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Official Islamic Policy Under Ayub Khan

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Official Islamic Policy Under Ayub Khan Journal of Political Studies, Vol 18, Issue – 1, 45-60 Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan Era (1958-69) Sarfraz Husain Ansari∗ Abstract The decade of 1960s in Pakistan witnessed modernization under General Ayub Khan, who passionately believed in the progressive-liberal and modernist version of Islam. His broad-mindedness and liberalism towards Islam was explicitly manifested in the official Islamic policy pursued during the first half of his regime from 1958 to 1965 when he governed the country in an authoritarian manner. During these years, the modernization program was implemented through public policies aimed at bringing about a progressive change in the constitutional, legal and social spheres of the country. It was, however, forced as well as highly selective and authoritarian in nature. The military regime pushed its modernization agenda despite opposition and resentment from many sections of the society. Nonetheless, the second half of the regime 1965-69, which was ‘quasi-authoritarian in nature’, saw a reversal of his official policy towards Islam, since his popularity was undermined, and he needed popular support for his regime. The present article explores the modernization measures undertaken during the regime of Ayub Khan, and analyzes the shift in the official Islamic policy in the country. Key-words: Forced modernization, public policy, General Ayub Khan, modernist Islam, opposition Modernization has affected a number of societies all across the globe. In many instances, modernization processes initiated by the states in many countries have been quite rapid and forced. Among the Muslim countries, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, and to some extent, Pakistan are conspicuous examples of forced modernization by undemocratic and repressive regimes. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-48) initiated a program of forced modernization in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the decade of 1920s, Turkey underwent modernization ∗ Author is Assistant Professor at National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad – Pakistan. Sarfraz Hussain Ansari under Mustafa Kamal Ataturk (1881-1938). In the decade of 1930s, Iran witnessed modernization under Emperor Mohammad Reza Shah (1919-1980) (Kamali, 2006). In the decade of 1960s, Pakistan undertook the path of modernization under General Ayub Khan. All these instances of modernization were highly selective and authoritarian in nature. In case of most of these countries, modernization projects were launched by non-democratic governments, since such governments do not need popular support for their public policies. Therefore, modernization programs were forced despite opposition and resentment from many sections of the society. In many countries, military is considered to be the most modern and Westernized state institution. A number of studies have treated the subject of army as a tool of modernization in many traditional and/or developing countries all around the world, particularly when army enters political arena.(Bienen, 2008). Pakistan is not an exception in this regard. Pakistan’s army is also considered to be a modern and West-oriented institution, and it has also seized power in the country quite a number of times. With the exception of the government of General Zia-ul-Haq (r. 1977-88), which witnessed a program of forced Islamization in the country, other military regimes such as those of General Ayub Khan and General Pervez Musharraf have embarked on the course of forced modernization. The speeches and statements of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (d. 1974) manifest his liberal and progressive approach towards the matters of religion. He is said to be a modernist Muslim. In other words, he personally believed in the modernist version of Islam, said to have been propagated and symbolized in South Asia by Nawab Abdul Latif of Calcutta, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Ameer Ali and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. During his regime, Ayub Khan tried to modernize various spheres of the Pakistani polity through public policies. The modernization he envisioned for the country was to be achieved not only through constitutional and legal means, but through social reforms as well. Ayub Khan’s regime can be divided into two distinct phases: the first phase beginning from 1958 to 1965, which can further be sub-divided into two periods. From 1958 to 1962, Ayub Khan governed the country as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and then from 1962 to 1965 as President after the withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962. The first phase of Ayub Khan’s regime was characterized by authoritarian pattern of governance aided by the Martial Law authorities. In this phase, Ayub Khan tried to introduce the modernist version of Islam through public policies. His efforts to modernize the Pakistani society led him to introduce some constitutional, legal and social changes in the country. 46 Forced Modernization and Public Policy, The traditionalists, led by the ulama (religious scholars), vehemently resisted the modernization agenda of the government. The second post-elections phase of his regime, i.e. from 1965 to 1969, represents democratic form of government, though dubbed as ‘controlled democracy’. It saw a reversal in the public policies aimed at modernization, as the modernization agenda was abandoned by the regime. A host of factors were responsible for this reversal. By and large, it was owing to the pressure of various forces, predominantly the religious leaders, who posed a threat to the legitimacy of Ayub Khan’s regime that led the government to reverse its policy. The present study is significant owing to the fact that Ayub Khan’s era, being the first military regime in the country, appears to be distinct in terms of the state policies. It offers an interesting study as one may compare and contrast two diametrically opposed patterns of governance in the same regime headed by the same head of the state. The present paper is an attempt to analyze the features of the public policy aimed at modernization of the Pakistani polity during the Ayub Khan regime. While doing so, it also tries to explore the factors that were responsible for the said shift in the public policy in the second phase of the regime. The present study attempts to address the following questions: What was the personal religious orientation of Ayub Khan? What steps were taken by him to modernise the society implying ‘change’ in public policy under him? What was the reaction of the religious leaders to the state attempts at modernization? Why and how did the changes occurring in the political system of the country render pursuance of the hitherto chalked out line of action impossible? And what were those perceivable threats to the regime, which led to the abandonment of the modernization agenda? 1. Islam, Modernism and Public Policy in Pre-1958 Era: An Overview Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, was a modernist and against theocracy. Similarly, Liaquat Ali Khan was also not in favour of Pakistan becoming a theocratic state (Munir, 1980). The ideas of the first two statesmen also reflected the viewpoints of the majority of Muslim League leadership consisting of modern western educated elite. Owing to their westernized orientation and lack of any background of traditional Islamic learning, the questions of religion did not significantly figure out for them. They generally did not perceive any problem of compatibility between traditionalism and modernism 47 Sarfraz Hussain Ansari regarding the practical matters of religion. However, the traditionalist ulama came to play very major role in politics after independence in 1947 because of their mass appeal. Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), founded in January 1948, was led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani while Jama‘at-i-Islami (JI), established in 1941, was headed by its founder-leader Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. Both JUI and JI along with other traditionalist ulama soon began demanding the introduction of an Islamic system in the country. To them, the notion of Western parliamentary democracy was totally incompatible with the spirit of Islam (Rosenthal, 1965). JUI demanded creation of the office of Shaikh al-Islam and Ministry of Religious Affairs, and appointment of a committee of ulama to draw Islamic Constitution for the country. The modernists, on the contrary, maintain that the ulama were practically ignorant of the complex procedures involved in constitution- making. The antagonism between the modernist and the traditionalists in the first decade after independence was manifested by three factors/events: the adoption of the Objectives Resolution in 1949, the anti-Ahmadi agitation in 1953, and the constitutional debates before the framing of 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. In this regard, in 1949, a Board of Talimat-i Islamiya consisting of ulama was appointed, with the aim to advice on matters, which may arise out of the Objectives Resolution. The Board’s recommendations were, however, rejected as being impractical (Binder, 1963), though its impact on constitution- making was clearly visible on the subsequent Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. The pre-1958 coup era represents the ideological interplay of Islam and political modernism. The traditionalist ulama and modern politicians debated from their respective stands but the focus of their controversy remained within the parameters of politics. The public policy did not focus on the social and cultural aspects of Islam and its compatibility or the otherwise with the contemporary modern times. 2. Ayub Khan’s Personal Orientation and Vision about Islam Ayub Khan was personally believed to be a practicing Muslim, and it is supported by the works and words of many of his close friends and associates. Writing about his own religious background, Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography Friends Not Masters that his father wanted him to have grounding in Islam and Muslim thought (Khan 1960). Col. Mohammad Ahmad in his book My Chief portrays the personal life of Ayub Khan and his interest in the matters of religion.
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