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Differential and Rectangle Attacks on Reduced-Round SHACAL-1*

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Differential and Rectangle Attacks on Reduced-Round SHACAL-1* Differential and Rectangle Attacks on Reduced-Round SHACAL-1? Jiqiang Lu1??, Jongsung Kim2,3???, Nathan Keller4†, and Orr Dunkelman5‡ 1 Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK [email protected] 2 ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium [email protected] 3 Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, Seoul, Korea [email protected] 4Einstein Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew University Jerusalem 91904, Israel [email protected] 5Computer Science Department, Technion Haifa 32000, Israel [email protected] Abstract. SHACAL-1 is an 80-round block cipher with a 160-bit block size and a key of up to 512 bits. In this paper, we present rectangle at- tacks on the first 51 rounds and a series of inner 52 rounds of SHACAL-1, and also present differential attacks on the first 49 rounds and a series of inner 55 rounds of SHACAL-1. These are the best currently known cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-1 in an one key attack scenario. Key words: Block cipher, SHACAL-1, Differential cryptanalysis, Am- plified boomerang attack, Rectangle attack ? A shortened version of this paper was published in Proceedings of INDOCRYPT2006 — The Seventh International Conference on Cryptography in India, Kolkata, INDIA, Rana Barua and Tanja Lange (eds), Volume of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp., Springer-Verlag, 2006 ?? This author as well as his work was supported by a Royal Holloway Scholarship and the European Commission under contract IST-2002-507932 (ECRYPT). ??? This author was financed by a Ph.D grant of the Katholieke Universiteit Leu- ven and by the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Gov- ernment(MOEHRD) (KRF-2005-213-D00077) and supported by the Concerted Re- search Action (GOA) Ambiorics 2005/11 of the Flemish Government and by the European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract IST2002507932 ECRYPT. † This author was supported by the Adams fellowship. ‡ This author was partially supported by the Israel MOD Research and Technology Unit. 1 Introduction In 2000, Handschuh and Naccache [10] proposed a 160-bit block cipher SHACAL based on the compression function of the standardized hash function SHA-1 [21]. In 2001, they proposed two versions, known as SHACAL-1 and SHACAL-2 [11], where SHACAL-1 is the same as the original SHACAL, while SHACAL-2 is a 256-bit block cipher based on the compression function of SHA-256 [22]. Both SHACAL-1 and SHACAL-2 were selected for the second phase of the NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption) project [19]; however, in 2003, SHACAL-1 was not recommended for the NESSIE portfolio because of concerns about its key schedule, while SHACAL-2 was finally selected as one of the NESSIE finalists. Since SHACAL-1 is the compression function of SHA-1 used in encryption mode, there is much significance to investigate its security against different cryptanalytic attacks. The security of SHACAL-1 against differential cryptanalysis [2] and linear cryptanalysis [18] was first analyzed by the proposers. Subsequently, Nakahara Jr. [20] conducted a statistical evaluation of the cipher. In 2002, Kim et al. [16] presented a differential attack on the first 41 rounds of SHACAL-1 with 512 key bits and an amplified boomerang attack on the first 47 rounds of SHACAL-1 with 512 key bits, where the former attack is due to a 30-round differential char- acteristic with probability 2−138, while the latter attack is based on a 36-round amplified boomerang distinguisher (see Table 3 in Appendix A for the two dif- ferentials), which was conjectured by the authors to be the longest distinguisher (i.e., the distinguisher with the greatest number of rounds). However, in 2003, Biham et al. [5] pointed out that the step for judging whether a final candidate subkey is the right one in the amplified boomerang attacks presented in [16] is incorrect due to a flaw in the analysis on the number of wrong quartets that sat- isfy the conditions of a right quartet. They then corrected it with the fact that all the subkeys of SHACAL-1 are linearly dependent on the user key. Finally, by converting the Kim et al.’s 36-round boomerang distinguisher to a 36-round rectangle distinguisher, Biham et al. presented rectangle attacks on the first 47 rounds and two series of inner 49 rounds of SHACAL-1 with 512 key bits. These are the best cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-1 in an one key attack sce- nario, prior to the work described in this paper. Other cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-1 include the following related-key attacks, which require two or four (related) keys: In 2004, Kim et al. [15] presented a related-key rectangle attack on the first 59 rounds. In 2005, Hong et al. [12] presented a related-key rectangle attack on the first 70 rounds. Most recently, Dunkelman et al. [8] presented a related-key rectangle attack on the full 80 rounds of SHACAL-1. Amplified boomerang attack [13], rectangle attack [3], and related-key rect- angle attack [6,12,15] are all variants of the boomerang attack [23]. As a result, they share the same basic idea of using two short differentials with larger prob- abilities instead of a long differential with a smaller probability. But, different from amplified boomerang attack and rectangle attack, related-key rectangle at- tack uses related-key differentials, which requires an additional assumption that the attacker should know or can choose the specific differences between one or two pairs of unknown keys. This additional assumption makes it very difficult or even infeasible to be conducted in most cryptographic applications, though cer- tain current applications may allow for related-key attacks [1], say key-exchange protocols [14]. In this paper, we exploit some better differential characteristics than those previously known in SHACAL-1. More specifically, we exploit a 24-round differ- ential characteristic with probability 2−50 for rounds 0 to 23 such that we con- struct a 38-round rectangle distinguisher with probability 2−302.3. Based on this distinguisher, we mount rectangle attacks on the first 51 rounds and a series of inner 52 rounds of SHACAL-1 with 512 key bits. We also exploit a 34-round dif- ferential characteristic with probability 2−148 for rounds 0 to 33 and a 40-round differential characteristic with probability 2−154 for rounds 30 to 69, which can be used to mount differential attacks on the first 49 rounds and a series of inner 55 rounds of SHACAL-1 with 512 key bits, respectively. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the SHACAL-1 cipher, the amplified boomerang attack and the rectan- gle attack. In Sections 3 and 4, we present rectangle and differential attacks on the aforementioned reduced-round versions of SHACAL-1, respectively. Section 5 concludes this paper. 2 Preliminaries 2.1 The SHACAL-1 Cipher SHACAL-1 [11] uses the compression function of SHA-1 [21], where the plaintext enters the compression function as the chaining value, and the key enters the compression function as the message block. Its encryption procedure can be described as follows, 1. The 160-bit plaintext P is divided into five 32-bit words A0||B0||C0||D0||E0. 2. For i = 0 to 79: Ai+1 = Ki ROT5(Ai) fi(Bi,Ci,Di) Ei Wi, Bi+1 = Ai, Ci+1 = ROT30(Bi), Di+1 = Ci, Ei+1 = Di. 3. The ciphertext is (A80||B80||C80||D80||E80), 32 where denotes addition modulo 2 , ROTi(X) represents left rotation of X by i bits, || denotes string concatenation, Ki is the i-th round key, Wi is the i-th 1 round constant, and the function fi is defined as, f = (B&C)|(¬B&D) 0 ≤ i ≤ 19 if fi(B, C, D) = fxor = B ⊕ C ⊕ D 20 ≤ i ≤ 39, 60 ≤ i ≤ 79 fmaj = (B&C)|(B&D)|(C&D) 40 ≤ i ≤ 59 1 We note that this is the opposite to Refs. [10,11,21]; however, we decide to stick to the common notation Ki as a round subkey. where & denotes the bitwise logical AND, ⊕ denotes the bitwise logical exclu- sive OR (XOR), ¬ denotes the complement, and | represents the bitwise OR operations. The key schedule of SHACAL-1 takes as input a variable length key of up to 512 bits; Shorter keys can be used by padding them with zeros to produce a 512-bit key string, however, the proposers recommend that the key should not be shorter than 128 bits. The 512-bit user key K is divided into sixteen 32-bit words K0,K1, ··· ,K15, which are the round keys for the first 16 rounds. Each of the remaining round keys is generated as Ki = ROT1(Ki−3 ⊕Ki−8 ⊕Ki−14 ⊕Ki−16). 2.2 Amplified Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks Amplified boomerang attack treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E1 ◦ E0. It assumes that there exist two differentials: one differential α → β through E0 with probability p (i.e., P r[E0(X) ⊕ E0(X∗) = β|X ⊕ X∗ = α] = p), and the other differential γ → δ through E1 with probability q (i.e., P r[E1(X) ⊕ E1(X∗) = δ|X ⊕ X∗ = γ] = q), −n/2 with p and q satisfying p · q 2 . Two pairs of plaintexts (P1,P2 = P1 ⊕ α) and (P3,P4 = P3 ⊕ α) is called a right quartet if the following three conditions hold: 0 0 0 0 C1: E (P1) ⊕ E (P2) = E (P3) ⊕ E (P4) = β; 0 0 0 0 C2: E (P1) ⊕ E (P3) = E (P2) ⊕ E (P4) = γ; 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 C3: E (E (P1)) ⊕ E (E (P3)) = E (E (P2)) ⊕ E (E (P4)) = δ.
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