent and overlapping mandates among the state management agencies, imbalanced power between these agencies makes the dynamics even more complicated. Decentralization aims to transfer authority in the state management of natural resources from central ministries to sub-national level authorities and line ministry agencies108. In spite of this, most provinces have not made the necessary arrangements. The resulting situation is that the anticipated decentralization of tasks and authority to district and commune levels remains limited. This problem has been observed and criticized in so far as there is no national action plan for local decentralization (Vasavakul et al., 2009).
A critical problem in the irrigation sector is that institutional settings within state agencies at district and commune levels are weak in comparison with those at central and provincial levels. State management of irrigation systems is not a primary task with specialized officers in almost any of the district and commune offices. Irrigation is one among many things, such as economics, forestry and rural development, that these district and commune agencies are responsible for. The study by VAWR (2009) documents that almost all of the 528 district sections (phong) in 53
108 Resolution 08 on decentralization issued in 2004
171 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces have confined their conduct mainly to activities relating either to economic planning and management or to agricultural and rural development. In 54% of the cases, they function under the Section of economy, and in 44% under the Section of agriculture and forestry. Only 2% of them have specializations in irrigation and drainage.
The effect of the structural imbalance from this design is a shortage of capacity at both district and commune levels. A small staff has to split responsibility for the whole workload. Only a limited number of staff has been trained in hydraulic engineering and management: 624 officers are assigned to state management of hydraulic works in 528 district sections (VAWR, 2009a). It means that on average just one person is mainly responsible for managing all irrigation systems within district boundaries per district section. A similar problem is found in the two studied irrigation systems. At district level, one member of staff is responsible for 19 and 20 communes in Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts, respectively (in Quang Tri province), or 11 and 15 communes in Trang Bang and Chau Thanh districts, respectively (in Tay Ninh). One person is responsible for state irrigation management in commune offices. Considering these figures, the shortcomings become obvious.
Limited capacity, a general shortage of information, and a confined database, especially at commune level, are further constraints. Communication and technical assistance from higher-level state management agencies are also limited, as mentioned earlier. The survey in 2008 (VAWR, 2009a) of human resources and the training needs of staff working in the provincial DARDs and the district sections, exhibits a picture of specialized training within irrigation. On average, 57% of staff working at DARDs has university degrees, whilst 24% and 15% of staff working in DARDs and the district sections have intermediate and primary degrees, respectively. At district level, 59% of the personnel working within the sections of agriculture and rural development (or the economy section) have been educated at university level, while 36% of them have intermediate degrees. Among the 1,400 district staff included in that study, only 14% have a specialization in water and hydraulic systems. Most have been trained as agriculture specialists, not in hydraulic engineering and management. Even more surprising, the survey showed that, of the 528
172 district sections, 120 did not employ anyone with specialization in the water sector (ibid.).
The survey carried out in the two studied cases establishes as a fact that going beyond formal education into further training gives no guarantee that competence is developed, since the training opportunities are limited. Staff interviewed within CPCs said that they have not been trained in hydraulic engineering. They have attended one or two short courses on Participatory Irrigation Management and water management under the projects, but they experience difficulties with solving technical problems related to hydraulic works or when dealing with financial management (i.e. budgeting, accounting, reporting). This situation shows that institutional design for state management of irrigation systems at district and commune agencies are very limited in terms of structure, capacity and institutions. These limitations become a major constraint affecting staff performance and service quality at sub-national levels. As a consequence, it also becomes an argument for the higher-level agencies why they do not want to transfer power to lower levels (Fritzen, 2006).
6.1.3 Power at district- and commune-level state agencies
With the afore mentioned shortcomings in institutional setting and capacity, the anticipated decentralization of tasks and authority to district and commune levels is destined to be beset by a shortfall in institutions and competence. Since there is no national action plan for local decentralization (Acuña-Alfaro, 2009), attention in the decentralization policy is given only to what is to be decentralized, and not to how this should be achieved. Most of the responsibilities and authority that have been delegated to provincial administration remain at this level and are still beyond the reach of district and commune levels. The mandates and authority of district and commune authorities (DPCs and CPCs), as defined in the legal documents109, highlight technical issues rather than management issues. Their mandates are to organize and implement legal documents, plans, procedures and technical standards that have already been approved by the provincial authorities and the line ministry agencies,
109 Circular 61/2008/TTLT-BNN-BNV
173 and to disseminate legal documents. Since there is a lack of dynamic coordination and consultation among state-management agencies and administrations as mentioned earlier, this adds a whole set of constraints that have their roots in an ambiguity in social capital use and management.
In contrast to the intention of decentralization, the power of district and community-level state agencies in decision-making over planning and budget allocation in the irrigation sector is limited. The legal document from 2005110 instructs that, with PPC acceptance, district and commune administrations can take decisions for investment projects with capital values below five billion VND (approx. 250,000 USD) at district level or below three billion VND (approx. 150,000 USD) at commune level. However, in reality, as shown by the survey, the decisions relating to planning, budgeting over new investment, rehabilitation, upgrading and maintenance of irrigation systems are usually taken at provincial level by line ministry agencies (i.e. by DARDs, DOFs, DPIs). The common situation is that Project Management Units (PMUs), which belong to DARDs instead, become involved in the implementation and control the processes directly. Two projects111 in the two cases studied provide examples. This practice has emerged because DARDs (via their PMUs) normally directly involve in the upgrading and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the province. PMUs are the main actors to take decisions in a bidding process when selecting the design consultancy, construction consultancy, and supervision consultancy. DARD/PMUs are heavily involved in decision-making about bidding procedures to select the design consultant companies, construction consultant companies, monitoring, and evaluation of construction works. Under the VWRAP project, one member of the Tay Ninh IDMC was invited to join the PMU, but this representative’s influence on the design, construction, and supervision of the construction process proved to be limited since the authority in decision-making belongs to DARD/PMU. In
110 Decree 16/200/ND-CP (7/5/2005) 111 The first one is the Vietnam Water Resource Assistance Projects (VWARP), a loan to the Government of Vietnam from the World Bank, has been implemented over seven years (2004-2011) to modernize irrigation infrastructures and capacity building and institutional strengthening in six large-irrigation systems; Causon Camson, Yenlap, Kego, Phuninh, Daban and Dautieng. The second one is the Central water resources project, 223 VIE (SF), year (2007-2011), a loan to the Government of Vietnam from the Asian Development Bank, implemented in six provinces in the central region; Thanh Hoá, Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên Huế, Quảng Ngãi và Bình Định
174 fact, the IDMCs and the state management agencies at district and commune levels have no room for maneuver within this type of design.
The effect of the fiscal decentralization process is that budget control is sought at provincial level. As a result, provincial authorities and line ministry agencies have received increased power in connection with budget approvals (Acuña-Alfaro, 2009; Anderson et al., 2010). As described in Section 5.4 on how water fees are allocated through the mechanism of “the assignment of plan” and “the placement of order”, PPCs and DOFs become powerful actors who control seasonal and annual irrigation supply plans, maintenance of systems, and the management expenses of IDMCs through the stipulated amounts, norms, prices and fees. The decisions selecting which levels of administration will receive autonomous budgets, what their duties and rights are, and how to distribute and use the state budget for each sector, are strongly dependent on how dominating or flexible each provincial administration can be. However, the long process of setting budgets that goes from the People’s Councils to the People’s Committee (horizontal dimensions) and then moves to the national government (vertical dimension) is experienced as one among the main constraints for fiscal autonomy in Vietnam (Vo, 2008). A critical issue in this context is that the mechanism of budget allocation for provincial financial departments (DOFs) does not follow the financial criteria or norms. Therefore, the decisions of PPCs and DOFs on the budget allocated to each spending unit at lower administrations depend on their own judgments of the needs (ibid.) as well as on informal relations rather than on projects’ priorities.
The key informants in district and commune offices reveal that this form of budget allocation is negative for the decentralization process in the sense that district and commune authorities submit the annual budget estimations for repairing and upgrading irrigation systems to the DARDs and DOFs. However, they do not know how much of the budget will be approved for each year because budgets allocated from the provinces to districts and communes vary depending on the size of the total budget the provinces receive from central government and do not fall in line with local plans and priorities. In addition to constraints relating to budget allocation, planning at local level also reveals several problems as indicated earlier.
175 The targets/goals in the development plans are not realistic and do not link well with budgeting. Top-down interventions from the provinces and lack of a proper consultation process with the local levels in planning have created gaps between the real needs of the people and the intended targets in planning (Anderson et al., 2009). Moreover, a lack of transparency plus inflexible control of financial departments at provincial level (DOF) mean that normative guidelines seem to create a lot of obstacles in budget allocation for district and commune planning as well as for IDMCs.
Overall, the findings in this section provide clear evidence that state management decentralization in the irrigation sector has limited outcomes. In contrast to the intention of decentralization, decentralization does not suffice to separate service management from state management. Mandates and authority still restrain provincial authorities and line ministry agencies. Resistance to power transfer occurs as a result of the “path dependency” (Sehring, 2009). Power differences between actors lead to imbalanced power relationships (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009) affecting the success of the decentralization processes (Wegerich, 2001; Ribot, 2002; Young, 2006). As a consequence of limited institutional settings and weak capacity, the state agencies at district and commune levels have limited influence over decisions relating to planning, budgeting of new investment, rehabilitation, upgrading and maintenance of irrigation systems.
The analysis in this section shows that provincial actors have the ability to establish specific structures and set regulations for the distribution and re- distribution of state budgets for district and commune actors. As suggested by Avelino & Rotmans (2009), provincial state agencies exercise both constitutive power and transformative power in such a way that they disrupt the power exercised by district and commune actors. Provincial actors therefore have power over and dominate district and commune actors. This explanation becomes very useful in understanding why state agencies are reluctant to transfer power to local communities. As the previous studies claim, central government and state agencies staff are reluctant to change because they have their own agenda and interests, and also want to maintain their control (Ribot et al., 2006; Larson & Soto, 2008; Bene et al., 2009). In this study, the nature of the resistance and dominance of state agencies is explained by analyzing power relations between actors.
176 6.2 Interactions between the state management agencies and state irrigation companies
The renovation of IDMCs (Section 5.5) is designed to create conditions for IDMCs to improve their performance towards financial reliability and autonomy, coupled with accountability. Another intention is to increase O&M cost recovery to cover maintenance expenses, and as a result, to enhance the performance of irrigation systems. The current institutional arrangements have brought changes in the roles of provincial actors (e.g. PPCs and DARDs). Before the renovation, DARDs were the supervisory organizations of IDMCs (co quan chu quan). Apart from technical supervision, DARDs also controlled and approved those decisions and activities of IDMCs relating to organization and personnel management, operation and maintenance, and all financial expenses. However, the effect of decentralization is to reduce the direct interventions of DARDs, and to enhance the autonomy and flexibility of IDMCs in their duties with regards to performance, finance and organizational and personnel management112. PPCs have become the capital owners of the transformed IDMCs113. One remaining key role of DARD is technical supervision and assistance for IDMCs.
Yet, there remain constraints that are counter-productive to decentralization. IDMCs operate under the control of a many-layered hierarchy: PPC as the company’s owner, DARD as the state management agency of irrigation & drainage, DOF in the capacity of budgeting and financial distribution, and DPC with the task of determining agricultural production plans. PPCs and the provincial departments have become more powerful as a result of the new institutional settings. Decision-making processes in this set-up take longer when some or all these actors are of necessity involved. The design also brings a comprehensive intervention of local authorities (PPC, DPC, CPC) and state-management agencies (e.g. DARD, DOF, DOLISA) into the service management of the IDMCs. The details of how the state agencies exercise an influence on IDMCs and to
112 Separating state management from public service management is highlighted in state management decentralization as indicated previously 113 Decree 25/2010/ND-CP (26/4/2010)
177 what extent IDMCs can exercise their power in decisions over the mobilization and management of resources (i.e. organization and personnel, finance), and operation and maintenance of irrigation systems are as follows.
6.2.1 Mobilization and use of resources
The leaders of IDMCs have the right to formulate and decide on the development strategy, both long-term and concerning annual plans for their company according to the latest regulations114 applied to the transformed IDMCs. They can take decisions relating to company development strategies and plans, capital mobilization, investment projects and service contracts with values of less than 50% of the total assets of the company. They can also decide on organizational management, and on staffing (mobilization, salary payment, appointment, dismissal, profits etc.). Outside these spheres, PPCs will take decisions in such a way that IDMC decision-making is not involved. In everyday operation, however, IDMCs do not have full empowerment to deal with personnel management. This is so because PPCs have the authority to appoint the leaders of the company (Chairman of the Members’ Council/General Director, Vice General Directors, and Chief accountant). IDMCs only recruit staff on lower grades and temporary labor. Autonomy means that IDMCs can be flexible in deciding the numbers of workers they need, but their influence is only partial; the number of staff and their salary grades, basic salary/wages, as well as the percentage of the company’s annual profits used for salary payment are all part of the annual plans. Personnel plans are submitted to both the provincial department of labor, invalid and social affairs (DOLISAs) and PPCs for approval every year. This is part of the procedure to get water fee subsidies from the state budget, which may be interpreted as a conspicuous top/down control over company operation.
The survey reveals that the dominance or flexibility of PPCs may affect the autonomy of IDMCs on an issue such as how much IDMCs can use the state budget for management or O&M of irrigation systems. For instance, from a view of the Tay Ninh PPC, the IDMC is now receiving money equivalent to
114 Decree 25/2010/ND-CP (26/4/2010) and Decree 117/2010/TT-BTC (5/8/2010)
178 that earned in water fees, but paid from the state budget instead of the farmers. This is why the PPC, DOLISA, and DOF allow the Tay Ninh IDMC to apply a minimum wage of 1,660,000 VND in 2011 (double the rate regulated by the government). In Quang Tri, in contrast, the PPC and provincial departments consider the state budget provided for the IDMC to be a subsidy. Financial management of the IDMC should therefore be strictly controlled. A minimum wage of 830,000 VND is applied in the Quang Tri IDMC, which is the same level as regulated by the government. The huge salary variation illustrates how the operation of IDMCs may vary, depending strongly on the viewpoints of the PPCs and the provincial departments. Flexible provincial PPCs and the provincial departments in charge (DOLISA, DOF) can provide constructive support to the new roles of IDMCs. Likewise, inflexible attitudes may increase the vulnerability of IDMCs.
6.2.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems
In spite of the drawbacks just presented in comparison with the situation before the transformation, the IDMCs have become more flexible in one way. Their decision-making processes within management and operation have improved according to the opinions of both the leaders and the staff of the IDMCs. Leaders are more confident in taking decisions in their domain since the new roles ascribed are different from the situation in the past when DARDs totally controlled all the activities and decisions of the IDMCs. The leaders of the studied IDMCs express the opinion, however, that, in reality, their companies and PPCs still follow this traditional approach. Even though the leaders of the IDMCs can take decisions inside their own sphere, they tend to submit proposals to PPCs as a fall-back. Rather than assuming responsibility for a decision unilaterally, they seek approval from PPCs, and the PPCs are willing to be involved. The effect, counter- productive for decentralization, is that PPCs get to make decisions for IDMCs in this indirect way.
Annual business and financial plans of IDMCs, including the schedule of irrigation supply, and budget estimations for system maintenance, salary and other expenses, need to be approved and controlled by PPCs and line
179 ministry agencies115. This approach follows the policy of the exemption of water fees. Since the revenues of IDMCs strongly depend on the annual budgets approved by PPCs and line ministry agencies, the attitude of IDMCs is to develop good relationships with PPCs, line ministry agencies (especially DOFs), and also with the Ministry of finance (MOF) in Hanoi. The chief accountants and the leaders of the IDMCs reveal that it is essential to keep in close contact with the officials in financial departments and that they even have to travel to Hanoi during the approval process to safeguard that their proposals are treated well. In the new situation, there is a shift in position: the leaders of IDMCs are persons who travel and “collect” water fees instead of staff and workers of IDMCs as before.
IDMCs are responsible for upgrading, rehabilitation and maintenance of irrigation systems, as indicated in policy116 but, in practice, hardly have an opportunity to do this because the provincial project management units (PPMUs) belong to DARDs. These units are involved in implementation, and control it directly as described previously. IDMCs/IMEs cannot be involved in project design and supervision during the design, construction, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the project. The situation has even become such that the IMEs are kept outside. The IMEs in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh) are not informed about the design (do not even have access to the design drawings) or about what is going on during the construction process although they and the cooperatives are directly involved in the O&M of irrigation systems. They claim that, in fact, several infrastructure components have serious problems due to improper design and poor technical quality after upgrading during the project. This problem has revealed what proves to be a top-down approach with strong interference by state agencies with limited influence from IDMCs.
The relationships between the IDMCs and local authorities are rather close. Irrigation supply plans for the IDMCs should follow the agricultural cultivation plans that are regulated by the district authorities (DPCs). In practice, the sub-units of the IDMCs at district level (IMEs, irrigation
115 It follows the mechanism of “the assignment of plan” and “the placement of order” as described in Section 5.5.2. IDMCs follow these mechanisms in order to be entitled to the water fees subsidized from the state budget 116 According to the Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation Systems (2001)
180 stations) usually establish close relations with DPCs and CPCs for the following reasons: DPCs and CPCs play an important role in the mobilization of local labor and in the allocation of local budgets for maintaining on-farm canals, as well as in conflict resolution. A key issue emerges when IDMCs seek to control water use contracts and local organizations through CPCs and DPCs. Such control is important for IDMCs/IMEs because they want to avoid uncertainties in their interactions with, for example, the 340 irrigation teams in Tay Ninh that are formed with only 1-2 individuals in each team. This pattern is confirmed by the leaders of the Chau Thanh and Trang Bang IMEs. Relations between the IDMC/IMEs and local authorities are generally based on the IDMCs’ needs to ensure that the irrigated area has been covered as much as possible in water contracts, rather than on making sure that water delivery is efficient and that good maintenance is upheld.
In short, the empirical findings in the studied IDMCs show that institutional arrangements have affected power relations between the IDMCs and state management agencies. A new situation occurs when both the exemption from water fees and the new financial mechanisms are applied. PPCs and line ministry agencies are in powerful positions to control resources through (i) the provision of irrigation services through Assignment of plan or Placement of order (i.e. service supply plans, water fees/prices, norms in labor force, salary, materials, maintenance), (ii) system management (i.e. investment and rehabilitation, plans of operation and maintenance – O&M), and (iii) payments (i.e. water prices/fees, norms, budget allocation for O&M expenses provided from the state budget, on-farm fees and local contributions). A conceptual framework described by Avelino & Rotmans (2009: 552-553) can be usefully employed to extend our understanding of this situation. PPCs and line ministry agencies do in fact have power over the IDMCs because the IDMCs are dependent on them for resources. The provincial actors have both innovative power and destructive power because they can create and mobilize new resources or adjust existing resources (e.g. new leaders for IDMCs, new type of local organizations, and new forms of IDMCs). They also have constitutive power and transformative power because they can distribute and redistribute different types of resources for the IDMCs (i.e. organization structure, financial budgets for salary, management, O&M of irrigation systems). The IDMCs have limited
181 systemic power because they are in a passive position with respect to mobilization of resources for their survival (to be discussed in further detail in Section 7.1). Thus, resource dependency is the main constraint that leads to the imbalance in power relations between provincial actors and IDMCs.
In contrast with the policy intention for the renovation of IDMCs, such interventions create obstacles for IDMCs in becoming autonomous, flexible, and accountable in their situation under market mechanisms117. The changes in power relations between actors towards more control result in (re)centralization rather than decentralization in irrigation management, in the sense that the provincial actors are now able to become involved in decision-making in irrigation management that should be decentralized. Line ministry agencies have room for maneuver according to province rather than enterprise interests. Technical, financial and management issues are all addressed from a provincial viewpoint (PPCs) rather than from a business viewpoint (IDMCs). Several gatekeepers’ functions are created in the process of budget allocation. The “Begging - Giving” mechanism to access the state resources and red tape appear because there are no common criteria for how budget allocation and information from financial departments can appear in a transparent manner.
6.3 Interactions between the state management agencies and cooperatives
6.3.1 Organization and personnel management
In principle, local authorities (DPCs, CPCs) and IDMCs should not interfere with organizational structure and personnel management within local organizations. For instance, as indicated in the regulation for collaboration in irrigation management between the Tay Ninh IDMC, local authorities and local organizations of the Tay Ninh province, irrigation teams should be established based on four principles “voluntary, fairness, democracy and common benefits”, and key leaders of these organizations should be elected
117 Decree 43/2006/ND-CP (25/4/2006) aims to encourage autonomy and flexibility in enterprises providing and producing public goods and services
182 by farmers. In reality, there are still strong interventions by commune or district authorities in the formation of local organizations, in selection of personnel to the management boards of local organizations, and in control of activities generally. This problem is obvious in Tay Ninh, especially in Chau Thanh district but not visible in Quang Tri. Many leaders of irrigation teams, and members of cooperative management boards in Tay Ninh, are appointed by CPCs. Several of them also hold positions in village or commune administration as well as on cooperative management boards (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2. Structure of cooperative management boards in Chau Thanh district, Tay Ninh
Cooperatives Members of cooperative management boards have positions in commune or village administrations Dong Khoi II 3 persons (chairman has close relations with CPC) Thai Binh I 3 (head of village, leaders of resident groups, commune women’s union, elder association) Thai Binh II 6 (heads of villages, leaders of farmer’s union, village party cells, Fatherland front, resident groups, commune people’s council). 9 Irrigators are heads of resident groups An Binh II 4 (leader of the Fatherland front, farmer’s union) Van Thang 7 (chairman, 2 vice chairmen, 2 controllers, accountant, cashier) Gia Tan 7 (chairman, 2 vice chairmen, 2 controllers, accountant, cashier) Lam Huynh 7 (heads of villages, leaders of commune farmer’s union, village farmer’s union, resident groups Thanh Cong 8 (chairman, 2 vice chairmen, 3 controllers, accountant, cashier) Gia Binh 7 (leader of farmer’s union, member of the Fatherland Front, cashier and accountant hold same positions in CPC)
(Source: The survey in Chau Thanh district, Tay Ninh province in 2011)
The key informants within the CPCs in the Chau Thanh district (Tay Ninh) argue that their trained staff is needed on the cooperatives’ management boards to ensure effectiveness in the cooperatives. This study claims that the motive hidden behind this argument is to control the operation and management of new cooperatives. Table 6.2 demonstrates that commune administrations in Chau Thanh district have recruited many staff to
183 cooperative management boards. In fact, there is tension between commune authorities and IDMCs over how to mobilize persons who work in irrigation teams because they have different interests. CPCs seek to recruit persons whom they can control easily or with whom they already have relations while IDMCs look for persons who are capable of performing in service delivery.
However, since these actors (IDMCs, CPCs, and coopeatives) depend on each other, their relationships become more complicated. Interventions from commune level not only lead to the nomination of members based on other criteria than specialized competence, but also affect the trust of farmers in the performance of cooperatives (further discussion is in Chapter 8).
6.3.2 Mobilization of financial resources
Regarding the possibilities for cooperatives to mobilize financial resources, local organizations say that bureaucracy within CPCs and DPCs is one of the main constraints for them. It involves issues such as having access to funds for on-farm canal lining. Even though DPCs or CPCs have been given authority to allocate the provincial budget for maintenance of irrigation systems at on-farm levels, there remain obstacles such as gatekeepers and bureaucratic webs according to local perspectives. Budget allocation and control of local administrations lead to inefficiency in the usage of the budget and performance of the cooperatives, because the cooperatives do not get an opportunity to participate properly at the planning stage. In Quang Tri, the budget for the maintenance of irrigation systems is shared: 60% comes from the state budget and 40% from cooperatives. The cooperatives’ leaders mention in the group discussions that even though financial allocation has been decentralized to communes, the process to get finance usually takes a long time due to the bureaucracy involved. It then becomes much quicker to access financing directly from DPC, at the district Section of Agriculture. This approach allows avoidance of the gatekeepers inside commune administrations. However, having and maintaining good relations with DPC staff an important factor for success according to the leaders of cooperatives because it opens opportunities to access inside information and instructions for preparing proposals. The procedure
184 sometimes creates a tedious process, which usually takes 6-10 months to settle the budget for project implementation. Therefore cooperatives have no control over whether a project may be implemented in time before the rainy season (i.e. October or November). Thus a decisive blockage in the decentralization of decision-making towards users is that local authorities limit the flexibility of local organizations to access finance using small-scale budgetary management and a long, slow planning process. The ability of local organizations to mobilize resources under such circumstances is another obstacle, that will be assessed more detail in Chapter 8.
6.4 Interactions between state irrigation companies and cooperatives
The relationship between IDMCs/IMEs and local organizations has changed since 2008 when the exemption of water fees was first introduced. The major issue is that IDMCs now receive water fees from the state budget and pay some part of it to local organizations. Such payments are stipulated by the PPCs based on the inquiry from IDMCs and are no longer based on negotiations between IDMCs and local organizations. In the studied cases, the Tay Ninh IDMC used to pay 20% of the total water fees they received for Irrigation Teams, whereas it now pays only 8%. The Nam Thach Han IME pays 60% of the water fees to agricultural cooperatives for pumping water to cultivated areas from canals within the system. Local organizations receive the payments from the IDMCs on condition that the IDMCs receive the water fees subsidized by the state budget118. The new situation has in this way changed the relationships between IDMCs/IMEs and local organizations profoundly. The implication of the current situation is that an IDMC turns into both “service provider” and “money payer” for the local organizations.
Obviously, the changes in policies have affected the subsequent power relations between IDMCs and local organizations. IDMCs have become
118 Circular 36/2009/TT-BTC (26/2/2009) issued by the Ministry of Finance providing the financial guidelines on water fees. Water fees are allocated from central government to provinces and then to IDMCs’ accounts. IDMCs pay the local organizations in accordance with the contracts signed between two parties
185 more powerful and local organizations are strongly dependent on them for finance. The expected “customer relations” between local organizations and IDMCs seldom emerge as a result of the decentralization design. Many leaders of cooperatives involved in the survey are not even aware of their position as “customers” who should place service demands on the IDMCs. Instead they still understand the relationship as “top-down”, because IDMCs “fix the rules of the games” between them, in water delivery, maintenance, and payments. From the IDMCs’ viewpoints in the study, they are aware that local organizations should be their customers but say that local organizations have shown a lack of initiative and that they seem to have accepted the top-down ways of interactions.
6.4.1 Mobilization and use of resources
As a result, the cooperatives in Tay Ninh are vulnerable due to their financial dependence on the IDMC. The cooperatives’ leaders reveal that the recent payments from Tay Ninh IDMC are too low, which has lead to inadequate revenues for the cooperatives. By contrast, the IDMCs prefer this payment mechanism, because they can manage the payment and use this as a tool to control the performance of irrigation teams and cooperatives. Through the payment conditions specified in pre-printed contracts, the IDMC can easily force irrigation teams and cooperatives to fulfill their tasks by controlling the payment119. This design reverses or significantly revises the “provider – customer” relationship between the IDMCs and local organizations; local organizations are losing their position as the customers of the IDMCs and moving to a new position as hired workers for the IDMC.
The cooperatives in Quang Tri are less dependent on payment from the IDMC because they provide different types of services. This does not, however, help them to become financially autonomous entities because they cannot negotiate on-farm fees at reasonable levels. Such fees are regulated by the PPCs, and farmers are not willing to pay more than fixed
119 8% payment for local organization is broken down into four tasks; signing contracts with water users, water delivery, grass cutting and canal dredging (2% for each task). If irrigation teams and cooperatives do not fulfill any of these tasks, the payments for them will be deducted at the end of the cropping season
186 prices120. In this situation it is hard for the cooperatives to be autonomous even though they are not heavily dependent on the IDMCs. The evidence shows that in reality all cooperatives in the two studied cases operate under pressure both from IDMCs and local authorities. The interventions of the IDMCs lead the cooperatives into a vulnerable situation: financial dependency on inflexible IDMCs. Cooperatives’ revenues are further constrained by the IDMCs, who control the payments to cooperatives (transformative power). Since cooperatives’ financial dependency leads to their vulnerable situation, cooperatives do not have the ability to exert systemic power for their survival (Chapter 7 goes into more detail).
This situation results in a relationship in which IDMCs have power over cooperatives as explained by Avelino & Rotmans (2009). Powers over decision-making are distributed unequally and it is the reason why the interaction between IDMCs and cooperatives follows a dominance pattern (Young, 2006). The same situation is reported in the literature of decentralization of natural resources management (Ribot et al., 2006; Badaragoda, 2006; Larson & Soto, 2008; Yonariza, 2008; Bene et al., 2009). In this study I offer a reason why a dominance pattern occurs. Empirical evidence shows that economic dependency between IDMCs and cooperatives is generated as an unforeseen consequence of the exemption of water fees.
A more complicated issue for the relationship between these actors is that they also depend on each other. The annual water fees provided from the state budget to IDMCs are determined based on the performance of IDMCs121 in irrigation services delivery as evaluated by cooperatives. If cooperatives do not give a good evaluation of the final acceptance report, IDMCs will not get the needed subsidy, which means that local organizations will not have any income either. In this situation, the “cooperation” pattern provides an apparent win-win situation for both IDMCs and cooperatives. However, it seriously affects the mechanism of monitoring and forcing both actors to deliver the irrigation service in an
120 According to the regulation of the Quang Tri PPC, the cooperatives cannot charge on-farm fees more than 80,000 VND/ha 121 Performance is usually assessed based on how they fulfill their duties through the quantitative indicators such as irrigated area, irrigation quantity, service quality (in time, equity, reliability)
187 accountable and effective way (this issue will be discussed detail in the next chapter).
6.4.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems
One concern in the current study is to document how this power relation affects the extent to which cooperatives can become involved in decision- making within irrigation, in particular with respect to identification of priorities for investment and/or upgrading projects at localities, and planning and investment plans, in addition to operation and maintenance (O&M). A key issue is how the power and influence of local organizations may penetrate into setting rules at the local level. The legal viewpoint is that the tasks for local organizations lie in service delivery and minor maintenance as defined in legal documents122. Local organizations have responsibility for service delivery, with rights to formulate operation rules. Their performance as investment owners in the maintenance, upgrading, and rehabilitation of irrigation systems is also defined, but there is no stipulation that the tasks should be done by the local organizations. There is accordingly no hint to how they can be involved in decision-making processes.
The results from the survey show that in reality local organizations are involved in different stages of the irrigation projects at local level (i.e. identification of the project, planning and preparation, design and budgeting, construction, maintenance and upgrading, operation and maintenance (O&M), monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and financial mobilization) but only to a limited extent. These limitations have been further evaluated through group discussion of the survey findings in the local organizations. The result of the assessments with three groups123 (Figure 6.2) shows that cooperatives have limited opportunities to participate in the identification of projects/priorities, so that their influence is limited to within the fields of design and budgeting, construction, maintenance, M&E as well as financial mobilization for their operation.
122 Circular 75 (2004), Circular 65 (2009) 123 The three groups are in Chau Thanh, Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh province), and Trieu Phong district (Quang Tri)
188
Participation and influences of cooperatives in Quang Tri participation and influence influence, but not high, 1 Note: 3 100%
80% - high 60% 40% level of participation and influence; 2 20% 0% - limited participation and weal influence, 0
high level medium level limited level
Participation and influences of cooperatives in Tay Ninh
100% 80% -
60% participation and 40% 20% 0% – no
Figure 6.2. Participation and influences of cooperatives in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri (Source: The field study in 2011)
The assessments from the cooperatives in Tay Ninh are extremely negative, as 70%-100% indicate that their involvement and influence in these aspects are very limited. In reality they are not involved in consultation even though the participatory design process is emphasized in the irrigation rehabilitation projects. Cooperatives are not even informed about the design of the IDMC-managed canals. Monitoring is mentioned by 90% of the cooperatives as a critical issue, as they are denied involvement and influence here. The lack of M&E by local organizations is causing serious problems relating to improper design and poor construction under the VWRAP project (see Figure 6.3).
189
Photo 1 shows a former earth canal which was Photo 2 shows a canal which was concreted but concreted under the project. Due to improper two banks were too low. Water overflows when design at 40 cm higher than the original canal, the gates are opened. The construction company water did not flow when the gate opened. In increased the height of the canal banks with a order to solve the problem, the construction new line of bricks (Source: Pham, Tay Ninh company built a new canal (left) next to the old irrigation system, Octorber 2011) one (Source: Pham, Tay Ninh irrigation system, Octorber 2011)
Figure 6.3. Irrigation infrastructure in the Tay Ninh system (Source: The field study in 2011)
These photos show the failures of canal rehabilitations in the Tay Ninh irrigation system. Insufficient participatory consultation between the design company, the construction company, the IDMCs, and the cooperatives is one of the reasons for these failures. Of the cooperatives in Quang Tri, less than 50% of respondents share the same opinion about limitations in design, construction and monitoring. However, the levels of participation and influence of the cooperatives in Nam Thach Han are more far-reaching than in Tay Ninh, basically as these cooperatives have been in operation for many years while the irrigation cooperatives in Tay Ninh have existed only since 2008. The cooperatives in Quang Tri have difficulties in becoming deeply involved in the preparatory stage of a project: design, construction and monitoring. Participation in meetings is generally low in 40-50% of the cooperatives, which hampers their ability to influence the planning, design and construction of infrastructure. 20-30% of them think that they participate in planning and designing but their influence is limited. More than half of the cooperatives assess their participation and influence in M&E as limited. The results from key group discussions reveal that 60-100% of the cooperatives’ leaders see that there
190 are significant needs for improvements in their organizations regarding aspects of financial autonomy, flexibility, and influence in decision-making, and their financial mobilization capacity to initiate operations.
Obviously, local organizations have limitations in the development of irrigation schedules and plans for maintenance and upgrading of irrigation systems. Why do the cooperatives in the case studies have limited levels of participation and influence in decision making? Do the influencing factors link to the changes in power relations? The roles and responsibilities of the cooperatives are assigned in top-down style (dominance pattern) by the IDMC/IMEs. The typical situation is that IDMCs decide upon irrigation schedules and that contracting is done in line with agricultural production plans that come from district authorities in tune with their interests, without discussions and negotiations with farmers.
The empirical findings in the cases studied provide strong evidence that the processes to transfer responsibility in the management and finance of irrigation from the IDMCs to cooperatives have a limited outcome. Power shifting does not create an opportunity for cooperatives to exercise an influence on decision-making in real life. Under the current institutional arrangements, the power of provincial agencies and IDMCs has been reinforced: they have the ability to mobilize, distribute or re-distribute resources (human, finance, knowledge, capacity, etc.). This situation leads to a mutual dependency on resources and benefits among actors. In particular, both IDMCs and cooperatives are in a situation of financial dependency that could affect their survival. IDMCs depend on PPCs and on line ministry agencies while cooperatives and local organizations depend on IDMCs. The aggregate consequence is that imbalances in power relations occur between actors. This is the main reason why the processes of power shifting do not achieve the expected outcomes. The relationships between actors are much more complicated than what is indicated. They are assumed to be weak, with links involving tension, unclear accountability, and lack of incentives of actors (Merrey, 1996; Jayathilleke, 2002; Sengupta, 2005; Garces-Retrepo et al., 2007; Yonariza, 2008). The complexity in the relationships brings about a mix of tensions, power struggles, but also a mutual dependency.
191 6.5 Interactions between cooperatives and farmers
Agricultural cooperatives have been in existence since the period of agricultural collectivization in the 1950s. While agricultural cooperatives are very common in the North and Central regions, farmers in the South have short-term experience of the collectivization reforms compared with farmers in other regions. A skeptical attitude has developed over the years. This difference is observed in the two cases studied. In contrast to the willingness to join agricultural cooperatives in Quang Tri (Nam Thach Han), there is a general negative attitude among farmers in the South, not least in Tay Ninh, towards agricultural cooperatives. This attitude is discussed here because it reflects the relationships between farmers and cooperatives.
Farmers in Tay Ninh are not keen on the cooperative model, and express general doubt about the performance of agricultural cooperatives. Their attitudes are grounded in the negative effects of agricultural collectivization on cooperatives in the past. In their views, the old type of cooperative has today been brought to form the basis for a collective means of production and the collectivization of workers to draw all economic activities into one collective system. The worry is that this brings inefficiency, and brings everyone down to the lowest level, thereby causing farmers to suffer. Such worries explain why few households are willing to join the new cooperatives that were establied under the WB project. Householder farmers who have not yet joined cooperatives want to observe and delay decisions until they see the advantages. The interviewed farmers in Tay Ninh claim that interaction between farmers and cooperatives in Tay Ninh is not close because cooperatives provide only irrigation services and they do not share many activities together. But beyond this argument, the suspicions of farmers over the performance of cooperatives are noted. In fact, a lack of support from farmers creates many difficulties for cooperatives, as discussed in Chapter 8.
As just mentioned, synergy between cooperatives and farmers is very important because both sides need support from each other. Farmers are willing to pay if they are satisfied with the services provided by
192 cooperatives. Cooperatives need the involvement of farmers in the maintenance of the canal network. The consequence of the exemption of water fees is an attitude change among farmers concerning water use, payment and maintenance. The common attitude among farmers now is that as water fees are subsidized by the state, on-farm fees for local organizations should be abolished. Many farmers in Quang Tri are hesitant about paying on-farm fees to support the work of cooperatives and irrigation teams.
In the case of Tay Ninh, they do not have to pay on-farm fees, according to the provincial policy. Such a policy impacts directly on the financial sources of local organizations for activities relating to the operation, management, and maintenance of irrigation systems. Many farmers are under the misconception that the members of cooperatives and irrigation teams already receive payments from IDMCs (i.e. from the state) and that they therefore are obliged to fulfill their duties in water delivery and maintenance. Some of the farmers in Tay Ninh feel, in addition, that irrigation teams and cooperatives do not need to be involved in water delivery and maintenance, as the canals have already been upgraded under the modernization project and it is not so difficult to access water. The conclusion for many is that they see no reason to contribute.
Such free-riding behavior among farmers is raised by the cooperatives as an important issue. The labor contribution by farmers to canal maintenance is very limited since they are not mobilized by cooperatives or local authorities to give specific working days for canal dredging and grass cutting as is the common practice in the cooperatives in the North and Central regions. Unclear rules for relations between farmers and cooperatives, and between cooperatives and the IDMCs, have created some confusion over maintenance at on-farm level. Many farmers take for granted that maintenance belongs to irrigation teams and cooperatives. Instead, farmers will take the initiative to clean canals along their own plots when they think it is needed, and refuse to participate in general dredging and grass cutting in canals: they appear not to care about other parts of the canals.
193 6.6 Power and the dynamics of decentralization
State management decentralization in the irrigation sector refers to a process to transfer mandates and authority in the state management of medium- and small-scale hydraulic works to sub-national level state agencies. These include planning and investment, organizational and personnel management, and financial allocation and management. In parallel, decentralization of irrigation services aims to share power and responsibility in the management and finance of irrigation systems between IDMCs and local organizations. These two decentralization processes have been analyzed in the current study. By scrutinizing power relations between involved actors (state agencies, administrations, IDMCs, cooperatives) in five different interaction domains, the findings of this study provide strong evidence that the outcomes of both decentralization processes are limited in comparison with the expectations. Mandates and authority in state irrigation management are still restricted at provincial levels. The mandates of state agencies at district and commune levels are limited in the spheres of organization and implementation of legal documents, plans, technical standards, and dissemination of policies. These mandates mean that other involved actors have limited influence over those decisions that relate to state management of irrigation.
In addition, the results from the survey in the two cases studied reveal the fact that the intention of irrigation decentralization is a long way from being achieved. Both the IDMCs and the cooperatives have little room for maneuver in making decisions that relate to water distribution; design, construction, operation and maintenance of irrigation systems; mobilization of resources, and monitoring and enforcement. Several major constraints that give rise to the limited outcomes are discussed in this chapter. Cross-level and cross-sector coordination and communication are generally weak, and institutional settings and capacity for implementing the tasks are too weak at district and commune levels. The analysis of five interaction domains between involved actors documents the positions of all involved actors under the existing current institutional arrangements, as summarized in Figure 6.4.
194
State management agencies (PPCs, provincial departments) Local organizations - State management in planning, investment, - Legal framework provides platform for organization & personnel, financial allocation establishment and operation - Capital owner of the transformed IDMCs -Financial source from on-farm fees, - Make decisions on fees, assign plans, orders payment paid/shared from IDMCs (no of irrigation service provision, maintenance negotiation) for IDMCs and local organizations - No need to hide irrigated areas in the - Budgetary & allocation of water fees contracts - Separation of state management of DARD - Evaluation of IDMCs’ service quality from service management IDMCs/IMEs - Provision of irrigation services through tasks/plans assigned or orders placed by the province - Water fees are subsidized from the state budget - Transformed IDMCs: aim at enhancing autonomy and flexibility Local authorities (DPCs, CPCs) (in some aspects) - Limited power and tasks delegated from province Farmers - Budget allocation for on-farm - Don’t have to pay water fees maintenance - Pay on-farm fees - Provide cultivation plans - No need to hide irrigated areas - Legal contracts certifying water - Labor contribution on use , local maintenance organizations/individuals
Figure 6.4. Positions of actors under the existing institutional arrangements (Source: Created for this research)
The findings report that the actors’ dependency on resources (human, knowledge, finance, institutions)124 is a real constraint affecting the power shifting process. As showed in Figure 6.4, the institutional settings seem to reinforce the powers of the PPCs and line ministry agencies at provincial level. Their interventions in budgeting, along with allocation and management of financial resources, create quite complicated bureaucratic procedures that limit the IDMCs’ working options. A parallel picture also emerges of how the cooperatives in turn come under the control of IDMCs and local administration. The main purpose of the remission of water fees was to reduce the financial burden on farmers, and to support O&M
124 An actor’s dependency on human resources means this actor is controlled by others in mobilization of staff, organizational structure, appointment of leaders, capacity. Financial dependency means actor’s budgets are controlled by others through level of salary, prices and quantity of service, business plans, expenses for maintenance and operation. Imbalanced knowledge refers to asymmetric information and knowledge between actors. Dependency on institutions means some actors can set up rules and regulations
195 expenses for IDMCs so that they can perform effectively. In fact, a situation has been created in which IDMCs control financial resources and have a commanding influence on cooperatives. This opens the whole system to the domination and top-down patterns (Adger et al., 2005; Young, 2006) that are evident in the heavy intervention from administrations and/or state- owned IDMCs.
These findings provide strong support for my arguments when developing the theoretical framework for this study (Chapter 2). Analysis that focuses on multi-level interactions between actors, as the concept of polycentricity suggests, is necessary because it is helpful to scrutinize relationships and the dynamics of power between actors. In this study, the complexity of power relations are assessed in both vertical and horizontal dimensions by looking at five types of interaction in two decentralization processes (state management decentralization and decentralization of irrigation services. This approach differs from those applied in much of the existing literature on decentralization, which focus on either the interaction between administrative actors at central and local levels or the interaction between state agencies/ companies and local organizations (Larson & Soto, 2008).
The study findings prove that analysis of the powers and interventions of state agencies and IDMCs is important for an understanding of why constraints occur and how they have counterproductive effects on decentralization. Analyzing power relations between actors provides a better understanding of why and how imbalances occur, and how they affect the dynamic interplay between actors in decentralization. Resistance and top-down attitudes are inherited from the established administrative culture (Sehring, 2009). Imbalanced power relations between actors are generated as unforeseen consequences of the current institutional arrangements, not merely because of any unwillingness or reluctance among actors to change that may be removed under public reforms as the literature suggested (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). The previous assessments do not pay attention to the consequences of the institutional arrangements on power relations between actors.
In the next chapters (Chapters 7 and 8) I shall assess how the actors react and respond to the changes in power relations and institutional
196 arrangements. There is a strong argument in the literature that public sector reforms would bring changes in attitudes, capacity of staff in irrigation agencies, and empowerment of local organizations (Aheeyar, 2002; Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). My concern is whether or not the IDMCs and cooperatives involved in participatory irrigation management projects could have the incentives and abilities to change, and to improve performance, as the literature claims.
197
198 CHAPTER 7: ACTORS’ AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND PARTICIPATION
The empirical findings in Chapter 6 provide clear evidence that under the institutional arrangements for irrigation decentralization, there are imbalanced power relations among the involved actors, resulting in the different levels to which actors exercise power in making decisions on mobilization and use of resources, in operation and management of irrigation service. This chapter, consisting of three sections, will assess how key actors (i.e. state irrigation management companies, cooperatives and farmers) perform in terms of autonomy, accountability, and public participation to enable them to deliver and access irrigation services. These three key elements are the expected outcomes of decentralization in general and of irrigation reforms in Vietnam in particular. Current institutional arrangements for the reforms of state-owned irrigation companies and for the empowerment of local water users’ organizations, as discussed in Chapter 5, are designed to create good conditions for these actors to improve their performance towards financial reliability and autonomy, coupled with accountability. The main concern in the current chapter is to assess how these actors perform in reality under the structural changes and what the gaps are between the policies’ intentions and the real consequences. In addition, the key factors affecting the performance of actors are also analyzed in each section.
7.1 Financial autonomy
According to Merrey (1996), an irrigation management agency is not considered to be financially autonomous if its financial source is allocated and controlled by outsiders, such as, for example, the government. In the view of the state officials in the MARD and line ministry agencies at provincial level, a financially autonomous organization is mentioned in the official reports as an organization that can balance its annual revenues and
199 expenses. In both Nam Thach Han and Tay Ninh irrigation systems, it is a primary challenge for the irrigation management companies (IDMCs) and the cooperatives to achieve financial autonomy in order to operate sustainably in the long run. At first glance this seems quite achievable: financial reports from these organizations show that they have a healthy financial balance every year. The cooperatives even have annual profits from irrigation services (20-100 millions VND/year, or ≈ 1,000 – 5,000 USD/year)125. The discussions with the leaders of the IDMCs and the cooperatives, however, indicate that the revenues generated from irrigation services are insufficient to cover the needed expenses for irrigation such as labor cost, maintenance, and management. By contrast, the report from MARD assessing the results of the two-year implementation of the exemption of water fees indicates that IDMCs have become financially autonomous as a positive consequence of this policy (MARD, 2011). What is the true position? The following section will demonstrate the actual financial situation of the IDCMs and the cooperatives.
7.1.1 Irrigation and Drainage Management Companies
As defined in the legal documents126 revenues of IDMCs are generated from different sources: (i) the state subsidies for water fees for irrigation services; (ii) fees collected from other water users (non-irrigators); (iii) the state budget for maintenance of irrigation systems; (iv) the state’s subsidy when revenue generated from irrigation and drainage services are not enough to cover expenses; and (v) other revenues from various activities. The major part of these revenues is from the state’s subsidy due to the remission of water fees. Their expenses127 include salary and related expenses, materials for operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, rehabilitation and upgrading of infrastructure, electricity and fuels, company management, training, scientific research, and technology application, flood control and others. The expenses for operation and maintenance (O&M) activities come directly from the state budget, instead
125 Results from the field survey conducted in the Tay Ninh IDMC, the Nam Thach Han IME, and selected cooperatives in the same areas 126 Ordinance 2001 and Decree 115/2008/ND-CP (14/11/2008) 127 Circular 11/2009/TT-BTC (21/01/2009)
200 of from farmers as before due to the exemption of water fees. The intention with this change is to ensure that IDMCs have an adequate budget for the improved quality of irrigation services and maintenance of systems. The concern of this study is to see how that works in reality. The annual revenues of all IDMCs began to increase in 2008, when the first policy of remission of water fees (Decree 154) came into force. But the big jumps for all IDMCs have taken place since 2009 when the current policy came into force (Decree 115). Figure 7.1 gives an example of the increased revenues of some IDMCs in the period 2007-2010128.
Revenue of IDMCs in 2007-2010 (unit: million VND) 60,000 50,000 Hue 40,000 Tay Ninh 30,000 Quang Binh 20,000 Quang Tri 10,000 Binh Dinh 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 7.1. Increased revenues of IDMCs for the period 2007-2010 (Source: Financial reports of IDMCs in 2007-2011)
As Figure 7.1 shows, all the selected examples exhibit drastic increases in revenues, about 2-2.5 fold over the last five years (2007-2011). The revenues of the Tay Ninh IDMC grew from 24 billion VND in 2007 to 58 billion VND in 2011 (2.4 times). The revenues for Quang Tri IDMC rose 1.4 fold (from about 17.6 billion VND to 24 billion VND). The revenues for Nam Thach Han IME, the sub-unit of Quang Tri IDMC, increased from 9 billion VND in 2008 to 10.5 billion VND in 2011 (1.1 times). Other IDMCs, such as the Hue, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai IDMCs, exhibit growth of between 1.8 and 2.5 fold.
128 IDMCs Hue, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh are not included in the study. They are shown here as the examples in order to see a pattern in increased revenues of IDMCs
201 The jumps in increased revenues are not congruent between individual IDMCs. For example, those of the Binh Dinh IDMC and Quang Tri IDMC were at same level in 2008 (about 17.8 billion VND) but have behaved differently since then. In Binh Dinh they almost doubled in 2011 in comparison with Quang Tri IDMC (44 billion VND compared to 24 billion VND). Some IDMCs have much bigger jumps than others, especially those with large irrigated areas, located in the southeast region, such as the Tay Ninh and Binh Dinh IDMCs. For example, revenues for both of these increased about 2.5 times in this period. All these examples suggest that the remission of water fees should make a significant impact towards increasing the revenues of IDMCs. In the Tay Ninh IDMC, before the remission of water fees, the revenues from collected water fees were about 778 million VND in 2006 and about 260 million in 2005. As a consequence of the current policy on water fees, the revenue in 2011 increased to a figure 74 times greater than that in 2006. Since revenues have increased year by year, the leaders and staff in the studied IDMCs all refer to positive impacts taking the form of increased resources for salary, management, and system maintenance.
There are two causes for the growth in the revenues of IDMCs: the first one is that water fees stipulated in Decree 115 are about 2.3 times higher in comparison with those regulated in Decree 143 (2003)129. The second one is that the irrigated area has increased significantly in most of the irrigation systems. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, infrastructure has been upgraded as a consequence of the recent rehabilitation projects. Secondly, a large irrigated area, that was previously hidden by local organizations and farmers, has now become registered in the contracts. Figure 7.2 shows that for the case of Nam Thach Han IME, the irrigated area has increased for both winter-spring and autumn-summer crops from about 5,500 ha in 2006 to approx. 8,500 ha in 2011. The irrigated area in Tay Ninh irrigation system increased dramatically during the period 2006 – 2011, especially in the autumn and winter crop seasons. The irrigated area for spring rice has risen from 45,000 ha in 2006 to 50,000 ha in 2011. For the autumn crop
129 The rates of water fees applied in Quang Tri were from 325 to 415 thousand VND/ha (in Decree 143 issued in 2003) and are now 866- 939 thousand VND/ha (in Decree 115 issued in 2008), depending on cropping seasons and irrigation methods. The rates of water fees applied in Tay Ninh were from 290 to 420 thousand VND/ha (Decree 143 in 2003) and are now 839-886 thousand VND/ha (Decree 115 in 2008)
202 season it has expanded from 26,000 ha to 35,000 ha, and for the winter crop season it extended from 22,000 to 36,700 ha (almost double). The total irrigated area for which IDMC Tay Ninh has been entitled to state subsidies in 2011 (121,800 ha), has grown about 30,000 ha in comparison with the area before the remission of water fees.
Irrigated area (ha) in Nam Thach Irrigated area (ha) in Tay Ninh Han system (2006-2011) system (2006-2011)
60,000 9,000 8,000 40,000 7,000 20,000 6,000 5,000 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Spring - Winter season Spring rice Autumn rice Autum Summer season Winter rice
Figure 7.2. The change of irrigated area in the studied IDMCs (Source: The IDMCs in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri, 2011)
Looking into expenditures in both cases, it can be observed that costs of salaries, maintenance of irrigation systems, and management all have risen; especially expenditure for salary and management. Comparing the level of expenditure in 2011 with that of 2008, expenditures for salary increased about 1.8 fold in Tay Ninh IDMC130, and about two fold in Quang Tri IDMC131. These increases have followed the increased minimum wage regulated by the government during the period 2003-2012132. The
130 Expenditure for salary in Tay Ninh increased from about 9.4 bill VND in 2008 to 16.4 bill VND in 2011. Maintenance expenditure increased from about 659 mill VND in 2008 to 12 bill VND in 2011 131 Expenditure for salary in Quang Tri increased from 7.4 bill VND to 14.4 bill VND. In Nam Thach Han IME, this expenditure increased from 2.7 bill VND in 2008 to 5 bill VND in 2011. Maintenance expenditure increased from about 1 bill VND in 2008 to 2 bill VND in Quang Tri, and by 700-800 mill VND for Nam Thach Han IME 132 During the period of 2003-2012, GoV adjusted the minimum wage for government staff 8 times: in 2003: 210,000 VND; from Jan 2004: 290,000 VND; from Oct 2005: 350,000 VND, from Oct 2006: 450,000 VND, from Jan 2008: 540,000 VND, from May 2009: 650,000 VND, from May 2011: 830,000 VND, May 2012: 1,050,000 VND
203 expenses for management have grown about seven fold in Tay Ninh IDMC and about 1.4 times in Quang Tri IDMC.
There is a common pattern for many IDMCs of the country after the exemption of water fees: the proportion of the total expenditure allotted to salaries increased exponentially when revenues increased significantly, but the cost for maintenance does not change much, even remained unchanged. The proportion for salaries in Quang Tri IDMC and its sub-unit, Nam Thach Han IME, grew from 40% in 2008 to about 60% in 2011. The proportion in the Tay Ninh IDMC rose from 20% to about 33% over the same period. In contrast to a linear salary increase, the expenditure on maintenance in Quang Tri IDMC and Nam Thach Han IME remained at between 7% and 9% of the total expenditure just as before the remission of water fees. This proportion is far too low to meet the requirements of MARD. MARD requires that 20-30% of the total expenses should be used for the maintenance and repair of irrigation systems133. This pattern (i.e. proportionally high spending on salary while maintenance receives a low proportion) is quite common in many IDMCs in Vietnam (MARD, 2010; Nguyen X.T., 2010; Hoang, 2011). For instance, the financial reports in 2011 of six IMEs belonging to the ADB project in the Central Region134 all show that 50-60% of total expenditure was used for salary, and only about 4-13% for maintenance (Figure 7.3).
The key informants of the Quang Tri IDMC and the Nam Thach Han IME argue that the current revenues cover only about 50-60% of the needed expenses. Since revenues are not adequate to cover maintenance, some expenses (e.g. salary and management costs) must be met since they are indispensable ones that cannot be reduced. Maintenance and the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure have to be delayed if there is not enough money. Their opinion is that the current rates of water fees regulated by the state cannot be considered as realistic.
133 Decision 211 (1998) guiding maintenance of hydraulic works 134 The Central water resources project, 223 VIE (SF), the Asian Development Bank loan, has been implemented during the period 2007-2011 to improve irrigation management systems and upgrade the irrigation infrastructure in six sub-projects belonging to six provinces in the central region; Thanh Hoa, Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh
204 Nam Thach Han IME Tay Ninh IDMC 100% 100
80% Management 80 Management
60% Maintenance & 60 Maintenance rehalibitation 40% 40 Electricity, energy Electricity, 20% 20 energy Salary, social insurance 0 Salary, social 0% insurance 2008 2008 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Binh Dinh IDMC Quang Tri IDMC 100 100% Management Management 80 80%
60 Maintenance & 60% Maintenance, rehalibitation rehalibitation 40 40% Electricity, Electricity, energy 20 energy 20% Salary, social 0% Salary, social 0 insurance insurance 2008 2008 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011
Proportions of salary and Hue IDMC mainternance of 6 IMEs
100 Management La Tinh 80 Trà Câu Maintenance Tay Nam Huong 60 Nam Thach Han Rehabilitation Th ng M 40 ượ ỹ Thạch thành 20 Electricity, energy 0 50 100 % salary in total expenses 0 Salary, social 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 insurance % maintenance in total
Figure 7.3. Proportions of expenses of IDMCs (Source: MWH, 2011)
Even though fees have increased about 2.3 times in comparison with the rates applied in 2003, they have not followed the increasing expenses for minimum wages regulated by the government (8 times during the period of
205 2003-2012), inflation (about 18% in 2011), electricity, and fuels (about 3 times). Many IDMCs, including Quang Tri and Nam Thach Han IME, have to balance their expenses within a too limited budget. In contrast to the situation of the IDMCs mentioned above, in reality, many IDMCs, especially in the Mekong River delta (such as Long An, Hau Giang, An Giang, Dong Thap, and Kien Giang) have been able to draw on the substantial subsidies from the government because the size of the subsidies is based on the size of the irrigated area they serve. In the situation where these IDMCs could not utilize the whole budget for maintenance, they have looked for creative ways to use these subsidies for capital construction investment such as canal lining, rehabilitation, and new construction of small scale schemes (MARD, 2010). This is not appropriate because, according to the government regulation of financial management, water fees are to be used solely for the O&M expenses. But it occurs nevertheless.
The Tay Ninh IDMC is one example. Expenses for major repairs and upgrading of infrastructure increased about 40 fold135 here while it only doubled in Quang Tri IDMC136. Since the water fees subsidies from the state budget are quite considerable, decisions taken by the PPC that allow the Tay Ninh IDMC to use a large proportion of these budgets for rehabilitation of the irrigation systems, are significant. This can be interpreted as a win- win solution for both the province and the IDMC because the PPC saves provincial income for other purposes, and the IDMC can access the budget to upgrade infrastructure. The IDMC’s financial report presents how the provincial budget for irrigation rehabilitation has decreased to one-third (from 9.6 billion VND in 2007 to 3.3 billion in 2011).
This situation occurring in Tay Ninh or other provinces in the South illustrates an imbalance between provinces. The main reason is that the rates of water fees defined in the current water fees policy (Decree 115) are unreasonably low in comparison with the real costs in the markets since these rates have been estimated based on outdated norms/unit costs. But not only that, Decree 115 is also seen as negative in that it does not
135 Expense for maintenance in the Tay Ninh IDMC increased from about 300 million VND in 2007 and 659 million in 2008 to 12 billion VND in 2011 136 Expense for maintenance in Quang Tri IDMC increased from about 1.4 billion VND in 2008 to 2.2 billion VND in 2011
206 create enough incentives for IDMCs to save and use financial sources effectively in all their activities. Firstly, DOFs do not allow the IDMCs to be flexible and adjust their expenses within an approved budget. With the mechanism of line item budgeting, companies cannot shift funds from one item to another. Secondly, the complicated financial procedures for returning money to the state budget encourage expenditure rather than saving in the IDMCs. If they return money, IDMCs also face difficulties in claiming an extended budget for the next year if they do not show there is a linear improvement in their business every year.
An important message is that the levels of financial autonomy of the IDMCs vary due to the implications of the policies. Since the major part of the revenues comes from the state’s budget, the IDMCs hardly perform autonomously because the provincial actors have strong influences on the budget allocation and management of financial resources (as analyzed in Chapter 6). The financial reports from the studied IDMCs show a good balance between annual expenses and revenues because the IDMCs have had to cut O&M expenses to a non-sustainable level. The book keeping, therefore, does not imply that IDMCs have become financially autonomous in the long run since revenues are inadequate and do not cover all expenses for maintenance works. This situation calls for more subsidy from the state budget in order to meet the policy’s intention; that is, to improve the IDMCs’ performance towards financial reliability and autonomy.
A critical issue has emerged: the exemption of water fees has created more financial burdens on the state budgets. Figure 7.4 illustrates the total state budgets that have been allocated for water fees in six regions during the period 2008 - 2011. The total budgets have increased every year, from 1,563 billion VND in 2008 to 3,141 billion VND in 2009, to 3,658 billion VND in 2010, and to 4,978 billion VND in 2011 (MARD, 2011). It also presents how the annual state budgets for water fees have increased in the six regions in comparison with 2008.
207
2000 1800 1600 1400 NorthMountain 1200 RedDelta 1000 CoastalZone 800 600 Central highlands 400 East South 200 MekongDelta 0 2008 2009 2010 2011
Regions 2009/2008 2010/2008 2011/2008 Northern midland and mountain area 2.4 2.6 3.0 Red River Delta 1.9 2.1 2.1 North Central area and Central coastal area 2.0 2.1 2.2 Central Highlands 2.4 3.4 4.1 South East 1.6 1.8 2.2 Mekong River Delta 2.1 3.7 9.5 Whole country in average 2.0 2.3 3.2
Figure 7.4. The state budgets for subsidizing water fees in 2009, 2010 and 2011 during 2008-2010137 (Unit: billions VND) (Source: MARD, 2010a)
The average budget in 2011 over the whole country was more than three times higher than that in 2008 when the policy of the remission of water fees was enforced. The budgets in 2011 for IDMCs in Red River Delta, North Central area and Central coastal area, and South East regions more than doubled. The budgets in Northern midland and mountain area, and Central Highlands, respectively, were three and four fold higher, whilst that for the Mekong River Delta increased sharply, to 9.5 times greater in 2011 than in 2008). These trends are of great concern at operation levels since the budgets for IDMCs vary significantly between regions. The growing budgets become a more and more heavy burden for the state. Decentralization has failed in one of its main aims: it has not brought about a reduction in the state budget for the operation, management and maintenance of irrigation systems.
137 The remission of water fees started in 2008
208 7.1.2 Cooperatives
The revenues of a cooperative are generated from its services. It means that it strives to rely on self-financing through its own activities. As described in Chapter 4, agricultural services cooperatives usually provide 6-10 different services (e.g. irrigation, plant protection, agricultural extension, materials for agricultural production, land preparation, paddy seeds, veterinary, forestry, electricity provision, credit) while irrigation service cooperatives only provide an irrigation service. Cooperatives in Nam Thach Han (Quang Tri) and Tay Ninh are examples of these two types of cooperatives in rural areas of Vietnam. In general, revenues from the irrigation service are generated mainly from on-farm fees. Some of the cooperatives in Nam Thach Han receive an extra amount shared with Nam Thach Han IME for those areas where cooperatives have to use pumps to deliver water to entire systems. This extra payment does not, however, account for any significant portion of the cooperatives’ total revenue (about 0-20%, see Figure 4.10). In Tay Ninh, on-farm fees are not applied, and therefore cooperatives and irrigation teams are completely dependent on the payments (8%) from the IDMC. By assessing the financial situation of these cooperatives, I also seek an explanation to two concerns: whether multi-service cooperatives are more autonomous than single-service cooperatives in finance, and whether cooperatives become more autonomous when their finance is less dependent on the IDMCs. Revenues generated from irrigation services in the selected cooperatives in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh could give an answer. They are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
The information in these tables gives an overview of the financial situation of the cooperatives. The revenues of 13 cooperatives in Quang Tri vary from 30 to 364 million VND per year (≈1,500-18,000 USD/year), and profits vary from 5 to 100 million VND per year (≈250-5,000 USD/year). The revenues for 21 cooperatives in Tay Ninh138 range from 6 to 95 million VND/year. Almost all have revenues of 20-50 million VND/year. While only one cooperative in Tay Ninh has revenues of 95 million VND, half of the cooperatives in Quang Tri have revenues above 100 million VND.
138 These irrigation cooperatives were established under the WB project (twelve in Chau Thanh district, and nine in Trang Bang district)
209 Table 7.1 Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 13 cooperatives in Nam Thach Han irrigation system, Quang Tri province
Cooperatives (commune) Irrigated area in Revenue Expenditure Profits service/season (million (million (million (ha) VDN) VND) VND) Nai Cuu (Trieu Dong) 114 177 155 22 Dai Hao (Trieu Dai) 126 158 Luong Kim (Trieu Phuoc) 119 364 264 100 Co Luy (Hai Ba) 98 92 Hoi Yen (Hai Que) 92 72 Tien Phong Dong (Hai 354 260 94 Thien) 100 Trung Don (Hai Thanh) 195 353 323 29 Da Nghi (Hai Ha) 60 65 31 33 An Hung (Trieu Tai) 60 72 55 17 Thuan Nhon (Hai Vinh) 40 38 24 14 Ta Huu (Trieu Tai) 28 31 25 5 Phuong Hai (Hai Ba) 167 266 239 27 Thi Ong (Hai Vinh) 152 170 145 25 (Source: Interviews with cooperatives in Nam Thach Han system, 2011)
Table 7.2 Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 21 cooperatives in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts, Tay Ninh province
Total irrigated Cooperatives Total
Cooperatives area in 3 in Trang Bang irrigated area
in Chau Thanh paddy in 3 paddy VND) (million Revenue seasons (ha) Revenue (million VND) seasons (ha) Dong Khoi II 535 31 Thanh Cong 1,215 41 Dong Khoi III 935 53 Loc Chau 1,300 59 Dong Khoi IV 730 41 Loc Hoa 823 42 Dong Khoi V 690 41 Loc Thanh 381 16 Dong Khoi VI 380 22 Gia Binh 579 32 Thai Binh I 459 29 Loc Khe 877 36 Thai Binh II 1,700 95 GIa Tan 499 24 Thai Binh III 177 10 Lam Huynh 357 15 Thanh Dien 883 56 Van Thang 156 6 An Binh I 531 33 An Binh II 767 47 Tri Binh 485 28 (Source: Interviews with cooperatives in Tay Ninh system, 2011)
210 Those cooperatives serving irrigated areas of 150-190 ha (per cropping season) have annual revenues reaching a level of 150-250 million VND in Quang Tri while they stay at about 30 million VND in Tay Ninh. It means that with the same irrigated area, the cooperatives in Quang Tri can generate more income from irrigation services than those in Tay Ninh. Consider the budget balances. Of the total expenses of cooperatives for irrigation service, salary accounts for a very large proportion (40-80% in Nam Thach Han, and almost 100% in Tay Ninh), even though the salary level is quite low. Salary paid to the members of cooperatives is 0.6-1.2 million VND/month (≈ 30-60 USD/month) and to water deliverers (thuy nong vien) is 0.2-1 million VND (≈10-50 USD/month), paid only 6-9 months of the year (only during cropping seasons). This salary level is about one- third of that of a junior worker in the IDMCs. The expenses for maintenance of the irrigation systems are about 10-30% of the total expense in Nam Thach Han. The depreciation expenses for pumping stations are very limited in almost all of the studied cooperatives139. In Tay Ninh there are no specified expenses for depreciation, because they are included in the budget post for salaries. This level is a long way from reaching the requirements of MARD which say that at least 80% of total expenses should be used for maintenance140.
100% 80% Other 60% 40% Training, meetings, 20% stationary Salary 0%
Electricity
Maintenance
Figure 7.5 Proportion of expenditures for irrigation service in Nam Thach Han (Source: Field survey in Quang Tri in 2011)
139 One leader of cooperative says: “we have a budget of six million VND for repairing two pumps per year but it excludes the depreciation. If the pumps break down, it would be a big problem for us because there is no money to buy new ones. We are aware of this but there is no solution since revenues generated from irrigation are too low” 140 Circular 75 (2004)
211 Figure 7.5 is an example showing how the selected cooperatives in Quang Tri spend resources on salary, electricity and fuels for pumping station, maintenance, and management. In general, the cooperatives located at the tail-end of irrigation systems use large proportions of the budget (about 70%) on salaries, since much labor must be mobilized to deliver water. The expenditures for management, training, and meetings are consequently very small (1-13%). The finding reflects the fact that both types of cooperatives, multi-service and single-service, are not autonomously financed from irrigation service delivery. Having noted that, the financial situation of the cooperatives in Nam Thach Han seems less dependent than that in Tay Ninh but both of them depend financially on the payments from the IDMCs. The situation puts the cooperatives in a vulnerable financial position.
These findings also show that there are misleading assessments of the autonomy of IDMCs and cooperatives. In fact, while net profits are shown as positive in the financial reports of these organizations, the evidence shows that the revenues from irrigation services are inadequate to cover the O&M expenses needed to ensure cooperatives operate properly. All expenses are squeezed into the very limited budget: salary has first priority and maintenance is dropped because there is no money left for it. The limited revenues force cooperatives to pay salaries and maintenance expenses at rock-bottom levels. This leads to unsustainable irrigation management in the long run because of inadequate maintenance as suggested in many previous studies (cf. Vermillion, 1997; Abernethy et al., 2000; Turral & Malano, 2002; Samad, 2002; Gulati & Narayanan, 2002; Mukherji et al., 2009a). Furthermore, financial dependency would also affect the incentive and accountability of local organizations in implementing decentralization (Merrey, 1996) (as will be discussed in Chapter 8).
7.2 Accountability and transparency
Accountability has, in theory, two directions: upward and downward. Upward accountability concerns whether the actor performs in compliance with regulations, rules and laws. Downward accountability relates to how
212 the results/services the actor is assigned to deliver may appear (Anderson et al., 2009). In the case of IDMCs and cooperatives, upward accountability is translated as compliance with laws and regulations in the operation and management of irrigation systems, as well as in the implementation of the decisions made by PPC and the provincial departments. Downward accountability in practice requires local organizations and IDMCs to provide good water services with which farmers are satisfied.
In assessing the performance of the studied IDMCs and cooperatives, semi- structured interviews have been conducted to access the opinions of farmers and cooperatives on key issues such as water services delivery (quantity, timing and quality), conflict resolutions in water distribution, level of infrastructure maintenance and technical competence in the operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, as well as how well IDMCs’ staff and cooperatives reach out to interact with farmers (I call this the ‘democratic level’ in the questionnaires). To begin with, I shall present the results of these assessments in the studied IDMCs and cooperatives and then discuss the current mechanism for monitoring accountability, and its major constraints. The intention of these assessments is not to compare and measure differences between the two cases or between actors, but to register trends in change and the different perceptions of various actors when dealing with the same issues141.
7.2.1 State irrigation management companies
In the studied irrigation systems, two recent rehabilitation projects have been earmarked to receive prime attention for the improvement of irrigation performance. The final assessments of the impacts of the projects in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability have not yet been reported, but two assessments of two projects were made at the end of 2011 (REEN.JSC, 2011 and MWH, 2011). The opinion of the key informants in the IDMCs is that since irrigation systems operate more efficiently, the number of times irrigation is undertaken and the length of each irrigation time can be decreased. For instance, in the Nam Thach Han system, the
141 A comparative study that measures differences between attitudes would require a different design, including bigger samples
213 number of scheduled irrigation periods may be decreased from 11-12 times to 10 times for Spring paddy (lua dong xuan), and from 13-14 times to 12 times for Autumn paddy (lua he thu). In both cases the irrigated area has been increased significantly as described in the previous section.
During interviews, farmers and local organizations have noted general improvements in water services, in both quantity and equity, decreased conflict over water, shortened times for each irrigation schedule (2 days instead of 4-5 days as before), and more ambitious water saving (5-7% of water is saved in comparison with the past). Of the total number of respondents, 75% in Tay Ninh and 50% in Nam Thach Han think that irrigation services have improved, whilst 20% of those in Tay Ninh and 50% in Nam Thach Han assess the quality of service as the same as before. Almost all respondents are of the opinion that the maintenance of irrigation systems is the same as before, when water fees were collected.
Performance of staff of Tay Ninh Performance of staff of Tay Ninh IDMC IDMC assessed by farmers assessed by cooperatives
Responsible 45% 60% 95% Competent 100% Easy to talk 45% 70% Listerning 40% 50% good services 15% 10%
Performance of staff of Nam Thach Performance of staff of Nam Thach Han IME assessed by farmers Han IME assessed by cooperatives
89% 85% 100% 100% 56% 40% 78% 50% 78% 35%
Figure 7.6. The performance of IDMC’s staff is assessed by interviewed farmers and cooperatives (Source: Field survey 2010)
214 Figure 7.6 presents the assessment by farmers and cooperatives of the performance of IDMCs through a range of indicators. In general, farmer respondents have a lower regard for the performance of IDMCs’ staff than cooperative respondents. Higher scores were awarded in Nam Thach Han where about 85% of respondents (both farmers and cooperatives) think that the IDMC’s staff provides a good irrigation service. By contrast, in Tay Ninh, only about 45% of the farmers and 60% of cooperatives in the survey think that the IDMC’s staff performs well in irrigation service delivery. When considering competence and the democratic level of IDMCs’ staff, the cooperatives generally show a more positive appreciation than the farmers do. Among the cooperatives, 78% in Nam Thach Han and 50% in Tay Ninh consider that the IDMCs’ staff is competent.
Only about 50% of the farmer respondents in Nam Thach Han, and as few as 10% in Tay Ninh, think that the IDMCs’ staff is competent. When discussing the democratic level of the IDMCs’ staff, more than half of cooperatives (50% in Tay Ninh, 78% in Nam Thach Han) think that the staff of IDMCs/IMEs is sympathetic to farmers and easy to talk with, that they pay attention and listen to farmers’ opinions, and are willing to help solve problems when needed. However, only 15% of farmers in Tay Ninh and 35% in Nam Thach Han are of the opinion that interaction with the IDMCs’ staff is easy. The outcome of this interaction is in line with the studies in the literature arguing the importance of good communication, and of information sharing in transparent ways.
7.2.2 Cooperatives
The accountability of cooperatives has been assessed in two different ways in this study; (i) self-assessment by the leaders of cooperatives in three group discussions in the two irrigation systems (Figure 7.7), and (ii) the opinions of farmers in questionnaires (Figure 7.8). From the leaders’ point of view (Figure 7.7), almost all of the studied cooperatives (90%) think that they are accountable and transparent in irrigation service delivery. They believe they establish good relationships between IDMCs and farmers through cooperation and collaboration (100%). They also believe that they perform well in irrigation service delivery and in the maintenance of irrigation systems (100% in Quang Tri and 90% in Tay Ninh).
215 In Quang Tri 0. Unacceptable level Limited 1. level Medium 2. Note: 3. High level
100% 80% 60% - – - Satisfaction but some scope needed for improvement, for needed scope some but Satisfaction Drastic improvements needed (undesirable status) (undesirable needed improvements Drastic 40% improv for needs significantly performance, Poor – 20% effective, Highly 0%
In Tay Ninh 100% 80% 60% limited 40% level medium 20% level
0% high level ement,
Figure 7.7. Institutional capacity and performance of the cooperatives are assessed by the cooperatives themselves (Source: Key group discussions in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han, in 2011)
From the farmers’ point of view (Figure 7.8), 55% of those in the interviews in Nam Thach Han, and 90% of those in Tay Ninh assess the management boards of the cooperatives as responsive. About half of all the interviewees in both cases are satisfied with the irrigation services provided by the cooperatives. Negative opinions come from farmers whose plots are located at tail-end canals in Tay Ninh. Some of these claim that the cooperatives do not take the lead in the mobilization of labor contribution for maintenance as they should, and therefore that the work is not done properly. Unclear tasks and a blurred boundary between IDMCs and cooperatives are mentioned by farmers as reasons why cooperatives refuse to conduct maintenance, arguing that this work belongs to IDMC.
216 Performance of cooperatives in Performance of cooperatives in Tay Quang Tri by farmers Ninh by farmers
Responsible Responsible 40% 55% 55% Competent 90% Competent Easy to talk Easy to talk 70% 55% Listerning Listerning 5% 0% good services good services 20% 10%
Figure 7.8. The performance of the cooperatives is assessed by farmers (Source: Interviews with farmers)
This difference in the background explains the variations in opinions between the two; more farmers in Nam Thach Han are dissatisfied with the irrigation service provided by the cooperatives. This is so because water delivery is more difficult in the Nam Thach Han system than in the Tay Ninh system because some cultivated areas have to be pumped due to a lack of water sources. The cooperatives in Nam Thach Han must therefore make greater efforts in irrigation service delivery than those in Tay Ninh. In addition, the farmers interviewed in both cases are demanding of the cooperatives because, from their point of view, the cooperatives receive the state subsidy and should therefore perform properly. The different assessments by cooperatives and farmers of the quality of irrigation services delivery and maintenance reflect their different key concerns. The general conclusion is that local organizations seem unaware of the need to deliver better service provision in order to meet the needs and expectations of farmers. Only 10% of cooperatives consider that they need to further improve their performance.
Of the farmer respondents in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh, 55% and 70%, respectively, consider that the cooperative management boards listen to the farmers’ opinions and respond to the farmers’ needs relating to services in agricultural production. For instance, cooperatives can deliver the fertilizers that farmers prefer to use, and delay payments from farmers until the end of the cropping seasons. However, farmers raise two critical
217 points on the performance of cooperatives: limited capacity and lack of openness. Almost none and 20% of interviewees in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh, respectively, believe that the management boards have sufficient competence in irrigation technical and management skills. Farmers mention the limited routes of communication and the low degree of transparency of information when cooperatives interact with farmers. Asymmetry of information and of technical skills in O&M of irrigation systems is an obstacle for farmers and local organizations. These will be discussed further in the section about farmers’ participation. A lack of openness and transparency makes it hard for farmers to monitor and evaluate the performance of cooperatives or to put pressure on cooperatives for improved accountability. The lack of fair and democratic elections, sufficient professional capacity, and transparent information for monitoring and enforcement, therefore, hampers the downward accountability of cooperatives (Merrey, 1996; Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Harrison, 2003).
In the studied cases, there are several such constraints that are likely to affect the accountability of local organizations. One is the intervention of local authorities in the selection of members of cooperative’s management boards, a practice that gets little support from farmers. These persons who work for local authorities and cooperative’s management boards have other specializations, and limited knowledge and experience in irrigation delivery and maintenance. Being involved elsewhere, they also do not have adequate time for their tasks in irrigation. Furthermore, low incomes affect incentive and the accountability of persons who work for local organizations. The inadequate financial situation of cooperatives allows them to pay only limited salaries to members of management boards and irrigation teams. Water deliverers receive low salaries (0.2-1 million VND, ≈10-50 USD/month), paid in the prime cropping seasons (6-9 months per year). All payments cover costs required to conduct the jobs (e.g. petrol for motorbikes and allowances) and include labor for maintenance activities such as grass cutting and canal dredging. This level of payment has a strong negative effect on the motivation of these persons to work for cooperatives and irrigation teams. According to farmers in Tay Ninh, due to the current low income level, some water deliverers refuse to deliver water during the weekend even though farmers actually need to water the fields. The
218 message is obvious; limited income is another factor affecting the incentive and accountability of persons working for irrigation teams or cooperatives. The Tay Ninh example brings out the key difficulties for cooperatives: that their accountability to the farmers (consumers of their services) may be reduced by financial pressure from the IDMC, and that the budget volume is so small that it may inhibit the motivation of the cooperatives.
7.2.3 Mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing accountability
Recent research on accountability argues that the accountability of service providers will be enhanced if they are exposed to strong pressure, monitoring, and enforcement from external actors (cf. Harrison, 2003; WB, 2004; FAO, 2006, Peters, 2007). Following these suggestions, I shall examine if effective mechanisms for improving accountability exist in the IDMCs and local organizations in this section. By discussing how their performance is monitored and enforced by others, I will point out the main constraints in the current mechanism, which I argue, would lead to uncertainty about the ways in which the actors perform.
IDMC’s accountability monitored by cooperatives and provincial actors
In design, the performance of an IDMC is monitored and enforced by both the local organizations and the state management agencies at provincial level. At present, IDMCs’ performance is evaluated by the local organizations through a final acceptance report certifying that the IDMC fulfilled the tasks to deliver good services after each crop season. This evaluation is used as the basis on which provincial authorities and the state decide on the annual subsidy for the operation and maintenance expenses of the IDMC. At first glance the design suggests a power shift to lower organizations. In this sense, decentralization sounds good in that local organizations are used to monitor and evaluate the performance of IDMCs.
However, there is a serious drawback. Dependency between these actors as described previously (Section 6.3) leads to a situation in which the interests of both are best served by positive evaluations. In addition to this catch, general local social pressure causes local organizations to hold back criticism. Actors live close to each other. Establishing good friendships is
219 therefore necessary in the social interaction. In fact, during the survey, I find contradictory messages in the assessment of the accountability of IDMCs by local organizations. The results of the interviews show that the accountability of staff is scored highly by cooperatives and local irrigation teams in both cases. But during the key group discussions, many leaders of cooperatives and irrigation teams express their dissatisfaction with the irrigation service provided by the IDMCs. They still give a good evaluation for IDMCs in the final acceptance report. What I learn from the informal discussions with the cooperatives provides a good explanation for this contradiction. When cooperatives’ revenues strongly depend on IDMCs, cooperatives do not have any other options. The drawback of the policy is that local organizations are unable to perform as external controllers who can force IDMCs to perform better.
Another concern is how the accountability of IDMCs is monitored and evaluated by PPCs and the line ministry agencies at provincial level. These actors have the power to assign annual business and financial plans to IDMCs. They need, in principle, a set of socio-economic and technical norms for budgetary control as well as for M&E of IDMCs’ performance. But in reality these kinds of norms are missing in many provinces or have become outdated. As a result, it has become difficult for PPCs and the provincial departments to establish a performance-based accountability assessment mechanism. State agencies use an indicator of inrrigated areas that IDMCs can provide services when they evaluate IDMCS’ performance. However, the certified reports made by cooperatives brings drawback as discussed above. The conclusion is that there is in reality no external pressure on IDMCs to perform accountably. Such pressure is missing from both provincial and local organizations. Monitoring, enforcement and pressure as recommended in the literature are necessary conditions for improving the accountability of service providers (Harrison, 2003). So far they are not forthcoming.
Cooperative’s accountability monitored by IDMCs and farmers
In the case of cooperatives, their performance should, in principle, be monitored and enforced by IDMCs and by farmers. From the farmers’ position, since they hardly access information in a transparent way due to
220 the limited communication, it is difficult to monitor and evaluate the performance of cooperatives (which will be discussed further in the next Section 7.3). From the IDMCs’ position, as discussed in previous sections, cooperatives are under strong pressure from IDMCs and are financially dependent on the IDMCs. The current design142, with its dependency consequences, creates pressure to push local organizations to fulfill their tasks and perform accountably at the local irrigation management level. The case in Tay Ninh is a telling example. Under the “militant” approach of the Tay Ninh IDMC and district IMEs, irrigation teams and cooperatives are forced to fulfill four tasks in order to receive the 8% from the IDMC at the end of the cropping season. These tasks are to sign water contracts with farmers, deliver water, cut the grass along canals (8 times/cropping season or every 1.5 month), and carry out canal dredging. The IDMC pays the local organizations only when they accept the results, otherwise they delay the payment.
From the view of IDMCs’ staff, this approach is quite effective since they can control the performance of local organizations through the payment, as they are the only source of finance for local organizations. However, from the point of view of local organizations, the situation becomes very stressful under this pressure. The pressure from the IDMCs can push local organizations to perform according to the contracts between them, but it is not necessarily providing a facilitating condition for them to be accountable to farmers. If service providers are not autonomous in organization, personnel management, and finance, they are upwardly accountable to actors on whom they depend, instead of downwardly accountable to their customers (Ostrom et al., 1993; Merrey, 1996).
In short, the accountability of irrigation service providers is an essential factor affecting the outcome of decentralization, as indicated in the literature. The farmer respondents have quite a low regard for the performance of the IDMCs and the cooperatives on service delivery, technical skills in the operation and maintenance of systems, and the level of democratic interactions with farmers. Only about half of the respondents in both cases are satisfied with the irrigation service provided by the
142 As described in Chapter 4, the Nam Thach Han IME pays 60% of water fees they receive from the state budget to the cooperatives. The Tay Ninh IDMC pays 8% of water fees to cooperatives
221 IDMCs and the cooperatives. In assessing the competence of IDMCs’ staff and the cooperatives’ management boards, farmers’ opinions, as expressed in the interviews, show that few of them have a strong belief in the technical and management skills of either IDMCs’ staff or the cooperatives. Openness and transparency of both IDMCs’ staff and the cooperatives in interactions with farmers is another critical point that is raised by the farmer respondents. In comparison with the opinions of farmers, the cooperatives have a higher regard for the performance of the IDMCs’s staff. They are also satisfied with their own performance, as assessed through self-evaluation.
At first glance, the mechanism for monitoring the accountability appears to involve a power shift to local levels combined with external controls from different actors. However, there is a serious drawback, in practice, with monitoring. As a consequence of the financial dependency between the IDMCs and farmers, the roles of cooperatives, in monitoring and enforcing the performance of the IDMCs, are blocked. This is due to the current water fees policy and the methods of payments from IDMCs to cooperatives. Moreover, a lack of openness and transparency between actors, is another obstacle that hinders the monitoring of the performance of IDMCs and cooperatives. With shortcomings such as lack of strong pressure, monitoring, and enforcement from external actors, there is no effective mechanism for improved accountability (cf. Harrison, 2003; WB, 2004; FAO, 2006, Peters, 2007). This study points out that the policy design creates a situation of financial dependency, resulting in uncertainty in the ways that actors interact, perform and monitor each other. Informal relations and social pressure bring farmers, cooperatives and irrigation teams in positions having to accept service quality as they are.
7.3 Farmers’ participation in decision-making
Participation and democracy at grassroots level are mentioned as requirements in the Vietnamese government’s policy and projects’ design financed by the international funding institutions (both grants and loans). The management perspective is that the participation by stakeholders at the different stages of the projects is a necessary condition that goes hand
222 in hand with infrastructure investment. In terms of project design and implementation, it is on a par with central and provincial policies on decentralization in irrigation that highlight participatory irrigation management, transferring the responsibilities of management, exploitation, and protection to the organizations/individuals at local level. The prime benefit of active participation by water users/farmers in making decisions in the activities of planning, implementation and monitoring is that “genuine owners” are established in irrigation management. The intention is therefore that irrigation systems will be managed and maintained in a sustainable manner, so that irrigation performance will improve.
The notion of “participation” occurs frequently in the agendas of projects concerning institutional capacity strengthening, but is still missing from the guidelines for implementation (Anderson et al., 2010). Implementation differs from project to project. It can vary with location, dependence on donor requirements, financial sources, the competence of project consultants or local staff, and the awareness of local authorities. The experience-based meaning of participation, as understood by farmers and local organizations in the interviews, relates to attending meetings and getting announcements/information from local authorities143. Since expectations are confined to this lowest degree of stakeholder interaction, the level of participation of local people and organizations is still very limited.
Participation is highlighted in policies. For example, grassroots democracy policy (Decree 79, 2003) requires that at least 50% of participants attend the meetings. The Ordinance of management and exploitation of hydraulic works (2001) states that the water users have the right to be involved in the development of plans (exploitation and protection plans, water use plans). The projects in rural infrastructure development and water sectors (for example, grants and loans from ADB, WB) have also emphasized the participation of local stakeholders as a necessary condition in the projects. The consultation process in planning and technical design (called participatory design) needs to be conducted in several rounds by consultants, interacting with local stakeholders (local authorities, farmers,
143 Interviews with farmers and leaders of cooperatives in Chau Thanh & Trang Bang districts Tay Ninh irrigation system, in Nam Thach Han irrigation system
223 local organizations and IDMCs). The projects with loans under ADB and WB usually require high levels of participation by local people in consultation meetings and training programs: for example in the two projects in the studied cases, at least 50-70% of households should be included and at least 40% of women involved in management boards of water users organizations. The numbers and percentages of participants in meetings, workshops, and training programs are considered to be a key indicator in evaluating the participation level in a project.
The Vietnam Development Report in 2010 (Anderson et al., 2009)144 concludes that hat grassroots democratization in Vietnam has been implemented for over more than ten years but that results do not seem impressive. The transparency of the processes and the active participation of local people in making the decisions are still limited. Even though “people’s right to know” is referred to in the regulation, people cannot access information about commune budgets and plans properly. About half of the interviewees have no knowledge, the majority knows very little or has very little information, and almost all of those who can access information complain that information about commune development plans does not correspond to what they need (ibid: 31). Local people are also obliged to participate in budgetary decisions, design and monitoring as well as in the planning and decision-making processes for the rural development projects145.
The survey conducted in 2012 by CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP shows that only two-thirds of respondents are aware of the slogan “people know, people discuss, people do, people control”, and that only one-third of the respondents participate in the public projects’ decision-making process (ibid.; 37 & 40). These outcomes are contrary to the democracy policy and to the legal provisions146 that require the communities to participate in the detailed investment master plans. On top of many reasons causing the limited participation, one concern is that people are not motivated. The
144 The assessments in this report also refer to the survey results from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2008 145 Report presented in the workshop “Development of appropriate approach for rural development in Vietnam”, October 2006 146 Such as the law of construction in 2004, Decree 8 in 2005
224 results of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey shows that only about 30% of the interviewed persons express an interest in commune socio-economic development plans and infrastructure investment plans (Anderson et al., 2010: 38). The current study has found similar patterns, particularly that participation by farmers in irrigation management is insufficient. The survey assesses the levels at which farmers can be involved in different stages of the irrigation project, and their attitudes during participation. Another focus is the constraints affecting farmer participation. The responses of farmers and local organizations in the semi- structured questionnaires show that farmers have participated at different stages in irrigation projects: planning, design & budgeting, construction, and operation & management (O&M), but only to a limited extent.
Figure 7.9 illustrates the opinions of farmers and local organizations participating in the survey147. The upper diagram gives the views of farmers while the lower diagram provides the views of local organizations on how farmers participate in irrigation projects. From a farmers’ viewpoint, it is mostly felt that they receive one-way information, and that there is no room for presenting their own opinions or even expressing these in discussions (82% of interviewees in Tay Ninh, 42% in Quang Tri). Few of the participants in Tay Ninh think they can ask questions, discuss or express opinions in planning (13% in Tay Ninh compared with 52% in Quang Tri).
Expressing opinions on the participatory design, participating in construction, and being involved in setting rules seems particularly limited in Tay Ninh where none of the farmers have such possibilities. The corresponding figures in Quang Tri are different; about half of respondents give positive answers. The number of persons who can participate in activities such as field investigation, monitoring during the construction period, management, operation, and maintenance is extremely low in the perception of interviewed farmers (below 10% in Tay Ninh, and 20-40% in Quang Tri).
147 The survey is conducted in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh province), and Trieu Phong and Hai Lang (Quang Tri province). The results presented here reflect only the opinions of interviewees in the current study, not the whole situation of systems or provinces
225 Views from farmers
100%
80%
60%
40%
20% Tay Ninh 0% Quang Tri
Views from cooperatives
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Tay Ninh Quang Tri
Figure 7.9. The participation by farmers: Views from farmers and local organizations (Source: Interviews with farmers and cooperatives in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han, in 2010 and 2011)
Many farmers acknowledge the ambition with community monitoring and evaluation, but many interviewees express that they have not been involved. Some of them have gone further and said that if they were allowed to be involved, they would not know what should be monitored. Many farmers believe that M&E is the duty of cooperatives. Some of them express clearly that the role of farmers in M&E is very weak even though they have good knowledge of water situations in the field. Such critical comments by the farmers on design matters receive no response from the construction companies or the project management units.
As Figure 7.9 shows, there is a big discrepancy between views of interviewed farmers and those of local organizations concerning the participation of farmers. Local organizations consider farmers to be active
226 in discussions and involved in selection of priorities (70% and 89% in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri, respectively), in designing (65% in both localities), in field investigation during the design stage (50% in Tay Ninh, 89% in Quang Tri), in monitoring of construction quality (25% in Tay Ninh, 89% in Quang Tri), and in management and O&M (40% in Tay Ninh, 100% in Quang Tri). They also think that farmers are actively involved in discussions and development of rules-in-use for the operation and management of irrigation systems. The reality shows that there are also other constraints that hamper the participation of farmers such as (i) dominating patterns in interaction, (ii) limited communication, information sharing and transparency in local meetings, (iii) motivations of farmers, and (iv) culture and passive attitudes. A process of learning-by-doing is therefore obviously hampered, as will be discussed in the following sections.
7.3.1 Dominating patterns of interaction
Farmers, IDMCs and cooperatives are the three actors on the local scene. Interactions are dominated by IDMCs and cooperatives. Dominating interactions, as described earlier, are the ways IDMCs control irrigation schedules, pre-printed contracts, and maintenance, and limit communication and information/knowledge sharing. IDMCs and cooperatives also use their influence to set the rules in irrigation management at the local level. This is reflected in farmers’ views in the survey: 100% of farmers in Tay Ninh and 71% in Quang Tri believe that IDMC and its IMEs are setting the rules. 30% of respondents mention that they can participate at local meetings but they do not actually participate or discuss the contents at all, whilst 35% state that they participate in meetings but are not concerned about the contents. Of the cooperatives and irrigation teams in Tay Ninh, 90% have the same opinion of the roles of IDMCs in rule setting as farmers have. 100% of respondents in Quang Tri believe that cooperatives’ management boards fix the rules. This is confirmed by 90% of cooperatives in Quang Tri. The conclusion is that patterns of domination are rooted in administrative culture and centralized management style. Unless changes are made at institutional levels, there is no realism in grass-root involvement. Farmers “vote with their feet” by not becoming involved even when opportunities are offered.
227 7.3.2 Communication, information sharing and transparency
The survey shows that most farmers have access to information via the heads of the villages, mass media (TV, radio, and loud speaker), or cooperative management boards. Informal information is exchanged among neighbors in village social networks and through the meetings organized by cooperatives. Such informal meetings are quite common in Quang Tri, but these reduce the opportunities for formal communication, participation and interaction between local stakeholders. The discussions with leaders of cooperatives in the study148 reveal that local meetings do not happen often. The cooperative members’ congress in Quang Tri usually occurs twice per year and runs for half a day with representatives of farmer households, persons holding different positions in the village and commune administrators attending (local party cell, CPCs, the Fatherland front, mass organizations, farmers’ association, women’s unions, head of village etc.). There are, however, no representatives from the IDMC or from district IMEs. Information about the funding of activities and the financial management (expenses, revenues) of cooperatives is read out at the meetings by the cooperative management boards. According to the cooperatives’ leaders, farmers attend the meetings but usually do not express their opinions because “farmers do not have much to say”. The design of meetings with a lot of administrative representatives involved may not be constructive in the sense that it can block communication by farmers. The survey results demonstrate that about half of the local people in Quang Tri are well informed while the other half have not understood anything.
Farmers in Tay Ninh usually attend resident groups (to tu quan) meetings. Their representatives from such meetings participate in the village meetings. There are, for example, 14 resident groups in the village Thai Binh I in Chau Thanh district, with about 25 households in each group. The leader of each resident group usually organizes two separate meetings. The minutes of the meetings are then brought to the village meetings attended by just the five representatives of the resident groups who are also
148 Interviews with the leaders of Cooperatives in Quang Tri ; Hai Que, Trieu Dong, Trieu Dai, Trieu Phuoc, Hai Ba communes. In Tay Ninh they are from Dong Khoi , Thai Binh in Chau Thanh district, Loc Chau, Lam Huynh, Loc Khe cooperatives in Trang Bang district
228 representatives of party cells, leaders of the resident groups, and mass organizations such as the fatherland front, farmers’ union, and women’s union. The final results and decisions of the village meetings are subsequently relayed to villagers through the head of the village. Under this design most of the interviewees (95%) in Tay Ninh recognize that information is fragmented, and that they have a patchy knowledge but not a full picture. Most respondents (80%) are not clear as to how their opinions could contribute to the project design and whether their experience would be made use of. It is notable that those who do not participate in decision-making processes are also unable to understand the information flows.
The concluding observation is that formal information about state policies, decisions, resolutions of administrative authorities, and commune annual budgets has been given mostly as one-way information, so that farmers have had access in passive ways only. This hinders communication and distorts incentives of farmers in participation (Uphoff, 2002; Lotz-Sisitka & Burt, 2006). Interviewed farmers149 express that they do not know the details of the irrigation projects in their communes, nor are they involved in discussions about, for instance, selection of prioritized canals to be upgraded. They know that there are specific projects at localities because they “saw workers involved in activities in the field” or “heard from their neighbors that there is an irrigation project to improve delivery of water to paddy fields”. The farmers receive incomplete and fragmented information about the kinds of projects, purposes, time periods, responsibility for design, forms for implementation, construction, monitoring and evaluations, and financial sources. Therefore they cannot give comments on design, or participate in monitoring and evaluation.
Improper access to information about a project as illustrated, along with a lack of transparency by cooperatives in their activities and financial management, have caused misunderstandings among farmers. As a consequence, therefore, farmers’ distrust of the cooperatives and the IDMCs is widespread. The results from interviews with farmers show that only 35% of those in Tay Ninh and none (0%) of those in Nam Thach Han
149 Farmers in Dong Khoi, Thai Binh, An Binh communes (Chau Thanh district), in Loc Chau, Lam Huynh, Loc Khe communes (Trang Bang district), Tay Ninh province
229 express the opinions that cooperatives are reliable. This situation also inhibits farmers’ participation as members of the cooperatives as illustrated by the cases in Tay Ninh. A lack of confidence of farmers’ in the competence of the IDMCs’ staff and the cooperatives affect the motivation of farmers to pay on-farm fees or maintain irrigation systems (Wade, 1988).
7.3.3 Motivation of farmers in participation
According to the leaders of cooperatives, it is quite difficult to mobilize people to attend local meetings. People seem only interested in attending those meetings that may affect them, or bring benefits (e.g. a project to open new canals or to concrete existing canals, land compensation, introduction of new fertilizers/plants, or use of paddy seeds that come with promotional T-shirts or a bag of spices or an allowance). Few come to meetings that people consider unimportant or uninteresting, or to be without a proper allowance. Due to the limited budget, one meeting usually covers several issues in order to share the cost for logistics (about 7000- 10,000 VND/person/meeting or 0.3 or 0.5 USD/person). This compensation, of course, is not attractive for participants who work and get 100,000-150,000 VND/day. This can be one reason why many farmers are not motivated to participate in the meetings. One cannot assume that farmers are willing to participate just for the sake of overall improved irrigation performance (Mukherji et al., 2009a). Their main concerns are limited to whether or not water comes to their plots, and whether or not the rehabilitation projects would affect their plots.
It may be that there is a different attitude among farmers in the regions where collective actions are well established at local community levels. Some opinions in the group discussions concern how farmers in the south tend to act in an individualistic tradition, while farmers in the north and central areas behave more as a collective. To them it seems that people pay less attention to, and are less concerned about, other members in the community in the south. Many farmers in the surveys in Tay Ninh also said they do not attend the meetings or join the activities of cooperatives because they have many things to do for their families, and they cannot afford to give up the time. However, beyond this, a lack of trust and
230 confidence would hamper willingness and incentives of farmers to participate in the process (Wade, 1988).
7.3.4 Culture and passive attitudes
Cultural differences between the administration and the farmers are inherited from earlier interaction traditions. A new administration culture has emerged during the PAR reform toward transferring power from central to local levels with decentralized responsibilities, and new forms for capacity building for civil servants. It should be noted though that an administrative culture with a top-down style is still inherited (Pham, 2010). This shows in the ways communication and information sharing are handled by officers in different administrative authorities and state management agencies. Technical design and construction companies and IDMCs have been more conservative in performance by maintaining the belief that villagers have limited understanding of the complicated technical issues and cannot become involved in design and monitoring. Farmers in turn have a tradition of silently accepting directives from the administration, rooted in their minds – “we are uneducated, we lack knowledge, therefore we should not talk and have opinions”. They therefore do not challenge the officers and remain passive in their actions.
The result from the survey shows the passive attitudes in the participation of the farmers (Figure 7.10): about 70% of respondents in Tay Ninh and 50% in Quang Tri do not feel they can freely express opinions in the meetings. A main issue is that many of them attend the meetings but only to listen to what others say. They do not express any opinions since they do not feel confident about their competence (85% in Tay Ninh and 32% in Quang Tri). They consider themselves as not having enough knowledge about the issues. Farmers in Quang Tri also say that they do not express their opinions because they think it is meaningless to comment when nobody will listen to their needs (25%), they are too shy to talk in public (30%), or they want to avoid conflicts with others (10%).
231 100% 80% 60% 40% 20%
0% Tay Ninh freely listen but offer no offer no do not offer no expresses have no opinion and opinion but discuss opinion and opinions knowledge avoid believe that anything but are very shy or opinion con licts no one is do what they Quang Tri concerned are told to Opinions of with their do farmers needs
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% freely listen but offer no offer no do not offer no expresses have no opinion and opinion but discuss opinion and opinions knowledge avoid believe that anything but are very shy or opinion con licts no one is do what concerned they are told Opinions of with their to do cooperatives needs
Figure 7.10. Farmers’ attitudes about participation in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri (Source: The results from the survey, 2010)
Overall, the results from the survey reveal the limited participation of farmers in the different activities within the irrigation projects. As can be seen from their responses, their involvement in planning, design, construction, and monitoring is very limited. Their influence on rule setting is also very weak since IDMCs/IMEs and cooperatives usually take this role. The dominating relations of local authorities, IDMCs and even cooperatives have been reflected in practice in different ways including the forms of communication and information sharing, and the persistence of an administrative culture with a top-down style in interactions. Such factors affect the quality of the participatory process, and the attitudes and motivations of farmers.
232 7.4 Reflections on the assessment of actor performance
This chapter services delivers (state irrigation companies and cooperatives) and service (farmers) in three key respects: autonomy, accountability, and public participation. The drive to reform state-owned enterprises and strengthen institutional capacity for local organizations has created opportunities for the IDMCs and local organizations to look for further autonomy and accountability. Along with these, the prime concerns for successful decentralization in irrigation management are active participation in decision-making and the capacity of local organizations.
There is still, however, a long way to go in practice to reach those expectations. The field assessments in the study areas reveal that the cooperatives and farmers in the studied cases are struggling hard in exercising power in decision-making, and that the targets seem difficult to reach. Given the institutional arrangements, power relations between IDMCs/IMEs and cooperatives are pivotal for decentralization. The empirical findings also show that neither IDMCs nor cooperatives are autonomous in making decisions on finance, personnel management, and operation and management. Both of these actors have had to cut expenses on the operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems to a ridiculously low level in order to keep the annual financial balance.
The results in the interviews express the dissatisfaction of farmers and cooperatives with the performance of IDMCs’ staff and the cooperatives in delivery of service, competence, and democratic interaction with farmers. By contrast, the evaluations of the two previous case studies present only positive outcomes. Information is compiled from the earlier assessments in two particular projects, one in Nam Thach Han150 and one in Tay Ninh151.
150 The assessments have been made based on the comparisons “before –after” project, between data from 2011 and 2009. Information is from the assessment report (2011) in the central water resources project, 223 VIE (SF), on an Asian Development Bank loan 151 The assessments have been done based on the comparisons “before – after” project, between data from 2007 and 2009. Information is only from two pilot areas, canal TN17 in Chau Thanh district and canal N20 in Trang Bang district. Information is from the final report of JSDF-PIM project written in 2009. This project was a part of the Vietnam Water Resource Assistance Project (VWARP)
233 Table 7.3. The previous assessments on main outcomes and impacts of irrigation decentralization in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han
Main indicators Nam Thach Han irrigation Tay Ninh irrigation system system An increase in -Spring rice: +144 In Chau Thanh district: irrigated areas (ha) - Summer rice: +197 -Spring rice: +104.79 - Summer rice: +93.11 In Trang Bang district -Spring rice: +92.32 - Summer rice: +81.36 An increase in -Spring rice: +0.36 In Chau Thanh district: cropping yields - Summer rice: +0.31 -Spring rice: +0.85 (tons/kg) - Summer rice: +0.33 In Trang Bang district: -Spring rice: -0.23 - Summer rice: +0.26 Training courses 400 participants from IDMCs, 210 participants from new (persons) PPMU, and section of irrigation cooperatives agriculture, 1678 members of cooperatives (45% women) were trained by PPMU 752 members of cooperatives (75% women) were trained by PIM consultants Establishment of 5 new cooperatives 12 new irrigation local organizations 47 existing cooperatives were cooperatives in Chau Thanh (numbers of strengthened 9 new irrigation cooperatives organizations) in Trang Bang Poverty reduction n.d. In Chau Thanh district: 2% (%) (from 6% to 4%) In Trang Bang district: 0.6% (from 3.6% to 3%) Number of women In training courses In meetings participating 75% in courses provided by In Chau Thanh district: 20% PIM consultants In Trang Bang district: 11% 45% in course provided by PPMU (Sources: VAWR, 2009b, MWH, 2011)
As Table 7.3 shows, the outcomes of irrigation decentralization are assessed using quantitative indicators such as an increase in irrigated area, an increase in cropping yields, an increase in the number of participants attending training courses and meetings (included women’s participation), the number of local organizations that have been established, and poverty
234 reduction. These indicators are quite similar to the ones presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Linking back to my argument in Chapter 2 on the need to have a different approach for assessing decentralization, I claim that the indicators presented in Table 7.3 show success only because they show results based on a limited number of indicators that give short-term and quantitative measurements. Qualitative assessments of actors’ autonomy, accountability, incentives and participation are not given enough attention; these need to be considered if we are to understand thoroughly the process of institutional change. These figures tell us little about the decentralization of power or the empowerment of local communities. What they tell us is, conversely, that local communities have become harder pressed in their daily work tasks so that the individual’s room for maneuver is decreasing. In effect, the situation will reinforce a polarization of the Vietnamese society unless corrective measures are taken, especially with regards to how the reform intentions are implemented. Existing evaluations only consider momentary and short-term effects, not the critical long-term effects of change on Vietnamese society.
A certain number of participants must attend local meetings according to the requirements for development projects (loans, external assistance). However, the ways in which participatory consultations based on the quantitative figures in the reports (e.g. numbers of participants, categories, numbers of women attending) are evaluated say very little about the quality of the participation beyond the physical presence, or about the incentives offered to different actors. Consultants have tried to achieve sufficiently high numbers of participants in meetings in order to fulfill their terms of reference. When doing so, they have not cared much for whether information, facilitation and communication are appropriate. Farmers are only interested in attending the meetings if they are given an allowance that is at least about equal to their daily income.
The current chapter concludes that the approach for assessing the outcomes of decentralized irrigation management seen in much of the existing literature is limited to production-oriented indicators. Left out are the ways and the extent to which actors interact and exert power; the changes in the process that are brought about as key consequences, not merely noted as secondary side effects of the decentralization reform, and
235 the incentives and capabilities which make the actors respond to these changes. The positive results presented in the projects’ documents are only momentary; the assessments have been made at the end of the projects. The long-term effects spell failure: inability to uphold productivity without environmental degradation, and a missed target to transfer power. Merely shifting power downward through the administrative hierarchy is counter- productive for such a key issue as the relationship between involved actors (state management agencies, local authorities, IDMCs, local organizations and farmers)—what was intended to become a local mandate to exercise power upward has been twisted into a tool for further control downward.
236 CHAPTER 8: ACTORS’ RESPONSES - INCENTIVES, WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY
So far in the previous chapters we have seen how irrigation decentralization has created profound consequences for power exercise of actors, for farmers’ participation, and for the performance of IDMCs and cooperatives in terms of autonomy and accountability. Following on from that, one concern of the current chapter is the incentives, willingness and capability of the actors to respond to the changes in the decentralization process. The chapter consists of four sections. Section 8.1 demonstrates the complexity of irrigation decentralization since the involved actors have contradictory interests and different incentives, generated as unforeseen consequences of policy change. Section 8.2 discusses how the IDMCs have changed attitudes and incentives under the renovation policies. Focusing on cooperatives, Section 8.3 analyzes how the major constraints of the cooperatives impede their incentives and capabilities to respond to the decentralized context. Section 8.4, finally, links up the various responses to the decentralization policy.
8.1 Trade-off between decentralization and contradictory interests
Irrigation decentralization, as understood broadly by the state management agencies and IDMCs in Vietnam, is “participatory irrigation management” (PIM) that concerns how to facilitate the involvement of farmers and their representatives in different stages of the irrigation projects. Typical applications in many PIM projects within irrigation decentralization involve establishing or strengthening local organizations, transferring specific responsibilities and rights, and strengthening the capacity of local organizations. In spite of these decentralization features, the power shifting processes are not going as smoothly as expected. The
237 survey results provide empirical evidence showing how the processes generate contradictory interests and influences among the actors involved. The struggles between these actors to gain power and to control finance result in problems that could affect the outcomes of the decentralization process.
Provincial authorities are the decisive actors who determine how decentralization should be implemented within their provinces under a broad national decentralization policy152. Decisions relating to implementation reflect the awareness, willingness and incentives of authorities. They may have an impact on the overall outcome of the decentralization process depending on how decisions are taken and how they are linked (Ribot, 2002). As raised in a report by MARD (2007), one of the reasons why decentralization outcomes have not met expectations is restrictions in the enabling legal framework. Decentralization policies have not been sufficiently concretized through detailed legal documents at sub- national levels for enforcement in practice. Up to 2009, only 13 out of a total of 63 provinces had issued provincial regulations for the transfer of irrigation management to the local organizations, and nine of them had drafted, but not yet approved, such documents (VAWR, 2009a).
The interviews with the key informants in the two studied cases in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri, in 2009, revealed that their delays in issuing decentralization policies was due to the unclear situation concerning the transformation of IDMCs to a new form of enterprise, the implementation of the exemption of water fees, and the lack of Government guidelines for decentralization. When the latest national policy on irrigation decentralization was issued in 2009153, however, as in most provinces, the provincial regulations regarding decentralization in both Tay Ninh and Quang Tri were still at the draft stage (at the end of 2011 when I finished conducting fieldwork). There has been no significant change in the decentralization process even though all issues that the key informants were concerned with in 2009 were already settled at that time. Specifically, IDMCs are in the progress of renovation, the new water fees policy has been implemented, and the government’s guidelines for decentralization
152 Government’s resolution on decentralization No. 08 issued in 2004 153 Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT (12/10/2009)
238 are in place. One reason for the lack of change might be that the provincial authorities are not motivated to implement decentralization in their provinces.
Let us consider IDMCs. Why should they want to decentralize? All interviewees at the IDMCs studied are aware of the fact that they need local organizations. They cannot reach individual farmers directly, be it to sign contracts, deliver water to individual plots, or conduct maintenance at tertiary and on-farm canals. Sharing the responsibilities with local organizations seems necessary. Under the policy of the remission of water fees, the state’s budgets for IDMCs depend on the size of the irrigated area the IDMCs serve. Large irrigated areas generate bigger revenues. The decentralization policy and the remission of water fees have automatically created a new kind of situation: IDMCs act to extend their control of irrigation systems downwards to local levels by maximizing the irrigated area served by them as a means of increasing their income. The situation provides an incentive for IDMCs when it comes to the transfer of irrigated areas to the local organizations and thereby a counter force to decentralization. The interviews with the two studied IDMCs reveal their concern about transferring irrigation systems to local organizations because the transfer means that IDMC’s lose revenue and have to reduce staff. Reluctance to share power with the local organizations of the state irrigation agencies due to fears of losing jobs, having a lower budget, and losing influence has been discussed in several previous studies (Merrey, 1996; Aheeyar, 2002; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007).
For district/commune authorities and cooperatives, a main concern in decentralization is how to access the specific assistance offered by the projects such as infrastructure rehabilitation, working offices, office equipment, funds for canal lining154, or training courses for technical and financial management skills. The Tay Ninh case depicts a telling story of how local authorities and local organizations have rushed into action in order to access the projects’ development grants but without thoroughly
154 Under the VWRAP project, in Tay Ninh, each newly established cooperative received 3,600 USD to build new offices,and to provide toilets, and some office facilities (computer, chairs, table, document stores), and 15,000 USD for on-farm canals. Under ADB project in Nam Thach Han, each cooperative received 1,500-2,000 USD to buy computers and about 30,000 USD for lining canals
239 considering whether or not the suggested actions are suitable or needed in local situations. In consequence, the new irrigation cooperatives’ organizations have been established, but most farmers are still not willing to join since they have to deal with many other difficulties. Most of the new offices are utilized only a limited number of times per year, simply because cooperatives do not have many activities. These types of responses readily lead to a partial form of decentralization, designed with the focus mainly on physical upgrading of infrastructure without consideration of all the relevant factors that fit local conditions (Cleaver, 2002; Merrey et al., 2007; Meinzen-Dick, 2007).
The cooperatives also express their willingness to manage a larger irrigated area in order to increase their revenues during the transfer process. The common trend is that IDMCs want to transfer electric pumping stations to local organizations while local organizations want to manage gravity irrigation systems (e.g. reservoirs and dams): both seek to avoid the high costs involved in the operation of the electric pumping stations. The cooperatives in the Gio Linh district of the Quang Tri IDMC even want to return three electric pumping stations, serving less than 100 ha, along with one reservoir with a capacity of five million m3. Such effects are not only counter-productive to decentralization due to the limited capacity of local organizations, they also imply a re-centralization process. Since local organizations are not willing to operate these irrigation systems, IDMCs may reactivate their tasks to ensure that these systems function for food security and poverty reduction at the localities. Obviously, the roles and responsibilities of the state/IDMCs are important in such situations when local organizations do not willingly manage the irrigation systems offered to them. This statement reinforces the discussion in Chapter 2 about the complexities of irrigation decentralization. It suggests that states still play an important role in the irrigation sector, decentralization or not. States’ interventions are necessary in dealing with externalities, non-excludability or the information asymmetry of public goods and services (including irrigation services) because private enterprises and local organizations cannot afford them or are unwilling to become involved (WB, 2008). The state’s overall coordination and competence in large-scale irrigation systems are also necessary in addressing efficiency and equity (Haggett, 2001; Shivakoti et al., 2005).
240 8.2 Privileges and vested interest in the new transformed companies
8.2.1 Organizational adjustments bring internal power concentration
Referring back to Chapter 2, much of the existing literature on irrigation decentralization suggests that the measures required for irrigation reforms such as organizational restructure, redefinition of roles/rights, and enhanced capacity can create changes in the attitudes and incentives of state irrigation agencies and water users’ organizations (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Vermillion, 2005; WB, 2008). By focusing on the renovation of IDMCs and its outcomes in this section, I examine whether or not IDMCs are willing and able to change their incentives and attitudes within the new transformed companies.
The renovation of IDMCs is a design that includes structural reorganization and the adjustment of their functions to increase the autonomy of the transformed IDMCs in their operation, finance, and organizational and personnel management155. However, in reality, the organizational structures, mandates and functions of these companies and their sub-units have not changed in the process towards decentralization as the old companies have been transformed into the new. The empirical finding in two studied IDMCs (Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han) is that the number of staff has hardly changed since the renovation (from 220 to 210 staff in Tay Ninh IDMC, and 95 unchanged staff in Nam Thach Han IME). After transforming into its new form in pursuance of the Law on Enterprise, the new organizational structure has become more hierarchical than before. The Quang Tri IDMC has a company President and the Tay Ninh IDMC has a Members’ Council (Section 4.3). In the organizational structure of the company, the leaders of companies hold dual positions, a fact that is highly significant. In the Tay Ninh IDMC, the Director General and the Chairman of the Members’ Council is one and the same person. In the Quang Tri IDMC, the Company President and Director General is the same person. Two Vice General Directors are also on the Members’ Council in the Tay Ninh IDMC. Whether Members’ Council or Company President, authority is ascribed by
155 Circular 65/2009/TT-BNNPTNT (12/10/2009) and Decree 25/2010/ND-CP (26/4/2010)
241 its capital owner, PPC, to decide on all strategies, plans and decisions that relate to organization, management, finance, investment, business and production of the company.
The key informants of the district irrigation management enterprises (IMEs) experience that the new forms of the companies appear to have a more centralized management controlled by powerful IDMCs. This mechanism generates an option for power concentration inside IDMCs’ organizations. The power in decision-making within a company stays with a group of persons who carry double roles both as decision-makers and implementers. The General Director in the Tay Ninh IDMC, in particular, has great power in this structural setting. Power concentration creates overlapping roles for decision makers and implementers in the company, which makes it difficult to evaluate the accountability and effectiveness of the IDMCs’ leaders or transparency in the operation and financial management of the company. The position of a General Director is the most obvious case: How can one person evaluate strategies, plans and decisions when he156 was involved in the earlier decision-making process, and: How can he be allowed to decide his own contract, salary, award, and other benefits? If the person in this position wants to, he has full power to appoint and dismiss, sign and terminate contracts, commend and reward, discipline, and determine the salary and awards of the Vice General Directors and the chief accountant.
Power concentration inside their organizations is shown clearly when looking into the working relations between IDMCs and their IMEs. In spite of having independent status in theory, IMEs are strongly dependent on IDMCs in practice, not only for their management mechanism and operation of irrigation systems, but also for financial accounting. The IDMCs assign irrigation quantities, irrigation schedules, and the annual budgets for their IMEs. Since a fixed budget is allocated by the IDMCs through in-house assessments without rigid criteria, the result is uncertain because the IDMCs allocate resources to the IMEs, irrespective of the irrigated area and the real needs of the infrastructure. IMEs are not autonomous and able to make decisions on expenditure, and do not have
156 None of the leaders encountered during the fieldwork period was a woman
242 the flexibility to reallocate funding between line items without approval from the IDMCs. IMEs are excluded from decision-making over their own activities, management costs included. They need to submit requests to IDMCs to get financial approval. If IMEs generate a surplus, this amount will come back to the IDMCs to be utilized for purposes other than IME activities. This situation does not create incentives for IMEs to be cost effective by saving expenses in order to increase revenues. Top-down attitudes and centralized management styles within IDMCs do not give positive signals for the kind of fair partnership that IDMCs should build with their sub-units and local organizations who are their customers. The dominance pattern of the IDMCs over the cooperatives in contracting, payments, water distribution and systems maintenance as discussed in Chapter 6 provides strong evidence for this argument.
8.2.2 Attitude and incentives in the mechanism for public utility
Members of staff at the IDMCs express a preference to be protected by the state, as they are not confident that they will be able to follow bidding mechanisms in competition situations with private enterprises. With this fear of risks and uncertainties, they prefer to follow the mechanism in which the state/province has assigned them the tasks and provided financial budgets (“Assignment of Plan”). Such lack of confidence is closely linked to the limited capacity of the staff. This is one of the constraints, which explains why the staff is reluctant to change. Bandaragoda (2006) has a similar conclusion, that the staff of state irrigation agencies is slow to respond to the changes due to their passiveness and limited capacity.
In the Tay Ninh IDMC (220 persons), 54% of the staff is employed at the worker level, 29% is educated at intermediate, college levels, and 17% of them are university educated. The total number of staff in Nam Thach Han IME is 95 persons, of which 28% is at worker level, 52% is at intermediate level, and 19% is educated at university level. The survey shows that the Tay Ninh and Quang Tri IDMCs conduct training courses every year at their own offices or send their workers to professional schools/centers to improve their capacity. These are workers who directly take charge in system management and operation, or officials who need to improve their knowledge to meet the conditions for progression (or promotion).
243 However, many training programs have not met the requirements due to improper contents and teaching methodologies, lack of qualified trainees, limited budgets for capacity building etc. Most of the university graduates working in state-management agencies in the water sector or in IDMCs have not had the opportunity to carry out extension studies. In particular, many of the irrigation engineers who have worked for many years at IDMCs (more than 10 and even up to 30 years and beyond) have not been updated with new knowledge about the operation and management of hydraulic systems. Training contents are generally limited to specific technical issues and thus do not allow trainees to develop creative approaches in work by putting the knowledge learnt into practice. Topics relating to water planning and management towards sustainable integrated resources management are absent in training schedules.
A general observation is that the attitude and incentives of IDMCs seem unchanged even though they have been through organizational restructuring. One reason could be that IDMCs, being public-utility state companies, have been treated specially by the state. The current renovation with the new financial mechanisms Assignment of Plan or Placement of Order together with the remission of water fees can be understood to create privileges for IDMCs. The expenses relating to investment, rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation have been financed by the state. Since the state controls both the quantities and prices of water used, IDMCs are not in a position to operate and manage their businesses in response to market. They do not have the incentives to perform and provide services as normal enterprises under market mechanisms. The linkages between revenue, good service and payment, essential conditions in enterprises, are non-existent.
8.3 Resources, capabilities, scales affecting incentives and accountability
As a consequence of two institutional capacity building projects supported by ADB and WB in the studied irrigation systems, several local irrigation organizations have been established and strengthened. Specifically, in Quang Tri, only one new water user cooperative and four water user
244 associations (lien hiep hoi dung nuoc) had been established for this reason, while the 47 existing cooperatives had been retained and strengthened. The four water user associations are those that have been established in inter-commune canals157. In Tay Ninh, 21 new irrigation service cooperatives have been established as pilots in two canals N17 (Chau Thanh district) and N20 (Trang Bang). Like many PIM projects in Vietnam in general, these cooperatives have been involved in the whole procedure within the projects, from organizational restructuring to initial support for offices, office equipment, funds for canal lining, and training programs to enhance capacity in technical and financial management skills. This institutional design is assumed to bring success (as presented in Table 7.3). These actions are considered to be necessary conditions for successful decentralization of irrigation (Vermillion, 2005; WB, 2008). One of assumptions is also that local organizations are able to change and adapt to the new institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 1990, Tang, 1992; Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002; Araral, 2011) through learning from each other, adjusting behavior and adapting to the new context through the interactive process (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008).
By contrast, the results from the field survey reveal that the cooperatives in both cases have faced many difficulties that could affect their survival. I argue that the introduction of a new institutional setting that mainly focuses on organizational adjustments and has been introduced in the studied cases under external pressure is an inappropriate solution. Experience suggests that replacement of old institutions with new does not provide a sustainable solution. The main reason is that constraints involving incentives, attitudes, and the capabilities of cooperatives are not even considered. In the following sections, I shall demonstrate the key constraints that, in my opinion, would impact on the incentives and capabilities of cooperatives to respond to new contexts for decentralization. The above-mentioned assumptions, that assume a collective learning process for social actors in the new institutional settings, as mentioned in the literature as well as in the conventional applications of many donors and consultants, need to be challenged.
157 These water users’ associations are established in canals N4C and N61 (in Triệu Sơn and Triệu Trung communes), canals N1 and A1 (in Trieu Dong and Trieu Tai communes), canals N1-8 (in Trieu Hoa and Trieu Long communes), and inter-village canals N4-B2 (in Trieu Trung commune)
245 8.3.1 Economics of scales, income, incentives and accountability
Following the Law of Cooperatives, a cooperative normally includes a management board (2-3 persons), a controlling board (1-3 persons), a financial section (2-3 persons), and irrigation teams (2-20 persons) (see in Section 4.2.3). The organizations of the cooperatives in both studied cases should follow this structure. In reality, most of the cooperatives in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han are at present small-scale, operating close to administrative boundaries (mostly in villages).
The situation of cooperatives in Nam Thach Han provides an example. Of a total of 113 agricultural services cooperatives in the Nam Thach Han irrigation system, 97% are village-level cooperatives. There are 2-5 cooperatives established in each of 70% of the communes in Quang Tri province. Of these, 70% are responsible for small irrigated areas of 10-100 hectares, while only four cooperatives are responsible for an irrigated area of more than 200 hectares (the biggest area is 308.5 ha in the Trieu Thuan cooperative). Each water deliverer, directly involved in delivery of water and in maintenance (thuy nong vien), is responsible for 10-20 hectares (the head-end is 15-36 ha while the tail-end is 3-15 ha). Being constrained by the Law, the cooperatives’ organizational structure is cumbersome in its scale of operation, especially if irrigation is the only service provided (as in Tay Ninh).
The information in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 gives snapshots of labor management in some cooperatives in the Nam Thach Han and Tay Ninh irrigation systems. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show that the big organizational structure is broken down into cooperatives with 4-7 persons in management and 7-20 water deliverers. These numbers vary greatly between cooperatives depending on how big the specific irrigated area is, and how difficult water delivery is (head-end, middle-end or tail-end plots, topography).
246 Table 8.1. Organizational structure of cooperatives in Nam Thach Han
Cooperatives Irrigated Cooperative structure Irrigation teams, area area (ha) (ha)/person Nai Cuu (Trieu 114 Management Board: 2 7 irrigators, 17 ha/person Dong) Controllers: 3 Accountant/Cashier: 2 Dai Hao (Trieu 126 Management Board: 2 10 irrigators (4 persons Dai) Controllers: 2 for 4 pumps, 4 persons in Accountant/Cashier: 3 on-farm canals, 2 persons guard in 2 secondary canals), 12.6 ha/person Luong Kim 119 Management Board: 2 6 irrigators, 20 ha/person (Trieu Phuoc) Controller: 1 Guard team: 14 persons Accountant/Cashier: 2 Co Luy (Hai 98 Management Board: 2 8 irrigators, 11 ha/person Ba) Controller: 1 Accountant/Cashier: 2 Hoi Yen (Hai 92 Management Board: 2 7 irrigators, 13 ha/person Que) Controllers: 2 Accountant/Cashier: 2 (Source: Interviews with leaders of cooperatives, 2011)
Table 8.2. Organizational structure of cooperatives in Tay Ninh (before and after project) In Chau Thanh district In Trang Bang district Cooperatives In 2008 In 2011 Cooperatives In 2008 In 2011 Dong Khoi II 5 3 Van Thang 5 7 + 4 water deliverers Dong Khoi III 6 4 Loc Hoa 6 Dong Khoi IV 6 1 Loc Thanh 7 5 Dong Khoi V 6 Loc Chau 7 7 Dong Khoi VI 7 1 Loc Khe 6 7 + 6 water deliverers Thai Binh I 7 3+ 3 Gia Tan 6 7 + 4 water water deliverers deliverer s Thai Binh II 5 6 + 9 Lam Huynh 7 7 +4 water water deliverers deliverer s Thai Binh III 6 4 Thanh Cong 8 8 + 7 water deliverers Thanh Dien 5 Gia Binh 7 7 (Source: Interviews with leaders of cooperatives, 2011)
247 In the Nam Thach Han irrigation system, each water deliverer is responsible for about 3-10 hectares at the head-end and for about 20-30 hectares at tail-end of the system. In the opinion of the cooperatives, the mobilization of high numbers of persons in the irrigation teams has led to greater operation costs, but it is a necessity since water delivery is very difficult, especially in tail-end canals. Some cooperatives that are located in tail-end canals and share water with several others upstream have to pay high costs for a guard team to keep watch along the secondary canals in order to avoid water thefts158. In Tay Ninh, the cooperatives are usually established with 6-7 persons in the management boards plus 3-9 persons directly responsible for water delivery in on-farm canals. Each cooperative manages on average about 200 ha of irrigated area per cropping season, and each water deliverer is responsible for 50-80 ha.
From an economic viewpoint, the small-scale structure would be ineffective because there is no economy-of-scale. Being small-scale also hampers the opportunities for organizations to mobilize resources (capital, labor, competence/knowledge, social networks etc.). The scale of operation of cooperatives (i.e. small irrigated area, few services) is now usually small while their organizational structure is still very big. The expenses for each member become high, especially for salaries. It leads to a situation where the revenue is inadequate to cover basic expenses and blocks the potential possibility of achieving financial autonomy. Members of management boards and water deliverers uphold the big structure but operating it leads to systematic payments of low salaries (200,000 to 1,000,000 VND/month or 10-50 USD/month) in order to balance budgets. There is no room for profits and no savings for management and for long-term development. Current operations are short-term in the sense that infrastructure maintenance and investment are set back, and also in that the low levels of investment encourage a laissez-faire attitude on behalf of management.
158An example of a tail-end location is the Luong Kim Cooperative located in the tail-end of N3 canal in the Nam Thach Han system, sharing water with five other Cooperatives; Phuoc Le, Nhu Ly, Viet Yen, An Cu, and Cao Hy. Every irrigation time, a guard team with 14 persons is mobilized to guard water 24/24 hours along canals N3. The cooperative then has to pay an extra 5-6 tons rice in total for 14 persons working on 10 lots of water delivery, 2-3 days/person/time, and 20 kg/per person/day- night
248 This situation poses a big challenge for cooperatives. Although the proportion of payments for labor work in their total budgets is quite high (40-80% of the total revenues of the cooperatives in Nam Thach Han and almost 100% in Tay Ninh, see more in Section 7.1.2), the payments made are still far below the salary levels that motivate farmers to work accountably. Leaders of cooperatives say that it is difficult to mobilize water deliverers because there are many possibilities for people to get other jobs in town with a salary of 4-5 million VND/month or 120-200 thousand VND/day. This reduces the enthusiasm and motivation of members of cooperatives’ management boards and irrigation teams to perform accountably in local irrigation service delivery.
In the case of Tay Ninh, the number of members of management boards dropped drastically after two years of operation (Table 8.2). More than half the members have already left the management boards of the cooperatives in Chau Thanh. Several cooperatives in Chau Thanh even have just one person on their management boards. The potential trend is to move back to the old model of irrigation teams with only 1-2 persons because of the limited budget. Many leaders of cooperatives express the opinion that they prefer to work individually as before. In their perspective, they would earn a sufficient income since they would not have to share it with the whole cooperative organizational structure.
The number of members of the Cooperative Management Boards and irrigation teams in Tay Ninh in the two situations are compared (Table 8.2); using figures from 2008, when they were established, and from 2011, after two years of operation. Two trends are notable: the number of members on management boards is reduced dramatically in some cooperatives, but is increased in others. In many cooperatives, there is a lack of staff because people left due to the low income. In other cooperatives, the number of members is increasing because many members of cooperative management boards also have other duties in local authorities. Such persons with dual positions have to mobilize others to deliver water and carry out maintenance, since they usually do not have experience in water delivery themselves, and since they are too busy with other administrative tasks. Both trends cause ineffectiveness and lack of responsiveness in the performance of cooperatives. The increase in the
249 number of people working in some cooperatives also puts more pressure on the economy with constraints affecting the financial autonomy of cooperatives.
As suggested by the policy159, one option would be to reorganize the cooperatives, following hydrological boundaries instead of administrative ones in order to improve water management efficiency and effectiveness. The discussions with the leaders of the cooperatives show that they are aware of this problem. Nevertheless, they do not like the idea of merging some of the many village-scale cooperatives into a few large-scale cooperatives based on hydraulic boundaries that reach beyond commune boundaries. The question is: Why not? What barriers hinder them from enlarging their scales of operation? Many cooperatives agree that operating at village level sometimes brings difficulties in water delivery and conflict resolution. They argue that small-scale structures are easy to manage and control since the cultural tradition stresses close relations among villagers. This fits with the findings of Uphoff (1999) who claims that relations between farmers are usually built on reciprocity, generosity, trust and solidarity inside local networks. The performance of small-scale local organizations is more effective than large-scale undertakings because of the simple structure and flexible operation mechanisms, which encourage more farmers to get involved in management and monitoring.
The empirical findings in the current study indicate that cooperatives do not respond quickly to the new institutional settings offered by the outsiders, as raised by some researchers (cf. Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1992: Araral, 2011, Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002). Firstly, farmers’ and cooperatives’ attitudes still reflect those of the organizations they are used to. There is a strong evidence for my argument when looking into the ways farmers have reacted to the cooperative model introduced in Tay Ninh. Secondly, there are many challenges that reduce the incentives to change (to be presented in the next section).
159 The Framework Strategy and Road Map on the development of Participatory Irrigation Management and Circular 75/2004/TT-BNN issued in 2004
250 8.3.2 Capability to mobilize and access resources
Social capital
Farmers’ opinions of the new cooperatives in Tay Ninh have been expressed in different ways. Some think they are a necessity because local irrigation management needs such organizations in order to operate professionally instead of relying solely on individuals who interact with local authorities. Others think that this kind of organization is not needed for a number of specified reasons. One is that farmers assess the capacity of the members of Cooperative Management Boards in a negative way; they believe that the staff is so old that the introduction of new knowledge and information technology is impossible, and that there are also shortcomings in their capacity and ability to compete with private enterprises.
Another reason is the selection of members of cooperatives management boards, which is done through intervention by local authorities (appointed by commune administration). This practice draws further negative comments from the farmers. Many farmers are still suspicious over the capacity and performance of cooperatives, and therefore delay their decision to join them. The number of households that join new cooperatives in Tay Ninh is still very low; in most cases, less than 10% of total households (Figure 8.1).
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
No. household members join Cooperative Total water users (households)
Figure 8.1. Number of households joining cooperatives in Tay Ninh (Source: Interviews with the leaders of cooperatives, 2011)
251 Many respondents also reply that they do not care when the cooperatives’ registrations take place, whether or not their households are members of cooperatives, or how many members the management boards have. Distrust, negative attitudes, and lack of support from farmers are factors that affect the enthusiasm of cooperatives as they try to overcome several current difficulties, and continue to develop. One leader of a cooperative in the Trang Bang District expresses the opinion that the individualistic attitude of people is an uncertainty factor in the development of cooperatives, and he adds that that is too bad, given that cooperatives have opportunities to access low-interest capital sources to invest in agricultural machinery. He is willing to involve his cooperative in such a venture but believes that he would not achieve success without support from the farmers.
Human resources
Limited capacity and ability is one of the major concerns that have been raised by almost all of the studied cooperatives in the three group discussions (Figure 7.6 in Chapter 7). Limitations are not only confined to irrigation O&M and financial management, but also include understanding of those laws, policies, and regulations that directly affect the business and management of the cooperatives. There is a lack of formal training in the organizations, and only partial practical experience. Cooperatives’ management boards admit that they can easily make a mistake. Given all these limitations, it is difficult to compete with the private sector. One example is that the cooperatives in Tay Ninh have to pay fines (about 15 million VND) to the Tax Authority because they have not been aware of the need to report their business every year even if profits are negative. Such constraints in human capacity inside cooperatives are quite common in Vietnam. Data from the General Statistics Office in 2009 show that the education levels and professional skills of key members of the cooperatives are very low in management, accounting, and technical skills. More than 62% of the leaders of cooperatives are trained to secondary and high school education level, but only 8% of them have graduated from universities. Furthermore, 38% of the leaders, 24% of the accountants, and 57% of the members of controlling boards are not trained in their respective current professions (GSO, 2009).
252 Similar patterns are found in both studied cases. All members of the cooperatives’ management boards have been trained to secondary and high school education. None of them have graduated from universities. Only one person in the An Binh two cooperative (Tay Ninh) was trained in hydraulic enginerring program. Almost none of the irrigation teams have been trained on technical courses, or they are newly recruited and therefore conduct their tasks mainly based on their own knowledge. One reason is that cooperatives do not have a budget for training (Section 8.1.2). Another reason is that capacity building does not have high priority among the cooperatives. The results from the discussions with the key informants indicate that many leaders of cooperatives are not motivated to provide on- the-job training for technicians, even though the maintenance of irrigation systems is so important. Their view is that this is a waste of effort due to high mobility. Technicians in their pumping stations, for example, change every year; they drop out due to the low income, or because their irrigation teams lose the contract for the coming cropping seasons. People with formal education are not willing to work for the cooperative because of the low salaries offered. On top of that, technical assistance in the form of training from local authorities and IMEs is also very limited.
In response to this situation, or rather because of it, training programs for water user organizations are carried out in a special format, as an integral part of specific projects with external funding. The outcomes have not met with the requirements of the local organizations involved. Many leaders of cooperatives have attended training courses on different topics relating to Participatory Irrigation Management (e.g. procedures to establish water users’ organizations, methods to design charters and operation regulations, knowledge and skills to conduct the operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, and financial management). They cannot however remember the training, and they do not know how to apply what they have been taught in practice. This goes especially for technical skills in operation and maintenance. They think that too much information is presented by the lecturers from Hanoi in a short time (3 days/course) and that on-the-job training would be more valuable than learning via displays of texts on computers and projectors. These results sound contradictory to the success of training programs that are usually evaluated using quantitative
253 indicators such as the number of participants attending the courses 160. Capacity building for local organizations to enhance their accountability and effectiveness is one condition for successful PIM/IMT programs, but these short courses are run on a routine basis where evaluations focus on the number of courses, number of women participants, etc., and not on the quality of teaching and learning.
Financial resources
Limited capital is one of the prime factors affecting the autonomy of the cooperatives. The cooperatives in Tay Ninh have been struggling for two years to find sustainable ways to carry out extended services beyond irrigation, but so far, in vain. Some of the cooperatives have plans to offer more services such as providing materials for agricultural production (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), and buying agricultural machines or other machinery, but the minimum capital needed is about 300-700 million VND, which is far beyond the cooperative’s capacity. It has been argued that multi-service cooperatives can generate revenues from different activities (e.g. irrigation, land preparation, agricultural extension, seeds, fertilizers), so that profits from other services can supplement those from irrigation. Reaching this operation model is the target for those cooperatives that at present operate with only one type of irrigation service. But multi-service cooperatives such as in Quang Tri also face many difficulties. Expenditure on irrigation service delivery involves water delivery, with high costs for labor and electricity pumping.
Lack of capital also means that there is no chance for cooperatives to approach the companies/suppliers of materials for agricultural production with the intention of signing agreements to be their agents. These companies require deposits in advance and the promise of financial capacity to pay for the materials at the end of cropping season. Another option for a cooperative to diversify would be to seek external financing through loans, but there are no opportunities for them to reach beyond the state budget and its financial sources. Borrowing capital from the banks is
160 For example, 935 people in cooperatives in Nam Thach Han are trained under project ADB (a final assessment report, in 2011), 420 rounds of people in Dau Tieng attend training courses (JSDF project, final report in 2009)
254 not a possibility for cooperatives since they do not have assets to offer banks as security. Offices of cooperatives are located on Communes’ lands and are leased to the cooperatives for 20 years. Moreover, if it were possible to take a loan, the current interest rates of 19-21% per year are far too high.
Cooperatives have some limited possibilities to access the local budget for maintenance and on-farm canal lining. This budget is quite small and can only be accessed on average once every 6-7 years161. At the end of the day, the only way open for cooperatives to diversify remains to seek support from the state. In that case, cooperatives have to raise 40% of the project budget162. Again, this proves extremely difficult since revenues are so low. A condition of 40% contribution from the cooperative’ budget is difficult for all cooperatives since their revenues are so low. The intention with local contributions in development projects (socialization) is to reduce the heavy burdens on the state budget, and to increase the responsibility taken by local people. Many cooperatives are actually willing to use their budget for developing other services instead of investing in canal lining.
Capabilities to extend activities
Financial limits prevent the development of more services by the cooperatives. As we have just seen, it is also not easy for cooperatives to extend their scales in operation. The possibilities for them to take-off and extend their activities and services are further constrained by limited capacity, lack of legal support from local authorities, lack of information and poor communication. These are all barriers for local organizations that want to develop their activities towards autonomy. The cooperatives target is to achieve financial autonomy. This ambition is encouraged by law; they are expected to become economically independent legal entities at local
161 Since this budget is spread among many communes for further distribution, the amount usually becomes very small, about 100-150 million VND (50,000-70,000 USD), barely enough for conducting limited work. For example, in 2005, Hoi Yen Cooperative received 255 million VND and contributed 100 million VND more to lining 365 m of canals. In 2009 Co Luy cooperative conducted a project of canal lining for 500 m with a total capital of 248 million VND (40% of it was contributed by the Cooperative) 162 The budget is allocated and managed by District People’s Committees (DPCs) on the basis of a sharing principle; 60% from local authorities and 40% from Cooperatives in Quang Tri
255 levels. But in contrast to this grand goal, the cooperatives are struggling so hard to survive under current market mechanisms that they can find no way out of their stagnant situation. The odds of their doing this are slim because of high competition from private sectors. Limited capacity, lack of information, and poor communication are the major barriers that hinder the possibilities for the cooperatives to access markets and expand activities. They also have further constraints from their charters that specify which activities they can pursue. These constraints limit them to such an extent that competition in the open markets becomes even more difficult. Therefore, even if the cooperatives were to succeed in providing many services in the short-term, the financial situation makes long-term prospects slim due to limited resources (human capacity, capital, experience, skills etc.) and established working styles. The differences in working style between cooperatives and private enterprises are regarded by the leaders of cooperatives as an issue that reduces the competitiveness of cooperatives when compared with private enterprises. This difference shows clearly, for example, in negotiations and signing contracts, when all members of a management board need to travel and attend, while private enterprises are more flexible and can delegate responsibilities.
Dealing with uncertainties is another issue. Crop diversification is unavoidable in an active market mechanism. Changing the crops to access attractive markets or industrialization are measures that call for flexibility within the cooperatives to develop their plans for production as well as water services in a responsive manner. For example, about 2,000 hectares were transferred from paddy rice to high-valued crops such as rubber and hot chili in the Trang Bang district in 2011. This means a change in the quantity of water consumed, which therefore affects the operation and financial plans of cooperatives and IME Trang Bang. In this situation both the cooperatives and the IMEs need to have more flexibility in their operations. In effect, the cooperatives, irrigation teams and operating staff are under pressure from the IDMC’s requirements to increase the irrigated area every year (at the very least to keep the same area as previous year) if they want to receive certain levels of salaries and payments. This condition is good in the sense that IDMCs’ staff and local organizations should work harder but it may have a negative impact because it blocks the flexibility and incentive of staff and local organizations.
256 8.4 Linking up: Responding to decentralization
There is one major challenge in the design and implementation of irrigation decentralization. Those involved have had to deal with contradictory interests and power struggles among many involved actors. Actors’ incentives and attitudes are indirect factors affecting the outcomes of the decentralization process and should therefore be given more attention in the assessments. The empirical findings presented in this section provide strong evidence to support this argument. In the process of transformation, IDMCs come under pressure to reorganize their structures and revise their functions, activities and management mechanisms in order to operate effectively. As a consequence, the organizational structure becomes more hierarchical and its dynamics remain as they were before transformation in terms of management mechanism, leadership operation, and staff capacity.
The study findings demonstrate how incentives and attitudes among the IDMCs have changed towards a more centralized style and a passive mode of operation due to the privileged treatment of the irrigation service by the state. Many staff may be satisfied with the prevailing “control” mechanism of the state, because they prefer not to change for fear of having to deal with the uncertainties and risks that arise within the competitive context. These attitudes are counter-productive when it comes to creating incentives for IDMCs to perform accountably. These findings seem contradictory to the suggestion found in the literature that irrigation reforms would create changes in attitudes and incentives within state irrigation agencies (Shivakoti et al., 2005). Because of this, the suggestion by Harrison (2003), that organizations will change only if there are external pressures even when formal organizations already have the capacity to change and increase responsiveness (ibid.), needs to be given attention.
The cooperatives in the studied areas have faced many difficulties. Internal financial mobilization for their operations from the members within the organizations is limited. The contribution must be affordable for farmers, but, because cooperatives are generally small with few members, the total collected is not high. External financial resources from the state or
257 provincial budgets, or from the banks or credit organizations, are not accessible. There is a widespread call for capacity building within local organizations. But instead of encouraging new and independent thinking, efforts are misdirected by targeting short-term physical inputs. Limited human resources capacity shows as a lack of knowledge of legal arrangements (laws, policies and regulations), financial management, and understanding of economic development in response to market mechanisms. Irrigation teams work with water delivery and maintenance of irrigation systems but are not properly on-the-job trained. The low salary is a major factor that directly affects the incentives of members of the cooperatives to work effectively and responsibly. Social networks, farmers’ attitudes, and general awareness of the issues are crucial factors for the performance of local organizations.
A whole range of constraints makes it hard for local organizations to perform even when they are ascribed opportunities to participate and exercise their power. Their autonomy is hampered. In actual fact, these limitations are both structural (in the way they are held in economic dependency by the IDMCs) and a matter of low-level budgets (in the way they are compelled by a policy requirement to operate with uneconomically-sized irrigation teams). These constraints affect their accountability to farmers. The findings of the study indicate that cooperatives are not capable of responding quickly to the new changes as suggested in the literature (Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1992: Araral, 2011, Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002). The major constraints as mentioned above reduce their incentives and capabilities. The existing assessments are misleading because they often pay attention to the quantitative indicators that are related to the performance of local organizations but ignore other factors such as incentives and attitudes that may affect the outcomes of decentralization.
258 CHAPTER 9: DECENTRALIZATION POLICY CONTEXTUALIZED – CHALLENGES FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
This chapter will tie up the discussions from the previous chapters in order to draw conclusions for this study. To begin with, in Section 9.1, I brief how the main arguments of this study connect to the main debates over global water reforms and irrigation decentralization. I then explain shortly the research approach and methods applied in the current study. In Section 9.2, I summarize main findings and reflect them on three research questions. Conclusions on the main challenges and constraints for decentralized irrigation in Vietnam are drawn. After that the study findings are reflected to the theoretical framework (Section 9.3). Section 9.4 provides implications for implementing decentralization of large- and medium-scale irrigation systems. The chapter ends with Section 9.5, which includes some principal comments for research follow-ups on the current study.
9.1 The study issues in the global debate context
As one key element in water reforms, irrigation decentralization has been introduced as a blueprint solution for increased efficiency and productivity through the active involvement of non-state entities (private sector, local communities, civil society organizations) in making decisions relating to management, finance, investment, and maintenance of irrigation systems. In actual fact, many donors and policy makers recognize that decentralization that has been tested in different forms is, in reality, unlikely to bring about the positive outcomes outlined in the theory (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). While many scholars have claimed that poor implementation is main cause affecting design and outcomes of decentralization, there has also been much debate about “a conceptual fault” (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Cheema & Rondinell, 2007; Mukherji et al.,
259 2009a). Water institutional reforms have been criticized because of a widespread lack of attention to social and political contexts, powers, and interface between formal and informal institutions (Cleaver, 2002; Mollinga & Bolning, 2004; Cleaver & Franks, 2005; Merrey et al., 2007; Molle et al., 2009).
Focusing on irrigation management in this study, I argue that some of the shortcomings for assessing decentralization connect with the problem understandings in much of the existing literature. Much attention is given to solutions to constraints during the implementation phase but less emphasis on understanding of contexts, processes, and the consequences of institutional arrangements. With blueprint applications, the common approach mainly focuses on local water users’ organizations but gives insufficient attention to the cross-level interactions between involved actors, their responses to reforms, and the changes in power relationships. There is also too much emphasis on quantitative indicators reflecting the performance of local actors, irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity. The effect of such limitations is that some real constraints of decentralization give rise to unexpected outcomes but are excluded from the analysis. Not least social and cultural processes become reduced to context and thereby not sufficiently reflected. I suggest that this is one important reason why the decentralization policy has such problems to gain foothold.
Using a multiple case study of two irrigation systems163 in Vietnam for discussing these debates, the current study has gone to great lengths to provide a comprehensive picture of irrigation decentralization in Vietnam and existing complications. The study concerns the dynamic processes emerging, actors’ responses to institutional arrangements, and the consequences of decentralization. My ambition is to understand why constraints/limitations occur and why such contradictory results are obtained in the policy implementation process. My concerns are formulated into the following three research questions: (i) How do actors involved in large- and medium-scale irrigation systems respond to the institutional arrangements for decentralization? (ii) What are the main options,
163 Nam Thach Han irrigation system (in Quang Tri province in central region) and Tay Ninh irrigation system (in Tay Ninh province in south region)
260 challenges and constraints to decentralization, and (iii) Why do constraints occur and have counter-productive effects?
As an alternative to overcome shortcomings of the common approach, this study looks at decentralization as a power-laden process in which a host of categories of actors at various administrative levels (i.e. state management agencies, irrigation companies, cooperatives, and farmers) interact dynamically and have an influence on each other in the decision-making processes during the intended transitions towards decentralization. The analysis focuses on how the existing institutional arrangements (both formal and informal) have a range of consequences; for power relationships between actors, for their autonomy in exercising power, for their accountability and participation, as well as for incentives and capability to change. In this study, the consequences of decentralization are assessed with regard to two types of interaction beyond local scope. The first one (state management decentralization) refers to the power transfer between state management agencies, from provincial to district and commune administrative levels. The second one (service management decentralization) refers to how the transfer of responsibility in the management and finance of irrigation systems from IDMCs to cooperatives takes place.
9.2 Study findings reflecting on research questions The legal framework sets the tone for decentralization
This study indicates that the platforms (a legal framework) and options for implementing decentralization in Vietnam are partly in place. Several well- intended decentralization efforts have been launched (Chapters 4 and 5). However, the findings show that the outcomes of both decentralization processes, for state management and for service management, have not been in line with the expectations, either in achieving power transfer or in improving efficiency and performance. The institutional arrangements have affected the outcomes adversely for power relations (Chapter 6), autonomy, accountability, public participation (Chapter 7), as well as incentives and capability of actors to change and adapt under decentralization (Chapter 8).
261 The existing institutional arrangements for the decentralization of irrigation systems have been shaped as an integral part of the overall reform process in Vietnam under the co-existence of four types of reforms (Chapter 5): (i) the public administrative reforms and state management decentralization, (ii) democratization and the decentralization of irrigation service delivery, (iii) financial decentralization, and (iv) the renovation has brought about organizational restructuring and reforming within state- owned irrigation management companies (IDMCs) under equitization. However, a review of the legal frameworks reveals a fact that there are inconsistencies and contradictions in policies, resulting in overlaps to the mandates and to the authority of the state agencies at all administrative levels (Chapter 6). The detailed policies relating to irrigation decentralization within provinces are not in place. Gaps between policy’s intentions and implementation have left room for ambivalence. The study claims that on the one hand, the legal framework has provided limited possibilities for local organizations and water users to participate in and have influence in decision-making. On the other hand, it has reinforced power for provincial state agencies and IDMCs.
Re-centralization tendency: imbalanced power structure and resource dependency
The study claims that the overall effect of irrigation decentralization is slow and ineffective implementation. The institutional design generates a new version of a centralized power structure at provincial level in which the important decisions are taken by provincial people’s committees (PPCs) and line ministry agencies. These decisions include (i) controlling the provision of irrigation services through “assignment plan”, (ii) investment and rehabilitation, operation and maintenance (O&M) plans of irrigation systems, (iii) budgeting, along with allocation and management of financial resources, and (iv) personnel appointment. This design, therefore, creates new forms of resource allocation mechanisms have generated a more centralized operation style in the management, operation, maintenance and financing of irrigation. This form of allocation creates dependency among actors on resources (human, knowledge, finance, institutions). Such dependencies can be, for instance, between a local organization and an IDMC or between an IDMC and state agencies. They result in imbalanced
262 power relations between the actors in ways that bring about both new and blocked actions during implementation. The circumstances react against policy intentions by finding new forms of re-centralization, resulting in unexpected effects on the autonomy, accountability, participation and incentives of the actors.
Both state agencies, especially at provincial level and IDMCs retain their power in state management and service management even though decentralization has been implemented. In consequence, maintained top/down control hampers the extent to which actors exercise power in decision-making. The situation leaves little space for state agencies at district and commune levels to exercise their authority and carry out their duties. Similarly, neither the IDMCs nor the cooperatives in the two irrigation systems studied are in effect autonomous when making decisions about the O&M of irrigation systems, and when mobilizing and managing their resources. IDMCs under the new company form are more flexible in organization, personnel management and financial management than before, but unfortunately, IDMCs in this design, are subjected to strong interventions from line ministry agencies and their capital owners – PPCs.
A power dominance has emerged locally where the IDMCs are in the position to pay cooperatives for services at the on-farm level instead of striving to improve their performance in order to get payments from farmers and cooperatives. The operation of cooperatives comes under the control of IDMCs and local administration at district and commune levels. In actual fact, the institutional arrangements have pushed cooperatives to a very weak position: IDMCs have a commanding influence on cooperatives as they have control over the financial resources. The cooperatives cannot in fact act as external monitorers to assess the accountability of the IDMCs due to their dependency on the IDMCs, an asymmetric sharing of information and capacity, and a lack of communication. The system is thus open to domination and top-down behavior patterns from the IDMCs, and changes in the partnership between the service providers (IDMCs) and the cooperatives and farmers. IDMCs maintain close relations with local administration for the sake of legal control at local level, even though there is tension sometimes around personnel recruitment at local organizations.
263 Slow decentralization: affects of incentives, administrative culture, and capacity
Imbalanced power relationships between actors lead to dominant relations (Young, 2006). The study also reveals that incentives and attitudes of the involved actors do not change even though actors are undergoing reforms as assumed in the literature (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). The limited influence of cooperatives and farmers on decision- making suggests an unchanged top/down management style within IDMCs after renovation. One reason similar to what is raised in the literature is that IDMCs’ staff is unwilling to change for fear of having to deal with the uncertainties and risks related to jobs and incomes (Merrey, 1996; Aheeyar, 2004). This study has discovered other obstacles: additional unforeseen consequences of the existing institutional arrangements include passiveness, vested interest and privilege within IDMC. The exemption of water fees for irrigation and the state subsidy of all expenses paid to IDMCs for the O&M of irrigation systems are intended for improved autonomy of IDMCs. Unfortunately, this policy becomes a critical factor that undermines the incentives of IDMCs in decentralization because the transfer reduces their revenues. The aggregate profile is different in the IDMCs across the country, but the issue of contextuality is alive across the board.
The study shows implications for reluctance to reforms appear beyond the changes in power relations under decentralization. Even though state agencies and IDMCs have been under decentralization reforms, traditions for administrative culture and top-down management styles have remained. Such a phenomenon is described in the literature as “path dependency” (Seleth & Dinar, 2004; Sehring, 2009). The limited mandates and authority within district and commune state agencies, and the delays with issuing the detailed policies relating to irrigation decentralization within their provinces reflect the reluctance of the provincial state agencies to decentralize. Major challenges remain unsolved under decentralization: inconsistencies and overlaps in mandates and authority among state agencies, weak coordination and communication across levels and across sectors, limited institutional settings within district and commune
264 agencies, a lack of qualified staff with experience and specialized knowledge within irrigation, a general shortage of information, and a restricted database. These challenges prove that there are limitations when decentralization has been implemented in a form of structural adjustments for the sake of reforming structures and redefining tasks of organizations rather than enhancing management mechanisms and capacity building164.
Such problems have also been observed when assessing farmers’ participation. Cultural differences between the administration and the farmers are inherited from earlier interaction traditions. Judging from the current study they must be considered as major constraints affecting the limited participation and influence of farmers and cooperatives in the planning, design, construction, and M&E stages. A new administration culture has emerged during decentralization reforms but the dominating behavior relations of local authorities, a lack of communication and information sharing, the persistence of a top-down style still remain in their actions. The passive attitudes of farmers together with their belief that they have limited understanding affect the ways farmers participate.
Cooperatives are not capable of responding and adapting quickly to the new structural change as suggested by the devolution’s advocates (cf. Ostrom 1990; Tang, 1992). Cooperatives have dealt with the shortcomings that are often blamed as the main obstacles for local organizations to take- off (Vermillion, 1997; Bandaragoda, 2006; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a): a lack of opportunities to mobilize financial sources from external sources, a lack of possibilities to extend/diversify extra service activities to generate more revenue to supplement that from irrigation services; and limited capacity, information and communication. A critical situation for the cooperatives is that they are squeezed between the dominant influence from the IDMCs and strong impacts from informal
164 For instance, IDMCs are under pressure under equitization to reorganize their organizational structures, and to revise their functions and activities in order to become autonomous, accountable, and effective in their planning, finance, and organization, including personnel management. Local organizations have been established or strengthened under the WB and ADB projects with the focus on organizational restructuring, capacity building, and participatory processes. 21 irrigation cooperatives in Tay Ninh were newly formed under the WB project while more than 300 irrigation teams co-exist. 47 agricultural cooperatives in Nam Thach Han were strengthened from the old form that have existed for many years
265 institutions. Factors such as social interactions within local farmers networks, a lack of trust of farmers in the new institutions, and farmers’ attitudes undermine the incentive and attitudes of cooperatives to perform accountably. Farmers’ skepticism of cooperatives, based on the failures, inefficiency and lack of transparency that were common in the collectivization period, affect their trust in the new cooperatives. The policy of the remission of water fees has created “free riding” behavior among many farmers. An unwillingness to pay on-farm fees, and to contribute labor for regular maintenance, was observed in the case studies. Low payment on a seasonal basis is a further major constraint that affects the incentives of people working for cooperatives. These problems (as seen clearly in Tay Ninh case) prove a statement in the literature that decentralization is unlikely to succeed if new forms for cooperatives were established without thoroughly assessing if they fit into local social, cultural and political contexts and if these cooperatives are capable to develop in new context (Cleaver, 2002; Mollinga & Bolning, 2004; Cleaver & Franks, 2005; Merrey et al., 2007). In actual fact, the new cooperatives in Tay Ninh, for example, are bringing back the old form as small irrigation teams.
On the basis of the findings generated by this study, I conclude that it is not just constrains during implementation that have adverse effects on the sustainability of decentralization. The limited outcomes of decentralization are indicative of shortcomings in institutional arrangements that created surprise events during implementation. The current institutional arrangements have created several major constraints to decentralization such as (i) imbalanced power relations between actors, (ii) the dependency of actors on resources, (iii) passiveness, vested interest and privilege within IDMCs and state agencies, (iv) free-riding behavior and distrust among farmers. The relationships between actors become very complicated, being a mixture of dominance, dependency, and social pressure. These produce unexpected effects on the autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of all involved actors. Performance and incentives, when seen as linked to imbalance power relations, financial dependency, obviously have deeper roots than limited understanding, leading to skepticism about the sustainability of a decentralization process.
266 9.3 Reflecting the research findings to theoretical approaches
The soaring world attention to potential and current water scarcity has brought water resources management to the forefront of the even broader concerns over natural resources management. The current study links into some very specific water related concerns that are crucial for sustainable development; that is the management of irrigation systems. Many challenges to decentralization of irrigation management have been addressed in this study. Even though they are draped into the specific Vietnamese context, there are several reflections that link with the broad theoretical agenda for water resources management; be it in search for integrated approaches in scarcity situations, efficiency in resource use for improved economic productivity, or resource control affecting international relations, to mention three major current research fields. The study linkage is with the second of these concerns.
A number of key issues in the general debate appear also in irrigation management. One such key political issue is the effort to transfer power in a process of decentralization. Another one is the effort to bring better understanding of “surprise consequences” of implementation of decentralization policies. A third one is the management of scarcity, be it in IWRM or, as in the current study, in terms of skewed power distribution. In the current study attention goes specifically to intentions, approaches, and responses within irrigation agriculture in Vietnam to understand what are the threats that causes decentralization policy to provoke a re- centralization process where power concentration occurs at provinces instead of national level without real change in key ethical issues such as participation, transparency, and coordinated decision-making.
The findings confirm that the theoretical approaches employed in this study to assess the dynamic processes of decentralization are useful. The polycentric approach (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008) highlighting the cross- level interactions between actors, and the conceptual framework to study power in transition (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009), are meaningful in analyzing the decentralization of large- and medium-scale irrigation
267 systems in the broader power context of multi-level governance. The study indicates that an analysis of power relationships between actors during institutional change is necessary. Power struggles between actors happen in reality and are not merely due to the resistance of powerful actors. They are generated as unforeseen consequences of the institutional arrangements and affect the outcomes of decentralization in a counterproductive manner. Therefore, they cannot be removed automatically during reform or through the networks of relationships as suggested in the literature (cf. Shivakoti et al., 2005; Carlsson & Barkes, 2005; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008).
By applying the polycentric approach and the conceptual framework to study power approaches, the study allows scrutiny of the dynamic processes in which these actors interact, react, have influence, and respond to the changes in structures and institutions in order to identify the major constraints to decentralization. Such findings do not appear in routine project assessments or in many of the existing studies which use quantitative indicators, and only focus on the impact of decentralization on irrigation efficiency, agricultural productivity, and the performance of local organizations linked to capacity, empowerment, and participation (Shivakoti et al., 2005; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; WB, 2008)165.
The findings confirm that such indicators do not capture the dynamics in power transfer and, therefore, do not sufficiently reflect the real constraints of decentralization that give rise to the unexpected outcomes. The seemingly successful results we see today, according to current evaluations, will change quickly when further assessment shows how the development of irrigation management, whether decentralized or not, will deteriorate with time. The performance of the irrigation systems and agricultural productivity reflect only the technical side of the process. Actors’ incentives and attitudes responding to the institutional changes are not given much attention whether in the existing literature or in implementation at project levels. More attention needs to be given to interest beyond irrigation management relating to (a) stakeholders’ power
165 Major foci in designing institutional arrangements for irrigation decentralization are to define clear roles/rights, empower and enhance the capacity of local organizations (WB, 2008), and carry out structural adjustments for state irrigation agencies (Shivakoti et al., 2005)
268 and dynamics in water resources management, and (b) informal institutions revived by water resources scarcities. Policy research needs to better problematize the concept decentralization. Institution researchers need to operationalize the concept informal institutions by linking it to cultural processes and actors’ perceptions. The sustainability of the process, as reflected in qualitative indicators of incentives, attitudes, empowerment etc., is a highly significant concern, as has emerged in the study. Applying a mixed methods research approach in this study proves beneficial because both quantitative and qualitative indicators are analyzed.
9.4 Study’s implications for implementing decentralization
Reflecting from the findings of this study, this section presents some implications for making decentralization work in reality.
The complexities and implications of irrigation
The findings in the current study show that the decentralized hydraulic society has proven to be a complex goal, hard to reach even when policies are in place. The application of decentralization to irrigation is more difficult than that to other natural resources because of the complexities and implications discussed in Section 2.2. The difficulties come from collective action problems due to irrigation’s characteristics (excludability, subtractability), or market failures of public goods/services (externalities, information asymmetry). Difficulties also arise during implementation depending on the scale of the system (large- or small-scale system), the type of infrastructure, the complexity of the technical design, and so on. All these implications should be considered thoroughly in order to avoid the mistaken applications of blueprint solutions.
Social-cultural issues and the dynamics in policies
Furthermore, the results in this study show the challenges of decentralization from another aspect. Current reforms lead to a change in
269 culture through the introduction of new techniques, new management, and new ways of thinking. Knowledge formation becomes central, particularly in its new ways, including the use of information technology. The interaction processes emerging from policy implementation are two-fold: an opportunity both for central power to exert more social control (re- centralization), and for local levels to become pace setters in assessing new and emerging value systems in connection with the management of irrigation systems under completely new circumstances. The empirical cases’ performance suggests that change in the new irrigation management practices is driven significantly by conflict or frustration, worries among farmers over unknown practices, and concern among administrations that they will lose power (including the state in its capacity as central controlling and managing institution). The study focus has also been on issues such as increased state control, the formation of new social groups, and emerging new value systems.
Since development issues dig deep into socio-cultural issues also with regards to irrigation management, policy needs to relate to the internal dynamics in society. This includes the flow of resources and cultural values, a concern that is only partly included in the current study. Such issues need greater attention than physical resource management itself when we are concerned with sustainability. The processes of decision- making have their roots in a complexity of considerations, beyond the logics of administrative management structures. The story of decentralization in Vietnam based on the in-depth study at two selected cases is an example. The current study has discovered a decisive case of an unintended power switch whereby an informal socio-cultural institution has emerged based on prescribed relations between the state-owned irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) and cooperatives. A major challenge is that the political process behind decentralization in Vietnam is directed by macro-economic goals and by short-term technical goals to achieve politically good production statistics, poverty reduction figures included. The legal framework with its host of decrees, policies, and regulations is well intended and rewarded with short-term success. Some legal documents are inconsistent and overlapping though; they can be partial or improperly sequenced. There is a lack of sufficient attention to the consequences and impacts of institutional arrangements of power
270 relations between actors at different levels, and their performance and incentives towards decentralization. In consequence, the legal frameworks and policy reform have not foreseen the indirect effects on either state management or service management decentralization. I suggest that instead of focusing on technical and administrative issues, policy research needs to pay attention also to the socio-cultural contexts and the dynamics in society for the implementation of decentralization in irrigation management and service provision.
Platforms and networks for power negotiation in polycentric systems
The study suggests that decentralization would work if there are comprehensive back-up efforts. These must include both an additional well-defined policy, and an understanding of the context for a decentralized hydraulic society. Success can be achieved in principle, probably via a mixture of centralized and decentralized power structures, but proper process is called for. A divide in terms of policy initiative exists between those who have adaptation aspirations for policy and those who subscribe to the assumption that institutions are built through checks and balances between competing power forces, produced by the hydraulic society itself. Irrespective of perspective, the study gives emphasis to the concept of polycentric systems. Identifying and involving informal institutional links, irrespective of how they may connect different administrative levels, provides an opportunity to form platforms and networks that can be meeting-places for several interests with decentralization as a common denominator.
Evidence from the two studied cases reveals that the state irrigation management companies still play an important role in large- and medium scale irrigation systems because of their competence in technical issues, and capacity in management of cross-administrative boundary systems (as described in Section 2.2.4). These companies are assigned to provide public irrigation services, even though no profits166 are guaranteed, to ensure regional/ national food security and livelihoods. The cooperatives do not always have both the capabilities and the incentives to fulfill these
166 Irrigation services are public goods and therefore subject to market failures caused by externalities, excludability, subtractability
271 conditions. A combination of centralization and decentralization of power (co-management) would be a generally suitable approach. The study suggests that policy and implementation need to be addressed on a much more comprehensive scale. The terms ‘multi-polar’ and ‘polycentric’ describe clearly how the key issues for sustainable power transfer should be regarded.
Since decision-making is based on perceiving a problem, solutions for decentralization should be identified based on an improved understanding of sustainable development. The implementation of “solutions” is at present treated as a technical problem inside a resource system with social constraints transformed from a social system. This is a single-sided approach to sustainability that does not encompass life quality in the sense that uncertainty can be balanced through improved controllability. Power, as an expression of social relations or control, is the missing “Factor X”. The view of social systems at present is limited to providing forms for negotiations and adaptability, whilst natural systems linked to food production set the agenda. In the extreme, the local communities become suppliers of labor to an already established system of exploitation, driven by economic thinking. For sustainability reasons, more empowerment and capacity building are needed to assess consequences, not only to manage technical design. Decentralization has become reduced to a tool for improved productivity, where empowerment is prescribed top/down and implemented with short-term focus on the factors that can increase production and decrease poverty. We may call this a conditional empowerment process where decentralization is a tool, improved production the aim, and successful long-term decentralization in irrigation systems a consequence; if it succeeds, it will be hailed as a great achievement.
This leads to my final reflections on the goal of the study. I stubbornly come back to the potential in current decentralization processes. Decentralization takes on different forms, but it needs to be adapted to each specific context: all local social, economical, cultural, and political conditions, all factors such as the scale of irrigation systems, infrastructure, and current institutional arrangements, should be considered. Actors’ responses in terms of incentives and capability to these arrangements
272 should be given sufficient attention. Policy is one-sided (technocratic with a focus on infrastructure improvements but not enough on social capital) but rooted in well-intended political ambitions, so that actors are aware of the improvements that could or will be made. These are two cornerstones that, with the mobilization of stakeholders as an integral part, have the potential to drive the decentralization process in a sustainable way with long-term effects that will last after the closures of the ODAs.
9.5 The study implications for future study
Having concluded the work for this thesis, I wish to go deeper into this subject in my future research as a continuation of the current study. I intend to enrich the analysis by adding three more factors. Firstly, the exemption of water fees policy is one factor in the analysis of institutional arrangements in this study. As this policy is expected to be changed by government soon, the impact of the change will form part of my continuous research. Secondly, the government of Vietnam is starting a comprehensive program for developing socio-economic, political and national defense policies in all communes in Vietnam (called the National Target Program on building the new rural society during the period 2010-2020). Recently, several pilots have been implemented in advance of launching on a national scale. I will assess how changes arising from this program affect decentralized irrigation management (for example, upgraded on-farm irrigation systems, economical re-structuring in agricultural production, reforms in organization structure and management mechanisms for farmer households, agro-SMEs, and agricultural cooperatives). Thirdly, I plan to include more examples in the continuous research in order to enrich the assessment of the impact of international donors on decentralized irrigation management.
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293 Wegerich, K., 2001. Institutional change: a theoretical approach. Occasional Paper No. 30. Water issues study group. London: School of Oriental and African studies (SOAS), University of London. Wescott, C.G., 2003. Hierarchies, Networks, and Local Government in Vietnam. International Public Management Review, 4(2). White, R., & P. Smoke, 2005. East Asia Decentralizes. Chapter 1 in World Bank, 2005. East Asia Decentralizes: Making local government work. Washington DC: World Bank. Wijayaratna, C.M. (Ed.), 2002. Asian Productivity Organization Seminar on Linking Main System Management for Improved Irrigation Management held in Sri Lanka, 3-8 June 2002 (02-AG-GE-SEM-08). Wilder, M. & P.R. Lankao, 2006. Paradoxes of Decentralization: water reform and social implications in Mexico. World Development, Nov 2006, 34(11):1977-1995. Wittfogel, K., 1957. Oriental Despotism. A comparative study of total power. Yale University Press, New Haven. Wong, S., & S. Guggenheim, 2005. Community-driven development: decentralization’s accountability challenge. Chapter 12 in World Bank, 2005. East Asia Decentralizes. Making local government work. Work, R., 2002. Overview of decentralization worldwide: a stepping stone to improved governance and human development. Conference Paper in 2nd international conference on decentralization federalism: the future of decentralizing states? 25- 27 July 2002 Manila, Philippines. World Bank, 1992. Governance and Development. Washington, D.C. World Bank, 1993. The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Oxford University Press. World Bank, 2000. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. Delhi: Oxford University Press. World Bank, 2001. Decentralization and governance: does decentralization improve public service delivery? PREM notes June 2001 Number 55. World Bank, 2004. Making services work for poor people. Chapter 3: The framework for service provision. World Bank and Oxford University Press. World Bank, 2005. East Asia Decentralizes: Making local government work. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2006. Vietnam - Aiming high : Vietnam Development Report 2007. Join Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, Hanoi, December 14-15, 2006. Washington D.C. - The Worldbank. World Bank, 2007. Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption.” Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, Washington, D.C. [www.world- bank.org/html/extdr/comments/governancefeedback/gacpaper.pdf ]. World Bank, 2008. World Development Report 2008. Agriculture for Development. World Bank, AFD, ADB, AusAID, CIDA, DFID, EC, Finland, German Development Cooperation, Irish Aid, JICA, New Zealand Aid Programme, Norway, the
294 Netherlands, UN, USAID, 2010, Natural Resources Management. Vietnam Development Report 2011. Join Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, Hanoi, December 7-8, 2010. World Bank, 2011, Market economy for a middle-income Vietnam. Vietnam Development Report 2012. Join Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, Hanoi, December 6, 2011. World Bank, Decentralization website. http://go.worldbank.org/WM37RM8600. World Commission on Environmental and Development (WCED), 1987. Our Common Future. Report of WCED published as Annex to General Assembly document A/42/427. Yin, R.K., 2009. Case study research: Design and Methods. Fourth edition. Applied social research methods. California: SAGE Publications, Inc. Yonariza, 2008. The resistance of central government towards Participatory Resources management: case of irrigation and forestry resources in decentralized Indonesia. Paper presented in the 12th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the study of commons”, to be held in University of Gloucestershire, Chelternham, England, July 14-18, 2008. www.iasc2008.glos.ac.uk/conference%20papers/.../Yonariza_104501.pdf. Young, O.R., 2006. Vertical Interplay among scale-dependent environmental and resources regimes. Ecology and Society 11(1):27.
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296 APPENDIXES Appendix 1. Questionnaire forms
FORM A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLD
This questionnaire is prepared to collect information for the assessment of the decentralized irrigation management. This form will help us in the research aimed at finding suitable solutions for improving irrigation management. Information provided by you is very valuable for us. Your name will not appear in this form. All information provided will be secret and used for research purpose only. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Guide: Please mark an X next to the boxes that fit with your opinion. You can use one or several X to answer one question. More information added will be appreciated.
Name of irrigation system…………………………………………………………………… Village:………….. Commune:………………District…………Province:……….. Age:………………Gender: Male Female Education Level: None Elementary Secondary High School Technical school College/University Position (if have)……………………………………………………………..
1. How do you involve into different activities in irrigation projects at your locality? - Planning and preparation - Design and budgeting - Construction - Management, operation and maintenance (O&M) 2. When participating in the meetings to discuss about projects’ activities, what do you usually do? 3. In what ways do you get the information, announcement relating to policies, regulations on water management? a. Informed by the head of village b. Informed by the leader of cooperatives in the member meetings c. Informed in local water user organizations e. Heard from commune louder speaker f. Heard from neighbors g. Informed through television and radio h. Seen in the newspapers 4. Do you know about Information relating to project planning a. I know very well b. I know some of them c. No ideas Information relating to budgeting a. I know very well b. I know some of them c. No ideas Information relating to project designers, constructers, managers, monitors a. I know very well b. I know some of them c. No ideas
5. How is information relating to money in/out-flows of Agricultural Cooperatives and Water User Organizations shared in public? a. They are read in the meetings b. They are printed out or hung up in the information boards
297 c. No information 6. Did you get clear explanations on the contributions your family has to give (how much and what purposes they were used for) a. Yes b. No 7. Who involve into the development of the Charter for use, management, and protection of irrigation systems? a. Irrigation Stations b. IDMC c. Management Board of Cooperative d. Members of Cooperative e. Farmers f. WUOs g. Others:………………………………………………………………………. 8. How do you participate in the development of these Charters? 9. Where are your parcels located in the irrigation system? a. Head b. Middle c. End-tail 10. Who delivers water to your plots a. Irrigation teams b. Cooperatives c. WUOs d. Households group e. Self 11. How is water distributed? 12. How is irrigation service provided since implementing the policy of water fee remission? a. Better than before b. Same as before c. Worse than before 13. If irrigation services are provided worse than before, what reasons can you think of? 14. Are there any conflicts over water in irrigation systems? a. No b. Yes. What are they? Please explain...... 15. Who involve in conflict resolving? a. IDMC/IME b. CPC c. AC/WUOs d. Farmers 16. Who decide the plans on infrastructure maintenance and upgrading? a. Cooperatives d. WUOs b. Farmers e. IDMC/IME c. CPC/DPC f. Other…………………………. 17. How does your family contribute to upgrading and maintenance? a. Labor contribution. How many working days/year ...... b. Cash contribution. How much contribution per year ? ………………………….. 18. What did you observe about maintenance works in irrigation systems after your family stopped paying water fees? 19. What did you observe about maintenance works in irrigation systems after your family stopped paying water fees? 20. Currently how much does your family pay for on-farm fees?…………… kg/sào/season 21. Do you know what on-farm fees are used for? a. Yes b. No 22. Do you think the level of on-farm fee is reasonable? a. Yes b. No. If so, please explain……………………………………… 23. How many tons of rice in approx. does your family harvest last year?…………..tons/year 24. Since you don’t have to pay water fees, how many kg of rice can your family save? …………………kg/year? 25. What did your family use this saving for?…………………………………………………… 26. How do you think about staff of administrative authority (commune level) 27. How do think about staff of Irrigation management company and District irrigation enterprise? 28. How do think about management boards of the cooperatives, water user organizations, irrigation teams? 29. What do you observe about the coordination between staff of IDMC/IME and Cooperatives/WUOs?
298 30. What do you see or expect of the improvements on decentralization and on irrigation management? Please explain why? 31. If you have more opinions, please write below …………………………………………
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
FORM B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COOPERATIVES, IRRIGATION TEAMS
This questionnaire is prepared to collect information for the assessment of the decentralized irrigation management. This form will help us in the research aimed at finding suitable solutions for improving irrigation management. Information provided by you is very valuable for us. Your name will not appear in this form. All information provided will be secret and used for research purpose only. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Guide: Please mark an X next to the boxes that fit with your opinion. You can use one or several X to answer one question. More information added will be appreciated.
Name of irrigation system…………………………………………………………………………. Village:………….. Commune:………………District…………Province:……………… Type of organization a. Agricultural Cooperative d. Irrigation team b. Water User Cooperative e. Management Board c. Water User Group f. Other,……………………………………… Position of the person providing information………………………………………………………
1. How do farmers involve into different stages in the rural development projects and water projects at locality?
2. When participating in the projects’ activities, what do farmers usually do according to your opinion? 3. In what ways do farmers get the information relating to policies, regulations on water management? They get information from: a. The head of village b. The leader of cooperatives in the member meetings c. Local water user organizations e. Commune loud speakers f. Neighbors g. Television and radio h. Newspapers
4. What levels of understanding do you think farmers have with Information relating to planning and implementation of project a. Understand well b. Know something c. Know nothing Information relating to budgeting and financial accounting a. Understand well b. Know something c. Know nothing Information relating to project designers, managers and monitors a. Understand well b. Know something c. Know nothing
5. How is information relating to money in/out-flows of Agricultural cooperatives and Water User Organizations shared in public? a. Read in the meetings b. Printed out or hung up in the information boards
299 c. No information given
6. Who involve into the development of the Charter for use, management, and protection of irrigation systems? a. Irrigation Stations b. IDMC c. Management Board of Cooperative d. Members of Cooperative e. Farmers f. WUOs g. Others:……………………………………………………………………….
7. How do farmers participate in the development of these Charters?
8. Who delivery water to the plots of farmers? a.Irrigation teams b.Cooperatives c. WUOs d. Households groupa e. Farmers
9. How is water distributed?
10. How is irrigation service provided since implementing the policy of water fee remission? a. Better than before b. Same as before c. Worse than before
11. If irrigation services are provided worse than before, what reasons can you think of?
12. Are there any conflicts over water in irrigation systems? a. No b. Yes. What are they? Please explain......
13. Who involve in conflict resolving? a. IDMC/IME b. CPC c. AC/WUOs d. Farmers
14. Who decide the plans on infrastructure maintenance and upgrading? a. Cooperatives d. WUOs b. Farmers e. IDMC/IME c. CPC/DPC f. Other………………………….
15. How does the family contribute to upgrading and maintenance? a. Labor contribution. How many working days/year ...... b. Cash contribution. How much contribution per year ? …………………………..
16. Do you think these contributions are reasonable? a. Yes b. No. If so, please explain. ……………………………….
17. What did you observe about maintenance works in irrigation systems after farmers stopped paying water fees?
18. Currently, on-farm fee farmers pay to ACs/WUOs is…………… kg/sào/season
19. Do you think the level of on-farm fee is reasonable? a. Yes b. No. If so, please explain…………………………………………….
20. How do think about staff of commune administrative authority?
300 21. How do think about staff of irrigation and Drainage management company (IDMCs) and District irrigation enterprise? 22. What do you observe about the coordination between staff of IDMC/IME and Cooperatives/irrigation teams? 23. If coordination are not good, what reasons can you think of? 24. What factors do you consider as the constraints for the autonomy of your organizations? 25. What factors mentioned below do you consider as constraints for the sustainability of your organizations? 26. What are the impacts from the government’s policy on water fee remission to reduce contributions for farmers
27. What changes do you see when farmers delegated or empowered in irrigation management? please explain?
28. If you have more opinions, please write below …………………………………………
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
FORM C: FORM FOR STAFF OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT COMPANIES This questionnaire is prepared to collect information for the assessment of the decentralized irrigation management. This form will help us in the research aimed at finding suitable solutions for improving irrigation management. Information provided by you is very valuable for us. Your name will not appear in this form. All information provided will be secret and used for research purpose only. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Guideline: Please use X to fill to the boxes that fit with your opinions. You can use one or several X to answer one question. More information added will be appreciated. General information Name of irrigation systems…………………………………………………………… Name of irrigation management organization ……………………………………………… Position of interviewer…………………………………………………
1. Did the provincial authority issue and implement the decentralization policies in water/irrigation sector? Not yet Yes. When? ………………….. 2. Did the provincial authority issue and implement the policies in irrigation management transfer to the local organizations? Not yet Yes. When? ………………….. 3. Do you think these policies already create legal framework for the implementation of decentralized irrigation management in your province? No Yes Please explain why………………………………………………………………….. Assessment of organizational performance (flexibility, sustainability, autonomy) 4. Government policy is to transform state-owned irrigation companies into state-owned one membership limited companies. Are there any changes in our companies? a. No change whether in organizational or personnel structure b. Organizational structure is rearranged to reduce staff The current numbers is……….persons. Total number of staff before rearranging is ……… persons c. Arrangement for unemployed
301 d. Adjustment of the functions and mandates in public services e. Adjustment of the functions and mandates in business services f. Adjustment of the functions and mandates of administrative units g. Changes in labor management h. Capacity building for staff i. Enhanced incomes and created incentives for staff of company j. Other…………………………………….
5. Do above-mentioned changes help the reform process in your company (both in company’s management and business)? a. Not yet b. Yes
6. In reality, is your company more flexible? If so, in what activities? a. Selecting and deciding activities, locations and types of business and investment b. Finding and extending the markets and customers to sign contracts c. Mobilization, distribution and use of financial sources d. Deciding personnel structure in accordance to the business needs e. Deciding expenses and investment for projects with values ≤ 50% company’s assets f. No improvement in flexibility
7. Which factors listed below may hinder the flexibility of your company? a. Unclear division of responsibility for company/enterprises b. Unclear division of responsibility for state management agencies b1. Department of Agricultural and Rural Development b2. Department of Natural Resources and Environment b3. Department of Finance c. The delegation of tasks to IDMC/IME is not clear d. Some tasks/responsibilities are delegated to company but not valid in reality (For example, Ordination mentioned is that IDMCs have become investment owners in the maintenance of irrigation systems but in reality, IDMCs are not delegated to conduct this works in the systems exploited and managed by them; therefore there should be an X here) e. Poor coordination among state management agencies or between company and local organizations f. Complications in decision-making as it takes time with the involvement of many agencies (For example, financial decisions for maintenance activities in irrigation systems need that DARD; DONRE; DOF all involve in field investigation, evaluation and approval) g. Intervention/ top-down from local authorities: PPC DPC CPC (For example, irrigation schedule needs to follow production plans of DPC) h. Under management of many layers of agencies (for example, when the investment owner is PPC, and state manage agency of irrigation & drainage is DARD, and budgeting and financial distribution is DOF, and production plans is DPC) i. Lack of coordination/collaboration among agencies causes complicated and slow procedures j. Overlaps in management among agencies (state management and system management) k. Lack of implementation planning from PPC, or from state management agencies l. Limited management skills and operation capacities of staff ……………………………………………………… 8. Many think that IDMCs have difficulties to be financially autonomous (including IDMCs that already are transferred to Ltd companies). Do you agree with this opinion? a. I don’t agree b. I agree If you agree, which of the reasons below fit with your opinion?
302 c. Water fees/prices for water services are low and not identified in the negotiation between service providers and users (not follow market mechanism) d. Water fees/prices fixed in Decree 115 are much lower than reality, so that GoV subsidies calculated based on that levels are not enough for IDMCs in operation and maintenance e. Company’s finance is balanced in order to match subsidies provided, not with business plans and service quality required f. Yearly orderding and assigning of irrigation service supply from Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) to IDMC are not suitable because there is no basis for planning
9. What are the impacts from the government’s policy on water fee remission? 10. What factors may hinder the autonomy of cooperatives, irrigation teams 11. What factors can become constraints for the sustainabilityof cooperatives, irrigation teams?
The coordination 12. What do you observe about the coordination between IDMC/IME with local authorities in listed matters: a. Development of irrigation and drainage schedules in tune with agricultural production a1. Very good a2. Somehow good a3. So and so a4. Somehow bad a5. Very bad b. Conflict resolutions and sanctions b1. Very good b2. Somehow good b3. So and so b4. Somehow bad b5. Very bad c. Budgeting and approving budgets for water fees subsidy c1. Very good c2. Somehow good c3. So and so c4. Somehow bad c5. Very bad d. Formulation and implementation of policies/regulations d1. Very good d2. Somehow good d3. So and so d4. Somehow bad d5. Very bad e. Financial mobilization and distribution e1. Very good e2. Somehow good e3. So and so e4. Somehow bad e5. Very bad
13. What do you observe about the coordination between IDMC/IME with the state management agencies (for example, DARD; DOF, DONRE) in these matters: a. Budgeting, approving and distributing financial resources a1. Very good a2. Somehow good a3. So and so a4. Somehow bad a5. Very bad b. Management, guideline and assistance in technical issues b1. Very good b2. Somehow good b3. So and so b4. Somehow bad b5. Very bad c. Mobilization and allocation of financial sources for upgrading and maintenance of irrigation systems c1. Very good c2. Somehow good c3. So and so c4. Somehow bad c5. Very bad d. Conflict resolutions and sanctions d1. Very good d2. Somehow good d3. So and so d4. Somehow bad d5. Very bad e. Planning and licencing for the business using water from hydraulic works e1. Very good e2. Somehow good e3. So and so e4. Somehow bad e5. Very bad
14. What do you observe about the coordination between IDMC/IME and local water user organizations/agricultural cooperative? 15. If these coordination activities are not good, what reasons can you think of? 16. Please assess irrigation services and quality of maintenance that are carried out by your company?
17. How is irrigation service is provided since implementing the policy of water fee remission? a. Better than before b. Same as before c. Worse than before
18. Please assess the satisfaction of farmers in irrigation services a. Satisfied b. Somehow satisfied
303 c. So and so d. Somehow dissatisfied e. Dissatisfied
19. Before implementing the policy of water fee remission (Decree 115), total amount of water fee collected per year is ………VND (in average), percentage of collected fee is ……%
20. If irrigation services are provided worse than before, what reasons do you think of? 21. How do you think maintenance works have developed since implementing the policy of water fees remission? a. Better because bigger budget from subsidy of water fee remission Subsidy received in 2008 is…………………….VND Subsidy received in 2009 is………… ………..VND Subsidy received in 2010 is…………… ……..VND b. Same as before because budget is not enough c. Worse than before because of lack in flexibility of financial sources Budgets are lower than real expenses Budgets come late
22. Please assess the participation of water users in operation, maintenance and management of irrigation systems 23. If you have more opinions, please write below ………………………………………… THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
304 Appendix 2. Stakeholder interviews
Semi-structured interviews (questionnaires)
In Tay Ninh In Nam Thach Han Farmers in Farmers in • Dong Khoi commune, Chau Thanh • Trieu Tai commune, Trieu Phong district district • Trieu Long commune, Trieu Phong district • Thai Binh commune, Chau Thanh district • Trieu Phuoc commune, Trieu Phong • An Binh commune, Chau Thanh district district • Tri Binh commune, Chau Thanh district • Trieu Trach commune, Trieu Phong • Gia Loc commune, Trang Bang district district • Loc Hung commune, Trang Bang district • Hai Ba commune, Trieu Phong district • Gia Binh commune, Trang Bang district • Hai Que commune, Trieu Phong district Cooperatives and irrigation teams in Agricultural Cooperatives in • Dong Khoi commune, Chau Thanh • Trieu Trach commune, Trieu Phong district district • Thai Binh commune, Chau Thanh district • Trieu Phuoc commune, Trieu Phong • An Binh commune, Chau Thanh district district • Tri Binh commune, Chau Thanh district • Trieu Hoa commune, Trieu Phong district • Gia Loc commune, Trang Bang district • Trieu Trung commune, Trieu Phong • Loc Hung commune, Trang Bang district district • Gia Binh commune, Trang Bang district • Hai Que commune, Hai Lang district • Hai Ba commune, Hai Lang district • Hai Vinh commune, Hai Lang district
• Tay Ninh irrigation and drainage • Quang Tri irrigation and drainage company company • Trang Bang irrigation and drainage • Nam Thach Han irrigation and drainage enterprise enterprise • Trang Bang irrigation and drainage enterprise
In-depth interviews
Cooperatives in Tay Ninh Cooperative in Quang Tri
Trang Bang district Trieu Phong district • Gia Tan cooperative, Gia Loc commune • Nai Cuu cooperative, Trieu Dong • Loc Thanh cooperative, Loc Hung commune commune • An Hung cooperative, Trieu Tai • Gia Binh cooperative, Gia Binh commune commune • Ta Huu cooperative, Trieu Tai commune • Loc Chau cooperative, Loc Hung • Dai Hao cooperative, Trieu Dai commune commune • Luong Kim cooperative, Trieu Phuoc • Loc Khe cooperative, Gia Loc commune commune • Lam Huynh cooperative, Gia Loc commune Hai Lang district
305 • Co Luy cooperative, Hai Ba commune Chau Thanh district • Hoi Yen cooperative, Hai Que commune • Dong Khoi 6 cooperative, Dong Khoi • Kim Long cooperative, Hai Que commune commune • Dong Khoi 2 cooperative, Dong Khoi • Phuong Hai cooperative, Hai Ba commune • Thi Ong cooperative, Hai Vinh commune • Thai Binh 2 cooperative, Thai Binh commune • An Binh 1 cooperative, An Binh commune • An Binh 2 cooperative, An Binh commune
State irrigation company in Tay Ninh State irrigation company in Quang Tri province province • Tay Ninh irrigation and drainage • Quang Tri irrigation and drainage management company management company • Trang Bang irrigation management • Nam Thach Han irrigation management enterprise enterprise • Chau Thanh irrigation management enterprise
State agencies in Tay Ninh province State agencies in Quang Tri province • Tay Ninh department of agriculture and • Quang Tri department of agriculture and rural development rural development • Tay Ninh department of finance • Quang Tri department of finance • Agricultural section of Trang Bang • Agricultural section of Trieu Phong district district • Agricultural section of Chau Thanh • Agricultural section of Hai Lang district district • Trieu Tai CPC • Dong Khoi commune people’s commune • Hai Que CPC (CPC) • Hai Ba CPC • Gia Loc CPC • An Binh CPC
MARD, researchers • Former vice minister of MARD • Former deputy director of department of hydraulic works, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development • Officer of section of planning and finance (department of hydraulic works) • Centre for Participatory Irrigation Management (CPIM), Vietnam Academy for Water Resources • Institute of Water and Economic Management (IWEM), Vietnam Academy for Water Resources
306 Appendix 3. Organizing and processing data collected
1. Matrix to organize themes of data Participation Power Autonomy Accountability Incentives/ Capability Farmers Cooperatives IDMCs
m 1 m State agencies (provincial, district, Irrigation syste commune levels) Farmers Cooperatives IDMCs State agencies (provincial, district, Irrigation system2 commune levels)
2. Coding information from the questionnaires
PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCES OF FARMERS
The stage of planning and preparation A1.1a./ B1.1a. Information is given, no opinions allowed A1.1b./ B1.1b. Ask questions about the unclear details A1.1c. / B1.1c. Discuss and raise opinions/suggestion A1.1d./ B1.1d. Actively involvement in the selection of the priorities at locality The stage of design and budgeting A1.2a. / B1.2a Information is given, no opinions allowed A1.2b. / B1.2b. Ask questions about the unclear details A1.2c. / B1.2c. Discuss and raise opinions on designs/drawings How do farmers A1.2d. / B1.2d. Actively participate with the staff in field investigations involve into A1.2e. / B1.2e. Discuss about levels and types of contribution different activities in The stage of construction irrigation projects? A1.3a. / B1.3a. Information is given, no opinions allowed (question 1, form A) A1.3b. / B1.3b. Participation in construction (question 1, form B) A1.3c. / B1.3c. Participation in monitoring and having opinions on the construction quality A1.3d. / B1.3d. Participation in labor and money contributions The stage of management, operation and maintenance (O&M) A1.4a. / B1.4aInformation is given, no opinions allowed A1.4b. / B1.4b. Participation in management, operation and maintenance A1.4c. / B1.4c. Participation in monitoring, having opinions A1.4d. / B1.4d. Involving in developing the Charter for O&M of irrigation systems A1.4e. / B1.4e. Discussing and selecting the representatives in the management board From views of IDMCs C22a. Get one-way information, not opinions/feedbacks C22b. Involvement in operation, maintenance and management (question 22, form C22c. Involvement in monitoring C) C22d. Involvement in formulation of charter/regulations in management C22e. Discussion and voting the representatives in management boards A2a. Feel free to express my opinions Attitudes of farmers A2b. Listen and have no opinions as I don’t have knowledge about these issues in the meetings from A2c. I do not give out opinions, avoiding conflicts views of farmers A2d. I do not give out opinions because no one will listen to our needs (question 2, form A) A2e. I do not discuss. I do what others told me to do A2f. I do not give out opinion because I am afraid
307 Attitudes of farmers B2a. Feel confident to raise their opinions in the meetings from B2b. Seldom raise opinions because they don’t have knowledge on technical and views of farmers management issues from views of B2c. Seldom raise opinions to avoid conflicts cooperatives B2d. Seldom make suggestions because they think nobody willing to hear their opinions (question 2, form B) B2e. Seldom involve into discussion but follow what they have been told to do B2f. Seldom involve in discussion because they are afraid talking in public Participation of A8a. Give opinions actively in the meetings farmers in A8b. Participating in the meetings but not concerned about the contents discussion of A8c. No participation or discussion about the Charter’s contents Charters, from views of farmers (question 8, form A) Participation of B7a. Give opinions actively in the meetings farmers in B7b. Participate in the meetings with no concern about the contents discussion of B7c. No participation or discussion about the Charter’s contents Charters, from views of cooperatives (question 7, form B)
Farmers Mr.1.1 A1a Mr.1.2 A1b
Ms.1.3 A1c Cooperatives 1.1 B1a 1.2
Irrigation system1 1.3 Farmers Mr.2.1 Mr.2.2
Ms.2.3 Cooperatives 2.1 2.2
Irrigation system2 2.3
PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE OF COOPERATIVES
Activities Scales of participation and influences • Identification of project 0 - No participation and influence • Planning and preparations of projects 1 - Limited participation and weak influence • Design and budgeting 2 - So and so • Construction 3 – High level of participation and influence. • Maintenance and upgrading • Operation and management • Monitoring and evaluation, financial mobilization
IRRIGATION SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE: opinions of farmers and cooperatives
How is water distributed? From farmers’ views A11a. Irrigation schedules is announced clearly and detailed to farmers (question 11, form A) A11b. Irrigation is delivered to plots (good in quantity and in time) A11c. Irrigation is delivered to plots (not good both in quantity and in time) A11d. Farmers and farmer groups have to take care themselves A11e. Irrigation is not equally delivered
308 From cooperatives’ views B9a. Irrigation schedules are announced clearly and in detail to farmers (question 9, form B) B9b. Irrigation is delivered to plots, good in quantity and in time B9c. Irrigation is delivered to plots but not good in both quantity and time B9d. Farmers and farmer groups have to take care themselves B9e. Irrigation is not equally delivered From views of IDMCs C16a. Irrigation schedules are announced clearly and detailed to farmers (question 16, form C) C16b. Irrigation is delivered to plots (good in quantity and in time) C16c. Irrigation is delivered to plots (not good both in quantity and in time) C16d. Farmers and farmer groups have to take care themselves C16e. Irrigation is not equally delivered Reason why irrigation From farmers’ views services are provided worse A13a. Degraded and incomplete infrastructure than before A13b. Lacking responsibility among irrigation staff A13c. Limited capacity of staff (question 13, form A) A13d. Not reasonable irrigation schedule A13e. Poor management of AC/WUOs A13f. Lack of water source A13g. Not saving water from farmers A13h. No cooperation among water users A13i. Lack of incentives of irrigation staff due to low allowance From cooperatives’ views
B11a. Degraded and incomplete infrastructure
B11b. Lacking responsibility among irrigation staff
B11c. Limited capacity of staff
B11d. Not reasonable irrigation schedule (question 11, form B) B11e. Poor management of AC/WUOs B11f. Lack of water source B11g. Not saving water from farmers B11h. No cooperation among water users B11i. Lack of incentives of irrigation staff due to low allowance From IDMCs’ views C20a. Degraded and incomplete infrastructure C20b. Lacking responsibility of irrigation staff C20c. Limited capacity of staff C20d. Not reasonable irrigation schedule (question 20, form C) C20e. Poor management of AC/WUOs C20f. Lack of water source C20g. Farmers do not save water C20h. No cooperation among water users C20i. Lack of incentives of irrigation staff due to low allowance Observation about A18a. / B17a. Better because bigger budget from subsidy of water fee maintenance works in remission irrigation systems when A18b. / B17b. Same as before because budget is not enough farmers do not pay water fees A18c. / B17c. Worse than before because budgets are not enough or come late (question 18, form A) (question 17, form B)
Farmers observation about 19a. Canals are dredged, no waste, no grass in the canals maintenance works in 19b. Flows are not good due to waste, grass, sediments in the canals irrigation systems 19c. Pumping stations are not well operated (question 19, form A)
309 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY of cooperatives, IDMCs, local authorities: opinions of farmers and cooperatives on
Performance of staff who in A26a. / B20a. Reliable charge of irrigation systems A26b. / B20b. Accountable at commune administration? A26c. / B20b. Competent in their profession (question 26, form A) A26d. / B20d. Close to citizens, easy to talk to (question 20, form B) A26e. / B20e. Concerned and listen to the citizens’ opinions A26f. / B20f. Willing to help to solve problems Performance of staff at A27a. / B27a. Reliable Irrigation management A27b. / B27b. Accountable company and District A27c. / B27c. Competent in their profession irrigation enterprise A27d. / B27d.Close to citizens, easy to talk to (question 27, form A) A27e. / B27e.Concerned and listen to the citizens’ opinions (question 21, form B) A27f. / B27f.Willing to help to solve problems A27g. / B27g.Provide good irrigation services (good quality and in time) Performance of management A28a. Reliable boards of the cooperatives, A28b. Accountable irrigation teams? A28c. Knowledgeable in irrigation operation and maintenance (question 28, form A) A28d. Close to citizens, easy to talk to A28e. Concerned and listen to the citizens’ opinions A28f. Willing to help to solve problems A28g. Provide good irrigation services (good quality and in time) A28h. Taking reasonable on-farm fees Coordination between staff From views of farmers and cooperatives of IDMC/IME and A29a. /B22a. They discuss together about irrigation schedule and infrastructure Cooperatives/WUOs? maintenance A29b. /B22b. They work together to open gates, delivering water to the plots (question 29, form A) A29c. /B22c. They discuss and coordinate to solve conflicts (question 22, form B) A29.d/B22d. They coordinate to investigate hydraulic works and develop the plans for maintenance A29e. /B22e. They do not discuss and hardly find consensus From views of IDMCs C14a. Coordination in contracting with farmers is OK C14b. Discuss together and build consensus on irrigation schedule and (question 14, form C) maintenance C14c. Coordination in water delivery to the fields/lots for farmers takes place C14d. They discuss together to solve problems C14e. Monitoring irrigation works for repair and maintenance is coordinated C14f. There are few discussions; difficult to reach agreements Reasons why coordination B23a. / C15a. Too many agencies involve in management (overlapped duties between Cooperatives and and mandates) IDMCs B23b. / C15b. Too many layers in management, lack of consistence (question 23, form B) B23c./ C15c. Too many layers in management, lack of flexibility in (question 15, form C) management and decision making B23d. / C15d. Heavy intervention from local authorities CONSTRAINTS OF COOPERATIVES
Factors may hinder the From views of cooperatives and IDMCs autonomy of local water B24a. / C10a. Legal status of WUOs is not recognized by local authorities user organizations B24b. / C10b. Lack of attention and support from local authorities B24c. / C10c. Lack of empowerment (tasks are not delegated properly to (question 24, form B) WUOs) (question 10, form C) B24d. / C10d. Lack of flexibility in financial mobilization since financial sources mainly depend on subsidy for water fees remission under IDMC distribution B24e. / C10e. Heavy intervention from local authorities
310 Factors can become From views of cooperatives and IDMCs constraints for the B24a. / C11a. Lack of attention and support from local authorities sustainability of B24b. / C11b. Limitation in some activities, low income, or difficulty in cooperatives, irrigation development teams B24c. / C11c. Low on-farm fees, not enough for the expenses relate to (question 25, form B management and maintenance (question 11, form C) B24d. / C11d. Limited capacity and skills in management and operation
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE OF COOPERATIVES (in target group discussions)
Activities Scales of participation and influences • Financially autonomous 0- Drastic improvements needed (undesirable status) • Degree of capacity and ability 1- Significantly needs for improvement (poor situations) • Competence in service delivery 2- Some scope needed for improvement (satisfactory) • Efficiency in maintenance and upgrading 3- Highly effective. • Cooperation and collaboration capacity • Transparency and responsibility in operations
ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS on decentralization
What do you see or expect From views of farmers and cooperatives the improvements on A30a. / B27a. Farmers have rights to participate, raise their voice in planning decentralization on irrigation and implementation management? A30b. / B27b. Farmers participated directly in decision-making process (question 30, form A) A30c. / B27c. Farmers are empowered in irrigation management (question 27, form B) A30d. / B27d. Information flows reach people transparently A30e. / B27e. Accountability of staff of authorities and irrigation management company improved A30f. / B27f. Better coordination among different organizations A30g. / B27g. Less interventions from local authorities A30h./ B27h. Enhanced autonomy for local water user organizations
Impacts of the exemption of B26a. / C9a. Good for IDMC/IME to get rid of water fee collection task water fees B26b. / C9b. IDMC has a better budget for the maintenance since it receives more subsidies than water fees collected in the past (question 26, form B) B26c. / C9c. Reduced IDMC income due to the implementation of water fee remission (question 9, form C) B26d. / C9d.The procedure to get the GoV’s subsidy has become more complicated due to water fees remission B26e. / C9e.Collection of on-farm fees and local labor mobilization has become more difficult B26f. / C9f. Relations between IDMCs and water user organizations/agricultural cooperatives have improved B26g. / C9g. The IDMC/IME management of irrigated areas have improved B26h. / C9h. Bad behavior from water users in water saving due to free fees B26i. / C9i. Lack of incentive and accountability from IDMC staff B26j. / C9j. No more job for some of IDMC/IME staff
311 Appendix 4. List of policies Decentralization, Democracy, Public administration reforms . Directive 100-CT/TWdated 1371/1981 issued by the Political Bureau in January 1981 to assign products to the labor groups and workers' cooperatives in agriculture . Circular No. 3 issued 18/3/1987 to implement the Directive 100/CT/TW . Directive 10 issued by Political Bureau of CPV dated 5/4/1988 reforms on management mechanism in agricultural economy, socio-economic activity in the rural sector . Law on the Organization of the People’s Councils and People’s Committees of 1994 and Ordinance on the Tasks and Authority of People’s Councils and People’s Committees . Decision 136/2001/QD-TTg dated 17/9/2001 overall Program on State Administrative Reform in the 2001-2010 period . Resolution 08/2004/NQCP on speeding up state management decentralization from the central government to local governments of centrally-affiliated cities and provinces . Resolution 17-NQ/TW dated 01/8/2007 from the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee on the acceleration of the public administration in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the state apparatus . Resolution 22/2008/NQ-CP Promulgating the government action program to implement the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the party central committee, Congress Xth, on further improvement of market economy institutions with a socialist orientation . Resolution 53-NQ/TW dated 07/11/2007, promulgating the government action program for implementation of the Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the party central committee . Decree 144/2005/ND-CP dated 16/5/2005 regulating coordination work among state management agencies in the formulation and the review of the implementation of the policy, strategy, master plans and plans . Decision 34/2007/QD-TTg dated 12/3/2007 on the promulgation of regulation to set up, organize, and operate sector coordination units . Decree 79/2003/ND-CP promulgating the regulation on the exercise of democracy in communes . Decision 29 dated 11/5/1998 on Democratization at Commune . Decree 130/2005/ND-CP dated 17/10/2005 of Government regulated on the self- management system and self-responsibility in the usage of governmental-staff and administrative management expenditure in state agencies. Reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) . Law of SOE (1995) . Enterprise Law (2000), revised Enterprise Law 60/2005/QH11 in force in 29/11/2005 . Decree 50/CP dated 28/8/1996 on the establishment, the reorganization, dissolution and bankruptcy of SOEs . Decree 28/CP dated 07/05/1996 on the transformation of a number of state enterprises into joint-stock companies . Decree 44/1998/ND-CP dated 29/06/1998 on the transformation of state-owned enterprises into joint stock enterprises
312 . Decree 64/2002/ND-CP dated 19/06/2002 on transformation of SOEs into joint- stock companies (replaces Decree 44/1998/ND-CP dated 29/06/1998) . Decree 59/CP (1996) and amended Decree 27 (1999) issuing the regulation on financial management and business accounting of SOE, . Decree 95/2006/ND-CP dated 8/9/2006 on transforming state owned companies to one-member limited liability companies (Replaced Decree 63/2001/ND-Cp dated 14 Sept 2001 and Decree 145/2005/ND-CP dated 21 Nov 2005) . Decree 25/2010/ND-CP dated 26/4/2010 on transforming state-owned companies to one-member limited liability companies and organizational structure of one- member limited liability companies owned by the State (Replaced Decree 95, 2006) . Circular 117/2010/TT-BTC dated 5/8/2010 guiding financial mechanism applied for one-member limited liability companies owned by the State
Regulations related to enterprises producing and providing public goods and services . Decree 56/CP dated 2/10/1996 on the public goods and services, and on the state public-utility enterprises . Decree 31/2005(ND-CP dated 11/3/2005 on producing and providing public goods and services . Decision 38/2007/QD-TTg dated 20/3/2007 on criteria for classification of and list of enterprises with one hundred per cent state owned capital . Decree 43/2006/ND-CP date 25/4/2006 regulating autonomy and self-responsibility regime on performance, organizational structure, employee size and personnel and financial management for public service delivery units . Decision 256/2006/QD-TTg dated 9/11/2006 regulating the procedures of bidding, the placement of order and the assignment of plan in public-utility state enterprises
Regulations related to irrigation and drainage management companies . Circular 13 (1970) on establishment of irrigation management enterprises . Circular 860-CT/VN dated 07/5/1992 on the guidelines for restructuring state- owned irrigation and drainage management companies, . Circular 06/1998/TT-BNN-TCCB dated 3/9/1998 guiding the organization and operation of irrigation and drainage management companies . Decision 211/1998 QD-BNN dated 19/12/1998 on regulation on expenses for maintenance of hydraulic works . Circular 11/2009/TT-BTC dated 21/1/2009 guiding the implementation of assignment and place order for the state-owned irrigation management enterprises . Circular 56/2010/TT-BNNPTNT dated 01/10/2010 providing more detailed guidelines for state-management agencies, IDMCs and local organizations in the implementation of “placement of order” mechanism
Regulations related to decentralized irrigation management, PIM/IMT . Circular 2305-TT/LB dated 23/11/1983 on organization of irrigation teams at localities . Law of Cooperative in force in 20/3/1996, revised Law of cooperative in 2003 . Decision 1959/BNN-QLN . Decision 126 issued in 1998 to establish the PIM Vietnam . Circular 94 /1999/TT_BCT by Ministry of Finance dated 31/7/1999
313 . Circular 134 by MARD dated 25/9/1999 instruct people committees at all levels to provide guidelines for rehabilitation of irrigation system involving farmers . The Framework Strategy and Road Map on the development of Participatory Irrigation Management (2004) . Circular 75/2004/TT-BNN guiding the establishment, strengthening and development of water users organizations . Decree 16/200/ND-CP dated 07/05/2005 on the management of investment in construction works and projects . Circular 61/2008/TTLT-BNN-BNV- guidelines on duties, responsibilities, authorities and organizational structure of the specialized agencies under provincial, district and commune administrative authorities . Decree 151/2007/ND-CP dated 10/10/2007 on organisation and operation of the collective organizations . Circular 04/2008 TT-BKH (2008) guiding the establishment and operation of the collective organizations . Circular 65/ 2009/TT-BNNPTNT dated 12 October 2009 on the guidelines on decentralization in management, exploitation of hydraulic works . Circular 40/2011/TT-BNNPTNT dated 27/05/2011 is new regulation regulating capacity of the organizations, and individuals involving in the exploitation and management of irrigation systems invested from the state budgets . Prime minister’s decision 80/2005/QD-TTg dated 18/04/2005 on community investment monitoring and evaluation
Irrigation management, water fees . The Law on water resources (1998) . Decree No.179/1999/ND-CP on stipulating the implementation of the law on water resources, dated 30/12/1999 . The Decree 73/CP the decision 40/1998 QD-BNN/VP, 02/3/1998 . The National strategy on water resources to 2020 (14/04/2006) . Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation System 36-L/CTN in 1994 . Revised Ordinance on the Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation System No. 32/2001/PL-UBTVQH10, dated 04/4/2001 . Strategy on the development of hydraulic works up to 2020, dated 26/5/2007 . Law on the organization of the People’s Councils and People’s Committees (1993 and 2003)
. Ordinance 68-SL dated 18/6/1949 . Decision 141-CP dated 26/9/1963- the regulation on Management, Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation works and Circular 31 dated 08/10/1963 guiding the implementation of Decision 141-CP . Decree 98/CP, on Use and Maintenance of Irrigation System, 27/12/1995 . Government Decree 66-CP on the collection of irrigation fees, dated 5/6/1962 . Decree 112/HDBT on collection of irrigation fees dated 25/8/1984 (replaces Decision 66-CP) . Government Decree 143/2003/NĐ-CP dated 28/11/2003 detailing the implementation of the Ordinance on Exploitation and Protection of Irrigation systems . Decree 154/2007/ND-CP dated 15/10/2007 amending and supplementing a number of articles of the Government’s Decree 143/2004/ND-CP of 28/11/2003, detailing
314 the implementation of a number of articles of the ordinance on exploitation and protection of irrigation works . Circular 26/2008/TT-BTC of Ministry of Finance dated 28/3/2008 on the guidelines to implement some articles in Decree 154/2007/ND-CP . Decree 115/2008/ND-CP dated 14/11/2008 amending and supplementing a number of articles of the Government’s Decree 143/2004/ND-CP . Circular 36/2009/TT-BTC dated 26/2/2009 guiding a number of articles of the Government’s Decree 115/2008/NĐ-CP dated 14/11/2008 (Replaced Circular 26, 2008) . Circular 11/2009/TT-BTC dated 21/01/2009 on guidelines to implement some articles in Decree 115/2008/ND-CP . Decree 16/200/ND-CP dated 7/5/2005 on the management of investment in construction works and projects
Regulations relating to decentralized irrigation management in different provinces
. Decision 55/2007/QD-UBND dated 9 August 2007 “Regulations on management, exploitation, maintenance of infrastructure in Lao Cai province” . Decision 514/QD_UB dated 14 March 1997 “Regulations on responsibilities and rights in management and exploitation of hydraulic works in Thai Nguyen province” . Decision 01/2006/QD-UBND dated 18 January 2006 “Regulation on decentralized management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works in Tien Giang province” . Decision 173/2004/QD-UN dated 17 September 2004 “Regulation on decentralization in management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works in Ninh Thuan province” . Proposal “Transfer of hydraulic works in Dak Lak province” dated 20 October 2004 . Decision 249/2004/QD-UB dated 6 December 2004 “Regulations on decentralization in management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works in Quang Ngai province” . Decision 37/2006/QD-UB dated 26 July 2006 “Regulations on management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works in Tuyen Quang province” . Decision 25/2005/QD-UBND dated 14 June 2005 “Regulations on management, exploitation and protection of hydraulic works in Hau Giang province” . Decision 57/2006/QD-UBND dated 24 October 2006 “Regulations on decentralization in management and exploitation of hydraulic works in Kon Tum province” . Decision 1572/2005/QD-UBND dated 5 August 2005 on “Regulations on management and exploitation of hydraulic works in Ha Giang province” . Decision 672/QD-UB.HC dated 20 April 2005. “Action plan on PIM development in Dong Thap province” . Decision 2938/QD-UB dated 2 October 2002 “Regulations on management and exploitation of hydraulic works in Son La province”
315 Appendix 5. Mandates and authorities of key actors in irrigation management
Table 1: Tasks and responsibilities of state-owned irrigation management companies
Tasks • Water distribution for irrigation and domestic uses, sign contracts with water users • Implementation of planning, plans, technical norms and standards • Implementation of investment projects • Maintenance and operation of hydraulic systems • Being investment owners in maintenance, upgrading, rehabilitation of hydraulic works • Formulating or involving in the development of operation rules • Data collection, research • Water quality protection • Organizing participation of people in exploitation and protection of hydraulic works • Business registration • Effective use of resources, state capitals • Use capitals, financial budgets, human resources to supply public services • Develop business plans etc
Rights • Receiving financial support in situations of natural disasters (drought, flooding), rehabilitation and upgrading of hydraulic works • Signing contracts with water users • Collecting water fees, water prices and waste water fees • Asking for support from local authorities on local labor mobilization in maintenance, on the protection of hydraulic works, conflict resolutions, • Integrating exploitation of hydraulic works in accordance to approved technical design • Developing organizational structure, human resources, use resources, technologies and facilities for the business etc
(Source: Ordinance 2001, Decree 143 (2003))
Table 2. Tasks, rights and responsibilities of local organizations in irrigation management
Tasks • Water distribution for irrigation and domestic uses; signing contracts with water users • Implementation of planning, plans, technical norms and standards • Implementation of investment projects • Maintenance and operation of hydraulic systems • Being investment owners in maintenance, upgrading, rehabilitation of hydraulic works • Formulation or involvement in the development of operation rules • Data collection, research • Water quality protection • Organizing participation of people in exploitation and protection of hydraulic works Rights • Receiving state financial support in specific situations (drought, flooding); organizations can not collected water fees and in the situation of deficit • Signing contracts with water users • Collecting water fees, water prices and waste water fees • Asking for support from local authorities on local labor mobilization in maintenance, on the protection of hydraulic works, conflict resolutions, • Integrated exploitation of hydraulic works in accordance to approved technical design. (Source: Ordinance 2001, Decree 143 (2003)
316 Table 3. The tasks, authorities and responsibilities in administrations and state-management agencies in hydraulic systems management
Categories Administrative authorities Line ministry agencies (specialized agencies) At Provincial level Provincial People’s Committees responsible for state management in exploitation and protection of hydraulic Department of Agriculture and Rural Development & Department of works at the provincial level hydraulic works • Formulate, direct and inspect the implementation of strategies, planning, plans, policies on exploitation, • Formulate and supervise the implementation of strategies, protection of hydraulic works in province (Decree 143, Ordinance 2001) planning, plans, policies on exploitation and protection of hydraulic • Formulate, guide and organize the implementation of policies, regulations, norms, technical standards on works (Circular 61,2010) hydraulic work exploitation and protection (Decree 143, Ordinance 2001) • Issue and organize the implementation of legal framework, • Formulate, approve, implement investment projects (new investment, rehabilitation, upgrading) (Decree technical norms and standards on exploitation and protection of 143) hydraulic works
• Make decisions on the adjustment of hydraulic work planning, proposals on investment and maintenance, • Decide on the adjustment of planning, investment and upgrading financial plan for IDMCs and WUOs (Ordinance, 2001) projects of hydraulic works
At District level District People’s Council: Office of Agricultural and Rural Development • Make decisions on annual socio-economic plans, undertakings and measures on development of • Formulate and submit DPC’s approvals on decisions, directions, cooperatives and household economic at local, planning and development plans on hydraulic works (law plans, planning 2003) • Issue and organize the implementation of legal framework, plans,
Planning, plans, design District People’s Committees: planning, technical norms and standards on exploitation and • Make decisions on planning in irrigation development at district level protection of hydraulic works
317 • Policy dissemination At Commune level Commune People’s Committees: • Organize and implement planning, plans, programs, projects • Policy dissemination Commune People’s Councils: • Make decisions on measures to implement socio-economic plans (Law 2003)
Peoples’ committees: • Draft local budgets and allocation • Regulate water fees/prices, and local contributions • State budget allocation and management budget Budget People’s councils: decide local budgeting and allocation, readjust budget allocation
management allocation and At provincial level Provincial People’s Committees Department of Agriculture and Rural Development • The functions of management of natural resources and state property (hydraulic works) (Law 2003) • Licensing of water uses and wastewater discharge from/to • Direct and inspect the exploitation and protection of water resources; construction, exploitation and hydraulic works (Circular 61, 2010) protection of medium and small-scale hydraulic works (Law 2003) • Guiding and supervising the implementation of state regulations on • Issue and withdraw permits for wastewater discharge to hydraulic works and other activities in the the exploitation and protection protection area of hydraulic works (Decree 143, Ordinance 2001) • Guiding and supervising the implementation of the PPC regulations • Decide the technical measures (Decree 143) on decentralized irrigation management for medium and small-
Implementation, Operation and management • Control and inspect, conflict resolutions (Decree 143, Ordinance 2001) scale systems
• Approve the proposals on protection of hydraulic works, on the methods to deal with technical problems • or natural disasters (Ordinance, 2001) • Guide, inspect and take responsibility for the construction, Provincial People’s councils: exploitation, use and protection of small and medium irrigation Decisions on the measures of management and use of water resources, hydraulic works environmental projects; protection • Implementing the provisions on the management, exploitation of rivers, streams in the province (Circular 61, 2010)
At district level District People’s Committees: Office of Agricultural and Rural Development • Organizing the protection of medium and small-scale hydraulic works • Organizing the protection of dikes, small & medium-scale works • Management of irrigation networks in district boundary (Clause 98, the Law 2003) • Providing professional instructions to CPCs District People’s councils: Statistics database on water surface • Decisions on the measures of management and use of water resources, hydraulic works environmental • Organizing the implementation of development projects protection • Coordination with relevant agencies to resolve conflicts • Responsible in the evaluation, registration and issuing the permits (Circular 61) At commune level Commune People’s Committees: • Direct the planning, organizing and mobilizing local labor in the protection of hydraulic works • Direct, inspect and supervise the construction of small-scale irrigation works • Inspection of water uses from hydraulic works • Database for the statistics (Circular 61) • Organizing the construction of small-scale hydraulic works (Clause 112, the Law 2003) 318 • Management, inspection and protection of water uses in commune boundary Commune People’s councils: • Decisions on the measures of management and use of water resources, hydraulic works environmental protection • Decisions on measures to implement construction, upgrading infrastructure, facilities at commune (Law 2003) Monitoring and Monitoring construction quality, evaluation and hand over infrastructure (Ordinance 2010) Evaluation (Source: Ordinance 2001, Decree 143 (2003), Law 2003, Circular 61, 2010)