Philip Frankel. Soldiers in a Storm. The Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000. xvi + 247 pp. $65.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-8133-3747-0. Reviewed by Vladimir Shubin Published on H-SAfrica (April, 2001) Phillip Frankel, of the Department of Political 'vulnerable' for criticism. For example, Frankel Science, University of the Witwatersrand, has begins this chapter with 'Prelude: Talks about published a book on the most crucial problem of Talks, 1991-1993'. However, in this reviewer's South Africa's transition to democracy, i.e. on the opinion, the 'talks about talks' stage preceded this transformation and integration of the country's period, and talks were conducted through several armed forces. To a large extent Frankel's book is channels from the mid-1980s. Moreover, it was an 'off-spring' of the project on the history of the during the late 1980s when the ANC top leader‐ national armed forces in the period 1990-1996, ship began receiving signals from the SADF high‐ commissioned by the new South African National est echelons on the urgency of a political settle‐ Defence Force (SADF), which however remained ment. (Frankel does write that 'there is some evi‐ 'internal' and therefore inaccessible to a broad dence to suggest informal discussions occurred reading public. Fortunately, however, Frankel had between individuals from the South African mili‐ permission to use material from military archives tary and MK as early as ten to ffteen years before for his 'public' work as well. (p.2)', however he does not disclose the origin of The frst chapter of the book - Negotiation: this claim). So, as to the period in question it Forging the Military Pact - is devoted to the early would be better to call it something like 'Bilateral 1990s when 'theoretically' various military organ‐ Talks', because, in those years direct and publicly isations, but in practice two of them - the South known talks did take place. African Defence Force (and the Department of De‐ In a number of cases, Frankel apparently fence) and Umkhonto we Sizwe, or MK, (and its overestimates the capacity of the SADF to influ‐ 'parent' body - the African National Congress) - ence developments. Thus, he describes how 'the conducted talks about the future of armed forces SADF strategists' discussed 'the comparative costs in a 'new' South Africa. As rich as this part of the and advantages of integrating MK members as a book is, some important points are overlooked or H-Net Reviews group or individually' (p.5) as if it depended on MK had been trained for over four years in a Sovi‐ them, and not on the ANC and MK. et Naval Academy? At the same time it is not clear Frankel correctly notes the 'political astute‐ what Frankel means by 'African standards ' of MK, ness' of MK representatives (p.9) who were not 'at least in the feld of military aviation'(p.22), be‐ just 'professional' but experienced politicians in cause all the ANC pilots, both helicopter and jet, the best meaning of this word with a much broad‐ with the exception of one or two, studied in the er worldview than their SADF counterparts. He USSR. explains in detail how the MK representatives It may be added here that courses of regular were defending their position: 'MK saw [the fu‐ officer training in the Soviet Union taken by MK ture of integration] as a genuine merger of forces members were more extensive (and probably, and not the absorption of MK into the SADF.' They more intensive) than those of their new col‐ rightly believed that 'What applied to one party leagues of the former SADF: the term of such should apply to another' and accused SADF com‐ courses in the Soviet military academies was at manders of making 'discriminatory, devious, per‐ least three years, while in South Africa it can be ceptive, and arrogant' judgements. (p.16) as little as six months. It is true that the number of However, at the same time Frankel echoes MK officers fully trained in conventional warfare Pretoria's propagandist cliches by speaking about was inadequate, however this was not a fault of 'apolitical, technicist professional soldiers in the MK Command but rather of its Soviet counter‐ SADF' who insisted that 'under apartheid they had parts. Head of MK Command (and future Minis‐ simply followed the commands of a legally consti‐ ter) Joe Modise several times, well in advance, em‐ tuted political authority' (p.17), as if they did not phasised the need to train an officers' corps for know that the apartheid regime was regarded as the future armed forces of a democratic South illegal by the UN and most countries of the world, Africa, but the usual rule of the Soviet military not to mention the majority of the South African was to train foreign personnel for the type of population, who were barred from 'constituting' arms and equipment to be supplied. However, lat‐ that 'political authority'. Frankel apparently for‐ er, in 1986, when that need became obvious in an‐ gets that white South Africans had a choice, albeit ticipation of the radical changes in South Africa, a difficult one - to serve the criminal regime, to the USSR Ministry of Defence had to agree to this. fight against it, or at least to refuse to serve. So to Frankel writes with painstaking details about be 'apolitical' for an SADF soldier was in reality to the lengthy process of negotiation on military defend a criminal policy which was universally matters. In particular, he is correct in his assess‐ regarded as a 'crime against humanity'. ment that the creation of the Sub-Council on De‐ Frankel notes that 'the SADF representatives fence of the Transitional Executive Council was left pleasantly surprised by the level of general supported by both sides, that is MK and SADF, be‐ knowledge about military aviation on the part of cause 'it allowed each military formation to moni‐ their counterparts.' (p.7) This was not the only tor the other while maintaining its internal auton‐ surprise: the level of knowledge by the SADF omy' (p.33). Unfortunately, Frankel fails to add about the MK and the system of its training was that this parity of a kind was exactly what SADF rather pitiful. In the next chapter it is noted that initially wanted to avoid. He calls MK 'the weaker 'the appearance of [MK] cadres with some naval party' (p.35) compared to the SADF, but 'weaker' expertise produced confusion in the SAN' (p. 64). should hardly be used as an equivalent of 'small‐ One could ask here why the much-praised Preto‐ er' and in any case the strength and the weakness ria intelligence could not even detect the fact that of one or another military formation cannot be 2 H-Net Reviews properly measures if it is taken out of the context or fve - MK would inevitably begin to make the of its political ties and popular base. necessary changes to the military pact as circum‐ I fnd the author's claim that each of the 'his‐ stances required, no matter how fne-tuned with‐ toric antagonists' [MK and SADF] 'saw itself as the in a wealth of sealed and signed documents' (p. armed wing of the "victors" in the apartheid 42). It remains to be added that this stage was in‐ struggle' (p.36) rather strange. Perhaps (if we for‐ deed reached in South Africa in about fve year get about their debacle in Angola), the SADF Com‐ time when the former MK members occupied the mand could claim to be 'victorious' to the extent most crucial positions of the overall Head of the they managed to contain the armed struggle in‐ SANDF, Head of the Army, Head of Military Intelli‐ side South Africa at the level of 'low intensity.' But gence, etc. their 'mother' organisation, the National Party The second chapter of Frankel's book is devot‐ Government, far from being able to claim to be a ed to the actual 'integration' of the SADF, bantus‐ victor in 'the apartheid struggle,' had to agree to tan 'armies' and 'Non-statutory forces (NSF)', that the elimination of the very apartheid system it is MK and the Azanian People's Liberation Army had created and upheld for over forty years. The (APLA), the armed wing of the Panafricanist Con‐ same applies to the phrase, uncritically quoted by gress. The title of the chapter, ''Caesarean Section': Frankel from Brigadier Bill Sass's article where The Birth of the South African Defence Force,' is a (after the battle of Cuito-Cuanavale!) 'success' was little strange as the process of integration, albeit named as one of the 'SADF traditions' (p.39). troublesome, was practically bloodless and in any Frankel gives a sober assessment in the con‐ case hardly resembled a surgical operation. As de‐ clusion of this frst chapter. Even if, on the sur‐ tailed as this chapter is, some aspects leave this face, 'the SADF appears to achieve more than it reader a bit puzzled. In particular, it would be surrendered', six years later, 'many of the original good to know in what ways Transkei's leader Gen‐ arrangements so carefully negotiated in eral Bantu Holomisa negotiated sending his offi‐ 1993-1994 are in tatters, partly due to rapid cers 'on staff courses to other parts of Africa' (p. democratisation, partly because SADF negotia‐ 54) and to what extend the ANC (and perhaps, tions failed to see past the horizon' (p.40-41). Fur‐ PAC) was involved in this project. (When ther, 'most MK leaders regarded negotiations as a Holomisa approached this reviewer in July 1991 stage in a much more sweeping and longer politi‐ in Durban about the possibility of training them cal process within which the peaceful transition in the USSR, he underlined that some of the ANC to democracy was one facet of a broader project cadres previously trained by Moscow were al‐ that would ultimately be appropriated in the ready at his disposal, i.e.