Philip Frankel. Soldiers in a Storm. The Armed Forces in 's Democratic Transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000. xvi + 247 pp. $65.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-8133-3747-0.

Reviewed by Vladimir Shubin

Published on H-SAfrica (April, 2001)

Phillip Frankel, of the Department of Political 'vulnerable' for criticism. For example, Frankel Science, University of the Witwatersrand, has begins this chapter with 'Prelude: Talks about published a book on the most crucial problem of Talks, 1991-1993'. However, in this reviewer's South Africa's transition to democracy, i.e. on the opinion, the 'talks about talks' stage preceded this transformation and integration of the country's period, and talks were conducted through several armed forces. To a large extent Frankel's book is channels from the mid-1980s. Moreover, it was an 'of-spring' of the project on the history of the during the late 1980s when the ANC top leader‐ national armed forces in the period 1990-1996, ship began receiving signals from the SADF high‐ commissioned by the new South African National est echelons on the urgency of a political settle‐ Defence Force (SADF), which however remained ment. (Frankel does write that 'there is some evi‐ 'internal' and therefore inaccessible to a broad dence to suggest informal discussions occurred reading public. Fortunately, however, Frankel had between individuals from the South African mili‐ permission to use material from military archives tary and MK as early as ten to ffteen years before for his 'public' work as well. (p.2)', however he does not disclose the origin of The frst chapter of the book - Negotiation: this claim). So, as to the period in question it Forging the Military Pact - is devoted to the early would be better to call it something like 'Bilateral 1990s when 'theoretically' various military organ‐ Talks', because, in those years direct and publicly isations, but in practice two of them - the South known talks did take place. African Defence Force (and the Department of De‐ In a number of cases, Frankel apparently fence) and , or MK, (and its overestimates the capacity of the SADF to infu‐ 'parent' body - the African National Congress) - ence developments. Thus, he describes how 'the conducted talks about the future of armed forces SADF strategists' discussed 'the comparative costs in a 'new' South Africa. As rich as this part of the and advantages of integrating MK members as a book is, some important points are overlooked or H-Net Reviews group or individually' (p.5) as if it depended on MK had been trained for over four years in a Sovi‐ them, and not on the ANC and MK. et Naval Academy? At the same time it is not clear Frankel correctly notes the 'political astute‐ what Frankel means by 'African standards ' of MK, ness' of MK representatives (p.9) who were not 'at least in the feld of military aviation'(p.22), be‐ just 'professional' but experienced politicians in cause all the ANC pilots, both helicopter and jet, the best meaning of this word with a much broad‐ with the exception of one or two, studied in the er worldview than their SADF counterparts. He USSR. explains in detail how the MK representatives It may be added here that courses of regular were defending their position: 'MK saw [the fu‐ ofcer training in the taken by MK ture of integration] as a genuine merger of forces members were more extensive (and probably, and not the absorption of MK into the SADF.' They more intensive) than those of their new col‐ rightly believed that 'What applied to one party leagues of the former SADF: the term of such should apply to another' and accused SADF com‐ courses in the Soviet military academies was at manders of making 'discriminatory, devious, per‐ least three years, while in South Africa it can be ceptive, and arrogant' judgements. (p.16) as little as six months. It is true that the number of However, at the same time Frankel echoes MK ofcers fully trained in conventional warfare 's propagandist cliches by speaking about was inadequate, however this was not a fault of 'apolitical, technicist professional soldiers in the MK Command but rather of its Soviet counter‐ SADF' who insisted that 'under they had parts. Head of MK Command (and future Minis‐ simply followed the commands of a legally consti‐ ter) Joe Modise several times, well in advance, em‐ tuted political authority' (p.17), as if they did not phasised the need to train an ofcers' corps for know that the apartheid regime was regarded as the future armed forces of a democratic South illegal by the UN and most countries of the world, Africa, but the usual rule of the Soviet military not to mention the majority of the South African was to train foreign personnel for the type of population, who were barred from 'constituting' arms and equipment to be supplied. However, lat‐ that 'political authority'. Frankel apparently for‐ er, in 1986, when that need became obvious in an‐ gets that white South Africans had a choice, albeit ticipation of the radical changes in South Africa, a difcult one - to serve the criminal regime, to the USSR Ministry of Defence had to agree to this. fght against it, or at least to refuse to serve. So to Frankel writes with painstaking details about be 'apolitical' for an SADF soldier was in reality to the lengthy process of negotiation on military defend a criminal policy which was universally matters. In particular, he is correct in his assess‐ regarded as a 'crime against humanity'. ment that the creation of the Sub-Council on De‐ Frankel notes that 'the SADF representatives fence of the Transitional Executive Council was left pleasantly surprised by the level of general supported by both sides, that is MK and SADF, be‐ knowledge about military aviation on the part of cause 'it allowed each military formation to moni‐ their counterparts.' (p.7) This was not the only tor the other while maintaining its internal auton‐ surprise: the level of knowledge by the SADF omy' (p.33). Unfortunately, Frankel fails to add about the MK and the system of its training was that this parity of a kind was exactly what SADF rather pitiful. In the next chapter it is noted that initially wanted to avoid. He calls MK 'the weaker 'the appearance of [MK] cadres with some naval party' (p.35) compared to the SADF, but 'weaker' expertise produced confusion in the SAN' (p. 64). should hardly be used as an equivalent of 'small‐ One could ask here why the much-praised Preto‐ er' and in any case the strength and the weakness ria intelligence could not even detect the fact that of one or another military formation cannot be

2 H-Net Reviews properly measures if it is taken out of the context or fve - MK would inevitably begin to make the of its political ties and popular base. necessary changes to the military pact as circum‐ I fnd the author's claim that each of the 'his‐ stances required, no matter how fne-tuned with‐ toric antagonists' [MK and SADF] 'saw itself as the in a wealth of sealed and signed documents' (p. armed wing of the "victors" in the apartheid 42). It remains to be added that this stage was in‐ struggle' (p.36) rather strange. Perhaps (if we for‐ deed reached in South Africa in about fve year get about their debacle in Angola), the SADF Com‐ time when the former MK members occupied the mand could claim to be 'victorious' to the extent most crucial positions of the overall Head of the they managed to contain the armed struggle in‐ SANDF, Head of the Army, Head of Military Intelli‐ side South Africa at the level of 'low intensity.' But gence, etc. their 'mother' organisation, the National Party The second chapter of Frankel's book is devot‐ Government, far from being able to claim to be a ed to the actual 'integration' of the SADF, bantus‐ victor in 'the apartheid struggle,' had to agree to tan 'armies' and 'Non-statutory forces (NSF)', that the elimination of the very apartheid system it is MK and the Azanian People's Liberation Army had created and upheld for over forty years. The (APLA), the armed wing of the Panafricanist Con‐ same applies to the phrase, uncritically quoted by gress. The title of the chapter, ''Caesarean Section': Frankel from Brigadier Bill Sass's article where The Birth of the South African Defence Force,' is a (after the battle of Cuito-Cuanavale!) 'success' was little strange as the process of integration, albeit named as one of the 'SADF traditions' (p.39). troublesome, was practically bloodless and in any Frankel gives a sober assessment in the con‐ case hardly resembled a surgical operation. As de‐ clusion of this frst chapter. Even if, on the sur‐ tailed as this chapter is, some aspects leave this face, 'the SADF appears to achieve more than it reader a bit puzzled. In particular, it would be surrendered', six years later, 'many of the original good to know in what ways Transkei's leader Gen‐ arrangements so carefully negotiated in eral Bantu Holomisa negotiated sending his of‐ 1993-1994 are in tatters, partly due to rapid cers 'on staf courses to other parts of Africa' (p. democratisation, partly because SADF negotia‐ 54) and to what extend the ANC (and perhaps, tions failed to see past the horizon' (p.40-41). Fur‐ PAC) was involved in this project. (When ther, 'most MK leaders regarded negotiations as a Holomisa approached this reviewer in July 1991 stage in a much more sweeping and longer politi‐ in Durban about the possibility of training them cal process within which the peaceful transition in the USSR, he underlined that some of the ANC to democracy was one facet of a broader project cadres previously trained by Moscow were al‐ that would ultimately be appropriated in the ready at his disposal, i.e. seconded to the Transkei name of the South African people' (p.41). More‐ Defence Forces by MK.) over, they were 'deeply schooled, through a mix‐ Frankel's interpretation of MK involvement in ture of choice and necessity, at the critical inter‐ Angola is rather vague. His phrase 'some MK sol‐ face between military and political afairs in a diers gained experience in conventional warfare fashion that was, with individual exceptions, way as South Africa moved to support various insur‐ beyond the exact comprehension of their SADF gent groups ranged against the de facto Angolan opponents ... ' (p.41) So much for the 'apolitical' government following Portuguese withdrawal af‐ nature of the armed forces! ter 1974.' (p.46) provokes several questions. True, 'All knew deep down,' continues Frankel, 'that MK fghters were engaged in fghting UNITA ini‐ after a diplomatic period of time when the ANC tially, while protecting their convoys, and from had consolidated its power base - be it three years 1983 in a counter-ofensive against UNITA as well.

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However these engagements were not so much tions were, at least at the outset, sufciently poor 'conventional warfare' but 'counter-insurgency' to justify some of the worst MK suspicions. Ade‐ actions. On the other hand, SADF, with the excep‐ quate tents, bedding, and clothing were in short tion of the 'battle of Cuito Cuanavale' and some supply for much of 1994 and each delay tended to other operations in Angola, was also mostly in‐ confrm NSF suspicions. Food was initially poor volved in counter-insurgency and not in 'conven‐ and unvaried, except for that provided to SADF tional warfare'. Besides, for lengthy periods of personnel." (p.74) Hence, there was more than time SADF soldiers were actually performing po‐ once valid reason for 'serious unrest in Wall‐ lice duties, in particular in black townships. mansthal' in October 1994 (p.78). However, it is Frankel writes that 'some 400 MK members' unfortunate that the author does not describe were trained in Zambia, Libya, Tanzania and these developments and the way their were han‐ Uganda where according to him 'the standards' dled by the two sides. difer from 'internationally recognised principles' All in all, the process of integration of various (p.57), but he omits the fact that the training of of‐ forces, often former adversaries, can be called fcers for regular forces was organised for MK in successful. However, in this reviewer's opinion a such famous Soviet establishments as the Frunze political compromise, worked out in the negotia‐ Academy in Moscow. tions prior to the 1994 general election, contained The degree of indoctrination in the 'apolitical' a serious (and painful) handicap for MK soldiers: SADF is well seen in the case when the South they had to ask for amnesty for their very mem‐ African Navy (SAN) command insisted 'that all se‐ bership of the armed liberation movement, as if nior NSF personnel at it bases complete a security the struggle against the apartheid regime was a vetting document, part of which contained refer‐ crime, while actions in defence of the regime in ence to previous Communist party afliations' a the ranks of the SADF, SAP, etc. were regarded as step 'no doubt motivated by the Soviet back‐ 'legitimate'. ground of former MK ofcers'. (p. 69) All in all, the Moreover, belonging to MK is sometimes still Navy, which was supposed to be more 'liberal' in regarded as a 'stigma' in certain spheres, such as South Africa than the Army, behaved as if no radi‐ the 'mainstream' press in post-apartheid South cal changes were required. As the British Military Africa, resulting in the fact that not every MK Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) reported, it member reported his or her involvement. A strik‐ was becoming clear that 'there are elements with‐ ing example of this is the well-known journalist in SAN who not only do not support the integra‐ Peter Wellman, whose underground work for MK tion process but are actively trying to torpedo it'. for many years became known only at his funeral (p. 65) in early 2001. This chapter has many examples of the in‐ The third chapter is devoted to the next stage sults made by the defenders of the illegal regime - the process of transformation of the South about liberation movement members. One must African Armed Forces and the difculties encoun‐ deeply respect the patience of MK soldiers and tered. It becomes clear that if, on the one hand, their commanders which prevented all attempts some MK cadres needed 'bridging' courses, espe‐ to sabotage the process of integration. Frankel cially in technical and administrative felds, on writes: '.. . some MK leaders believed that the the other hand former SADF personnel and espe‐ Wallmansthal AA [assembly area] was a concen‐ cially their commanders should also have had a tration camp where they were to be cordoned pri‐ kind of 'bridging courses' to gain at least some or to an SADF military onslaught ... living condi‐ knowledge of the true history of Southern Africa

4 H-Net Reviews and the place of the apartheid regime within the found in Southern Africa where state borders di‐ framework of international law. The lack of such vide many ethnic groups. courses for the SADF resulted in such scandals as Frankel regards the 'enormous concentration the decision of then SANDF Head General Meiring of weapons' in Southern Africa as 'left over from to hold a 'commemorative parade' in May 1996, the Cold War' (p.165). However, the main feature (two years after the change of government in of developments in the region in the previous South Africa!) on the anniversary of the old Army decades was not the 'Cold War' but the liberation 'operation' in Angola which resulted in the mas‐ struggle, and the main reason for accumulation of sacre of hundreds of Namibians, mostly civilians those weapons was resistance of the racist and in Kassinga. (p.124) colonial regimes (and their overt or covert sup‐ Unfortunately, from time to time it appears as porters in the West) to the inevitable change. if the author unconsciously shares something of Elsewhere, Frankel writes about 'the failure the 'old guard' bias against MK cadres, provoked, of South Africa to determine a foreign policy' (p. possibly by a lack of contacts with them. For ex‐ 166), not bothering to present much evidence. He ample, he writes about the 'accelerated career' of does not hesitate to call Joe Modise an 'unknown the frst SANDF female general, Jackie Sedibe, for‐ quantity' (p.212) (Unknown to whom? For those getting (or not being aware) that she held the im‐ who participated in the struggle or supported it portant post of Head of MK Communications 13 the 'quantity' or, rather, the quality of 'Cde J M,' years before her promotion to this rank. aka 'Cde Thabo More' was well known). Frankel The fourth chapter, 'Guns or Butter,' is devot‐ does not hesitate to put en par military comman‐ ed to the controversial issue of balancing social ders of the apartheid regime and of the ANC when reconstruction and rearmament in South Africa. he writes that 'the old leaders of the SADF and After the collapse of the apartheid regime, a MK, for better or for worse, have escaped being rather strong feeling developed in South Africa brought to justice for their behaviour during the that arms were 'toys for boys' and that instead of pre-transition years' (p.196), again, not bothering buying or producing weapons, money should be to explain what 'behaviour' he has in mind. spend on solving social problems. The proponents Finally, in The Epilogue ('Beyond the Millenni‐ of this view substantiate their position by saying um') Frankel seeks to measure the success of the that there is no threat to a new South Africa from integration and transformation of the Armed outside its borders. Frankel quotes from the draft Forces in South Africa. He tries to be objective White Paper on Defence (one wonders why not but, probably unconsciously, sometimes appears also from the fnal document, adopted in 1996?) to look at matters from the position of an 'apoliti‐ which stated that South Africa 'is not confronted cal' white South African prior to 1990. In particu‐ by an immediate conventional threat to national lar, he claims that 'a career in the military, rela‐ security and doesn't anticipate military aggres‐ tive to other public service, has already ceased to sion in the short-term future' (p.153). However, be seen as a promising path for the socially mo‐ developments of the last decade, and especially bile, the seekers of technological skills, and those the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, show who quite simply seek to serve their country' (p. how quickly the situation can change and how 214) as if before the elimination of the apartheid suddenly a threat can emerge. In the case of Yu‐ system all those 'paths' were not blocked for the goslavia, the pretext for intervention was 'ethnic African majority unless they regarded bantustans confict'; but a similar pretext could be easily as 'their countries".

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Perhaps the faws of this book can be ex‐ in fact unique, contribution to the study of the de‐ plained by the fact that it is based mostly on docu‐ velopments whose importance goes far beyond ments provided by the SADF or BMATT. Docu‐ the borders of South Africa, which makes it is a ments of 'the other side' might not have been ac‐ must for every scholar of Africa. cessible to the author but it is pity that Frankel Copyright (c) 2001 by H-Net, all rights re‐ could not (or had no time to) interview members served. This work may be copied for non-proft of MK (and APLA for that matter). For example, he educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ could have discovered that the 'historical absence thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ of ranking in MK' (p.59) was not absolute, at least tact [email protected]. one could meet some MK members in the uni‐ forms of major in Moscow in 1990-1991. One can point to other weaknesses in the book. It appears that diferent parts of the book were written at diferent times, and the author did not always manage to update the old ones. Among the missing points in Frankel's research is the so-called 'coup plot': three years ago General Meiring accused former MK Chief of Staf General Siphiwe Nyanda, and the then Deputy Minister , and other 'lefties' of nothing short of an attempt to overthrow Mandela! This clumsy attempt to discredit them boomeranged and speeded up the resignation of General Meiring and some of his lieutenants. Another weakness is the 'facelessness' of many of the historical actors. Frankel writes about 'senior black ofcers' or 'par‐ liamentarians', without naming them, just as he does not mention the name of a new Deputy Min‐ ister of Defence, Nozizwe Routledge-Madlala, the frst woman to take such a post in South Africa. Neither is the book free from some minor 'slips of the pen,' such as calling Codesa 'Congress' and not 'Convention' for a Democratic South Africa' (p.2) or saying that MK was legalised in 1991 and not in 1990. It is also not clear what Frankel really means when he writes that (in 1993!) '"Sincere" international observers from the Eastern bloc would be welcome to oversee the process' (p.11) of concentrating MK personnel in assembly areas, since the 'Eastern block' had disintegrated several years earlier. All these comments and critique notwith‐ standing, Frankel's book is an extremely valuable,

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Citation: Vladimir Shubin. Review of Frankel, Philip. Soldiers in a Storm. The Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition. H-SAfrica, H-Net Reviews. April, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5085

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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